Journal of Evolutionary Psychology, 5(2007)1–4, 67–87
D O I: 10.1556/JEP.2007.1009
CRITICAL POINTS IN CURRENT THEORY OF
CONFORMIST SOCIAL LEARNING
K. ERIKSSON1, a, M. ENQUIST, S.b GHIRLANDAc
a
Mälardalen University
Stockholm University
c
University of Bologna, Stockholm University
b
Abstract. Existing mathematical models suggest that gene-culture coevolution favours a
conformist bias in social learning, that is, a psychological mechanism to preferentially acquire the
most common cultural variants. Here we show that this conclusion relies on specific assumptions
that seem unrealistic, such as that all cultural variants are known to every individual. We present
two models that remove these assumptions, showing that: 1) the rate of cultural evolution and the
adaptive value of culture are higher in a population in which individuals pick cultural variants at
random (Random strategy) rather than picking the most common one (Conform strategy); 2) in
genetic evolution the Random strategy out-competes the Conform strategy, unless cultural
evolution is very slow, in which case Conform and Random usually coexist; 3) the individuals’
ability to evaluate cultural variants is a more important determinant of the adaptive value of
culture than frequency-based choice strategies. We also review existing empirical literature and
game-theoretic arguments for conformity, finding neither strong empirical evidence nor a strong
theoretical expectation for a general conformist bias. Our own vignette study of social learning
shows that people may indeed use different social learning strategies depending on context.
Keywords: social learning, conformist transmission, gene-culture coevolution
1. INTRODUCTION
Social learning, the non-genetic transmission of traits from a model individual to a
naive individual, is a crucial element of cultural evolution. Since humans live in
groups, there are usually many potential models around. If they all use the same
1
Corresponding author: K. ERIKSSON, Center for cultural evolution, Wallenberglaboratoriet,
Stockholm University, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden.
Fax: +46 21 101330, E-mail: kimmo.eriksson@mdh.se.
1789–2082 © 2007 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
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cultural variant, then social learning will result simply in the transmission of that
variant. Human populations, however, are rarely culturally homogeneous. Thus the
following questions are central to understand cultural evolution: How do
individuals choose among cultural variants? What determines such rules of choice?
How do they influence cultural evolution?
Figure 1. Historical variants of hammers. The arrow indicates increasing efficiency. Adapted
from Basalla (1988)
As an example, consider different variants of hammers (Figure 1). Suppose a
naive individual observes that many use hammer A and few hammer B. What
hammer will she use? Many possible choice rules come to mind. She might try out
both hammers to see which works best; she may stick with the first hammer she
finds; she may choose the design that appeals to her most, regardless of how well it
works; she may choose the hammer that is used by the best hammer-wielder; she
may choose the hammer that seems to be most popular, and so on. The choice rule
is important because hammers are not all equally good for their purpose. Hammer
B, for instance, is better than hammer A. With a better hammer, the wielder can
work more efficiently than individuals with worse hammers. In general, an
individual’s choice of cultural variants can often affect the individual’s reproductive
success. If the mechanisms to choose among cultural variants have a genetic basis,
we expect natural selection to favour mechanisms that tend to result in the
acquisition of superior cultural variants. Two types of strategies for choosing
among variants have been considered.
The first suggestion is that individuals evaluate on their own the available
cultural variants and choose the best one (BOYD and RICHERSON 1985, 1995). This
strategy, it has been suggested, may be the basis of adaptive culture (ENQUIST et al.
2007). However, it may not always be possible to accurately evaluate all variants,
e.g., if effects can only be seen in the long term, or if they have a large stochastic
component. The second suggestion is to rely on social information, i.e., information
on what variants are used by others. It has been suggested that we have evolved
special psychological biases that result, on average, in the acquisition of adaptive
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cultural variants (LUMSDEN and WILSON 1980, 1981). One influential idea is that
we have a strong bias for imitating common variants vs. rare ones, referred to as
conformist bias. The rationale is that “once adaptive processes cause the best
variants to be most common, those who imitate the most common variant are less
likely to acquire inappropriate beliefs than those who imitate at random”
(RICHERSON and BOYD 2005, p.~121). We may thus expect natural selection to
favour a genetically based conformist bias. This interesting idea has had some
impact on theoretical research on cultural evolution. For example, conformist bias
has been proposed as essential to the maintenance of adaptive culture, and as a
driving force for the emergence of cultural phenomena such as stable betweengroup differences and altruistic punishment (BOYD and RICHERSON 1985; HENRICH
and BOYD 1998, 2001; RICHERSON and BOYD 2005). The idea, however, has also
been criticized, for instance on the ground that a conformist bias would slow down
the spread of adaptive innovations (HENRICH and BOYD 1998; MAMELI 2007).
