‘Cold War in one country’: Soviet involvement in the 1975-1991 Angolan Civil War 0900560 Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree M.A. (SocSci) (Honours) Central and East European Studies University of Glasgow March 2013 12, 931 words ‘Country’ by John Keane (http://www.johnkeaneart.com/13Angola/Country.jpg, accessed 16/5/2012) 2 “In war, whichever side may call itself the victor, there are no winners, but all are losers” (Chamberlain, Speech at Kettering, July 1938, brainyquote.com) “Next to a battle lost, the greatest misery is a battle gained” (Sir Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, in Jay, 2007:415) 3 Acknowledgements This dissertation would not have been possible without all those who have given me advice, guidance and support. Thank you to all of you, from the bottom of my heart. To my friends, Andy Smith and Vivienne Westland, for helping me make sense of it all, and reading the drafts. To my parents, for spotting mistakes I would have glanced over, and for putting up with my rambling. Yes, I’ll stop talking about it now, promise. To my supervisor, Professor Geoff Swain, for keeping me on the straight and narrow, and helping me improve it. To Alina Yashina who helped me find the relevant clauses in the Soviet treaties. All remaining mistakes are mine alone. Adeus, Angola! 4 Location Map of Angola http://www.nationsonline.org/maps/angola_map.jpg, accessed 9/4/2012 5 Ethnic Map of Angola http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Angola_Ethnic_map_1970.svg, accessed 25/1/2013 6 (Gleijeses, 2002:313) 7 (George, 2005:121) 8 Spread of Foreign Involvement in Angola, 1958-1991 Compiled from a variety of sources by author, all of which are included in the works cited or consulted. Multiple colours indicate changing or divided support, while cross hatch indicate arms sales but no other support. 9 Contents Acknowledgements 4 Maps 5 Contents 10 List of Figures 11 1. Introduction 12 Some History 15 2. Soviet Motivation 20 3. International Relationships 26 4. Assessing Soviet Intervention 30 5. The Negotiated Settlement 35 6. Conclusion 42 Appendix - Chronology 1974-1993 44 Appendix - Tables and Charts 48 References 50 Bibliography 57 10 List of Figures Location Map of Angola 5 Ethnic Map of Angola 6 Military Situation in Angola, mid-November 1975 7 The War in Angola, 1976-84 8 Spread of Foreign Involvement in Angola 1958-1991 9 Figure 1: ‘Castro as a Soviet puppet in Angola‘ 26 Figure 2: “Knuckle-rapping” 27 Figure 3: “Lord Kissinger Needs You” 37 Cuban troop numbers and Soviet military aid to Angola, 1975-91 48 Soviet Military Assistance to Angola 49 Foreign Military Personnel in Angola - 1986 49 11 Chapter One: Introduction “when it comes to Angola there are few solid facts, merely disputed versions of reality.” (Potgeiter, in Cilliers and Dietrich, 2000:225) It is often said that the beginning is a very good place to start. If you can work out when ‘it’ began, that is. This is not always as simple as it sounds, particularly with the kind of war which pits neighbour against neighbour, sometimes even brother against brother. Does one count from the moment violence broke out? From when the atmosphere turned hostile? When the influences which would one day result in the violence were brought together in a limited space? 1975 in Angola represents none of these. The “debilitating no-win fratricide” (Marcum, 1978:211) between the three liberation movements had already begun. 1975 in Angola means independence: the Portuguese Empire has been broken up and Angolans are now free to do as they please. 1975 removes the old colonial masters from Angola, but not the tensions - national, regional, or global which have already affected the power balance in the country. After the Portuguese have gone, the real power struggle begins. The three movements are going to war, and everyone’s invited. What does 1975 mean to the world? Gerald Ford lives in the White House. Leonid Brezhnev rules from the Kremlin. Harold Wilson governs from behind the black door of Number 10. The world has formally been at peace for thirty years, but a war of words and propaganda rages across the face of the planet. Capitalism and Communism are circling each other like prize fighters, trying to spot their opponent’s weaknesses; a global scale ‘Rumble in the Jungle’. The United States of America has withdrawn, humiliated and weakened, from Vietnam and is still reeling from the Watergate scandal. McCarthyism is over, but the mental attitude remains. The USSR is flexing its military muscle, heading towards stagnation and stability at home, seeking advantage abroad wherever it can. South Africa is isolated, an international pariah who taints everything she touches, condemned and berated for apartheid and for refusing to release South West Africa now the trustee mandate has expired. The empires are no more, except for Portugal’s and its days are numbered. Fingers are near the nuclear button, but not about to push. The Doomsday Clock reads nine minutes to midnight (The Doomsday Clock, accessed 21/8/2012), no immediate danger, but the threat remains. In the south west of Africa, in and around Angola, nestled between the Congos and South West Africa, between Zambia and the Atlantic Ocean, forces are gathering which will rip the country and the world in two for the next fifteen years. And it all begins with an ambiguous declaration from the outgoing colonial power. The Angolan tinder box is about to explode. The cold war is about to reach boiling point. 12 What fanned the flames of war in a country five times the size of the UK, but with not even a third of the population (CIA World Factbook, Angola and UK, accessed 24/12/2012)? What ensured that this fight to the death could never be resolved on the battlefield, but had to be resolved around the negotiating table? The answers, which this dissertation seeks to provide and explain, are a mixture of Bismarckian Realpolitik, heady idealism, powerful perception and heart-breaking reality. Despite causing the deaths of at least half a million people (1975-2002, Global Policy, 2000), there is minimal literature addressing the civil war as a whole and none of this asks why negotiation was the only possible method of conflict resolution. This dissertation can therefore be regarded either as one literature review with independent analysis scattered throughout, or as lacking one completely; the author intended the former. For information purposes and to introduce the main actors, a brief history of Angola’s twentieth century follows this introduction. After addressing the broad question of why the Soviet Union got involved with the affairs of the ‘Third World’, then narrowing to what drew the communist bear to southern Africa, Angola, and its party of choice - the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Portuguese acronym MPLA) - the question of why diplomats rather than soldiers ended the war will be addressed in the majority of this work. Using a range of evidence, it will be concluded that it was the involvement of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) which underpinned the other influences on the conflict. Without this input, the other forces at work would probably have been arrayed differently, to different degrees, perhaps not even have been involved at all. The relationship between two pairs of external actors in the conflict will be examined as their dynamics affect the evaluation of the war. Firstly, the extent to which Cuba was merely a proxy of the USSR, with no independent motivation for intervening in Angola, rather than an autonomous actor who chose involvement for its own reasons and off its own back. This is relevant because the degree of Soviet responsibility for Cuban intervention affects the scope of Soviet involvement and thus how decisive this role was. Ultimately, can the Soviet Union be seen as the sole or main motivator of Cuban involvement and therefore is this a part of Soviet impact on the Angolan conflict? In addition, the co-operation between the USA and the RSA in the war prior to independence in November 1975 will form a section of the work. South African politicians have claimed - whilst the Americans have denied - that the USA made it known that it would be taken as a favour if South African Defence Forces (SADF) intervened in Angola on behalf of anti-MPLA forces, as the USA was unable to do so. If this is so, and the evidence is mixed although conclusions are possible, then it was the United States which ultimately provoked the escalation of 13 the conflict, not the USSR or her allies, as has been traditionally presented. A re-evaluation of the evidence and factors in the Angolan conflict is due. Ultimately, the Bicesse Accords which brought the war to an end in May 1991 were unsuccessful; the war flared up again for two years in 1992, and again for four in 1998, only ending after the death of the leader of the rebel group, Jonas Savimbi, on 22 February 2002. This underlines that not all causes of the civil war were imported; some were native and personal, enduring long after the superpowers had packed up and gone home. There is a tendency to see every conflict in the second half of the twentieth century purely through the prism of East-West rivalry, the Bear versus the Eagle, but the fact remains that - in all likelihood - Angola would still have been the scene of some conflict after independence from Portugal even if the October Revolution had not happened, if the world was all capitalist or all socialist. The ethnic complexity of what became the Angolan state, the racialist policies of the Portuguese colonialists, the richness of Angolan soil, the proximity to apartheid South Africa, would still be as solid, as real, as they were in the bipolar reality of the cold war world. The superpowers did not create the Angolan civil war but they did prolong it, as this dissertation will argue. They exploited it for their own ends, yes, but that tension, that seed of conflict, which they nurtured, was a product of hundreds of years of colonialism, ethnolinguistic intricacies, and big personalities. The intervention of foreign powers merely served to prolong the conflict, rather than assist in its resolution; this is the contention of this dissertation. The conclusions presented in this dissertation have been arrived at primarily from secondary sources. This is a reflection of the fact that the Angolan and Cuban archives are closed to researchers, except for a select few in the case of Cuba, the author’s inability to read Russian fluently, and the absence of published oral histories. In addition to this, time allowed has eliminated the possibility of recording oral history from players in the conflict as they are concentrated in countries not easily accessible to the undergraduate researcher. Further to this, the policy of newspapers charging for online access to archives has ruled out using their articles for contemporary popular reaction to the events described within these pages. There is considerable secondary literature on the issue of the Soviet Union in the Third World as a whole and in various regions, including southern Africa, and this has been utilised. Accounts