Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law

ENHANCING UNITED NATIONS CAPACITY TO SUPPORT POST-CONFLICT POLICING AND RULE OF LAW JOSHUA G. SMITH, VICTORIA K. HOLT, AND WILLIAM J. DURCH REPORT FROM THE PROJECT ON RULE OF LAW IN POST-CONFLICT SETTINGS FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS PROGRAM NOVEMBER 2007 STIMSON CENTER REPORT NO. 63 ii Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Copyright © 2007 The Henry L. Stimson Center 1111 19th Street, NW 12th Floor Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: 202-223-5956 Fax: 202-223-9604 www.stimson.org Email: info@stimson.org TABLE OF CONTENTS Glossary of Acronyms ................................................................................................. v Acknowledgements ................................................................................................... viii Preface ......................................................................................................................... ix Executive Summary ................................................................................................. xiii 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 2. Rule of Law as a Remedy for Post-Conflict Insecurity ........................................... 5 The United Nations and Post-Conflict Rule of Law .............................................7 Focusing on UN Police and Related Criminal Justice Field Capacity ................10 3. United Nations Police (UNPOL) in Modern Peace Operations...............................15 The Increasing Demand for UN Police ...............................................................16 The Growing Complexity of UN Police Mandates .............................................17 Principal Police-Contributing Countries .............................................................23 Financing UN Police: Individual versus National Incentives .............................25 4. Taking Stock: Problems and Progress in UN Policing ............................................29 Overarching Issues of Structure, Doctrine, and Strategy ....................................29 Planning Rule of Law Components in UN Operations .......................................37 Rapid and Effective Deployment ........................................................................39 Measuring Progress toward Mission Goals .........................................................43 5. Anticipating UN Peace Operations’ Need for Policing Personnel .........................45 Anticipating Mission Types ................................................................................45 Projecting Numbers Required, Other than Formed Units ...................................46 Estimating Needed Skill-Sets ..............................................................................48 6. Improving UN Capacity to Deploy Police and Other Rule of Law Personnel Rapidly and Effectively .........................................................................51 Deeper Change: An Overview ............................................................................51 Deeper Change: The Details ................................................................................54 7. Conclusions .............................................................................................................67 Annexes: I. Rule of Law Mandates and Tasks in UN Peacekeeping Operations ..............69 II. Analysis of UN Police Deployment Rates, 1989–2007 .................................85 III. Estimating Costs of a UN Standing Police Service .......................................87 Select Bibliography .....................................................................................................99 About the Authors .....................................................................................................111 LIST OF SIDEBARS, FIGURES, AND TABLES Sidebar 1: Defining the Rule of Law ...................................................................................... 6 Sidebar 2: Brahimi Report Recommendations for Enhancing United Nations Rule of Law Activities in Peace Operations .......................................................... 8 Sidebar 3: What, Exactly, is Democratic Policing? .............................................................. 13 Sidebar 4: Do You Need Democratic Police to Teach Democratic Policing? ...................... 26 Sidebar 5: Why Not a Reserve System for Formed Police Units? ........................................ 55 Figure 1: Figure 2: Figure 3: Figure 4: UN Police Deployments, 1995–2007 .................................................................. 16 Deployment Rates for Individual Police in UN Peace Operations, 2001–2007 .. 41 Frequency of Types of UN Police Mandates 1990–2006 .................................... 46 Annual New UN Police Authorizations, 1989–2006........................................... 47 Table 1: Table 2: Table 3: Table 4: UN Division of Labor for Rule of Law Activities ................................................. 9 Typology of UN Policing Mandates, 1989–2007 ................................................ 18 Top 20 Police Contributors to UN Operations, 2001 and 2006........................... 23 Origin and Deployment of UN Police by Region, July 2005–June 2006 Average................................................................................................................ 24 Contributors of Formed Police Units, April 2007................................................ 25 Annual UN Cost Comparison, Individual Police versus Formed Units, in UNMIL 2005–2006 ......................................................................................... 28 UN Mandates for Peace Operations with Rule of Law Components Since 1999............................................................................................................ 35 United Nations Police Deployment Rates, Percent of Authorized Posts Filled, 1989–2007....................................................................................... 40 UN Policing and Other Rule of Law Tasks, First 90 Days of Mission................ 49 Deployment Tempo of Proposed Standing UN Rule of Law Capacity, over a Two-year Cycle......................................................................................... 58 Estimating Annual Apportioned Cost of a 400-strong Standing UN Rule of Law Capacity .................................................................... 60 Estimating Costs to UN Missions of Using ROLCAP and Police Reserve (Summary Version)................................................................................ 61 Table 5: Table 6: Table 7: Table 8: Table 9: Table 10: Table 11: Table 12: Table A1.1: Key Rule of Law Language in Security Council Resolutions, 1964–2007 ......... 69 Table A1.2: UN Policing and Other Rule of Law Tasks, 1999–2007, Full List...................... 81 Table A2.1: Comparative Analysis of UN Police Deployment Rates, 1989–2007................. 85 Table A3.1: Estimating Annual Personnel Costs for a 400-Strong Standing UN Rule of Law Capacity .......................................................................................... 87 Table A3.2: Estimating Annual Basing Costs for a UN Standing Rule of Law Capacity ....... 88 Table A3.3: Estimating Annual Training Costs for a UN Standing Rule of Law Capacity .... 89 Table A3.4: Annual Apportioned Cost Estimates Associated with Incentive-Based UN Police Reserve System .................................................................................. 90 Table A3.5: Individual Senior Reserve Roster, Marginal Annual Per Capita Costs ............... 91 Table A3.6: Estimated Cost to UN Mission in Liberia of Using ROLCAP and Police Reserve, for the Mission Start-up Period October 2003–June 2004......... 92 Table A3.7: Calculating Marginal Costs of UN Police Reserve, Applied to UNMIL, 2005–2006 ........................................................................................................... 94 Table A3.8: UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) Expenditures, 2005–2006 .............................. 95 Table A3.9: UNMIL Estimated Mission Costs Worksheet ..................................................... 96 GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS ACABQ Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan BINUB United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi BONUCA United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic CIVPOL Civilian Police CJLAU Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit CoESPU Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units COMPSTAT Computerized Statistics DCAF (Geneva Centre for the) Democratic Control of the Armed Forces DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration DPA Department of Political Affairs DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo ECPS Executive Committee on Peace and Security FPU Formed Police Unit GPOI Global Peace Operations Initiative HNP Haitian National Police ICG ICITAP ICRC International Crisis Group International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (US Department of Justice) International Committee of the Red Cross IDP Internally Displaced Person IPA International Peace Academy IPTF International Police Task Force IRC International Rescue Committee IRIN Integrated Regional Information Networks ITS Integrated Training Service KAIPTC Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center KPS Kosovo Police Service MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti MIPONUH MONUC MSA United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Mission Subsistence Allowance MSU Multinational Specialized Units NGO Non-Governmental Organization vi Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services OLA Office of Legal Affairs ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi ONUC United Nations Operation in the Congo ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe PAE Pacific Architects and Engineers PCC Police Contributing Country PNTL Timor-Leste National Police Force PSA Peacekeeping Support Account R&R Rest and Recuperation RECAMP Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacity (France) RoL Rule of Law ROLCAP Rule of Law Capacity (UN) ROLIX Rule of Law Index RS Republika Srpska SAT Selection Assistance Teams SG Secretary-General SOFA Status of Forces Agreement SPC Standing Police Capacity SPU Stability Police Units/Specialized Police Units/Special Police Units SRR Senior Reserve Roster STM Standardized/Standard Training Module UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission UNCIVPOL UN Civilian Police UNDP United Nations Development Program UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children Fund UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women UNIOSIL United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch vii UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia UNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor UNMIT United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes UNOGBIS United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia UNPOL United Nations Police UNPR United Nations Police Reserve UNSAS United Nations Standby Arrangements System UNSMIH United Nations Support Mission in Haiti UNSF United Nations Security Force (West New Guinea) UNTAC UNTAES UNTAET United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Namibia) UNTMIH United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti UNTOP United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding US United States USIP United States Institute of Peace ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS T his report would not have been possible without the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the Compton Foundation, and the United States Institute of Peace. We also have benefited from the continuing confidence of Stimson’s president, Ellen Laipson, and its chief operating officer, Cheryl Ramp. We are grateful to the participants in two Stimson sponsored roundtables on United Nations policing, particularly to former UN Police Advisor Mark Kroeker for his insights and candor at an event held in August 2006. We also deeply appreciate the officials in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations for their time, insights, and analysis shared during research interviews. The report benefited greatly from suggestions and comments offered by several expert reviewers, including Andrew Carpenter, Peter Gantz, Bruce Oswald, Robert Perito, and Kevin Steeves. The support of our colleagues in the Stimson Center’s Future of Peace Operations Program, particularly research associate Alix Boucher and research assistant Katherine Andrews, was indispensable throughout this process. Dara Francis was instrumental in launching the early phase of research for this report. Joshua Shifrinson, Michael Broache, and Brandon Hunt were invaluable in the compilation of data on UN police deployment rates contained in Annex II. FOPO interns Abigail Kim, Daniel Levine, Azita Ranjbar, Jason Terry, Tristan Volpe, and Stephen Wittels deserve thanks for editing and proofing earlier drafts of the report. Finally, we also thank Jane Dorsey for her assistance in turning our work into a finished product. All errors and omissions, of course, remain the responsibility of the authors alone. PREFACE S ince 2001, the Henry L. Stimson Center’s program on the Future of Peace Operations (FOPO) has worked to promote sensible US policy toward and greater UN effectiveness in the conduct of peace operations—internationally-mandated efforts that engage military, police, and other resources in support of transitions from war to peace in states and territories around the globe. Such places suffer from many deficits—in education, health, jobs, and infrastructure—but the greatest and most costly, in the long run, is their deficit in the rule of law and security. This deficit impacts on quality of governance, justice, and other goals of international security and aid institutions that want to promote sustainable peace and development. There is, however, no agreed definition of the term. For purposes of this and other reports in FOPO’s series on restoring post-conflict rule of law, we therefore choose to use the relatively comprehensive definition contained in the UN Secretary-General’s August 2004 report on rule of law and transitional justice. It defines rule of law as, a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to the laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation indecision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.* Promoting and sustaining the rule of law in war-torn lands requires a multi-dimensional approach that extends beyond the reform and restructuring of local police, judicial, and corrections institutions to: Early provision of public security by the international community while local security forces are reformed and rebuilt; International support for effective border controls, both to curtail illicit trade and to promote legitimate commerce and government customs revenues; Curtailment of regional smuggling rings and spoiler networks that traffic in arms and commodities to finance war and, afterwards, to sustain war-time political and economic power structures; Strict legal accountability for those who participate in peace operations, lest their actions reinforce the very cynicism and resignation with regard to impunity that their work is intended to reverse; and Recognition that corruption can drain the utility from any assistance program and undermine the legitimacy of post-war governments in the eyes of their peoples. This study is one of five produced by FOPO, each addressed to one of the bullets above. The study stems from the recognition that establishing public security and bolstering local capacity to maintain that security is a critical component of modern peace operations. Rampant criminality * United Nations Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para. 2. x Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law and dysfunctional or abusive local police forces pose dire risks to fragile peace processes, undermining public confidence in nascent governments and increasing the likelihood of renewed conflict. The growing numbers of international police authorized by the Security Council to serve in UN missions attests to an increasing recognition of the importance, and challenge, of fostering the rule of law in post-conflict environments. To date, however, the UN’s capacity to recruit and deploy highly-skilled officers to the field in a timely manner has fallen far short of what is required to succeed in this task. This study attempts to address present shortfalls in UN capacity through a series of reinforcing proposals, including a core standing cadre of UN police and rule of experts to serve as mission leadership, a UN Police Reserve that offers police forces and governments financial incentives to participate, and a Senior Reserve Roster to promote the availability of highly experienced rule of law professionals for UN peacekeeping mission service. This study, and the other four described briefly below, can be accessed online from the FOPO homepage on the Stimson Center website (www.stimson.org/fopo). Borders. FOPO’s border security study, Post-Conflict Borders and UN Peace Operations, is in two parts. For part one, author Kathleen A. Walsh surveyed more than 100 international border assistance and training programs. Her report, “Border Security, Trade Controls, and UN Peace Operations,” found both a great deal of overlap and lack of coordination among these programs that, if remedied, could make them much more cost-effective. The second part of the study, “A Phased Approach to Post-Conflict Border Security,” by Katherine N. Andrews, Brandon L. Hunt, and William J. Durch, lays out the requirements for coordinated international support to border security in post-conflict states that host international peace operations. Spoiler Networks. During and after conflict, continued smuggling of small arms, as well as of high-value commodities, such as diamonds, precious metals, and timber, sustains war and impedes peace; feeds the informal economy; and undermines efforts to support peacebuilding and sustain the rule of law. To disrupt such “spoiler” networks, the UN Security Council has regularly imposed targeted sanctions on some countries and individuals. To track progress of these measures, the UN has appointed small teams of investigators to monitor and evaluate sanctions implementation. These Panels or Groups of Experts shed critical light on the problems in implementing UN sanctions regimes, writing reports detailing how these networks operate, from Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Afghanistan; and recommending measures to counter them and to contribute to building the rule of law. These expert panels face challenges, however, both in the field and in getting the Security Council and UN member states to implement their many practical recommendations. This FOPO study details these issues, highlights how implementing Panel recommendations could improve post-conflict rule of law, and offers recommendations about how the Panels could be better used and sanctions implemented. The study is, Targeting Spoilers: The Role of UN Panels of Experts, by Alix J. Boucher and Victoria K. Holt. Accountability. In 2004, major problems of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo and other operations became a public scandal for the United Nations. Before that story broke, FOPO had begun work on the problem of criminal accountability for personnel in peace operations. Because states retain disciplinary responsibility for their military forces in peace operations, that work focused on police and civilian personnel. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch xi As operations become more deeply involved in assisting or substituting for local government, their personnel must themselves be subject to the rule of law, and be seen as subject to it by local peoples. FOPO found, however, that the tenuous reach of the law—any law—covering criminal acts by UN personnel on mission has left a legal and procedural vacuum filled only in part by administrative sanctions (docking of pay; job loss, blacklisting, etc.). FOPO therefore looked into the cost and feasibility of other options, some of which would require serious rethinking of criminal jurisdiction in and for peace operations. The study is, Improving Criminal Accountability for Police and Civilian Personnel in UN Peace Operations, by Katherine N. Andrews, William J. Durch, and Matthew C. Weed. Corruption. As a contribution to the many efforts to contain and reduce pervasive corruption in post-conflict settings, FOPO reviewed what the world’s specialists in corruption say about how to recognize and fight it in post-conflict circumstances, especially where international peace operations are deployed. The resulting study, a meta-analysis of the English-language literature on the subject, reflects a search for consensus and insight rather than independent field research. Its principal contributions lie in its structured summaries of the literature surveyed and in how it uses that structured assessment to visualize both the patterns of post-conflict corruption and emerging best practices in fighting it. The study is, Mapping and Fighting Corruption in WarTorn States, by Alix J. Boucher, William J. Durch, Margaret Midyette, Sarah Rose, and Jason Terry. All of these studies recognize that the United Nations cannot immediately “create” the rule of law in countries where it does not exist, or transform recalcitrant and abusive police into model protectors of the public trust in a few short months. Such efforts take time. Moreover, even wellequipped peacekeepers will have difficulty totally securing hundreds of miles of border in unfamiliar and rugged terrain against smuggling or spoilers, nor is it likely that the bestcoordinated international efforts can completely eradicate corruption in post-conflict circumstances. The UN and its partners can, however, provide critical assistance, guidance, and support, on all of these issues, step by step, to fragile governments attempting to develop the capacity and legitimacy to effectively govern on behalf of their peoples. In short, the United Nations, its member states, and other international institutions and aid donors can help fragile states begin the rocky journey towards self-sustaining peace, good governance, and stable economic livelihoods. The common foundation on which such institutions and outcomes must be built is respect for and deference to the rule of law. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY P olice personnel play a vital and expanding role in United Nations peace operations. Their responsibilities have grown from merely monitoring host nation police forces to reforming, restructuring, and rebuilding police forces decimated or discredited by war. Where no effective local police capacity exists, UN police have assumed primary responsibility for maintaining law and order. Across all missions, they play diverse and critical roles in the effort to (re)establish the rule of law in states attempting to transition from war to a peace that produces safe and stable societies. Indeed, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehénno has argued that “(e)xperienced civilian law-enforcement professionals are just as vital to the success of our missions as military forces.” Yet the current system for recruiting and deploying individual police for service in UN missions consistently fails to deliver high quality personnel to missions quickly and efficiently. Resolving this long-standing problem is an increasingly urgent priority for the United Nations. This report offers potential solutions to it that are both feasible and affordable. UN Capacity: Not Keeping Pace with Demand and Complexity The importance of UN police in modern peace operations is reflected in the growing demand for their services. Through the 1990s, steady demand kept about 2,000 UN police (UNPOL) officers deployed. In 1999, however, demand grew dramatically and with it came new tasks. Two new complex peacekeeping missions with “executive” (law enforcement) mandates, in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, rapidly quadrupled the number of UN police deployed and gave the United Nations direct responsibility for public security in those mission areas. Other peacekeeping missions were subsequently established with significant policing and other rule of law-related elements. By June 2007, the United Nations had over 9,500 police from nearly 90 countries serving in ten peacekeeping missions (and an additional six political and peacebuilding missions) around the globe. The following month, the Security Council authorized another 3,800 individual officers and 2,500 personnel in formed police units for the African Union-UN hybrid force in Darfur, Sudan, as well as 300 police for a UN mission in Chad, driving the total authorized force to roughly 16,000. The growing demand for international police and increasing complexity of their assigned tasks stem from the recognition of two things: that rule of law is fundamental to lasting and selfsustaining peace, and that competent, professional police—international and domestic—are essential to rule of law. Thus today, UN police not only support post-conflict public security, but usually are involved in building needed local capacity. In Timor-Leste, 1,600 UN police serve both as the primary providers of law and order and as instructors for the Timor-Leste police force. In Haiti, 1,900 UN police help combat the gangs of Port-au-Prince while simultaneously working to build up the Haitian National Police. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), roughly 1,100 UN police coordinate with the European Union and others to professionalize the large, fractious, and frequently-abusive Congolese police. UN police play similarly diverse and important roles in peacekeeping missions in Sudan, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and elsewhere. Yet this recognition of the importance of rule of law and of UN police has not translated into necessary deployable capacity. First, the United Nations faces major and basic gaps in its ability xiv Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law to recruit, prepare, and deploy qualified police to new missions in a timely manner, as well as in its ability to strategize, offer operational guidance, and effectively manage police contingents in the field. For example, Stimson analyzed rates of deployment for all UN peacekeeping operations with police components since 1989 and found deployment rates of individual UNPOL officers to be unimproved over time. After Security Council action, it still takes an average of nine months to get the authorized number of police officers to the field. This delay deprives new peace operations of public security personnel at the most critical phase of a country’s war-to-peace transition: Its beginning. Stimson also found that peak demand for UN police comes in waves, every six to seven years, with Security Council authorizations rising rapidly in those years, to four or five times average annual levels. These peak-demand years further stress the ad hoc system for recruiting, preparing and deploying police to UN peacekeeping missions. That system is at the core of present problems. Police must be offered by countries, but states do not nominate officers to any sort of UN police roster and have proved quite reluctant to do so. Since all police have active “day jobs,” countries find it hard to part with them. This leaves states with mostly moral incentives to contribute qualified individual officers, in contrast to the material incentives offered by the UN for both formed police and military units. The problem goes beyond member states, however, to the UN system for managing and deploying personnel. If states did have greater incentives to contribute personnel, the United Nations would still have no advance knowledge of the pool of officers potentially available to it or their operational specialties. Further, if such knowledge were in fact made available, there are too few UN Headquarters staff to use that information effectively. About 50 professional staff— including the still-forming UN Standing Police Capacity of 25—must now cope with all of the elements of UN policing laid out above, from strategy onward, for a police force in the field that is 200 to 300 times as large, executing over a dozen different mandates. Beyond documenting and demonstrating the urgent need for change, this report advances proposals, described below, that attempt to solve the current problem of ad hoc recruitment of personnel and to give states in all economic brackets useful incentives to contribute scarce police resources to meet widely-recognized post-conflict public security needs. We sketch each of them here, briefly. Proposal 1: Create a Standing UN Rule of Law Capacity (ROLCAP) Stimson proposes creating a larger, standing cadre of police and rule of law experts to help plan, deploy, and fill key leadership posts of new missions in their critical first year and provide support to other, ongoing peacekeeping operations. This standing rule of law capacity (ROLCAP) of roughly 400 personnel would comprise eight teams of about 50 people each. One third of each team would be devoted to legal issues, prison support, and the justice sector. Other experts would include highly experienced police leaders capable of conducting mission needs assessments, planning for the mission, jumpstarting the reform process for local police, and running the police component of the operation from mission headquarters. These proposed numbers are based on our analysis of recent UN mission staffing requirements and mission frequency. On average, mission police components have about 30 key headquarters personnel—from leadership to critical communications personnel—and other rule of law components (legal, judicial, and prison experts) have approximately 20 headquarters personnel, Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch xv for a total of roughly 50 key police/rule of law leadership positions per mission. To be able to meet surge period requirements, ROLCAP should be able to staff up to four new missions per year, that is, have four deployable teams of 50 people each. To sustain this capacity, the “deployment tempo” should not exceed 50 percent—serving 12 months in the field and then 12 months recuperating, being trained, and training others. ROLCAP members could, for example, train the police reserve proposed below, lead induction training for the bulk of mission police and other rule of law personnel, and be available to run training initiatives in non-mission countries, as part of DPKO’s new role as the global lead entity within the UN on police issues. Proposal 2: Create a UN Police Reserve (UNPR) Rather than leave recruitment of the bulk of UN mission police and rule of law personnel to the current, ad hoc system, Stimson proposes creation of a UN Police Reserve (UNPR). The reserve would be composed of officers nominated by countries for deployment in UN missions for fixed terms that are interspersed with rotations back to their home services. Improving the incentives for countries to offer skilled police is fundamental to such a reserve. Thus, we propose that police agencies be offered “retainer fees” for officers selected for the new reserve system and be reimbursed for their deployment. The retainer would be offered in recognition of ongoing demand for police officers at home. We propose that the United Nations offer a police agency (not the national government, but the agency whose officer would be placed on the reserve roster) an annual retainer equivalent to 10 percent of the officer’s actual annual salary: Five percent to defray the costs of two weeks annual UN-related training, and five percent as an incentive fee for placing his or her name on the reserve list and committing to release that officer within 14 days of call up by the United Nations. Officers nominated for the UNPR should be screened by the United Nations (one task of the proposed ROLCAP) and once accepted, complete an initial UN-certified training program. In further recognition of domestic demand for good police, UNPR deployment tempo would be lower than that of ROLCAP, at about 33 percent (for example, six months UN duty, 12 months domestic duty; or 12 months UN duty, 24 months domestic). The size of the reserve should reflect shifting demand for police in the field, but it should be large enough to meet all demand for individual police by UN operations at the above deployment ratios. Proposal 3: Create a Senior Reserve Roster Finally, Stimson proposes creation of a Senior Reserve Roster (SRR) as a source of senior professionals who volunteer in advance for service in UN missions. Its membership would consist initially of retired or former police and criminal justice experts and allow DPKO to fill open senior positions in those areas quickly and efficiently. Members could fill, in particular, senior security sector reform posts where a certain amount of “grey,” especially from the mission’s region, is needed to advise local ministers, senior judges, and heads of security forces, or fill leadership positions in a mission’s following personnel rotations. A stipend could be offered to those members on the roster willing to commit to rapid call-up (on the order of 30 days notice), and that stipend might equal three percent of the salary that would be paid to them after call-up. The size of the roster and the proportion on rapid call-up could be flexible; over time, represented skill-sets could expand from rule of law to other specialties needed by UN peace operations. xvi Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Costing These Proposals The three proposed structures would add some costs to UN operations, but their adoption would reduce UN response times and thus reduce overall mission timelines and mission costs. We estimate the start-up costs of ROLCAP itself at about $45 million, including support infrastructure, with recurring costs of roughly $33 million per year for its non-deployed elements, distributed across missions. We estimate that UNPR would have between $28 and $52 million in recurring, non-deployed costs distributed across missions (costs will depend on the ratio of developed state participation). By comparison, the approved annual UN peacekeeping budget for 2007-2008 is $5.29 billion. The deployed costs of ROLCAP and UNPR would be part of the budgets of missions to which they contribute personnel. Using the example of the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL), we estimated their combined, incremental startup costs would have increased that mission’s historical costs by 8.5 percent in its first nine months, and by about 3.5 percent in subsequent years. In exchange, UNMIL would have had professional management of its police and rule of law components, and a full complement of police and rule of law personnel, from its first month, rather than after six to nine months. UNMIL was authorized 755 individual police, several formed units, and about 15,000 troops. Incremental costs for other missions would vary with the relative size of the police/rule of law presence in their structures. The Senior Reserve Roster, we estimate, would cost about $9,000 per year per person to support periodic training, and another $5,400 annually per individual designated for rapid call-up. A hypothetical roster of 100 persons, one-third of whom were on rapid call-up, would cost about $1 million per year. Building Responsive and Flexible UN Field Capacity in Police and Rule of Law This report’s proposals aim to overcome the chronic and systemic shortcomings that hobble the UN’s current ability to carry out its post-conflict policing and rule of law support mandates in a timely and effective manner. These shortcomings include a lack of clear guidance and strategy; insufficient planning for the police component of new operations; and slow deployment times. The lack of timeliness is tied in part to the UN’s present inability to pre-identify and pre-qualify officers for its missions; to the uneven quality of police personnel that are offered to missions by UN member states; and to continuing mismatches between missions’ needs and the skill-sets of state-offered personnel. Implementing these proposals requires new and solid commitments of support by member states. Nations must be willing to trade short-term costs for continuing and longer-term benefits in mission planning, execution, and achievement of mandated objectives. Present trends suggest that demand for qualified police officers and other rule of law personnel is unlikely to slow appreciably in the near future. Taken together with the critical nature of UN work in providing and supporting law and order in post-conflict settings, a long-term boost in UN capacity to do that work should more than offset the short-term investment costs necessary to build that capacity, and the ongoing costs to maintain it. The sooner these investments begin, the sooner UN police and other rule of law personnel will begin to meet the performance standards that UN staff and member states alike expect of them, and the sooner security can be improved for the victims of violence in the countries where UN peacekeepers serve. Summary Chart: Proposals for Enhancing United Nations Capacity for Post-Conflict Policing Proposals UN Police Reserve (UNPR) UN Senior Reserve Roster (SRR) Primary Challenges this Would Overcome - Slow deployment A permanent, standing cadre of police and rule of law experts available for rapid - Uneven quality of police and ROL personnel deployment to new missions. - Lack of pre-deployment training Rapid Deployment Teams of 50 would - Lack of strategic planning serve as mission leadership during first -Incomplete needs 12 months of a new mission. assessment - Lack of institutional memory - Need for integrated Rule of Law Approach Replaces current recruitment of individual UN police officers with a system whereby contributing member states are offered financial incentives for placing specific officers on reserve. The employing agencies would receive retainers equal to 10 pct of officers’ actual salary (5 pct to cover annual training and 5 pct incentive fee) and UN reimbursement when officers deploy that is comparable to that given for troops and police in formed units. Officers selected would receive general and pre-deployment training and be available for rapid deployment. Deployed officers would continue to receive UN Mission Subsistence Allowance, as at present. - Slow deployment of individual UN police - Uneven quality of those that do deploy - Uneven UN access to needed specialties - Lack of pre-deployment training prior to arrival in mission - Lack of institutional memory Primary Tasks Size Non-deployed: - Vet and train new recruits for reserves - Conduct lessons learned analyses - Refine ROL doctrine, guidance, and policy - Plan for anticipated missions Immediately pre-deployment: - Mission-specific training - Participation in strategic needs assessments and initial mission planning. Deployed (within 7-14 days of mandate): - Headquarters setup, advanced operational planning, including security sector reform planning; - Reception, final training of ROL/police personnel arriving from reserves. 