Here we try to contribute to this theoretical debate with several arguments. In
section 2 we describe the conformist bias idea and the theoretical models that show
how such a bias would be adaptive in a population living in a changing environment
(BOYD and RICHERSON 1985; HENRICH and BOYD 1998). We point out that these
models implicitly assume that individuals have access to all possible cultural
variants – what we call the accessibility assumption. We believe this assumption is
not appropriate to describe culture: variants are not known until they are invented
by someone, and then they are known only to the inventor or to individuals who
learn it from the inventor or from others. In section 3 we modify the model of
HENRICH and BOYD (1998) relaxing the accessibility assumption. The result is that
a conformist biased population can now be invaded by an unbiased genotype. In
other words, conformist bias is not evolutionarily stable in this model. In section 4
we develop a new model of cultural evolution, relaxing the oft-made assumption
that exactly two variants of a trait exist at any one time, and allowing for
unbounded cumulation of inventions (e.g., a series of inventions increasing in
efficiency, Fig. 1). In this model a conformist bias performs even worse. A
conformist biased population is at a severe disadvantage compared to an unbiased
group because of its inability to adopt new, adaptive cultural variants.
These theoretical results cast doubt on the adaptive value of a conformist bias,
but ultimately its existence in humans is an empirical question. In section 5 we
review the empirical evidence, which we find scarce and apparently not supportive
of the conformist bias hypothesis. In section 6 we report results of a vignette study
of social learning in two different contexts, food choice and punishment of social
defectors. Our rationale is that, from a game-theoretic point of view, there is little
justification to expect that conforming to the majority should always be the best
strategy. We might thus expect to see different social learning strategies according
to the specific problem at hand. Our study indeed suggests that newcomers in an
environment are more likely to adopt common behaviours in the domain of food
choice than in the domain of punishment of social defectors.
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2. CURRENT THEORY OF CONFORMIST BIAS
We are aware of two models showing that a genetically based conformist bias can
evolve, one in BOYD and RICHERSON (1985) and the other in HENRICH and BOYD
(1998). It has also been suggested that a genetically based conformist bias could
coevolve with a “success bias” (a tendency to imitate successful individuals, BOYD
and RICHERSON 1985; RICHERSON and BOYD 2005), and that these biases may be
socially learned rather than innate, but we are not aware of any formal studies of
these ideas (see MAMELI 2007 for discussion).
The models in BOYD and RICHERSON (1985) and in HENRICH and BOYD
(1998) are similar in that individuals choose between two cultural variants, each of
which is favoured in one of two possible environmental states. Both models also
feature a number of local populations in different environmental states, linked by
moderate migration. The model in BOYD and RICHERSON (1985) combines two
processes. Parents with the best variant have more children, causing natural
selection on both genetic and cultural traits, including strategies for social learning.
Children learn from their parents, but if they migrate to another habitat they may
either copy the most common variant (conformist bias) or copy at random. The
basic finding was that genetic evolution favoured a conformist bias.
It was later recognized that the result of BOYD and RICHERSON (1985) might
not hold if the environment can change with time, since a conformist bias might
prevent individuals from adapting to change. Thus a new model was proposed
where each habitat stochastically and independently switches between the two
different environmental states (HENRICH and BOYD, 1998). Another new feature of
this model is the central role played by individual learning. Agents are assumed to
first try to evaluate the two variants on their own, relying upon social information
from the previous generation only when individual learning yields no decisive
results. In this model there is no natural selection of cultural variants and cultural
parents are drawn at random. Another difference is that all learning, social or
individual, occurs before migration. Thus a conformist bias plays no role in
adapting the individual to a new environment after migration. The model was too
complex for mathematical analysis, but based on simulations the authors concluded
that a conformist bias should be favoured under a very broad range of parameter
values – though not when individual learning is completely ineffective.
