Legal knowledge based systems
JURIX 92
Information Technology and Law
The Foundation for Legal Knowledge Systems
Editors:
C.A.F.M. Grütters
J.A.P.J. Breuker
H.J. Van den Herik
A.H.J. Schmidt
C.N.J. De Vey Mestdagh
J.C. Hage, G.P.J. Span and A.R. Lodder, A Dialogical Model of Legal Reasoning, in:
C.A.F.M. Grütters, J.A.P.J. Breuker, H.J. Van den Herik, A.H.J. Schmidt, C.N.J. De Vey
Mestdagh (eds.), Legal knowledge based systems JURIX 92: Information Technology
and Law , The Foundation for Legal Knowledge Systems, Lelystad: Koninklijke
Vermande, pp. 135-146, 1994 ISBN 90 5458 031 3.
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1992 JURIX The Foundation for Legal Knowledge Systems
http://jurix.bsk.utwente.nl/
A DIALOGICAL MODEL OF LEGAL REASONING
J.C. HAGE, G.P.J. SPAN and A.R. LODDER
Law and Computer Science, University of Limburg, Maastricht, The Netherlands
Summary
This paper argues the thesis that the rules of law are best viewed as rules for dialogues
rather than as rules constituting institutional facts. Starting from this view, a dialogical
model of legal reasoning is developed. The paper provides an example of such a model in
action. Thereafter a prelude to an intelligent legal tutoring system is given, incorporating
the chosen view and the dialogical model as starting points.
1.
Introduction
Although most legal reasoning takes place in the context of legal disputes in which two
parties argue their positions in a dialogue with the other party, formal models of legal
reasoning often resemble monological proofs [Sergot et al., 1986][Prakken, 1991]
[Sartor, 1991]. This phenomenon might be explained by the fact that monological logics
are the prevalent tools for formalizing any type of reasoning, but this explanation would
not suffice unless there would be independent reasons to consider legal reasoning along
the lines of proofs.
Such independent reasons can be found in the positivist view of the law which prevails
among modern legal theoreticians. This view considers the law as a social institution and
legal conclusions as descriptions of institutional facts [MacCormick, 1974]. In our
opinion this view is wrong, and as a consequence we reject monological logics as
adequate tools for modelling legal reasoning. Instead we propose a dialogical model
introduced informally in this paper. The model is illustrated by means of an example.
Moreover, we indicate how the model may be applied in an intelligent legal tutoring
system.
2.
Law as institutional fact
A popular modern view of the law tells us that the law consists of a set of rules. The
results of applying rules of law are facts of a special kind, namely institutional facts.
Institutional facts are the result of the application of the rules of a social institution to
other facts. These rules are constitutive, which means that they 'create' their conclusions
[Searle, 1969, p. 50 f.].
Examples from chess are famous in this context. The rules of chess make it the case that
some moves are legitimate ones, and other illegitimate ones. Less familiar in this
connection is the constitutive role played by rules of language. The definition of laser
makes it the case that some beams are laser beams.
In the law a comparable mechanism would make it the case that a person which takes a
good belonging to someone else, with the purpose of misappropriation is a thief. Being a
thief in the sense of the law is an institutional fact. Legal definitions are constitutive rules
[MacCormick, 1974][Ruiter, forthcoming].
But not only definitions would be constitutive, also rules which declare some types of
behavior punishable would be constitutive. Being punishable is an institutional fact
within the social institution of the law.
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Hage, J.C., G.P.J. Span and A.R. Lodder
Although institutional facts are different from normal, "brute" facts [Anscombe, 1958],
they are just as real. For instance, institutional facts are independent from whether some
individual wants to acknowledge them. I have a duty to pay my taxes, whether I
recognize it or not. Laser beams, illegitimate moves, rights and duties, permissions and
powers, they all exist independent from individual recognition just as the sea, buildings
and thoughts.
There exists, however, a difference. Institutional facts depend on the rules of a social
institution and these rules in their turn depend on humans. Usually institutional rules
cannot be changed by individuals to suit their whims. But most often they can be changed
if a social group grows into different rules (this is how moral rules change), or if an
official within the institution, who has the power to do so (e.g., the legislator) changes
the rules.
