Collective Memory

ARTS3102 Theories of Memory and Heritage: Social, Cultural, and Historical perspectives What is “collective memory”? Sherman Tan Australian National University Introduction: Main issues and theoretical complexities The endeavor to understand, theorize, and define “collective memory” is fraught with many difficulties. First and foremost, the term has been taken up across a number of disciplines, including History (and Historical Studies/Historiography), Anthropology, Sociology, Cultural and Literary Studies, Psychology, and Political Science. The growing interdisciplinary literature has only served to complicate matters – proliferating numerous (and often conflicting) definitions of collective memory based on various different theoretical presuppositions and disciplinary assumptions. As Erll puts it, this is a field “to which many disciplines contribute, using their specific methodologies and perspectives”; as such, “this makes for its terminological richness, but also for its disjointedness” (2008: 3). At the same time, one can witness attempts to bring together the wide-ranging literature on collective memory through the development and culmination of new cross-disciplinary fields of research, including (but not limited to) that of “Memory Studies”, “Social/Cultural Memory Studies” or “Heritage and Museum Studies”. However, the possibility for the production of a truly inclusive understanding of collective memory still remains to be seen. Secondly, the study of collective memory certainly, and rightfully, presents a series of theoretical and methodological dilemmas for the social sciences, suggesting the overwhelming complexity involved in this field of study. In a sense, these issues appear self-evident. Understanding the nature of collective memory requires an immense sensitivity towards human consciousness and subjectivity, and demands that researchers engage with the phenomenological reality of socio-historically situated beings that are located within broader political and economic processes of stasis and change. To further compound matters, theorizing “collective memory” throws open a Pandora’s box of (possibly) unanswerable questions: Can intellectuals escape the sway 1 of collective memory? To what extent are their accounts and (re)constructions of collective memory free from the specter of broader socio-cultural/historical/political determinations, in which they are, themselves, inescapably caught in? Can one hope for a vantage point outside of the prison-house of contemporaneity? Indeed, these pertinent issues invoke (ironically) the memory of the intellectual-literary canons now known as the “linguistic”, “cultural” or “poststructuralist” turn in the humanities and social sciences – in which a focus on textual representation and their implicit “traces” of meaning occupied a central position in criticizing and deconstructing the constitution of a “taken-for-granted” (or assumed) human (inter) subjectivity. Yet, this theoretical agenda fundamentally conflicts with attempts to establish more positively objective bodies of knowledge pertaining to a determinate set of collective memories based on specific and explicable socio-cultural norms – and this is often evidenced in visible efforts to “fix” narratives of remembrance and forgetting, for instance, in public displays of commemorations such as museum exhibits, monuments, etc. It follows then, that intense controversies and debates realized within the context of everyday contests/negotiations of memory and meaning, are in fact to some extent, premised on these vastly different intellectual frameworks and metaphysical/epistemological architectures. I believe that it is paramount to cut through the cacophony of theoretical complexities to make sense of the “collective memory” concept in a more systematic manner, and this is certainly what a number of scholars have attempted to achieve in recent years. More often than not, these theoretical syntheses are a reaction against the use of the term “collective memory” in empirical studies in the absence of a rigorous theoretical understanding of the concept itself – in turn, this results in researchers talking past one another in discussions of collective memory. And most certainly, these differing assumptions of what “collective memory” means is premised on the different theoretical commitments held by various scholars and their wide-ranging intellectual emphases. However, I wish to argue that it is not possible, and indeed counterproductive, to attempt to produce a single overarching definition of “collective memory”. Instead, while engaging with the concept, it is equally important to avoid an overly abstract and vacuous view of “collective memory”. 