Contemporary Politics, Volume 9, Number 1, 2003 Recent research The potential role of ‘pro-democratic civil society’ in responding to extreme right-wing challenges: the case of Brandenburg AMI PEDAHZUR University of Haifa One of the main issues on the political agenda in Germany in the summer of 2000 was the future of the extreme rightist National Democratic Party (NPD)— the oldest of Germany’s major neo-fascist parties. Politicians, journalists and many other public figures from all parts of Germany were in favour of ousting the NPD from the framework of the legitimate political process. With this step they hoped to reaffirm Germany’s stance as a ‘militant’ or ‘defensive’ democracy (Wehrhafte Demokratie), as defined by the Federal Constitutional Court which, based on German history and the Basic Law enacted after the fall of the Third Reich, determined that democracy cannot allow subversive acts to take place under the guise of legitimate parliamentary activity.1 The possibility of pushing the NPD outside the boundaries of the political establishment caused a great deal of controversy. Some—who maintained that the state is obligated to deal a hard blow to parties of the extreme right, including those that do not pose an immediate threat to democracy—favoured banning the party. Others considered this to be a drastic political measure that would undermine the basic democratic principles on which West German democracy was established after the Second World War. The disagreement between these two camps reflects a longstanding theoretical and philosophical debate, which may be titled ‘the paradox of defensive democracy’. The discussion focuses on the type and the severity of the measures with which a defensive democracy can retaliate against its enemies before it undermines the very moral principles it seeks to protect.2 Although there is already much analysis of this ‘paradox of defensive democracy’, most discussions have been in either a philosophical or formal legal framework. It is the purpose of this article to add a layer of social analysis, focusing on civil society’s potential role in helping democracy confront this paradox. The research underpinning this article focuses on the state of Brandenburg (formerly part the German Democratic Republic), which in the nineties became one of the centres of activity of the far right in Germany. In fact, an assessment of the incidence (relative to a population of 100,000) of violent acts motivated by the far right in all of Germany in 1999 places Brandenburg third, ISSN 1356-9775 print/ISSN 1469-3631 online/03/010063-12 DOI: 10.1080/1356977032000072468 © 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd 64 Ami Pedahzur after only Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. Moreover, the number of members and supporters of the far right in Brandenburg far exceeds their relative rates in other German states.3 The article centres around the claim that civil society has an important role in helping democracy confront potential threats without undermining the system’s underlying moral principles. However, prior to discussing the potential benefits for defensive democracy, a definition of ‘civil society’ is warranted. Civil society and defensive democracy The concept of civil society is not new in the literature of social science. It has been used by many political thinkers, among them Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, De Tocqueville, Hegel, Marx, and Gramsci; however, virtually all interpreted civil society differently, making it one of the most changeable terms in the academic literature.4 To avoid falling into this same pattern of relying on multiple definitions, we shall attempt to define what this concept is not, and from there proceed to explore what it may in fact include. Therefore, the term relates to a range of activities that take place outside the framework of the legal establishment (i.e. activities that do not pertain to the state), primordial relationships (i.e. family), and profit-motivated competition (i.e. the economic market). Thus, the term civil society includes activity that takes place within some other sort of organizational framework, either permanent or temporary. A necessary (although insufficient) condition for the existence of a civil society is the voluntary character of its organizations, based on citizens’ willingness to dedicate their time, effort and resources, and to co-operate with their fellow citizens.5 Five types of organizations are characteristic of a civil society, according to this definition. The first two are interest groups that work to promote the particular economic or professional cause of their members, and self-help groups that include members with a particular disability or need who promote a very immediate and concrete interest. The concerns of both of these groups are less related to the travails of a defensive democracy than the issues promoted by the remaining three types of organization. The latter groups, which play an important role in preserving the principles of the defensive democracy, include first and foremost social movements that wish to effect changes in their society or in the state’s priorities. The second type of organization involves grassroots groups that aim to influence the immediate environment and whose activities are focused at the neighbourhood or community level. Finally, the third type of organization comprises volunteer groups of civilians whose goal is to contribute to the welfare of others. The concept that places civil society at the centre of the democratic process is also a familiar one. It originates in de Tocqueville’s doctrine that