of the Angolan civil war are also available although not comprehensive and flawless. The final source used, which touches upon primary sources, is that of published oral histories of military and civilian personnel who witnessed the events which are under consideration. Further investigation into the 1975-1991 civil war is 14 necessary to reach a conclusive understanding of the events which tore Angola in two, incorporating those sources not included in this dissertation. A word on country names and terms. Until 1977, there were two countries - bitter rivals - with the name Congo, differentiated by the addition of the name of their capital afterwards, CongoBrazzaville and Congo-Léopoldville. This changed with the Mobutu regime, which decided to remove the traces of Belgian colonisation and ‘Africanise’ many place names within CongoLéopoldville, creating Zaire with Kinshasa as its capital. To prevent confusion, Zaire and Kinshasa will be used throughout this dissertation, even when referring to the period prior to this name coming into existence. Today, Zaire is named the Democratic Republic of Congo, and CongoBrazzaville is the Republic of Congo. Additionally, as the name Namibia was used by the international community to refer to South African-occupied South West Africa during the period under discussion, this term will appear throughout. Finally, a note on ethnic groups in Angola. There are three main groupings, with many smaller ones associated with or marginalised from the rivalry between the big three. Each of these three formed the basis for one of the major liberation movements and so deserve an early introduction. These are the Mbundu group, based around Luanda and extending back from there to the Zaire border; the Bakongo, ranging above the Mbundu lands towards and over the Zaire border, the old Kongo kingdom; and the Ovimbundu, directly to the south of the Mbundu and in the region surrounding Benguela (Guimarães, 2001:33). Some History The Portuguese arrived in Angola in the 1480s and returned to “establish permanent relations” with the Kongo kingdom in 1485 (Marcum, 1969:1). Trading posts were established along the coastline, with Luanda established as the capital in 1575 (George, 2005:56). Until the second half of the nineteenth century, trade was the main, if not only, interaction between the Portuguese settlers and native inhabitants, manifesting itself for the most part in the slave trade. “[O]ver three million” people were “exported” (Marcum, 1969:2) from what would become Angola across the Atlantic Ocean to the plantations in Cuba and other countries. 1845 to 1860 saw “colonial expansion” (Marcum, 1969:2) as the Portuguese crept inland, although this process was never fully completed. By the early twentieth century, “effective occupation was limited to the coast and some adjoining plateau areas, and, in spite of more than 300 years of involvement in Angola, Portugal probably controlled less than one tenth of the territory within the colony’s official borders” (Marcum, 1969:3). In the 1930s, Antonio Salazar established the “conservative and 15 ultranationalist Estado Novo” (Marcum, 1969:5) in Lisbon and the racial divisions in the African Lusophone colonies were formalised, keeping the white population in a privileged separation from the mestiços and assimilados and the mass of peasant and worker inhabitants (Heimer, 1979:11-12). “In 1958 all of Portugal’s overseas possessions were officially incorporated into the Portuguese state” (Marcum, 1969:5), marking the creation of one indivisible state which spanned two continents, and paving the way the following decade for the grant of citizenship to all inhabitants regardless of previous status (Heimer, 1979:13). No longer a colony, Angola was now an overseas province of Portugal, setting the stage for a war of independence which would last for over a decade The year 1961 saw Angola explode onto the world stage, as uprisings rocked the province. Uncoordinated rebellions sprang up in all parts of Angola, provoking brutal reprisals and guerrilla warfare (Weigert, 2011:23-24). “[T]he control and repression of dissent” (Guimarães, 2001:7), ensured Portuguese rule but several clandestine groups had managed to emerge, organise and survive oppression and arrest. Three of these remained post-independence to form the two sides of the civil war so their origins are of interest. The MPLA - eventual winner and still ruler of Angola - was founded in December 1956 (Marcum, 1969:28), a merger between “the young Marxists of the former Angolan Communist Party, the leaders of the PLUA [Partido da Luta dos Africanos de Angola], and other patriots” (Andrade, in Marcum, 1969:28). Initially based in Conakry, Guinea, the MPLA relocated to Kinshasa in 1961-2 (Guimarães, 2001:58; James III, 2011:47) until 1963 when the recognition of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (Portuguese acronym GRAE, see below) by Zaire resulted in the MPLA being evicted across the River Congo to Brazzaville, where it remained until independence (Guimarães, 2001:65-66, 71-72; James III, 2011:48). The USSR began supporting the MPLA in 1958 (Maxwell, 1988:13), with financial aid beginning in 1961 through the “ “International Trade Union Fund for assistance to left workers’ organisations, attached to the Romanian Council of Trade Unions” ” (Shubin, 2008:8-9). Cuba’s help was committed to the MPLA in early 1964 when the movement’s president Agostinho Neto met Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara in Brazzaville while he was trying to assist Congolese rebels (Ottaway and Ottaway, 1986:101). Although the alliance experienced times of relative strength and weakness, the Cubans would remain loyal to the MPLA for the next 27 years. 16 Originally founded to restore the old Kongo kingdom which was divided between Angola and Zaire (James III, 2011:42), the Union of the Northern Peoples of Angola (Portuguese acronym UPNA) dropped the ‘N’ to become a national, if Bakongo focussed, liberation movement in 1958 (Marcum, 1969:83). Led throughout by Holden Roberto from exile in Kinshasa, the UPA joined with several smaller movements originating in non-Bakongo ethnic groups to form the FNLA in March 1962 (James III, 2011:44). This front then formed the GRAE in April 1962 (James III:2011:44) which was recognised by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as the only legitimate - and thus supportable - “organization [sic] fighting for Angolan national self-determination” (Guimarães, 2001:65). “Roberto did receive some covert American assistance in the form of money from the ... [CIA] from 1962 until about 1969 when he was put on a modest retainer” (Marcum, 1978:17), although Roberto denies receiving financial assistance from the CIA (George, 2005:12, footnote 306). The Soviet Union refused to assist the GRAE and continued to fund the MPLA (Marcum, 1978:20). A year after the GRAE came into existence, its Foreign Minister, an Ovimbundu named Jonas Savimbi, resigned in protest against a wide range of “charges” including “the nepotism and despotism of Roberto’s leadership” at a conference in Cairo (Guimarães, 2001:78). The GRAE faded away and Savimbi travelled for two years searching for another movement to support. Initially drawn to the MPLA before even joining the FNLA, it still didn’t suit him (Marcum, 1978:160-161). His travels turned into fundraising drives for a new movement of his own creation and, in March 1966, at the Muangai Conference in Moxico province, Angola, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Portuguese acronym, UNITA) was born (Marcum, 1978:160). The MPLA’s opponent for the next 36 years had arrived. UNITA and the FNLA quickly agreed to focus their efforts on the MPLA rather than on each other and it was this third liberation movement which fast became the main enemy in the war of independence, surpassing even Portugal, the colonial power (Minter, 1994:19; Marcum, 1978:211). There is some evidence, although it seems to be inconclusive, that Savimbi collaborated with the Portuguese forces, handing over intelligence on the location of MPLA units in return for equipment and being left alone. The allegations never entirely went away and would be used by the MPLA as reason to distrust Savimbi in negotiations around the time of Angolan independence. The war in Angola - added to simultaneous revolutions in Portugal’s other African provinces of Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe - helped motivate the Armed Forces Movement (Portuguese acronym MFA) which overthrew Salazar’s successor Caetano in the Carnation Revolution on April 25, 1974 in Lisbon (James III, 2011:41). General Spínola, who took Caetano’s 17 post as Prime Minister, “took no steps toward beginning the decolonization [sic] process” (James III, 2011:56). This was a factor in the deposition of Spínola and the new leader - Francisco da Costa Gomes, who had MPLA sympathies (James III, 2011:54) - accelerated decolonisation. Independence for Angola was scheduled for 11 November, 1975, 400 years to the day since the founding of Luanda (George, 2005:56). But who would rule in place of the Portuguese? Attempting to remain out of intra-Angolan strife, Lisbon refused to hand power to one movement at the expense of the others and, eventually, an agreement for a transitional, coalition, appointed government to govern until elections at the end of October 1975 was signed at Alvor, the Algarve, in January 1975 (James III, 2011:55). A variety of factors, including external supporters’ determination to place ‘their’ movement in the best position possible and inter-movement rivalry meant that, two months later, the Alvor Agreement was not worth the paper it was written on. The situation steadily deteriorated into open war and, by August, Portugal had lost control of Angola (George, 2005:59). In September, the Soviet Union stepped up arms shipments to the MPLA, the Cubans sent hundreds more military advisors, the US provided CIA operatives to advise the FNLA, Zaire prepared to invade and the RSA added troops to the patrol stationed on Angolan soil since August 8 (George, 2005:62). RSA Operation Savannah crossed the Angolan border with Namibia in October 1975 in support of UNITA (George, 2005:68), triggering the massive Cuban Operation Carlota intervention (George, 2005:278) and global condemnation of the RSA. The internationalisation of the Angolan conflict, the ideological aspect it took on, and sheer determination ensured that it would not end for decades. In what was termed the ‘second war of independence’ by the MPLA (Heimer, 1979:80), the three sides battled it out until February 1976 when the FNLA was in tatters, UNITA was defeated and the South African forces had been sent back over the border into Namibia. The war halted temporarily. South Africa regrouped, aided UNITA and soon the conflict had roared back into life, more violent and unpredictable than before. The thousands of Cuban troops were reinforced, instead of being withdrawn, and arms supplies from the Soviet Union continued. The two sides tussled until the end of the decade, unable to inflict a resounding military defeat on their opponent, nor bring themselves to negotiate