2 In order to achieve clarity and specificity, it is certainly more useful to highlight the different dimensions of “collective memory” and broader sets of theoretical issues and concerns that are implicated in understanding it. As such, in this essay, I would like to explore four broad aspects of “collective memory” which are especially relevant to the study of this concept, and discuss a number of theorists/theoretical perspectives that may be useful in their contributions to each of these dimensions. First, there is the question of the metaphysical “location” of “collective memory”: indeed, where is collective memory “sited”? Second, the issue of collective memory as a certain representation or interpretation of “what happened”: in this, one can discern the influence of social-scientific critiques of essentialism/relativism and the inherent epistemological dilemmas involved in the socio-cultural construction of “meaning” in (and through) discourses and multimodal narratives of memory. Thirdly, collective memory is inextricably connected with power relations and the notion of an “identity politics”, and one must engage with the themes of domination and resistance that are integral to understanding the multiple agencies of collective memory as well as its role/function within the context of broader sociopolitical movements. On the whole, these three dimensions should be read as suggestive insights rather than as dogmatic prescriptions for each and every empirical study of collective memory – the question of the relation of theory to practice is a difficult one, but one must be able to account for the relevance of theoretical perspectives in the production of explanatory accounts and, at the same time, recognize the fallibility of these contingent frameworks. The “location” of collective memory: Holism, Individualism & Culture In itself, the term collective memory appears oxymoronic. How, indeed, can a sociocultural dimension of remembering be reconciled with an inherently individualpsychological act of cognitive organization? There are a number of positions along the holist-individualist continuum, evidenced in the work of recent theorists of memory. At the same time, it has become especially important for researchers to move towards more encompassing frameworks to analyze collective memory which transcend the group/individual dichotomy in various ways. In what follows, I would like to examine a number of different attempts to theorize and explain the “sited-ness” of memory, and demonstrate how they differ in their emphases on collectivity and individualism, and on the dialectical relationship between both of these poles of analysis. 3 On one hand, memory seems to be a self-evidently personal/individualist concept. It can be seen as being “actualized only on an individual level” and is essentially “performed by individuals” (Gedi and Elam 1996: 34). According to Funkenstein, […] consciousness and memory can only be realized by an individual who acts, is aware, and remembers. Just as a nation cannot eat or dance, neither can it speak or remember. Remembering is a mental act, and therefore it is absolutely and completely personal. (1989: 6) Indeed, what this perspective stresses is how remembering is a fundamental “individual phenomenon” which “we seem to do in the solitary world of our own heads”; and it is conceivable that “when we ‘reminisce’, we often experience this as a process of offering up to the external world the images of the past locked away in the recesses of our own minds” (Olick 2006: 10). However, on the other hand, there has been a growing tendency to view collective memory as a phenomenon that is intrinsically irreducible to individual processes of remembering. This view, to a large extent, is premised on Maurice Halbwachs’ (now) classic work on collective memory. For him, “in each epoch [memory] reconstruct[s] an image of the past which is in accord […] with the predominant thoughts of the society” (Halbwachs 1992: 40). Indeed, the emphasis is on how these social groups are already “delimited in space and time” (Halbwachs 1980[1950]: 84). Megill’s explanation of Halbwachs’ model is especially useful here: The essential point here is that for Halbwachs the social identities in question already have a determinate existence before the collective memories that, at every moment, they construct. To be sure, over time an identity will undoubtedly be reshaped by the collective memories that it has constructed, but, fundamentally, identity precedes memory. [author’s emphasis] (1998: 44) Therefore, what is clear from this other perspective is that collective memory is viewed as a “social essence”, and is seen to “reside in structural settings” such as “cultural artifacts, organizational arrangements, and institutionalized practices” (Prus 4 2007: 379). On the whole then, the pertinent issue for theorists of “collective memory” is to seek out solutions in order to bridge the divide between the cognitive/individual and social/cultural dimensions of remembering. It is important to subject Halbwachs’ insights to a more detailed scrutiny, given his immense influence on the academic study of social/collective memory and remembering. Erll notes that “Maurice Halbwachs was the first to write explicitly and systematically about cultural memory” and more importantly, it was he who “coined the fundamental term ‘collective memory’” and is the “best remembered founding father of memory studies” (2008: 8). Halbwachs’ attempts to understand the nature of collective memory were influenced by the philosopher, Henri Bergson, and the sociologist, Emile Durkheim (Olick 2006: 10). With regards to the question of the metaphysical “location” of memory, Durkheim’s sociological theory appears to have been particularly important in shaping Halbwachs’ intellectual work on memory. Halbswachs, on the one hand, was keen to stress the ways in which individual acts of remembering were essentially social/culturally “framed”, suggesting that memory necessarily takes place within the context of social groups and by virtue of individuals’ participation in them. Olick (2006: 11) explains: “for a true Durkheimian, culture is not reducible to what is in people’s heads”, and that in the same way, Halbwachs had argued that “it is impossible for individuals to remember in any coherent and persistent fashions outside of their group