On the Logical Character and Coherence of Islamic Economics Idris Samawi Hamid Abbas Mirakhor Professor of Philosophy Professor of Economics (retd.) Colorado State University Fort Collins, CO 80523 1 Background Even a cursory review of published research in Islamic Economics over the last decade reveals a picture of “glass half full.” On the one hand, there has been an intensifying rise of consciousness regarding Islam’s vision of the economy and economics and, on the other hand, there is also the emergence of a wilderness of logical incoherence with a rapidly developing “echo-chamber” mentality that retards intellectual discourse and saps the energies needed for advancement of this nascent discipline. In this process, the guidance of the first generation of Muslim specialists in economists – e.g., Siddiqi, who suggested a research program that set a direction for future research – does not seem to have had much traction in the debate still raging among some well known scholars about what is Islamic Economics. Each side is pushing its own idea centered on how its view is right and everyone else’s is wrong, but without the substantiation required of an intellectually honest critique. Regrettably and too often, the language used in these attacks lacks the adab (etiquette of discourse) urged by the Qurʾān.1 Each side takes positions, using alqāb (pejorative labels)2 to discredit others’ ideas. Hence, inter-communication among Muslim economists has become strained, retarding the search for a common language, 1 2 See, e.g., 𝒬 2:83, 7:85, 16:125, and 39:18. See 𝒬 49:11. 2 epistemics, and logic of the ideal system of Islamic economy as envisioned in the Qurʾān and operationalized by the Sunnah. The vision of someone like Siddiqi who, in addressing a session of Muslim economists debating the question of definition of Islamic Economics, urged the participants to consider that “Islam is primarily about a spiritual view of life and a moral approach to life’s problems, including the economic problem. The contentment Islam promised man is rooted in this spiritual framework.” In effect, Siddiqi seemed to be saying that, instead of focusing on vacuous debates about what is or what is not Islamic Economics, the focus of research should be on finding answers to questions such as the ones he posed: “How to realize economic values and achieve Islamic ends in economic life of our times.” His vision transcended a narrow, localized and parochial position to suggest, “It is time to demonstrate how modern man can live a peaceful, satisfying life by shifting to an Islamic paradigm that values human relations above material possession.” Siddiqi went further to suggest a methodology of proceeding with such a research program: The primary source of its logic and epistemics had to be the Qurʾān. Then comes the Sunnah which, he emphasized, is “best understood as conduct and policy directed at realization of the objective and values in the Qurʾān.” After these, he suggested, “fiqh can become helpful.” Siddiqi lamented that this order seems to have been reversed: “For many, if not most scholars, fiqh comes first.” These sage advices were not heeded: Much of “Islamic Economics” research is anchored about what some faqīh (jurisprudent) has considered as the “maqāṣid al-sharīʿah” which, for most writers, is some fiqh-based conception of Sharīʿah. In turn, an equivalence is established between fiqh and Sharīʿah. This involves an apparent absence of awareness that ‘sharīʿah’ is a term used by the Qurʾān to establish a matter of infallibility, whereas fiqh is a product of the human mind and is fallible; for this reason Islamic Economics must be grounded in the Qurʾān and Sunnah, and then fiqh (in that order). (Note that, even here, Siddiqi’s suggestion seems to entail the view that fiqh plays a necessary role in the understanding of how to structure the logic, design and implementation of policies derived from the first two sources. Such a view may require some modification.)3 3 See Siddiqi (2004). 3 A work that followed the order of priority suggested by Siddiqi in grounding the vision of the economy perceived from the vantage point of the Qurʾān was the Iqtiṣādunā of ʿAllāmah Shahīd M. B. Ṣadr (rḍw). Deeply seeped in the sciences of the Qurʾān and Sunnah (as well as Islamaic/Aristotelian philosophy), Ṣadr developed i) a logic of istiqrāʾ/epagōgē (commonly translated induction) – al-Usus al-Manṭiqiyyah lil-Istiqrāʾ (Logical Foundations of Induction); ii) a philosophy of Islam – Falsafatunā (Our Philosophy); then iii) he then proceeded to do his pioneering and highly fertile book on the ideal Islamic economy – Iqtiṣādunā (Our Economics). Based on his work on logic, he understood that the axiomatic structure of the “science” of the contemporary, dominant paradigm of economics is in direct contradiction with the logic of an Islamic Economics based, first and foremost, on the Qurʾān. One of these axioms involves the notion of “scarcity,” which is considered to be so ubiquitous and central to standard economics that the latter is often called “the science of scarcity.” That this axiom is in conflict with the the Qurʾān was pointed out by the Shahīd. Rather, as the Qurʾān repeatedly emphasizes, Allāh (swt) has always and continues to create resources for the sustenance of humans with an “exact measure”. The concept of scarcity within the dominant economic paradigm is thus juxtaposed to that of sufficiency of resources within the Qurʾān.4 To be sure, the Qurʾān does not reject the idea that, at the micro-level, humans do face “scarcity.” However, that is not due to any paucity of the resources created by Allāh (swt), but rather to deliberately designed policies and instruments (e.g., legislative, political, social and administrative) governing distribution that favor one or more particular classes that continues to accumulate wealth in the face of the growing poverty of others. Some two decades after Iqtiṣādunā first appeared, Hasanuzzaman (1984), referring to 𝒬 41:10, suggested that Allāh (swt) “has created sufficient resources for His creatures. Therefore, scarcity may be either due to lack of proper utilization of natural endowments or an imbalanced distribution”. Indeed there is much evidence from the Qurʾān and Sunnah that it is not the paucity of resources but the system of distribution 4 See, e.g., 𝒬 13:8, 15:21, 17:30, 28:82, 29:62, 30:37, 34:36, 34:39, 42:12 & 27, 54:49, and 89:16. 4 of resources that underlies emergence of poverty and deprivation in societies.5 Contemporary scholars who have focused on the concept of scarcity suggest that there is a distinction between actual, material scarcity and the “feeling of scarcity.”6 The latter is conditioned by the mindset that tells a person how much is enough and how much is too little. Such a mindset is, in turn, conditioned by social, cultural, psychological, ideological, religious and other elements7 In its primordial character, however, human nature knows when enough is enough.8 The concept of scarcity by itself, once internalized by a critical mass of members of a given society, has deleterious effects on efforts to deal with distributional problems: Incidence of poverty and deprivation can always be explained away by scarcity. On the other hand, the axiom of sufficiency, once accepted by a critical mass of members of a given society, would require a search for redistributive means of alleviating poverty in that society. The scarcity axiom, while damaging to social solidarity in and of itself, becomes even more onerous and strongly in conflict with the logic of Islamic Economics when combined with unlimited wants – this leads to insatiability, a “psychological disposition that prevents us, as individuals and as societies, from saying that ‘enough is enough’”), narrow self-interest, and presuppositions of restricted rationality. The result is a discipline with moral defects, such as the “coexistence of great wealth and great poverty” and “palpable economic defects,” such as an “inherently unstable financial system”.9 Sometime ago, Polanyi argued that economics can be understood as having two distinct senses: formal and substantive. In its formal sense, economics derives from the logical character of means-ends relationship. In its substantive sense, 5 See, e.g., Mirakhor and Askari (2017). 6 See, e.g., Mullainathan and Eldar (2013), p. 4. The authors define scarcity as “having less than you feel you need.” 7 See for example, Barber (2007). 8 See, e.g., Gowdy (1998). The book is a collection of excellent anthropological studies on hunter-gatherer cultures in which members knew when they had enough for a comfortable life and managed their societies through sharing surpluses. 9 See, e.g., Skidelsky and Skidelsky (2012). 