The Prospect of 'Hope' in Kant's Philosophy

The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (CPoJ) can be, or otherwise ought to be, regarded as a transcendental phenomenology of hope. Kant states repeatedly that CPoJ mediates between the first two Critiques, or between the theoretical knowledge we arrive at on the basis of understanding and reason’s foundational role for practical philosophy. In other words, exercising the power of judgment is implicated whenever we try to bring together the ethical issue of strictly determining our actions on the one hand and the necessity to act in the physical world on the other. We will argue that this mediating function is properly understood only if the ideations produced by self-understanding are characterized as objects of rationally required hope or fear. Beyleveld, Deryck & Ziche, Paul (2015). Towards a Kantian Phenomenology of Hope. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18(5): 927-942.

Contemporary Studies in Kantian Philosophy, 2020

I begin by presenting the concept or fact of hope in the context in which it is usually discussed, namely in Kant’s practical philosophy. Then I discuss definitions and kinds of judgments in order to contextualize hope in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Finally, I conclude by giving an interpretation of the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic” in the Critique of Pure Reason that supports my the argument for the existence of a theoretical Kantian hope.

Knowledge, Shahid Beheshti University, 2014

In accordance with the Critique of Pure Reason, one of Kant's main concerns throughout his critical project is to find an answer to the issue of hope: to what extent can a person be hopeful in achieving happiness if they fulfill the moral duties imposed by reason? The separation of the natural order from the moral order in Kant's philosophy justifies this hope as a fundamental issue. Although Kant himself acknowledges that this issue is both theoretical and practical, he attempts in his early works to provide an answer solely through the practical function of reason. However, due to the deep divide between his theoretical and practical philosophy regarding nature and ethics, his answer is not entirely satisfying. The main claim of this article is that Kant, in Critique of Judgment, bridges the gap between nature and ethics - theoretical and practical philosophy - in an effort to address the shortcomings of his theory of hope, ultimately developing a convincing theory of hope by employing the concept of teleology in the philosophy of history.

Philosophy: the Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2008

Kant is clear that the concept of the 'highest good' involves both a demand, that we follow the moral law, as well as a promise, that happiness will be the outcome of being moral. The latter element of the highest good has troubled commentators, who tend to find it metaphysically extravagant, involving, as it does, belief in God and an afterlife. Furthermore, it seems to threaten the moral purity that Kant demands: that we obey the moral law for its own sake, not out of interest in the consequences. Those commentators brave enough to tackle the issue look to the concept of the highest good either to add content to the moral law (Silber), or to provide rational motivation, in a way that does not violate moral purity (Beiser and Wood). I argue that such interpretations, although they may be plausible reconstructions, are unable to account for certain conceptual and textual problems. By placing Kant's thought against the background of medieval theology, I argue that the hope for the summum bonum is irreducibly important for Kant, even where its function is not that of providing the content or motivational force of the moral law. Kant is not only concerned with the shape of our duties and motivations, but the shape of the universe within which these emerge.

Con-Textos Kantianos, 2023

In the beginning of his critical period, Kant treated the perfect attainment of the highest good-the unconditioned totality of ends which would uphold the perfect proportionality between moral virtue and happiness-as both the ground of hope for deserved happiness and the final end of our moral life. But I argue that Kant moved in the direction of de-emphasizing the latter aspect of the highest good, not because it is inappropriate or impossible for us to promote this ideal, but because the endless pursuit of it offers no prospect of moral satisfaction. I take this change as one possible reason for him to shift his focus toward social and political progress in history because its main subject is the human species, which is immortal in some sense.

Kant rejects all of the standard accounts of the dependence of morality on religious claims or commitment. He nevertheless thinks that morality “leads to” religion. I defend an account of this “leading to” relationship, arguing that it is the result of Kant’s struggle to characterize the normative import of happiness.

2014

Kant-Studien

This paper offers an account of the historical development of Kant’s understanding of belief (Glaube) from its early ties to George Friedrich Meier’s Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre through various stages of refinement. It will be argued that the Critique of Pure Reason reflects an important but not final stage in Kant’s understanding of belief. Its structure is further refined and its scope narrowed in later works, including the Critique of Practical Reason and Critique of Judgment. After charting these stages, an analysis of how belief relates to the Fact of Reason will be presented.

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that morality obliges us to believe in the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. I argue, however , that in two late essays – " The End of All Things " and " On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy " – Kant provides moral counterarguments to that position: these beliefs undermine moral agency by giving rise to fanaticism or fatalism. Thus, I propose, the Kantian position on the justification of religious belief is ultimately antinomial. One ought, moreover, to understand Kant's considered position concerning the immortality of the soul and the existence of God to be similar to that he proposes concerning the theoretical ideas of reason in the Appendix to the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason: they are necessary as regulative ideas guiding moral action, not endorsed or even postulated as propositions. In other words, they are subject matters not of belief, but of hope.

2005