Why does conformist bias evolve in these models? Genetic evolution always
favours a conformist strategy when the best cultural variant is also the most
common variant. Thus, it is central to know how cultural variants of different
fitness are distributed, both in theoretical models and in reality. We know of no
studies of the latter. In the model of BOYD and RICHERSON (1985) only individuals
migrating to another subpopulation could have a conformist bias. Non-migrating
individuals, the majority, acquired the cultural variant of their parents, and parents
with the best variant had more children. Thus eventually most individuals in each
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subpopulation will use the best variant for their habitat, favouring a conformist bias
among migrating individuals.
In the model of HENRICH and BOYD (1998) there is no natural selection of
cultural variants, as cultural parents are drawn at random. Another mechanism,
individual learning, ensures that the most common variant is usually the best. All
individuals are assumed to have a priori knowledge of both variants, hence plain
guessing leads to a 50% chance of picking the best variant. If individuals can
sometimes discover by individual learning which variant is best, and if social
learning is faithful enough, then the frequency of the superior variant will soon be
above 50% even after an environmental change, which makes a conformist bias
adaptive.
How general are the conclusions from these two models? In this paper we
investigate the consequence of relaxing two assumptions. We call them the two
variant assumption, meaning that individuals must choose between only two
cultural variants, and the accessibility assumption, meaning that individuals know a
priori what the available variants are. As we argued in the introduction, we believe
that these assumptions are not realistic. Thus it is important to understand how they
impact model results. We will focus on two questions:
1. When does natural selection promote a conformist bias over unbiased
choice?
2. When does a conformist-biased population have higher average fitness than
an unbiased population?
3. A MODEL WITH TWO CULTURAL VARIANTS ACCESSIBLE
THROUGH INVENTION AND SOCIAL LEARNING
We have tried to design a simple model that preserves all important features of the
model by HENRICH and BOYD (1998) and allow us to both replicate their result and
to explore the consequence of relaxing the accessibility assumption. We consider a
single population of N individuals that must choose between just two cultural
variants. Depending on the environmental state, one of them is superior to the other.
With a probability pswitch the environment switches state so that the other variant
becomes superior in the next generation. A naive individual tries to find out the best
cultural variant based both on social information from n individuals from the
previous generation (her cultural parents) and on her own effort to evaluate variants.
We consider two decision processes, one which removes the accessibility
assumption and one which maintains it.
Removing the accessibility assumptions, we assume that an individual knows
about a variant only if she has seen it among her cultural parents. If she has seen
only one variant, then she adopts it. Otherwise, she tries to find out which variant is
best. The evaluation is either correct or leaves the individual uncertain. The latter
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occurs with a probability puncertain , in which case the individual uses social
information to choose a variant. We contrast two genetically based choice rules:
Conform: Choose the most common variant among cultural models.
Random: Choose a cultural model at random and adopt her variant
(equivalently: adopt a variant with a probability equal to its frequency
among cultural models).
Lastly, we assume that an individual that is not using the best variant after the
above decision process has a small probability, pinvent , of inventing it on her own.
The second decision process we consider keeps the accessibility assumption,
i.e., an individual is assumed to always know about both variants, even if one was
absent among her cultural parents. Then the decision process goes on as above.
Figure 2. The frequency of individuals with best variant in populations of either the Conform or
the Random strategy under two assumptions about access to variants obtained for varying
puncertain . Each data point is the average of 5000 generations of simulation
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We have run a large number of simulations of this model. In the following
example, which is representative, the invention rate is pinvent = 0.01, the population
size N = 10000, and each naive individual observes n = 10 cultural models. The
environmental instability is pswitch = 0.1. We first study whether a conformistbiased population has a higher average fitness than an unbiased population. Fig. 2
shows the frequency of individuals with the superior variant as a function of
puncertain in populations where all individuals follow the same social learning
strategy. Conform is able to maintain a higher frequency of the superior variant only
when individuals have a priori access to both variants (lower panel). When
individuals must know about the variants by social learning, Random does as well
as Conform (upper panel).