If the law consists of a set of institutional rules, there is a striking isomorphism between,
on the one hand, the constitution of institutional facts on the basis of legal rules, and on
the other hand, the reasoning step in monological logics which is famous under the name
of "Modus Ponens" (detachment). This isomorphism is presumably the reason why
monological logics are still popular as tools for modelling legal reasoning.
3.
Why the law does not constitute institutional facts
An important characteristic of institutional rules, which is lacking in the law, is that the
rules function as it were independent. They depend for their existence on human practice,
but as soon as they exist, they independently constitute institutional facts. A laser beam
does not become a laser beam because of express application of a rule of language, nor
does an illegitimate chess move ask for express application of a rule of chess. Rules
underlying institutional facts are so to speak self-applying; they need not expressly be
applied by a human being in order to constitute institutional facts.
Legal rules are not self-applying. Sometimes they appear to be, but that is just an illusion.
It is always possible to dispute the application of a rule of law, even if the rule's
preconditions are met. For instance, even the rule defining theft is amenable to
discussion. Should it be applied if the misappropriation serves a higher goal than the
preservation of property? If not, the person who fulfills the preconditions of the
definition of theft is not a thief. He would have been in case that definition had been selfapplying.
It might still be argued that legal rules are self-applying, because the discussion is not
about the application of the rule but about the nature of the rule. The 'real' rule may have
hidden conditions, which make that the rule is not applicable even if all manifest
conditions have been met. As a consequence we cannot be certain how the institutional
reality looks like.
This theory cannot be refuted in an absolute sense, but it is highly unlikely. It would
imply that we can never be certain about the conditions of legal rules and that as a
consequence we all live in an institutional reality that we can never know. The whole idea
of institutional facts makes no sense if these facts remain forever unknown to us.
We must conclude that the law does not consist of a set of constitutive rules underlying
institutional legal facts. From this conclusion it follows that the mentioned reason to use
monological logics for modelling legal reasoning is deceptive. Since the practice of legal
dialogues also points in a different direction, we might look for a different model.
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A Dialogical Model of Legal Reasoning
4.
Law as a procedure
In the context of distributive justice, Rawls [1972, p. 85 f.] distinguished between three
types of justice. First there is substantive justice, which relates to a situation which is just
in itself. For instance, the division of a cake into three equal pieces may be called just
(according to some egalitarian standard).
Second there is imperfect procedural justice. This type of justice is invoked in case we
need a procedure to achieve substantial justice and we cannot establish the nature of what
is substantively just independently. Rawls mentions in this context the example of a
criminal trial (as far as the establishment of the facts is involved).
Third we have purely procedural justice, where the outcome of a procedure is just,
exactly because it is the outcome of the procedure. Elections and a lottery are examples of
purely procedural justice. Of course the outcome of the procedure is only just if the
procedure has been applied correctly.
We propose to look at the law as something purely procedural. The procedure consists of
an argument in the form of a dialogue, where the rules of law define which argument
moves can legitimately be made. Next to the traditional rules there are procedural rules
defining the roles of the parties in the dialogue. The outcome of the dialogue determines
what counts as the law.
Before elaborating the view of the law as something purely procedural, we want to point
out what is maybe the most important difference between our view and the view of the
law as a set of constitutive rules. This difference is that in our view the law depends on
an actual procedure. It is not possible to establish the law without following a procedure.
This procedure need not be an official legal procedure. It is even possible to conduct a
legal dialogue in the mind of one man, but it must still be a dialogue to be law.
The outcome of the procedure depends on the argument moves which are actually made,
and as a consequence different outcomes may all be equally legitimate. This phenomenon
has been described by Berman and Hafner as the "indeterminacy of the law" [Berman &
Hafner 1987]. The view of the law as the outcome of a procedure explains
indeterminacy. Only if the rules of law sufficiently constrain the allowed courses of the
dialogue to allow only one outcome, the law is determinate.
5.
A dialogical model of legal reasoning
5.1.