400 persons (275 police experts, 125 other ROL experts) Non-Deployed: - Must be certified prior to joining reserve, through completion of UN basic police training program - Availability for 2 weeks of annual refresher training Flexible, based on level of demand, but with two officers in reserve for every officer deployed, with slight cushion for illness, etc. Deployable in teams of 50 or as needed Based on UN individual police deployments as of late 2006, that would mean roughly 5,000 officers deployed and 11,200 officers on reserve (not deployed) at any given time, assuming that time in field is balanced with Deployed (within 14 days of call-up): twice that amount of time serving with their UNPR officers would conduct all activities currently home law enforcement agency (e.g., 6 carried out by individual UN police (i.e., monitor and months deployed, 12 months at home; 12 report on local police; reform, restructure, rebuild local police; conduct joint patrols, assist local law enforcement; months deployed, 24 months at home). and carry out law enforcement, in executive missions). Emphasize end-of-mission reporting to capture experiences, and lessons learned. Immediately pre-deployment: - Mission-specific training xvii - Serve as ROL Mission Leadership, usually second and Variable. - Poor Availability of Police A roster system where senior (retired) later rotations; sometimes as initial leadership Leadership police and rule of law experts receive a - Lead reform efforts of local police, prisons, and court - Lack of institutional modest annual stipend in exchange for systems, with sufficient seniority and experience to be memory being willing to deploy on short notice if credible mentors and advisors to senior host state - Need for integrated Rule of needed. Only a fraction of the roster is counterparts Law Approach anticipated to be on short (30-day) notice - Conduct post-mission debriefings to inform future efforts and thus on retainer. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch UN Standing Rule of Law Capacity (ROLCAP) Description —1— INTRODUCTION W orldwide, modern peace operations—combining the security elements of peacekeeping and the transforming/reconstructive elements of peacebuilding—attempt to bring stability to war-torn lands. Central to this mission is the (re)establishment of a functioning system to support the rule of law. This report is about equipping United Nations (UN) peace operations— current and prospective—with greater and more responsive capabilities to contribute to that task, both by providing public security as needed in the immediate post-war period and by rebuilding host states’ ability to do so in the longer term. Virtually every study of post-conflict environments concludes that stable public security is a prerequisite to peacebuilding; indeed, it is common sense. Yet the supply of international police and related personnel for peace operations has lagged demand for decades. With the exception of paramilitary police, recruiting sufficient numbers of competent officers in needed specialties is as difficult now as it was 15 years ago, partly because the global demand for these specialties is now higher than ever. Although this study focuses on the United Nations, other organizations that need international police, like the European Union, have had just as hard a time quickly staffing their missions with the right people. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has been working to improve its policing capacity for nearly a decade, with visible but still modest results. The need to reform UN policing and to integrate police with other post-conflict rule of law support was laid out in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in August 2000 (the Brahimi Report). The report called for a “doctrinal shift” in how the UN “conceives of and utilizes civilian police in peace operations” and recommended increased use of “judicial, penal, human rights, and policing experts working together” to uphold the rule of law. The report recommended a series of concrete steps, including creation of an on-call roster of 100 police experts, establishment of national pools of officers to be included in the UN Standby Arrangements System, and development of regional training centers and single “points of contact” in member state governments to facilitate UN recruitment of police for its peace operations.1 In December 2003, the Future of Peace Operations program at the Stimson Center published an assessment of Brahimi Report implementation, concluding that “the Civilian Police Division’s— indeed, the UN’s—capacity to recruit and deploy in the rule of law areas still falls short of what is needed to meet present, let alone future, mission demands rapidly and effectively.”2 Indeed, the Secretary-General originally rejected the call for a “doctrinal shift,” and member states declined 1 United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, paras. 39–40, 119, 122–125. 2 William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, and Moira K. Shanahan, The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 106. 2 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law to name individual officers to the proposed police on-call roster.3 By late 2006, the police and other rule of law components of UN peace operations remained hard-pressed to recruit qualified personnel in the numbers required and were still largely bereft of strategic guidance. In a November 2006 meeting that addressed the UN’s role in promoting the rule of law, the SecretaryGeneral’s high-level Policy Committee stressed “the lack of doctrine and guidance in this field,” noting that “[t]he UN had to rely on ad hoc consultants and short-term staff too frequently and thus had trouble building up the institutional memory and continuity required. There was a clear need for dedicated and adequate core capacity…” and a better division of labor among the various parts of the UN system with a program stake in rule of law, both in peace operations and other activities.4 This study assumes that demand for police and rule of law work will continue undiminished. It reviews UN capacity to support and extend the rule of law through its peace operations and the obstacles that hinder the further development of that capacity. Further, it concludes that the UN’s historically ad hoc approach—driven in large part by resource constraints, but also by a lack of vision that has only recently begun to be corrected—is no longer acceptable, if it ever was. It therefore recommends new approaches for more systematic planning, recruiting, and rapid deployment of larger numbers of quality UN police (UNPOL) and other rule of law personnel for integrated peace operations. These include a standing UN Rule of Law Capacity, a complementary ready reserve of police and other criminal justice personnel, and a Senior Reserve Roster of experienced, retired police officers, judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers. The study assesses the political, operational and cost implications of these proposed capabilities. In conducting this analysis and generating these proposals, the authors drew from a wide variety of sources, including interviews with UN officials (in the Police Division, Integrated Training Service, and Best Practices Section of DPKO), government officials (including members of permanent missions to the UN and officials in the US Departments of State and Justice), and individuals specializing in international police issues (including scholars, staff of operational nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], and private contractors). The authors reviewed the international policing and rule of law literature, analyzed historical deployment rates for UN police, and compiled task lists for every UN operation with a police component since 1960. The study also hosted two workshops at The Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, DC to explore trends in UN policing and options for improving its effectiveness, including an August 2006 session with then UN Police Advisor Mark Kroeker. UN policing has undergone significant change since research for this study began in mid-2004, which has influenced the study’s recommendations. First, in September 2005, the World Summit endorsed the creation of a Standing Police Capacity (SPC) of 25 police experts to assist the planning and start-up of new missions and to support ongoing UN police activities in peace operations. The concept for the SPC was initially proposed by the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change in late 2004, albeit at a level of 50 to 100 3 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations peace operations, A/55/502, 20 October 2000, para. 27. 4 United Nations, “Decisions of the Secretary-General, Decision No. 2006/47, Rule of Law,” 24 November 2006, Attachment: “Policy Committee, 7 November 2006, Summary Record of Discussion—Rule of Law,” para. 3. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 3 officers.5 The Standing Capacity is a significant step towards greater UN ability to mount successful police missions that validates, politically, the notion of a standing, deployable UN police/rule of law capability. Second, the UN has dramatically increased its reliance on “formed police units” (FPUs) as personnel in peace operations, borrowed from national paramilitary gendarmerie forces. FPUs have 125–140 well-armed officers whose job is to meet law and order threats that require more muscle than the average patrol officer can muster, but used with more precision than a military response often allows. While some police organized into units were deployed with the UN’s executive missions in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, use of FPUs on a broad scale began in 2003, with three FPUs recruited for the mission in Liberia. Less than four years later, that number had grown to 35 units (with roughly 4,000 officers) serving in six missions, substantially altering the character of UN police activities.6 Finally, since 2003, the mandates of most new UN peace operations have included support for rebuilding local criminal justice capacity. This change has been reflected in UN staffing tables and mission plans. UN operations in Côte d’Ivoire, Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Haiti, Sudan, and Liberia all have one or more components focused on support to or reform of the host state’s courts, prosecutors, corrections, ministries of justice, or ministries of interior. (See Annex I.) Such efforts are likely to be fixtures of future operations as well, as establishing good governance under the rule of law continues to be a central goal of such operations, in collaboration with other international actors. These developments are all addressed further in this report, which reviews the emergence of rule of law on the peacebuilding agenda, assesses the growing complexity of police tasks, identifies major national contributors of police to UN operations, considers the rise of FPUs in those operations, and discusses how they and other UN police personnel are funded. It does not analyze or make recommendations regarding actual UN police operations in the field, nor does it address how to do post-conflict security sector or criminal justice sector reform. Specific recommendations on these subjects have been ably offered elsewhere.7 Instead, the report is focused on improving the UN’s structural capacity to recruit, prepare, and deploy appropriate police and other criminal justice personnel to the field in a timely manner. This study offers concrete proposals to these ends, acknowledging that getting skilled criminal justice personnel into the mission area in a timely manner is, by itself, no guarantee of success, but arguing that the 5 United Nations, A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, 2 December 2004, para. 223. 6 This figure does not include the nineteen formed units authorized by the Security Council in July 2007 to serve in an African Union/UN hybrid operation in Darfur, Sudan. UN Security Council Resolution 1769, S/RES/1769, 31 July 2007, para. 2. 7 See, for example, David H. Bayley, Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to do and How to do it (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, June 2001); or David Bayley, Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). See also Otwin Marenin, “Restoring Policing Systems in War Torn Nations: Process, Problems, Prospects,” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005; Charles Call, “Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability,” International Peace Academy, 2003; Annika S. Hansen and Sharon Wiharta with Bjørn R. Claussen and Stian Kjeksrud, The Transition to a Just Order—Establishing Local Ownership after Conflict, A Practitioners’ Guide (Printgraf, Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2007). 4 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law organization’s present inability to deploy them expeditiously dramatically increases the likelihood of failure. Since police make up the largest component of the rule of law “teams” in UN peace operations, our analysis of numerical needs and rule of law-related tasks is focused on them. Yet better analysis of UN recruitment and retention of personnel experienced in the other components of the rule of law would also serve the organization well. The mechanisms that we propose to overcome persistent problems in recruiting and deploying police in UN peace operations would enhance the effectiveness and availability of other rule of law components as well. —2— RULE OF LAW AS A REMEDY FOR POST-CONFLICT INSECURITY “(I)n Bosnia we thought that democracy was the highest priority, and we measured it by the number of elections we could organize…In hindsight, we should have put the establishment of the rule of law first, for everything else depends on it: a functioning economy, a free and fair political system, the development of civil society, public confidence in police and the courts.” -Lord Paddy Ashdown, UN High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, October 20028 B uilding sustainable peace in societies emerging from violent and protracted conflict is a daunting task. Over the last two decades, experience in post-conflict peacebuilding has tempered overly optimistic assumptions about the ease and speed of transitions from war to stability.9 Early international efforts that focused on stopping the shooting and organizing quick elections have given way to an increasingly complex and comprehensive peacebuilding agenda. That agenda is based on the recognition that ending open warfare is but a vital first step on a long journey towards ensuring sustainable peace and security. The new, ambitious template for transitioning to a stable peace includes an array of tasks: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants; strengthening of government institutions; addressing issues of political impunity and accountability; combating organized crime; reforming dysfunctional economies; resettling refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); combating “spoilers” aligned against peace; and organizing democratic elections. In short, peacebuilding has increasingly come to resemble state-building.10 Among these tasks aimed at consolidating a fragile peace, the rule of law is increasingly recognized as essential. The importance of the rule of law as a necessary ingredient of peaceful, democratic societies has, after many years and missions, become widely accepted among policy8 Paddy Ashdown, “What I Learned in Bosnia,” The New York Times, 28 October 2002. “Peacebuilding” was first defined by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as “action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen peace and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict.” United Nations, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-keeping, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992, para. 21. Use of the term has since broadened to include, in the words of the Brahimi Report, “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war,” A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 13. For further analysis of the term and how it is used, see Charles Call, “Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-Concept Peacebuilding Concepts and Issues for DPA,” Report for the UN Department of Political Affairs, 31 January 2005. 10 Simon Chesterman, You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administrations, and State-Building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Robert C. Orr, ed., Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004). 9 6 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law makers, academics, and practitioners alike. The challenge is identifying the precise components that constitute the rule of law and the steps needed to establish it.11 Societies that operate under a healthy rule of law demonstrate many distinct yet interrelated characteristics: a functioning and accountable internal police force, civilian control of the armed forces, effective and timely judicial and penal systems, a political hierarchy answerable to the people, minimal levels of corruption and organized crime, and a culture of respect for human rights. Recognizing the necessary building blocks for a stable and sustainable rule of law system, however, is easier than devising and implementing the policies and mechanisms to create and fit those building blocks together in any particular place. Sidebar 1: DEFINING THE RULE OF LAW While most people embrace the need for rule of law in post-conflict societies, the exact meaning of the term remains disputed and open to conceptual ambiguity. Attempts to define the rule of law are hampered by the fact that the term is intended to describe a concept with many components and potential applications. For the international organizations and individuals attempting to assist its development in the field, rule of law is an operational goal. It is therefore something that necessarily requires a clear meaning so as to provide a common understanding of the end-state that is being sought by what may be a relatively large number of official and unofficial international actors in any given political setting. In the crudest terms, the rule of law is, “the existence of public order maintained through the systemized application or threat of force by a modern state.” The law, understood in this sense, is whatever the sovereign decrees as essential to public order. Such a definition fails to incorporate notions of accountability and equitable application of the law, or even a notion of law as citizens of a modern democracy would understand it. In a democratic context, laws are rules for behavior or transactions that are drawn up by legislative authorities, duly constituted (that is, elected according to established, consistent, and fairly-enforced electoral rules). Moreover, as Thomas Carothers notes, the laws must be “public knowledge,” “clear in meaning,” and “apply equally to everyone.” In his 2004 report, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the rule of law as “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to the laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.” This definition best captures the complex and interwoven aspects that comprise the rule of law, and most accurately reflects the term as used in this report. Sources: W. Burnett Harvey, “The Rule of Law in Historical Perspective,” Michigan Law Review 59(4), February 1961, 491; Thomas Carothers, “The Rule of Law Revival,” Foreign Affairs 77(2), March/April 1998, 96; United Nations, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, Report of the SecretaryGeneral, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para. 2. 11 Miguel Schor, “The Rule of Law,” in David Clark, ed., Encyclopedia of Law and Society: American and Global Perspectives (London: Sage Publications, 2005); Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 7 The importance of supporting the rule of law was not always appreciated in earlier international attempts to assist fragile states and those emerging from conflict or authoritarian pasts. Over the last decade or so, however, rule of law activities have slowly moved up the post-conflict priorities list. Early post-Cold War UN peace operations in Cambodia, Bosnia, and Haiti showed the international community the high cost of ignoring rule of law and tackling it piecemeal. A decade later, there is still a substantial gap between what a comprehensive rule of law agenda requires and the international means available to meet those requirements. THE UNITED NATIONS AND POST-CONFLICT RULE OF LAW In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace first identified an “obvious connection between democratic practices—such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making—and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order.” The follow-on Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, released in 1995, explicitly cited the need for improved UN capacity in “the building up of national institutions,” including police and judicial structures.12 Starting in the late-1990s, the UN system took a closer and more critical look at the significance of rule of law in states emerging from conflict. Particularly within DPKO, the gap in addressing police and rule of law issues was recognized. UN leadership knew it needed to reevaluate the organization’s own institutional readiness and approach to developing and managing such programming. In 2000, the “Brahimi Report” gave formal recognition to the importance of the UN’s rule of law work in peace operations, highlighting shortcomings and proposing improvements in the organization’s capacity to undertake that work (see sidebar 2).13 In response to the Brahimi Report, DPKO proposed in August 2001 that a three-person Criminal Law and Judicial Affairs Unit be added to a newly-strengthened Civilian Police Division. The General Assembly authorized a two-person unit in February 2002.14 A few months later, the UN’s Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) commissioned a Task Force for Development of Comprehensive Rule of Law Strategies for Peace Operations, which surveyed system-wide UN rule of law expertise and resources. The Task Force report, released in August 2002, catalogued a range of existing programs but also found system-wide shortfalls in the areas of assessment, strategic planning, specialized skill-sets, and oversight.15 The UN established a Rule of Law Focal Point Network in 2003, intended to serve as a coordination and information sharing mechanism among the various departments involved in rule of law support. A lack of dedicated capacity limited the network’s effectiveness.16 In August 2004, the Secretary-General published an extensive report on how the United Nations could best support rule of law in post-conflict states, ending with a list of proposed activities that was subsequently endorsed by the Security Council.17 12 United Nations, Supplement to An Agenda For Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, A/47/277 - S/24111, 3 January 1995, para. 59. 13 A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 10e. 14 Durch, Holt, et al., The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations, 29, 31, 82. For the further evolution of the unit, see chapter four. 15 United Nations, Final Report of the ECPS Task Force for Development of Comprehensive Rule of Law Strategies for Peace Operations (New York: UN Executive Committee on Peace and Security, 15 August 2002). 16 United Nations, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para. 57; United Nations, Uniting our strengths: Enhancing United 8 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Sidebar 2: BRAHIMI REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW ACTIVITIES IN PEACE OPERATIONS 2(b) The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments; 10(a) Member States are encouraged to each establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice, within the context of the United Nations standby arrangements system [UNSAS]; 10(b) Member States are encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for civilian police in the respective national pools, to promote a common level of preparedness in accordance with guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations; 10(c) Member States are encouraged to designate a single point of contact within their governmental structures for the provision of civilian police to United Nations peace operations; 10(d) The Panel recommends that a revolving list of about 100 police officers and related experts be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days notice with teams trained to create the civilian police component of a new peacekeeping operation, train incoming personnel and give the component greater coherence at an earlier date. 10(e) The Panel recommends that parallel arrangements to recommendations (a), (b) and (c) above be established for judicial, penal, human rights and other relevant specialists, who with specialist civilian police will make up collegial “rule of law” teams. Source: United Nations, The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, 54-56. Not until 2006, however, did the Brahimi Report’s recommendations regarding collaboration across UN bureaus and offices that work on rule of law begin to be realized. In late November 2006, the Secretary-General endorsed a clear division of labor among UN entities with a stake in promoting various elements of the rule of law, establishing a Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group, with members from seven UN departments, agencies, funds, and programs. The group is intended to serve as a “(h)eadquarters focal point for coordinating system-wide attention on the rule of law so as to ensure quality, policy coherence, and coordination.”18 It will be supported by four professional staff and be chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General. The same Secretary-General decision distributed lead and supporting responsibilities in three “baskets” or “sectors”: (1) Rule of Law at the International Level; (2) Rule of Law in the Context of Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations; and (3) Rule of Law in the Context of Long-term Development.19 Its allocation of responsibilities for these rule of law sectors is reproduced in table 1. Nations support for the rule of law: Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/636-S/2006/980, 14 December 2006, para. 31. 17 S/2004/616, especially para. 65. 18 The group includes the Office of Legal Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Development Program, UN Development Fund for Women, and UN High Commissioner for Refugees. A/61/636-S/2006/980, paras. 48–50. 19 United Nations, “Decisions of the Secretary-General, Decision No. 2006/47,” Annex 2: “Rule of Law—Baskets and Sectors.” Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch Table 1: UN Division of Labor for Rule of Law Activities BASKET/SECTOR Lead Entity Other Key Entities, Roles, and Contributions 1) Rule of Law at the International Level UN Charter Related Issues OLA Multilateral Treaties OLA International Criminal Court OLA 2) Rule of Law in Conflict/Post-Conflict Situations Transitional Justice OHCHR National Transitional Justice OHCHR Consultative Process Truth and Reconciliation OHCHR Mechanisms International and Hybrid OLA Tribunals Strengthening National Justice Systems/Institutions DPKO in mission Legal/Judicial Institutions* areas/ UNDP elsewhere Police and Law Enforcement DPKO Agencies (global) (including Border Security) DPKO Prisons (global) Implementing Human Rights OHCHR Norms Monitoring OHCHR Other Priority Areas Alternative and Traditional UNDP Dispute Resolution Legal Education (No Lead) Interim Law Enforcement / DPKO Executive Judicial Authority Security Support to National Law DPKO Enforcement Agencies 3) Rule of Law for Long-term Development Strengthening Legal System and UNDP Institutions Police, Law Enforcement DPKO (HQ) Agencies, and Prisons Monitoring OHCHR OHCHR and other agencies within their mandates OHCHR, UNDP UNDP, DPA UNDP, OLA, UNIFEM OHCHR, UNDP UNDP in mission areas, OHCHR, UNODC, UNIFEM UNDP, OHCHR, UNODC, UNIFEM UNDP, OHCHR, UNODC UNDP, UNIFEM UNIFEM UNODC, UNIFEM OHCHR on human rights, UNDP, UNODC, UNIFEM OHCHR, UNODC UNODC, sometimes OHCHR UNDP, OHCHR, UNODC UNIFEM Acronym Key: OLA-Office of Legal Affairs; OHCHR-Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights; UNDP-United Nations Development Programme; DPA-Department of Political Affairs; DPKO-Department of Peacekeeping Operations; UNODC-United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; UNIFEM-United Nations Development Fund for Women. * UNDP is lead entity on Court Administration and Civil Law even in areas where there is a DPKO-led mission. DPKO is lead entity for all other Legal/Judicial Institutions work in areas where there is a DPKO-led mission. Source: United Nations, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, “Decision No. 2006/74 – Rule of Law,” 24 November 2006, annex. 9 10 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law FOCUSING ON UN POLICE AND RELATED FIELD CAPACITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE In fully democratic societies, the police play a crucial role in maintaining public security and order and in legitimizing the state’s monopoly on the use of force through a commitment to the rule of law. The nexus between good governance, rule of law, and public security makes effective policing an important component of well-functioning, modern societies. In countries emerging from violent conflict, local police capacity is often non-existent and what does exist is frequently ineffective, highly politicized, and/or abusive. Thus, there are two distinct yet related demands associated with policing in post-conflict environments: establishing short-term public security and building long-term, effective local capacity to provide security that respects the rights and demands of citizens. International actors in postconflict settings need tools and strategies for both challenges. The Short-Term Challenge of Establishing Public Security Societies emerging from social upheaval and civil conflict often experience high public insecurity and lawlessness soon after fighting formally ends. Post-conflict transitional periods in El Salvador, Mozambique, Kosovo, Liberia, and Haiti, for example, were plagued by surges in crime. The reasons are two-fold. First, the demobilization of combatants often results in small arms and ammunition flowing from armed groups into the general population.20 Lacking job opportunities and/or skills, many former combatants resort to crime, a problem compounded by the psychological effects of war, which leave many ex-combatants accustomed to violence and danger.21 Further compounding the challenge is the fact that many paramilitary activities are easily transferable to criminal enterprises such as smuggling.22 Social divisions may also have been aggravated by the conflict and the return of refugees often leads to increased competition over limited resources.23 Thus, increased crime is a likely by-product of a formal peace agreement in the absence of concrete strategies to prevent it.24 20 In Liberia and Sierra Leone, for instance, Taya Weiss has observed that “demobilisation and reintegration processes have created their own weapons markets.” Taya Weiss, Perpetuating Power: Small Arms in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia, ISS Monograph Series No. 116 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, June 2005), i. See also, Foday B. Fofanah, “Sierra Leone: A Small-Arms Depot,” World Press Review, 11 July 2001. A study by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) found that weapons related injuries in Cambodia actually increased in the postconflict phase. ICRC, “Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” ICRC, 1999. Similarly, in Guatemala the number of firearms-related deaths diminished only slightly post-conflict, as compared to the 37-year civil war. Jenny Pearce, “Peace-Building at the Periphery: Lessons from Central America,” Third World Quarterly 20(1), 1999, 51–68. In 2000, the defense ministry of El Salvador reported that 165,186 firearms were registered for personal or commercial use, and estimated an additional 200,000 remained unregistered. Charles Call, “Democratization, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El Salvador,” Journal of Latin American Studies (35)4, November 2003, 843. 21 Chrissie Steenkamp, “The Legacy of War: Conceptualizing a ‘Culture of Violence’ to Explain Violence after Peace Accords,” The Round Table 94(379), April 2005, 264. 22 Analysts have observed that many of Mozambique’s ex-combatants have moved into organized crime. Jaremey McMullin, “Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?” International Peacekeeping 11(4), Winter 2000, 626. 23 For a detailed analysis of challenges in repatriating refugees, see Howard Adelman, “Refugee Repatriation,” in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). 24 Charles T. Call and William Stanley, “Protecting the People: Public Security Choices after Conflicts,” Global Governance 7(2), Spring 2001. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 11 Second, the state will likely have diminished capacity to address such lawlessness and criminality. As noted, war may have severely depleted local police capacity and the police, as an arm of government, may well have been active partisans in the conflict. The governments they served may have no history of, or experience providing, even-handed protection of the civilian population. Young states may themselves be so ravaged by war that effective internal security institutions will need to be created anew—a major challenge for weak, recently formed, and under-funded post-war governments like those in Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone, for example. Thus, criminal violence may peak at precisely the time that a national government is least able to fight it, a situation that Michael Dziedzic and other experts have referred to as an “institutional gap.”25 Its repercussions can be far reaching. Failure to create and maintain a secure environment undercuts peacebuilding tasks in all sectors, including public health, infrastructure, education, and the economy.26 Organized crime and illicit trade networks may thrive and, once entrenched, withstand fledgling government efforts to dismantle them.27 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, the international community’s early failure to take on organized criminal networks during the immediate post-Dayton phase allowed them to flourish, despite belated international efforts to rebuild the local police.28 Post-conflict insecurity diminishes public trust in governmental institutions and can lead to vigilantism and private protection forces. As Annika Hansen has observed, “security is the key to a ‘new social contract’ between the population and its government or society in which the population is willing to surrender the responsibility for its physical safety into government hands.”29 Two years after a Liberian peace deal was signed, for example, vigilante groups were roaming the streets of Monrovia in response to increased banditry and a lack of police presence in certain sections of the city.30 These factors make clear the need for at least minimal public security in the immediate aftermath of conflict. In modern peace operations, international actors have sometimes tried to assume responsibility for public security, with mixed results. Absent effective domestic means to provide 25 Michael Dziedzic, “Introduction,” in Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, eds., Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998). 26 Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, K. Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order After Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 1, 8–12; Michael Brzoska and Andreas Heinemann-Gruder, “Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Under International Auspices,” in Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, eds., Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2005). 27 Colette Rausch, ed., Combating Serious Crimes in Postconflict Societies: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 3-8. See also Jock Covey, Michael Dziedzic, and Leonard Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 12–13. International sanctions aimed at curbing organized crime are also likely to fall short unless better implementation and enforcement mechanisms are created. Alix J. Boucher and Victoria K. Holt, Targeting Spoilers: The Role of UN Panels of Experts (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, forthcoming). 28 Kari M. Osland, “The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” International Peacekeeping 11(3), Autumn 2004, 554. 29 Annika Hansen, From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations, Adelphi Paper no. 343 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 35. Joseph S. Tulchin and Heather A. Golding, “Looking Ahead: Steps to Reduce Crime and Violence in the Americas,” in Hugo Fruhling, Joseph Tulchin, and Heather Golding, eds., Crime and Violence in Latin America: Citizen Security, Democracy, and the State (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2003), 260. 30 “LIBERIA: Vigilante gangs patrol streets as police force rebuilds,” IRIN News, 18 October 2005. 12 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law such security, outside effort is often required to maintain law and order, a task that Graham Day and Christopher Freeman have characterized as “policekeeping.”31 Urgent public security tasks are often given to military peacekeepers out of necessity, since such forces are able to deploy to insecure, war-torn areas and have traditionally made up the bulk of peacekeeping missions. Well-trained peacekeeping forces may be configured to support police work and work closely with civilians. Military police may bridge both worlds as well.32 Yet many military forces are ill-suited for this role. National militaries are primarily trained to engage organized, armed entities like themselves, to destroy designated enemy targets, and to seize and hold territory. Strategies and tactics for such endeavors are different from those for providing public security in urban situations, especially in cases of civil disorder or demonstrations, which call for de-escalation and restrained use of force. Further, the military in international operations may be relatively isolated from the general population for purposes of force protection, and have limited contact with the public. Effective international police, on the other hand, are trained to be integrated into (or at least to work with) the community in order to build trust and develop relationships that assist in information gathering and deterring criminal activity. All of these factors make the use of military peacekeepers less effective than police as the primary tool for carrying out law and order activities in the initial post-conflict period.33 The Long-Term Challenge of Building Up Domestic Institutional Capacity Ideally, local police forces should be effective, accountable, and oriented towards serving the public rather than the political elites. (Re)establishing domestic capacity to ensure law and order (what some have termed “policebuilding”) is a longer-term effort necessary to facilitate the gradual exit of interim international military and police forces and to establish the foundation for a functioning and stable society.34 International efforts to build up domestic police capacity usually aim to keep the worst known human rights abusers out of the new police force and instill concepts of “democratic policing” (see sidebar 3), lest security forces undermine state legitimacy in the eyes of the public.35 Thus development of an accountable, indigenous police force and supporting criminal justice institutions capable of maintaining law, order, and public trust is a vital component of peacebuilding efforts.36 31 Graham Day and Christopher Freeman, “Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect: The Policekeeping Approach,” Global Governance 11(2), April-June 2005; Graham Day and Christopher Freeman, “Policekeeping is the Key: Rebuilding the Internal Security Architecture of Postwar Iraq, International Affairs 79(2), March 2003. 32 Military police may be trained in forensic investigation, evidence gathering, and the arrest and detention of suspects, usually for the purpose of policing fellow military personnel, not the civilian population. 33 Rachel Bronson, “When Soldiers Become Cops,” Foreign Affairs 81(6), November/December 2002; Alice Hills, “The Inherent Limits of Military Police Forces in Policing Peace Operations,” International Peacekeeping 8(3), Autumn 2003. 