3.1. Genetic evolution
The above results have no direct bearing on genetic evolution. In this section we let
the Conform and Random social learning strategies compete with each other in a
gene-culture coevolutionary process. We are interested in whether there is a
selection pressure for or against conformity and whether the Conform strategy is
evolutionarily stable. Hence we start our simulations from a homogeneous
population of Conform, as well as from random mixtures of the two strategies, and
introduce a small probability of genetic mutation in each generation. We use the
same parameters as above. In addition, we assume that individuals with the best
variant have fitness two times higher than individuals with the inferior variant. We
model genetic evolution with random drift as follows. Each new generation of N
individuals is created by sampling the previous generation N times; every time, the
probability for an individual of being chosen is proportional to her fitness. On
average this process yields reproduction proportional to fitness. The probability of a
strategy being changed to the other one by mutation is pmutation = 0.0001.
We first show that we can replicate the result of Henrich and Boyd (1998) by
assuming that each individual always has access to both variants. As shown in Fig.
3, the Conform strategy seems to be an ESS unless puncertain is close to 1. Dropping
the accessibility assumption the result is different. Fig. 3 illustrates that a
conformist population can always be invaded in this case. No strategy is
consistently superior, although for most values of puncertain the Conform strategy is
somewhat more frequent on average than Random. A detailed examination of the
simulations reveals that periods in which Conform does better alternate with periods
in which Random does better. This follows from the pattern of environmental
changes. After a long time without an environmental change the best strategy is
established in the population and conformity is favoured. However, when a change
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occurs very few, if any, individuals have the best variant and unbiased choice is
favoured as long as the best variant is in the minority.
Figure 3. The frequency of the Conform strategy as a function of puncertain for two different
assumptions about individuals’ access to cultural variants. Each data point is the average of 5000
generations of simulation, starting from a Conform population
3.2. Conclusions
In conclusion, we have shown that the accessibility assumption is crucial to the
evolution of a conformist bias. When the assumption is dropped, a conformist bias
is not consistently superior to unbiased choice. The reason is that when individuals
have always access to all cultural variants they can adapt more quickly to
environmental change. This translates into a higher frequency of individuals with
the superior variant, which in turn tends to favour conformism in social learning.
When individuals need to see the variants before they can compare them, on the
other hand, adaptation to environmental change is slower, fewer individuals end up
with the superior variant and conformism is not consistently favoured.
Lastly, note that the most important parameter for the adaptive value of culture
in this model is the individual’s uncertainty of evaluation, puncertain , not which rule
she applies when uncertain (Fig. 2). The logic behind this is straightforward: If
perfect evaluation is possible, then no individual will ever need to use any other
choice rule. On the other hand, if no evaluation at all is possible, then no choice rule
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based only on the frequency of variants can be adaptive both when the superior
variant is uncommon and when it is common.
4. AN INFINITE-STEP MODEL OF CULTURAL CUMULATION
In the previous model, evolution was driven by environmental change. However, a
variable environment is not necessary for cultural evolution. We describe now a
model with a stable environment, in which culture has unlimited potential for
change through an unbounded sequence of possible inventions. As a mental image,
think of an infinite cultural ladder where each step represents an improvement. For
instance, the hammer types in Fig. 1 are arranged in order of increasing efficiency.
Thus the present model is obtained from the previous one through four
modifications:
Instead of just two cultural variants, we assume an infinite number of
variants arranged in a sequence of increasing efficiency, referred to as a
cultural ladder.
There is no environmental change. Cultural variants, however, can become
suboptimal because superior variants are invented.
The ability to distinguish which of two variants is best may depend on how
different the variants are (i.e., the number of steps that separate them on the
cultural ladder).
After an individual has obtained a cultural variant through social learning,
she has a probability pinvent of improving it through invention;
improvements result in a variant that is one step further on the cultural
ladder.
As before, the Conform and the Random strategy specify what individuals do
when they cannot reach a conclusion about which variant is best. We study two
cases reflecting two different assumptions about how these choice rules are applied.
In the first case, the individual is uncertain about all the observed variants; in the
second case, it is only uncertain about the best and the second best variants (i.e., it
is easy to discard clearly inferior variants).
4.1. Conformist bias inhibits cumulation of culture
We first study how the two choice rules influence the cumulation of culture. We
measure the performance of the different choice rules by measuring the speed at
which they climb the cultural ladder, i.e., the speed at which the efficiency of
cultural variants increases. In the examples below we use a population size of
N = 1000. Each individual observes n = 10 cultural models, and the probability of
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inventing a superior variant is pinvent = 0.01. Fig. 4 shows the average cultural level
reached after fifty generations, for varying values of puncertain . The figure illustrates
two results. First, Random almost always results in a more efficient cultural variant
than Conform. When puncertain is small the difference is absent or small, but as
individual evaluation becomes more uncertain the difference grows. When puncertain
is close to one, a population adopting Conform has a remarkable disadvantage.