Basic ideas
To analyze legal dialogues, we developed a dialogical model of legal reasoning [Hage &
Leenes, 1992]. Our model works with reasons pro and contra a conclusion. A reason is a
set of one or more facts, with an underlying rule which makes these facts relevant for the
conclusion of the reason. To draw a conclusion, one must collect the reasons which plead
for and against it. In the end it may be necessary to "weigh" reasons.
We consider legal disputes to be dialogues between two parties about a specific
proposition, which is called the conclusion of the dialogue. One party, the proponent,
defends the conclusion, the other party, the opponent, does not accept and maybe even
denies the conclusion. Both parties are allowed to make argument moves [cf. Skalak &
Rissland, 1991], such as adducing reasons and asking for justifications.
A dialogue often contains subdialogues, the conclusion of which is a fact or rule in the
dialogue one level higher. The rules for the main dialogue are also used in the
subdialogues. The structure of dialogues is recursive [Naess, 1966].
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Some moves in a dialogue commit the party which makes them to accepting specific
beliefs. Ideally a dialogue ends when the opponent is committed to the conclusion, or
when the proponent is committed to the denial of the conclusion. A dialogue also ends
when the proponent stops defending the conclusion, without actually being committed to
its denial.
In a legal dialogue three belief sets are involved. A belief set is a set of beliefs (facts and
rules) to which a party is committed. Both parties are committed to the beliefs in their
own set (which may be empty). Next to these sets it is sensible to make use of a common
belief set, which contains beliefs to which both parties are committed. These beliefs are
for instance those which are dictated by common sense, or by generally accepted rules of
law.
In a dialogue both parties seek to make such moves that the other party is committed to its
opponents point of view. Moreover, they also try to avoid to become committed to their
opponents point of view themselves. The dialogue is the process of making argument
moves which in the end leads to some result concerning the conclusion.
5.2.
The process of reasoning
An argument comes into existence when some party, the proponent, proposes some
thesis which is not accepted by the other party, the opponent. It is not necessary that the
opponent denies the thesis; refusal to accept is sufficient. The thesis then becomes the
conclusion of the argument.
If the opponent refuses to accept the conclusion, he may invite the proponent to produce
reasons for it [Alexy, 1978, p. 361]. However, the opponent is only allowed to ask for
reasons if he himself is not already committed to the conclusion.
There are two grounds for being committed to some belief. Either one has performed an
argument move which commits one to a belief, in which case the belief is in one's own
belief set, or the belief is in the common belief set.
By making argument moves a party commits himself to beliefs. For instance, by
adducing a reason, one commits oneself both to the factual beliefs contained in it and the
rule underlying the reason. And by accepting a reason adduced by the other party, that is,
by not asking for a justification of the reason, one also commits oneself to the factual
beliefs within the reason.
The common belief set is a set of factual beliefs and rules which are assumed by default.
Parties in a dialogue are committed to the beliefs in the common set.
If a party is committed to a certain belief, but nevertheless does not want to accept it, he
must adduce reasons against that belief. This comes down to adducing reasons for the
denial of the belief, and this procedure is just a case of adducing reasons for a belief.
Adducing a reason consists of mentioning other factual beliefs which purport to be
reasons in favor of the conclusion.
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A Dialogical Model of Legal Reasoning
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Figure 1: Schematic overview of the beginning of the dialogue
If the proponent has adduced one or more reasons in favor of the conclusion, the
opponent can choose from several tactics, some of which can be combined. The first
possibility is to accept the reason(s), and do nothing else. In that case the opponent
commits himself to the conclusion and the dialogue ends.
The second possibility is that the opponent does not accept the facts adduced as reasons.
This situation is analogous to not accepting the conclusion and is dealt with in the same
fashion.
If the opponent accepts the facts, he can nevertheless refuse to accept them as reasons.
The third possibility is that the opponent asks the proponent to provide the rule
underlying the reasons. If this happens, the proponent must identify the rule on the basis
of which the adduced facts constitute a reason in favor of the conclusion.