5 economics derives from man’s dependence upon nature and his fellow. It refers to the interchange with his natural and social environment… the two root meanings of economics, the substantive and formal, have nothing in common. The formal meaning implies a set of rules referring to choice between the alternative uses of insufficient means. The substantive meaning implies neither a choice nor insufficiency of means; man’s livelihood may or may not involve the necessity of choice and if choice there be, it need not be induced by the limiting effect of a “scarcity” of the means…10 Economic thought that shares what Siddiqi suggests to be a "spiritual view of life and a moral approach to life’s problems, including the economic problem," would lie within the universe of discourse of what Polanyi called the substantive sense of economics, sharing little or no common ground with the formal sense invoked by the currently dominant paradigm of economics. The argumentation advanced by some to conclude that Islamic Economics, if it is going to be effective and meaningful, has to abandon everything that “conventional,” “standard,” economics has to say is fallacious. Meanwhile, the voices in wilderness, such as those of Ṣadr and Siddiqi, that call for Islamic Economics to develop a language and logic of its own based on the Qurʾān and Sunnah adequate to addressing the problems faced by humanity at large, go largely unheeded. To heed them, Islamic Economics needs to develop a common language11 and logic based on the Qurʾān. The present paper is a modest attempt to address the logical foundations of Islamic Economics, in a manner that would perhaps lead to meaningful discourse both within and outside of the Islamic economic community aimed at addressing the issues suggested by Siddiqi.12 10 See Dalton (1971) pp. 139–174. Quotations in the above paragraph are taken from p. 140). 11 On the necessity of a common language for Islamic Economics, see, e.g., Khan (2000). 12 For greater detail and technical development of this theme, see the authors’ forthcoming book The Logical Foundations of Islamic Economics: Objective Logic and Phenomenology of Consciousness and Action. Much of this note condenses results discovered in the course of preparing that work. 6 2 Universes of Discourse and Categorical Coherence “The Islamic [sic] ummah is facing crises of types never before seen in Islamic history. The issue of how Islamic Economics should be defined… remains unresolved.”13 A necessary, if not sufficient condition, for defining the concept “Islamic Economics” involves a determination of the logical, philosophical, and/or scientific parameters that govern i) the movement of consciousness and action within the particular sphere associated with the extension of that concept, as well as ii) the interrelation of that sphere with other general, relevant domains of human experience (e.g., realms of economic consciousness and action). This necessary condition involves, in part, determining whether the concept “Islamic Economics” is even coherent. Does the range of applicability of “Islamic” intersect with that of “economics” (in the contemporary sense of ‘economics’)?14 If not, then the concept “Islamic Economics” has no material15 extension and remains in the realm of shadows. Determining some exact sense in which “Islamic Economics” is coherent depends, in large part, on fulfilling the necessary condition sketched above. The distinction between Muslim and Islamic is one of the most important guiding principles of our discussion. Given a guideline, human activity, or phenomenon, it is Islamic only to the degree that it precisely flows from and is consistent with the framework of consciousness and praxis established by the Qurʾān and the Messenger of Islam. A person, society, social or other institution, guideline, activity, or any other phenomenon is Muslim to the degree that it is reasonably associated with some class of self-identifying Muslims. In practice, it is possible and quite common that, in some domain of human experience, a Muslim does not behave in an Islamic manner. Similarly, it is possible that, 13 Zaman (2017), p. 205. In the spirit of Sayyid Maududi and other contemporary, progressive thinkers, the authors would prefer to speak of, not the Islamic, but, rather, the Muslim ummah and Muslim history. 14 In conformance with the standard convention for the use-mention distinction, in this paper we use a singlequote name to mention an expression, sentence, or other string of characters per se; we use a double-quote name to mention a concept, proposition, or other object of thought per se. We also use double quotes for the usual purpose of quoting the speech or comments of others. The context should make it clear which sense of double-quotes is intended. 15 Material: The word ‘material’ is being used in a general sense and without prejudice; i.e., it is not synonymous with ‘physical’. 7 with respect to some domain of human experience, a non-Muslim behaves in an Islamic manner and a Muslim does not.16 With respect to the “shadowy” nature of concepts and conceptual entities: A careful study of the proper sources for the articulation of any genuinely Islamic framework of knowing will show that, within such a framework, all thought is concrete (in some important sense of ‘concrete’ – to be discussed). That is, given an activity of conscious (e.g., rational) thinking, it has a real object; no single thought is truly abstract (in some important sense of ‘abstract’ – to be discussed) or merely subjective. However, if that conscious thinking (or pseudo-thinking) does not shadow (or reflect) reality in some primary, material sense,17 then its object remains shadowy. Related positions were held by Hegel (d. 1831ce) and Alexius Meinong (d. 1920ce). In traditional Islamaic philosophy,18 such a position was systematically worked out, apparently for the first time, by Shaykh Aḥmad al-Aḥsāʾī (d. 1826ce). On the other hand, Kant’s (d. 1804ce) earlier rejection of some variant of this position has dominated later European logical, philosophical, and scientific thinking.19 Let us rephrase the challenge set forth at the outset: The task at hand involves articulating the universe of discourse proper to Islamic Economics, in comparison and contrast with that proper to contemporary, mainstream economic theory and practice. Such an articulation is needed to provide a proper basis for answering questions such as, How, and 16 For example, there has been an effort to develop an “economic Islamicity index” that aims to objectively rank the nations of the world in terms of their compliance to a select set of Islamic economic principles. In a 2010 version of this program (Rehman & Askari 2010), the winner was Ireland, and the first Muslim country to appear on the list was no. 33: Malaysia. Given the interwoven nature of the Islamic framework in concreto some of the methodology of the authors may be questioned. Still, their work illustrates an application of the critical distinction between Muslim and Islamic. 17 See Footnote 15. 18 We use ‘Islamaic philosophy’ in place of the usual ‘Islamic philosophy’, ‘Muslim philosophy’, and so forth. The distinction between Islamic and Islamaic is analogous to the distinction between Hellenic and Hellenistic. Examples: ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (ʿa) articulated an Islamic, but not an Islamaic, philosophy. Moses Maimonides was an Islamaic, but not an Islamic, philosopher. Islamaic philosophy appropriates and develops a non-Islamic (Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, etc.) heritage. 19 This topic is an important one for future study and exposition. 8 to what degree, can the problems of contemporary economies be addressed by Islamic Economics? How, and to what degree, can analytic methods developed in conventional economics, which are ideologically conditioned by, and/or deduced from the axioms specific to, the universe of discourse of the latter, be employed in Islamic Economics? Our sights can be aimed deeper: Granting the coherence of “Islamic Economics”, and given the roots of the range of applicability of “Islamic” in the Prophetic era and its sources (viz., the Qurʾān and the authentic Ḥadīth, i.e., those traditions which do not contradict the Qurʾān): How and to what degree, if at all, can a general question of contemporary Western economic theory be transformed into one of Islamic Economics? The reverse is also important: How and to what degree, if at all, can a general question of Islamic Economics be transformed into one of contemporary Western economic theory? For example, can Islamic Economics address non-trivial and important questions, ignored by the dominant paradigm of economics, such as the following: What is the purpose of wealth? How much wealth is sufficient for a secure and comfortable life? Can Islamic Economics suggest ways and means of correcting the moral and economic defects of the forms of capitalism that dominate economies across the world, including those of Muslim nations? Can analytically and axiomatically neutral methods of standard economics assist Islamic Economics to arrive at its own systematic and coherent paradigm for analysis and policies addressed to achieving the life of security, peace and economic sufficient which Islam promises humans? A universe of discourse is