Second, climbing up the cultural ladder is faster when the individual’s uncertainty
of evaluation is limited to the two best variants.
Figure 4. The level reached after 50 generations of cultural evolution in homogeneous
populations of each of the two choice rules Conform and Random as a function of puncertain . In
panel A the individual is uncertain about all observed variants, in panel B the uncertainty includes
only the two best variants. The values given are the average of 25 runs
These results can be understood by considering the distribution of cultural
variants in the population, which individuals sample through social observation. As
generations pass the cultural ladder is progressively climbed, so there is no typical
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distribution in the absolute sense. However, what matters is the distribution of
variants in relation to each other. Fig. 5 illustrates such distributions and shows that
Conform and Random are favoured under different circumstances. Note also that
when puncertain or pinvent increase, the importance of the choice rule used decreases,
just as in the model studied in section 3.
Figure 5. Hypothetical efficiency distributions of cultural variants. The fitness of a social learning
strategy is proportional to the probability of picking the most efficient variant. Thus for a
symmetrical distribution Random and Conform fare equally well, while for distributions with a
left (right) skew Random (Conform) performs better. If individuals are uncertain only about the
most efficient variants (shaded areas) then Conform fares worse than both Random and a strategy
that always picks the rarest variant
4.2 Conformist bias is often selected against
We now consider the genetic evolution of choice rules by letting them compete with
each other in simulations, as in section 3. We use a mutation rate of
pmutation = 0.001. and start with a homogeneous population using the Conform
strategy (other starting points yield the same result) and find that it is often outcompeted by the Random strategy. Fig. 6 shows the proportions of the two
strategies reached after five hundred generations, for varying values of puncertain .
The Random strategy is particularly successful when the individual is uncertain
only about which one of the two best variants is the best.
In Fig. 6, panel A, the Random strategy is not dominating when puncertain is
less than 0.5. This is associated with the distribution of cultural variants being more
symmetric or skewed toward better variants. The reason is that with low puncertain
individuals are better at evaluating alternative variants and the best variant becomes
common more rapidly. A decrease in the probability of invention pinvent also
favours Conform, because also in this case the best variant is more likely to be the
most common. Fig. 7 illustrates a case with puncertain . = 0.5 and individuals only
being uncertain about which one of the two best variants is the best. To get some
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intuition for these values, note that pinvent = 0.01 leads to a level around 20 after 50
generations while pinvent = 0.001 leads to a level around 9.
Figure 6. The frequency of the Conform and Random strategy after 1000 generations of genecultural coevolution, as a function of puncertain . In panel A the individual is uncertain about all
observed variants, in panel B the uncertainty includes only the two best variants. The values given
are the average of 25 runs
Note that genetic evolution is slow in some of the considered cases. For
instance, when puncertain is small the choice rule is seldom used, because individuals
can make up their mind on their own. Thus there the choice rule has only a small
effect on fitness, while random factors such as drift and the random sampling of
cultural parents become relatively more important. For this reason it was necessary
to run simulations for 1000 generations to observe a clear pattern.
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Figure 7. Equilibrium frequencies of the Conform and Random strategies as a function of the
probability that an individual invents a more efficient cultural variant, pinvent
4.3 Conclusions
We have shown that the Random strategy allows faster cumulation of adaptive
innovations than the Conform strategy. Adaptive cultural evolution is also faster
when the individuals are better at discriminating between alternative strategies
(lower puncertain ) and better at inventing more efficient cultural variants (higher
pinvent ). In genetic evolution, Random social learning dominates the Conform
strategy under most conditions, unless cultural evolution is very slow (e.g., low
pinvent ), in which case the two strategies can coexist.
5. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CONFORMISM
The interpretation of empirical studies of conformism is difficult for two main
reasons. First, a tendency to do as the majority is not necessarily a result of an
innate psychological bias – an argument we develop in the next section. Second,
researchers themselves use the term “conformism” to refer to the outcome of
processes unrelated to “conformist bias” in the present sense. For instance, in an
archaeological study of ceramic styles in villages in New Mexico (around AD
1300), KOHLER et al. (2004) found less diversity than expected from pre-village
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data. The authors do argue for an explanation in terms of conformist social
transmission of styles between potters, but they attribute it to a conscious desire to
signal group identity at a time when tensions between groups were significant,
rather than to a psychological bias to conform. Another example is social
psychology, where the term conformity is used for an individual’s tendency to
follow group beliefs or norms, which is not the same as a “conformist bias’’. The
latter refers to choice of behaviour when there is variability within a group, rather
than an established group norm, and is unrelated to issues such as peer pressure or
group identification.