34 Gordon Peake and Kaysie Studdard Brown, “Policebuilding: The International Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands,” International Peacekeeping 12(4), Winter 2005. 35 Mark Shaw, “Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies-Conference Summary and Overview,” Jan Smuts House, University of the Witsatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, 30 August-1 September 2000. 36 Alan Bryden, Timothy Donais, and Heiner Hänggi, “Shaping a Security Governance Agenda in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,” Policy Paper No. 11, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), November 2005; Chris Ferguson, “Police Reform, Peacekeeping and SSR: The Need for a Closer Synthesis,” Journal of Security Sector Management 2(3), September 2004; Neclâ Tschirgi, “Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges,” International Peace Academy, 7 October 2004. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 13 The actual tasks associated with long-term institution-building vary according to local circumstances. Where police forces remain largely intact after a conflict (as in Mozambique), they may require only modest reforms or limited vetting to become effective and accountable. Where police forces must be entirely (re)built (as in Kosovo and Timor-Leste), or substantially reduced or restructured (as in Bosnia), a more costly and comprehensive international effort may be needed. Sidebar 3: WHAT, EXACTLY, IS DEMOCRATIC POLICING? “Democratic policing” captures the desire of international mission planners to have peace operations leave behind internal security forces that use policing standards and procedures that would be acceptable in developed, democratic states. There remains, however, disagreement over the precise goals, strategies, and policies that “democratic policing” should entail. International criminologist David Bayley has identified four key criteria that qualify a police force as committed to ‘democratic policing’: accountability to the law, rather than to the government; protection of human rights, especially those associated with exercising political freedoms; accountability to people outside the police organization who are empowered to provide effective oversight; and an operational priority to securing groups and individuals. He also argues that a fair and effective police force requires the trust of the public. Countering those who argue that democratic reforms and public trust-building make law enforcement “soft on crime” and less able to deter and punish criminals, Bayley argues that trust often increases public willingness to give the police the criminal intelligence that makes them effective crime fighters. Sources: Bruce David and Rachel Neild, “The Police that We Want: A Handbook for Oversight of the Police in South Africa,” Justice Initiative, Open Society Institute, 24 January 2005; David Bayley, Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad (Oxford, Oxford University Press, November 2005). Connecting Short- and Long-Term Tasks The short- and long-term challenges of providing public security and establishing effective indigenous security forces are distinct and require different strategies, but connect in several key ways. Studies of internationally-led police reform efforts have highlighted the difficulties they face in high-crime, high-violence environments, for example. The population at large and the local police are likely to resist reform if they perceive it as a distraction from the primary goal of establishing acceptable levels of law and order.37 It follows, therefore, that establishing public security early on in the post-conflict period and preventing, if possible, the emergence of a lawless environment is likely to assist the long-term task of developing an effective and democratic local police capacity. Moreover, the sooner internal security is established, the sooner public confidence in the government and its intention to use its authority to benefit the general population is likely to grow. Creating or restructuring local police forces early on is especially critical when a peace process includes provisions for large-scale DDR.38 Ex-combatants not implicated in gross human 37 Bayley, Democratizing the Police Abroad, 25; William G. O’Neill, “Police Reform in Post-Conflict Societies: What We Know and What We Still Need to Know,” International Peace Academy, April 2005, 2-3. 38 Bryden, Donais, and Hänggi, “Shaping a Security Governance Agenda,” 13–15. 14 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law rights abuses are likely to view entry into the new force as a good career option, limiting the temptation to turn to crime as a source of needed income. The importance of establishing public security and building up local police capacity in postconflict settings is critical for all the reasons outlined in this section. The UN has relied on police and, increasingly, other criminal justice personnel to carry out rule of law work in modern peace operations. —3— UNITED NATIONS POLICE IN MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS “We learn it again with every mission we do. Experienced civilian lawenforcement professionals are just as vital to the success of our missions as military forces.” - Jean-Marie Guéhenno, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations39 F or over 40 years, UN peacekeeping missions have included police components. Their roles, however, have changed substantially over time. Drawn from contributions by its member states, the UN has deployed police in more than 30 peace operations and assigned them a broad range of tasks related to public security and institution building. The UN Police Division within DPKO plans and manages police activities according to mandates created by the Security Council. UN police contingents in the field have had to patch together, in turn, means of carrying out these increasingly ambitious mandates. At the same time, DPKO has struggled to enlist member state support and resources, particularly well-qualified personnel. Until recently, planners and donors often treated policing as an afterthought for missions, focusing instead on the military aspects of peacekeeping. There are reasons for this lack of enthusiasm: The nature of the UN’s work in reforming, restructuring, and (at times) creating local police forces is a long-term process that often runs counter to the desire for a relatively short lifespan for most peacekeeping missions and the episodic attention of the international community.40 That long-term work has, moreover, increasingly been supplemented by mandates requiring early and forceful international policing presence intended to complement or, on occasion, substitute for local police. Despite many challenges, the UN has made substantive progress in designing and refining the role of police in peacekeeping missions. Today, the UN is the single largest provider of international police support in the world, outpacing both bilateral training initiatives and regional organizations alike.41 39 David Sands, “The Thin Blue Line,” The Washington Times, 24 July 2006. Edward Rees, “Security Sector Reform and Peace Operations: ‘Improvisation and Confusion’ from the Field,” External Study for the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, March 2006, 10. 41 Although other countries and multinational organizations have begun in recent years to deploy police officers internationally to assist in reform efforts, none rival the UN in the size and scope of its policing work. By comparison, the European Union had roughly 350 police officers deployed throughout 2006, having downsized the European Police Mission (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) from a peak strength of over 500 officers. The Australian-led International Deployment Group had approximately 350 police deployed, as well, as of March 2007. The Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2007); Australian Federal Police website, September 2007, www.afp.gov.au/international/IDG.html. 40 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law 16 THE INCREASING DEMAND FOR UN POLICE The size of UN police deployments has changed dramatically over the decades. In January 1988, only 35 UN police officers were serving worldwide, all in a single UN mission (UNFICYP in Cyprus).42 As of May 2007, there were nearly 9,500 UNPOL officers (individuals and members of FPUs) deployed in 13 missions worldwide and drawn from 87 countries (see figure 1).43 In 1995, police represented only two percent of the total uniformed personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping operations, whereas by mid-2007 they were nearly 13 percent.44 Civilian rule of law personnel, such as judicial and corrections advisors, represent a much smaller percentage of current operations, but play key roles in advising and training their host state counterparts. Figure 1: UN Police Deployments, 1995–2007 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 Individual Police Jan-07 Jul-06 Jan-06 Jul-05 Jan-05 Jul-04 Jan-04 Jul-03 Jan-03 Jul-02 Jan-02 Jul-01 Jan-01 Jul-00 Jan-00 Jul-99 Jan-99 Jul-98 Jan-98 Jul-97 Jan-97 Jul-96 Jan-96 Jul-95 Jan-95 0 Formed Police Units Figure 1 shows that as UN police deployment levels have risen since 1999, the organization has relied increasingly upon FPUs to meet the demand. As noted earlier, these armed units are specially trained to deal with scenarios too volatile or dangerous for individual police officers, such as major civil unrest. Once used sparingly, FPUs accounted for 40 percent of all police deployed in UN peace operations by mid-2007. 42 A/50/60-S/1995/1. These missions include 10 peacekeeping operations led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNFICYPCyprus; MINURSO-Western Sahara; UNOMIG-Georgia; UNMIK-Kosovo; MONUC-Democratic Republic of Congo; UNMIL-Liberia; UNOCI-Côte d’Ivoire; MINUSTAH-Haiti; UNMIS-Sudan; and UNMIT-Timor-Leste), and three political/peacebuilding missions led by DPKO (UNAMA-Afghanistan; UNIOSIL-Sierra Leone; and BINUB-Burundi). This number excludes the small police personnel present in three political/peacebuilding missions led by the Department of Political Affairs (UNOGBIS-Guinea-Bissau; BONUCA-Central African Republic; and UNTOPTajikistan). 44 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Background Note,” June 2007. 43 Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 17 THE GROWING COMPLEXITY OF UN POLICE MANDATES Since the early 1990s, the number and complexity of tasks assigned to UN police by the Security Council have grown dramatically. Much of this can be attributed to the fact that earlier operations have revealed the need for ever-more multifaceted and intrusive police components in mission mandates. With each policing mission, the urgency and significance of effectively establishing public security and fostering local police capabilities has been increasingly recognized. This, in turn, has led the Security Council to increasingly emphasize the importance of international police in UN operations, but has not translated to any greater capacity to fill this role, particularly in the area of individual police recruitment. The evolution of UN policing in peace operations can be described in terms of three categories of mission types: traditional, transformational, and executive (see table 2). This typology is helpful for understanding the different roles assigned to UN police forces. It also demonstrates the evolution of UNPOL officers from passive monitors of local police to active reformers and, occasionally, enforcers of internal security in host countries. These three “ideal-types” capture the various roles and responsibilities that UN police have been mandated to assume. Traditional Policing Mandates In traditional policing operations, unarmed police officers monitor the behavior of domestic security forces and report on human rights violations.45 They essentially serve as a confidencebuilding measure, offering some reassurance to a traumatized population that abuses by domestic police will be reduced. These operations are the least intrusive of the three operational types, and are typified by UN operations in the early 1990s, such as those in Namibia (UNTAG), Western Sahara (MINURSO), Angola (UNAVEM II), and Mozambique (ONUMOZ).46 All relied on police to monitor the activity of their local counterparts, with varying levels of success. The UN Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ, 1992–1994), a typical traditional operation, began with 128 UN civilian police, but increased to 1,144 due to rising crime rates, complaints over human rights violations by the national police, and accusations that demobilized government soldiers were being funneled into that force.47 UN police were mandated to “monitor and verify” that police activities were “fully consistent with the general peace agreement” and respectful of the “rights and civil liberties of Mozambican citizens throughout the country.”48 UNPOL officers had no authority to take action in the face of human rights abuses, however. Their only recourse in such circumstances was to file a report with the National Police Affairs Commission, which would then relay the complaint to the Ministry of Interior in hopes that something would be 45 The emphasis on monitoring in “traditional” policing operations mirrors the military role of monitoring compliance with peace agreements in early, traditional peacekeeping missions. 46 The UN deployed police in three peacekeeping missions prior to 1989: the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964, the oft-forgotten United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF) from 1962 to 1963, and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) created in 1964 and still operational. While these missions established the precedent of a police role in UN peacekeeping, the police responsibilities were unique and did not follow a standard model or ‘type’ of policing mandate. 47 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), S/24892, 3 December 1992, para. 53 (b). 48 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), S/1994/89/Add.1, 28 January 1994, para. 9. 18 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Table 2: Typology of UN Policing Mandates, 1989–2007 Type of Policing Mandate Major Area of Responsibility Executive Examples of UN Operations* Monitoring and limited training or guidance for indigenous police • Monitoring local police forces to ensure compliance with peace agreement and/or respect for human rights • Reporting on violations to designated authority • Providing limited guidance/training to local police ONUSAL (El Salvador) UNFICYP (Cyprus) UNTAG (Namibia) ONUMOZ (Mozambique) MINUGUA (Guatemala) MINURSO (W. Sahara) UNPROFOR (Croatia) UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III & MONUA (Angola) UNCRO (Croatia) UNPSG (Croatia) UNTAC (Cambodia) Reforming, restructuring, rebuilding indigenous police. (This category may include partial, clearly defined law enforcement responsibilities, such as providing security for elections or protecting refugees) • Establishing training doctrines and materials • Setting up police training academies • Vetting of prospective police for past abuses • Designing and implementing internal checks on police system • Providing security for election sites, specific individuals, and locations UNOSOM II (Somalia) UNOMIG (Georgia) UNMIH, UNSMIH, UNTMIH, MINUSTAH (Haiti) UNAMIR (Rwanda) UNMIBH (BosniaHerzegovina) UNTAES (Eastern Slavonia) MINURCA (Central African Republic) UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) MONUC (DRC) UNMIL (Liberia) UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire) ONUB (Burundi) UNMIS (Sudan) Primary Law enforcement responsibility (‘Executive Authority’), while simultaneously developing local law enforcement capacity and institutions • Providing law and order • Conducting investigations, arresting criminals, disrupting organized crime, working with judicial officials. • Coordinating the reforming and restructuring of indigenous police forces UNMIK (Kosovo) UNTAET, UNMISET & UNMIT (Timor-Leste) Traditional Transformational Specific Tasks * These operations are categorized based on mandate language for the mission. Some missions, UNTAC and ONUSAL for example, are categorized based on their primary mission, despite temporarily veering into more active law and order activities due to circumstances on the ground. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 19 done—a hope that was often disappointed.49 Reports of human rights abuses by the national police continued during and after the operation, and crime rates rose dramatically in the wake of ONUMOZ’s departure.50 Sometimes realities on the ground demonstrated that traditional mandates were inadequate. In El Salvador, for example, some UNPOL officers were forced to assume limited law enforcement duties in rural areas where local police forces were non-existent, despite their mandate to merely monitor local forces. Similarly, UN police in Cambodia, authorized to “monitor and control” police activities, were temporarily granted the powers of “arrest and detention” as the government’s police grew increasingly uncooperative.51 These experiences contributed to more intrusive UN mandates for police in operations launched since the mid-1990s. Transformational Policing Mandates Transformational mandates involve reforming, restructuring, and/or (re)building indigenous law enforcement capacity.52 The first goal is to reform local police, based on the principles of “democratic policing” and increased transparency. Such efforts target police behavior and, in addition to seeking changes in relevant legislation, codes, policies and procedures, usually offer training in human rights and community relations. The impact of such training is often constrained by larger factors, however: A class on international human rights law may not alter police behavior if the force remains embedded in a larger political culture that lacks accountability norms and rewards protection of state prerogatives over protection of the citizenry, as the UN learned in Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, and elsewhere.53 The second goal of transformational policing is to restructure and depoliticize local forces, purging them of human rights violators, recruiting new police, and establishing effective chains of democratic authority and oversight. The process may involve downsizing forces bloated by war or enlarging forces decimated by war. It may also involve recruiting new police from segments of the population previously victimized by police. In both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, for example, the recruitment of minorities into the local police was a major goal of reform efforts. A comprehensive vetting procedure to ensure that police recruits are not implicated in past human rights abuses has proven critical for new forces to behave better than the 49 James Woods, “Mozambique: The CIVPOL Operation,” in Oakley et al., eds., Policing the New World Disorder, 162-163. 50 Amnesty International, “Mozambique: Human Rights and the Police,” Amnesty International, 1 April 1998. 51 Yasushi Akashi, “Directive from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Establishing Procedures for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Human Rights Violations,” Directive No. 93/1, United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 6 January 1993. 52 Former UN police advisor Mark Kroeker calls these “the 3 ‘R’s.” Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch, “From Timor-Leste to Darfur: New Initiatives for Enhancing UN Civilian Policing Capacity,” The Henry L. Stimson Center, August 2007, www.stimson.org/fopo/?SN=FP200607111022. 53 One lesson to emerge from international efforts to reform local police (from Bosnia to Iraq) is the importance of focusing significant personnel and resources on reform of the Interior Ministry. Robert Perito, “Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police, and Facilities Protection Service,” USIPeace Brief, US Institute of Peace, February 2007; Marina Caparini, “Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Stabilisation: The Case of the Western Balkans,” in Bryden and Hangii, eds., Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector. 20 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law old ones. In Liberia, for instance, only one in four members of the old police force were cleared for inclusion in the new police service after being vetted for past human rights abuses.54 The third goal of transformational policing—rebuilding—focuses on local police effectiveness. A humane police force that respects human rights will be of little use if it cannot also investigate and deter crime. Indeed, as Annika Hansen has observed, “[i]f authorities cannot counter persistently high crime rates, they will be tempted to use repressive measures, undermining reform and democratization efforts.”55 Thus, providing local police with the skills, equipment, and logistical support needed to function effectively has been increasingly recognized as a key component of transformational efforts. During the 1990s, the UN undertook a number of transformational missions, including those in Haiti and the Balkans. In Haiti, the Security Council authorized 900 UN police to assist in “the creation of a separate police force.” The old police had been instrumental in ousting Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and creating an environment of human rights abuses, impunity, and corruption.56 The UN mission, UNMIH, collaborated closely with the US Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), assisting in the recruitment, vetting, and training of a new Haitian National Police (HNP) force. Follow-on UN missions aimed at the “professionalization of the HNP,” focusing primarily on training and mentoring HNP specialized units and supervisors, while also providing technical advice.57 In the absence, however, of parallel efforts to reform the rest of the criminal justice system and the country’s larger political framework, these reform efforts ultimately failed. Partly as a result of that experience, UN operations in this century almost all focus on more than just police reform, per se, addressing the larger criminal justice system as well. After UNMIH, the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) was the most expansive transformational operation the UN had ever undertaken. Its International Police Task Force (IPTF) initially aimed to monitor local police but then was tasked to overhaul those forces, based on the Agreement on Restructuring the Police of the Federation and the Framework Agreement on Police Restructuring, Reform and Democratization in Republika Srpska.58 The IPTF 54 International Crisis Group, “Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils,” Africa Report No. 75, 30 January 2004, 19. Although criticized by some for including too many former police in the new police force, UNMIL has tried to ensure that the vetting process is comprehensive. Names of recruits are published in Monrovian newspapers and citizens are asked to come forward with information about prospective recruits. Adedeji Ebo, “The Challenge and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia,” Occasional Paper No. 9, Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), December 2005; International Crisis Group, “Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States,” Africa Report No. 87, 8 December 2004. 55 Annika S. Hansen, “Strengthening Indigenous Police Capacity and the Rule of Law in the Balkans,” in Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, eds., The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond (London/Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 186. 56 UN Security Council Resolution 940, S/RES/940, 31 July 1994. 57 The United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1063, S/RES/1063, 28 June 1996; the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1123, S/RES/1123, 30 July 1997; and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1141, S/RES/1141, 28 November 1997. 58 Based on consultations with UNMIBH, the Agreement on Restructuring the Police of the Federation (also called the Bonn-Petersburg Agreement) downsized the Federation police force from 32,750 to 11,500; it was signed on 25 April 1996. The Framework Agreement on Police Restructuring, Reform and Democratization in Republika Srpska (RS), also brokered by UNMIBH, reduced the RS police force from 12,000 to 8,500 and was signed on 9 December 1998. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 21 eventually reduced local police forces from 44,000 in December 1995 to 17,000 in 2004.59 It was responsible for ensuring that remaining police met international standards.60 Local forces, whose practice had been to transfer offending personnel to new posts rather than dismiss them, were at times actively resistant to the UN’s reform effort.61 In response, the IPTF Commissioner was granted authority to “dismiss ‘non-compliant’ officers and officials from all public security services employment.”62 When the UN handed its police reform responsibilities to the European Union at the end of 2002, the IPTF had certified approximately 16,000 officers to serve in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s police forces, including the State Border Service and court police.63 Every UN mission launched since 2003 has included police components with “transformational” mandates of varying scope. The newest development is authority for direct operational assistance to some police forces in maintaining law and order. In Haiti, for instance, the Security Council authorized MINUSTAH in 2004 not only to support the reform of local police but to “assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety, and public order through the provision, inter alia, of operational support to the Haitian National Police.”64 In the field, this has translated into FPUs engaging against armed gangs (at times leading to casualties), despite the mission’s lack of full executive authority.65 It has also led to the arming of UN police contingents even in operations where police reform is the primary goal. This move towards including some limited law enforcement responsibilities in transformational policing mandates is an important development with implications for future UN policing needs. At the same time, MINUSTAH has also been devoting resources to reform and restructure the Haitian judicial and corrections systems, aiming to reduce pretrial detentions, increase the number of cases that are “finalized through due process” (either release or conviction and sentencing), and increase, to 300, the number of correctional officers trained by the mission in 2006–07. The mission also advises on reform of Haitian laws to bring them into conformity with international treaties and other instruments that Haiti has already ratified, and mentors prosecutors and investigative and trial judges on criminal procedure “including the timely provision of due process.” It offers guidance to civil society and human rights groups on how to monitor and report on the courts, and advises Haitian authorities on providing legal aid to the indigent. Heinz Vetschera and Matthieu Damian, “Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role of the International Community,” International Peacekeeping 13(1) March 2006, 36. 59 Heinz Vetschera and Matthieu Damian, “Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 41. 60 The IPTF received substantial assistance from the US Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program, which provided curriculum, training materials, and instructors who trained UN and local police in “train the trainer” courses. Robert Perito, US Institute of Peace, correspondence with authors, 30 November 2006. 61 Michael J. Dziedzic and Andrew Bair, “Bosnia and the International Police Task Force,” in Oakley et al., eds., Policing the New World Disorder, 286. 62 Judy S. Hylton, “Security Sector Reform: BiH Federation Ministry of the Interior,” International Peacekeeping 9(1), Spring 2002, 156. 63 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, S/2002/1314, 2 December 2002, para. 11. 64 UN Security Council Resolution 1542, S/RES/1542, 30 April 2004, paras. 7(b), 7(d). 65 The authority of FPUs to take on armed gangs was further justified under MINUSTAH’s mandate to “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.” S/RES/1542, para. 7(f). See also, Victoria K. Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), 95–98. 22 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law In a similar effort in Liberia, criminal cases began moving forward when the UN mission there offered the services of 12 “national prosecutorial consultants” and 11 “public defence consultants, initially for a period of six months,” which, according to UNMIL, “resulted in more cases being heard by the courts, which has contributed to a reduction in the backlog of pending cases; greater access to justice; improved adherence to fair trial standards; and increased public trust and confidence in the judicial system.”66 Executive Policing Mandates Executive policing mandates give UN police personnel direct authority to enforce the law, including powers of arrest and detention. Executive policing requires the largest number of UNPOL officers in relation to local population size, and those so far have been armed. Major reform and restructuring of local police forces is usually a component of executive policing missions as well, and the scaled hand-over of law enforcement authority from international forces to domestic police is a primary goal of the mission. In Kosovo and Timor-Leste, executive policing supported UN transitional governing authority. In Kosovo, most of the local police force, of Serb ethnicity, had abandoned the mostly ethnic Albanian province in the aftermath of the war. In this context, the UN Mission (UNMIK) included 4,700 police mandated to “maintain civil law and order,”67 an operational challenge compounded by lack of agreement on applicable law.68 UNMIK also struggled to respond to the violence visited on the remaining Serb population by Albanian Kosovars and scrambled to develop procedures for policing an environment completely foreign to most of the officers in the mission. UN police collaborated with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the creation of a Kosovo Police Service (KPS), establishing a training academy and developing curricula and recruitment procedures from scratch. As of late 2006, UNMIK maintained primary responsibility for policing the region but its police force had shrunk to under 2,000 as it continued its phased transfer of responsibility to the KPS. In Timor-Leste, 1,600 UNPOL officers were deployed to fulfill UNTAET’s mandate to “provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory.”69 Simultaneously, the mission set out to build a Timor-Leste National Police force (PNTL) of 2,800 officers. Following formal independence in 2002, a follow-on operation (UNMISET) continued elements of the executive operation and full authority for law and order was not officially transferred to the Timor-Leste government until May 2004. UNMISET left in May 2005. In August 2006, however, violent clashes and a breakdown in the national police force prompted the Security Council to establish a new policing mission with 1,600 officers and responsibility for “interim law enforcement and public security until PNTL is reconstituted.”70 66 United Nations, Twelfth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2006/743, 12 September 2006, para. 43; UNMIL Human Rights and Protection Section, Quarterly Report, May–July 2006, para. 6. 67 UN Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244, 1999. 68 Kosovo’s majority Albanian population, for example, had rejected previously prevailing Serbian law. 69 UN Security Council Resolution 1272, S/RES/1272, 1999. 70 S/RES/1704 (2006). Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 23 PRINCIPAL POLICE-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES As the types of tasks assigned to UNPOL officers have changed, so too have the countries contributing police personnel to UN service. As of May 2007, 87 countries were seconding (i.e. lending) police officers to UN operations around the globe. Most of the top contributors draw officers for UN missions from national-level police forces. These include Jordan, with a 25,000strong Public Security Force, and Bangladesh, with its 120,000-strong national police force. The main contributors of police to UN missions have changed substantially over time. Table 3 lists the top 20 UN police contributing countries (PCCs) at year’s end in 2001 and 2006. One discernable trend is the UN’s increasing reliance on developing states to provide police personnel, mirroring a similar trend in the source of military peacekeepers. The percent of UNPOL officers coming from developed states has fallen from 37 percent to 16 percent since 2001.71 Table 3: Top 20 Police Contributors to UN Operations, 2001 and 2006 December 2001 Country December 2006 Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Jordan United States India Germany Pakistan Ghana United Kingdom Ukraine Portugal Spain France Turkey Bangladesh Poland Philippines 808 707 636 487 379 273 258 255 213 197 196 182 178 170 168 Argentina Russian Federation Bulgaria Egypt 20 Nepal Country Total Jordan Bangladesh Pakistan Nepal Senegal Nigeria India Philippines United States 894 787 512 493 467 365 361 325 298 160 143 142 130 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 17 19 Turkey Ukraine Malaysia Portugal Romania Germany China Cameroon France Niger 242 230 210 208 203 182 180 150 150 149 119 20 Poland 128 Note: Gray shaded rankings indicate members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or “developed” states. Sources: United Nations, “Monthly Summary of Contributors,” United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 31 December 2006; United Nations, “Monthly Summary of Troop Contribution to United Nations Operations,” United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 31 December 2001. 71 “Developed states” are defined here as members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The 23 current members of the Development Assistance Committee are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. 24 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law In December 2001, many of the UN’s top PCCs were European. But of the countries contributing police to UN operations, European states were the most likely to keep their people within their own region (see table 4). So as the UN’s Balkans peace operations diminished in the new century, so did Europe’s participation in UN policing. The UN police mission in Bosnia handed over responsibility to the EU in January 2003 and, by late 2006, UNMIK’s police force had less than half its 2001-level strength.72 As the EU continues to expand its own policing missions, European contributions to UN operations may diminish further. Table 4: Origin and Deployment of UN Police by Region, July 2005–June 2006 Average Regions Sub-Saharan Africa Europe & Russia Central & South Asia Middle East & North Africa East Asia & Australia North America Latin America & the Caribbean Totals Total UNPOL Deployments Total UNPOL Contributions to Region from Region Number Number % of Total % of Total 2,926 40% 2,226 30% 2,299 31% 1,736 24% 7 nil 1,588 22% 6 nil 774 10% 523 7% 474 6% 0 nil 443 6% 1,619 22% 139 2% 7,380 Percentage Deployed within Their Own Region 53% 78% nil nil 4% nil 33% Sources: United Nations, “UN Mission's Summary detailed by Country,” United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 31 July 2005 through 30 June 2006 The increase in African contributions to UN policing is noteworthy. Only one African state— Ghana—was among the top 20 PCCs in 2001. It is now outpaced in UN operations by Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger.73 The total number of UNPOL officers from sub-Saharan Africa has more than doubled in the last five years, from fewer than 800 in December 2001 to over 2,000 by December 2006, with much of the increase occurring since 2004. There are several explanations for this shift. First, four of the five major UN peace operations launched since 2003 are in Africa, all with significant police contingents. Over half of the UN police from African nations are serving in missions on the continent (see table 4). Drawing African police for these missions makes sense, as they are more likely to share some cultural and linguistic affinity with local populations than are police drawn from elsewhere.74 A second possible explanation is that several Western training packages aimed at improving African peacekeeping capacity (such as the US-sponsored Global Peace Operations Initiative—GPOI—and the French-led Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacity—RECAMP) have begun to include policing components, thereby increasing the number of African police available for UN deployments.75 72 In December 2001, UNMIK contained 4,519 UN police. By December 2006, that number had dropped to 1,960. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Mission Totals,” 31 December 2001 and 31 December 2006. In late 2001, 90 percent of police contributed by the top 10 European PCCs were serving in UNMIK or UNMIBH. Only Portugal sent a substantial number of police to a UN mission outside of Europe in 2001, to UNTAET in Timor-Leste, a former Portuguese colony. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Monthly Summary of Troop Contribution to United Nations Operations,” 31 December 2001. 73 Ghana’s international police contributions remain in the top three for African nations if its contribution to the African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS) is factored in. 74 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted this benefit in a 2004 report. United Nations, Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity: Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/591, 30 November 2004, para. 21. 75 The effect of GPOI support for African police contributions to peace operations is hard to measure. The primary mechanism for police training under GPOI is the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), which relies on a “train the trainer” approach. It is difficult to track the number and quality of officers who both receive Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 25 Thirteen countries provided FPUs in UN operations as of April 2007 (see table 5).76 Of these, Jordan has been the most frequent and responsive contributor. Its FPUs were among the first to arrive in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Haiti. China became a contributor in October 2004, deploying its first FPU to Haiti. India recently undertook a first of its own, committing an FPU to Liberia composed entirely of female officers, deployed in January 2007.77 The UN Police Division would like to continue to expand the number of countries providing FPUs and with 19 units authorized in for the AU-UN hybrid force in Darfur alone, such expansion is likely. Table 5: Contributors of Formed Police Units, April 2007 FPU Contributing Countries Jordan UN Missions with Formed Units MINUSTAH (Haiti) 2 UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire) UNMIL (Liberia) 3 1 2 1 Pakistan 2 Senegal 1 India Nigeria UNMIK (Kosovo) 2 Bangladesh Nepal MONUC (DR Congo) 1 1 Total Units Fielded per Country 6 1 2 5 3 1 2 5 3 2 1 Ukraine 1 3 1 2 2 2 Portugal China UNMIT (TimorLeste) 2 1 2 1 Malaysia 1 1 Poland 1 1 Romania Mission Totals: 1 1 8 6 5 6 5 5 35 Sources: UN mission reports and DPKO troop contributor data tables. FINANCING UN POLICE: INDIVIDUAL VERSUS NATIONAL INCENTIVES The United Nations estimated that the costs of policing in UN operations would total roughly $330 million from July 2006 to June 2007.78 This estimate included headquarters support and the costs of recruiting, training, deploying, and sustaining police officers in the field, both individual officers and FPUs. The cost growth reflects not only the increased levels of police in UN peace operations but their expanding responsibilities. (For example, it costs more to reform and restructure local police forces than to just observe and chide them.) training from CoESPU “graduates” and are deployed to UN missions. RECAMP only began including police training as a component of its program in RECAMP V, launched in mid-2005. 