perceived the voluntary unions in the early 1900s in the USA as the source of democratic life.6 This understanding has gained support in the studies of Robert Putnam, which highlight the connection between the existence of a civil society and the triumph of democracy.7 However, this approach also sparked controversy. Many claimed that Putnam, relying on de Tocqueville, ignored civil society’s less democratic context, that is, its conflictual and violent aspects. Thus, Berman presented civil society’s contribution to the development of the Nazi regime in Germany,8 while Weinberg and Eubank made a similar claim regarding civil society’s relation to the fascist regime Pro-democratic civil society 65 in Italy.9 Foley and Edwards divided the concept of civil society according to two analytical categories. The first category, ‘civil society I’, derived from Putnam’s approach, refers to the groups that contribute to democratic life, while the second category, ‘civil society II’, is indicative of the potential conflict implicit in the activities of civil society, although it mostly includes groups that operate in the social sphere to organize opposition to oppressive regimes.10 Booth and Richard expanded the categories to include a third type, ‘civil society III’, or as it is also called, ‘uncivil society’. In this category are included organizations that actively seek conflict and violence in order to challenge not the oppressive regimes, but rather, in their case, democratic rule. As examples of such organizations the authors mention the Ku Klux Klan, the Militia organizations in the USA, and the Death Squads of Central America.11 However, this category can also be said to include all of those radical organizations, violent and non-violent, that operate outside the political party framework and promote ideas that undermine the values of democracy. Movements located at the extreme right end of the political spectrum in western and eastern Europe, which are characterized by their objection to democracy and its values, are a prime example of the concept of uncivil society.12 This division of the concept into three distinct subtypes may help define the place and the potential roles of civil society in a defensive democracy. The role of civil society I is to uphold democracy, mostly by responding to the third type of civil society (III), as well as to the radical base in the society that espouses the ideological foundations necessary for the existence and the activities of this type of civil society. The primary means available to civil society I are the raising of public consciousness and mobilization of support for the condemnation of extremist/radical acts, extending humanitarian aid to the victims, and strengthening the democratic foundations of society through involvement in elementary-level education. The role of civil society II is no less important. While the efforts of civil society I are dedicated to confronting the roots of the extremist phenomenon and its consequences, the efforts of civil society II focus on restraining the state’s response to extremism, since even the leaders of democratic states, when sensing a threat to their system, tend to adopt a harsh response towards those who challenge them—a response that correlates poorly with the democratic values of the state.13 For the purpose of defensive democracy, restraining the state is no less crucial than restraining its anti-democratic challengers, since without the former, the extremists’ chance of de-legitimizing the democratic system and undermining its moral standing increases. Therefore, a civil society capable of supporting a defending democracy should include organizations of both the first (civil society I) and second (civil society II) categories. Organizations of the first category work to strengthen the democratic foundations, promoting coexistence among populations of varied national, ethnic, and religious origins; fostering tolerance and social and religious pluralism; and defending the rights of minorities. The second category of civil society includes civil rights organizations and those that advocate proper governance by a body that is accountable for its citizens’ welfare. The response of the state of Brandenburg to right-wing extremist phenomena in the nineties will serve as an example for observing the extent to which a budding pro-democratic civil society was able to aid the state in its early stage of democratization in confronting elements of the extreme right. 66 Ami Pedahzur The response of Brandenburg’s civil society to the expansion of right-wing extremism Before discussing the rise of civil society in Brandenburg, it should be mentioned that such a phenomenon was not unique to this state. It has become clear in recent years that the contribution of civil society to the struggle against rightwing extremism was also present in other parts of the former GDR. Thus, for example, in April 1998, following the success of the right-wing party DVU in the elections in Sachsen Anhalt and before the general elections took place in September of the same year, there was widespread recruitment on the part of civil society organizations in an attempt to decrease the party’s supporting ranks. Among the organizations mobilized to this end were the Postal Workers’ Organization, the Committee of Professional Unions, and the Union of German Christian Churches.14 Much like the unfolding of events in other post-communist countries,15 it is clear that in the former GDR, civil society’s activity to counter the spread of right-wing extremism did not rely exclusively on highly formal organizations such as those mentioned above; rather, it