Now the opponent can accept the rule or not. If he accepts the rule, he will also accept the
reason, because he already committed himself to the facts. If he does not accept the rule,
and is not committed to it either, he can ask the proponent to give reasons in favor of the
rule.
Even if the opponent both accepts the facts adduced as a reason and the rule underlying
the reason, there is a possibility that he does not accept the reason itself. For he may say
that the rule should not be applied to the facts. If this happens, usually the opponent must
provide reasons why the rule should not be applied. However, sometimes the proponent
must provide reasons why the rule should be applied.
There are two possible reasons why a rule should not be applied to a set of facts. The
first and most obvious reason is that the facts do not satisfy the conditions of the rule.
The second is that there should be made an exception to the rule, although the facts
satisfy the rule conditions.
In the first case, it is not clear beforehand which party has the burden of proof.
Sometimes the proponent must give reasons why the rule conditions are satisfied in this
case. At other occasions, the opponent must give reasons why the rule is not applicable.
It is possible that a meta-level discussion about the burden of proof results, which can be
analyzed within the same framework as object-level discussions.
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Hage, J.C., G.P.J. Span and A.R. Lodder
Even if it is established that the rule conditions are not satisfied by the facts, the
proponent can still argue that the rule must be applied analogously. This is a new thesis
for which he may have to argue if the opponent does not accept it.
In the case of an exception to the rule, the party who wants to argue the exception should
provide reasons for that. Typically he adduces reasons based upon a meta-rule. Of course
the other party can argue for an exception to the exception etc.
Finally, if the opponent accepts the facts, the rule, and its applicability, and therefore also
the reason adduced by the proponent, it is still possible for him to refuse to accept the
conclusion. But then he must adduce reasons against the conclusion himself. In that case
the proponent has all of the above mentioned possibilities to challenge those reasons.
If at the end of a discussion both reasons pro and contra the conclusion remain, the
decision about the conclusion depends on weighing these reasons. The proponent has the
responsibility to argue why his reasons should weigh more heavily than his opponent's.
5.3.
Possible outcomes of a discussion
In the case where at the end of the discussion both parties agree to what reasons plead in
favor of the conclusion, and what reasons plead against it, there are two possible
outcomes. First it may be the case that a discussion about the weights has determined
which group of reasons ought to win, or that at the end of the discussion only reasons for
or against the conclusion remained. In this case both parties are committed to the
conclusion or its denial, depending on the nature of the reasons and their weights.
Second, it may be the case that the main discussion has ended without commitment of
either party to one or more reasons. In this case reason dictates neither acceptance nor
rejection of the conclusion.
If both parties agree to the reasons, but not to their relative weights, there usually is no
rational solution to the problem whether the conclusion should be accepted or not. The
number of reasons itself is not sufficient to determine which conclusion must be drawn,
since one important reason may theoretically outweigh several less important ones.
In case there is at least one reason on which parties do not agree there are two
possibilities. The first is that the acceptance of the disputed reason(s) does not make a
difference to the acceptance of the conclusion. The conclusion should then be accepted or
rejected on the basis of the undisputed reasons, and the disputed reason is left out of
consideration.
The second possibility is that the disputed reason does make a difference. Under this
second possibility, neither the acceptance nor the rejection of the conclusion is dictated by
reason.
5.4.
The common set, the neutral party and the burden of proof
We have already encountered the common set as an element in the setting of a dialogue
whose function it is to resolve possible impasses in the dialogue. The common set
provides solutions to impasses because it contains rules and facts which are to be
assumed by default. However, it is often difficult to determine whether a fact or rule is
contained in the common set. In actual discussions, the common set is not a neat
explicitly listed collection of rules and facts. Just like common sense knowledge, with
which it largely coincides, the common set is never fully known.
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A Dialogical Model of Legal Reasoning
Therefore, in legal dialogues a decision procedure is invoked to determine whether a
specific rule or fact is in the common set. This decision procedure consists of an appeal to
the neutral party (judge or arbiter). The neutral party has as one of its most important
tasks to determine whether a belief element is in the common set or not.