76 This increased from 11 in August 2006. New FPU contributors for the UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) include Malaysia and Portugal. Official, UN DPKO Police Division, correspondence with authors, November 2006. 77 UN News Centre, “UN hails decision by India to send 125 female police officers for peacekeeping,” UN News Centre, 1 September 2006. 78 UN peacekeeping’s fiscal year runs from July to June, in contrast to the January–December fiscal year for the UN regular budget. Since the total cost of UN peacekeeping missions now are about twice as much as the annual UN regular budget, this offset evens out the workload for the budgeting offices, and keeps the spending bills from piling up each year in the final weeks of the UN General Assembly’s main fall session. The figure of $330 million includes budget estimates for the Police Division in UN headquarters ($8,024,100), as well as the police component of ongoing UN missions. All figures drawn from the peacekeeping support account for 2006-2007 (A/60/727) and relevant mission budget reports for 2006-2007 (A/60/724; A/60/726; A/60/653; A/60/684; A/60/728; A/60/652; A/60/840; A/60/753; A/60/731; A/60/612; and A/61/519). 26 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Sidebar 4: DO YOU NEED DEMOCRATIC POLICE TO TEACH DEMOCRATIC POLICING? Breakdown of UN Police by Contributing Country Freedom House Ranking, 2001 and 2006 June 2001 Not Free 9% Free 61% Partly Free 30% June 2006 Not Free 23% Free 41% Partly Free 36% United Nations policing mandates have increasingly focused on reforming and restructuring local police forces, relying on the model of democratic policing. Given the diversity of policing cultures around the globe, it is worth pausing to consider whether all countries are equally qualified to contribute to such missions. According to former UN Police Advisor Mark Kroeker, “all UN police officers, no matter where they are from, play a vital role in assisting the UN to build institutional police capacity in post-conflict environments.” Such a position is understandable; DPKO’s difficulties in recruiting adequate numbers of police from member states prevents them from becoming too picky over the origins of officers. Yet the trend in police contributions in recent years may be cause for concern. The figures (at left) show the breakdown of police officers serving in UN missions in 2001 and 2006, based on the contributing countries’ Freedom House rankings of “free,” “partly free,” or “not free.” Over the past five years, UN police have been increasingly drawn from countries with questionable or non-existent democratic credentials. There has been a 20 percent drop in the number of UNPOL officers from “free” countries, and increases in the proportion drawn from “partly free” and, even more substantially, “not free” countries. While the UN’s reliance on member states for police personnel may force the organization to take what it can get, this trend could risk undermining the UN’s legitimacy and effectiveness in fostering democratic policing abroad with officers unfamiliar with democratic policing at home. Sources: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2006 (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2006); Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Comparative Rankings: 1973-2005,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/ FIWrank7305.xls; Mark Kroeker, “The UN Department of Peacekeeping Responds, Letter to the Editor,” The New York Sun, 8 September 2005; For a similar analysis of combined military/police contributing countries, see William J. Durch and Tobias C. Berkman, Who Should Keep the Peace? Providing Security for Twenty-first Century Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006). Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 27 The majority of UN police deploy as individuals rather than as part of a unit. The UN covers the cost of officers’ transportation to and from the mission area, and provides them directly with monthly Mission Subsistence Allowances (MSAs). MSAs, based on local cost-of-living evaluations, are intended to cover the costs of housing, food, and other essentials for individual police, who lack the institutional support that military units or FPUs provide their troops. MSAs vary from roughly $85 per day in Kosovo to nearly $140 per day in Haiti.79 Every individual UNPOL officer in a given mission receives the same amount of MSA, regardless of rank. Generous even for officers from developed states, the MSA represents a de facto salary that may be an order of magnitude larger than what those from developing countries receive in pay from their home governments. MSA is thus an incentive for individuals to volunteer for UN police service. Governments, however, do not have an incentive to put individuals forward for service, especially their best officers, since they receive no reimbursement whatsoever for seconding individual police to UN missions. The UN does, on the other hand, reimburse member states for officers contributed in formed units. FPUs are expected to be logistically self-sustaining, and states are reimbursed for operating costs and for wear and tear on contingent-owned equipment. Because these units offer special skill-sets to the mission, their governments also receive per capita monthly reimbursements based on the UN’s military “specialist” reimbursement rate, currently $1,331 per uniformed officer per month. Member states also receive $68 per officer per month for clothes, gear and equipment. Officers deployed in FPUs do not receive MSAs from the UN. Unlike FPUs, individual UNPOL officers use equipment purchased by the mission (for example, trucks, fuel, spare parts, communications gear, and office equipment, such as computers). Based on this cost structure, the UN pays significantly more per officer for individual police than for members of FPUs.80 Using UNMIL as an example, table 6 lays out the estimated annual costs per officer for individual police and for those deployed in FPUs. The results suggest that, on average, it costs UN mission budgets about 75 percent more per capita for individual police officers than it does officers in FPUs—plus the recruitment of individual officers is much more labor-intensive for the UN Police Division. The overall cost effectiveness of FPUs, along with their utility in crowd management and protection of UN personnel and facilities, is an important driver in their growing presence in UN operations. Reimbursements to states who contribute such units provide an incentive to contribute them and the UN has so far had little trouble soliciting FPUs for deployment. This stands in stark contrast to the UN’s persistent struggle to fill the authorized number of posts for individual officers. 79 MSA data drawn from Michael Carnahan, William Durch, and Scott Gilmore, “Economic Impact of Peacekeeping, Final Report,” UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, March 2006, 19. A higher MSA is provided for the first month in the field to defray costs associated with getting situated in the new locale. 80 This cost comparison is for police deployed in the field. UN costs for transporting police to the field are not included here. 28 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Table 6: Annual UN Cost Comparison, Individual Police versus Formed Units, in UNMIL 2005–2006 MONTHLY COSTS/PERSON ANNUAL COSTS/PERSON Individual Civilian Police Average Monthly Mission Subsistence Allowance* Average per capita operational costs** $3,860 $46,320 $912 $10,943 Travel to/from mission (est.) — $5,803 Total — $63,066 Police Deployed in FPUs Personal Reimbursement $1,028 $12,336 Specialist Reimbursement $303 $3,636 Clothes, Gear and Equipment Reimbursement $68 $816 Average per capita operational costs** $1,398 $16,775 Travel to/from mission (est.) — $2,447 Total — $36,010 * MSA in Liberia during 2005–2006 was $191/day ($5,730/mo.) during the first month in the field and $123/day ($3,690/mo.) during all subsequent months. United Nations, Performance report on the budget of the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/715, 26 January 2007, para. 8. ** Operational costs calculated based on UNMIL expenditures. A/61/715. For detailed information and methodology, see Annex III, Table A3.8. *** Travel cost estimates are deduced from expenditure calculations. Travel costs for officers deployed in formed units is lower due to their ability to deploy as a group. A/61/715. While much has changed in terms of demand for police, the tasks they are assigned, and who contributes them to UN missions, some shortcomings in the UN’s conduct of policing operations are stubbornly constant. Identifying these persistent challenges is the first step in devising strategies for overcoming them. —4— TAKING STOCK: PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS IN UN POLICING “Substantial advances notwithstanding, the demand for skilled police personnel to implement the mandates of contemporary peace operations in public security-sector reform, re-establishment of the rule of law and local capacity-building far outstrips current capacities.” - Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, December 200581 T he UN’s ability to successfully plan, organize, deploy, and carry out policing missions has faced chronic challenges. This section provides a brief overview of these challenges in four distinct yet related categories: issues of structure, doctrine and strategy; capacity for planning UNPOL components of missions; impediments to rapid and effective deployment; and challenges in measuring progress. Recent reform efforts are also explored and their level of implementation and effectiveness assessed. OVERARCHING ISSUES OF STRUCTURE, DOCTRINE, AND STRATEGY Structural shortcomings in doctrine and strategy have limited the operational effectiveness of UN police activities. While some of these problems can be corrected by instituting specific policies, many will only be solved through major structural overhauls, including increasing the police expertise and resources available to the UN on a standing basis. Structural Challenge of “Borrowing” Police The UN relies on contributions from member state police forces that are otherwise employed in their domestic capacities. Unlike militaries, which may not be fully utilized in times of peace, police have a permanent domestic role. As such, most countries are reluctant to deploy police abroad, especially if they are already short-handed.82 Recruitment is further hindered by the lack of incentives offered to police contributing states. When candidates are put forward by member states, their quality remains very uneven. The ad hoc cobbling together of individual officers for each new peace operation dramatically slows deployment times, hinders the UN’s ability to obtain officers with needed skill-sets, and inhibits UN institutional learning. UN Policing Doctrine and Guidance Doctrine provides concepts and guidelines that help clarify ambiguous operational situations and ensures that all police elements are operating with shared outlooks and common goals. Writing in 81 United Nations, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/640, 29 December 2005, para. 49. 82 “Police Find It Hard to Fill Jobs,” The Washington Post, 27 March 2006; Mimi Hall, “Police, fire departments see shortages across USA,” USA Today, 28 November 2004; “Govt Blamed for Regional Police Shortages,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation News, 10 March 2004. 30 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law 2005 for the DPKO Best Practices Section, experienced peacekeeper and international legal expert Bruce Oswald stressed that, The absence of doctrine to which peacekeepers undertaking [rule of law] tasks can be held accountable . . . impacts on the capacity to prepare adequate standard operating procedures, mission-specific rules of engagement and force commanders directives, and training regimes. Peacekeepers cannot, and should not, expect that their actions involving the use of force, limiting freedom of movement, and detaining individuals are justifiable solely on the basis of necessity or the ‘fog of peacekeeping’. Rather, their actions must be guided by sufficiently detailed principles and standards so that they and the local population are clear about the parameters within which peacekeepers will undertake law and order functions and tasks.83 Since 2005, DPKO has undertaken a concerted effort to develop its own doctrine for UN police and other peacekeeping mission components, an effort previously resisted by some member states. This “guidance project” is more responsive to the complex and dangerous environments of contemporary police operations than earlier documents, such as the United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines (December 2000) and the Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (December 2003).84 The 2000 publication (answering a request from the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations) contained general information on traditional and transformational missions but devoted only a few paragraphs to issues of executive authority and the use of FPUs. The 2003 Handbook has a chapter on police components of missions, with an overview of UN policing activities; it is presently undergoing revision. In January 2006, DPKO issued a detailed doctrinal guidance document on corrections, the first of a new series on rule of law issues. It addresses a range of topics, from pre-deployment planning and guiding principles to specific issues like establishing family visits for inmates and preventing the transmission of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS.85 In November 2006, DPKO also released much-needed policy guidance for FPUs. The document defines these units, lays out their organizational and command and control structures, lists their generic tasks, and defines several levels of public disorder, distinguishing situations of a “nonmilitary” and “military” nature based on the determination of “sustained use of firearms or military weaponry.” A separate policy directive on “detention, searches, and use of force” provides further details, and specifics on the use of force are spelled out in “rules of engagement” documents issued for each mission.86 83 Bruce Oswald, “Addressing the Institutional Law and Order Vacuum: Key Issues and Dilemmas for Peacekeeping,” Think-Piece for the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, September 2005, 10. 84 United Nations, Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects: Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/54/839, 20 March 2000, para. 34, which sought “clear identification of tasks and functions for civilian police for each deployment…;” United Nations, United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, December 2000), and Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, Handbook on Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, December 2003). 85 Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, Prison Support Guidance Manual (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, January 2006). 86 United Nations, “Functions and Organization of Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO/PD/2006/00060, 6 November 2006. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 31 The FPU policy directive begins to differentiate between military and police functions in the realm of law enforcement, defining their respective roles in cordoning off areas to restrict movement or responding to riots or other forms of civil disturbance. The dividing line between FPU and military responsibilities for dealing with organized (and armed) criminal elements are not spelled out at this level and may need to be treated mission by mission. What the new policy does not suggest is the direct substitutability of FPUs for military forces. Outside observers, however, report that this happens in field settings. In Haiti, for instance, one UN military contingent commander apparently viewed the deployment of an FPU to his area of operation in Cap-Haitien as a signal to pull his troops out.87 Indeed, the Security Council itself downsized the military component of the UN’s operation in Liberia by the same amount that it increased FPU personnel.88 Although the swap was modest in size (125 troops for 125 police), it is a potentially dangerous precedent unless those troops were engaged in essentially law enforcement tasks. The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Vicenza, Italy, is developing doctrine for stability police (which includes FPUs) as part of its mandate to become a “doctrinal hub” for these specialized units.89 The level of progress in this effort and coordination between CoESPU and DPKO, however, have been inconsistent. In December 2006, DPKO published a primer on judicial support in peace operations that is the “first step in the development of a body of guidance materials designed to assist UN personnel working on judicial and legal issues in the context of peace operations.”90 The primer offered advice on increasing the immediate effectiveness of the host state’s criminal justice system, strengthening the national legal framework, providing and reforming legal education and training, reinforcing judicial independence, promoting judicial and prosecutorial professionalism, accountability and transparency, improving court administration and management, developing basic judicial infrastructure, bolstering the integrity of the legal profession, and increasing public access to justice and attention to victims’ rights.91 The United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office has also helped fill the doctrinal gap for individual UN police by publishing guidance on international policing in peace support operations in April 2007. Although aimed at British police participating in such missions, the manual provides broad guidance on the strategies, objectives, and principles of international policing in peace operations and represents a significant contribution to the field.92 87 Peter Gantz, Refugees International, correspondence with author, 25 May 2006, and email correspondence, 28 August 2006. 88 UN Security Council Resolution 1694, S/RES/1694, 13 July 2006. 89 Michael Dziedzic and Col. Christine Stark, “Bridging the Public Security Gap: The Role of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Contemporary Peace Operations,” USIPeace Briefing, US Institute of Peace, June 2006. 90 Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, Primer for Justice Components in Multidimensional Peace Operations: Strengthening The Rule Of Law (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, December 2006). From the foreword by Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno. 91 Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, Primer for Justice Components, ch. 4. 92 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK), “Peace Support Operations: Information and guidance for UK police personnel,” Police and Justice Team, Conflict Issues Group, April 2007. 32 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Meanwhile, DPKO continues to work on its new, comprehensive guidance documents, from its “1000 series, capstone doctrine,” United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (nearing final version in late-2007), through documents covering headquarters support to operations (the “2000 series”), management and integration of operations (“3000 series”), field operations (“4000”), field operations support (“5000”), and headquarters management and administration (“6000”). Overall doctrine and guidance for “law enforcement (police)” will be document 4.400, while legal and judicial will be 4.500, and corrections and prisons is 4.600.93 UN Police and Rule of Law Components in Security Council Mandates Beyond broad doctrine, international policing missions are guided by mandate language, strategic guidance from DPKO, and, for armed police and FPUs, rules on the use of force and firearms. Guidance and other directives should clearly specify the expectations, tasks, and responsibilities of the UNPOL component of the mission. In the past, UN mandates (determined with advice from DPKO) have been vague in describing policing tasks and goals. This has led to divergent interpretations of the mandate among contingents in the field and increased the likelihood of “mission creep.”94 In El Salvador, for example, the police mandate, articulated in the peace agreement and endorsed by Security Council Resolution 693, tasked UN police in ONUSAL (the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador) with “assisting in ensuring a smooth transition and assisting police authorities,” as well as “accompanying officers and members of the National Police in the performance of their duties.”95 Translating that charge into operational reality was left to the police component on the ground to determine. In Cambodia, on the other hand, UNTAC’s mandate stipulated that local police were to operate under “UNTAC supervision or control” and that UNTAC was to “ensure that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially.”96 Attempting to “control” local police proved impossible given the intransigence of the parties and the UN’s limited number of unarmed police monitors, however. The Brahimi Report identified the problems posed by “ambiguity” and “unclear instructions” in Security Council resolutions and called for “clear, credible, and achievable mandates.”97 In early 2006, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping addressed the issue as well, calling for “greater clarity and specificity in United Nations peacekeeping mandates, to better guide mandate implementation” in rule of law related activities.98 Some progress has been made in this area, as seen by comparing language from Security Council resolutions authorizing the two major UN 93 United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, Consultation Draft 29 June 2007, Annex 1. 94 The term “mission creep” refers to the gradual expansion of the goals, tasks, and requirements of a mission as it responds to unfolding situations in the field. Annex I traces, in detail, the evolution of Security Council Resolution language dealing with rule of law aspects of UN operations since 1964. 95 Chapter II, Section 7, Subsection B, paragraphs e-f, of the Peace Agreement signed at Chapultepec. Full text available in United Nations, The United Nations and El Salvador 1990-1995, United Nations Blue Books Series, vol. IV (New York: United Nations, 1995), 193–230. 96 Emphasis added. UNTAC’s mandate was included as an annex to the Paris Accords. UN Department of Public Information, Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict: Paris, 23 October 1991, January 1992, Annex One. 97 A/55/305-S/2000/809, paras. 56 and 64. 98 United Nations, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group at the 2006 Substantive Session, A/60/19, 22 March 2006, para. 125. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 33 missions in Haiti. In 1994, the Council mandated the UN peacekeeping mission, UNMIH, to “(p)rovide guidance and training to all levels of the Haitian police and monitor the way in which the operations are implemented.”99 Ten years later, in contrast, the Council called on a new peacekeeping operation, MINUSTAH, to: assist the Transitional Government in monitoring, restructuring, and reforming the Haitian National Police, consistent with democratic policing standards, including through the vetting and certification of its personnel, advising on its reorganization and retraining, including gender training, as well as monitoring/mentoring members of the Haitian National Police…(and to) assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order through the provision inter alia of operational support to the Haitian National Police…, as well as with their institutional strengthening, including the re-establishment of the corrections system.100 MINUSTAH’s mandate also specified that MINUSTAH in collaboration with other partners shall provide advice and assistance within its capacity to the Transitional Government: (a) in the investigation of human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law, in collaboration with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, to put an end to impunity; [and] (b) in the development of a strategy for reform and institutional strengthening of the judiciary;101 This example represents an immense improvement over the past ambiguities of Council mandates in terms of clearly articulating MINUSTAH’s objectives and tasks in relation to police, judicial, and corrections reform. Such clarity is not yet universal among recent Security Council resolutions, however. Explicit reference to the goals and strategies of a peace operation in UN mandates is critical to the formulation of guidance to DPKO and mission leaders alike. It is also crucial to ensuring that member states give appropriate attention, resources, and priority to this aspect of an operation. The Need for an Integrated, Comprehensive Rule of Law Strategy Post-conflict policing activities are not carried out in a vacuum. In the 1990s, UNPOL officers often found themselves tasked with reforming local police forces in post-conflict societies plagued by dysfunctional judicial and prison systems. UN police would train their local counterparts to catch criminals (humanely), only to have no humane means of detaining or prosecuting them. In Cambodia, reforming the utterly defunct legal system was deemed to be a non-priority and penciled in as something to be sorted out in the post-election, constitutionwriting phase.102 In Haiti in the mid-1990s, it took nearly a year for UN officers to realize that local police were shooting criminal suspects not out of hatred or cruelty but because the broken court system virtually guaranteed that those arrested for crimes would be promptly released.103 99 UN Security Council Resolution 867, S/RES/867, 23 September 1993. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1542, S/RES/1542, 30 April 2004, para. 7, I (b) and (d). 101 Ibid., para. 8. 102 James A. Schear and Karl Farris, “Policing Cambodia: The Public Security Dimensions of UN Peace Operations,” in Oakley et al., eds., Policing the New World Disorder, 88. 103 Michael Bailey, Robert Maguire, and J. O’Neil G. Pouliot, “Haiti: Military-Police Partnership for Public Security,” in Oakley et al., eds., Policing the New World Disorder, 237. 100 34 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Likewise, in Bosnia, UN police monitors were expected to assist in creating a corruption-free police force, but were given little leverage to address the corrupt court system.104 Recognition that policing operations must be situated within a wider rule of law strategy has expanded dramatically since the late-1990s. As noted, the Brahimi Report called for an integrated rule of law effort involving support to a range of institutions, including prisons, courts, and police forces. The Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit in DPKO started, as noted earlier, with just two officers in 2002, received two more professional posts in 2005 and, as part of the restructuring of DPKO in mid-2007, acquired another five. As of July 2007, it was authorized four judicial officers, four corrections officers, and a section chief (“section” is a notch above “unit” in the UN bureaucracy). It also moved into DPKO’s new Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, which will also manage the Police Division, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section, the new Security Sector Reform Section, and the Mine Action Service. This restructuring brings all of DPKO’s previously scattered elements related to rule of law into a single administrative reporting chain.105 The Security Council has also increasingly recognized the interconnected nature of rule of law support. While references to reforming or strengthening judicial and penal systems were virtually non-existent in 1990s mandates, since 1999 the Security Council has made more explicit reference to these rule of law activities (see table 7). Beginning with the transitional administration mandates for Kosovo and Timor-Leste, where the UN needed to create judicial systems essentially from scratch, the strengthening of courts and prison systems has become a more prominent feature of UN operations.106 (See Annex I for a comprehensive review of mandate language dealing with rule of law issues). While increased attention to the broader tasks of establishing the rule of law is welcome, much work remains to coordinate, sequence, and effectively carry out efforts to strengthen institutions across the rule of law spectrum. A 2006 report by DPKO’s Best Practices Section found that many UN operations are characterized by “competition and discord” between the various UN agencies involved with rule of law work in the field.107 Rhetorical recognition of the centrality of judicial and prison support has yet to translate into adequate resources and expertise on the ground. In Liberia, for example, UNMIL created a Legal and Judicial System Support Division and a Corrections Advisory Unit within the mission in 2003. Nonetheless, more than three years later, 104 Durch, Holt, et al., The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations, 29. United Nations, Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/858/Add.1, 17 April 2007, para. 150. 106 Hansjorg Strohmeyer. “Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor,” The American Journal of International Law 95(1), January 2001. 107 Scott N. Carlson, “Legal and Judicial Rule of Law Work in Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons Learned Study,” UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, March 2006, 14. 105 Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 35 the justice system continues to be constrained by the lack of court buildings and a dearth of qualified judicial and legal officers, which have resulted in serious delays in the processing of criminal cases… Court officials often apply legal rules and procedures in an inconsistent manner or fail to observe minimum human rights standards. In addition, corrupt practices involving some magistrates and judicial officials, inefficiency and prolonged pre-trial detention continued…throughout the country.108 In late 2004, prisons were non-functional outside of the capital, Monrovia, and severely overcrowded in the capital. More than three years into the mission, in late 2006, they remained “below minimum human rights standards,” with continued overcrowding attributed in large part to long-delayed trials. To build court facilities or new prison wings, or to pay judges and other court officials, UNMIL relies on interested donors. The United States and Norway, for example, both fund prison refurbishment, and the World Food Program and its partners feed prisoners. The mission has bent the rules a bit to hire Liberian lawyers to serve as prosecutors and defense attorneys, which has enabled some trials to go forward, but in general it cannot provide direct budgetary support to the Liberian government.109 Table 7: UN Mandates for Peace Operations with Rule of Law Components Since 1999 Mission Country or Territory Dates Specific Reference to Reforming Police UNMIK UNAMSIL UNTAET MONUC UNMISET UNMIL UNOCI MINUSTAH ONUB UNMIS UNMIT Kosovo Sierra Leone Timor-Leste DRC Timor-Leste Liberia Côte d'Ivoire Haiti Burundi Sudan Timor-Leste 6/10/99–present 10/22/99–12/31/05 10/25/99–5/20/02 11/30/99–present 5/20/02–5/20/05 10/1/03–present 4/4/04–present 4/30/04–present 6/1/04–12/31/06 3/24/05–present 8/25/06–present X X X X X X X X X X X Specific Reference to Reforming Judicial System* Specific Reference to Reforming Prison Systems* X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X * Includes references to judicial and/or penal reform contained in Secretary-General reports, in instances where Security Council mandates explicitly endorse the mission plan described in the SG report. Sources: Data drawn from Security Council resolutions and Secretary-General reports for each of the missions listed. 108 United Nations, Fourteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, S/2007/151, 15 March 2007, paras. 33, 40; Participant remarks, Liberia Working Group Meeting, “Liberia’s Peacebuilding Efforts: One year After Transition,” United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 13 November 2006. 109 Aboagye, Festus B. and Alhaji M. S. Bah, “Liberia at a Crossroads: A preliminary look at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the protection of civilians,” Institute for Security Studies Paper 95, Pretoria, South Africa, November 2004, 11. UNMIL Human Rights and Protection Section, Quarterly Report, May–July 2006, October 2006, para. 4, and S/2007/151, paras. 34, 42. 36 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Similarly, missions in the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burundi have been given ambitious judicial support mandates that are hindered by limited personnel assignments and underfunding. MONUC’s Rule of Law Unit in the DRC, created in 2003, and ONUB’s Rule of Law and Civil Affairs Office in Burundi, were each given three international staff positions for judicial work. These staff levels were insufficient to meet the challenges and geography of both countries. In Côte d’Ivoire, UNOCI was tasked with supporting judicial reform in a country lacking any functional courts in its northern half—with five international staff positions in support of this effort.110 Correctional support has too often fallen short of needs as well, with peacekeeping missions in the DRC and Burundi each having only one international post dedicated to prison efforts despite the pressing need for major corrections reform.111 Devising effective strategies and garnering sufficient resources in this area clearly remains a key challenge and failure to address the broad spectrum of rule of law institutions in post-conflict environments will continue to undermine police reform efforts and hinder peacebuilding activities. Accountability of UN Personnel in the Field Posing an additional challenge on the ground is the problem of criminal behavior by some UN peace operations personnel. Police and other staff deployed in UN missions have been accused of criminal activity in multiple instances. Allegations have included involvement in human trafficking (Bosnia), rape (Kosovo and Timor-Leste), smuggling (Cambodia), and sexual exploitation (DRC).112 Few of these cases have resulted in substantial punishments. The chief weaknesses relate to the procedures and policies of the UN, the capacity and political will of both personnel-contributing states and mission host states, and the legal jurisdictional capabilities of the United Nations. Through the Model UN Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), police and military observers serving in UN missions enjoy the status of “experts on mission,” meaning that they have “functional immunity” from prosecution by the host state for actions taken in performance of their duties.113 The Secretary-General can choose to waive the immunity of UN international staff (including police) so that they can be prosecuted by local authorities, or prosecuted by their home state. In practice, however, the Secretary-General has no clear parameters on when to grant immunity waivers.114 There have been a number of cases where police that have been repatriated to their home state for potential prosecution, only to have the allegations ignored.115 110 Carlson, Legal and Judicial Rule of Law Work in Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Operations, 9. Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit and Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, “Supporting National Prison Systems: Lessons Learned and Best Practices for Peacekeeping Operations,” UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, December 2005, 9-10. 112 For allegations against UNPOL officers in Bosnia, see Colum Lynch, “Misconduct, Corruption by U.S. Police in Bosnia,” The Washington Post, 29 May 2001. For allegations related to UNMIK, see Frederick Rawski, “To Waive or Not to Waive,” Connecticut Journal of International Law 18, 2002, 119. For Timor-Leste rape accusations, see “UN Policemen Charged with Rape in East Timor,” Agence France-Presse, 24 August 2004. For smuggling allegations, among others, in UNTAC, see Robert Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When You Need Him? America’s search for a post-conflict stability force (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2004). For allegations of sexual exploitation in the DRC, see Owen Bowcott, “Report reveals shame of UN peacekeepers,” The Guardian, 25 March 2005. 113 This immunity is granted under Article VI of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. United Nations, Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO/CPD/DDCPO/2003/001, 2003. 114 Rawski, “To Waive or Not to Waive,” 114, 131–132. 115 United Nations, A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations, A/59/710, 24 March 2005, para. 66. 111 Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 37 The UN had begun to investigate means of enhancing accountability of its personnel prior to explosive revelations in 2004 about sexual exploitation by military peacekeepers in the DRC. In October 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a bulletin on sexual abuse and exploitation that detailed precise prohibitions on UN staff, and outlined the responsibilities of senior staff for receiving and monitoring allegations, as well as for preventing and responding to alleged abuse.116 In July 2004, Annan invited Prince Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations, to undertake a comprehensive investigation of the problem. His subsequent report presented a series of recommendations for confronting the issue.117 The DPKO-adopted strategy for dealing with sexual abuse features a three-pronged approach, involving prevention, enforcement, and remedial action to repair damage already wrought by the misconduct of UN staff.118 Even with significant progress in this area, major gaps in accountability remain. These include limited host state capacity to investigate and prosecute crimes (and Liberia-like failure to meet basic human rights standards even if the capacity to prosecute exists); limited extraterritorial jurisdiction (the ability to prosecute nationals for crimes committed abroad) of contributing countries; and the difficulty of ensuring that contributing countries do take action when extraterritorial jurisdiction applies and individuals are repatriated for misconduct. Promising developments include the establishment of conduct and discipline units within missions and the creation of a dedicated conduct and discipline division within the new UN Department of Field Support in New York. The recent creation of model criminal codes and codes of criminal procedure could potentially improve accountability as well, were they to serve as laws applicable to UN personnel in countries where UN peace operations deploy.119 (A separate Stimson report treats this and other accountability issues and options in greater detail.120) PLANNING RULE OF LAW COMPONENTS IN UN OPERATIONS Good planning is critical for complex rule of law support operations. The challenges inherent in attempting to maintain public security and establish sustainable, local law enforcement institutions require strategic decisions about a mission’s method of operation, desired goals, guidelines, and end-state prior to deployment. Failure to establish a clear policing strategy risks undermining the entire operation. Planning for UN peace operations reflects the unique nature of the United Nations, where some states (members of the Security Council) task individuals from their own and other states (either volunteers or officers on loan from their home countries) to carry out complex tasks, often on shoestring budgets and with little to no advance warning. Despite this unfortunate mix of 116 United Nations, Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, ST/SGB/2003/13, 9 October 2003. 