basically a closed collection of objects of thought under discussion by members of an intellectual community; the objects of thought and concepts of that collection are generally understood by those participating in the discussion. For example, in the universe of discourse of natural numbers (0, 1, 2, 3, and so forth), we may say, e.g., “Every number is either even or odd.” There is no need to mention the property ‘natural’ before mentioning the object ‘number’; since the universe of discourse is closed it is understood by the participants as given that all numbers in that universe are natural. Another aspect of a universe of discourse is that it determines the range of concepts of objects over which concepts of properties can be coherently predicated. For example, given the properties even and odd (as denoted in number theory), the object of thought “This tree is even” is neither true nor false, but incoherent. That is, the concept 9 tree (botany) and the concepts odd and even (number theory) do not belong to the same universe of discourse. Hence it is incoherent to predicate evenness of a tree; to do so is to commit what is called a category mistake. A declarative sentence may express either a coherent or an incoherent object of thought; if coherent, that object of thought can be either true or false. Thus, within the universe of natural numbers: The object of thought “Some number is even” is coherent and true; “Every number is even” is false but still coherent. “Some tree is even” is neither true nor false but incoherent; to call a tree even is to commit a category mistake. A coherent object of thought is usually called a proposition in the strict sense of ‘proposition’. But even incoherent objects of thought can be called propositional in form if not in content. Thus the object of thought “Some tree is even” is propositional in form but is not, strictly speaking, a proposition per se. 3 Science, Intrinsic Value, and Self-Transcendence A universe of discourse is supposed to serve as an element within an overall framework of knowledge and practice, of science. Yet there appear to be certain limits, obstacles blocking our path forward before the task can even begin. For example: On the one hand, contemporary science in the narrow, quantitative sense has no place for value in any intrinsic, self-transcending (as opposed to mercantile or quantitative) sense. That is, values, allegedly, are not subject to scientific knowledge. Given some school of contemporary economics which, by and large, takes science in some such narrow sense as its ideal paradigm of knowing, intrinsic value would appear to lie outside of its scope, and thus, strictly speaking, outside of the range of applicability of the concept “economics”. On the other hand, although any authentic school of Muslim thought does and must place significant emphasis on intrinsic values at its core, these are, in the contemporary zeitgeist, allegedly to be taken purely on faith and not in any manner that is scientific or which involves knowledge (as opposed to mere faith).20 This would appear to implicate, 20 Yes, earlier, classical Muslim theology did develop a rationalist, scholastic framework of value based on presuppositions about, e.g., beauty and ugliness. But, as useful as they were in their own time, the degree to which the Aristotelian cognitivism (upon which systems deriving from that framework were based) produces genuine knowledge of the objects in its universe of discourse is doubtful; in major part for reasons that will be discussed further on. 10 i.e., point in the direction of the conclusion, that the ranges of applicability of “Islamic” and “economics” respectively are mutually exclusive, for i) economics aims to be scientific, but there is (allegedly) no science of value; and ii) the core characteristic of Islām and Islamicity is intrinsic value, but, again, there is (allegedly) no science of value. Whether, and the degree to which, the contemporary discipline of economics can or should take science in some narrow, quantitative sense, as its ideal is a matter of debate. With respect to Islām, however, there can be little doubt that value21 lies at the core of its system, its framework and methodology, of thought and action. According to one of the most famous aḥādīth, one oft-repeated by Muslims of every school of thought, the Messenger (ṣ) said, Surely I was solely sent to perfect the nobilities of intrinsic moral value.22 The use of ‘intrinsic’ in the translation above may raise concerns of anachronism. However, ‘akhlāq’ (plural of ‘khulq’ or ‘khuluq’) literally and lexicographically signifies a disposition that characterizes its host in an innate, intrinsic manner. This is consistent with the standard Islamic principle that everyone and everything in existence was created with a fundamentally good, beautiful (ḥasan), primordial nature (fiṭrah).23 The aforementioned Ḥadīth implicates that any and every object or mapping in the Islamic universe of discourse ultimately pertains to intrinsic moral value. However, it emphatically does not implicate, let alone logically imply, that Islām denies that there can be a science of intrinsic value, in some appropriate sense of ‘science’. To assume that, because Islām’s fundamental interest is intrinsic value, therefore there is no such thing as an Islamic science of value, let alone economics, is to commit a crude non sequitur. As we shall explore, a number of contemporary Muslim, as well as anti-Islamic, 21 Unless otherwise specified, explicitly or by context, in the sequel we will use ‘value’ to mention intrinsic, self-transcending value. 22 23 ‫إّﻧَﻤﺎ ُﺑِﻌْﺜُﺖ ِﻷَُﺗﱢﻤَﻢ َﻣَﻜﺎِرَم اْﻷَْﺧَﻼِق‬. This is related to the well-known fact that, in contrast to Christianity, there is no concept or reality of original sin in Islām. 11 scholars have been misled by one or both of the following: i) the scientism of the currently dominant European culture that derives from the Cartesian analysis of the world, Newtonian mechanism, and Kant’s rejection of the concrete nature of thought;24 and ii) the concomitant fideism of the same culture, in conjunction with the traditional fideism promulgated and ossified by traditional Muslim figures such as Ghazzālī. Ultimately, however, value and its praxis constitute a unity that is inseparable from genuine knowledge of (as opposed to mere faith in) the truth and reality that they are about. This is an important teaching of the Qurʾān and the Messenger (ṣ), one that has been often obfuscated, when not altogether denied, by the Muslim and Islamaic traditions of scholastic theology and even philosophy. In the Qurʾān one reads (𝒬 29:43) And those are the symbols we propound to the people, yet no one can prehend them except the knowers.25 The number of ayāt (signs, also known as verses) of the Qurʾān, as well as aḥādīth, which bear upon this matter can hardly be counted.26 In the āyah quoted above, knowing is connected with ʿaql (prehending, nexal consciousness). And in other places throughout the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth, as will be discussed in some detail, such prehending is intimately bound with intrinsic value and its practice in a movement that is both developmental and self-transcending. It is in this context that Islām provides the foundations for a complete system of value. Such a system involves, not a mere articulation of some organized list of normative rules of action, but a comprehensive phenomenology of consciousness and praxis. Critically, the phenomenology of consciousness and praxis latent within Islām also entails a concrete framework and cogent method of knowing. Thus an Islamic phenomenology is scientific in a broad sense of ‘science’. It turns out that the framework and method of knowing espoused by Islām is neither Aristotelian (as adopted by traditional Islamaic civilization) nor empiricist (as 24 25 26 In can hardly be emphasized enough that neither Descartes, Newton, or Kant espoused scientism. ِ ِ ِ ِ ِ ‫﴿َوﺗْﻠَﻚ اْﻷَْﻣَﺜﺎُل َﻧْﻀِﺮُﺑَﻬﺎ ﻟﻠﻨﱠﺎ‬ َ ‫س َوَﻣﺎ َﻳْﻌﻘُﻠَﻬﺎ إِﱠﻻ اْﻟَﻌﺎﻟُﻤﻮ‬ .﴾‫ن‬ For an introduction to this matter, see Hamid (2011a), Ch. 2. 