was characterized by grassroots activity directed against extremism and initiated at the community level. As to Brandenburg, the first signs of right-wing extremism were revealed a short time after East and West Germany were reunited, and they continued to develop throughout subsequent years. The most prominent expression of such extremism is the formation of right-wing militant groups and their aggression towards foreigners. As these groups began to appear, it was naturally the state that first responded in various ways. The body most directly responsible for the state’s response to extremism is the BfV, the federal office for the protection of the constitution, which is under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior. The BfV’s mode of response demonstrates that this body, like other authorities in Brandenburg, was forced to contend with the ‘paradox of defensive democracy’ and did not always meet the challenge successfully. In fact, as the extremist phenomena became more widespread, the state’s mode of response turned to more severe measures. The major act that reflected the BfV’s policy of harsh response was the banning and dispersing of right-wing militant groups. In 1995, the Direct Action/Central Germany (Direkte Aktion/Mitteldeutschland) organization was banned, and two years later so was the ‘Comradeship of Upper Havel’ (Kameradschaft Oberhavel).16 Although these examples do not constitute a blow to the state’s constitutional democratic fundamentals, since the German constitution grants the Ministry of Interior the authority to hinder the activities of subversive organizations, they do indicate, however, an undermining of the moral foundations of the liberal principle, first among them the freedom of political expression and action. The decision of Brandenburg’s BfV chiefs not to ban other groups in the late nineties, however, cannot be attributed either to considerations of a moral and liberal tenor or to their desire to maintain the foundations of democracy, but rather to the fact that the efficiency of this tactical policy was dubious. Accordingly, and as mentioned by Backes and Mudde, banned organizations tend not to disappear but are more likely to regroup and organize under a less formal framework,17 a fact that makes it even more difficult for the state to deal with them. Moreover, according to the representatives of the BfV in Pro-democratic civil society 67 Brandenburg, the act of banning is also considered inefficient because it does not help restrain the level of violence, given that most of the violent acts are carried out by activists unaffiliated with a formal registered organization.18 This claim is also upheld by the declarations made by authorities in the Omega Task Force, founded in Brandenburg, as in many other former GDR states, following the rapid spread of violence in the region. Members of this task force, who receive special training in how to cope with the violence of rightwing extremists, readily admit that despite numerous cases in which violent criminals have been dealt with successfully, they are unable either to keep the extreme right from expanding or to cope with the many radical elements that act outside the framework of known, established organizations.19 The conclusion that can be derived from this description is that even should the state, in its struggle against extremism, subversiveness, and political violence, choose to apply a policy that relies on constitutional laws but also undercuts basic liberal rights, such an option would not produce the comprehensive and efficient response intended. So far, our discussion has been limited to the confrontation with rightwing extremism that is expressed through organizations or violent acts, but this is only the tip of the iceberg of the right extremist phenomena, since both the organizations and the violent acts are cultivated in a supportive social milieu. Therefore, it may be assumed that contending first and foremost with this infrastructure would aid both the Ministry of Interior as well as the police in their struggle against extremism. There are two efficient approaches by which to address the issue of the extremists’ social infrastructure, and in both of them the activity of civil society plays an important role. The first approach educates for democracy, inculcating values of tolerance among both youths and adults, while the second approach focuses on responding to right-wing extremism through activities within the community and offering aid to the victims. Educating for democracy Despite controversy on this issue, recent studies on political socialization show that the educational system plays a central role in inculcating values of tolerance and democracy.20 However, due to considerations of budget or curricular preference, often the state does not include the topic in the required curriculum. The education system in Brandenburg also devotes less than the optimal amount of time to the topic of democratic education, a fact that raises the need to find alternative methods for addressing the issue. Thus, parallel to the federal initiative of May 2000, which resulted in the founding of the Treaty for Democracy and Tolerance, Brandenburg’s Ministry of Education conducts a state-wide programme to confront extremism and violence, which is known as ‘Tolerantes Brandenburg’. The programme has two main goals: firstly, to activate a network of state-backed activities for initiating educational projects and informational presentations on the topic of right-wing extremism; and, secondly, to support organizations of civil society I that aim to promote democracy and, among other things, work