their way out. Castro’s pride and prestige forbade a Cuban admission of the impossibility of victory on the battlefield and the abandonment of his ally to the probable fate of South African conquest. The RSA’s refusal to leave Angola before the Cubans locked the two into an self-perpetuating cycle of fighting and talking that neither believed would succeed. In 1981, the new American President Reagan’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, 18 began pursuing a policy of ‘constructive engagement’ with South Africa (George, 2005:172), and confirmed ‘linkage’: that the Cuban withdrawal from Angola would be linked with South African withdrawal from Namibia. The policy was instantly condemned by the MPLA and its allies, arguing that the two cases were too different to be linked in such a simplistic way (George, 2005:172). Crocker insisted and, despite the tension between the US and Angola caused by the repeal of the Clark Amendment, American mediation - with Portuguese and Soviet support - did succeed in bringing about a general ceasefire in the New York Agreement in 1988 before the Bicesse Accords in May 1991 papered over the political differences between the warring sides. A detailed chronology can be found in the Appendix, but the trend which occurred throughout the period is essential for determining the importance of the varying factors in the war. Once the participants accepted that the outcome was not going to be decided on the battlefield but around a negotiating table, each side concentrated on ensuring that they - not their opponents - were in the best position to negotiate with strength. Not seeking to win, but only to “ ‘force the other party to come to terms’ ” and ensure that “ ‘the stalemate ... hurt mutually’ ” (Pazzanita, 1991:100). It would be this ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ which brought each side to the table and kept them there. 19 Chapter Two: Soviet Motivation “a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing” Neville Chamberlain, 27th September 1938, “on Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland” (in Jay, 2007:80) The Soviet Union was the first to become involved in Angola’s politics. Moral support for the MPLA began as early as 1958 and financial support began in 1961. If the CIA gave financial support to the FNLA, it began only in 1962. So why did the Soviet Union get involved? Dealing with Soviet motives for involvement in conflicts outside its borders, beginning with those in the Third World as a whole, before narrowing in stages to why the USSR chose to support the MPLA in their campaigns to liberate Angola from colonial domination and then against internal dissent. At the outset, it is worth remembering that there was no declaration of aims and methods from the Soviet Union regarding the Third World, Southern Africa, Angola, or the MPLA. These can “be inferred from the USSR’s behaviour” (Albright, 1981:211) but this is not foolproof. Actions may not have the desired effect or may be implemented ineffectively or the coveted opportunity may not arise (Albright, 1981:211). Furthermore, “[t]he nature of the subject is such that few totally reliable sources exist, and even some normally credible sources must be treated with caution” (Porter, 1984:3), rendering it very difficult to determine with accuracy the motives behind Soviet actions. The atmosphere of suspicion and tentative co-operation which prevailed during the Cold War period - when the majority of the literature was written - will also impact upon the approach taken to Soviet motives by scholars, and this should not be forgotten. With this in mind, the possible motives for Soviet involvement in the Third World will now be explored, using examples of their relevance in the Angolan case. Within the considerable literature on Soviet motives in the Third World, there are six main causes discussed: ideology, opportunity, status as a world power, military interests, economic possibilities, and the reconfiguring of access and influence away from both the West and China and toward the Soviet Union. Each of these will be examined in turn, helping build to the conclusion that it was combinations of these which resulted in Soviet engagement with the Third World. Each motive leads to and is derived from other motives; thus they cannot be viewed in isolation. The reason given by the USSR is ideology: liberation from colonialism and capitalism is connected. Lenin mentioned this link between “the revolutionary struggle of the working class and the situation of the oppression of the colonial people” (Pick, 1981:4) in 1920 at the Comintern Conference, and proclaimed that the USSR was “ a “natural ally” ” (Whelan and Dixon, 1986:7) of the Third World. 20 It was not until the Khrushchev years, however, that the Soviet Union began to assist forces in the Third World fighting against colonial regimes. Khrushchev declared it the “duty of all internationalists to” help peoples “forced to rise in armed struggle” against colonialism (Khrushchov, 1964:22) and named the Third World continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America “the most important centers [sic] of revolutionary struggle against imperialism” (Khrushchev, 1961:31). The 1977 Constitution of the USSR vowed to continue “supporting the struggles of peoples for national liberation” (Constitution of the USSR, 1977, Chapter 4, Article 28). A “Marxist historical analysis of historical trends in Africa and Asia” predicted progress from colony through several intermediate steps would lead to the dominance of the communist party (Westad, 2005:203). It would, therefore, seem logical for professed Marxists to do what they could to speed up the process and “further the progress of Marxist-Leninist ideology” (Strategic Survey, 1977:64) at the expense of capitalism. Bissell remarks that “the emergence of indigenous Marxist-Leninist policies in the African states” was believed by some within the Soviet leadership to be a method to extend “Soviet global influence” (1981:2), something implied by the rest of the literature but not explicitly stated. This extension of Soviet influence through the spread of Marxism-Leninism is based upon the assumption that new Marxist-Leninist states would look to the USSR for guidance, leadership, support and side with the Soviets against non-socialist states. History does not show this to always be the case: the survival of socialist regimes in Yugoslavia and China following Stalin’s break with Tito and the Sino-Soviet split testify to the fact that socialism does not equate with supporting the Soviets. Ideology’s influence on foreign policy was not consistent. In the early 1960s and late 1970s, the direction of policy took a pragmatic turn, placing Soviet self interest at the top of policy considerations. “ “No longer, in short, would the USSR pursue revolutionary willo’-the-wisps; instead, it would select countries for courtship on the basis of their intrinsic significance” ” (Albright, 1980:41). As an all-explaining motivation for Soviet involvement in the Third World, ideology is not convincing. Although there can be no doubt that it proved useful for window dressing, ideology alone cannot account for the degree of commitment and the amount of resources the USSR poured into the Third World during the latter half of the twentieth century. Ideological motivation can only be put into practice if there are opportunities for intervention and the material capability to do so; Marxist ideology alone does not manufacture tanks and planes. The most frequent adjective used to describe the MPLA in the literature is Marxist. Quite often this is meant to insinuate that it is due to this that the USSR funded the movement, for example the “Soviet Union always favoured the 21 Marxist MPLA over its rivals” (Klinghoffer, 1981:100). Other authors are less subtle and proclaim that it was “Marxist sympathies” which “attracted” the Soviet Union (George, 2005:447). Further to this, the USSR “viewed the MPLA as the only legitimate liberation organization [sic] in Angola” (Campbell, 1988:94): possibly a reference to the American and South African support supplied to the FNLA and UNITA, respectively, suggesting that the other movements had ‘sold out’ to what the USSR considered imperialist powers. The Marxist leanings of the MPLA undoubtedly helped in the decision of the socialist camp to assist them, this was not the only reason why the Soviets committed money, arms and personnel to the MPLA in their war for independence and then civil war. Opportunity can account for which countries or conflicts the Soviet Union was involved with. Pick argues that “opportunism was built into the concept” of the idea of correlation of forces which played a part in policy decisions (1981:4). Hosmer and Wolfe write of “local requests for support” and the absence of other “great-power patrons” (1983:xviii) as persuading the Soviets to become involved in a conflict, and Clough and Jordan also refer to “opportunities created by local situations” (1986:8). The USSR did not create the conflicts which resulted in a request for help being sent the them, but they did take advantage when they arose. The reason they could take advantage of situations was “the immense expansion of Soviet military and infrastructural capabilities during the late 1960s” (Westad, 1996:21); without this, intervention in the Third World would have been impossible. Quite simply: the Soviets could intervene so did. Reacting to outside requests and events, however, does constrain how far a strategy can be planned. With no control over where and when the next opportunity would arise, “a grand design” for intervention and the extension of influence and socialism in the Third World is “unlikely” (Bissell, 1981:18). It seems probable that the USSR - having decided for other reasons that its involvement in the Third World was desirable - grasped opportunities when they presented themselves. Thus, the opportunistic Soviet Union reacted to events rather than caused them. In selecting the MPLA to support, the USSR was displaying this opportunism: in his memoirs, Karen Brutents, the deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU in the 1980s, states that it was “pragmatic” reasons rather than ideological ones which persuaded the Soviets to support the MPLA: “it was the only national movement ... which waged a real struggle against colonisers” (Shubin, 2008:17). Furthermore, by allying with a movement in Angola which was likely to be successful - at least to a certain degree the USSR “gained ... a route by which it can supply assistance and training to the region’s remaining liberation movements” such as SWAPO and the ANC (Clement, 1985:31), and more 22 potential clients once their struggle was over. To a certain extent, the Soviets can be described as building a future empire of influence through supporting movements before they accede to power. Whether or not this influence becomes reality is another thing entirely. The third possible motivation for the Soviets is expressing their role as a great power. To the Soviet mind, being a world power means it must have “direct Soviet interests” in all parts of the globe and