Where the common set does not give the answer to a specific question, a decision about a
belief can sometimes be forced by giving one of the parties the burden of proof. If a party
has the burden to proof something, it is implied that if the proof fails, the belief which
should be proved is rejected.
The assignment of the burden of proof is sometimes governed by rules. In the case these
rules lack, the neutral party in the dialogue has the task to assign this burden to one of the
other parties.
Since it is not possible to offer here a more detailed description of the dialogical model of
legal reasoning, interested readers are referred to [Hage & Leenes, 1992]. Below, we
illustrate the model by means of an analysis of a particular piece of legal reasoning.
6.
An illustration of the model
6.1.
The case
The following example gives an impression of how the dialogical model can be used to
analyze legal reasoning. The case is based on the doctrine of "a third party in good faith"
as laid down in art. 3:86 and 3:87 BW (Dutch Civil Code). These legal rules concern the
transfer of property between a person who has no power of disposal and a person who
acts in good faith and assumes he is buying from a proprietor.
The case runs as follows:
Albert owns an antique clock. On October 25th, 1988 Bernard steals the clock. A few
days later Bernard sells the clock as an auctioneer to Cornelis at a reasonable price. On
June 6th, 1991 Albert discovers the clock at Cornelis' home and asks how Cornelis
obtained the clock. Cornelis tells him the whole story, after which Albert wants to
revendicate his clock.
6.2.
The debate
The debate on this case will be between the Proponent (P) and the Opponent (O).
Commentary on the argument moves is in italics.
P
Albert (A) can revendicate the clock.
Proposes the conclusion of the dialogue.
O
Why?
Asks for reasons.
P
A is the proprietor.
Provides a reason.
O
Why?
P
1. A was the initial owner of the clock.
2. He never lost the ownership of the clock.
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Hage, J.C., G.P.J. Span and A.R. Lodder
The two assertions together constitute one reason for the thesis "A is the
proprietor".
O
I do not agree with 2 because ...
Denial of a part of the reason. Although not (yet) committed to provide
reasons for the denial he provides them to speed up the debate. The
consequence of this argument move is that the role of opponent and
proponent changes here, since the subdiscussion is about a new thesis
proposed by O.
1. The clock is a personal property.
2. The clock is stolen from A by Bernard (B).
3. B got a hold on the clock.
4. B had no power of disposal.
5. Cornelis (C) paid a reasonable price.
6. C assumed B was the proprietor.
7. C obtained the clock in good faith.
All these assertions together constitute one reason for the denial.
P
I agree with the facts, but why are they a reason for the conclusion?
Two argument moves: acceptance of the facts and a demand to show their
relevance.
O
The rule of article 3:86 section 1 BW
O. provides the underlying rule. To avoid complications, we identify rules
of law with statutory rules.
P
I accept the rule, but the rule should not be applied to the facts.
Again two moves; acceptance of the rule and denial that it should be
applied. P is - by the way - committed to acceptance of the rule of 3:86
section 1 BW, since such rules are in the common set.
O
Why?
By denying that the rule should be applied, P has committed himself to a
new thesis, thereby giving O the opportunity to attack the thesis and
reverse the initiative in the debate. O takes his chance by asking for a
reason.
P
1. B is an auctioneer.
2. C bought from B.
Conditions which together create an exception to the rule.
therefore:
3. A can revendicate the clock within 3 years after the theft.
Conclusion of 1 and 2. The arguments (1 and 2) create an exception to the
applicability of article 3:86 section 1 BW. This exception itself leads to a
new legal consequence which is stated in 3.
O
What is the underlying rule?
P
The rule of article 3:86 section 3 subsection a BW.
O
I accept the rule, but the rule should not be applied to the facts.
P
Why?
O
Because application of the rule would be contrary to the rule's purpose.
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A Dialogical Model of Legal Reasoning
P
Why?
O
1. The purpose of art. 3:86 section 3 subsection a with regard to public sale is to
avoid the difficulty for the initial owner in finding the person who sold the
personal property. As a consequence the initial owner often is unable to recoup
his losses from this person.