against right-wing extremism. According to Karten Fridel, who is in charge of the state’s activities, among the pro-democratic organizations supported by the state are sports organizations, 68 Ami Pedahzur churches, youth movements, and commercial organizations.21 A major civil society organization in this regard is the RAA (regional centres for inter-cultural understanding, education and schools in Brandenburg), which was founded in 1992, when hatred of foreigners became prominent and the first signs of the right-wing’s wave of violence against foreigners became discernible in the state. With the state’s support, the RAA, whose central offices were located in Potsdam, opened ten more offices throughout Brandenburg and aided in similar initiatives in other former GDR states.22 The RAA is the largest among civil society’s organizations that educate for democracy. It has 70 salaried employees and 150 volunteers, and activates approximately 400 projects. Its main goal is to promote inter-cultural understanding and prevent, or at least lessen, hatred of foreigners and thus reduce the violence directed against them. The organization’s activities focus on designing educational programmes about democracy and tolerance to be applied in kindergartens, elementary schools, and youth clubs. In addition, the organization also works to educate adults, and its range of activities has expanded also to include aid to refugees and immigrants. According to RAA representatives, most schools in Brandenburg readily accept the pro-democratic civil society organizations, as well as the government’s involvement, and the demand for extra-curricular activities on the subject is constantly increasing.23 One of the schools in Brandenburg to receive support and to create a positive impression due to its activity against right-wing extremism was the Friedrich Gymnasium in the city of Frankfurt-Oder. Student activity there came in response to several events of a violent nature that occurred in their city. The goal was to arouse students’ understanding of the many dangerous implications of this phenomenon, and the school’s management provided the organizational and material resources for such activity. In due course, this project became more formalized, and the school joined the European project of ‘Schools Without Racism’. Representatives of the project provided information and guidelines for increasing the level of tolerance and openness among the school’s students. The success of this project gave its leaders the impetus to go beyond the framework of the school and introduce to the community at large the promotional project on the issue of hatred of strangers. This created the first instances of co-operation between the school students and other organizations whose focus is the struggle against extremism and the protection of democracy.24 The state adopted this local initiative and took it under its wing. Wolfgang Thierese, president of the federal parliament, praised the students for their active role, called for the project’s expansion and focused the media’s attention on the project’s beneficial effects in terms of stabilizing democracy in the states of the former GDR.25 Thus, it is apparent that co-operation between the state and its established representatives in civil society can potentially strengthen society’s democratic foundations while marginalizing the extremist elements and distancing them from public consensus. This is achieved by focusing on comprehensive and varied programmes that aim to internalize democratic values and that encourage students and adults alike to show an interest in democratic ideas, identify threatening elements, and be politically active. To realize the potential benefits of such activities, programmes must be both broadened and prolonged over time, and so require participants to dedicate more time and resources. Pro-democratic civil society 69 Community activism against right-wing extremism Civil society’s role in aiding struggling democracy is not confined to large-scale organizations that educate for democracy. As mentioned, civil society can play an important role also in less formal configurations, particularly due to its ability to penetrate into social levels that the state cannot reach. Moreover, activism at the community level addresses the social aspect of the phenomenon, thereby alleviating the severity of the anti-democratic threat to the state and affording the state the opportunity to develop a proper response policy consistent with its democratic principles. This study presents three local civil society organizations that work against right-wing extremism in several cities in Brandenburg: ‘Utopia’, an organization at work in the city of Frankfurt-Oder, ‘Tolerantes Eberswalde’ and ‘Infocafe Der Winkel’, in the city of Belzig. Despite differences in the organizational characteristics of these three groups, which by virtue of their status as grassroots communal organizations maintain no connection with each other, they all have certain things in common. First, the three organizations were founded in 1998, in a spontaneous citizen response to expanding extremism or to extremist violent acts. All three are positioned at the low end of the establishment scale; although they have registered in Frankfurt-Oder and in Belzig as non-profit organizations, their affiliation with the state is minimal. They receive limited resources and their level of organization (in terms of membership, conventions, and organized programmes) is indeed very basic. The third characteristic common to all three organizations is their main area of activity. They are all engaged in local promotional activity