12 espoused by mainstream contemporary European culture); rather, it is irreducibly dialectical in a sense that involves movement, development, and self-transcendence. The fact that it does not fit into an Aristotelian or empiricist paradigm explains, in part, why the Islamic framework of knowledge has, with some exception, been obfuscated, neglected, or denied throughout Muslim history, both traditional and contemporary. An important entailment of the dialectical nature of the Islamic framework and methodology of consciousness and praxis is that economic action constitutes a necessary – although not sufficient – condition for the cultivation and development of moral action. Put another way, economic development, using ‘economic’ in some contemporary sense, cannot be decoupled from the cultivation, development, and perfection of intrinsic value that constitute the core of Islamicity. There can be no question of a bifurcation of the economic from the moral in the Islamic framework, methodology, and movement. And that dialectical movement is, again, scientific in a broad sense. Let us return to the question of intrinsic value vis a vis contemporary economics. If Islām offers a perspective from above to below (moral to economic), might there be some perspective, also scientific in spirit (in the broad sense of ‘science’ to be discussed), commensurate with contemporary economic science, one from below to above (economic to moral)? It turns out that such perspectives do exist. An important case is the dialectic of the economic and the moral in the thought of the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce (d. 1952ce). A related thinker, one influenced by Croce and especially Hegel, is G. R. G. Mure (d. 1979ce). It turns out that the contours of Croce’s dialectic of opposites and distincts constitute something close to a special case of a corresponding and broader Islamic phenomenology and dialectics of consciousness and praxis. Furthermore, Mure’s penetrating analysis of the nature of economic action, and its relation to moral action and intrinsic value, comes strikingly close to the Islamic position on the matter.27 From one direction, the dialectics of Croce and Mure appears rich enough to allow for a fruitful mutual exploration without falling into the ditch of either syncretism or anachronism. From another, the dialectic of the economic and the moral, developed from a joint Islamic and appropriately chosen contemporary logical, philosophical, and scientific vantage point, 27 See especially the second chapter of Mure (1958). 13 can provide the context and meta-language in which the parameters of the coherence of Islamic Economics can be adequately determined and articulated. 4 Objective Logic and Phenomenology of Consciousness and Action 4.1 Objective Logic and Subjective Logic As mentioned at the outset, our task involves the determination of the logical and scientific parameters governing the sphere (= category) particular to Islamic Economics, as well as the interrelations of that sphere with the relevant domains of human experience, particularly those of interest to contemporary economic science. Pursuit of that task involves a logical, philosophical, and scientific methodology that is sometimes called objective logic. Contemporary economics, as a discipline, involves a universe of discourse associated with some paradigm of logic and/or science internal to that universe. Islamic Economics, as a discipline, also involves a universe of discourse associated with some paradigm of logic and/or science internal to itself. A paradigm of logic and/or science internal to some universe is sometimes called its subjective logic. This point can hardly be overemphasized. As William Lawvere, one of the founders of the formal objective logic known as mathematical category and topos theory, puts it (Lawvere & Rosebrugh 2003, pp. 239–240) The long chains of correct reasonings and calculations of which subjective logic is justly proud are only possible within a precisely defined universe of discourse, as has long been recognized. Since there are many such universes of discourse, thinking necessarily involves many transformations between universes of discourse as well as transformations of one universe of discourse into another. Given a set of scientific axioms or presuppositions, they are specific to some specific universe of discourse (= category). The conclusions deduced from those axioms also belong to the same universe of discourse. As Aristotle discovered, deduction from first principles (= axioms, presuppositions) is always bound to and never escapes the relevant universe of discourse. It is in this respect that deductive logic is subjective. But this leaves a 14 serious problem, one not solved by traditional Aristotelian logic. For Aristotelian logic has no solution, no precise formalism for representing or articulating objective-logical reasoning. When an observer looks at two universes of discourse from the perspective of the subjective logic particular to one of them, particularly from that of the more narrow of the two, it is easy to fall into some bifurcationist fallacy. This is, in part, because it is easy to forget that the cogency of reasoning of some subjective logic is not independent of the associated universe of discourse in which it is being employed. Even from the perspective of the broader of the two, if the factor of dialectical development and self-transcendence is left out, then, once again, it is easy to fall into a bifurcationist fallacy. In contrast to the situation with subjective logic, an objective logic is a logic and science of bridging distinct (even apparently irreconcilable) universes of discourse and exhibiting them as a coherent, inter-related whole, and to make precise and explicit the logical rules of transformation between one and the other. This may involve development (or self-transcendence) from one universe to the higher; it may also involve decay (or selfcorruption) from one universe to the lower. An example from mathematics will illustrate: A set may be said to develop, objective-logically, into a topological space; a topological space may be said to decay, objective-logically, into a set. Correlative to a set, a topological space constitutes a broader universe of discourse (= category); correlative to a topological space, a set constitutes a narrower universe (= category). The Islamic category has its own subjective logic, as does contemporary economics. If “Islamic Economics” is coherent, then it must constitute an objective-logical system, one appropriate to i) some category of intrinsic value, as well as to ii) another category specific to economic action. The questions asked earlier may now be expressed in more general terms: Given two categories within an objective-logical system, what are the cogency conditions of the subjective logic appropriate to each category? What are the rules for transposing a problem expressed within the narrower category, and investigated via its associated subjective logic, into the corresponding problem in the broader category, and investigated via the subjective logic associated with the latter? 15 4.2 Two Dialectical Lynchpins The current research of the authors into the logical foundations of Islamic Economics, based upon study of the Qurʾān and Sunnah, reveals a number of dialectical lynchpins that subserve the Islamic phenomenology of consciousness and action. Together, they appear to constitute necessary and sufficient building blocks for the construction of a very concrete objective-logical system. For puposes of this note we restrict ourselves to discussion of only two of them. One lynchpin of Islamic phenomenology is its dialectic of knowing and doing; more generally, of the theoretical and the practical. This is in sharp contrast to the Western paradigm, dominant from its initial articulation by Aristotle up to the present day (in both Western and Islamaic traditions), which recognizes and builds upon a bifurcation of theory and practice. Variants of such a bifurcation set in early in Muslim history,28 leading the gamut of its theological and intellectual thought off track ever since, vis a vis the primordial Islamic spirit. Over the course of this research, we have worked out the parameters of an Islamic phenomenological system based in large part upon certain critical, general objective-logical guidelines – each is explicitly stated in general form in the course of a crucial narration or āyah, and supported by numerous other evidences from the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth. One such guideline is the following: Through nexal-consciousness/prehending (ʿaql) the depths of praxial-wisdom/wise practicing (ḥikmah) are fathomed; through praxial-wisdom the depths of nexal consciousness are fathomed. The importance of this particular guiding, dialectical principle for the development of any authentic, Islamic framework and methodology of knowing and practice can hardly be overestimated. Among other things, it entails a rejection of Aristotelian cognitivism,29 28 In addition to the situation in Aristotelianism, the bifurcation of faith and works in Pauline Christianity and within what was to become Ashʿarī theology theology are also cases in point. 29 See Footnote 20. Aristotelian cognitivism involves a bifurcation between learning and knowing (i.e., induction and deductive demonstration), in sharp contrast to the method of Socrates, whose approach is closer in spirit to the Islamic methodology. 