contexts” explaining how “these are the necessary social frameworks of memory”. By concluding that “memory, our most personal, immediate, mental operation, has no substance outside its social context”, Halbwachs’ efforts could, to some extent, be construed as an “obliteration of the individual consciousness as real and determinant” (Gedi and Elam 1996: 36). Yet, it is possible to argue that these aspects of his work were concerned with an analysis of the social frameworks of memory, “rather than of social memory per se”; in fact, Halbwachs appears “to have preserved the notion of an individual memory, however shaped that memory is by social frameworks and identities” (Olick 1999: 335). However, one can also recognize another aspect of Halbwachs’ thought: his emphasis on collective memory as generalized “imagos” and as “collective representations” (a Durkheimian term) – which, on the whole, portrays collective memory as externalized “collective commemorative representations and mnemonic traces”. (Olick 1999: 335-336). This 5 can be viewed as the “more radically collectivist [or holist] moment in Halbwachs [writings]”, being a reaction against the Freudian notion that “the individual’s unconscious acts as a repository for all past experiences” (Olick 1999: 335). Therefore, on the whole, it is possible to discern a largely unresolved tension between collectivism/holism and individualism in Halbwachs’ thought. Indeed, two very different concepts of culture are involved here, that of (1) “culture as a subjective category of meanings contained in people’s minds”, as contrasted with (2) “culture as patterns of publicly available symbols objectified in society” (Olick 1999: 336). In other words, “collective memory”, premised on this ambiguity in the conceptualization of the “culture” concept, has come to be seen as either individual acts of remembering shaped by socio-cultural filters, or externalized bodies of commemorative knowledge and artifacts, or both. And, as I would add, the study of collective memory is even more complicated precisely because these two views of culture necessarily intersect/overlap with one another – indeed, even externally “stored” repositories of commemorative practices and mnemonic traces are subject to the influence of sociocultural filters as they enter the individual consciousness. In this sense, the maintenance of an internal-subjective/external-objective divide is just as problematic and untenable as it is to resolve this dichotomy in favor of either holism or individualism. As such, the challenge that becomes especially important for later theorists of collective memory is to navigate (however imperfectly) the chasm between individual remembering/consciousness/phenomenological experience (internal- subjective) and the external-to-oneself collectivity of sociocultural commemoration (external-objective). And simultaneously, they (the theorists) must also account for the (sociocultural or cognitive) “filters” that sit between both of these poles. Collective memory as interpretation and representation If one can discern both the individualist and external-collective dimensions of memory, it is also equally important to theorize the interrelation between highly personal instances of remembering, the social contexts within which remembering takes place, as well as the externalized textual and discursive resources involved in the record, storage and transmission of collective memory. In view of this complex conceptual challenge, I believe that some kind of interpretive social theory is required – one that takes into 6 account the functions and involvement of discourse and communication in the construction and construal of social reality – in order to make sense of the operations of collective memory. Therefore, in this section, I would like to explore and outline a number of contemporary ideas and concepts in the field of semiotics, literary theory and philosophy, which can usefully contribute to the understanding of collective memory. In essence, what these ideas have in common is their shared interest in the nature of social meaning and its inter-subjective communication through systems of signs, textual (and other discursive) resources, as well as sociocultural products and practices. To begin with, Charles Sanders Peirce’s attempt to theorize and model semiotic processes can be especially illuminating for the study of collective memory. The notion of the Peircean sign involves three components: the Representamen, Object, and Interpretant. This triadic system can be basically explained as follows: 1. The representamen: the form which the sign takes (not necessarily material, though usually interpreted as such) – called by some theorists the ‘sign vehicle’. 