be “part of the game which great powers play” (Pick, 1981:10-11). “[I]nternational involvement” (Strategic Survey, 1977:64) was one means of asserting the status of the Soviet Union and of creating the interests mentioned by Pick. Hand in hand with this go both economic and military interests. In economic terms, the Third World presented the Soviet Union with sources of resources, of which its own reserves would not last forever, and markets to export “a wide variety of equipment, often of indifferent quality,” although the Soviet economy did remain “largely autarkic” (Clawson, 1986:33). Perhaps more important was the military and strategic advantage to having friendly relations with countries all over the world. To ease and facilitate Soviet power projection far from its borders, “access to ports and air bases” in Third World states has “obvious strategic value” as well as enabling displays of “military might to affect the perceptions of selected Third World countries” (Andolino and Eltscher, 1986:74), presumably to persuade leaders to come around to the Soviet perspective. The idea that the Soviet Union became involved in southern Africa in order to obtain military bases and access to “one of the largest and best natural harbors [sic] on the west coast of Africa” in Luanda (Goodman, 1987:53) is perhaps an example of what Albright was referring to when he discussed deducing intent from behaviour (1981:211): the Soviets gained military access, so it is assumed that this was desired or planned. Southern Africa is the “richest and most geostrategically important part of the continent” (Rotberg, 1986:231), sitting as it does astride the Cape of Good Hope, where the Atlantic and Indian Oceans meet, placing it at the centre of the trade network. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that proximity to the sea lanes which follow the southern African coast is considered a motivation for Soviet involvement in the region. Many of the ships which use the route were oil tankers, carrying oil destined for the West; Soviet presence on the coastline could result in “the interdiction of oil-tanker transport” (Klinghoffer, 1984:27). Klinghoffer observes that the Soviets had not harassed oil shipments elsewhere, so why would they do so from Angola (1980:78)? By the same token, the idea of the Soviet navy blocking sea lanes is impractical as it would render the navy “vulnerable to attacks elsewhere” (Mayall, 1981:193), and both Fukuyama and Whelan and Dixon comment that 23 this interdiction would only be possible in wartime (1984:18; 1986:210-211) and could constitute a casus belli in times of peace. As provoking direct war with the US was never on the Soviet ‘to do’ list, this is highly unlikely to be a serious motive for engagement with southern Africa. These motives were denied by the Soviet leadership, claiming ideology as the motivating factor, not what benefits the Soviet Union actually gained through the support. The agreements between the PRA and the USSR demanded later negotiation on reimbursement (USSR, 1976:167), but “Angolan goods and/or ... a freely convertible currency” was specified as the means of payment (USSR, 1976:168). It is, however, doubtful that the gains brought about by intervention in the Third World - whether by negotiated or accidental means - were high on the list of Soviet motivations when considering intervention. It seems far more likely that they were an added bonus, not a primary motivating factor. The most potent during the Cold War was the desire to prevent or contain Western and Chinese influence within the Third World. After ideology, this is the reason most academics cite as rationale for Soviet intervention. Rivalry between East and West - beginning with “the division of the political forces operating on the international arena into two major camps”; one led by the US, the other by the USSR (Zhdanov, Cominform, 1947) almost straight after World War Two - is no news to anyone with knowledge of the Cold War. The Marxist belief that capitalism was running out of time as the dominant ideology and the Western view that socialism had to be stopped at all costs obviously led to tensions as they could not both be right. Each then set out to prove their opinion was correct. Competition over the allegiance of the newly independent states - ensured by supporting the liberation struggle - was an expected consequence of this antagonism. Following the Sino-Soviet split over the course of the 1960s and beyond, the Soviets viewed the Chinese as an alternative source of support for liberation movements and sought to prevent this becoming reality, or at least having any hold over newly created countries (Legum, 1982). By the time of the Soviet decision in 1974-5 to support the MPLA with large amounts of materiel and some personnel, China’s training role for the FNLA had become “A determining factor” (Legum, 1984:20). This was compounded by both Chinese and American support for both the FNLA and, after the USSR had turned him down, Savimbi’s UNITA (Shepherd, Jr., 1979:49; Guimarães, 2001:176). The SinoSoviet conflict and the Cold War were therefore imported into the Angolan hostilities, adding an extra facet of competition against ideological rivals. Soviet “prestige” demanded that a movement supported by the Chinese could not be allowed to win (Mayall, 1981:199). It must not be forgotten that the reason for the hostility between the West and the Soviet Union was, at its most basic, 24 ideology; capitalism versus socialism-communism. Competing versions of socialism provided the basis for the Sino-Soviet split. The all-pervading nature of ideology is at the foundation of all other motivations for Soviet intervention in the Third World. Foreign policy usually has roots in the domestic situation. Daring moves are more common when things at home are bad - witness the Falklands adventure during Thatcher’s premiership - and less frequent when the home front is stable. The 1970s was the age of détente, a policy interpreted differently by the two main parties: “the Soviets interpret detente [sic] as allowing them a free hand to assist in any way they chose revolutionary movements ... anywhere in the world” (Rothberg, 1980:7); the Americans disagreed. At the same time as the USSR was carrying out a liberal interpretation of détente, Brezhnev was coming under “pressure from militant circles within the Soviet regime for a reaffirmation of the Soviet commitment to revolution” while domestic economics was also on the downward spiral (Gonzalez, 1980:164). The 25th Party Congress was due in October 1975 and Brezhnev needed a foreign policy success in order to prove that détente had not weakened Soviet resolve (de Beer and Gamba, 2000:71). Valenta elaborates on this by broadening the group of people who were to be impressed by Brezhnev’s tenacity, that intervening in Angola would present an image of a strong and loyal leader to the world and that détente was a two-way street, not purely aimed at neutralising the USSR (1978:21). In summary, therefore, none of the seven factors on their own can account for all Soviet action in the Third World. A combination of some or all of them is the only way that those outside the decision-making processes of the USSR can attempt to explain why the Soviets did what they did. Although separated, all rest upon the USSR’s self-identification as a superpower with an historical and moral duty to spread socialism globally and aid the end of capitalism. 25 Chapter Three: International Relationships “You have to accept that countries don’t have friends; they only have self-interest” (Parabat, 1995:48) Figure 1: ‘Castro as a Soviet puppet in Angola’ (Gleijeses, 2002:306) The unique feature of the Soviet and US intervention in Angola was the use made of proxies: the Soviet-Cuban and the US-South African relationships. It was assumed in 1975 and since that the Cubans were acting as the Soviet Union’s “pawn” with no independent motives (Hosmer and Wolfe, 1983:100), perhaps even as “vassals” to a medieval King Brezhnev (Westad, 1996:28), as represented in figure 1 above. Archival materials and memoirs have shown this to be wrong. Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to Washington, DC, at the time, states that Cuban troops were sent “on their own initiative and without consulting us” (1995:362). Adamishin, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister during the late 1980s, confirms that “The Cubans made their appearance in Angola practically without our knowledge, let alone permission” (2000a:228). Furthermore, there is evidence that Soviet military personnel acted on their own initiative to assist Cuban planes who refuelled at Soviet bases in West Africa (George, 2005:79; Shubin, 2007:258). Not only was it Castro’s idea to send ground forces to Angola to fight alongside the MPLA, until January 1976 Cuban planes alone lifted men and equipment across the Atlantic - Brezhnev has refused to assist in August 1975 (George, 2005:65). It appears that around this time - and coinciding with Cuban troop surges later in the war - “Soviet economic subsidies to Cuba increased markedly” (Kempton, 26 1989:45). It has been speculated that this was an economic reward for international solidarity or saving Soviet face, but this cannot be proven beyond doubt with the available information. It is now accepted wisdom that Castro acted on his own initiative to assist his friend Neto in autumn 1975. There is one incident in May 1977 which underlines the independence of thought between the USSR and Cuba: the Nito Alves coup. This was a dispute within the MPLA, with Alves “an advocate of closer ties to the Soviet Union” (Marcum, 1986:19). Alves’ supporters schemed to free him from prison and then to overthrow the Agostinho Neto leadership. The Soviet and Cuban embassies knew in advance of these plans, yet neither warned Agostinho Neto (Marcum, 1986:19). While the Cubans actively defended the attacked MPLA Politburo and crushed the coup attempt (Gaspar, 1988:51), the Soviets “simply let matters run their course” (George, 2005:131). A puppet could not have opposed its master. Whether out of socialist solidarity, personal friendship, the Angolan ancestry of many Cuban former slaves, Cuban initiative saved the MPLA from annihilation in 1975. Figure 2: “Knuckle-rapping” (Gleijeses, 2002:336) Less unanimous is scholarship on the American relationship with the RSA. South African politicians are adamant that Henry Kissinger - then US Secretary of State - made it known that if the SADF were to invade Angola in support of the FNLA and UNITA, that would be much appreciated. Through the Clarke Amendment to the 1976 Defense Budget Bill, Congress had tied 27 the hands of the Ford Administration, preventing all US aid to Angola, and Kissinger opposing the Soviets as figure 2 suggests he desired to. There is “no smoking gun” (Gleijeses, 2002:299) which definitively proves this encouragement took place. There is, however, considerable circumstantial evidence which suggests it to be possible and likely. Firstly, even after he left office and apartheid was dismantled, Botha - RSA Prime Minister from 1978 - insisted that the RSA had been encouraged by the