16 as well as empiricism, in favor of another, dialectical approach to science. The second lynchpin involves the dialectic of nexal-consciousness (ʿaql) and ignorance (jahl) (= ego (nafs)). The Islamic sources provide a guide in the form of one of the most important traditions for our phenomenology: The Ḥadīth of the Troops of NexalConsciousness and Anti-Consciousness (i.e., Nexal-Grasping and Ignoring, or Nexus and Ignorance). At first glance, the setting is a cosmological account of creation, but the phenomenological subtext is explicit: First and foremost this ḥadīth provides an account of the innermost drama of the human spirit. Following is an excerpt. As reported by the great-grandson of the Messenger (ṣ), the Imām Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (ʿa): Surely God created Nexal-Consciousness – and it is the first of all spiritual things30 – from the light of the right of the ʿArsh (Empyrean). So He said to it: “Go back!” and it went back. Then He said, “Come forth!” and it came forth. Then He said, “I have created you as a magnificent creation, and have honored you over the entirety of my creation.” Then He created Anti-Consciousness from a murky, brackish sea. So He said to it: “Go back!” and it went back. Then He said, “Come forth!” and it did not come forth. So he said to it, “Are you conceited?,” and cursed it. Then He gave Nexal-Consciousness seventy-five troops. When Anti-Consciousness saw that with which God had honored Nexal-Consciousness and what He had given it, Anti-Consciousness developed an enmity to Nexal-Consciousness, and said, “O my Cherisher-Lord! This [Nexal-Consciousness] is a creation like me. You have created it, honored it, and strengthened it, while I am its opposite and have no strength against it. So give me troops like those you have given NexalConsciousness!” God said, “Yes [I will do so]. But if you disobey again after that I will remove you and your troops from my Mercy.” Anti-Consciousness replied, “I am well pleased!” So God gave Anti-Consciousness seventy-five troops. 30 It must be remembered that, in the Islamic sources, there is no opposition between spiritual and material per se. A spiritual entity is non-physical, but not immaterial. 17 And so came to be, from among the seventy-five troops that God gave Nexal-Consciousness [along with their opposites from the troops of AntiConsciousness], the following: Good, which is the chief of staff of Nexal-Consciousness; He made bad its opposite, and it is the chief of staff of Anti-Consciousness. Īmān, and its opposite is kufr.31 Affirming [the truth], and its opposite is rejection. Hope, and its opposite is despair. Justice, and its opposite is tyranny. [For the rest of the troops of ʿAql and Jahl see Table 1.] So these dispositions of Nexal-Consciousness do not all cohere (ijtimāʿ) except in a prophet, the heir (waṣī) of a prophet, or a muʾmin32 whose heart has been tested for īmān. As for the rest of those who move in the orbit of our dynamic loving (walāyah), any one of them will have at least some of these troops until he is cleansed of the troops of Anti-Consciousness: When that happens he comes to be in the highest rank among the prophets and heirs. And that can only be perceived by cognizing Nexal-Consciousness and its troops, and by avoiding Anti-Consciousness and its troops. Current research also reveals that ‘jahl’ is another name for ‘nafs’ in the Qurʾānic sense that may be translated by ‘ego’: Surely the Ego does command to evil, except that for which my Cherisher-Lord has mercy. (𝓠 12:53) 31 These two words are ubiquitous throughout the Qurʾān and Sunnah, but difficult to translate; they have been subject to severe misunderstandings over the centuries. ‘Secure and dynamic belief and action’ comes close to a reasonable translation of ‘īmān’. 32 For muʾmin: See Footnote 31. ‘Muʾmin’ is the active participle, i.e., the doer, of īmān. 18 The Troops The Troops The Troops The Troops of Nexal-Consciousness of Anti-Consciousness of Nexal-Consciousness of Anti-Consciousness good bad faithfulness treachery īmān kufr sincerity insincerity belief rejection vigor lethargy hope despair intelligence stupidity justice tyranny cognizance denial well pleased-ness displeasure tolerance/graciousness open enmity thankfulness ingratitude trustworthiness beguiling striving giving up discretion indiscretion reliance avarice communion neglect (communion) compassion cruelty fasting breaking fast mercy anger jihād cowardice knowledge ignorance pilgrimage (Mecca) dissolving the pact understanding foolishness prudence backbiting decency indecency goodness to parents refractoriness detachment longing genuineness showing off gentleness roughness right wrong wariness recklessness covering (oneself) self-display humility pride precaution exposing (oneself) deliberation haste pure impartiality fanatic bias forbearance foolhardiness rectifying factiousness deep silence incoherence cleanliness filthiness yielding (to truth) arrogance modesty immodesty full assent doubt resolution (conflict) enmity patience impatience rest tiredness forgiveness revenge ease difficulty richness poverty giving blessing denying blessing remembrance negligence health and security affliction memory forgetfulness economy extravagance cordiality cutting off of ties wisdom inclination contentment covetousness solemnness flippancy munificence stinginess felicity misery affection hostility turning (to repent) persistence (in bad) fulfillment betrayal seeking forgiveness heedlessness obedience disobedience discipline indulgence meekness insolence supplication haughtiness safety tribulation energetic-ness laziness love hatred joy grief truthfulness lying friendship separation the true the false generosity miserliness Table 1 19 Indeed! I swear by the self-accusing ego! (𝓠 75:2) O Tranquil Ego! Return to your Cherisher-Lord, well pleased with Him and He well pleased with you. So enter among my adorer-servants! And enter my Garden! (𝓠 89:27–30) Allāh (swt) thus commands Ignorance (= Ego) to return. At first it ignores the command,33 but then it is given a choice: “If you disobey again after that I will remove you and your troops from my Mercy.” How does the ego obey? Byt submitting itself and its troops to nexal-consciousness and the latter’s troops. But what is the engine of that process of development? The engine is the first dialectical lynchpin, that of prehending (ʿaql) and wise practicing (ḥikmah). Together, both dialectical lynchpins constitute a concrete, dynamic objective-logical system. 5 Two approaches to Objective Logic: Informal and Formal In contemporary philosophy and science, two approaches to a systematization of objective logic may be identified: one more informal, the other more formal. Lack of space precludes extensive discussion; for greater development and technical detail, see the authors’ forthcoming book, The Logical Foundations of Islamic Economics: Objective Logic and Phenomenology of Consciousness and Action. What follows is a summary account of each approach. 5.1 Informal Objective Logic: Scale of Forms The informal approach is well-illustrated by examples from the primary sources. There are countless traditions and ayāt of the Qurʾān that articulate various stages and processes of self-transcendence in Islām. A comprehensive example is articulated in the following ḥadīth narrated by Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Bāqir (ʿa): 33 The semantic field of ‘ignorance’ and its cognates, such as ‘ignore’, provide a happy instance of near identity between the semantic field of an English word with that of a corresponding Qurʾānic Arabic word. 20 Īmān (dynamic security in belief and action) is above islām (initial acknowledgment and submission) by a degree. And taqwā (dynamic awareness) is above īmān by a degree. And yaqīn (dynamic certainty) is above taqwā by a degree. And nothing has been so little-apportioned amongst the adoring-servants as yaqīn.34 The crucial thing to notice here is that each higher degree absorbs and develops its predecessor. These stages, constitute differences of both kind and degree. Here is an example found in a number of aḥādīth. To paraphrase: Consider the courtyard of the the Forbidden Mosque (al-Masjid al-Ḥarām) and the Kaʿbah which lies at its center. The courtyard of the mosque is not nearly as precious as the Kaʿbah itself, although it remains a sacred place of safety and security, where it is forbidden to harm or kill anyone. The Forbidden Mosque symbolizes islām. Now if you see a man in the courtyard, you can say that he is in the Forbidden Mosque, but you cannot say that he is in the Kaʿbah. On the other hand, if you see a man in the Kaʿbah, you can say that he is in the Forbidden Mosque. So being in the Kaʿbah absorbs being in the Forbidden Mosque, but being in the Forbidden Mosque does not absorb being in the Kaʿbah. Thus one may enter islām without entering īmān, but one cannot enter īmān without entering and remaining within islām.35 Here is an example from the Qurʾān, illustrating the scale of self-transcendence within taqwā: There is no blame on those who are dynamically believing and do deeds of righteousness regarding what they consume as long as they are dynamically aware, are dynamically believing, and do deeds of righteousness. Then they are dynamically aware and dynamically believing. Then they are dynamically aware and act beautifully. And Allāh loves those who act beautifully. (𝒬 5:93) 34 In some aḥādīth three degrees are mentioned: islām, īmān, and iḥsān (beautiful action). In these traditions, ‘iḥsān’ is used to encompass the highest stage of taqwā plus yaqīn. See Hamid (2011b), pp. 71–72. See also the table on page 111. 