that aims to confront right-wing extremism in order to raise consciousness in the community against the extreme right and to encourage the citizens in the cities to expel this social element. In addition, these organizations are also involved in offering aid to foreigners who live in the city districts where they are active. The major difference between these organizations relates to the socio-demographic characteristics of their members and the specific activation methods that each organization applies. The Utopia organization, for example, is based mostly on young activists, many of whom receive unemployment compensation in return for their participation in the organization. The organization’s activities focus on three main paths. The first is to maintain ongoing contact with business people and public transportation officials in the city, in order to teach them the available methods for protecting immigrants attacked by rightist activists. The second form of activity is to raise consciousness at the community level regarding the problem of rightist violence, and the third focus is to provide shelter to immigrant children who refrain from going outside in the afternoon for fear of being attacked.26 The methods employed by the Infocafe at Belzig are similar to those used by Utopia; however, the demographic characteristics of its members are somewhat different. The Infocafe organization focuses its activities at the café, which serves as a meeting place where asylum seekers can receive social support and consultation regarding various aspects of life in Germany, including legal advice. This organization also seeks to raise community consciousness of the issue of extremist violence, and one of the notable methods to this end is the holding 70 Ami Pedahzur of street fairs. In fact, it was due to precisely such a local event that the organization became the focus of both German and foreign media, which eventually led the organization to receive a federal prize for the strengthening of democracy. The Infocafe membership, unlike that of Utopia, is more demographically varied: its members are not only youths, but are from all social ranks in the community.27 The least formally established of these organizations is the Tolerantes Eberswalde, which was founded as a student organization at the local university. In comparison with the other organizations mentioned, the foundation of this organization is less stable. It has no offices of its own and must conduct its activities from Red Cross offices in the city. In addition to implementing educational programmes in the local kindergartens and schools, the organization’s activities also focus on eradicating local support for right-wing extremist organizations, by means of both influence and pressure. In the first instance they try to persuade the city’s policy makers of the significance of this issue, and in the second they do not shy away either from holding public events intended to stir public dialogue, or from entering areas known as right-wing activity centres. Their purpose in doing so is not to create a confrontation, but rather to demonstrate to the inhabitants of these neighbourhoods that the public is neither unaware of the phenomenon nor apt to remain unresponsive. Regarding the demographic characteristics of this organization’s members, despite the fact that it was initiated by students, as time progressed and public awareness increased, its membership grew to include residents from all socio-demographic segments in the city.28 Two common elements became evident in the course of the interviews conducted with activists from all three organizations. First, they all report positive, albeit partial, achievements—partial, because they do not perceive a significant decline in the level of right-wing extremist activity in the various communities. However, in all cases, activists noted that their communities demonstrated increased consciousness of the problem which, prior to the organizations’ establishment, had been treated with complete indifference. Further evidence of the community’s increased interest in the problem is the fact that the human component in these organizations, which was initially homogeneous, became more varied as consciousness and involvement by many parts of the community increased. It is not surprising, then, that all the representatives of civil society who participated in the study were confident in their ideology, which maintains that a response to right-wing extremism must occur first and foremost in the public realm, that is, through education and activation provided by civil society. Certain activists’ opposition to the severe measures taken by the state against organizations and movements of right-wing extremists is based on cumulative experience, which shows that such measures are of very limited efficiency and inconsequential in the face of the spreading of local rightist extremism and violence against foreigners. A common denominator that came through during conversations with activists from the three organizations was their feeling of isolation and the fact that they were unaware of the existence of other organizations active in the same realm. This is apparently due to the local and therefore peripheral character of these particular groups, and their relatively non-established and non-formal Pro-democratic civil society 71 affiliation. That is why there is little contact either between these organizations in particular, or between the small local groups and the larger, well-established organizations that work on a state-wide level, such as churches, workers’ unions, and other social organizations working under the