USA/Kissinger to invade Angola to “ “assist UNITA” ” (senior RSA official, in Gleijeses, 2002:298) because the Americans could not do it themselves. Additionally, Stockwell Chief of the CIA Angola Task Force - states that he “saw no evidence that the United States formally encouraged” the RSA to join the Angolan conflict (1978:186). The fact that he had to differentiate between formal and informal suggests that there was indeed some of the latter, otherwise he would not have needed to qualify which kind of encouragement he meant. Thirdly, when Kissinger first met Botha after Operation Savannah, he said that he owed Botha an apology (Daniel, 2009:42). According to the South Africans, the plan hatched by the US would involve an invasion by the RSA, swiftly followed by American material aid. The second stage never happened (Bridgland, 1990:11-12). In reality, when the incursion into Angolan territory was exposed by a journalist in November 1975, US condemnation of the RSA’s actions was loud and outraged. To quote Botha once more, the Americans had “left us in the lurch” (RSA parliamentary debate, in Gleijeses, 2002:299). The US vehemently denied that they were involved, so it became a case of American word versus South African. The RSA had very little to gain by slinging mud at the US: suffering under arms and trade embargoes, she needed all the friends she could get; false accusations would be counterproductive. President Ford made an intriguing statement on a visit to China in December 1975. Completely out of context and unnecessarily, he denied the role of the US in the South African invasion of Angola, stating that the RSA “ “have taken a strong stance against the Soviet Union. And they are doing that totally on their own, without any stimulation by the United States” ” (from Memorandum of Conversation, in Shubin, 2008:279). Perhaps the guilt of betraying a loyal ally was playing on his mind. Finally, there is evidence from White House files that the US traded “nuclear reactors” for South African involvement to “help them bring about a solution to the Southern African problems” (Central Files, Subject Files TA3/CO135-157, cited in van Wyk, 2009:65). This suggests that the encouragement went beyond suggestion of mere gratitude and had practical rewards, although this has not been corroborated. Against all this admittedly circumstantial evidence rests solely American denial and even this is not convincing. In an interview with Gleijeses, Joe Sisco, the American Undersecretary of State in 28 1975 allows only that, “with a smile, “while it cannot be demonstrated that the administration explicitly took steps to encourage South Africa’s intervention, it certainly did not discourage it” ” (2002:299). The careful word use and implications read like an underhand confession. The balance seems to tip, therefore, in favour of the RSA acting on American encouragement and then being abandoned and betrayed when the world community disapproved. Or maybe, just maybe, Kissinger grumbled - á la Henry II about Thomas Becket - and the South Africans saw a chance to re-enter the light of open American favour but misunderstood the American Secretary of State’s meaning, in the process totally alienating itself from the international political arena. Historical allegory aside, the gamble taken by the RSA - costing them men, equipment and any remaining political currency - is too large to have been purely based on a single comment taken awry. If the US was supposed to get involved after the initial invasion, that would need some form of conversation, even if it was ‘hypothetical’ or coded. The RSA invasion of Angola seems to be a case of encouragement then betrayal, rather than misunderstanding. This does not mean that the South Africans are absolved of blame and all responsibility for subsequent events is placed on US shoulders. The RSA was and is an independent, autonomous, sovereign state and had its own reasons for invading Angola - primarily SWAPO and ANC camps in Angolan territory - and is therefore accountable for its own actions. The RSA could have said no. Nor does encouragement in 1975 account for operations later in the civil war. Motives other than potential US gratitude kept the SADF in a war which cost South African lives. It is perhaps possible to suggest that South African intervention on the ground would have occurred anyway in Angola, the US merely brought forward D-day. George and Burchett and Roebuck claim that then-considered “moderate Black African presidents” also requested that the RSA launch “a military operation in Angola” (Arnaud de Borchgrave in Burchett and Roebuck, 1977:24). These presidents are “generally understood” (Burchett and Roebuck, 1977:24) to be: Mobutu of Zaire, Kaunda of Zambia, Senghor of Senegal and Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire (George, 2005:71/315), and Burchett and Roebuck confirm these while adding those of Liberia and Tunisia (1977:24). This can only have added to the feeling within the South African leadership that intervention in Angola could only improve their international standing. However influential the African pressure, it can be stated with a degree of confidence that ultimately the US encouraged the fateful invasion of Angola in October 1975, thereby triggering Operation Carlota, prolonging the war and delaying the peace. 29 Chapter Four: Assessing Soviet Intervention “There in this turbulent land, a storehouse of pain and trouble, confused mother of fear, Hell in life.” (quoted in Bridgland, 1990:293) Why the Soviets intervened in Angola in favour of the MPLA has been established, but did they actually make a difference to the outcome? Was it the aid and assistance in all shapes and sizes supplied by the Kremlin which ensured an MPLA victory? Or was it something else entirely that secured a negotiated settlement which kept the MPLA in power? It will be seen from the following pages that, although the MPLA regime depended upon Soviet arms and Cuban combat troops for “survival” (Rothberg, 1980:118), it was South African ground intervention on the side of UNITA which was decisive in determining a negotiated outcome to the civil war. It was the invasion by the SADF which triggered the airlift of Cuban combat troops - code named ‘Operation Carlota’ - and the escalation of Soviet arms shipments. It was the determined South African allegiance to linkage which delayed the diplomatic resolution of the conflict. It was the combination of South African conventional forces and UNITA guerrilla bands which prevented the concentration of MPLA and Cuban troops, thereby preventing a military conclusion. It was the South Africans’ military response to problems at the negotiating table which delayed the latter progressing and prolonged the war. Finally, it was the SADF invasion which legitimised Cuban and Soviet aid to Neto in the eyes of the world. Without the South African intervention the war would have been shorter, less violent and resolved on the battlefield. For the purposes of the remaining chapters, la guerrilla will be used to refer to the practice of unconventional and non-nuclear warfare, and los guerrillos will refer to the practitioners of this method. The main contribution of the USSR to the conflict was to send money and arms to support the MPLA. The table in the appendix details what is known of the value of aid provided by the Soviets, resulting in an estimated debt of £20 billion between the USSR and Angola (James III, 2011:213). There are, however, considerable challenges in estimating the dollar price of Soviet arms. There are no “Soviet official or semi-official data on Soviet arms exports” and details of “all ... arms transactions” are strictly secret (Efrat, 1983:437). Quite simply, the cost of a piece of Soviet weaponry is not known and so must be estimated (Efrat, 1983:437). The study conducted by Efrat into the pricing of equipment bought by the Egyptians demonstrates that Western “assessments ... [are] basically misleading; they underestimate the prices, as well as the total value, of Soviet 30 military aid” (1983:454). It is therefore with caution that these figures are used. The literature is vague itself in defining the difference between aid and arms sales. It is not made clear whether the arms were part of the overall aid figures or not. No matter the financial value of the arms provided, it is without doubt that the arms and money provided by the USSR helped the MPLA’s chances of a favourable outcome to the conflict. These same factors also helped prolong the war, as without them the MPLA would have been unable to fight on against UNITA and the RSA, meaning that “the Angolan war would have ground to a halt years ago” (Bridgland, 1990:155). Equally, an absence of an enemy in the RSA/UNITA would have eliminated the need for such goods, reducing the Angolan debt burden and again shortening the war. The USSR also sent military advisors to the Angolan conflict, to work alongside Cuban advisors and the units of FAPLA, the MPLA’s army (Kempton, 1989:85; George, 2005:193). This resulted in the death and capture of a “few ... in southern Angola” (Copson, 1983:197). It was not until the second half of the 1980s, however, that Soviet advisors began taking over operational responsibility from the Cubans, not always successfully, for example the southeastern Angola offensive in 1987, carried out against the advice of Cuban advisors on the strength of Soviet decisions (Bridgland, 1990:341). Castro commented that “ “One day history will reveal it all, where the mistakes lay, why those mistakes were made. I shall only limit myself to saying that Cuba was not responsible for those mistakes” ” (Bridgland, 1990:368). By ruling out the Cubans, he points the finger at the only other active military advisors in the MPLA, the Soviets. Castro knew what was happening across the Atlantic: he painstakingly followed events on the Angolan battlefield (George, 2005:98). Weigert observes that “the strategy and tactics that Russian [sic] advisors had crafted for their Angolan clients rarely advanced beyond the legacy of World War II” (2011:97). The Soviet advisors were perhaps, therefore, more trouble than they were worth, with guarded separate beach facilities (Ondjaki, 2008:43) and racist attitudes towards the Angolans which were not found in Cuban advisors (Legum, 1980:20). The advisors provided by the Soviet Union also prolonged the war as they prevented action recommended by the more experienced - in this situation - Cubans which might have forced a settlement earlier. Alternatively, a higher quality of Soviet advice might 31 have given the MPLA a better position at the negotiating table, with more to bargain with, resulting in a more favourable settlement 1. The final contribution that the USSR made to the outcome of the Angolan civil war was diplomatic. This began in 1975 with the launch of a “Soviet major diplomatic campaign on behalf of the MPLA” (Valenta, 1980:114), aimed at achieving OAU recognition of Angola. Once this was achieved, no thanks to “Soviet diplomatic clumsiness” (Albright, 1981:213) but sympathy after the RSA invasion, this aspect took a back seat to military conflict. Various diplomatic gestures were made, and even some agreements signed - for example the Lusaka Accords in 1984 - but the USSR was not involved in any of these negotiations, except when it “disrupted the process at any sign of real progress” (James III, 2001:203). It was not until Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union in 1985 and spread “his ‘new thinking’ ” (Saunders, 2009:236) to all aspects of Soviet policy that a diplomatic solution became the official line of Soviet action in “southern Africa. Soviet officials have made it clear that this offer pertains to both Angola and South Africa” (Kempton, 1989:221). By this time, it had become clear to all that a military victory was impossible for either side and thus the solution would have to be hammered out around the negotiating table (O’Neill and Munslow, 1990:88). After the decision had been made in Moscow, the full might of Soviet influence was thrown behind the negotiations. Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin “was quoted as calling explicitly for negotiations between the MPLA and UNITA” (MacFarlane, 1989:83) and the Angolans were pressured into agreeing terms (Knudsen and Zartman, 1995:17; Pazzanita, 1991:107), Adamishin even going so far as to have “privately warned [Angolan President] dos Santos that Moscow was tired of footing the bill for an unwinnable war” (James III, 2011:227). Although not part of the mediating team, and purely “behind the scenes” (Campbell, 1988:110), the fact that the Soviets wanted the negotiations to succeed, even if only for the benefit of eliminating Regarding Soviet advisors, there is a discrepancy between the Russian and Western sources. This is General Konstantin Shaganovitch. The Russian scholars vehemently deny the existence of this general that Western scholars claim planned the became “supreme commander of all FAPLA and foreign forces” in 1985 (deBeer and Gamba, 2000:77), had oversight of “the August 1987 offensive on Mavinga” (O’Neill and Munslow, 1990:88), and was allegedly “a known chemical warfare expert” (Bridgland, 1990:62). Pazzanita (1991:99, footnote), Campbell (1988:10), and the 1987 Strategic Survey also accept his existence and involvement in Angola as fact (193). This person simply does not seem to exist. Shubin, who has lead the Russian charge to get the names right, suggests that what may have happened is a twist in the name of a general who did serve as “Soviet Chief Military Adviser in Angola” before 1980: Vassily Shakhnovich (2007:259). “One of Shakhnovich’s successors was Lieutenant-General (from 1983, Colonel-General) Konstantin Kurochkin, First Deputy Commander of the Soviet Paratroopers. So it seems that [scholars] managed to merge someone dead [Shakhnovich died shortly after he returned to Moscow in 1980] with someone living” (Shubin, 2007:259-260). In his later book on the cold war in southern Africa, Shubin points out that even Del Pino, a high-ranking Cuban defector, muddled up the names (2008:76). If Shubin is right about this, what else is wrong within the Western scholarship on Angola? 1 32 one pull on the failing Soviet economy, rather than a belief that this was the best deal the MPLA would get, would surely have influenced the Angolan negotiators. Acceding to the Angolan presidency following Neto’s death in 1979, Dos Santos was more amenable to Soviet suggestion than his prickly predecessor and could see the damage the war was doing to his country - even if others in the MPLA leadership did not see this as grounds to end it (Marcum, 1986:29). Soviet weight to the negotiations, therefore, made them more likely to succeed, although this is not to say that its absence would have lead to their failure. As has been seen, the Soviet contributions of arms, money, advisors and diplomatic pressure were helpful but not decisive. They helped to prolong and intensify the conflict, only helping to defuse the situation when Gorbachev came to power and the domestic situation dictated that an end to commitments abroad would be more beneficial than their continuation. Soviet support of the MPLA in all forms helped to create the situation where only a negotiated outcome would resolve it but did little to help create that outcome until necessity demanded it. The Cuban contributions to the Angolan civil war were more to do with feet on the ground than money in the bank account. Cuba contributed civilians, combat personnel including advisors, and again were involved in the negotiation process, although in a very different way to the Soviets. The civilians were “invaluable” (Marcum, 1982:193) to Angola after the departure of the Portuguese who had run the country until independence. During the civil war, the Cubans were “involved in education, culture, health, transportation, communications, the military, the ruling party’s activities, police, prisons, mining, agriculture, and so forth” (Radu and Klinghoffer, 1991:55). Their permeation of society was aided by the similarity of Spanish and Portuguese, leading to the creation of a blend of the two which George terms “ ‘Portuñol’ ” (2005:161). Cuban civilian assistance became engrained within the psyche of Angolans, as seen through Ondjaki’s novel in the protagonist’s confusion over why his Cuban teachers were leaving: it had become normal (2008). The presence of civilians did not help the progress of the war, but it did keep the country running, allowing the leadership to focus on military and diplomatic attempts to resolve the conflict. The impact of the combat troops and advisors is less clear cut. There seems to be a distinction between the immediate decisive impact in 1975-6 and the importance of advisors as opposed to boots on the battlefield throughout the rest of the period. Scholars are agreed that Cuban troops were “the arbiter of Angola’s future” (Marcum, 1982:196), stopped the destruction of the MPLA 33 (Rozès, 1998:186-7, own translation) and Porter concludes that in that period these troops were “Of greater consequence than the [Soviet] arms shipments” (1984:31). After the initial campaigns of 1975-6, however, the Cubans appear to disappear from the battlefield almost entirely, being used for guard duty on American-owned oil installations (George, 2005:190) and the President, and training local forces to enable FAPLA to take on UNITA (Laquer, 1983:13), except for large offensives. A member of the SADF comments in an oral history that UNITA were scared of Cubans shooting, although whether this is fear of the weapon or the person wielding it is unclear (Parabat, 1995:33), also observing that “The Cubans were not very good soldiers, but the advisors they had did a good job” (1995:35). It would therefore seem that after the initial troop surge and action, the Cubans were rarely used against enemy troops but did prevent backsliding. Aldana, a high ranking member of the contemporary Cuban government, commented that “ “It is no secret to us that Angola exists only because the Cuban troops are here” ” (Shubin, 2008:81). This is true but only in the sense that their presence prevented the SADF and UNITA overrunning Angola. When the circumstances were right to negotiate, furthermore, the Cubans’ ability to maintain the status quo “on the battlefield” allowed the New York Accords in 1988 to be agreed. “Cuba changed the course of Southern African history” (Gleijeses, 2009:216). 34 Chapter Five: The Negotiated Settlement “When your only friends are the Americans, it is not a very comfortable situation to be in. Western diplomat, West Africa, 29 October 1990” (Windrich, 1992:125) Ironically it was the Cuban presence in Angola which opened up a possible diplomatic solution. It was the Cuban presence in Angola which enabled the concept of linkage to be proposed and made the basis of all future rounds of talks. Therefore, despite prolonging the war, the Cuban presence also provided a starting point for talks: the RSA and UNITA wanted them out and so would negotiate to achieve this. The process was far from smooth, however. The Cubans were initially vetoed in 1983 by the USA from joining talks (Gleijeses, 2009:212) and so it was not until March 1987 that the Cubans were at the table (James III, 2011, 233). The Cubans were not helped in their endeavour to gain a seat at that table by their rejection of linkage when it was first launched, while suggesting that it should work the other way around: Namibian independence before Cuban withdrawal (George, 2005:177). In the end, however, it was the Cubans who “were the first to offer the olive branch” (George, 2005:247) by removing an aggressive negotiator, agreeing to linkage and accepting the American mediated talks as “the principal means of conflict resolution in Angola” (George, 2005:247-8) in July 1988 at the New York talks. If the USA and RSA had not been so adamant to continue with linkage despite its many pitfalls, the matter may have been resolved sooner and with less bloodshed. Conversely, if Cuba and Angola had acknowledged that linkage was here to stay earlier in the steps towards negotiations, an outcome may have been agreed before 1991. The USA was involved throughout the civil war, but - unlike that of the USSR - the nature of the contribution shifted from military to diplomatic: an American proposed linkage and the final talks were mainly American mediated. The USA initially supported the FNLA as the movement most likely to defeat the MPLA and so in July-August 1975, it was in aid of Roberto that Operation IAFEATURE was launched by the CIA, with a budget of “nearly $25 million” authorised by Congress (Westad, 2005:222), with a lesser degree of support going to UNITA (Stockwell, 1978:177). Although this support from the CIA would ultimately prove embarrassing to Roberto (Daddieh and Shaw, 1984:37), there was no reason to predict that the “communications specialists ... communications officers ... paramilitary officers” and “retired army colonel ... hired on contract and assigned full time to the FNLA command” (Stockwell, 1978:177) would not result in victory. The CIA also provided propaganda which UNITA published as factual news during meetings of the UN General Assembly in 1975 (Stockwell, 1978:198). The final aspect of 35 IAFEATURE was “obsolete weapons from the National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve stores” (Stockwell, 1978:58). Some of these were transported in Pearl Air aircraft, “a chartered airline headquartered in the British colony of Hong Kong” (Harsch and Thomas, 1976:108). This was brought to a halt when Congress passed the Clark Amendment, banning all American aid to Angola. Support did not dry up, however, as Wright describes a system of passing arms through various third party countries to the RSA which would then be “given to UNITA” (1997:110), while Harsch and Thomas depict the French secret police as “channeling [sic] money and arms to the FNLA” after Clark, suggesting they were acting on another’s behalf (1976:108). There is also evidence that Israel trained and sold both UNITA and the FNLA arms after American suggestions to provide the same for the SADF (Hunter, 1987:59; 28). The words of Savimbi to the Washington Post on 23 January 1982 seem rather appropriate: “ ‘A great country like the United