35 See Hamid (2011b), pp. 39–43. The relevant aḥādīth are paraphrased on p. 40. 21 The scale of self-transcendence from islām through yaqīn thus constitutes what R. G. Collingwood calls a scale of forms.36 A scale of forms involves an overlap of classes (i.e., of categories, universes of discourse, genera) in which a difference in kind is combined with a difference in degree. The genus animal is different in kind from that of plant, yet animal also involves a higher degree of developedness of the characteristic feature of plant, viz, biological growth.37 Yaqīn is different in kind from taqwā, taqwā from īmān, and īmān from islām. Yet īmān is also a higher degree of islām, taqwā of īmān, and yaqīn of taqwā. One of the difficulties involved in establishing a true taxonomy of Islamic science lies in precisely articulating, as a coherent scale of forms, the structure of overlap of kind and degree between the subdisciplines of the Islamic sciences. This is a matter that deserves further study and research.38 5.2 Formal Objective Logic: Functors and Natural Transformations In the 20th century, in the context of category and topos theory, mathematicians discovered powerful, formal tools for making objective logic precise: functors and natural transformations. Again, space precludes detailed development; readers are referred to the aforementioned, forthcoming book. We restrict ourselves to two examples. 36 See Collingwood (2005), Ch. 3. 37 A version of this scale of forms was discovered by Aristotle, and articulated by him into a system of metaphysics. The next stage in the Aristotelian scale of forms is that of the human being, followed by the celestial intellects, followed by the Prime Mover (= God). But Aristotle’s scale is one of fixed genera (= universe of discourse) with no way to connect its objective-logical structure with the first principles of demonstration posited for each genus. Put another way: Aristotle was unable to connect the intraconnective demonstrative logic within any given genus with the inter-connective objective logic between the genera That is, objective logic is bifurcated from subjective logic. See our forthcoming book for details as well as Chapter 4 of Mure (1959). 38 A perusal of Hamid (2011b), e.g., Chapter 2, will illustrate some of the difficulties involved in articulating a proper Islamic taxonomy of self-transcendence. At the time of writing that book, the author was unaware of Collingwood’s framework of a scale of forms, in terms of which the earlier attempt to outline a taxonomy could possibly have been better articulated. 22 For the first, we consider Benedetto Croce’s dialectic of distincts and opposites. This is important for economics in general, and Islamic Economics in particular, because i) it provides a phenomenological treatment of the economic and the moral as terms of a scale of forms; and ii) it does so against an original, primordial dialectic involving the theoretical and the practical. That original dialectic is preserved or realized in the dialectic of the aesthetic and the economic, where ‘economic’ is used in some contemporary Western sense. But this dialectic takes place at a level of abstraction: It does not capture the fullness of the human being, who is something more than an economic animal that seeks mere aesthetic fulfillment. According to Croce, the aesthetic is succeeded and absorbed by the conceptual, and the economic is succeeded and absorbed by the moral. That is, the economic is absorbed by the moral and is a necessary condition of the moral. But the moral is more than the economic. As Croce’s commentator Mure emphasizes, the mistaken belief in a bifurcation between the economic and the moral has resulted in a “great deal of bad ethical theory”.39 In formal objective logic, the absorption of one category (= universe of discourse) into a higher category, with precise specification of difference and/or residue, is articulated by a functor, a special kind of objective mapping. Loosely speaking, a functor category is constituted by i) some categories; ii) the functors that specify the transcendence, development, or decay of one category into another; which are organized as a systematic sequence of realizations or preservations – the corresponding Qurʾānic expression is āthār (imprints) – of iii) some original dialectic of categories. Unpacking and expanding this description is beyond the current scope, but the Figures 1 and 2 will give some flavor of the formalism. 39 See Mure (1958), p. 22. 23 Theoretical 𝛾′ 𝛾 Practical concretization1 Aesthetic 𝐹𝛾′ 𝐹𝛾 Economic abstraction1 concretization2 Conceptual 𝐺𝛾′ 𝐺𝛾 Moral abstraction2 Figure 1 𝛾′ 𝓣 𝓟 𝛾 𝐹𝛾′ 𝓐 𝓔 𝜏1 𝐹𝛾 Figure 2 𝜏′ 1 𝜏2 𝜏′ 2 𝐺𝛾′ 𝓝 𝓜 𝐺𝛾 The original dialectic of the theoretical and the practical is imprinted on the phenomenological background of four modes of human experience as two realizations (= preservations): a dialectic of the aesthetic and the economic, and a dialectic of the conceptual and the moral. These two imprinted dialectics are related by two natural transforma- tions 𝜏 and 𝜏′ : one of concretization (= development, self-transcendence) and one of abstraction (= decay, self-corruption). 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 are components of 𝜏; 𝜏′ 1 and 𝜏′ 2 are components of 𝜏′ . See Figure 2. These diagrams illustrate what may be called the Croce topos, a functor category constituted as described above. There are two dialectical lynchpins: The original and the natural transformations. These two lynchpins are orthogonal to one another. We may say that it takes at least two mutually orthogonal and dialectical lynchpins to constitute a concrete objective-logical system. 24 The Islamic phenomenology is far richer, and much more concrete, than that of Croce. If we restrict ourselves to the two lynchpins of the Islamic phenomenology of consciousness and action discussed earlier, we find that they are also orthogonal. The original topos – loosely speaking, a topos is a naturally closed or complete category – is that of the nexus and the ego: The ego (nafs) seeks to develop towards submission to and harmony with the nexus (ʿaql). The engine of that development also works towards mutual coherence (ijtimāʿ) of the troops of the nexus. Thus it involves natural transformations between the 75 troops of intrinsic value, orthogonal to the upward movement of the ego. Let our original topos of consciousness be designated as 𝓐0 . It is constituted by i) nexus (= consciousness proper), designated by 𝓒0 ; ii) ego/ignorance (= anti-consciousness, ego-consciousness), designated by 𝓒nt 0 ; and iii) ego-consciousness’ upwards movement (= functor) of development (= self-transcendence) towards nexal-consciousness, des- ignated by 𝜓nt 0 ; and iv) ego-consciousness’ downwards movement of decay (= self- corruption) away from nexal-consciousness, designated by 𝜓0 . The abbreviation ‘nt’ is short for ‘anti’. The 75-plus-75 troops of consciousness and anti-consciousness form a background of modalities of human experience. Given a pair constituted by one modality (= “troop”) of nexal-consciousness and its opposite anti-modality, the original topos of consciousness is preserved in that pair: The anti-modality may grow to submit to its opposite or it may decay to ultimate removal from the mercy of Allāh (swt). At the same time, that growth ultimately depends on coherence (ijtimāʿ): Thus the engine constituted by the dialectic of prehending and wise practicing also entails natural transformations between the modalities. A general illustration of the resultant objective-logical system is provided by Figure 3. 25 𝓐0 𝜓nt 0 𝓒0 𝓒nt 0 𝜏1 𝓐1 𝜓0 𝜓nt 1 𝓒1 𝓒nt 1 𝜏𝑐1 𝜓1 𝜓nt 2 𝜏nt 𝑐1 [cont.] 𝓐2 𝓒2 𝓒nt 2 [cont.] 𝜓2 (𝓐) 𝜓nt 74 [cont.] 