117 A/59/710. 118 United Nations, Comprehensive report prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 59/296 on sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, including policy development, implementation and full justification of proposed capacity on personnel conduct issues: Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/862, 24 May 2006. 119 See, for instance, Vivienne O’Conner and Colette Rausch, eds., Model Codes for Post-Conflict Criminal Justice, Volume I: Model Criminal Code (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007). 120 Katherine N. Andrews, William J. Durch, and Matthew C. Weed, Improving Criminal Accountability for Police and Civilian Personnel in UN Peace Operations (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007). 38 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law ambitions and constraints, some improvements in UN capabilities have been made in recent years. These include the enlargement of the Police Division and other rule of law elements at UN Headquarters in New York, and the inclusion of police, judicial, and corrections personnel in mission assessment teams. The recently approved 25-strong Standing Police Capacity will effectively double the size of the Police Division and enhance what has been a skeletal capacity to plan, not just policing per se but other aspects of criminal justice support as well. Effectively matching the size and skill-sets of an UNPOL contingent to the specific policing needs of the host state has consistently proven difficult. There is no universal formula for identifying all the policing needs of countries in post-conflict settings, for example. Variables include population size, mandated tasks, land mass to be policed, size and status of local police forces, conditions of the court and prison systems, nature of the conflict and peace agreement (if any) and levels of local corruption, among others. Absent a clear methodology for calculating the size and shape of a new mission’s police component, the UN has employed various techniques. Population size is regularly a guide. Planners for the operation in Cambodia decided that one UN police monitor for every 15 indigenous police officers was a good ratio, whereas in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the chosen ratio was one to 30.121 UNMIK, in Kosovo, measured its personnel needs against the total population, since there was no local police force when it deployed (the remaining Serbian police were ordered out under NATO escort). UNMIK planners sought two international police per thousand local inhabitants.122 This ratio, while common to fully functional and developed states, fell short of the strength actually needed in Kosovo given UNMIK’s mandate and the unsteady security environment.123 A 2005 RAND study proposed that an ideal international police force should have at least 1.5 officers per thousand local inhabitants. Few UN missions have included police contingents that have come close to RAND’s recommended ratio, except Kosovo and TimorLeste, although it’s worth noting that the RAND authors assumed that international police would be taking the lead in maintaining law and order.124 Other factors used to calculate force size have been local crime levels, the abilities of the local police force, and anticipated financial resources for the operation.125 The UN Police Division has also used mission-specific estimators. For the UN’s return to Timor-Leste, for instance, planners totaled up the country’s police stations and calculated that each needed eight UNPOL officers, based on two-person shifts of eight hours each around the clock (and factoring for time off), which suggested an end strength of 1,608 officers.126 121 Dziedzic, Michael J. and Andrew Bair, “Bosnia and the International Police Task Force,” in Oakley, et al., eds., Policing the New World Disorder, 272. 122 Halvor A. Hartz and Laura Mercean, with Clint Williamson, “Safeguarding a Viable Peace: Institutionalizing the Rule of Law,” in Covey et al., eds., The Quest for a Viable Peace. 123 Michael J. Dziedzic, “Kosovo,” in William J. Durch, ed., Twenty-First Century Peace Operations (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006). 124 Jones, et al., Establishing Law and Order After Conflict, vii, 19. 125 Official, UN DPKO Police Division, interview with authors, July 2005. 126 Official, UN DPKO Police Division, email correspondence with authors, November 2006. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 39 To improve UN mission planning and better assess mission impact, efforts are also underway to apply a new instrument, the UN Rule of Law Index (ROLIX), to evaluate a host state’s legal system, law enforcement agencies, judicial system, and correctional services, as well as community perceptions of domestic law enforcement.127 This tool has yet to be used in the field beyond pilot testing, but ROLIX surveys are planned for Haiti and Liberia.128 When fully operational, it should facilitate planning and evaluation of reform efforts. RAPID AND EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT The Brahimi Report called for deployment times of UN military and police personnel to be tailored to the recognition that “the first six to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord is often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers.” Unfortunately, police in UN peace operations have been, and continue to be, plagued by lengthy deployment times and dramatically uneven levels of qualifications among seconded police personnel. Ability to Deploy Rapidly What Michael Dziedzic and others have dubbed “the deployment gap” can have major consequences for the success of peace operations.129 Security is a precursor to reconstruction, democratization, and economic stimulation and, once lost, is hard to regain. Slow international police deployment also hinders rebuilding local police institutions. Slow deployments have continued to plague recent peacekeeping missions (see table 8). Between September 2003 and March 2005, for example, the Security Council authorized the deployment of roughly 3,000 individual police and another 1,500 in formed units for new operations in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Burundi, and Sudan. The average time required to fully deploy the authorized numbers of individual UN police to the field has remained about nine months (see figure 2 and Annex II of this report for details). There are many explanations for the delay. In part, the Police Division has put increasing emphasis on quality over quantity, thereby trading higher vacancy rates for more skilled personnel. Delays also stem from the fact that, as overall demand for UN police has grown, the pool of potentially available and qualified individual officers has not kept pace. Nor have member states been willing to create the sorts of national pools of pre-qualified officers called for in the Brahimi Report. One means of addressing the delays in police deployment has been to increase the use of FPUs, who deploy in complete teams. Initially, deployment rates for FPUs were comparable to those of 127 Official, UN DPKO Police Division, interview with authors, August 2006. Further discussion of ROLIX can be found in Ylber Bajraktari, Arthur Boutellis, et al., “The PRIME System: Measuring the Success of Post-Conflict Police Reform,” January 2006, www.wws.princeton.edu/research/ PWReports/F05/wws591b.pdf. This project was funded by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and undertaken on behalf of UN Police Advisor Mark Kroeker and US National Security Council Director for Stability Operations J. Clint Williamson. The graduate student authors were advised by Gordon Peake (International Peace Academy). 128 United Nations General Assembly, Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/727, 23 March 2006, 85. 129 Dziedzic, “Introduction” in Oakley et al., eds., Policing the New World Disorder, 8-11. 40 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law individual officers: Formed units for Kosovo and Timor-Leste did not fully deploy any faster than the rest of their police comrades. FPU deployment rates have improved considerably in the last two years, however. FPU expansions in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC, authorized in June and September 2005, respectively, were completed in three to four months. The dispatch of FPUs to Timor-Leste in mid-2006 was also relatively rapid, with two of UNMIT’s four units deployed within 30 days of the Security Council’s authorizing resolution and a third within 60 days. Much credit for this timeliness is due to the Police Division and its ongoing efforts to encourage member states to offer FPUs for service. The Police Division has also increased emphasis on negotiating terms of service with these countries prior to Security Council action. Such advance planning is possible in part through access to “pre-authorization” funding of up to $50 million once it appears that the Council will be approving a new mission. Used selectively for key missions over the years, advance funding has factored routinely into mission planning only since 2003. Table 8: United Nations Police Deployment Rates, Percent of Authorized Posts Filled, 1989–2007 Months After UN Authorization 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 1989–1994 Individual Police SPU/FPU Posts Posts Filled Filled 24.92% N/A 69.75% N/A 89.98% N/A 84.60% N/A TOTAL Police Posts Filled 24.92% 69.75% 89.98% 84.60% Months After UN Authorization 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 1995–2000 Individual Police SPU/FPU Posts Posts Filled Filled 46.90% 0% 75.38% 8.96% 86.91% 17.91% 91.36% 62.31% TOTAL Police Posts Filled 36.11% 54.50% 71.97% 86.19% Months After UN Authorization 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 2001–2006 Individual Police SPU/FPU Posts Posts Filled Filled 21.57% 60.66% 49.15% 77.00% 70.75% 97.28% 76.44% 95.97% TOTAL Police Posts Filled 37.55% 63.01% 83.08% 82.89% Note: Chart shows average percent of authorized mission strength filled at three month intervals following initial authorization and/or increased authorizations. Missions analyzed include ONUMOZ, ONUSAL, UNMIH, UNTAC, UNAMSIL, UNMIBH, UNMIK, UNTAES, UNTAET, UNMIS, ONUB, ONUCI, MONUC, UNMIL, MINUSTAH, and UNMIT. Averages are calculated accounting for different mission sizes. For explanation of methodology and sources, please see Annex II. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 41 Figure 2: Deployment Rates for Individual Police in UN Peace Operations, 2001–2007 Goal Percent of Authorized UNPOL deployed 100% 90% 80% 70% MINUSTAH (Haiti) 60% UNOCI (Cote d'Ivoire) MONUC (DR Congo) * 50% UNMIS (Sudan) 40% UNMIL (Liberia) 30% UNMIT (Timor-Leste) 20% 10% 0% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Months Since Authorization * MONUC deployment rate compiled by averaging initial and subsequent deployments. See Annex II for detailed analysis. Personnel Quality and Training Police officers seconded to UN operations have always varied widely in skill, experience, organizational culture, and philosophies of policing. Although the proportion of UNPOL candidates meeting the Police Division’s minimum selection standards has risen from perhaps one in five a few years ago to around one in two more recently, this rejection rate is still unacceptably high.130 This situation imposes undue burdens on the Police Division and reflects badly on those states that offer unqualified candidates. Efforts to improve the quality of police deployed in UN missions are on-going. In the mid-1990s the concept of Selection Assistance Teams (SATs) was developed in response to serious lapses in professionalism amongst seconded UN police officers. The intent of SATs is to take proficiency testing “upstream” to the sending state, to weed out unsuitable candidates before they are sent (at UN expense) to the mission area, only to be repatriated (again at UN expense). SATs typically consist of three individuals (a Police Division representative, a UN police officer from the relevant field mission, and one other person with knowledge and experience of regional policing needs) who test UN police candidates’ skills.131 The standards they apply begin with certain basics, such as citizenship in a UN member state, ability to pass a mental and physical screening, and personal integrity. They also look for professional qualifications, such as official status as a sworn police officer with a minimum of five years of policing experience, proficiency 130 131 Official, UN DPKO Police Division, discussion with authors, August 2006. Official, UN DPKO Police Division, discussion with authors, August 2006. 42 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law in the mission language (usually English or French), ability to operate a 4x4 vehicle, and, in missions where police are armed, proficiency in firearms.132 Despite the use of SATs, however, UN police components in the late 1990s and early years of this century continued to incorporate underachievers and some criminally-inclined individuals.133 Shortcomings need not be sinister to be serious, however: Limited language proficiency can cripple a police operation by forcing reliance on potentially unreliable interpreters who may also be security risks. In Haiti, for instance, little more than a third of UNPOL officers deployed with MINUSTAH as of mid-2006 spoke French—yet MINUSTAH is frequently engaged in deadly encounters with armed gangs and responsible for mentoring local police in the principles of community policing.134 UN police come from over 80 countries, lack a common training background, and represent widely varying philosophies of policing—all serious challenges to mission coherence. As Robert Perito graphically points out, “One can imagine the initial conversations between a London Bobbie, an American highway patrol officer, and a Rwandan gendarme on how to organize their police stations, conduct patrols, or make arrests.”135 Staffing leadership positions in the early stages of missions has presented a particular challenge.136 Occasionally, police contingents have tried to overcome the multinational cacophony much as military contingents routinely do, by mapping out specific geographic areas of responsibility for national contingents. In Timor-Leste, UNTAET attempted something similar by assigning the Baucau District to a single national police contingent, but with mixed results.137 The Brahimi Report identified the challenges posed by the lack of a common training regimen for UN police officers. The Panel recommended the formation of regional training centers to provide common police training that complied with “guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations.”138 Yet few countries actually offer any UN-specific, pre-deployment training to police offered for UN service; exceptions include Canada, Norway, and Australia.139 The UN has introduced a Standardized Training Module (STM) on policing in UN peace operations, which is being shared with various police 132 United Nations, Selection Standards and Training Guidelines for UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, May 1997), 7–9. 133 Lessons Learned Unit, “The United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), January 1996-January 1998: Lessons Learned,” UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, July 1998, para. 60, and Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit “Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone,” UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, September 2003, 53. 134 ActionAid, “MINUSTAH: DDR and Police, Judicial and Correctional Reform in Haiti, Recommendations for change,” Action Aid, July 2006, 14, www.actionaid.org/assets/pdf%5CUN_haiti.pdf. 135 Perito, Where’s the Lone Ranger When You Need Him, 86. 136 Call and Stanley, “Protecting the People: Public Security Choices after Conflicts.” 137 Conflict, Security and Development Group, “A Review of Peace Operations: The Case for Change, Overall Introduction and Synthesis Report,” International Policy Institute, King’s College London, 2003, 58. 138 A/55/305-S/200/809, para.126 (b). 139 Eirin Mobekk, “Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions,” Policy Paper no 9, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), November 2005, 17. Privately-contracted police officers from the United States receive a one week pre-deployment training/screening, covering areas such as country specific briefings, stress management, the challenges of working overseas. Private contractor (PAE), interview with authors, 24 May 2006. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 43 training centers. By conforming their training programs to the STM, centers can receive UN certification, meaning that all graduates of their programs will be pre-cleared for UN service.140 Attempts by DPKO to provide training guidance to member states have included publication of Selection Standards and Training Guidelines for UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) in 1997. It contained curriculum guidelines for a UN Police Officers Course, covering issues such as the history of UN peacekeeping, how an operation works, human rights training, first aid, stress management, and safety training.141 This guide, while a step in the right direction, did not offer actual learning materials or recommended timelines of instruction. Regional training programs for police officers have been slow to materialize. Recent developments include the launch of CoESPU, which trains high-level and mid-level officers, who are then expected to return to their countries of origin and provide training to other police. The curriculum is modeled on common paramilitary police standard operating procedures.142 There were 29 students in the first high-level graduating class in December 2005 and the first mid-level course concluded in February 2006. Graduates came from gendarmeries in Cameroon, India, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, and Senegal.143 The full benefits of CoESPU have yet to materialize, however, and few if any graduates of the program have gone on to serve in UN-led operations. Since CoESPU stresses a “train the trainer” approach, its graduates may be training others to deploy, but such indirect impact is difficult to verify. Beyond CoESPU, regional training centers such as the Pearson Peacekeeping Center in Canada and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) in Ghana have begun to offer specific courses for prospective police officers modeled on UN guidelines. These centers are capable of training only a small fraction of the officers that UN operations need annually, however. The lack of more widespread standardized UNPOL pre-deployment training and the limited number of officers currently enrolled in existing programs limit the quality and consistency of training that UNPOL officers receive before reaching the field. Although SATs are designed to screen out incompetence, they have not been designed to “screen in” those skill sets that a mission needs most. Even experienced police can have trouble performing duties that exceed the bounds of their training and home jobs. Policing is not a monolithic endeavor; specific aspects of the profession require specific skills. Matching the skills required for a mission with the skills on offer from member states has been a continual challenge. MEASURING PROGRESS TOWARD MISSION GOALS The UN has struggled to develop useful indicators for measuring progress towards its short- and long-term mission goals of establishing public security and building local law enforcement institutions. Regular progress evaluations are critical for improving UN police activities in the 140 Official, UN DPKO Integrated Training Service, interview with authors, 31 March 2006. United Nations, Selection Standards and Training Guidelines for UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL). 142 Training for high-level officers includes modules on international and humanitarian law, cultural awareness, doctrine, operational planning, and negotiations. Training for mid-level officers includes modules on anti-riot training, police self-defense, peace support operations, tactical doctrines, international and humanitarian law, and series of tactical areas. Official, US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, interview with authors, 9 May 2006. 143 Remarks by General Leonardo Leso, Commander, Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, Vicenza, Italy, 24 February 2006. 141 44 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law field, guiding strategic planning, and providing lessons learned and best practices for future missions. Where UN missions have had an executive mandate, measuring the short-term task of ensuring public security has been undercut by the lack of detailed crime statistics and the chaotic environment that often faces a thinly stretched UN police force arriving (slowly) in a foreign, post-conflict environment. Efforts to measure the success of the UN’s long-term police reform activities (and broader rule of law elements) have traditionally been ad hoc and inconsistent. The challenges related to this task are numerous. Policing is a complex phenomenon that includes tasks as disparate as deterring violence, investigating crime, establishing community ties, and conducting traffic patrols. Even in stable and well-functioning states, the means to accurately measure the successes and shortcomings of police forces remains a highly contested question among policing experts.144 In North America and Western Europe, many of the most widely praised police performance assessment systems, such as the Compstat (Computerized Statistics) program utilized in New York City, rely primarily on the tracking of criminal statistics.145 In post-conflict environments, however, replicating such an assessment model is difficult due to a lack of reliable criminal statistics and the advanced technology required. Measuring the progress of police reform also requires metrics for tracking factors other than crime rates, such as community relations, corruption, accountability, and respect for human rights. In Timor-Leste, the UN relied on performance reports to benchmark the number of local officers trained and the number of hours of training. While useful, such metrics fail to measure the effectiveness of reform in actually producing positive outcomes such as reduced crime and increased public confidence in the police force. Other assessment techniques employed by UN police have included spot checks on police departments to ensure compliance with various reporting techniques and administrative bookkeeping (Sierra Leone) as well as public opinion polls (Kosovo).146 The lack of standardized mechanisms for assessing police reform efforts has limited the UN’s ability to be flexible in adjusting policy in the field and hindered efforts to develop best practices that can be used to inform the planning and implementation of future missions. In short, UN policing continues to suffer from shortcomings in defining clear doctrine and strategies for UNPOL activities; planning for the police component of new missions; recruiting and deploying qualified officers in a timely manner; and measuring progress once in the field. Recognition of these challenges has led to a series of innovative initiatives undertaken in New York and in the field, yet truly addressing the remaining gaps will require significant structural reforms in the way the world body recruits and maintains highly-skilled police experts for these missions. 144 Rick Sarre, “Community Policing—Success or Failure? Exploring Different Models of Evaluation,” in Julia Vernon and Sandra McKillop, eds., The Police and the Community: Proceedings of a Conference Held 23-25 October 1990 (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1992). 145 Mark H. Moore and Anthony A. Braga, “Measuring and Improving Police Performance: The Lessons of Compstat and its Progreny,” Policing (26)3, 2003. 146 United Nations Development Program, “Light Blue: Public Perceptions in UNMIK,” United Nations Development Program. Also Ylber Bajraktari et al., “The PRIME System: Measuring the Success of Post-Conflict Police Reform.” Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 45 —5— ANTICIPATING UN PEACE OPERATIONS’ NEED FOR POLICING PERSONNEL T he first step in crafting a more effective UN policing capacity is to identify the needs that future UN operations are likely to encounter. Such an exercise is challenging on several fronts. First, as noted earlier, there is no universally agreed upon basis or formula for generating force estimates for policing operations. The diversity of post-conflict settings makes any generic formulation—police-to-population ratios or international-to-local police ratios—less useful than some measure of local police and judicial functionality, crime rates, arms availability, and other local factors. Mission assessment teams can attempt to measure these factors in the field—security conditions permitting—before a new operation receives its formal mandate. As noted earlier, the UN Police Division’s Rule of Law Index (ROLIX) is being developed to measure local law enforcement needs and capabilities as part of mission assessments. The results will reflect what a two-week mission can produce, depending on local records and interlocutors, as well as what the team’s experts can observe and analyze directly. A composite of that research and subsequent mission experience, across many missions, can help inform the design of any standing police/rule of law capacity as well as the training modules for police and other rule of law mission personnel. Short of gathering such knowledge in advance for all possible areas of UN policing operations, other sources offer insights for planning an UNPOL contingent. UN mandates (influenced in part by on-ground mission assessments) and the periodic reports to member states published by operations once deployed, are the next best sources of trends. These tools can be used to make predictions for future mission type (traditional, transformational, or executive), force size and force type mix (individual officers or FPUs), skill set mix, and urgency of deployment of each skill set. We analyze recent mandates and mission reports in this chapter to estimate future needs of UN peace operations and to inform the discussion of proposed standing and reserve forces in chapter six. ANTICIPATING MISSION TYPES Since the mid-1990s, transformational operations have become the dominant type of UNPOL mandate (see figure 3). It is likely that UN police will continue to be called upon by the Security Council to both monitor the performance of and lead efforts to reform, restructure, and rebuild local police. The main question is whether executive operations will become more common. Given the difficulty, costs, and sensitive nature of executive policing missions, the UN Secretariat would prefer to avoid them. There are a number of reasons for this reluctance: The requirements for effective law enforcement often outstrip the UN’s ready capacity, local police can become Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law 46 dependent on the organization, and blame may fall on the UN when crime continues or escalates during the mission. United Nations police planners therefore face the same “unpleasant dilemma” described in the Brahimi Report in reference to transitional administrations as a whole. The UN, the report argued, can choose “to assume that transitional administration is a transitory responsibility, not prepare for additional missions and do badly if it is once again flung into the breach, or prepare well and be asked to undertake them more often because it is well prepared.”147 Despite the challenges posed by executive missions, recent history has shown that the Security Council will mandate the UN to assume at least some responsibility for law enforcement within the context of transformational missions. 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 19 89 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 Number of New and Ongoing Missions Figure 3: Frequency of Types of UN Police Mandates 1990–2006 1989 - 2006 Year Traditional Transformational Executive Peacekeeping missions undertaken since 2003 have required that the UN “support” domestic police forces while simultaneously working to restructure, reform, and rebuild them. This can involve UN police in active policing jobs (at the government’s invitation) in niche areas beyond the reach of nascent local forces. Roles have included dealing with civil disturbances, securing borders, conducting investigations (particularly those requiring forensic analysis), and tackling organized crime and smuggling. It is therefore necessary to assume that the ability to enforce the law will be a selective but essential task in future UN peace operations. Having more specialty policing skills close at hand would significantly enhance the operational capacity of UN police contingents. PROJECTING NUMBERS REQUIRED, OTHER THAN FORMED UNITS A key question, then, is how many new police the UN can expect to need in a given year. Figure 4 depicts new UN police authorizations annually since 1989. The chart includes authorizations in 2006 for police in Timor-Leste and in 2007 for Darfur, Sudan. It does not include officers required for the rotation and replacement of personnel already in the field. 147 A/55/305 - S/2000/809, para. 78. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 47 Figure 4: Annual New UN Police Authorizations, 1989–2007 7000 New FPU (or SPU) Authorizations New Individual Police Authorizations 6000 5000 4000 3000 Annual ‘Off-Peak’ Average, New Individual Officer Authorizations, 1993–98 1993-1998 = 996 Annual ‘Off-Peak’ Average, New Individual Officer Authorizations, 2000–06 2000-2005 = 630 2000 1000 0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 An average is a statistical “expected value.” In the absence of better prognostic data, it is reasonable to expect that future demand will mimic the past, and thus reasonable to use average demand as a planning factor. But which average? Although there may be more peak-demand years, it would be uneconomic to base a standing force on levels of demand reached only infrequently. The average demand for new individual UN police officers since 1989 has been roughly 1,400 annually. Since 2003, it has been about 2,000 annually. The chart shows that the United Nations has faced major surges in police demand, however, since 1989. In surge years, the Security Council has authorized deployments of individual UNPOL officers four to five times higher than average, that is, between 4,000 and 5,000. In contrast, between those peak years, authorizations averaged about 1,000 officers annually between 1993 and 1998 and about 700 annually between 2000 and 2006.148 The lower average authorization levels for individual officers in the present decade, between peak years, reflects the UN’s greater use of FPUs to fill out police components. The combined off-peak average, around 800 new individual officers per year, can be considered a minimum henceforward unless the mix and frequency of circumstances calling for police deployments change radically. 148 The Security Council authorized a peacekeeping force for Darfur, Sudan in August 2006 with 3,300 individual police and 16 FPUs, but it did not deploy and was superceded by the force authorized 31 July 2007 by Security Council Resolution 1769. Figure 4 uses the latter numbers, not the former, to avoid double counting. From the perspective of fall 2006, however, that year looked to be the new surge year for police deployments. 48 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law In addition to these police numbers, recent UN peacekeeping missions have together employed about 125 international personnel per year (UN professional staff and UN Volunteers) in support of legal, judicial, corrections, and related security sector reform mandates. ESTIMATING NEEDED SKILL-SETS Experience from past operations makes clear that matching skill-sets to the needs of a mission is crucial to its success. A traffic officer is not a homicide investigator. A patrol officer may not be competent to establish police academy curricula or training novice officers. Moreover, large police contingents must be managed, procedures established, and discipline enforced. It is essential, therefore, that attempts to identify UN policing needs take into account the diversity of tasks that UN police undertake and the diversity of environments into which they may deploy. A survey of UN operations over the past two decades yields a long list of tasks for UNPOL officers. Many of these tasks require special skills and preparation. Being able to identify the specific skill-sets needed and to recruit and deploy the officers who possess them is critical to future UN success in filling police components and carrying out their mandates.149 For non-police components in the rule of law/criminal justice fields, the differential professional skill-sets needed are relatively clear. A judge or magistrate, a prosecutor, a court clerk, a defense lawyer, a corrections officer, and a ministry administrator have clearly different professions and backgrounds. Differentiating amongst policing specialties is more difficult for the average policy maker, however, and so we emphasize that differentiation here. Table 9 presents a breakdown of police-related tasks in UN peace operations, matching skill-sets associated with each task. The tasks are coded for frequency (how often missions have included the task) and urgency (how rapidly the task must be executed in new missions; higher numbers equal greater urgency). Skill-sets can be grouped by urgency and, within urgency, by frequency of demand. This makes it possible to determine which skills are most needed in a rapidlydeployable, standing service and reserve force. The table also notes skills that may only be needed infrequently, but which are critically important when the need arises, such as those required for executive policing (firearms proficiency, detention center management, or forensic investigation, for example). This skills-based assessment of future UN policing needs, built from past operations and current trends, suggests that future UN missions are likely to require a broad range of specialties and skill-sets, from forensic investigators to classroom instructors. UNMIK was the first UN mission to begin to distinguish between types of police needed for various aspects of the mission, calling upon member states to provide “regular” patrol officers, specialized police units for riot control, and border police.150 Efforts to enhance UN police capacity should ensure that the UN has access to police officers with these skill-sets. 149 Personnel in the Police Division at DPKO view this particular capacity (identifying necessary skills and acquiring officers with these skills) as a fundamental challenge. Official, UN DPKO Police Division, interview with authors, Washington, DC, August 2006. 150 Hansen, From Congo to Kosovo, 55. Table 9: UN Policing and Other Rule of Law Tasks, First 90 Days of Mission Frequency Relative Rating* Urgency Planning support Mission/operations planners 10 Crowd/riot control Civilian police, stability police, translators 8 Joint patrols (with local police) Civilian police, police advisors, translators 7 Border/customs control Border/customs police, civilian police 7 Conduct Criminal Investigations Investigators, Forensic Specialists 6 Needs/capacity assessment Police advisors, statisticians/analysts 5 Humanitarian/UN personnel security Civilian police, stability police 4 Detention Corrections officers, civilian police, translators 4 Joint Patrols with International Military Patrol Officers 4 Arrest, Law Enforcement Civilian police, stability police, forensics experts, translators 4 Guard/protect persons/buildings/equipment Civilian police, translators 3 Airport/Seaport security Civilian police, airport security specialists, border/customs police 3 Conduct Independnent Patrols Civilian police, Stability Police 3 Anti-trafficking operations Stability police 2 Assist Illegal checkpoint removal Stability police, translators 1 School security Civilian police, translators, child protection specialists 1 Monitor/assess police conduct and performance Police advisors, human rights monitors 10 Advise national (or other non-UN) police Police advisors 10 Mentoring Local Police Forces Police Mentors, Patrol Officers 9 Investigate police and government abuses and corruption Human rights monitors, civilian police, internal affairs specialists 6 Register Local Police 5 IDP security/repatriation (minority protection) Civilian police, stability police, translators 2 Dismiss/Deactivate Local Police 2 Media monitoring, communications, public relations Civilian police, media specialists, translators, negotiators 2 Traffic management Traffic Officers 1 * Frequency rating records how common this task has been among the ten missions analyzed (UNMIL, UNOCI, MONUC, MINUSTAH, UNMISET, UNMIT, UNTAET, UNMIK, ONUB, and UNMIS). 10 = all ten missions included this task; 1= Only one mission reported the task, etc. Task Skill(s) Tasks to start within 90 days of mission startup. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch Tasks to start within 30 days of mission startup. SOURCES/METHODOLOGY: This chart was compiled through an analysis of every Secretary-General report and Security Council Resolution related to these 10 missions since 1999. Only tasks reported in these official UN sources have been recorded. 