States has other channels ... the Clark Amendment means nothing’ ” (Minter, 1994:152). Direct aid resumed after the repeal of the Amendment in 1985, having direct consequences on the ongoing negotiations so this will be addressed with the American diplomatic efforts. In a rather neat turn of irony, while successive US administrations were working to end the rule of the MPLA, American oil companies had been paying the Angolan government royalties - in September 1975, these “quarterly royalties” amounted to $116 million (Legum, 1976b:12) - which “enabled the MPLA to pay for Soviet and Cuban military aid” (O’Neill and Munslow, 1990:92). Without these payments, the MPLA would have been unable “to prosecute their civil conflict for a decade without incurring substantial debt to the USSR and Cuba” (MacFarlane, 1989:77), thereby shortening and de-intensifying the conflict. Mercenaries - or “ “foreign military advisors” ” as the CIA termed them (Stockwell, 1978:183) were the CIA’s answer to operating around the Clark Amendment: “As long as they were not Americans, the 40 Committee [responsible for approving CIA covert operations] approved” (Stockwell, 1978:182). Despite this, some of those who signed up for the Angolan venture were American but more were British, to that government’s distress and prompting many exchanges in the Houses of Parliament - for example, in the Commons on June 29 1976, Official Report, volume 914, columns 205-210. The recruitment campaign in Britain is mocked in the cartoon below. The mercenaries’ campaign in Angola was short, mainly because they were killed or captured. In late June 1976, what is known as the Luanda Trial took place, with thirteen mercenaries in the dock “as war criminals” (Stockwell, 1978:247) before a Revolutionary Tribunal. Of these, four were sentenced to death, three to sixteen years of hard labour, three to twenty-four years’ in prison, and three to thirty years in prison (Ignatyev, 1977:175); the executions were carried 36 out on 10 July that same year. This is not the place for an exploration of the dirty deeds of the mercenaries in Angola - and dirty they were - or the motives of trying them rather than executing them extra-judicially, but the fact that the CIA took this path demonstrates their determination to prevent the MPLA gaining and then consolidating its power. Furthermore, during the SADF incursion in 1975, the soldiers were instructed to claim to be an American mercenary “to any foreign newsmen”, rather than a member of the SADF (Parabat, 1995:25); perhaps they thought it would be more acceptable to the world community. They were wrong. The Luanda Trial triggered international outrage and the mercenaries stopped going to Angola. Mercenaries had no practical impact on the outcome of the war, but they did reinforce the MPLA’s claim to be in the right and besieged by hostile powers2. Figure 3: “Lord Kissinger Needs You” (Gleijeses, 2002:335) What is interesting is that the very presence of mercenaries in Angola during any part of the conflict is mentioned in very few books. The vast majority do not consider it worth even a sentence or footnote. Further research would have to ascertain why this is the case. When confronted about the support of foreign soldiers for UNITA, Savimbi asked “if the Cuban was not also a mercenary” (James III, 2011:66); maybe this is what scholars do not want to have to deal with. 2 37 Under President Reagan, US policy changed dramatically. He repealed the Clark Amendment, which meant that the era of mercenaries had passed and direct US aid to UNITA could resume. This opened the way for “a compact between the superpowers” (Cleary, 1999:144), but the road was not straightforward. Repealing the Clark Amendment, according to Powell, was when “ ‘the Angolan regime started to take seriously the idea of a negotiated settlement’ ” (O’Neill and Munslow, 1990:91). The same action also had the unfortunate effect of leading the MPLA to walk out of negotiations in protest (George, 2005:191; Ciment, 1997:195). With Reagan came Chester Crocker as Assistant Secretary of State and an American administration dedicated to the path of negotiated settlement. Crocker had written about the need for “constructive engagement” (1980:346) with South Africa and one of the issues he constructively engaged with the RSA on was Angola. He masterminded linkage, linking together the fate of Cuban troops in Angola and the continued South African occupation of Namibia, a plan which “addressed head-on the genuine security concerns of each of the warring parties” (George, 2005:164), although the two situations were wildly different. The complexity of recent Angolan history caused problems: the MPLA refused to talk to Savimbi (James III, 2011:208). Accusing him of treason, they referred to allegations that he and UNITA had collaborated with the Portuguese Army during the War of Independence, giving them information on the location of MPLA units (Review of African Political Economy, 1976:84-5). The USA “dismissed” MPLA concerns as “moralistic questions” (Minter, 1994:163) and negotiations continued. December 1988 saw the New York Agreement as the culmination of previous talks and proof that negotiations gave results. The Agreement had a fundamental flaw: “There were no commitments, however, on US military aid to Unita [sic], or on Soviet support for the Angolan government” so the war could continue undisturbed by signatures in New York (Minter, 1994:50). Ultimately, the US-mediated talks succeeded as they “offered all the parties something to claim credit for” (O’Neill and Munslow, 1990:95), which they could regard as a victory, as well as war fatigue and “persistent Soviet prodding” (Pazzanita, 1991:111). American-led negotiations were crucial in ending the war and only the US put themselves forward as the major power mediator the conflict needed, although they were not as neutral as would have been ideal. It must be pointed out, however, that if the US had not provided weapons initially and then after the repeal of the Clark Amendment along with an absence of other foreign intervention, mediation would not have been necessary. The interference of foreign powers in what began as an internal dispute prolonged and intensified the civil war to the point that the outcome could not be decided on the battlefield but only at the negotiation table. 38 South African involvement also moved dramatically from the military to the diplomatic sphere. Its military incursions were decisive in ensuring a negotiated settlement and persistence in linkage prolonged the talks and thereby the conflict. Without the invasion of Angola by the SADF, the war would have ended sooner, cost less lives, and possibly had a difference outcome entirely. As with the Cuban combat contribution, that of the SADF must be broken into two time periods: the 1975-6 conflict and the remainder of the war. In 1975, before the arrival of Cuban troops, the SADF swept through southern Angola and were poised to take Luanda until Operation Carlota stopped this (Marcum, 1986:18). The real significance of this initial show of force was in fact political, as it rallied African countries to the side of the MPLA in the face of South African aggression “and made large-scale Soviet and Cuban assistance to Neto respectable” (Maxwell, 1988:28). In addition to this, co-operation with apartheid RSA served as “the kiss of death” (Legum, 1976a:5) for UNITA among African states, so the UNITA/RSA alliance was condemned for many reasons. Operation Savannah, in October 1975, was the final impetus for the instigation of Operation Carlota. Without the SADF intervention, the MPLA may not have requested Cuban combat troops, or at least not in the numbers that arrived. If the MPLA had only been opposed by the FNLA, UNITA and Zairian troops, the Cubans would not have been needed (MPLA commandant, in Burchett and Roebuck, 1977:23). Kapuscinski mentions the psychological impact of seeing white men opposing the MPLA, as history suggested that the white man would always win so “The MPLA soldier could whip the FNLA or UNITA soldier, but he would fear the white army coming from the south” (1988:97-8). By choosing to intervene militarily and directly in Angola, the RSA “may, ironically, have chosen the one policy that ensured the failure of their principal objective:” to prevent the coming to power of the MPLA (Guimarães, 2001:122). After 1976, however, as the war settled into a situation of what was essentially stalemate, the SADF saved UNITA from destruction by conventional means up until the negotiations bore fruit (Ciment, 1997:86). The reality of conventional war in Angola also prevented the concentration of forces necessary to eradicate los guerrillos of UNITA and, to a far lesser degree, the FNLA, again delaying the conclusion of the war. Once it was acknowledged that neither side could win a complete military victory, the SADF treated action in the field as an extension of action at the negotiating table. “South Africa ... allowed negotiations to stumble along until a possible settlement was likely, then would either attach Angola, or introduce a new set of demands from SWAPO and Angola” (James III, 2011:204) until around 1982, thereby prolonging a war which could have ended earlier were it not for the actions of the SADF. During the final round of negotiations between 1988 39 and 1991, both sides could still mount offensives which would cause losses and shift the balance of power at the negotiating table. There was, therefore, a situation where “Both sides sought to negotiate from a position of military strength, or to negotiate when it seemed that they were losing military advantage” (Pycroft, 1994:247). Stubborn adherence to linkage also protracted the negotiations as it took years for the MPLA to accept this as the basis for an agreement. The MPLA refused to expel the Cubans while the SADF still occupied and attacked Angolan territory, but the SADF refused to leave until the Cubans had gone (MacQueen, 1998:8). After the initial war for control of Angola, the Cubans remained because, in the words of Neto, “ “we are being daily attacked by the South Africans” ” (James III, 2011:197). The two sides were at an impasse. As stated above, it was the Cubans who blinked first but this would not have been necessary if the RSA and later Crocker had not insisted that the independence of Namibia and the Cuban presence in Angola were linked. “If there has been a single insurmountable obstacle to a negotiated solution in southern Africa, it has not been Cuba’s attitude of position, or Angola’s; it has been, rather, South African intransigence” (Smith, 1988:13). The mutually hurting stalemate (Pazzanita, 1991:100) which dictated a negotiated resolution in place of a final battlefield confrontation was also a result of the nature of the fighting. Both sides used conventional warfare, but UNITA specialised in la guerrilla, “the war of the broad masses of an economically backward country standing up to a powerfully equipped and well-trained army of aggression” (Vo, 1971:105). When used in a country with a sympathetic population and welltrained/enthusiastic guerrillos, la guerrilla is nigh unbeatable, for