auspices of a larger framework established in Furstenwalde in September of 1998 to counter right-wing extremism.29 Despite the great significance of working at the community level, it is clear that unless these small groups manage to forge a connection among themselves as well as with other larger organizations, they stand little chance of surviving. Most of these grassroots organizations are characterized by limited resources and lack of sufficient organizational know-how, relying heavily on participants’ high level of commitment to the organization and its goals. Nevertheless, in order to survive, these organizations must become more established. The knowledge and resources required for this process could be provided by the establishment (the state) and shared by several organizations at the community level. Moreover, the establishment of a network connecting all pro-democratic civil society organizations would make them a more prominent entity in the public and media-oriented arenas, a step which would serve the dual purpose of promoting their goals and simultaneously increasing activists’ motivation to continue their efforts. Conclusion The aim of this study is to demonstrate civil society’s potential role in aiding democracies in their defence against extremist and subversive elements while refraining from using means that risk undermining the moral foundations of democracy itself. The assumption, presented at the outset, is that civil society plays the following roles. First, regardless of their degree of affiliation with the establishment, organizations pertaining to civil society I have the potential to respond to the challenge of extremism in society by educating in democratic values, conducting community activity intended to strengthen democratic foundations, and helping the victims of extremist activities. The investigation of the Brandenburg example demonstrates that these functions are indeed performed in this state, although the number of organizations active in this realm is still small, and their resources fairly limited. Another function of organizations pertaining to civil society I is to provide a community-based response to activities of organizations of civil society III, or uncivil society, intended to de-legitimize them and cause them to be banned. It was assumed in this study that, in effect, such activity would impede the mobilizing activities of right-wing extremists, thus attenuating the severity of the threat to the state. It was found that some of the smaller and less-established organizations did in fact fulfil such a function and that they reported partial success.30 Discussion with BfV officials and members of the police force revealed that state representatives are also supportive of such activity and its consequences and, provided it does not involve violence, they see it as facilitating their own work. However, since this activity is not widespread, representatives of the law still feel that the state must continue its involvement in this type of activity. Another of the assumptions of the study was that organizations pertaining 72 Ami Pedahzur to civil society II, that is, civilian groups (such as civil rights organizations in the USA) whose purpose is to preserve the state’s democratic values, also play an important role, conducting activities that include opposition to the state when its response to rightist extremism jeopardizes fundamental, democraticbased civil liberties. Our continuous efforts to locate such organizations in Brandenburg were unsuccessful. We were somewhat surprised by the lack of such organizations, given our previous experience, which demonstrated the important role that civil society II organizations played in confronting the communist regimes in eastern Europe and in the democratization process observed in many countries of that region.31 The reasons for the lack of such organizations are varied, but chief among them could be the absence of an East German tradition of opposition to the state, as well as economic conditions that were not conducive to citizens’ involvement in civil society activities. To summarize, while many of the study’s assumptions regarding the function of civil society within a defensive democracy were supported in the case of Brandenburg, the theoretical framework could be strengthened by enlarging the scope of the study to include a comparison between Brandenburg and other struggling democracies in countries of the former eastern bloc, as well as in the west. In addition, it may be worthwhile to return to Brandenburg and examine the development of its civil society and the extent of its influence both on the extreme right and on the authorities’ response to such extremism. As to the current challenges facing the authorities and society in Brandenburg, this study shows that the state’s pro-democratic civil society organizations are a new and growing phenomena, currently in their formative stages. Therefore, they are in a very fragile state, constantly in danger of folding due to limited funds and low motivation on the part of citizens required to dedicate a great deal of time and effort. While the resource problems may be solved by financing provided either by more established civil society organizations or the state,32 the aspect of citizen involvement must be addressed by the organizations’ promotional activities. They must themselves convince the citizens that the process of setting anti-extremist mechanisms in place is an extended one, the results of which can become apparent only after years of activity, and that therefore, despite the paucity of short-terms results, to attain these achievements in the