Even setting aside problems of interpretation, the evidence for a conformist
bias seems scarce. Several empirical studies of social learning have shown that
people do use information about others’ choices as a guideline to their own choices,
but in a way that was often at odds with existing theory of conformist bias
(MCELREATH et al. 2005; EFFERSON et al. 2007). The best evidence comes,
perhaps, from studies in which people had to choose between just two possible
variants. Before discussing such evidence, note that in the case of two variants a
choice rule can be visualized as a curve that relates the observed frequency of a
variant to the probability of adopting that variant (Fig. 8A). Unbiased choice is thus
represented by a straight line: a variant is adopted with a probability equal to its
observed frequency. A conformist bias is instead represented by an S-shaped curve
(BOYD and RICHERSON 1985). The reason is that the slope (i.e., the marginal effect
of adding one more cultural model bearing on a certain variant) should be highest in
the middle, because here a difference of just a few percent in observed frequency
can determine whether a variant is in majority or not. On the other hand, when a
variant is clearly very common or very rare a conformist-biased individual would
be less sensitive to one cultural model more or less. The S curve will be vertically
compressed if there is a direct bias favouring one of the two variants, but it will
remain S-shaped.
Existing evidence, while certainly not definitive, runs contrary to an S-shape
for the effect of observed frequency on choice. For instance, in the classical
experiments of ASCH (1952), the impact of the group decreased dramatically if just
one of the confederates agreed with the participant. On the other hand, according to
the conformist bias hypothesis the difference between unanimity and nearunanimity would be negligible since in both cases the same variant is clearly the
most common one. Inspired by conformist transmission theory, COULTAS (2004)
performed the following two experiments. In the first one, she monitored whether
newcomers to a communal computer room would adopt an odd way of placing the
computer keyboard cover, namely to balance it on the computer monitor, as a
function of the proportion of people in the room that were already doing so. In a
second study she considered two ways of writing the date, a short form like 18/5/04
(estimated to be the more common at ∼80% frequency), and a long form like 18
May 2004. People were asked to sign on a participant list for a psychology
experiment that had been manipulated in order to contain variable proportions of
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A)
B)
Figure 8. A) Unbiased social learning yields a linear relationship between the frequency of one
(out of two) cultural variants and the probability for a naive individual of acquiring this variant
through social learning. Conformist bias gives an S-shaped curve. The form of the bias is the one
in BOYD and RICHERSON (1985), HENRICH and BOYD (1998). B) Data from COULTAS (2004).
Circles: data from the computer room experiment. Squares and diamonds: data from the date
writing experiment. See text for details. The continuous line is again the example of conformist
bias plotted in the A) panel
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the two date writing styles, to see whether they would change their own style to
conform to the one that was most used on the list. COULTAS’S (2004) results are
summarized in Fig. 8B. One set of data, from the date writing experiment (closed
squares, relative to people switching from the rare to the common form), matches
the expectation of conformist bias theory while two data sets do not, one from the
computer room experiment and one from the date experiment (relative to people
switching from the common to the rare form).
6. WHEN SHOULD ONE CONFORM?
6.1 A game theoretical perspective
One difficulty in testing the hypothesis of an innate conformist bias in social
learning is that there may be several reasons to conform (or not conform) to the
majority. For instance, there might be a direct advantage in doing what the majority
does. Individuals may thus choose to conform as a strategic choice (direct
frequency-bias in BOYD and RICHERSON 1985). In game theory, this occurs in socalled coordination games (COOPER 1999). In such a game, agents benefit from
choosing the same strategy as everyone else, as in many instances of concerted
effort. Obviously, conformity is the game-theoretic prediction for the outcome of
coordination games quite independent of a conformist bias in social learning. It is
also clear from game-theoretic considerations that conforming is not always the best
thing to do. In complementarity games, for instance, individuals have an incentive
to be different from others (MATSUYAMA 2002). Typically, complementarity games
model situations where there are specializations and benefits of exchange. For
instance, if there are already many bakers one might do better as a butcher. In a
complementarity game, the equilibrium has behavioural diversity. Even situations
that are not strategic in themselves are often transformed into coordination games or
complementarity games by other mechanisms. For example, even if the
functionality of a certain clothing style is not affected by how other people choose
their clothes, forces like peer pressure or desire of group identification add a need
for coordination, whereas trend-setter prestige gives to the same situation elements
of a complementarity game.