𝓐74 𝓒74 𝓒nt 74 𝜏74 𝓐75 𝜏𝑐74 𝜓74 𝜏nt 𝑐74 𝜓nt 75 𝓒75 𝓒nt 75 𝜓75 (𝓑) Figure 3 The diagram is not fully concrete. For one thing, there are thousands of combinations between the modalities, not one linear order from 1 to 75. Taking all possible combinations into consideration, there are 11,000 natural-transformation pairs in the background of modalities of consciousness, each of which takes the form of Figure 4. The minimal unit of concrete human consciousness is not any particular modality, but a naturaltransformation unit, for every modality is definable and exists only in terms of at least one other. We can say that, from the perspective of the Ḥadīth of the Troops of ʿAql and Jahl, the Islamic phenomenology of consciousness and action thus involves 11,000 units or dimensions of human consciousness. Development of the implications of this discovery for Islamic phenomenology and Islamic Economics constitutes an important avenue for further, extensive scientific research for researchers in these fields. Furthermore, there is at least one other lynchpin that has not been taken into account in the above discussion. The dialectic of adoration-service (ʿubūdiyyah) and cherishinglordship (rubūbiyyah) constitutes another original topos, one just as important as that of nexus and ego. For details, see the forthcoming book. 26 𝜏𝑖 𝓐𝑖 𝜓nt 𝑖 𝓒𝑖 𝓒nt 𝑖 𝓐𝑗 𝜏𝑐𝑖 𝜓nt 𝑗 𝜓𝑖 𝜏nt 𝑐𝑖 𝓒𝑗 𝓒nt 𝑗 𝜓𝑗 Figure 4 6 Transcending Cartesian Dualism: the Monism of the Qurʾān One weakness found in some of the current research in Islamic Economics is that, despite the criticism of scientism on the part of many of its advocates, it rarely advances beyond a Cartesian dualism of a personal consciousness which confronts an impersonal object; this leads to a practical dualism of fideism and scientism (to be discussed further down. Consider, for example, the following statement of Asad Zaman (2018): For reasons detailed elsewhere, European conceptions about the nature of knowledge were distorted by a battle between Science and Religion which lasted for centuries, and was eventually won by Science. Because of this battle, the West came to the false and misleading view that Science is the only reliable source of knowledge. This is certainly true about the external world, but completely false about our internal personal lives, which cannot be explored by standard scientific techniques. [Our emphasis.] Two of Zaman’s results are of interest here. The first, that “the West came to the false and misleading view that Science [in some accepted, narrow sense] is the only reliable source of knowledge” agrees with our own conclusion, even if arrived at from a different route. The trouble begins with the second conclusion: “This is certainly true about the external world, but completely false about our internal personal lives, which cannot be explored by standard scientific techniques.” Although Zaman rightly rejects scientism, 27 he does so at the cost of maintaining the wholly untenable Cartesian dualism between an “external” world, governed by the impersonal physical sciences, and an “internal personal” world, inaccessible to science and governed by another set of laws that have no effect on the external world. This leads to metaphysical commitments such as i) a dualism maintained in commerce by God (original Cartesianism), ii) reduction of the world to physical matter (physicalist materialism), or iii) reduction of the world to personal mind (subjective idealism). The first scenario is as inexplicable and untenable as the atomism of the Kalām, and presages the contemporary dualism of scientism and fideism (as we will discuss further on); the second takes us towards scientism, which has already been rejected; and the third takes us down one route towards solipsism. More generally, the realist view that the world consists of utterly separate personal minds which confront an independent, external world governed by quantitative science is, in the words of Mure, an “economic observer’s” view which, by another route, leads inescapably to solipsism and skepticism.40 But even from the Islamic vantage point, Cartesian dualism is untenable. For the Qurʾānic position is that the world is ultimately one, featuring no fundamental discordance: You will not see in the creation of Al-Raḥmān any mutual incongruity or dis- cord. (𝒬 67:3)41 The Fashioning of Allāh who made everything as an intricate whole. (𝒬 27:68)42 Cartesian dualism is in direct conflict with this principle of monism. It is significant that the Qurʾān, emphatically, does not ask one to take this matter on mere faith, but to directly and deeply observe: 40 41 42 See, e.g., Mure (1958), pp. 166–167. ٍ ِ ِ ِ ‫﴿َﻣﺎ َﺗَﺮٰى ﻓﻲ َﺧْﻠِﻖ اﻟﱠﺮْﺣَٰﻤ‬ .﴾‫ﻦ ﻣﻦ َﺗَﻔﺎُوت‬ ٍ ِ ِ .﴾‫ﻲء‬ ْ ‫﴿ُﺻﻨَْﻊ اﻟﱣﻠﻪ اﱠﻟﺬي َأْﺗَﻘَﻦ ُﻛﱠﻞ َﺷ‬ 28 So return your vision again [and observe]! Do you see any cleavage? Then return your vision again and again [and look]; your vision will come back to you bedazzled and weary as well. (𝒬 67:3)43 Cosmological pluralism (inclusive of dualism) is ultimately unthinkable by reason or by any stage of consciousness that transcends its periphery. Cartesian dualism, in its original form or that of any of its many descendants, has always been phenomenologically found (mawjūd) unsatisfactory by the human spirit; hence the common motivation to embrace some form of reductionism to a single abstract principle – even if misguided, as in some variety of physicalist materialism or subjective idealism – or concrete dialectic (such as objective idealism). The core wijdān (existential experience) of the human being resists any ultimate, absolute bifurcation of the world, as forcefully pointed out in 𝒬 67:3 above. One result towards which our investigations lead is this: Any genuine science must be able to account for the characteristics of the “internal personal” world; at the same time, any genuine system of intrinsic value must be able to account for the characteristics of the “external” world.44 Any genuine science must ultimately involve intrinsic value, and any system of intrinsic value must ultimately involve science. (Current civilizational consciousness is currently very far from appreciating this noble goal, let alone achieving it.) The thesis of the current project may be stated as follows: The importance and relevance of Islamic Economics lies, in large measure, in the struggle to determine and articulate 43 44 ِ ُ ‫﴿َﻓﺎْرِﺟِﻊ اْﻟَﺒَﺼَﺮ َﻫْﻞ َﺗَﺮٰى ﻣﻦ ُﻓ‬ .﴾‫ﻄﻮٍر‬ The concrete nature of consciousness discussed earlier entails that every thought (= act of conscious prehending on the part) of a given thinker has a real object; there is an intimate nexus between thinking and its object that negates any absolute bifurcation between knowing and that which is known. Even when (pseudo-)thinking (such as fantasy) fails to shadow some material extension, its object is not merely abstract or personal to that thinker. Thus any absolute distinction between an internal, personal world and an external, impersonal world is negated. Rather there is a dialectical contrast between any individual locus of consciousness (subjective) and that which is prehended by consciousness (objective) that transcends the personal contours of that individual. 29 a type of (scientific) system that integrates the categories of human economic, as well as moral, self-transcending (= spiritual) experience into an (objective-logical) intricate, coherent whole. The informal and formal objective-logical examples provided earlier illustrate the thesis and, at minimum, provide a proof-of-concept on the basis of which further research may be conducted. 7 Towards a Science of Iqtiṣād The thesis outlined in the preceding paragraph is rich enough to encompass, and general enough to extend, a particular consensus which is largely shared by a subset of specialists in the field that includes figures such as as Abdel–Rahman Yosri Ahmed, Zaman Asad, Ali Khan, Abbas Mirakhor, and Mohammad Nejatullah Siddiqi. In brief:45 Implicit within Islam is a concrete, systematic framework and methodology, based on certain philosophical considerations, for organizing and developing economics institutions, which i) is distinctive and unique vis-à-vis secular European ideologies; ii) is communicable to mainstream economists; and iii) yields empirically testable results. Our objective is to extend this consensus by placing it in the context of a more general system of science, in an appropriately broad sense of ‘science’, one that is consistent with and flows from the Prophetic, Islamic, sources. In the absence of such an integrated approach, it will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to avoid the ultimately non-Islamic dualism of fideism and scientism. Such a system of Islamic Economics will integrate the economic (in the narrow, contemporary sense) with intrinsic value in an integrated science of development and self-transcendence. For Islamic Economics, i.e., iqtiṣād, is inseparable from self-transcendence. Consider the following scale of forms mentioned in the Qurʾān: Then we made to inherit the Decree those whom we have chosen from amongst our servants. Among them is one [type] who does injustice due to one’s ego, and among them is one [type] who acts in a balanced and efficient manner (muqtaṣid). 45 See Mirakhor (2006), pp. 22–24. 