2. An interpretant: not an interpreter but rather the sense made of the sign. 3. An object: something beyond the sign to which it refers (a referent). (Chandler 2007: 29) A graphical representation of the three components of the Peircean sign makes it especially clear that the process of semiosis itself includes the very act of interpretation (or making sense) of things. Without delving into too many technicalities, Munday (as cited in Chandler 2007: 30-31) explains that The three elements that make up a sign function like a label on an opaque box that contains the object. […] The first thing that is noticed (the representamen) is the box and label; this prompts the realization of that something is inside the box (the object). This 7 realization, as well as the knowledge of what the box contains, is provided by the interpretant. ‘Reading the label’ is actually just a metaphor for the process of decoding the sign. The important point […] is that the object of a sign is always hidden […] if the object could be known directly, there would be no need of a sign to represent it. […] Therefore, the hidden object of a sign is only brought to realization through the interaction of the representamen, the object and the interpretant. As such, one could consider the interpretant as the meaning that individuals garner from the sign itself. In the same way, collective memory, at the most fundamental level, can be perceived as engaged in an active process of semiosis, which in turn, necessarily includes a dimension of interpretive practice. Indeed, “Peirce’s emphasis on sensemaking involves a rejection of the equation of ‘content’ and meaning; the meaning of sign is not contained within it, but arises in its interpretation” (Chandler 2007: 32). Therefore, the interpretant itself, in the context of the study of collective memory, can be seen as the individual a-posteriori meaning emerging actively from the interpretive process, which depends on how individuals actually “decode” the representamen of history – memory “texts” across a variety of medium (including but not limited to monuments, photographs and other images, films, oral narratives and written documents). And of course, this process of “decoding” to arrive at a determinate “sense” or meaning can be seen, in turn, to be dependent upon prior processes of socialization and social conditioning which may differ among various (groups of) individuals. In fact, one distinct way of understanding how the socialization process bears on one’s interpretative practices is given by the (extended) Peircean model of the sign itself. Taken from “http://finaldelenguaje2.files.wordpress.com/2009/08/semiosis_esquema.png” 8 This diagram demonstrates how an interpretant (the meaning of a sign), can in turn become a representamen (the form) of another sign, to be interpreted once again, forming a new second-order interpretant. In this way, a process of “unlimited semiosis” (Eco 1976: 68-69) occurs; as such, there is a series of successive interpretants, potentially ad infinitum (Chandler 2007: 31). To a large extent, this model provides a useful explanation of how semiosis itself is a dynamic and recursive process – and perhaps, it is implicit that different individuals and groups possess different “mappings” of meanings (what one might call socialization). With regards to collective memory, the Peircean model of the sign does seem to suggest that one needs to examine how commemorative meaning is constructed and produced against the backdrop of the social frameworks of memory, or in this case, the interrelation and interconnection of one interpretant with another. All in all, these ideas of semiosis provide a useful framework for understanding the operation of underlying meaning-formative processes, and more importantly, explain the emergence of different meanings (or “versions” of the same event), accounting for the “subjectivity” of individual memory and its dependence on a chain of other meanings and ongoing interpretive practice (including in this process the social ‘shaping’ or influence on individual remembering). As such, I believe that more theoretical work needs to be done in attempting to conjoin Peircean semiotics with an understanding of the processes of social constructionism and socialization, as well as its effects and significance on individual meaning, within the context of various empirical (and ethnographic) studies on collective memory. Engaging with this model of semiotic (interpretive) process is especially important if one wishes to recognize that “collective memory” should be examined as the ongoing and dynamic interaction between individual remembrance, their social frameworks of memory, and the externalized (material) resources of memory, instead of conflating these distinct dimensions in a single analytical category. Very crucially, if collective memory is seen to be inherently involving a process of interpretation and representation, it is also important to ask what this means for the truth and authenticity of memory narratives. In other words: is “collective memory” only relative to a particular social group in question, but not others? What this also suggests is that there is often a contest over different interpretations (and meanings) of textual 9 and/or material resources – and this can be best evidenced by debates over the accuracy of information in various sites of memory (e.g. regarding museum exhibits, monuments, epithets, etc). To this end, certain philosophical and literary theory perspectives are also useful for elucidating the epistemological dilemmas underlying the “collective memory” concept. Roland Barthes, for instance, speaks of the “death of the Author”, arguing how To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing. […] by refusing to assign a ‘secret’, an ultimate meaning, to the text (and to the world as text), liberates what may be called an anti-theological activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary since to refuse to fix meanings is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostases – reason, science, law. […] Thus is revealed the total existence of writing: a text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author. […] Classic criticism has never paid any attention to the reader; for it, the writer is the only person in literature. (1992 [1968]: 117-118) However, if the contestation of