It is also worth noting that conformist or non-conformist behaviour can arise
from information asymmetries. For instance, a newcomer who wants to know what
is good to eat at an unfamiliar place will likely assume that more experienced
individuals sit on superior information worth having. In contrast, an individual who
has found out she gets sick from a certain type of food will likely avoid it even if
the majority eats it.
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6.2 A demonstration of context-specific choice rules
In summary, from a game-theoretic perspective it is clear that we should not expect
a general conformist bias. At most, we might expect a conformist bias in
coordination games and in situations where we expect the majority of people to
have valuable information. We have carried out a simple vignette study to test
whether people’s tendency to conform depends on the nature of the behaviour
considered. According to the argument above, food choice is an example of a
domain where we expect newcomers to conform, since they have reason to believe
veterans have better information but similar preferences.
An important example of a domain where we do not expect newcomers to
conform is in punishment of social defectors. We base this hypothesis on the
following theoretical considerations. First, punishing can be conceived as a
complementarity game in the sense that if you want anti-social behaviour to be
punished, but punishment is costly, then the more other punishers around the less
reason for you to punish. Second, if anti-social behaviour is common despite many
punishers, then a rational agent may start doubting the effect of punishment; on the
other hand, if anti-social behaviour is rare, then there will be little actual punishing
to imitate.
The case of punishment is particularly interesting since it has been proposed
that costly punishment of social defectors can be maintained by conformist
transmission of the punishing behaviour, hence solving the problem of how prosocial behaviour can evolve (HENRICH and BOYD 2001).
6.2.1 Method. Nine different types of vignettes were designed (see Appendix).
Each vignette describes a situation where the respondent comes, as an exchange
student, to a college club. Three of the vignettes describe a party where the
exchange student had a choice between two unknown and unrecognizable dishes (a
light-brown stew and a dark-brown stew). These vignettes differed in the proportion
of people ahead in line who chose the light-brown stew (10%, 50% or 90%). The
remaining six vignettes instead described how some people at the club are social
defectors (using the communal printer for large jobs), and how some people engage
in costly punishment (telling the defectors to stop, despite their getting angry).
Vignettes came in six different versions depending on the proportion of punishers
(10%, 50% or 90%) and whether or not there were other people around in the
situation when the respondent had an opportunity to punish a defector.
Each vignette ended with a single question: “How likely is it that you in this
situation would choose the light-brown stew” or “How likely is it that you in this
situation would tell the person to stop his printing job?” Responses were on a
seven-point Likert scale (1 = would definitely do it, 7 = would definitely not do it).
Since the effects were expected to be large for food choice and much smaller for
punishment, we decided to collect fewer responses to food choice vignettes than to
punishment vignettes.
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250 participants (230 males, 20 females; average age 22 years) were recruited
among computer science students at two Swedish universities. Each participant was
given one vignette, drawn at random from a pile consisting of 50 copies of each
version of the punishment vignettes, and 15 copies of each version of the food
choice vignettes. The numbers of drawn copies of each version are reported in
Fig. 9.
Figure 9. Results from a vignette study of frequency-dependent social learning. The study asked
people to rate on a seven point Likert scale the likelihood of adopting one of two particular
behaviours, manipulating the frequency of the two behaviours among cultural models. Only when
the choice was about which food to eat we could see an effect of the frequency of the two
variants, but not when the choice was about whether to punish or not a social defector (in the
presence or absence of other people). Standard deviations ranged between about 0.8 and 1.9
6.2.2 Results. Fig. 9 shows our result as mean likelihood ratings for the nine
vignette types. The data on responses to food-choice vignettes show a clear effect of
the frequency of models using the behaviour, in the expected direction
(conformity). In contrast, there is no discernible effect of the frequency of
punishers, either in the scenario with other people around or in the alternative
scenario. An ANOVA with mean rating as dependent variable and frequency of
cultural models and context as independent variables shows a strong interaction
between frequency and context (F(244.2) = 11.63, p < 0.0001) and a main effect of
frequency (F(244.1) = 5.12, p < 0.005).