2. B stole the clock from A.
3. C knows he bought the clock from B.
4. A is able to recoup his losses from B.
1 states the purpose of the rule, while 2-4 state that application of the rule
in the present case would be contrary to that purpose.
P
Why should we follow the rule's purpose, instead of its conditions?
Relevancy of the purpose of the rule.
O
Because a rule should not be applied if this application would be contrary to the
rule's purpose.
The rule which makes the purpose relevant.
P
I do not see why conflict with the purpose of the rule implies that the rule should
not be applied.
The rule is not accepted.
O
The purpose of the rule in this case is more important than the applicability of the
rule.
P
I do not agree.
If the parties in the discussion cannot solve a discussion by themselves, and the common
set does not commit either one party to a solution, an arbiter has to resolve the matter.
This is the case in a situation as the present one, where there exists disagreement about a
legal meta-rule about which there is no general agreement in the legal community.
Depending on the decision of the arbiter, P or O wins the discussion, unless new reasons
are produced which plead in the other direction than the one supported by the arbiter.
7.
Conclusion
This example shows how a debate can be analyzed in terms of our dialogical model. Such
an analysis can be the basis for an evaluation. It is possible to establish which party has
won (which part of ) the debate, under the condition that the decisions of the arbiter are
known.
As soon as the dialogical model is formalized, a decision procedure can be defined which
establishes the winner of the debate. That would create the possibility to evaluate the
outcome and the individual steps in a formalized debate. This possibility in its turn opens
perspectives for an intelligent tutoring system, based upon debates between a student and
the computer. In the context of the Archimedes-project, we started to build such a
system, the main ideas of which are described in the next section.
The Archimedes tutoring system is based on a game, because games (if they are good)
motivate people to play. The idea behind the game is that the student must try to beat the
computer in a simulated legal argument about a case in the domain of the system. The
argument consists of a dialogue in which both the student and the computer can make
argument moves [Skalak & Rissland, 1991]. On basis of the represented domain
knowledge, an underlying system of dialogical reason based logic [Hage, 1991][Hage &
Leenes, 1992] evaluates the discussion and determines who wins.
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Hage, J.C., G.P.J. Span and A.R. Lodder
If the student makes bad argument moves, the tutoring system can adapt its level, and/or
provide hints. These hints range from remarks about the student's performance to the
presentation of legal materials and a study advice. The tutoring system is linked to a
hypertext-like information-network and provides suitable entry points into that network.
In this way the student receives relevant information in the form of text concerning the
law, case law and doctrine.
The tutoring system must fulfill four roles. First it must play the student's opponent in
the legal debate. Second it must monitor the student's performance and adapt the student
profile and correspondingly the tutorial approach. At this point the computer can give
hints on which argument move is best and give the student an adequate entry into the
information network. Providing this entry we consider as the third role of the tutoring
system. Finally it must play the arbiter who determines which argument moves are
permitted, makes decisions on open questions, and decides which party in the dispute
wins (figure 2).
TUTORING
SYSTEM
STUDENT
SIDE IN THE
LEGAL DEBATE
ARBITER IN THE
LEGAL DEBATE
TUTOR
DATA NETWORK
Figure 2
In this paper we tried to draw attention to a dialogical approach to legal reasoning. For
this purpose we first argued why the seeming attractiveness of monological approaches is
ill-founded. Second we gave an informal description of possible steps in a legal dialogue.
And finally we showed how a dialogical approach of legal reasoning can be put to
practical use in an intelligent legal tutoring system.
We are aware that we only offered the beginnings of a new approach. The next steps
should include formalization of legal dialogues and a logic by means of which the
outcome of dialogues can be evaluated. Such a logic should be compared to rival
approaches, especially applications of non-monotonic reasoning in law [Prakken, 1991]
[Sartor, 1991].
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A Dialogical Model of Legal Reasoning
8.
Acknowledgement
This research was partly financed by the Foundation for Knowledge-based Systems
(SKBS), a foundation with the goal to improve the level of expertise in the Netherlands
in the field of knowledge-based systems and to promote the transfer of knowledge in this
field between universities and business companies.
9.
References
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