memory is stressed, together with its (potentially) infinite number of interpretations on the part of different socially situated individuals and groups, this casts doubt on any attempts to fix or to define collective memory as the essential or unquestionably true representation of “what really happened”. Of course, this is what Barthes was arguing for: instead of granting the Author (or producers of memory resources) a privileged position to define the meaning of narratives, it is important to perform an analysis that focuses on how narratives themselves are open to competing interpretations on the part of readers (and consumers of various sites of memory). Yet, even if we grant Barthes this much, by stressing the indeterminacy of meaning and a whole range of competing interpretations, it is important to note that he did not deal more specifically with the question of how these competing interpretations could be resolved or dealt with. In other words, it is one thing to emphasize the multiplicity of meanings that can be “read off” memory narratives, but it is another to understand how certain meanings and interpretations become dominant and accepted as (more-orless) true accounts for certain individuals and groups of people. As Thompson aptly 10 puts it: “to acknowledge […] that no foundation of absolute and undeniable truth exists is not the same thing as saying that the concept of truth is meaningless” (2000: 97). Additionally, while memory can be viewed to a large extent as narratives and discourses, it is equally important to theorize the dependence of the ideational dimensions (e.g. meaning and textual aspects) of social life on both global and local material realities (e.g. economics and political formations) (Marsh 2009: 689). 1 Therefore, while a theory of interpretation helps to make sense of the relationship between individuals and social processes of identity and conditioning that shape collective memory, what is equally necessary is a theory of power/agency: the latter deals with the question of the “uptake” of particular meanings/interpretations of certain memory discourses (and the rejection of others), sensitizing itself towards the actual agencies (or parties) involved in the active and dynamic process of the production, consumption and commodification of these meanings against the backdrop of power relations. As such, it has become pertinent to ask: Who are the actors involved in the promulgation of memory narratives? And how do they legitimize and challenge the validity of certain memory narratives over others, in line with their interests and broader sociopolitical/economic agendas? The agencies of collective memory: Power relations, domination, and (the possibility of) resistance As identified above, if one is to conceive of collective memory as a competition between various interpretations and representations of historical events, then it is also important to understand how and by what means this struggle over the narratives and practices of commemoration actually occurs. Most certainly, a good starting point would be to identify the actors involved in the articulation and definition of collective memory. Ashplant et al. (2000) provide a useful survey of “the politics of war memory 1 The dependence of narratives and discourses on material circumstances is reminiscent of Marxist social‐theoretical debates about the interrelation between base and superstructure (or the material and ideational institutions of social praxis). This is an important meta‐theoretical issue that is implicated across various social and political theories (Marsh 2010), and the study of collective memory is no exception, especially since it deals with interpretations and discursive representations. 11 and commemoration”, and identify two major actors involved in the contest of collective memory, associated with two different approaches and theoretical/empirical emphases. Specifically, they refer to the “state-centered” and “social-agency” approaches (2000: 33). For Ashplant et al., while the former stresses the role of the nation-state as being “central to the politics of war commemoration” (2000: 16), the latter is more interested in the dimensions of psychological trauma, grief, and the way in which “the work of remembrance [is] performed by the agencies of civil society” (2000: 8). Indeed, if one were to trace the origins of these different emphases and approaches, it is clear that the former emerged from Hobsbawm and Ranger’s The Invention of Tradition (1983), being concerned with “social cohesion” and “legitimizing authority” behind memory narratives, and that the latter is based on Winter and Sivan’s ideas in Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning (1995) and War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (1999), which stress the “existential function of mourning in commemoration” and the translation of “individual grief into public mourning” based on “a universal human desire for psychological reparation of loss” (see Ashplant et al. 2000: 7-8, for a more detailed outline). To sum up again then, one can posit the nation-state and individuals/groups within civil society as the two main agencies involved in the articulation and contest over collective memory.2 Even though the agents can be (relatively) straightforwardly identified, I would like to suggest that there are certain issues underlying these agents’ modus operandi which remain under-theorized, and that will benefit from the inclusion of social and political thought into the field of memory studies. First, in