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7. DISCUSSION
We have investigated the popular idea of a so-called conformist bias in human
social learning, i.e., an evolved psychological bias to imitate the most common
cultural variant among cultural models. We have highlighted two simplifying
assumptions of existing models: the accessibility assumption, postulating that
individuals have a priori knowledge about existing cultural variants, and the
assumption that individuals must choose between just two cultural variants. We
have studied two models that replace these assumptions with more realistic ones,
namely, that an individual only knows about those cultural variants she experiences
and that invention can produce an unlimited number of cultural variants varying in
efficiency. Simulations of both models show that conformist-biased social learning
is not, in general, evolutionarily stable, and often leads to lower fitness than
unbiased social learning. The models also show that an individuals’ ability to
discriminate between cultural variants (referred to as adaptive filtering by ENQUIST
and GHIRLANDA 2007; see also ENQUIST et al. 2007) seems more important, for the
cumulation of adaptive culture, than frequency-based choice rules.
We also found no strong empirical tests of conformist-biased social learning.
Most empirical findings are open to alternative interpretations, are at odds with the
predictions of models of conformist bias, or are simply not an adequate test of the
theory. Our own vignette study indicates that people may use different choice rules
in different domains of experience, namely food choice and punishment of social
defectors, which undermines the notion of a generalized conformist bias. This study
was suggested to us by strategic (game-theoretic) considerations, that clearly show
how conforming to the majority may be a good strategy in some cases but not in
others.
Our overall conclusion is that, although transmission patterns and social
learning strategies are probably essential in shaping human cultural evolution, a
conformist bias is not a catch-all solution to adaptive problems. Based on our
theoretical arguments and simulations, we do not expect any strong selection
pressure for a conformist bias, and we found no satisfactory evidence that such a
bias actually exists within human psychology.
APPENDIX
We reproduce here the text for the vignette study presented in Section 6. Alternative
text used in different conditions is here highlighted in boldface, but was presented
as normal text to the subjects.
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Punishment vignette
Imagine coming as an exchange student to a university with alien customs. The
students of your class have a common-room the costs of which are shared equally
by everyone in the class through a class-fee. This room has a printer with the sign:
“Print no more than a few pages, please!!” Your first time in this room, someone
seems to be printing out an entire book. In surprise you point to the sign. The
person becomes angry with you, and you find the situation unpleasant. After a
while, though, the person stops his printing job and disappears. You tell another
student about the incident, and he is not surprised at all:
“Some students use the printer to avoid paying the cost of textbooks. It is very
expensive for us, so we must soon raise the class-fee.”
“I’m afraid so. Well, nobody here thinks bad of you if you don’t intervene.”
“So how many here are prepared to intervene anyway?”
“Oh, I’d say about [10 / 50 / 90]% do it.”
Next time you pass the printer, you see that once again there is a student
printing an entire book. [There are no other people around. / There are two
other persons close by.] Would you tell him to stop? Answer on a seven-point
scale (1 = yes, definitely, 7 = definitely not).
Food vignette
Imagine coming as an exchange student to a university with alien customs. The
students of your class have a common-room the costs of which are shared equally
by everyone in the class through a class-fee. This room has a sign saying: “It’s
back! SILENT PUB here tonight!” When you arrive to the pub you realize that it’s
really silent. Lots of people are on the dance-floor, and they seem to enjoy
themselves immensely, despite (or perhaps due to) the fact that there is no music.
Other people are playing cards, arm-wrestling, playing dart, kissing, gesticulating
wildly ... but no one says a word! Behind a simple counter there are two dishes
served: a light-brown stew and a dark-brown stew. You have no clue what’s in the
stews or how they taste. There is no sign, and of course you cannot ask anyone
since everyone must be silent. People ahead of you in line choose their dish through
pointing. About [10 / 50 / 90]% choose the light-brown stew. Would you choose
the light-brown stew? Answer on a seven-point scale (1 = yes, definitely, 7 =
definitely not).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This research was supported by the CULTAPTATION project (European
Commission contract FP6-2004-NEST-PATH-043434) and the Swedish Research
Council.
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