49 50 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Based on these data, we concluded that improvements in the deployability and initial effectiveness of UN police and related rule of law personnel should be based upon the following assumptions: Establishing effective and accountable local police is likely to be the primary policing objective in most UN peace operations, followed closely by reforms in the rest of the local criminal justice system. As part of such transformational efforts, UN police will be called upon to provide active support to the maintenance of law and order, particularly in niches beyond the capacity of nascent domestic police (for example, in border security, customs, and fighting organized crime). Peace operations where the UN takes on full executive responsibility for law enforcement will be rare but, if deployed, will be sent where no legitimate law enforcement capacity exists (e.g., secessionist conflicts and/or total state failure). Demand for qualified individual police will remain at least 800 officers annually and more in some years, with ‘peak’ demand periodically approaching 5,000 officers. Demand for police in formed units has been growing dramatically, averaging nine units (about 1,200 officers) per year most recently; if more qualified individual police officers are available to the UN, then demand for FPUs may level off. Finally, future policing operations will call for a wide range of specific skills with roughly predictable frequency. Demand for highly-trained UN police with diverse expertise shows no signs of abating in the foreseeable future. While existing initiatives, such as the 25-person Standing Police Capacity and the development of a Rule of Law Index, are promising efforts to improve the UN’s performance in carrying out police activities, they are not enough. At present, there are no credible, comprehensive proposals for addressing the underlying structural deficiencies that the UN faces in attempting to carry out the police and rule of law components of UN mandates. What is needed are reform efforts that would dramatically improve the UN’s ability to recruit and deploy topnotch officers, pre-screened and pre-trained, into the field in the critical first weeks of a new mission. The following section lays out a series of proposals intended to do just that. —6— IMPROVING UN CAPACITY TO DEPLOY POLICE AND OTHER RULE OF LAW PERSONNEL RAPIDLY AND EFFECTIVELY “I have no doubt that the world should eventually have an integrated police force which will be accepted as an integral and essential part of life in the same way as national police forces are accepted. Meanwhile, we must ensure that developments are in the right direction and we can also meet critical situations as and when they occur.” -U Thant UN Secretary-General, 13 June 1963 H istorical shortcomings in UN capacity to quickly deploy well-trained, well-coordinated, and capable individual police officers continue to appear when new missions are authorized, despite incremental changes in policies and procedures intended to nudge the system along. Although the UN Police Division has been working to improve the quality of candidates put forward and accepted for mission service, the demand for officers has escalated faster than good ones can be recruited. UN member states have shown little inclination to address these issues in the past. The Police Division’s new Standing Police Capacity is a first step toward revamping how missions are set up and planned for. It does not, however, address the challenge of recruiting, training, and deploying well-qualified police personnel. To improve the UN’s ability to execute new missions quickly and effectively, much deeper changes are needed. This section addresses these substantive requirements and offers options to marry demand with availability of both quality police and specialists in other areas of rule of law. DEEPER CHANGE: AN OVERVIEW The complementary approaches laid out below address the need for substantive reforms. These measures shift early responsibility for new mission deployments from the traditional stateseconded model to one in which UN DPKO has direct access to many of the individual officers needed to launch new policing operations. Transforming a criminal justice system—from judiciary, to prisons, to police—is a daunting task, requiring unique skills, cultural sensitivity, political savvy, high-quality leadership, and the ability to constantly assess progress and adjust strategies. The current, ad hoc system of piecing together a UN mission’s rule of law components over the course of many months is poorly suited to creating such transformations. The United Nations itself has recognized this fundamental problem. We propose instead a combination of standing and reserve capacity, that is a known quantity to UN mission planners, and that can be trained and mobilized rapidly for pre-agreed terms of 52 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law service. The proposal outlined here has three components—a standing UN Rule of Law Capacity, a UN Police Reserve, and a Senior Reserve Roster. This mix of capacities would solve two clear problems. First, it would give both member states and experienced individuals the incentive to participate in UN operations. Second, it would give the UN more reliable sources of qualified personnel for the rule of law components of its peace operations. While UN operations clearly need a quicker and better-trained initial response to have an immediate, positive impact on fragile peace processes, such capacity may also shorten mission duration, lower costs, and lay the groundwork for longer-term peacebuilding objectives. Such capabilities within the UN system will strengthen its ability to support criminal justice capacity outside the framework of peacekeeping missions as well, consistent with the system-wide division of labor on rule of law established by the Secretary-General in late 2006. 1. Building a Standing, Deployable UN Capacity to Support Rule of Law We propose creation of a standing UN Rule of Law Capacity (ROLCAP) of 400 individuals, to institutionalize the knowledge, training, and mind-set necessary for transformational missions. ROLCAP would be sufficiently large to provide leadership cadres for every element of policing and security sector reform in the first year of new integrated missions with these mandated elements. Recruited and trained by the United Nations, ROLCAP could help establish three to four missions per year, matching most recent peak demand. This standing capacity could improve the organization’s ability not only to plan and manage new transformational or transitional administration operations, but also to launch them quickly and conduct them for the first year (in conjunction with an effective reserve force). The benefits of a standing capacity include: specialized training and vetting; familiarity with UN goals and procedures; eventual experience with multiple missions; rapid deployment of police mission leadership even under pressure of two-plus simultaneous deployments; greater initial coherence of mission rule of law components; and greater institutional memory and expertise for mission startup and initial execution. The main tasks would be planning for and providing initial management of new operations’ rule of law components; contributing to the vetting and training of reserve personnel; and doing the induction training of these personnel as they deploy. While creating ROLCAP would entail upfront costs, its ability to help launch new missions and affiliated security sector reform would make it cost-effective over the long-term. Rapid deployment capability would enable the UN to seize on the political windows of opportunity that open after a peace agreement is signed but slide shut again as local actors see little or no benefits from keeping an agreement and no penalties for violating it. ROLCAP personnel would themselves need to be held accountable for their actions. Past abuses and disciplinary infractions by UNPOL officers and other UN mission members have proven hard to punish owing to legal and political constraints—and vacuums. The creation of new UN standing and reserve forces would make even more urgent the aforementioned need for a better accountability regime for UN missions. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 53 2. Building an Effective, Incentive-based UN Police Reserve To complement and supplement the standing service, we propose creation of a UN Police Reserve. This Reserve would be a standby arrangement that supplies the bulk of skilled personnel needed to carry out the rule of law components of peacekeeping operations. As stated earlier, countries, like individuals, react to incentives. Under the current system, states have only moral incentives to contribute individual police officers to UN operations; they continue to pay the salaries of their officers deployed, but receive no UN reimbursement. Individual police have personal incentives to volunteer for UN service because they receive MSAs directly. More than three decades ago, the United Nations opted to establish a regime of fixed per capita reimbursements for personnel in military units contributed by member states to UN operations. That system continues to function in modified form to this day and has been extended to cover FPUs. The impact of this incentive structure can be seen in comparative rates of police deployment to UN operations. While individual police continue to be slow to arrive, FPU deployments are increasingly brisk. There is no proven link between their respective compensation mechanisms and their availability to missions, but clearly there is a correlation. We therefore propose a compensation mechanism for individual police that would give states greater incentive to offer quality personnel to UN operations in a timely fashion. We envision ROLCAP and a new reserve system built around this compensation mechanism as replacing the current system for recruiting individual police to serve in UN missions. The effectiveness of a reserve system would depend heavily, however, on its having a roster of named individuals. This will enable the United Nations to offer training at regular intervals when reservists are not on deployment, as well as to identify those who are to receive specialized predeployment training as new missions loom. There were no real incentives for states to participate in the last (failed) effort to create an on-call police roster. More tangible incentives could overcome such state resistance or indifference. Note that a country could choose to contribute members to a UN Police Reserve as the US State Department does now—by contracting with private vendors who in turn provide police personnel to UN missions on behalf of the US government. A member state using this approach would be reimbursed at the proposed standard per capita rate and absorb the difference between that rate and market rates for the personnel its contractors send to the field. (At present, of course, the United States absorbs the entire cost of its contracted police program.) If the UN itself were to contract for police or security personnel in this manner, it would pay negotiated market rates for the resulting goods and services rendered, as it does for all systems and other private sector contracts. Contractors could also compete for police support systems contracts—similar to those the UN uses to obtain bulk rates for vehicles, strategic lift, and other critical mission support items. Services provided could include long-range surveillance; specialized, secure communications; or crime data mapping technologies and the personnel to operate them. 54 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law 3. Building a Senior Reserve Roster of Retired or Former Criminal Justice Personnel Finally, we propose creation of a Senior Reserve Roster. This separate reserve of individuallycontracted, senior personnel would serve two main functions. First, this cadre would advise and assist in restructuring host state criminal justice systems; second, it would provide replacement leadership for mission rule of law elements following the outward rotation of ROLCAP experts at the end of a mission’s first year; and third, it would be a source of senior, specialized expertise for new operations when needed. The goal is to give the UN a direct line to an array of senior personnel in a structured and predictable fashion. The envisioned Roster could include former (likely retired) police officers, criminal court judges, prosecutors, criminal defense lawyers, corrections officers, and corrections system managers. Its members would contract directly with the United Nations, initially to affirm their availability to serve, then as active duty mission personnel on a 12-month rotation. Since retired personnel are no longer employed by their local or national governments, a distinct system from the UN Police Reserve described above would be required to identify, recruit, and deploy senior rule of law expertise. A Senior Reserve Roster of this type would be particularly useful for meeting needs for senior police, judicial, and corrections advisors and operational mentors. It would allow the UN to identify qualified personnel to be called upon when required. When members of this reserve become active, they would serve as international civilian staff, at UN salary scales. The only added cost of this reserve would be any annual retainers that may need to be paid to reserve members in exchange for their commitment to deploy on agreed notice. DEEPER CHANGE: THE DETAILS Given the dominant numbers of police in the rule of law components of UN peace operations, our proposals are sized and shaped to focus on police and police work. The purpose of these mechanisms could be broader, however, serving the needs of UN operations for well-trained, UNpolicy-conversant, experienced criminal justice personnel as well. The proposals that we put forward here are designed to address past challenges in implementing change, to overcome well-known shortfalls, and to offer realistic means of moving more swiftly to increase UN effectiveness in this area. Rather than simply float concepts, we have made an effort to delve into the details of how these three ideas might be operationally structured, sized, and funded. Structuring and Costing ROLCAP A permanent, standing UN ROLCAP would conduct advanced mission planning and strategic needs assessments for all aspects of mandated rule of law support to a host state. It would be responsible for the timely dispatch of core leadership for police and other rule of law elements within seven days of mandate approval and headquarters elements of all rule of law-related components within 14 days. These teams would work with local actors (i.e. police, civil society, and government) to develop a transformational plan early in an operation; set up coordination mechanisms with other components of the operation (particularly in areas of DDR and human rights); and use early-arriving reserve police personnel—in collaboration with any FPUs and the military contingent—to institute high-visibility patrols to renew the host public’s sense of Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 55 security, mandate permitting. It would help set up the process for reforming, restructuring, and rebuilding local police forces, in conjunction with other elements of the UN system and other potential donors and partners. To ensure continuity in new missions, the ROLCAP deployment team should have a 12-month tour of duty. Sidebar 5: WHY NOT A RESERVE SYSTEM FOR FORMED POLICE UNITS? Demand for FPUs in peace operations has increased dramatically in the past few years but the Police Division has been able, so far, to elicit adequate contributions from member states to meet this demand. Over the last several years, FPUs have required significantly less time to deploy than individual police and about the same amount of time as military peacekeepers. This is likely a reflection of the similar financial incentives member states face when contributing FPUs and troops. In short, the present gap in UNPOL capacity does not extend to the UN’s ability to find and field FPUs. Should demand begin to significantly outstrip availability, then inclusion of FPUs in the ready reserve concept might be worthy of consideration. However, the brief lifespan of a somewhat similar proposal from the SecretaryGeneral that a few military battalions be put on standby in their home countries to rapidly reinforce UN peace operations suggests that advance, public commitment of specific FPUs might be similarly hard to arrange. Second, the military-like organization and heavily-armed status of FPUs would likely make the prospect of a standing or reserve UN capacity in formed units less acceptable politically to some member states. The idea of a standing UN military force has long been anathema to many governments. The prospect of several thousand armed individuals organized along paramilitary lines operating under the direct, permanent command of the UN would likely invite enough debate and opprobrium from certain capitals to kill the concept quickly. A standing or reserve system individual patrol officers, armed with light weapons if at all, on the other hand, would be a less objectionable option to pursue. There are, however, some smaller steps that could be taken to enhance the availability and quality of FPUs in peace operations. For instance, in exchange for member state commitments to make FPUs rapidly available in future missions, the UN could offer to sponsor the advanced training of FPU leadership cadres at centers such as CoESPU or KAIPTC, both to ensure their greater familiarity with UN purposes and procedures, and to enhance their effectiveness at home. The costs of such training for the United Nations could be lessened through collaboration with the G-8, which funds CoESPU programs. G-8 support could be targeted towards FPU training for countries willing to make those units available on short notice for UN operations. Increasing the global capacity of these units would also likely improve UN ability to quickly secure FPU commitments and deploy them in new operations. Fully equipping a newly created FPU would cost about $6 million, but currently there is no international mechanism to help defray such costs for countries with the will but not the funds to create one or more FPUs. To increase the global supply of FPUs, developed countries should consider such funding in their bilateral assistance programs. The United States, for example, spent $634 million on international police assistance in 2004, a sum that could have trained and equipped about 50 FPUs. Donor costs for equipping an FPU could even be offset over time by allowing the UN to provide reimbursements for “contingent owned equipment” (roughly $750,000 per year of operation for one FPU) directly to the donor instead of the country providing the unit until an agreed proportion of the equipment cost had been recouped, to be reinvested in new FPU equipment. Sources: Michael Dziedzic and Col. Christine Stark, “Bridging the Public Security Gap: The Role of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Contemporary Peace Operations,” USIPeace Briefing, US Institute of Peace, June 2006. David H. Bayley, Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 56 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law ROLCAP should reflect present and anticipated demand for rule of law and police specialties. Thus, we propose that ROLCAP be built around mixed-capacity rapid deployment teams composed of two-thirds police specialties and one-third other rule of law specialties. This is roughly the current ratio found in the headquarters structures of integrated mission that we were able to assess. It reflects the fact that police tend to have the most urgent public order tasks and constitute a far larger field contingent than most non-police rule of law mission elements. Examples of this proportioning include UN police headquarters in Liberia (with about 50 key posts) and Sierra Leone (about 30 such posts). Non-police rule of law headquarters elements for six current missions range from eight to 34 posts, depending on mandate, so 20 is a conservative average estimate for key non-police rule of law staff.151 Given these numbers, the average ROLCAP deployment team should probably comprise about 50 persons: 30 to 35 police and 15 to 20 non-police rule of law personnel. ROLCAP also needs to be large enough to meet maximum anticipated demand for new missions. It should therefore have the ability to set up three to four missions in any given 12-month period, which is about the peak demand level of 2003–2004, when new missions were established in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi and Haiti. It should have sufficient additional capacity to vet and train new recruits to the reserve system; to offer refresher training to reservists and mission personnel; to train its own people when they are not on field rotations; to create and absorb collective lessons learned and modify best practices; to plan for the next mission; and to allow for time off. It could also be utilized to help fulfill DPKO’s new global responsibility to “make its HQ [headquarters] expertise available to support law enforcement and police related assistance being provided in countries that do not have UN missions.”152 This ambitious new mandate, put forth under the Secretary-General’s policy directive to create a division of labor within the UN bureaucracy on rule of law related activities, would allow DPKO to respond to a request by a member state for technical assistance in implementing police reform efforts, for instance. So far, this expanded global responsibility has yet to be coupled with any additional capacity in the Police Division, raising questions over how, exactly, they will be able to carry it out.153 An important component in sizing this capability is appreciating the right tempo of deployment for ROLCAP personnel. This proposal is structured for a deployment tempo—the percentage of 151 Missions reviewed include Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Haiti, Liberia, Sudan, and Timor-Leste. These numbers include professional posts and UN Volunteers but not UN Field Service, General Service, or local personnel. United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/783, 6 March 2007; United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/745, 15 February 2007; United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/728, 28 March 2006; United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/773, 1 March 2007; United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/759, 23 February 2007; United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste for the period from 25 August 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/767, 23 February 2007. 152 United Nations, “Decisions of the Secretary-General, Decision No. 2006/47,” Annex 2: “Rule of Law—Baskets and Sectors.” 153 There are also questions as to what authority would be required to undertake such police support activities in the absence of a Security Council authorized peacekeeping mission. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 57 time that people actually spend in field positions or otherwise working away from their home base with the reserve system or meeting other missions’ training needs—of 50 percent over a two-year duty cycle (effectively one year deployed and one year not). Although ROLCAP will not be deployed to fight wars, part of its job will be to lay the groundwork for re-establishing post-conflict public security and/or public order in tough environments, a difficult and potentially dangerous task creating stresses from which headquarters personnel are not immune. We think, therefore, that a 50 percent deployment rate for this standing service would be a maximum sustainable rate. (The initial UN Standing Police Capacity may be planned to be deployed as much as two-thirds of the time, on shorter cycles of four months on, two months off.154 This tempo would be considered an unsustainably high deployment rate for comparable military forces, regardless of whether they were facing peacekeeping duty or combat.)155 We calculated deployment tempo conservatively, counting only days in which team members would actually be on the ground in missions or on temporary duty vetting and/or training members of the UN police reserve or members of ongoing missions. We do not count annual leave or rest and recuperation leave to which they likely would be entitled under UN rules for field personnel (see table 10). The size and composition of ROLCAP deployment teams would be key to its effectiveness. To enable it to set up as many as four missions in the same calendar year, ROLCAP would need a structure of eight teams of about 50 persons each, for a total of 400 deployable personnel. A normal configuration of two-thirds police would scale up to a total standing police capacity of roughly 275, with 125 other rule of law personnel. Each team should be fully deployable but flexible enough to allow partial deployments based on specific mission needs or for short-term assignments at regional training centers, for example. Deployable personnel should be supported by a small, non-deploying headquarters staff of about a dozen, who would recruit personnel for the standing capacity, arrange for training, and manage team deployments. Logically, this administrative team would be situated physically within the new Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in the UN Department of Peace Operations 154 Official, UN DPKO Police Division, interview with authors, New York, 19 April 2007. A detailed RAND Corporation study of US Army deployment tempo from 1997 through October 2000—now somewhat wistfully referred to as the Army’s “peacekeeping phase”—and its impact on military readiness for combat, found that the average, pre-9/11 deployment tempo for 1,400 deployable Army units was about 23 percent—segmented as 17 percent for training away from barracks (about 60 days/year) and six percent for operations. In 1998, US Army Forces Command set a standard of 120 days—33 percent— “as the maximum desirable level of annual DEPTEMPO [deployment tempo] for its units.” Ronald E. Sortor and J. Michael Polich, “Deployments and Army Personnel Tempo,” MR-1417 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), xii, 11, 60, 71. Those units sent to Bosnia in the 1990s, at most four percent of the total force, exceeded that standard with six month (180-day) field rotations. Together with training for those deployments, their tempo was probably closer to 75 percent for the twelve month period that included their time in the Balkans. Moreover, a few light infantry units were used repeatedly for peacekeeping in that decade. But since 9/11, and especially operations in Iraq, the regular Army’s average deployment tempo has increased to roughly 50 percent and Special Forces commanders have been struggling to bring their troops’ rate down to 50 percent. In the fiscal year 2003 defense authorization bill, the US Congress, recognizing the added stress of high deployment tempos, added financial compensation of $100/day for each day over 400 that a soldier was deployed—to training or operations—over the course of two years (730 days), which translates as a deployment tempo of 55 percent. Congressional Budget Office, “An Analysis of the U.S. Military’s Ability to Sustain an Occupation of Iraq,” 3 September 2003, 35, www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/45xx/doc4515/09-03-Iraq.pdf. Carl Conetta, “Fighting on Borrowed Time: The Effect on US Military Readiness of America’s post–9/11 wars,” Briefing Report No. 19 (Cambridge, MA: Project on Defense Alternatives, September 2006), 10. 155 58 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Table 10: Deployment Tempo of ROLCAP over a Two-year Cycle Total Days in Two-Year Cycle: 730 Duration (days) Frequency, over two years 258 12 5 20 5 45 14 14 28 2 1 9 4 1 7 1 5.6 1.8 2 34.8 258 108 20 20 35 45 79 25 56 70 35% 15% 3% 3% 5% 6% 11% 3% 8% 10% 5 2 10 1% Total time deployed in field, not counting R&R (aka "Deployment Tempo")** Total time in training Total time planning and assessing missions 366 55 65 50% 8% 9% Total leave, R&R, sick, and "weekend" time 239 33% Activity De facto field mission presence over a 12month deployment Conducting overseas training/vetting Team training/exercises After mission reporting Individual learning/training Next-mission assessment & planning R&R leave while on deployment* R&R accumulated on training/vetting Annual leave, non-deployed Weekends, non-deployed, non-leave Sick leave, used Total Days per activity in each two-year cycle % of time spent in each activity Summary * Deployed UN personnel are entitled to 14 days rest and recuperation leave (R&R) for every two months deployed; table assumes a seven-day work week when not on R&R. ** Includes time deployed to the field, both in year-long missions as well as conducting short-term overseas training and vetting missions Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding. in New York, and later co-located with ROLCAP, at its home base, which should be a convenient staging base that offers ready access to UN missions’ areas of operation but also modern facilities and infrastructure. The head of ROLCAP should report to the head of the Office for Rule of Law and Security Institutions but collaborate closely with the UN Police Advisor and the Police Division in DPKO. ROLCAP personnel would be recruited and trained by the United Nations. Persons who apply for police-related posts should have at least five years of policing experience; others should have demonstrated career experience in their respective fields. All should be proficient in one or more mission languages (to date, English, French, and Spanish).156 The standing capacity should offer a clear career path to encourage members to stay in the service, so that it accumulates experience and knowledge. ROLCAP teams would serve 12-month mission-startup tours. Individual end-of-mission reports should be required upon rotation out of the field and each returning team should distill its experience, jointly, in after-action debriefing sessions for which the individual reports would be 156 Additional language skills would of course be advantageous, to facilitate direct communication with both population and host state counterparts in the mission area. Rapid language training facilities should be considered as an element of ROLCAP’s home base infrastructure. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 59 feedstock. Frank participation should be encouraged and valid criticisms, wherever directed, should incur no penalty. Team reports should be distilled into institutional memory and used to modify doctrine and standard operating procedures for mission startup. Given the challenges imposed by long-distance deployments in volatile environments, adequate time between deployments must be ensured and the housing, educational, and employment needs of members’ families must be taken into consideration. Hence table 10 takes into account not only active time but down time. The latter numbers represent two years’ worth of weekends (some taken as rest and recuperation leave while on mission status), annual leave, and a modest average amount of sick leave taken. Considering the disease burdens in areas into which most UN integrated missions deploy, sick leave taken could easily be greater in practice. After the initial start-up, the mission’s rule of law needs for year two and beyond should be met, in periods of intense startup activity, from the proposed Senior Ready Reserve (below), with several weeks deployment overlap for more effective handover of responsibilities. In years with fewer mission startups, ROLCAP teams could be replaced after 12 months from within the standing capacity itself, to maintain a 50 percent deployment tempo. Other needed replacement staff for missions’ police component headquarters elements could be drawn from the UN Police Reserve. Year two-plus replacement personnel for non-police, rule of law components could be recruited in the normal manner for international civilian staff. The costs of sustaining ROLCAP as an institution, and the costs of non-deployed personnel, should be treated similarly to other system-wide mission support costs that are presently apportioned (pro-rated) across all missions as a common peace operations asset. At present, these include the Peacekeeping Support Account, which funds most of UN peacekeeping’s New York headquarters costs, and the operating costs of the UN Logistics Base at Brindisi.157 With half of deployable personnel not assigned to missions and a dozen staff who manage the institution but do not deploy, we estimate the apportioned cost of ROLCAP’s first year to be about $45 million (allowing for such things as facilities purchase and refurbishment) and about $33 million per year thereafter (table 11). Because ROLCAP members assigned to missions would both add to and offset current mission personnel costs, it would not be correct simply to define their cost as a summation of salaries, benefits, and Mission Subsistence Allowances. Some individuals would fill posts already budgeted, but would arrive earlier than under the current mission recruitment system. In other words, they would push the mission “vacancy rate” in their areas of specialization toward zero, arriving soon after the mission receives its mandate rather than over three to six months. Their marginal (additional) cost to the mission would be that extra 90–180 days on the job. Their marginal cost beyond 90–180 days would be nil, because the posts that they would fill quickly might well be filled by then under the current recruitment system—for these posts, the mission would incur the same costs under either system. 157 For an example of pro-rating, see United Nations, Financing of the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations; Financing of the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy – Note by the Secretary-General, A/C.5/61/31, 28 June 2006. 60 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Table 11: Estimating Annual Apportioned Cost for a 400-Strong Standing UN Rule of Law Capacity Total Apportioned ROLCAP Personnel Costs* Basing Costs Training Costs Total Cost Estimate Year One/Start-Up Annual/Recurring $27,919,000 $14,420,000 $2,792,000 $45,131,000 $27,919,000 $3,749,200 $1,396,000 $33,064,200 * Apportioned personnel costs assume a mission deployment tempo of 50 percent. ROLCAP personnel not assigned to missions will be engaged in short-term training of mission and/or police reserve personnel, vetting of potential reservists, and their own training programs, or will be on leave. These personnel costs not specific to any one mission are reflected here, and would be apportioned across all missions similar to the costs of the Peacekeeping Support Account and the support budget of the UN Logistics Base at Brindisi. The costs of ROLCAP personnel assigned to missions would be reflected in those missions' budgets (see table A3.6). Some ROLCAP personnel, however, would represent entirely new costs to the mission, particularly those in the police component, where at present only a handful of leadership and other key personnel occupy UN-salaried posts. Although the marginal costs of ROLCAP for the police component would be considerable, so would their marginal benefits to the mission. As early-arriving, knowledgeable personnel, they would be able not only to set up a new police component quickly but also to manage the influx of the main body of police—which, if the proposed police reserve is implemented, would be large and fast. ROLCAP personnel would be equipped by the missions in the same manner as all other individual police and civilian personnel. Since ROLCAP and reserve personnel would deploy faster, the mission would have to spend on equipment sooner and equipment demands on the Brindisi logistics base may be proportionately greater each time a new mission is launched. The price of a 400-person standing capacity would not be high by comparison to other costs of policing and police assistance. For example, the United States alone spent roughly ten times as much ($634 million) on international police assistance in 2004.158 If, moreover, ROLCAP had been available when the United Nations was given responsibility for peacekeeping in Liberia, one ROLCAP team plus mobilized police reservists might have met all of the mission’s police needs competently within a month or so of mission startup. Instead, the actual mission had less than ten percent of its authorized police on hand in the critical first 90 days, and those officers did not arrive fully-trained on UN procedures or fully-briefed on the mission. Less than half of the authorized number of police had arrived even six months after mission start-up (see table 12). Deploying a ROLCAP team and a full complement of police reservists within a month of mission launch would have added about 8.3 percent to UNMIL’s initial, nine-month budget. Continuing to draw from the police reserve would have cost the mature mission about 3.4 percent more than it actually spent in 2005–06 (the last period for which expenditure data are currently available).159 158 Bayley, Changing the Guard, 8. UNMIL was initially authorized roughly 750 individual police, three FPUs, and about 15,000 troops. Incremental costs for other missions would vary with the relative size of the police/rule of law presence in their structures. See Annex III for further details on how the existence of ROLCAP would have impacted the costs of the UNMIL operation. 159 Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 61 Table 12: Estimating Costs to UN Mission in Liberia of Using ROLCAP and Police Reserve UNMIL's Actual Costs for Professional Posts and Individual Police Officers UNMIL's Costs for Police/Rule of Law Budgeted Posts (Actual) Personnel Costs (Salaries and Benefits) $1,175,850 Travel (estimated) $36,000 Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA) $20,424 Operations Costs (estimated) $259,061 $1,232,274 Total Police/Rule of Law Professional Posts - Actual Costs UNMIL's Costs for Individual Police (Actual) Travel (estimated) $853,500 Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA) $10,373,910 Operations Costs (estimated) $4,283,498 $15,510,908 Total Individual Police Officers - Actual Costs UNMIL's Hypothetical Costs if Start-Up Covered by ROLCAP and Police Reserve UNMIL's Costs If Startup Covered by ROLCAP (Hypothetical) ROLCAP Personnel Costs $4,063,500 ROLCAP Travel $75,000 ROLCAP MSA $1,879,500 Operations Costs, ROLCAP $809,565 $6,827,565 Total ROLCAP - Hypothetical Cost UNMIL's Costs If Startup Covered by Reserve (Hypothetical) Reservist Per Capita Reimbursements to Sending State Police Agency $7,055,440 Reservist Travel Reservist MSA $1,237,500 $25,194,450 Operations Costs, Police Reserve Total Police Reserve - Hypothetical Costs $10,830,181 $44,317,571 UNMIL's Apportioned Share of ROLCAP/UNPR Basing, Training, and Related Costs:**** $12,280,585 Summary** Total actual UNMIL expenditures, 1 August 2003–30 June 2004: Total Marginal Cost of Using ROLCAP/Reserve in UNMIL Start-up, 03–04: Marginal Cost in Percentage Terms: Financial Impact of Using Reserve System on Mature Mission Costs:*** $548,278,700 $46,682,538 8.5% Total actual UNMIL expenditures, 1 July 2005-30 June 2006: $707,368,900 Total actual UNMIL expenditures for individual police, 2005–06: Estimated additional MSA and travel due to full deployment of police from reserve Estimated cost of reimbursements to reserve-participating police contributors: UNMIL's share of non-deployed ROLCAP (same as mission’s 2005–06 share of the Peacekeeping Support Account and Logistics Base, Brindisi): Total Marginal Cost of ROLCAP and UN Police Reserve to UNMIL, 2005–06: Marginal Cost in Percentage Terms: $36,550,100 $4,949,205 $9,551,532 $9,282,508 $23,783,245 3.4% * UNMIL authorized on 19 September 2003 and launched 1 October. ** For sources and details of analysis on mission start-up costs, see Annex Table A3.6. *** For sources and details of analysis on mature mission costs, see Annex Table A3.7. **** Assumes that 25 percent of UN Police Reserve are officers from developed countries, which was the actual proportion as of December 2006. Should the percentage of reservists from developed countries increase, support costs for nondeployed reservists would be higher. 62 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law In exchange for the added expenditure in its first year, UNMIL would have had much greater police capacity and greater initial credibility with the people of Liberia at a difficult time in the country’s transition from chaos, when there were no police in the capital city. In particular, the availability of a full complement of experienced individual police, backed up by FPUs, might have helped prevent the disorder that accompanied the first phase of UNMIL’s disarmament and demobilization program in December 2003.160 Structuring and Costing a UN Police Reserve (UNPR) We envision the proposed UN Police Reserve system as the standard mechanism for recruiting individual UN police officers in quantity. It should therefore be rather substantial in size, able to handle both the requirements of new missions and the rotational and replacement needs of already-established missions. The average new demand for individual UN police over the past 17 years has been nearly 2,000 officers per year. Ongoing missions must be staffed as well, as officers’ tours end every six to twelve months and they are replaced. As of late 2006, there were about 8,700 UN police of all types with UN peace operations, about 4,900 not in formed units. The proposed reserve system would need to be able to sustain that presence. The number of officers on reserve at any one time could be adjusted in accordance with average trends in demand (perhaps a three-year moving average) and corresponding limited-term commitments of three years, staggered so that a third of the reserve comes up for renewal or termination in any given year. Since the UN may be mandated to assume executive authority, or be given an assistance mandate where its police force would need to bear sidearms, a substantial percentage of the reserve personnel (say, about 25 percent) should be capable of armed law enforcement work. All officers nominated for the UN Police Reserve should be screened for professionalism and qualification prior to acceptance. They should be given preliminary certification training (carried out by the DPKO Integrated Training Service or a UN-accredited training center, perhaps with the assistance of ROLCAP personnel). Once selected for mission service, they should be available for deployment within 14 days. To increase states’ incentives to name quality individuals to the reserve, we propose, first, that governments be paid retainers for individuals who qualify for the reserve force and, second, be paid fixed levels of reimbursement for officers who are called to UN duty. The retainers should be paid to officers’ national, provincial, or local police agencies to cover two weeks cumulative annual training for police reservists—about five percent of their time—and thus five percent of their annual salary. The same contributing agencies should receive a further five percent incentive payment to encourage nomination of quality personnel (since rejected candidates generate no revenue). In exchange, the reservists’ agencies would agree to release them on the required notice for an agreed length of service in a UN peace operation, for example, for 6 or 12 months, followed by 12 or 24 months, respectively, of normal national policing duties following brief 160 “Due to a lack of preparedness and inadequate security, the situation in the cantonment site got out of hand, leading to looting and violence in the camp and elsewhere in the city.” Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, “Lessons Learned Study on the Start-up Phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia,” UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, April 2004, 16. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 63 readjustment leave. That would make the UN Police Reserve deployment tempo about 33 percent.161 Retainer payments would cease when reservists deploy, to be replaced by the fixed per capita reimbursement. Reimbursement rates should be comparable in amount to that paid by the United Nations for military and police personnel in formed units, and similarly adjusted for officers with “specialist” skills. Equipment for deploying reservists would be provided by the UN mission where they deploy, as at present for individual police, and MSA for these officers should continue to be the same as that paid international civilian staff and military observers.162 Sustaining a deployment of 4,900 individual police—the number of UN police in late 2006—at a deployment tempo of 33 percent would require two officers in waiting for every officer deployed from the reserve, or 9,800 non-deployed reservists. Some officers will not be available when needed (for example, due to illness, pregnancy, or an unstable security situation at home) and the numbers of particular specialties needed at any given time will vary. The system should have some slack built into it, say ten percent (or 1,470 officers). That implies a total UN Police Reserve, both deployed and non-deployed, of roughly 16,200. If this number sounds large, it is no larger than the pool of invisible/unknown individual officers that the United Nations must in fact tap into to meet its present policing mandates. Indeed, if UN rejection rates for officers presently offered by member states is about 50 percent, the current “pool” from which the UN now draws must be twice the size of the proposed ready reserve to produce the requisite number of (mostly) competent personnel. That pool may appear to be a free good to the United Nations, but the organization pays a heavy price in lack of overall quality, in lack of timely deployment, and in lack of advance knowledge as to available specialties. These deficits hamper planning, undercut mission effectiveness, waste the time of UN headquarters and field staff, and ultimately increase total mission deployment times and thus total costs. What, then, is a better way to pay for this system and its personnel? Estimating the costs of the proposed salary-based retainers to be paid reservists’ employers is complicated by the wide diversity in policing salaries around the globe.163 Precise costs would depend on the mix of 161 The contemplated deployment tempo for police reservists is lower than that for ROLCAP in recognition of governments’ own need for capable police officers and the officers’ likely reluctance to undertake back-to-back deployments. Trained officers who remain on the reserve list would be expected to undertake a further field rotation, however, after their home time has been fulfilled. We are agnostic as to whether the most desirable deployment period would be six or 12 months. For current police secondees unfamiliar with UN procedures and mission area alike, 12 months is a more efficient deployment period that allows for a period of familiarization in which value-added to mission may be relatively low. But pre-trained reservists may be effective on the job much sooner, six months absence may be more acceptable to their supervisors at home, and re-availability to the UN after 12 rather than 24 months would mean that they return to UN service with fresher memories of their prior field experience. 162 MSA and its de facto supplementary function as hazardous duty pay are separate and involved issues beyond the scope of the analysis here, as are questions about whether some sending states quietly “tax” MSA that is wired home. Appropriate safeguards and/or escrow accounts for that portion of MSA not taken in cash in the mission area might circumvent or deter such practices. For analysis of MSA, see Carnahan, et al., Economic Impact of Peacekeeping, Final Report, 18–19. 163 Consider, for example, that the average police salary in Monrovia, Liberia, is roughly $60 to $90 per month, while the average police salary in Monrovia, California, is roughly $4,164 to $5,315 per month. United Nations, Report of the Panel of Experts submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 (e) of Security Council resolution 1647 (2005) concerning Liberia, 64 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law nationalities in the reserve. We estimate the average costs of developing state police salaries using, as a proxy, the mid-level government salaries paid by several states and territories hosting UN peace operations, as gleaned by the 2006 Economic Impact of Peacekeeping study cosponsored by the DPKO Best Practices Section. The average mid-level salary of these locales (Burundi, DRC, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste) is $100 per month. For average developed state salaries, we use a mid-size California (US) town as a proxy, at roughly $4,750 per month.164 At the end of 2006, officers from developed states accounted for just over 25 percent of deployed individual UN police, or an average annual salary across the force of about $15,000, while a force with 50 percent developed state participation would average $29,000. The costs of annual retainers at 10 percent of annual salary, for a reserve of about 11,300 police, would be about $17 million for the first mix and about $33 million for the second. Training costs, equivalent to five percent of salary, as for ROLCAP, would add between $8 and $16 million per year. The Police Division, which should have policy and overall management responsibility for a UN Police Reserve, would need a modest bump-up in posts for managing the reserve—let us say one post per thousand reservists, or about 15 additional posts altogether.165 These would add about $2.75 million a year to the cost of the reserve system, for a total annual cost of $28 to $52 million. As with ROLCAP, these costs of maintaining the reserve system should be apportioned across UN missions as common assets. They are built into the calculations in table 12. (See also Annex III, table A3.4.) The marginal costs of deploying police reservists to missions would equal the costs of the new reimbursement structure, as police seconded to UN missions are already transported to and from the mission and allocated MSA. The annual costs to reimburse sending agencies for 4,900 deployed reservists would range from about $69 million (if all were reimbursed as nonspecialists, at $1,100 per month) to about $86 million (if all were reimbursed as “specialists,” at $1,400 per month).166 Actual costs would fall somewhere in between, depending on the number of specialists in the active force. Developed states’ police agencies would make real money from retainers (for the one to two years that officers spend on reserve status in each cycle), but they would not recover their costs when those officers are deployed for UN work, despite the reimbursement system. They would therefore tend to bet that officers placed on the reserve would not be needed and might need highlevel encouragement to nominate high-quality people. Developing states’ police agencies would make a little from the retainers but a lot from deployments. They would thus nominate officers in hopes that they would be called up and would have significant incentive to nominate qualified and capable personnel. The difference between salaries and reimbursements could be enough in the latter cases that, where reimbursements substantially exceed (by, say, a factor of five or more) the real salaries of seconded officers, sending agencies and the United Nations should enter into a S/2006/379, 7 June 2006, and City of Monrovia, “Police Officer Recruitment,” brochure, www.ci.monrovia.ca.us/city_hall/human_resources/Police%20Officer.pdf. 164 Ibid., and Carnahan, et al., Economic Impact of Peacekeeping, table 5.2. 165 In managing the police reserve, the Police Division would be assisted by ROLCAP, whose non-deployed personnel could assist with testing, managing, training, and rotating UN police reservists. 166 United Nations, Review of the rates of reimbursement to the Governments of troop-contributing States, Report of the Secretary-General, A/57/774, 3 April 2003, table 1. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 65 memorandum of understanding that the surplus be reinvested in the capabilities and professionalism of the sending force itself. As with the standing capacity, a comprehensive strategy for ensuring accountability should accompany the creation of a UN Police Reserve. These officers should abide by the laws they are hired to support or to enforce, and conduct themselves as professional civil servants with respect to the local population, which is critical to the success of the proposed arrangements. Structuring and Costing a Senior Reserve Roster (SRR) The Senior Reserve Roster would provide experienced, international civil servants to UN operations. Former heads of mission and other senior personnel with valuable management skills and effectiveness based on their experience in previous UN operations could be encouraged to enroll in the SRR. Maintaining a roster of highly-qualified senior personnel, particularly those with previous UN service, would give the organization an ability to predictably and effectively fill critical posts in new and ongoing missions, a capacity that has been attempted with only mixed success since being recommended by the Brahimi Report.167 While initially aimed at senior leadership in rule of law related posts, the roster could be expanded to include potential candidates for Special Representative and other key mission leadership roles, as well as senior advisor/mentor positions in security sector reform and capacity-building programs. For an individual ready reserve roster of senior retired personnel, a retainer system may or may not be needed to ensure availability of the right people at the right time. Using such payments to buy specific availability might be worthwhile. Retainers could be paid directly to the individual in exchange for willingness to serve in a 12-month mission appointment upon agreed notice. The size of such retainer might be keyed to agreed call-up notice and range from, say, five percent of expected active-duty salary for agreement to deploy on 30 days notice to no fee for agreement to deploy upon notice of six months or longer. When called up, members of this roster would serve and be paid as international civil servants on mission. To assure quality of service, all members of the roster should be certified by the DPKO Integrated Training Service or by a regional training program using UN training standards. Periodic refresher training should also be offered, with the UN bearing transport and meeting costs. The size of this roster should be equivalent to the upper tier of ROLCAP, which it would be intended, in most instances, to replace as they rotate out of the field, with room for police, judges, or other criminal justice experts who, having retired from their local or national positions, wish to offer their services to the United Nations directly. Thus it could range in size from a minimum necessary 50 people (counterparts to the D1’s and P5’s in ROLCAP) to as many persons as might be considered useful to have on call to fill out and sustain operations. If 20 percent of the roster was available for rapid deployment and training costs are assumed equivalent to five percent of deployed, UN-level, salary and benefits, then the average per capita cost of the roster would be roughly $11,000 (see Annex III, table A3.5). Together, these three elements—the UN Rule of Law Capacity, a UN Police Reserve, and Senior 167 A/55/305-S/2000/809, paras. 95–96, 101. On prior attempts to establish rosters and procedures for selecting mission leadership, see Durch, Holt, et al., The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations, 67. 66 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Reserve Roster—would provide core competency to the police and rule of law components of peace operations deployed by the United Nations. Such a system is long overdue, yet clearly possible, given the ongoing desire of UN member states to address the organization’s ability to deploy police and rule of law personnel in peace operations. Implementation of these proposals would improve prospects for longer-term stability, justice, and peace where such missions serve. —7— CONCLUSIONS I n this study, we have focused on current (indeed, longstanding) gaps in UN capacity to meet its mandated requirements to provide public security and/or promote the rule of law through integrated operations deployed in post-conflict environments. These shortfalls, in turn, affect the ability of UN peace operations to rapidly and effectively constitute programs for rebuilding and reforming the host state security sector, which is a prerequisite to effective, legitimate postconflict governance and sustainable peace. Given the centrality of international police and other rule of law support to effective post-conflict peacekeeping and peacebuilding, we have argued that the time has come to develop policies and institutional responses to finally resolve the UN’s longstanding deficiencies in these fields. We have offered a series of recommendations that reach well beyond what has been proposed to date with regard to either standing or reserve UN capacity in this area. We have argued that part of the solution lies in giving the UN greater standing capacity to manage the rule of law elements of its operations, and that part lies in giving UN member states incentives to contribute qualified police in the needed numbers to UN missions. In making these recommendations, we have attempted to balance long-standing operational needs against the financial and political costs that meeting those needs may entail. Our proposals—for a Standing UN Rule of Law Capacity, a standby UN Police Reserve, and a supplementary Senior Reserve Roster—are designed to improve the timely execution of increasingly complex mandates handed down by the UN Security Council for the rule of law components of UN peace operations, with minimum necessary cost and maximum cost-effectiveness. The United Nations remains the organization of choice for comprehensive management of postconflict peacebuilding. Although other institutions have become engaged on the military side of peace operations, and the European Union is developing a deployable policing capacity, the UN is still the dominant global provider of immediate post-conflict support to societies and governments attempting the difficult transition from often long-running war to lasting peace. No other entity is so frequently called upon to provide law and order support and, in particular, to provide direct assistance to local police forces in their law enforcement tasks, while seeking at the same time to transform them into successful and accountable providers of public safety who also enjoy the public’s trust. It is critical that the United Nations improve its ability to carry out these essential tasks. These needed improvements require the commitment and support of member states. Over the years, states’ willingness and ability to offer the UN qualified individual police officers in a timely manner has consistently fallen short of the organization’s operational needs. Willingness to contribute names to individual ready rosters has been minimal, yet states have proven increasingly responsive to requests for formed police units, in part because they can recoup at least some of the costs of those contributions, which they cannot now do with regard to individual officers. Solutions to the shortfall in individual UN police officers must thus address state 68 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law incentives as well as UN needs, and our proposals do so. Indeed, if a ready reserve system were to be established as proposed here, states may insist on contributing officers only through that system, because of the participation incentives built into it, reversing present attitudes toward roster-like arrangements. Local populations increasingly bear the brunt of the suffering and destruction unleashed by contemporary conflicts. These populations deserve to feel safe from the crime and chaos that often erupt in the wake of war. They deserve domestic police forces that are accountable, respectful, and effective in resurrecting law and order from the ashes of violent conflict. They deserve, in turn, timely and competent international support that will train, guide, support, and where necessary insist that those local forces move in these directions. To promulgate the mandates but not provide the means to achieve these objectives in a timely and professional manner risks raising false hopes that turn into disillusionment among those who have already suffered from too much of both. ANNEX I: RULE OF LAW MANDATES AND TASKS IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS Table A1.1: Key Rule of Law Language in Security Council Resolutions, 1964–2007 Dates Key Language from Mandates or Relevant Documents March 1964– August 1974 Cyprus United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) Resolution 186 (1964): To contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. (Mission continued with a more limited observer mandate after Turkish forces bisected Cyprus in August 1974 into de facto Greek and Turkish Cypriot sectors.) April 1989– March 1990 Namibia United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) S/20412 (S-G Report): 40…As regards UNTAG’s civilian police monitors, the concept was first described in paragraph 9 of the Settlement Proposal (S/12636): Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in Namibia during the transition period shall rest with the existing police forces. The Administrator-General (UN)…shall ensure the good conduct of the police forces and shall take the necessary action to ensure their suitability for continued employment during the transition period…[and] make arrangements…for United Nations personnel to accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties. January 1991– Guatemala May 1997 United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) General Assembly Resolution A/RES/48/467: Authorized verification mission with mandate delineated in Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights for Guatemala: X-16-B: Offer its support to the judiciary and its auxiliary organs, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Counsel for Human Rights, and the Presidential Human Rights Committee in order to contribute to the development and strengthening of institutions for the protection of human rights and due legal process. Resolution 1094 (1996): authorized mission with mandate outlined S/1996/1045 (S-G Report): B-8: Any police activities within these zones [security zones around URNG assembly points] will be subject to coordination with the United Nations verification authorities B-12: Police activities may be carried out [in security zones] subject to coordination with the [UN] verification authority” April 1991– Present United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Resolution 690 (1991), with mandate as outlined in S/21360 (S-G Report): (b) To monitor activities of the existing police forces so as to ensure that they are acting in strict accordance with the settlement proposals and the present implementation plan, which are intended to secure the organization of a free and fair referendum without military or administrative constraints and to prevent any possibility of intimidation or interference from any quarter. May 1991– Angola February 1995 United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) Resolution 696 (1991): Authorizes mission with a mandate “in line with the Peace Accords of Angola”: III- 2.1: The neutrality of the police…shall be the object of verification and monitoring by teams of monitors composed of two members designated by the Government of the People’s Republic of Angola, two members designated by UNITA and one expert in police affairs to be designated by and subordinate to the United Nations command structure. III- 2.2: Within the sphere of their authority, the monitoring teams shall have as their specific mandate the duty to visit police facilities, examine their activities, and investigate possible violations by political rights committed by the police. July 1991– April 1995 United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) Resolution 693 (1991): Authorized mission with mandate specified in Agreement on Human Rights-El Salvador: 14 (h): to offer its support to the judicial authorities of El Salvador in order to help improve the judicial procedures for the protection of human rights and increase respect for the rules of due process of law. Peace Agreement of 1991: II-1-B: The organization of the National Civil Police and the general outlines of its staff profile shall be determined…under close international cooperation and supervision, coordinated by the United Nations. II-3-B (d): International legal advisory services shall be staffed by suitable personnel and high-level specialists…coordinated by the United Nations…. S/23402 (S-G Report): CIVPOL were to: 7. …work closely with the Salvadorian police, monitoring their activities in order to ensure that they are conducted with professionalism, objectivity and impartiality.…Mobile monitoring …by accompanying police patrols and monitoring their activities by random checks …to deter intimidation, reprisals, or other violations of the civil rights of all sectors of the population. Western Sahara El Salvador 69 Mission Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch Country Dates Key Language from Mandates or Relevant Documents February 1992–March 1995 Former Yugoslavia United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Resolution 743 (1992): Mission authorized as outlined in S/23592 (S-G Report), 17 (c): “To monitor the work of the local police forces, in accordance with paragraph 12 of the plan,” and S/23280, (S-G Report, Annex III): 12: “The role of the United Nations police monitors would be to ensure that the local police forces carried out their duties without discriminating against persons of any nationality of abusing anyone’s human rights [but only within the United Nations Protected Areas].” February 1992– September 1993 Cambodia United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) Resolution 745 (1992): Authorized mission with mandate outlined in the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict: B-4 (b): “All civil police will operate under UNTAC supervision or control, in order to ensure that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully protected. In consultation with the SNC , UNTAC will supervise other law enforcement and judicial processes throughout Cambodia to the extent necessary to ensure the attainment of these objectives.” December 1992– December 1994 Mozambique United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) Resolution 898 (1994): Authorized CIVPOL deployment “with the mandate and deployment described in paragraphs 9 to 18 of document S/1994/89/Add. 1 (S-G Report), 9 (a): to monitor all police activities in the country, including those of PRM and any other police and security agencies and verify that their actions are fully consistent with the General Peace Agreement 9 (c): to provide technical support to the National Police Commission 9 (e): to verify the strength and location of government police forces, their materiel, as well as any other information which might be needed in support of the peace process 9 (f): to monitor and verify the process of the reorganization and retraining of the quick reaction police and its activities, as well as to verify their weapons and equipment 9 (g): to monitor, together with other ONUMOZ components, the proper conduct of the electoral campaign and verify that the political rights of individuals, groups and political organizations are respected, in accordance with the General Peace Agreement and relevant electoral documents 12. …CIVPOL’s functions would be carried out by stationing United Nations teams in the vicinity of the Mozambican police stations, posts and by extensive patrolling. In order to monitor certain activities, police observers would be deployed at various national police headquarters. At the same time, ONUMOZ would have unrestricted access to the general public and would be able to gather information as well as to receive complaints from individuals and organizations. CIVPOL would conduct its own investigations, on the basis of such complaints, as well as independently, into politically motivated offences and, when necessary, recommend corrective action. Information about such investigations would be provided promptly to the National Police Affairs Commission and the national authorities. 13. Special attention would be given to the systematic verification of weapons and equipment in the possession of the national police and of private agencies and to monitoring the activities of the quick reaction police force, whose facilities would also be visited on a regular basis; ONUMOZ would also examine the latter’s role and structure. 14. …All violations of the Criminal Code will be investigated by the Mozambican police, with the possibility of parallel investigations being conducted by CIVPOL, when the latter considers it appropriate...It may be necessary to familiarize local police with the international concepts of rights, civil liberties and fundamental freedoms, as well as the codes of conduct the political parties might agree to observe during the electoral process…United Nations police observers would assist the electoral observers of ONUMOZ in monitoring the registration process and the electoral campaign. In this context, they would also monitor security at the polling stations, including the security arrangements for the storage, counting and transporting of ballot papers and other election material. Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Mission 70 Country Dates Mission Key Language from Mandates or Relevant Documents March 1993– March 1995 Somalia United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) Resolution 814 (1993): 4 (c): To assist in the re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate at the local, regional or national level; to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability, and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law Resolution 897 (1994): 4 (d): Assisting in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system. August 1993– Present Georgia United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) Resolution 1495 (2003): Authorized 20 CIVPOL officers with mission, as outlined in S/2003/751 (S-G Report), (19) …[T]o build the capacity of local law enforcement by coordinating and facilitating assistance with respect to training and equipment; the provision of advice to and monitoring of local law enforcement agencies; and the facilitation of cooperation across the ceasefire line.” S/2003/1019 (S-G Report): [CIVPOL]… will advise UNOMIG civilian and military leadership on law enforcement issues; coordinate and facilitate assistance in training and equipment for the local law enforcement agencies; monitor and provide onthe-job training and advice to local law enforcement agencies; and facilitate cross-ceasefire-line cooperation through joint activities and on-the-job-training.” United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) Resolution 872 (1993): 3 (h): To investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police. Resolution 965 (1994): 3 (b): Assist in the establishment and training of a new, integrated, national police force. October 1993– Rwanda March 1996 September 1993– June 1996 Haiti United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) Resolution 867 (1993): 3. Provide guidance and training to all levels of the Haitian police and monitor the way in which the operations are implemented. Resolution 940 (1994): 9. …assist the democratic Government of Haiti…with…(b) The professionalization of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force. February 1995–June 1997 Angola United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) Resolution 976 (1995): Mission established “to assist the parties in restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation in Angola” with mandate outlined in the Lusaka Protocol: 2.1 Verification and monitoring of the activities of the Angolan National Police, placed under the legitimate authority, in order to guarantee its neutrality. 2.2 Verification and monitoring of the process of quartering the Rapid Reaction Police and the adaptation of its armament and equipment to the nature of its mission. 2.3 Establishment of the timetable and the identification of the quartering areas for the Rapid Reaction Police on D-Day +10, jointly with the Government and in the presence of UNITA and the Representatives of the observer States. 2.5. Verification and monitoring of the protection, storage and custody of all the armaments in the hands of civilians, by the Angolan National Police. 2.6 Verification and monitoring of the neutrality of the activities of the Angolan National Police relating to the commitments made in matters of security arrangements guaranteed for the UNITA leaders. 2.7 Verification and monitoring of the neutrality of the activity of the Angolan Police in their task of protecting the Polling Station Officers and the candidate agents of the participating candidates. United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) Resolution 983 (1995): UNPROFOR within the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia shall be known as the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force … with the mandate set out in paragraph 85 of the Report of the Secretary-General of 22 March 1995 (S/1995/222): “the same responsibilities and composition as UNPROFOR has at present in those Republics,” per Resolution 743, as outlined in S/23592 (S-G Report): To monitor the work of the local police forces. March 1995– Macedonia February 1999 Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch Country 71 Dates Key Language from Mandates or Relevant Documents March1995– January 1996 Croatia United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) Resolution 990 (1995): Mission authorized with mandate specified in S/1995/320 (S-G Report): IV-15 (f): Civilian police monitors (CIVPOL) will supervise the local police which, under the ceasefire agreement, is obliged to assist UNCRO in the prevention of crime and maintenance of law and order in the area between forward troop deployment lines. IV- 15 (g): CIVPOL will patrol the area between the forward troop deployment lines in order to enhance confidence and identify policing requirements. IV- 15 (i): UNCRO will conduct liaison activities with military and policing authorities at all levels. IV- 20 (e): UNCRO will contribute to deterring human rights abuse by maintaining an overall presence; closely monitor and colocate with local police forces; monitor judicial institutions to enhance respect for human rights. December 1995– December 2002 Bosnia and Herzegovina United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) Resolution 1035 (1995): Authorizes UN International Police Task Force (UNIPTF), as mandated in the General Framework Agreement for Peace, Annex 11, Article III, para. 1: (a) monitoring, observing, and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities, including associated judicial organizations, structures, and proceedings; (b) advising law enforcement personnel and forces; (c) training law enforcement personnel; (d) facilitating, within the IPTF’s mission of assistance, the Parties’ law enforcement capacities; (e) assessing threats to public order and advising of the capability of law enforcement agencies to deal with such threats; (f) advising governmental authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the organization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies; and (g) assisting by accompanying the Parties’ law enforcement personnel as they carry out their responsibilities, as the IPTF deems appropriate. Resolution 1088 (1996): incorporate tasks referred to in the Conclusions of the London Peace Implementation Conference (PIC): “improving the effectiveness of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) by allowing it to investigate or assist with investigations into allegations of misconduct by police and to propose the sanctioning of offenders; ensuring police reform and providing material and financial support conditional upon implementation of democratic policing principles and cooperation with the IPTF; obtaining additional resources from the international community.” Additionally, UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBIH), which by this time oversees the IPTF, is charged with providing assistance in the “setting up” of “effective institutions without delay; amending laws inconsistent with the Constitution; [and] creating the conditions for a viable and democratic civil society.” Resolution 1144 (1997): Mandate revised to incorporate tasks from the Conclusions of the Bonn PIC: I-2-a: The judicial appointment process must be reformed to ensure that selection is based on merit rather than political or ethnic criteria… A facility for judicial training ...established and …the judicial system [monitored]. I-2-b: support for the “ongoing criminal justice reform effort within the Federation” and promoting “consistency and co-operation between the Two Entities in the area of legal reform” and “cooperat[ion]” with the Council of Europe and OSCE in a “program of judicial and legal reform” IV-3: to train Bosnian police to address more effectively key public security issues, such as refugee returns; organized crime, corruption and terrorism; and public security crisis management (including crowd control) IV-5: to “train the Entities’ police forces in the detection of financial crime, smuggling, and corruption, in co-operation with those international organizations involved in customs training. Resolution 1184 (1998): calling for “the establishment by the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) of a programme to monitor and assess the court system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as part of the overall programme of legal reform outlined by the Office of the High Representative,” pursuant to S/1998/314 (9 April 1998) transmitting the Ninth Report from the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement: “A comprehensive process is needed to ensure that judicial appointments are based on merit rather than political criteria, and to ensure that all ethnic groups are fairly represented in the judicial system. At the same time, training programmes for legal professionals, including the initiative to establish a judicial training institute for Bosnia and Herzegovina, should be supported.” (para. 82) January 1996– Eastern January 1998 Slavonia United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Resolution 1037 (1996): 11 (a): to establish a temporary police force, define its structure and size, develop a training program and oversee its implementation, and monitor treatment of offenders and the prison system, as set out in paragraph 16 (a) of the SecretaryGeneral’s report (S/1995/128): Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Mission 72 Country Dates July 1996– July 1997 Country Haiti Key Language from Mandates or Relevant Documents Baranja, and Western Serium (UNTAES) 16 (a): …[T]o establish a temporary police force; define its structure and size; develop a training program and oversee its implementation; and monitor treatment of offenders and the prison system…[m]onitoring law enforcement institutions, border monitoring, training and monitoring the prison system. Much of the work would need to be done on a 24-hour basis and would include an element of human rights monitoring. 11 (b): to undertake tasks relating to civil administration as set out in paragraph 16 (b) of the Secretary-General’s Report (S/1995/1028): 16 (b): …[T]o oversee local judicial procedures. United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) Resolution 1063 (1996): 2. [To] assist the Government of Haiti in the professionalization of the police and in the maintenance of a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of current efforts to establish and train an effective national police force S/1996/416 (S-G Report) specified, in para. 34: (a): Assistance to the Haitian authorities in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police; (b): Assistance to the Haitian authorities in maintaining a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of the current efforts to establish and train an effective national police force; [and] (c): Coordination of activities by the United Nations system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation in Haiti. United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) Resolution 1118 (1997): Authorized mission “with the objectives, mandate, and organizational structure recommended by the Secretary-General in section VII of his report of 5 June 1997” (S/1997/438): 36….[C]ontinue to verify the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, the incorporation of UNITA personnel into the national police, the quartering and occasional deployment of the rapid reaction police, as well as the free circulation of people and goods….special attention should be given to respect for civil and political rights and freedoms. With a view to generating confidence among the population, the civilian police would be called on to carry out joint patrols with the Angolan National Police, especially in areas formerly controlled by UNITA, to inspect prisons and, if need be, to establish its temporary presence at national police posts and stations. 37. The Mission’s civilian police unit would continue to monitor and verify the collection of weapons recovered from the civilian population, supervise proper storage or destruction of these weapons and oversee security arrangements for UNITA leaders. Haiti United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) Resolution 1123 (1997): [T]o assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police, as set out in paragraphs 32 to 39 of the Secretary-General’s report of 19 July 1997” (S/1997/564): 38. During the forthcoming four months, the civilian police element would gradually shift its tasks to the training of three of the HNP specialized units—crowd control, rapid reaction force and Palace security…The Mission and UNDP would also continue to prepare a technical assistance programme. 