order to understand how nationstates attempt to dominate and reproduce dominant memory narratives, one must further elaborate a theory of power and ideology. I will argue that the writings of Michel Foucault, in particular, serve as a rich resource for understanding the workings of power relations in and through discourse, and can usefully contribute towards an analysis of the processes by which memory narratives are “taken up” or come to 2 There is room for debate over whether nation‐states and the individuals/groups of civil society are the only agencies involved in the articulation of collective memory. Perhaps it has also become important to recognize inter‐ and trans‐ national agencies as well, especially since memory narratives can also be transmitted and transplanted across national boundaries. At the same time, it will be important to theorize the ways in which new models of cultural globalization intersect with the existing study of collective memory. Due to the limitations of space, I am unable to examine these issues and debates within this essay. 12 dominate within nation-states. Secondly, if one wishes to understand individuals’/groups’ resistance towards national memory narratives, then it is important to draw upon social-theoretical concepts of habitus and the unconscious, as well as that of reflexivity. These notions (the former borrowed from Pierre Bourdieu, and the latter based on Margaret Archer’s work) are crucial because they clarify and present different normative visions regarding the possibility of challenging dominant social and political orders/structures, and can correspondingly explicate the socio-cultural processes involved in (and provide a theoretical framework of reference pertaining to) the contestation of national (dominant) memory narratives. Let us first interrogate the nation-state as an agent of collective memory – in particular, one that has the so-called ability to impose dominant memory narratives “from above”. Hobsbawm perceived this as an “exercise […] in social engineering”, emphasizing how [t]he history which became part of the fund of knowledge or the ideology of the nation, state or movement is not what has actually been preserved in popular memory, but which has been selected, written, pictured, popularized and institutionalized by those whose function it is to do so. [emphasis mine] (1983: 13) But how exactly is memory institutionalized? How is any given dominant memory narrative taken up by social/political subjects? In other words, what is missing in this analysis is a model or theory of power relations that explains the process by which national narratives operate on and within sociopolitical contexts. In this respect, Michel Foucault’s ideas regarding a productive (as opposed to repressive) view of power is one possible way of theorizing how certain discursive regimes (or narratives) come to dominate within nation-states and how social relations of dominance are sustained through the former. According to him, “the state’s power […] is both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power” (1982: 782). Interestingly, in this view, power does not impose itself on human subjects through the exercise of (top-down) political coercion; rather, power operates by the legitimization and prescription (through a process of defining and rationalizing) of what individual subjects and the state of things (e.g. a code/system of morality, legality, etc) should be. 13 To illustrate this point, Foucault provides an example from the sixteenth century (which he argues, continues to be the way in which power operates in modern society): ‘Government’ did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; rather it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed: the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick. […] To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others. […] Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments, may be realized. [emphasis mine] (Foucault 1982: 790) As such, Foucault’s view of power is not one which can be described as repressive or coercive, or along the lines of: “accept this, or else…”; rather, power is productive (in the sense of producing a certain human subject), prescriptive and normalizing, somewhat like the tagline: “this is normal/acceptable, and that is pathological/deviant”. It follows that this becomes a way of seeing and perceiving things, something that subjects themselves adhere to on their own; on the whole, there is the emergence of what Foucault calls “techniques of the self” (1993: 204). Indeed, there are two distinct ways in which the articulations of memory narratives, by the nation-state, can be theorized against the backdrop of Foucault’s analysis of power and governmentality. One possibility is for collective memory to be seen as a “technique of the self”. In this view, the memory narrative itself is regarded as the manner in which a particular worldview is produced. It follows that it is through a given national memory narrative that a certain social/political subject is legitimized and produced – for instance, the valorization of the bravery and condemnation of cowardice in soldiers’ conduct during the Second World War could be seen as a justificatory discourse for the definition and prescription of what counts as appropriate conduct for the “modern soldier”, and in fact, may constitute an idealized subject (or a “model/perfect soldier”) which military personnel attempt to orient their behavior/conduct towards. This, in itself, can be seen as a structuring (and