long term it is necessary and worthwhile to join and actively support such organizations. Should the organizations observed in this study be unsuccessful and collapse, leaving the counter-extremist arena empty, there will be no social opposition to right-wing extremism, making the state the only body capable of responding to and curbing such activity. This scenario could have two possible results for struggling democracy. On one hand, if the state continues to use severe methods in response to extremism, it is likely that many citizens will question these methods and the difference between this regime and the former one; on the other hand, should the authorities choose to ignore the activities of the extreme right, allowing it to expand its base, it is unlikely that the fledgling democracy will stabilize, making life for foreigners in such countries even more difficult. Pro-democratic civil society 73 Notes 1. For a discussion of the German Militant Democracy, see J. E. Finn, Constitutions in Crisis Political Violence and the Rule of Law, New York, 1991. 2. A comprehensive discussion of the different philosophical schools in the field can be found in R. Cohen-Almagor, The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance: The Struggle against Kahanism in Israel, Gainesville, 1994. 3. Annual Report, Office for the Protection of the Constitution, 1999, p. 22. 4. A. B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, Princeton, 1992. 5. Y. Yishai, Research Proposal, 2000. 6. A. De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, New York, 1961. 7. R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton, 1993; R. Putnam, ‘Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, 1995, pp. 65–78; R. Putnam, Bowling Alone—The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York, 2000. 8. S. Berman, ‘Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic’, World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3, 1997, pp. 401–9. 9. W. L. Eubank and L. Weinberg, ‘Terrorism and Democracy within One Country: The Case of Italy’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1997, pp. 98–108. 10. M. W. Foley and B. Edwards, ‘Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and Social Capital in Comparative Perspective’, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1998, pp. 5–20. 11. J. A. Booth and P. B. Richard, ‘Civil Society, Political Capital and Democratization in Central America’, Journal of Politics, Vol. 60, No. 3, 1998, pp. 780–99. 12. For further reference to the idea of ‘uncivil movements’, especially in Latin America, see L. A. Payne, Uncivil Movements: The Armed Right-wing and Democracy in Latin America, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. 13. R. D. Crelinsten and A. Schmid, ‘Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-five Year Balance Sheet’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1992, pp. 307–40. 14. \http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw98-9/germany.html[. 15. Lászlo Szôcs, ‘A Tale of the Unexpected: The Extreme Right vis-à-vis Democracy in Post-communist Hungary’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 21, No. 6, 1998, 1096–15. 16. Source BfV Report, \http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/publikationen/[. 17. Uwe Backes and Cas Mudde, ‘Germany: Extremism without Successful Parties’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 3, 2000, p. 464. 18. From a personal interview with Dr Annegret Ortling and Mr Jorg Milbradt, BfV, Ministerium des Innern, Land Brandenburg, 24 October 2000. 19. From a personal interview with Officer Zimmerman, Mega Task Force, FrankfurtOder, 23 October 2000. 20. C. L. Hahn, ‘Citizenship Education: An Empirical Study of Policy Practices and Outcomes’, Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 25, No. 1–2, 1999, pp. 231–50. 21. From an interview with Mr Karsten Friedel, coordinator, Tolerantes Brandenburg, 23 October 2000. 22. Brochure, RAA Brandenburg—regional centres for inter-cultural understanding, education and schools in Brandenburg. 23. From an interview with Ms Annegret Ehmann, Head, RAA Brandenburg, 25 October 2000. 24. From an interview with Ms Anita Nagel and Mr Matthias Steinmetz, Die Schweiøwarzen—Schule ohne Rassismus, Friedrichsgymnasium, Frankfurt-Oder, 24 October 2000. 25. Wolfgang Thierse, ‘Ich SchÄme mich für dises land’ (I am feeling embarrassed for this land), Die Zeit, 27 July 2000. 26. From an interview with Mr Henryk Simon, Utopia, Frankfurt-Oder, 20 October 2000. 27. From an interview with Mr Weinder, Infocafe ‘Der Winkel’, Belzig, 24 October 2000. 28. From an interview with Mr Dieter Müller, Tolerantes Eberswalde, Eberswalde, 23 October 2000. 29. \http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw98-9/germany.html[. 30. At this point we should present some reservations. Among the activists engaged in confrontations with right-wing extremists, a minority was not motivated by a prodemocractic ideology but rather from a radical left-wing one. Such activists should 74 Ami Pedahzur not be regarded as part of civil society I but as members of a different type of uncivil organization. 31. M. W. Foley and B. Edwards, ‘The Paradox of Civil Society’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, 1996, p. 39; Z. Pelczynski, ‘Solidarity and the Rebirth of Civil Society’, in J. Keane (ed.), Civil Society and the State, London, 1988, pp. 361–80. 32. For a comprehensive discussion regarding the problems that may arise from state sponsorship of civil society organizations, see J. S. Dryzek, ‘Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 1, 1996, pp. 475–96. View publication stats