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We agree with critics that enactive, sensorimotor, and ecological accounts of conscious experience do not in and of themselves fully deflate the hard problem of consciousness. As we noted in our earlier work (Silberstein and Chemero, 2011a), even if an extended account of cognition and intentionality allows us to be rid of qualia by deflating the dualism between intentionality and phenomenal experience , the heart of the hard problem, namely subjectivity, still remains. We argue that in order to resolve or deflate the hard problem the hypothesis of extended consciousness needs to be understood as an expression of neutral monism and can quite naturally be understood that way.
The Moral Foundations of Philosophy of Mind, 2019
It’s been about 15 years already that the idea that cognition is radically embodied has been taking central stage in cognitive science. Radical Embodiment has also gained footing in the field of AI and robotics, largely thanks to the work of Rodney Brooks (Brooks, 1991; 1999; 2002). It has also been suggested that ‘radical embodiment’ should be integrated into neuroscience (see e.g. Thompson and Varela, 2001;). However, despite the fact the radical embodiment has been gaining growing attention, it is still the case that clarity and agreement are missing on what ‘radical embodiment’ even means. As Alsmith and Vignemont note, while “Embodied cognitive science has become an industry… its unity is questionable” (Alsmith and Vignemont, 2012, p. 1). Shaun Gallagher recently suggested that “it may be too early in the game for there to be anything like a unified theory of what counts as embodied cognition” (Gallagher, 2015, 97), but it is certainly not too early to try to get more clarity into this picture, and point to some obstacles standing in the way of such an attempt. This is the central aim of this paper. After discussing radical embodiment and its challenges in sections 1-4, the fifth and closing section presents an outline for a body-centric theory of embodiment. My primary aim in this section, in the context of the present paper, is to exemplify what a body-centric account of cognition might look like, and to point out its main tasks, and the challenges it faces.
ABSTRACT A model of decision and action processes is outlined, and several consequences of this model are developed. The simple plausibility of this model demonstrates that common discussions of decision making and action are constrained within metaphysical frameworks that are at best questionable. The model, in turn, enables a model of free will that is consistent with contemporary physics and likely, from an evolutionary perspective, to have emerged.
Language Sciences, 2015
This is nominally a book review of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content (The MIT Press, 2013). But it is a narrowly focused and highly prejudicial review, which presents an analysis of a contradiction at the heart of the book. Radicalizing Enactivism is a powerful and original philosophical argument against representations in cognition, but it repeatedly endorses an old-fashioned representationalism about language. I show that this contradiction arises from the authors’ unexamined, reflexive adoption of traditional linguistic concepts and terminology, which presuppose a representational interpretation of linguistic capacities and phenomena. The key piece of evidence for this analyses is the separability of Hutto and Myin’s substantive remarks on the ontogeny of language-dependent cognitive capacities, which they explain in terms of scaffolding and decoupling, from the representational gloss on those remarks that they present as if it were simply identical with observed empirical matters of fact. They follow a model laid out in Hutto’s earlier work, in which everyday linguistic activity is understood as instantiating abstract public vehicles with representational content (i.e., sentences which express propositions). I argue that this model is susceptible both to pre-existing arguments against representational theories of language and to a variant of their own ‘Hard Problem of Content’. The take-away lesson from Radicalizing Enactivism is that anti-representationalist accounts of language remain unconvincing - even to radicals like Hutto and Myin - because they have no way of explaining the phenomenal experience of literate speakers, wherein words really do feel like instantiations of abstract forms with determinable semantics. I suggest that anti-representationalists can address this by focusing on the ways in which patterns of attention become stabilized and interpersonally regularized as we learn language.
In Ecological Psychologies as Philosophies of Perception two perspectives on the concept of perception are discussed. The naturalistic perspective, which aims to conceive perception in such a way that it is amenable to naturalistic, scientific explanation is analysed. It is contrasted with the epistemological perspective that constrains the concept of perception such that it might support empiricism, the idea that all knowledge ultimately originates in perception. These two perspectives play defining roles in Ecological Psychology, the approach to the psychology of perception founded by American psychologist James J. Gibson. Three Ecological Psychologies are distinguished. First, there are the works of Gibson himself. Second, there is the branch of Ecological Psychology led by Michael Turvey and Robert Shaw, which is referred to as “Neogibsonian”. And third, there is a modest but growing branch of research that takes its inspiration from Gibson, but rejects aspects of Neogibsonian orthodoxy. These rejections are fuelled by diverging assumptions about naturalism and epistemology, and the roles they play for the concept of perception. The philosophy of Willard V. Quine is used as an analytic tool to assess the concepts of knowledge that shape the epistemological perspectives in the three ecological approaches, as well as to assess their naturalistic credentials. It is argued that the epistemological perspective in the Neogibsonian branch is coloured by a concept of knowledge that comprises the idea of “certainty”. The decisiveness with which this view is advanced by the Neogibsonians entails a demotion of the naturalistic perspective. The third, heterodox branch of ecological research—we focus on the work of Alan Costall, Rob Withagen and Anthony Chemero—attributes more weight to the naturalistic perspective, including considerations from evolutionary biology, and it minimises the role of traditional epistemological concerns. This dissertation aims to contribute to the philosophical support for this “evolutionary-ecological” approach.
Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society
Frontiers in Psychology
Doctoral Thesis presented at the University of Wollongong
Frontiers in Psychology
Frontiers in Psychology, 2021
Frontiers in Psychology, 2020
Proceedings of the 41st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2019
Adaptive Behavior (2019). 27(6), 363-388., 2019
Indiana University Master's Thesis, 2014
Philosophy of Science, 2008
… : the engagement of mind with the …, 2004
Biology and Subjectivity: Philosophical Contributions to a Non-Reductive Neuroscience, 2016
Frontiers in Psychology, 2020
ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2018, VOL. 30, NO. 1, 6–38, 2018
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2018
Ecological Psychology, 2019
From perception to action to perception in action: a review of Contemporary sensorimotor theory'
A remedy called affordance AVANT Volume III, Issue 2/2012 (October-December). ISSN: 2082-6710. ISBN: 978-83-931671-7-3., 2012