definition) of the possibilities of action and conduct in contemporary societies. What this analysis 14 suggests is that memory narratives are themselves, discourses in and through which power (in the modern, Foucauldian sense) can operate – therefore, collective memory is government. Another possibility is for collective memory to be seen as part of/within/subsumed by other “techniques of the self”. In this view, memory narratives can be seen as bounded discursive products, which may more or less agree with a system of definitions, differentiations, and rationalizations inherent in existing “techniques of the self”. So, for example, if there is an existing discourse on nationhood, which produces the citizen as peace-loving, gentle and defensive (and not offensive), etcetera, then it is possible that a given memory narrative which emphasizes those attributes might come to be emphasized (and promoted or integrated into the discourse of nationhood), rather than another memory narrative that points to the aggressive nature of the citizen-subject. As such, memory narratives are involved in dialogue with other broader socio-political discourses – and one could say, in this view, that (the uptake and rejection of certain narratives of) collective memory is part of the enterprise of government. In fact, it is not always clear in the collective memory literature what is meant by the nation-state’s production of a dominant memory narrative. Exactly what does a “invented tradition” entail, in relation to a given model of political dominance? Surely, understanding this concept requires much more than a generalized statement declaring that it is “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual and symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past” (Hobsbawm 1983: 1)? Most definitely, I believe that a more detailed examination of what is really meant by a “set of practices”/“inculcate”/“continuity with the past” is required, especially in terms of a theoretical vocabulary of social and political processes. Upon examining Foucault’s theory of power, it is evident that more scholarly work needs to be done in terms of explicating both the ways in which power actually operates in and through “collective memory”, and in producing an account of how “collective memory” features against the backdrop of other narratives and/or material realities. 15 Having dealt with the nation-state as an agent of collective memory, let us subsequently direct our attention towards the social-theoretical concepts of habitus and the unconscious (in the work of Pierre Bourdieu), as well as that of reflexivity (as discussed by Margaret Archer), as a way of understanding individuals’/groups’ resistances towards national/official memory narratives. Put briefly, the notion of habitus in Bourdieu’s work is that of a socialized subjectivity. [...] [it is] the durable and transposable systems of schemata of perception, appreciation, and action that results from the institution of the social in the body (or biological individuals) [...] [emphasis mine] (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 126) Another way of understanding “habitus” is to see that it is “a product of history” and “an open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected to experiences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a way that either reinforces of modifies its structures” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 133). In fact, social reality exists, so as to speak, twice, in things and in minds, in fields and in habitus, outside and inside of agents. And when habitus encounters a social world of which it is the product, it is like a ‘fish in water’: it does not feel the weight of the water, and it takes the world about itself for granted. Habitus being the social embodied, it is ‘at home’ in the field it inhabits, it perceives it immediately as endowed with meaning and interest. [emphasis mine] (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:127) On the whole, what is especially important here is an emphasis on habitus as a kind of unconscious and embodied dimension of the social conditioning of the individual – as an inclination (or as Bourdieu puts it, a “disposition”) to act. Essentially, Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and its unconscious dimension stands opposed to Margaret Archer’s concept of reflexivity, which places more emphasis on intentionality and the ability for individual agents and groups to consider and contemplate the dominant and existing social structures they encounter. More specifically, Elder-Vass discusses Archer’s views on reflexivity in the following way: For Archer, reflexivity is a power that human beings possess[.] [...] [T]he ability to monitor ourselves in relation to our circumstances [...] is exercised through a process of 16 conscious reflexive deliberations, during which we conduct internal conversations with ourselves about [...] our situations, our behavior, our values, our aspirations. [...] What is critical for Archer [...] is that we continue to recognize that human beings, social structures and cultural entities each have their own distinct existences and influences on social outcomes. None of these types of entity can be eliminated from the explanation of social events, nor conflated with each other in such explanations. (Elder-Vass 2010: 102) With regards to the nature of “collective memory”, I believe that Bourdieu’s habitus and Archer’s reflexivity reflects two distinct (and opposed) poles of determination and