30 And amongst them is one [type] who outstrips the rest in acts of goodness by the permission of God; that is the great virtue! (𝒬 35:32)46 In the commentary of Imām Ṣādiq (ʿa): The one who is unjust is the one who hovers about his ego. The one who is balanced and efficient (muqtaṣid) is the one who hovers about his center. And the one who outstrips the rest is the one who hovers about his Lord.47 Contemporary economic science by and large focuses on ego consciousness combined with peripheral consciousness (= economic rationality) and some system of associated rules. Iqtiṣād, on the other hand, is truly operative only when central consciousness is activated. Yet a necessary condition of iqtiṣād is a system of economic rules. In addition, iqtiṣād is a bridge between ego-consciousness and Allāh-consciousness – perhaps it is even appropriate to associate iqtiṣād with the sirāṭ (overpass) everyone in the next life has to cross in order to finally reach felicity. Hence the need for an integrated science that overcomes any bifurcation. An objective-logical approach to the matter appears inescapable. Zaman is correct in his identification and criticism of the philosophical error of scientism. However, in order to escape scientism and solipsism one has to abandon the economic observer’s vantage point. This Zaman does not do: Instead he sets up and develops a strong bifurcation between the Islamic and the economic.48 Zaman is also correct in his contention that a genuinely Islamic framework and methodology is in fundamental conflict with those of secular ideologies with respect to certain principles. However, with respect to the core issue of the category (= universe of discourse) involved in the discipline of contemporary economics (with its associated objects and mappings), the solution does not lie in yet more Cartesian-style bifurcation and dualism. Rather, an 46 47 48 ِ ‫﴿ُﺛﻢ َأورْﺛﻨَﺎ اْﻟِﻜَﺘﺎب اﱠﻟِﺬﻳﻦ اﺻَﻄَﻔﻴﻨَﺎ ِﻣﻦ ِﻋﺒﺎِدَﻧﺎ َﻓِﻤﻨْﻬﻢ َﻇﺎﻟِﻢ ﱢﻟﻨَْﻔِﺴِﻪ وِﻣﻨْﻬﻢ ﻣْﻘَﺘِﺼٌﺪ وِﻣﻨْﻬﻢ ﺳﺎﺑٌِﻖ ﺑِﺎْﻟَﺨﻴﺮا‬ ‫ت‬ َ ْ ْ ْ َ َ َْ َ ْ ُ َ ‫َ ُ ﱡ‬ ٌ ْ ُ َْ ‫ﱠ‬ َ ‫ﺑِﺈِْذِن اﻟﱠﻠِﻪ َٰذﻟَِﻚ ُﻫَﻮ اْﻟَﻔْﻀُﻞ اْﻟ‬ .﴾‫ﻜﺒِﻴُﺮ‬ ‫اﻟﻈﺎﻟﻢ ﻣﻦ ﻳﺤﻮم ﺣﻮل ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و اﻟﻤﻘﺘﺼﺪ ﻳﺤﻮم ﺣﻮل ﻗﻠﺒﻪ و اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ﻳﺤﻮم ﺣﻮل رّﺑﻪ‬. See, e.g., his “Islam vs. Economics” (Zaman 2015). 31 objective-logical approach is needed to exhibit that economic category as a dialectical phase in the human development and self-transcendence that is core to an Islamic framework and methodology. And an Islamic framework and methodology, as we will show, exhibits itself as a phenomenology of consciousness and action. One of the aims of an Islamic system built on that phenomenology is to transcend and supersede the dualisms that dominate Western thinking, such as those of theory and practice (Aristotelianism), learning and knowing (Aristotelianism), personal and impersonal worlds (Cartesianism), scientism and fideism (the current zeitgeist). In place of these abstractions, an Islamic system seeks to show a progressive, efficient (mustaqīm) path to knowledge (ʿilm), followed by objective certainty (yaqīn),49 then followed by cognizance (maʿrifah) of the whole, each in intimate conjunction with the stage of experience and practice of intrinsic value specific to it. The available scientific formalism for objective logic is developed within the context of mathematical category and topos theory. Although they constitute a conceptual tool of the highest order, the philosophical and scientific potential of categories and toposes has hardly been tapped; the range of their possible application to Islamic Economics is virtually unlimited. Without using the expression ‘objective logic’, one can find aspects of its sense expressed by many philosophers and scientists, from ancient to contemporary, as well as important applications. After all, it did not take Aristotle’s discovery of formal deductive logic for thinkers to engage in cogent deduction. Similarly one can find countless exemplifications of objective-logical struggle in the history of human thought: It is an ubiquitous endeavor, indispensable in any effort to discover and explicate a coherent system of science in any of the senses we have considered. Looking at it the other way around, it should be noted that the mathematical theory of categories and toposes constitutes one particular paradigm for a sufficiently general theory of formal objective logic; at the moment it is also the only formal paradigm that we have. It may be the case that the crises facing the “ummah” of Muslims are, as Zaman puts 49 Certainty is to be distinguished from mere certitude: The former is a state of knowing the truth, the latter a state of surety that may or may not shadow the true or the real. 32 it, “of types never before seen in [Muslim] history”.50 This is on the right track, but it does not go far enough. For these crises are rooted in severe errors of commission and judgment made by the earliest generation of Muslim history. Progressive thinkers and liberation theologians of the near-contemporary Muslim world, from the generation of Allama Iqbal and Muhammad Abduh to that of Sayyid Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, Shariati, and Imām Khomeini, have all recognized and emphasized this fact in one manner or other. For workers in the field of Islamic Economics, that insight has to be developed and more deeply fathomed. Despite their impressive historical accomplishments, neither the immediate post-Prophetic generations nor the classical age of Muslim civilization adequately developed, except in disparate pieces here and there, the framework and methodology, the system, of science implicit within the Qurʾān and authentic Sunnah. Before that system could mature in an organic manner, severe errors were made which spawned the three negative aberrations personified in the famous cults of the religious elites in service to unjust wealth distribution and class superiority (nākithīn), tyrants (qāsiṭīn), and fanatics (māriqīn). The revolving mill-stone (raḥā) of Islām came, in short order, to a complete stop, as the Messenger (ṣ) had famously predicted. Then, where simplistic 50 An ummah is a community whose members share a common, self-transcending objective (umm) under the leadership of a righteous imām. This is the paradigm of the original, archetypal ummah that existed under the leadership of the Messenger (ṣ). An ummah is also the concrete, organic reality of an objective-logical system, one that consists of two sub-categories and the mappings between them: The imām (leader), the maʾmūm (someone who is led), and the mutual exchange of dynamic loving (walāyah) between them in the form of i) guidance and purification (tazkiyah) from the imām, and ii) becoming purified (tazakkiyy) and guided on the part of the maʾmūm – through following the imām. Say! If you have come to especially love Allāh, then follow me and Allāh will especially love you. (𝒬 3:31) He [the Messenger] purifies them and teaches them the Decree and Wisdom. (𝒬 62:2) Surely whosoever receives the purification is successful. (𝒬 87:14) The Prophet has more walāyah with the dynamic believers than they have with themselves. (𝒬 33:6) In the final analysis, an ummah without a loving, guided, guiding, and beloved imām is an abstraction. This point deserves to be further elaborated and fathomed deeply. 33 norms and formulas of piety were transcended, the trappings of the meta-categorical contours of Christian theology, Aristotelianism, and Neoplatonic philosophy took over the Muslim mind, with disastrous consequence. This was then followed by the absorption of the Muslim mind into the meta-categorical context of contemporary Western civilization. At the end of this trajectory lies the current cauldron of crises. It is far beyond the scope of the present note to outline that critical history in detail or in brief, although it is a task that remains in urgent need of accomplishment. Critical, yet productive and dynamic, awareness is one of the sides of ‘taqwā’. A concrete concept of taqwā, in turn, is a necessary ingredient in the formulation of any definition of “Islamic Economics”.51 And one of the raisons d’être of Islamic Economics is to play a crucial role in proffering effective solutions to these crises: If only the people of the communities had dynamically believed [stage of consciousness and action] and then became dynamically aware [next stage of consciousness and action], we would have opened upon them blessings from the heaven and the earth. But they belied [the Messenger], so We chas- tised and restrained them on account of what, and the manner in which, they earned. (𝒬 7:96)52 Acknowledgements Thanks first and foremost belong to the Inventor (Badīʿ) of the world, which He made as a firm, intricate whole. The authors owe a debt of gratitude to Hossein Askari, John Corcoran, Ali Y. Al-Hamad, William Lawvere, Bilal Muhammad, Thierry Vanroy, and others. 51 An extensive discussion and development of the scale of forms involved in taqwā and iḥsān is provided in Chapters 2 and 3 of Hamid (2011b). Certain aspects of that effort are developed more formally and technically in the authors’ aforementioned, forthcoming book. 52 ٍ ‫﴿وَﻟﻮ َأﱠن َأﻫَﻞ اْﻟُﻘﺮى آﻣﻨُﻮا واﱠﺗَﻘﻮا َﻟَﻔَﺘﺤﻨَﺎ َﻋَﻠﻴِﻬﻢ ﺑﺮَﻛﺎ‬ ِ ‫ت ﱢﻣَﻦ اﻟﱠﺴَﻤﺎِء َواْﻷَْر‬ ‫ض َوَٰﻟِﻜﻦ َﻛﱠﺬُﺑﻮا َﻓَﺄَﺧْﺬَﻧﺎُﻫﻢ ﺑَِﻤﺎ‬ ْ ْ ْ َ َ ٰ َ ْ َ ََ ْ َ ‫َﻛﺎُﻧﻮا َﻳْﻜِﺴُﺒﻮ‬ .﴾‫ن‬ 34 References Barber, B. R. (2007). Consumed: How Markets Corrupt Children, Infantilize Adults, and Swallow Citizens Whole. New York: W. W. Norton. (p. 3) Collingwood, R. G. (2005). An Essay on Philosophical Method. Clarendon Press. (2nd edition edited by James Connelly and Giuseppina D’Oro) (p. 20) Dalton, G. (Ed.) (1971). Primitive, Archaic, and Modern Economics: Essays of Karl Polanyi.. Boston: Beacon Press. Gowdy, J. (Ed.) (1998). 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