example the 1808-14 Peninsular War, and the Vietnam War: “ “no enemy could occupy a country employing guerrilla warfare unless every acre of land could be occupied with troops” ” (T. E. Lawrence, paraphrased by Lt. Col. Wilkins, in Loveman and Davies, Jr., 1986:3-4). The MPLA had to fight a conventional war against the SADF while trying to combat UNITA, so the concentration of forces necessary to defeat guerrilla tactics was not possible. In fact, the MPLA mainly used “Search-And-Destroy ... missions” with mixed FAPLA and Cuban units, “aimed at rooting out UNITA sympathisers” (George, 2005:154), to undermine the popular basis of Savimbi’s force. Savimbi used a blend of Maoist tactics (James III, 2011:91-2) with the aim of forcing the MPLA to negotiate, rather than seeking an outright military victory, “ “a moral victory through a process of attrition” ” (Weigert, 2011:12), like that of Grivas in the Cypriot struggle against British rule. Grivas fought a “battle for the hearts and minds of the population” (1964:34) while trying “to focus the eyes of the world on Cyprus and force the British to fulfil their promises” (1964:47). This is 40 what Savimbi sought to do in Angola. He repeatedly sabotaged the Benguela railway, in accordance with Guevaran principles to cause “the paralysis of the life of the region” (Guevara, 1986:62). Savimbi used terror (James III, 2011:108), hostage taking, attacks on civilian targets (Minter, 1994:41) and attacks on villages (Weigert, 2011:65) to keep the MPLA on their toes and distract FAPLA from ending the conventional war with the SADF while the SADF reciprocated in kind. The stalemate caused by the two conflicting yet complimentary kinds of warfare ensured that there would be a negotiated resolution to the war, but not until all parties acknowledged that this was the case. The tactics used by both sides thereby prolonged the war while ensuring a diplomatic rather than military outcome. 41 Chapter Six: Conclusion In conclusion, the Soviets were not decisive in the outcome of the Angolan Civil War between 1975 and 1991. In order to assess this impact, the reasons for Soviet involvement in the Third World as a whole have been confirmed as ideology, opportunity, to assert their status as a world power, and to deny influence to the PRC and the West. The motivation behind engagement specifically in southern Africa has been identified as a combination of the region’s strategic location, superpower strategy, the possibility to support the area’s liberation movements, and rivalry with both China and the West, while lust for resources has been relegated to an afterthought on the part of Soviet strategists. Finally, the reasons for supporting the MPLA over the FNLA or UNITA have been established as a mixture of ideological compatibility, the MPLA’s comparative higher chances of success, a chance to oppose China’s chosen movement, and the simple fact that the MPLA asked for help. Having established why the Soviet Union was involved in the civil war, it has been proven with the sources available that it was in fact the intervention of the RSA which was decisive in ensuring a negotiated resolution to the conflict. Their stubborn commitment to linkage prevented an earlier diplomatic solution being negotiated. Their use of conventional tactics alongside UNITA’s guerrilla war prevented the concentration of forces necessary to defeat either. Their presence prevented the MPLA relinquishing the services of the Cubans, allowing the RSA to claim their forces were needed to prevent the Cubans overrunning Angola. The continuing war due to their involvement meant that the MPLA needed Soviet arms and aid which would otherwise would not have been necessary beyond the power struggle in 1975-6. Finally, it was seen that the Cubans acted from their own initiative, not at the bidding of the USSR in launching Operation Carlota and stayed under the same motivation, and that the USA encouraged the RSA to invade Angola, thereby triggering the intensification of the conflict and ensuring its protraction. The USSR was useful but not decisive in the outcome of the 1975-1991 phase of the war. Ultimately, Bicesse broke down. The two sides returned to hostility before the end of 1991, with outright conflict breaking out in 1992. After two years of war, more accords saw 4 years of peace before the final stage flared up, only ending after the death of Savimbi on 22 February 2002. UNITA was legalised, the MPLA ended its commitment to Marxism and a form of peace set in. Jose Eduardo Dos Santos is still President of the People’s Republic of Angola. 42 There is still research to be done on what happened in the forests of Angola during the fifteen years of war, not least because the Cuban and Angolan archives are closed. What treasures must lay within. Oral histories also remain to be taken. Some have been recorded and have been used, but many more stories are yet to be heard, including that of ordinary Angolans who lived through the storm of war. In order to complete a comprehensive history of the war, it will be necessary for the scholars to have that quality which Marx recommended for insurrectionists, himself echoing Danton: “de l’audace, de l’audace, encore de l’audace!” [boldness, daring] (in Stalin, 1946:245-6, own translation) 43 Appendix - Chronology 25 April 1974 Carnation Revolution, Lisbon 9 August 1974 US President Nixon resigns as a result of the Watergate scandal Mid-August 1974 USSR attempts to heal rifts within MPLA Late summer 1974 China begins aiding MPLA 4 December 1974 Congo agrees to transit Soviet arms to MPLA 15 January 1975 Alvor Agreement Late January 1975 USA begin covert operations to aid FNLA 30 April 1975 Saigon falls to Viet Minh forces 9 July 1975 FNLA driven out of Luanda 9 August 1975 SADF patrol enter Angola August 1975 First RSA arms shipments to FNLA and UNITA enter Angola Mid-October 1975 Operation Savannah 11 November 1975 People’s Republic of Angola declared in Luanda by MPLA, Social Democratic Republic of Angola declared in Huambo by FNLA/UNITA; Battle of Quifangondo Valley 5 January 1976 MPLA report FNLA HQ at Uige taken 27 January 1976 Huambo abandoned by FNLA/UNITA 30 January 1976 Operation Carlota crushes FNLA, Roberto flees to exile in Zaire 6 February 1976 Clarke Amendment signed into law 9 September 1976 Mao Zedong dies November 1976 FAPLA/Cuban offensive towards Namibian border 20 January 1977 Carter inaugurated as US President 7 March 1977 Shaba I invasion 27 May 1977 Nito Alves coup 10 December 1977 MPLA party congress, PT added to name - vanguard party 44 May 1978 RSA Operation Reindeer 11 May 1978 Shaba II 21 August 1978 Viljoen sworn in as RSA State President 10 October 1978 Vorster sown in as RSA State President March 1979 RSA Operations Safron and Crossbar June 1979 Viljoen sworn in as RSA State President 10 September 1979 President Neto dies in Moscow of cancer 21 September 1979 Jose Eduardo dos Santos sworn in as President of Angola June 1980 RSA Operations Sceptic and Smokeshell July 1980 RSA Operation Klipklop 20 January 1981 Reagan sworn in as USA President August 1981 RSA Operations Protea and Carnation October-November 1981 RSA Operation Daisy March 1982 RSA Operation Super July-August 1982 RSA Operation Meebos 10 November 1982 Andropov becomes General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union April 1983 RSA Operation Phoenix December 1983 RSA Operation Askari 9 February 1984 Chernenko becomes General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union September 1984 Botha sworn in as RSA President 10 March 1985 Gorbachev becomes General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union June 1985 RSA Operation Bush Willow 45 11 July 1985 Clarke Amendment repealed October 1985 Battle of Lomba River I March 1986 US/USSR talks in Geneva May 1986 Angola/USSR talks in Moscow September 1986 US/Angola talks in Luanda 10 September 1986 Castro links withdrawal of troops from Namibia with Cuban withdrawal from Angola October 1986 UN/UNITA talks in Paris March 1987 Angola/USSR/Cuba talks in Luanda April 1987 US/Angola talks in Brazzaville June 1987 US/Angola talks in Washington July 1987 US/USSR talks in London; US/Angola talks in Luanda August 1987 Angola/Cuba talks in Luanda September 1987 US/Angola talks in Luanda and Brussels 9 September-7 October 1987 Battle of Lomba River II November 1987 Angola/USSR/Cuba talks in Moscow December 1987 RSA Operations Modular and Hooper January 1988 US/Cuba/Angola talks in Luanda 13 January-23 March 1988 Battle of Cuito Cuanavale March 1988 US/Angola talks in Luanda April 1988 US/USSR talks May 1988 RSA/US/Cuba/Angola talks in London Angola/RSA talks in Brazzaville May-June 1988 US/USSR talks in Lisbon and Moscow (Reagan/Gorbachev Summit) June 1988 RSA Operations Packer and Displace US/Angola talks in Washington 46 US/UNITA talks in Washington RSA/US/Cuba/Angola talks in Cairo 27 June 1988 FAPLA/Cuban attack on RSA at Calueque July 1988 RSA/US/Cuba/Angola talks in New York and Cape Verde US/USSR talks in Geneva August 1988 RSA/US/Cuba/Angola talks in Geneva and Brazzaville UNITA/Cuba talks in Ivory Coast 30 August 1988 SADF leave Angola September 1988 RSA/US/Cuba/Angola talks in Brazzaville UN/RSA talks in Pretoria RSA/US/Cuba/Angola talks in Brazzaville October 1988 RSA/US/Cuba/Angola talks in New York November 1988 RSA/US/Cuba/Angola talks in Geneva and New York December 1988 RSA/US/Cuba/Angola talks in Brazzaville (two sets) and New York 22 December 1988 New York Accords signed, also known as the Tripartite Accords January 1989 UNAVEM [UN mission to monitor and verify preparation for the election and the election itself] troops arrive in Angola 20 January 1989 George Bush Snr. sworn in as USA President 22 June 1989 Gbadolite Agreement 20 September 1989 de Klerk sworn in as RSA President 24-5 April 1990 UNITA/MPLA-PT talks in Evora, Portugal 16-8 June 1990 UNITA/MPLA-PT talks in Oeiras, Portugal 27-31 August 1990 UNITA/MPLA-PT talks in Lisbon 24-7 September 1990 UNITA/MPLA-PT talks in Lisbon 16-20 November 1990 UNITA/MPLA-PT talks in Lisbon 31 May 1991 Bicesse Accords signed 19 May 1993 US formally recognises the government of Angola 47 Appendix - Tables and Charts (George, 2005:303) 48 Soviet Military Assistance to Angola, James III, 2011:213, Table 7.2 Year Amount in $ 1974-6 450 million 1981 250 million 1982 300 million 1983 800 million 1985 2.0 billion 1986 1.0 billion 1987 1.0 billion 1988 1.5 billion 1989 800 million 1990 800 million (1989 and 1990 figures are estimates) Foreign Military Personnel in Angola - 1986, James III, 2011:212, Table 7.1 Nation Total Duties Cuba 35, 000 Combat troops, advisers, pilots, drivers USSR 250 Military advisers GDR 2, 800 Formation of State Security Service, paratroop training North Korea 1, 500 Possibly combat troops, and/or pilots North Vietnam 150 Unknown SWAPO 5, 000 Combat troops ANC 1, 200 Combat troops Total 45, 900 49 References Adamishin, A., (2000a) ‘The White Sun of Angola: How the Conflict Knot Was Untied in South Western Africa’, International Affairs (Moscow), 46:3, 225-232 Albright, David E., (1980) ‘Moscow’s African Policy of the 1970s’ in David E. 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