intentionality/agency. More importantly, these conflicting positions certainly bear on the question: to what extent is it possible for individuals and groups of people to resist dominant narratives of memory? Is it more appropriate to view “collective memory” as operating at a non-conscious level, in terms of being embodied in social action and practices, or should we emphasize the ways in which agents challenge social structures through processes of interrogation and self-reflection? Additionally, the issue is made more complicated if we consider how the skill of reflexivity itself may differ among individuals (and groups of individuals), possibly being, to some extent, pre-determined by different processes of socialization (Marsh 2010, personal communication). In this sense, it also becomes possible to raise the question of whether all individuals and groups are equally reflexive towards dominant national memory narratives, or if there is an underlying tendency for certain socioeconomic groups (for example) to be more critical and resistant towards these official representations of “what really happened”. Concluding remarks Throughout this essay, I have attempted to demonstrate how the “collective memory” concept can be viewed in the light of different thematic aspects – that of its metaphysical sited-ness, its necessarily interpretive and representative nature, as well as its entwinement with issues of power, agency and resistance. Yet, on a broader level, it is also possible to view these three dimensions of “collective memory” as suggestive of new epistemological dilemmas and frontiers for historians and scholars from other disciplines. As Peter Burke aptly pointed out: “neither memories nor histories seem objective any longer” (1989: 98). Perhaps it is appropriate to conclude by examining how the “collective memory” concept is indicative of a contradictory 17 impulse in modernity. On one hand, one witnesses “the reflexive turning of history upon itself”, “the end of a tradition of memory” and the termination of “real environments of history” which are fundamentally “spontaneous” (Nora 1989: 7-11). However, at the same time, the normative significance of memory for individual and social identity as well as the psychological self has also become immensely important (Roth 1995). Clearly, while there has been a fundamentally critical attitude towards the study of memory as related to its production and consumption (and tied up with interests, agencies and power relations), there has also been an attempt to reinstate this “reconstituted object beneath the gaze of critical history” (Nora 1989: 12). On the whole, I believe that “memory’s relation to history remains one of the interesting theoretical challenges in the field” (Kansteiner 2002: 184), especially since the “collective memory” concept has raised a range of pertinent questions for intellectual practice; indeed, it is slowly but surely reconfiguring the traditional practices of historians by bringing into greater focus particular sociological, cultural, and political theories of remembering. References Ashplant, T. G., Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper. 2000. "The politics of war memory and commemoration: contexts, structures and dynamics." Pp. 3-85 in The politics of war memory and commemoration, edited by T. G. Ashplant, G. Dawson, and M. Roper. New York: Routledge. Barthes, Roland. 1992 [1968]. "The Death of the Author." in Modern Literary Theory: A Reader (2nd Edition), edited by P. Rice and P. Waugh. London: Edward Arnold. Bourdieu, Pierre and Loic Wacquant. 1992. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. 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"Collective Memory - What Is It?" History and Memory 8:3050. Halbwachs, Maurice. 1980 [1950]. The Collective Memory (translated by F. J. Ditter, Jr and V. Y. Ditter, introduction by M. Douglas). New York: Harper & Row. —. 1992. On Collective Memory (edited and translated by Lewis Coser, from parts of Halbwachs' Les Cadres and La Topographie legendaire). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hobsbawm, Eric. 1983. "Introduction: inventing traditions." in The Invention of Tradition, edited by E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kansteiner, Wulf. 2002. "Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies." History and Theory 41:179-197. Marsh, David. 2009. "Keeping Ideas in their Place: In Praise of Thin Constructivism." Australian Journal of Political Science 44:679-696. —. 2010. "Meta-Theoretical Issues." in Theory and Methods in Political Science (3rd edition), edited by D. Marsh and G. Stoker. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Megill, Allan. 1998. "History, memory, identity." History of the Human Sciences 11:37-62. Nora, Pierre. 1989. "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire." Representations 26:7-24. Olick, Jeffrey K. 1999. "Collective Memory: The Two Cultures." Sociological Theory 17:333-348. —. 2006. "Products, Processes, and Practices: A Non-Reificatory Approach to Collective Memory." Biblical Theology Bulletin: A Journal of Bible and Theology 36:5-14. Prus, Robert. 2007. "Human Memory, Social Process, and the Pragmatist Metamorphosis: Ethnological Foundations, Ethnographic Contributions, and Conceptual Challenges." Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 36:378-437. Roth, Michael. 1995. The Ironist's Cage: Memory, Trauma, and the Construction of History. New York: Columbia University Press. Thompson, Willie. 2000. What Happened to History? London: Pluto Press. 19