41. …A follow-on presence in order to provide advice and active support in the fields of public security and judicial reform, as well as in the monitoring of human rights, will be required for at least the medium term. December 1997– March 2000 Haiti United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) Resolution 1141 (1991): To assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian national police, …including mentoring Haitian national police field performance, set out in paragraphs 39-40 of the Report of the Secretary-General of 31 October 1997 (S/1997/832): 3. The proposed mission…would oversee the technical assistance to the Haitian National Police funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 5. [G]ive special emphasis to assistance at the supervisory levels and to training specialized units of the national police force. In addition, they would, periodically and in selected areas, continue to monitor the performance of the Haitian National Police, guide agents in their day-to-day duties and maintain close coordination with technical advisers to the Haitian National Police funded by UNDP. They would not undertake patrolling activities. 6. Technical assistance to the Haitian National Police will be carefully monitored by UNDP…with special attention to the professional conduct and management of the police force, as well as respect for human rights. Resolution 1212 (1998): To extend the present mandate, including the concept of operation of MIPONUH…in order to continue to assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police in accordance with the arrangements set out in paragraph 32 of the Report of the Secretary-General of 11 November 1998 (S/1998/1064), including 73 August 1997– November 1997 Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch June 1997– Angola February 1999 Mission Dates Country Mission Key Language from Mandates or Relevant Documents United Nations Police Support Group (UNPSG) Resolution 1145 (1997): 13. To continue to monitor the performance of the Croatian police in the Danube region, particularly in connection with the return of displaced persons, in accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the Report of the Secretary-General (S/1997/953), and in response to the request by the Government of the Republic of Croatia” S/1997/953 (S-G Report): 38…[M]onitoring investigations by the Croatian police of any allegations of police misconduct in connection with the return of displaced persons to the region and the provision of limited on-the-job training to improve professional capability of the local police. April 1998– Central February 2000 African Republic United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) Resolution 1159 (1998): 10 (b): To assist the national security forces in maintaining law and order and in protecting key installations in Bangui; 10 (e): To assist in the coordination with other international efforts in a short-term police trainers program and in other capacitybuilding efforts of the national police, and to provide advice on the restructuring of the national police and special police forces 14 (e): To provide advice and facilitate technical assistance in the areas of good governance and the rule of law. July 1998– October 1999 Sierra Leone United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) June 1999– Present Kosovo, Serbia United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) Resolution 1181 (1998): 8 (a) To advise, in coordination with other international efforts, the Government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on police practice, training, re-equipment and recruitment, in particular on the need to respect internationally accepted standards of policing in democratic societies; advise on the planning of the reform and restructuring of the Sierra Leone police force, and monitor progress. Resolution 1244 (1999): 10 (i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo S/1999/779 (S-G Report), further specified: VI-2-60: Two main goals will define UNMIK’s law and order strategy in Kosovo: provision of interim law enforcement services, and the rapid deployment of a credible, professional and impartial Kosovo Police Service (KPS). VI-2-61: …UNMIK’s civilian police will advise KFOR on policing matters and establish liaison with local and international counterparts. The special police units under UNMIK control will also establish liaison with local and international counterparts and protect United States installations, if needed. UNMIK border police will advise KFOR units stationed at the border. VI-2-62: …UNMIK civilian police will carry out normal police duties and will have executive law enforcement authority. At that time, UNMIK civilian police will be armed. To the extent that trained local police become available through the police academy through UNMIK’s institution-building component, UNMIK civilian police will initiate on-the-job training, advising, and mentoring. UNMIK special police units will carry out public order functions, such as crowd control and area security. VI-2-64: UNMIK will begin developing a professional Kosovo Police Service immediately, recruiting candidates on the basis of stringent standards for selection and conducting ongoing screening and background checks…Training for selected candidates will include basic training organized under the police academy, as well as field training under the supervision and guidance of UNMIK civilian police…UNMIK civilian police will, moreover, maintain the capacity and authority to conduct independent investigations of alleged human rights violations or other misconduct by members of KPS. It will also be responsible for developing an effective and transparent command structure for KPS in accordance with international standards of democratic policing. Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law January 1998– Croatia October 1998 74 mentoring Haitian national police field performance and strengthening the capability of the central directorate of the police force to manage aid provided to it from bilateral and multilateral sources.” S/1998/1064 (S-G Report): 32. …In addition to monitoring the field performance of the Haitian National Police, the principal tasks for the Mission during the new mandate period, if so authorized by the Council, would be to reinforce training already given to middle and senior cadres of the force, to reinforce the creation of a proper command structure and administration, and to strengthen the work already done on community policing. It will be essential at the same time to ensure that, on the eventual departure of MIPONUH, the central directorate of the police force has a functioning capability. Dates Country Mission Key Language from Mandates or Relevant Documents VI-2-65: [O]nce properly trained and selected local police in sufficient strength are available, UNMIK will transfer responsibilities for law and order and border policing functions to the Kosovo Police Service. At that time, UNMIK civilian and border police will revert to training, advising, and monitoring functions. VI-3-67: Under its civil administration component, UNMIK will have a Judicial Affairs Office, with four major areas of responsibility: the administration of courts, prosecution services, and prisons; the development of legal policies; the review and drafting of legislation, as necessary, for the goals and purposes of UNMIK; and the assessment of the quality of justice in Kosovo, including training requirements. United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) Resolution 1272 (1999): 2 (a): to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor 3: Decides further that UNTAET will have objectives and a structure along the lines set out in part IV of the Report of the Secretary-General (S/1999/1024): 58. To maintain law and order; to recruit, train and establish an East Timor police force. 59. . . . A civilian police unit will consist of 1,250 officers holding executive enforcement functions. An armed border/marine police unit . . . will be deployed to designated border crossing points . . . Two armed rapid reaction units . . . will provide specialized capabilities for crowd control and operational support, and standby rapid response capacity to the civilian police unit.” Additionally, Press Release SC/6745, outlined the role of UNTAET as described in S/1999/1024: “UNTAET will be responsible for the administration of courts, prosecution services and prisons, the development of legal policies, the review and drafting of legislation for the goals and purposes of UNTAET, and the assessment of the quality of justice in East Timor, including training requirements…An independent judicial commission will be established to advise the Special Representative on judicial appointments” and “The Transitional Administration will develop interim law enforcement services and rapidly develop a credible, professional, and impartial East Timor police service…International police will be deployed, commanded by a Police Commander, to maintain law and order, recruit, train, and establish an East Timor police force, and monitor and assist in the safe return of displaced persons and refugees.” 75 VI-3-69: Newly appointed judges should receive continuous training, particularly in the area of the law and application of international instruments on human rights…In addition, it will be important to provide immediate “quick start” training programs in domestic and international law for those Kosovo Albanian lawyers who were trained during the time of the “parallel institutions” or were banned from practicing their profession in the past decade. These efforts will be supplemented by the dissemination of international instruments in local language. VI-3-70: UNMIK will also establish a technical advisory commission on the structure and administration of the judiciary and prosecution service. VI-3-71: UNMIK will re-establish the Supreme Court of Kosovo, which was abolished in 1990, to hear, inter alia, appeals against decisions of the current five district courts in Kosovo. Similarly, a General Prosecutor’s Office will be re-established. VI-3-73: The establishment of strong and independent judges and prosecutors associations in Kosovo is an additional and essential institutional safeguard for building and securing an independent judiciary. At the same time, UNMIK will sponsor the revival of the Kosovo Bar Association to help identify and build legal capacities and further support the creation of an effective judiciary. VI-3-74: UNMIK is also planning to establish a legal aid scheme to facilitate equal access to courts and ensure the provision of legal assistance, where required. VI-3-75: UNMIK will initiate a process to amend current legislation in Kosovo, as necessary, including criminal laws, the law on internal affairs and the law on public peace and order. VI-3-76: UNMIK will address on a priority basis the problem of identification and documentation of all people in Kosovo, particularly returnees and IDPs. This process will contribute to maintaining law and order, facilitate the restoration of social services and help to resolve a number of potential legal problems, including property rights. VI-3-78: UNMIK, with the support of other international organizations and agencies, will establish a standard registry of property claims; redress legal measures on property taken in recent years and that in any way discriminate against any ethnic group; and rebuild the property and cadastral records. UNMIK will also establish a court to review property disputes. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch October 1999– East Timor May 2002 UNMIK (cont.) Dates Country Mission November 1999–Present Democratic Republic of the Congo United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) Resolution 1355 (2001): 31: Approves the updated concept of operations put forward by the Secretary-General in paragraphs 84 to 104 of his report of 8 June 2001 (S/2001/572): 98. [C]onduct a more in-depth assessment of the policing institution, its needs, and capabilities [and] to prepare recommendations for an eventual expanded MONUC Civilian Police component wherever MONUC military personnel are deployed and to advise and assist the local authorities in the discharge of their responsibility to ensure the security of the population. Resolution 1565 (2004): 5. Decides that MONUC will also have the following mandate, in support of the Government of National Unity and Transition: (a) to contribute to arrangements taken for the security of the institutions and the protection of officials of the Transition in Kinshasa until the integrated police unit for Kinshasa is ready to take on this responsibility and assist the Congolese authorities in the maintenance of order in other strategic areas, as recommended in paragraph 103 (c) of the Secretary-General’s third special report… 7: To provide advice and assistance to the transitional government and authorities, in accordance with the commitments of the Global and Inclusive Agreement, including by supporting the three joint commissions outlined in paragraph 6 of the SecretaryGeneral’s third special report, in order to contribute to their efforts, with a view to take forward: (a) essential legislation, including the future constitution, (b) security sector reform, including the integration of national defence and internal security forces together with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. Special Report of the Secretary-General (S/2004/650): 103 (c): Contribution to the maintenance of order in strategic areas through active monitoring and mentoring of local police units such as the integrated police unit in Kinshasa (74 officers) and the new police forces in Ituri (43 officers). Together with the necessary headquarters and support staff (32 officers), this would require an increase in MONUC civilian police strength to 507 officers. May 2002– May 2005 East Timor United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) Resolution 1410 (2002): 2 (b): To provide interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East Timor, the East Timor Police Service (ETPS). Report of the Secretary-General (S/2002/432) further specified mandate: III-A-64 (b): To assist in the development of a law enforcement agency in East Timor operating in accordance with international human rights standards III-A-76: To continue to assist in the conduct of investigations and court proceedings to bring to justice those responsible for serious crimes committed in 1999. III-A-79: To continue providing executive policing after independence, and to support the development of the East Timor Police Service through training, co-location and the timely and coordinated handover of responsibilities III-A-85: Throughout the transition period, specialized training, including training in human rights, and management skills, would Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Resolution 1289 (2000): 10 (d): “To coordinate with and assist the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities,” as specified in S/2000/13 (S-G Report): 36. [A]dvise and assist, in close cooperation with other international efforts, the Government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on the restructuring and training of the Sierra Leonean police forces…[B]e deployed at the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites and population centres to provide advice on the maintenance of law and order. 37. UNAMSIL should be prepared, if needed, to assist the Government in its efforts to maintain law and order at the [disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration] sites as soon as possible. 76 October 1999– Sierra Leone United Nations Mission in Sierra December Leone 2005 (UNAMSIL) Key Language from Mandates or Relevant Documents Dates Country Mission UNMISET (cont.) Key Language from Mandates or Relevant Documents be provided. UNMISET would continue to develop the organizational capacity and integrity of the East Timor Police Service, and review its entire organizational structure. Upon endorsement of the organizational structure and handover of the headquarters…, the national police commissioner would assume full executive responsibility over the police, while a limited number of UNMISET police would remain in an advisory role. Resolution 1543 (2004): 3 (i): support for the public administration and justice system of Timor-Leste and for justice in the area of serious crimes 3 (ii): support to the development of law enforcement in Timor-Leste 3 (iii): support for the security and stability of Timor-Leste Liberia April 2004– Present Cote d’Ivoire United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) Resolution 1528 (2004): 6 (p) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international organizations in restoring a civilian policing presence throughout Côte d’Ivoire, and to advise the Government of National Reconciliation on the restructuring of the internal security services, (q) To assist… in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law. Resolution 1609 (2005): 2 (s): “to contribute, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, to the security of the areas where voting is to take place, 2 (w): “to assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with the African Union, ECOWAS and other international organizations in restoring a civilian policing presence throughout Cote d’Ivoire, to advise the Government of National Reconciliation on the restructuring of the internal security services, and to assist the Ivorian parties with the implementation of temporary and interim security measures in the northern parts of the country, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Pretoria Agreement. 2 (x): to assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with the African Union, ECOWAS, and other international organizations in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout Cote d’Ivoire. June 2004– Present Haiti Resolution 1542 (2004): I (b): To assist the Transitional Government in monitoring, restructuring, and reforming the Haitian National Police, consistent with democratic policing standards, including through the vetting and certification of its personnel, advising on its reorganization and retraining, including gender training, as well as monitoring/mentoring members of the Haitian National Police. I (d): To assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order through the provision inter alia of operational support to the Haitian National Police…, as well as with their institutional strengthening, including the reestablishment of the corrections system. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch Resolution 1509 (2003): United Nations Mission in Liberia 3 (n): To assist the transitional government in the monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with (UNMIL) democratic policing, to develop a civilian police training program, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police, in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested States, 3 (q): To assist the transitional government in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions. September 2003–Present 77 Dates Key Language from Mandates or Relevant Documents June 2004– December 2006 Burundi United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) Resolution 1545 (2004): 6. – to carry out institutional reforms as well as the constitution of the integrated national defence and internal security forces and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms…– to complete implementation of the reform of the judiciary and correction system, in accordance with the Arusha Agreement, 7. – extending State authority and utilities throughout the territory, including civilian police and judicial institutions. March 2005– Present Sudan United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) Resolution 1590 (2005): 4 (vii): To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in coordination with bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes, in restructuring the police service in Sudan, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a police training and evaluation program, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police. 4 (viii): To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of human rights of all people of Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability and to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to develop and consolidate the national legal framework. April 2005– May 2006 Timor-Leste United Nations Office in TimorLeste (UNOTIL) Resolution 1599 (2005): 2. Decides further that UNOTIL will have the following mandate: (i) to support the development of critical State institutions through provision of up to 45 civilian advisers; (ii) to support further development of the police through provision of up to 40 police advisers, and support for development of the Border Patrol Unit (BPU), through provision of up to 35 additional advisers, 15 of whom may be military advisers; (iii) to provide training in observance of democratic governance and human rights through provision of up to 10 human rights officers. January 2006– Sierra Leone United Nations Present Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) Resolution 1620 (2006): 1 (a): To assist the Government of Sierra Leone in… (v) strengthening the rule of law, including by developing the independence and capacity of the justice system and the capacity of the police and corrections system; (vi) strengthening the Sierra Leonean security sector… 1 (b): to liaise with the Sierra Leonean security sector and other partners, to report on the security situation and make recommendations concerning external and internal security threats; 1 (c): to coordinate with United Nations missions and offices and regional organizations in West Africa in dealing with crossborder challenges such as the illicit movement of small arms, human trafficking and smuggling and illegal trade in natural resources… Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Mission 78 Country Dates Mission Key Language from Mandates or Relevant Documents August 2006– Present Timor-Leste United Nations Integrated Mission in TimorLeste (UNMIT) Resolution 1704 (2006): 4 (c): To ensure, through the presence of United Nations police, the restoration and maintenance of public security in TimorLeste through the provision of support to the Timorese national police (PNTL), as outlined in the Secretary-General’s report, which includes interim law enforcement and public security until PNTL is reconstituted, and to assist with the further training, institutional development and strengthening of the PNTL as well as the Ministry of Interior, and also assist in the planning and preparing of electoral-related security arrangements to adequately prepare the national police for performing their roles and responsibilities during the conduct of the 2007 elections; 4 (d): To support the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, to liaise on security tasks and to establish a continuous presence in three border districts alongside armed United Nations police officers assigned to district police stations, through the impartial presence of United Nations military liaison officers; 4 (e) To assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste in conducting a comprehensive review of the future role and needs of the security sector, including… the PNTL and the Ministry of Interior... through the provision of advisers and in cooperation and coordination with other partners, in strengthening institutional capacity-building, as appropriate; 4 (i): To assist in the implementation of the relevant recommendations in the Secretary-General’s report on Justice and Reconciliation, including to assist in the Office of the Prosecutor-General of Timor-Leste, through the provision of a team of experienced investigative personnel, to resume investigative functions of the former Serious Crimes Unit... July 2007– Present Sudan (Darfur) African Union/United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Resolution 1769 (2007): 1. Decides…the mandate of UNAMID shall be as set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007; Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (S/2007/307/Rev.1): (a) support for the peace process and good offices: (g) To assist in the promotion of the rule of law in Darfur, including through support for strengthening an independent judiciary and the prison system, and assistance in the development and consolidation of the legal framework, in consultation with relevant Sudanese authorities; (b) security: (i) To promote the re-establishment of confidence, deter violence and assist in monitoring and verifying the implementation of the redeployment and disengagement provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement, including by actively providing security and robust patrolling of redeployment and buffer zones, by monitoring the withdrawal of long-range weapons, and by deploying hybrid police, including formed police units, in areas where internally displaced persons are concentrated, in the demilitarized and buffer zones, along key routes of migration and in other vital areas, including as provided for in the Darfur Peace Agreement; (ix) To support, in coordination with the parties, as outlined in the Darfur Peace Agreement, the establishment and training of community police in camps for internally displaced persons, to support capacity-building of the Government of the Sudan police in Darfur, in accordance with international standards of human rights and accountability, and to support the institutional development of the police of the movements; (c) Rule of law, governance, and human rights: (i) To assist in the implementation of the provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement and any subsequent agreements relating to human rights and the rule of law and to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to respect for human rights and the rule of law, in which all are ensured effective protection; (iii) To support the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement in restructuring and building the capacity of the police service in Darfur, including through monitoring, training, mentoring, co-location and joint patrols; (iv) To assist in promoting the rule of law, including through institution-building, and strengthening local capacities to combat impunity… Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch Country 79 80 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 81 X X X X X X X X Detention Joint patrols with international military X X Arrest, law enforcement X X Airport/Seaport security X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Conduct patrols Anti-trafficking operations Assist Illegal checkpoint removal School security Monitor/assess police conduct and performance Advise national (or other non-UN) police Mentoring local police forces Investigate police and government abuses and corruption Register local police IDP security/repatriation (minority protection) Dismiss/Deactivate local police Media monitoring, communications, public relations Patrol officers Civilian police, stability police, forensics experts, translators Civilian police, airport security specialists, border/customs police Civilian police, stability police X X X X X X X X X 10 X X X X X X X X 8 X X X X X X 7 X X X X 6 X X X X 7 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 4 X 4 X 4 X 4 X 3 X Stability police 5 3 X X 2 Stability police, translators X 1 Civilian police, translators, child protection specialists X 1 Police advisors, human rights monitors Police advisors Police mentors, patrol officers X X X X X X X X X X 10 X X X X X X X X X X 10 X X X X X X X X X 9 X X X X X X X X 6 5 X X 2 X 2 Human rights monitors, civilian police, internal affairs specialists X X X Civilian police, stability police, translators X X Civilian police, media specialists, translators, negotiators X X 2 Tasks should be undertaken within 30 days of mission startup. X X Tasks should be started within 30 to 90 days of mission startup. X Frequency Rating X ONUB X UNMIK X MONUC X Crowd/riot control Joint patrols (with local police) Border/customs control Conduct criminal investigations Needs/capacity assessment Humanitarian/UN personnel security MINUSTAH X UNMIT X Mission/operations planners Civilian police, riot police, stability police, translators Civilian police, police advisors, translators Border/customs police, civilian police Investigators, Forensic Specialists Police advisors, statisticians/analysts Civilian police, stability police Corrections officers, civilian police, translators UNMISET Planning support UNTAET X UNOCI Executive X Skill-Sets/Experts UNMIL Transformational X Task UNMIS Traditional Table A1.2: UN Policing and Other Rule of Law Tasks, 1999–2007, Full List X X Traffic management Traffic officers X X X X X X X X X X X X Correctional reform/assessment X X X X X Police trainers Lawyers, human rights monitors, judicial specialists Lawyers, human rights monitors, corrections officers Police advisors, human resources specialists, lawyers X X Train local police Legal/judicial reform and monitoring X X X X X X X X X Police advisers Civilian police, elections monitors, translators X X X X X Liaison officers Police advisors, human resources specialists, lawyers, human rights monitors, translators Police advisors, architects, engineers, urban planners, human resources specialists, translators Police advisors, human rights monitors, child protection specialists, women's rights specialists Civilian police, human resources specialists, translators Restructure/reform police force Aid coordination (to local police force) Election security Liaise with intl orgs or humanitarian community Recruitment assistance (including screening/ certification) Institution/ infrastructure development Women's & children's rights, domestic violence unit development Assist demobilization/ reintegration Disarmament, weapons inspection/ destruction X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Anti-gang operations Organized crime prevention/disruption Secure cantonment sites Escort former combatants Assist in distribution of aid X X Community policing X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Assist development of legal codes Arms embargo inspections Maritime police Liaise with UNPOL in other missions Travel ban monitoring Track crime statistics Forensic investigation X X X X Forensic investigators X X X 10 X X X X X 9 X X X X X X 9 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 8 X 7 X X 7 X X X 7 X X X 7 X X 6 5 X X 2 1 X 1 X 1 X X 4 3 X X X X X X X X X 6 X X X X X 1 X X Maritime officers Liaison officers Monitors/immigration officers Police advisors, IT specialists, statisticians/analysts X X Legal specialists Inspectors, customs officers X X Stability police, ordnance disposal Civilian police, organized crime specialists Civilian police, organized crime specialists Patrol officers, stability police Patrol officers, stability police Liaison officers Civilian police, negotiators, translators X 1 X X 4 4 3 X 2 X X X X X Tasks should be started within 90 to 180 days of mission startup. X Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law 2 2 1 Tasks that can start beyond 180 days. 82 Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 83 Types of Training Office of missing persons development X Judicial police X Child protection X X X X X X X X X Human rights and/or Intl HR law Senior & Management Gender, sexual exploitation, domestic violence X X X X X 9 X X X X X X 8 X X X X X X 8 X X X Public order Train the trainer course X X X X Community policing Border control/customs X X X X X X X X X Firearms X X 7 X 6 X X 6 X X 6 X 5 X X 5 X X 4 X X 4 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Corrections Organized crime Intelligence & Surveillance X X X X Counter-terror / insurgency training Airport/Seaport security Money laundering X X X Patrolling 3 X X Close protection 4 X Traffic management Investigation X X Election security Forensics X 1 X 4 X 4 X X 3 X X 3 X 2 X 2 X 1 X X 1 1 * Frequency rating records how common this task has been among the ten missions analyzed (UNMIL, UNOCI, MONUC, MINUSTAH, UNMISET, UNMIT, UNTAET, UNMIK, ONUB, and UNMIS). 10 = all ten missions included this task; 1= Only one mission reported the task, etc. ** Urgency ratings indicate when the task needs to be started: 4 = immediately (within the first 30 days); 3 = short-term (30 to 90 days of startup). Sources/Methodology: This chart was compiled through an analysis of every Secretary-General report and Security Council Resolution related to these 10 missions since 1999. Only tasks reported in these official UN sources have been recorded. 84 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 85 ANNEX II: ANALYSIS OF UN POLICE DEPLOYMENT RATES, 1989–2007 This Annex tracks the deployment rates of UN police in peace operations undertaken between 1989 and 2006. The following summary chart compares deployment rates from three distinct time periods: 1989-1994, 1995-2000, and 2001-2006. These figures were compiled by analyzing police deployment rates in every UN-led peacekeeping mission with at least 100 authorized UNPOL officers since 1989. The only exceptions were: UNTAG (Namibia) and UNPROFOR (Balkans) were excluded due to lack of data; and ‘followon missions,’ such as UNMISET (East Timor), were excluded since police personnel were already in the field at the creation of the mission as part of a previous operation. Data for this analysis were obtained from United Nations Security Council Resolutions, Reports of the Secretary-General, and monthly troop contributor charts published by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). A complete description of the methodology used in this analysis, individual mission data charts for all operations, and brief narrative descriptions of police deployments in each mission are at http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/Stimson_AnnexII_UNPOL.pdf. Table A2.1: Comparative Analysis of UN Police Deployment Rates, 1989–2007 Individual Police Police in Formed Units TOTAL POLICE Posts Authorized Actual Deployed Percent Deployed Posts Authorized Actual Deployed Percent Deployed Posts Authorized Actual Deployed Percent Deployed 6275 6275 6275 5259 1564 4377 5646 4449 24.92% 69.75% 89.98% 84.60% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6275 6275 6275 5259 1564 4377 5646 4449 24.92% 69.75% 89.98% 84.60% 7785 7839 7845 3651 5909 6818 46.90% 75.38% 86.91% 1390 1340 1340 0 120 240 0.00% 8.96% 17.91% 9125 9179 9185 3295 5003 6610 36.11% 54.50% 71.97% 7245 6619 91.36% 1340 835 62.31% 8585 7399 86.19% 4686 4566 4321 3213 1011 2244 3057 2456 21.57% 49.15% 70.75% 76.44% 3620 3605 3605 3105 2196 2776 3507 2980 60.66% 77.00% 97.28% 95.97% 8306 8166 8166 6558 3119 5145 6784 5436 37.55% 63.01% 83.08% 82.89% 1989–1994* 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 1995–2000** 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 2001–2007*** 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months * Missions analyzed in 1989–1994 series include ONUSAL, UNTAC, ONUMOZ, and UNMIH. UNTAG and UNPROFOR are excluded due to limited data. ** Missions analyzed in 1995–2000 series include UNMIBH, UNTAES, UNMIK, UNAMSIL, and UNTAET. *** Missions analyzed in 2001–2007 series include MONUC, UNMIL, ONUCI, MINUSTAH, ONUB, UNMIS, and UNMIT. 86 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch ANNEX III: ESTIMATING COSTS OF A UN STANDING POLICE SERVICE Table A3.1: Estimating Annual Personnel Costs for a 400-Strong Standing UN Rule of Law Capacity Personnel Rank Apportioned ROLCAP Personnel Costs Mission-budgeted ROLCAP Personnel Costs (four teams deployed, on avg.) D-2 (Head of Standing Capacity) D-1 (Team Leaders) P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2 P-1 Basic Salary* Post Adjustment* Estimated Benefit Costs* 1 4 21 62 67 58 0 $15,419,000 $4,790,000 $7,710,000 4 20 60 60 56 0 $14,447,000 (+MSA in lieu) $7,224,000 Total Personnel Costs* $27,919,000 $21,671,000 *All numbers rounded to the nearest thousand dollars. Base Salary Cost: Uses Step I gross salaries (shown in US Dollars) for each Professional and Director Grade Level, as of 1 January 2006 (P1=$42,664; P2=$54,382; P3=66,881; P4=$81,943; P5=$99,511; D1=$120,487; D2= $131,947). Source: United Nations Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM), "Salary Scale for the Professional and higher categories showing annual gross salaries and net equivalent after application of staff assessment," 1 January 2006. Post Adjustment: The post adjustment is intended to give UN staff the same purchasing power at all duty stations. This chart relies on the post adjustment multiplier for Brindisi (42.6 percent of net salary). Uses Step I net salaries (shown in US dollars) for each Professional and Director Grade Level, as of 1 January 2006 (P1=$32,599; P2=$40,947; P3=$49,149; P4=$59,132; P5=$70,742; D1=$83,587; D2=$90,236). Source: "Consolidated Post Adjustment Circular," ICSC/CIRC/PAC/382, International Civil Service Commission, 1 October 2006, and UN OHRM. "Salary Scale for the Professional and higher categories..." Estimated Benefit Costs: For new posts in the Peacekeeping Support Account, subtracting base salary and post adjustment from total projected personnel costs suggests that benefits (for health, leave, etc.) average 50 percent of base salary. Source: United Nations, Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/727, 23 March 2006. Cost of HQ Support Staff: This costs assumes a ROLCAP support staff of 12 personnel (1 P-5, 2 P-4s, 7 P-3s, and 2 P-2s). Costs include base salary, post adjustment, and estimated benefits. While this support team should eventually co-locate with ROLCAP at its home base, we cost it here assuming initial stationing with DPKO in New York. 87 88 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Table A3.2: Estimating Annual Basing Costs for a Standing UN Rule of Law Capacity ROLCAP Size (including HQ support staff) NON-RECURRING COSTS Low Estimate Facilities refurbishment Acquisition (IT, admin. equipment, vehicles, etc.) Total High Estimate Facilities refurbishment Acquisition (IT, admin. equipment, vehicles, etc.) Total RECURRING COSTS Low Estimate Facilities maintenance Equipment maintenance Total High Estimate Facilities maintenance Equipment maintenance Total 412 $2,472,000 $8,240,000 $10,712,000 $9,888,000 $8,240,000 $18,128,000 $494,400 $1,648,000 $2,142,400 $1,236,000 $4,120,000 $5,356,000 TOTAL ESTIMATED BASING COSTS (Average of High & Low) $14,420,000 Non-Recurring (First Year) Recurring (Second Year Plus) $3,749,200 Note: The per capita low estimates on first year costs are based on budget estimates for potentially housing the 27-strong Standing Police Capacity at the Brindisi Logistics Base ($6,000 per officer for facilities and $20,000 per officer for administrative support, vehicles, communications, information technology, etc). This estimate is premised on the need to refurbish existing facilities. Given the size of a potential UN ROLCAP, it is likely that new facilities (particularly for housing) will need to be constructed, and our high estimate for first year costs is 400 percent larger than current per capita estimates to account for potential construction costs. Low estimates for recurring costs assume that 20 percent of initial expenditures will be required in following years and the high estimate assumes that 50 percent of first year costs will be required in subsequent years. Source: Official, United Nations Logistics Base, Brindisi, Italy, correspondence with author, 12 October 2006. Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 89 Table A3.3: Estimating Annual Training Costs for a Standing UN Rule of Law Capacity Size of deployable ROLCAP 400 Apportioned Personnel Costs (from Table A3.1) Training Costs as Percent of Total Personnel Costs UN mission average 1% ROLCAP option 1 2% ROLCAP option 2 5% US Army average, 2000 11% US Army average, 2006 7% $27,919,000 Per Capita Training Costs $700 $1,400 $3,490 $7,680 $4,890 Total Annual Training Costs $280,000 $560,000 $1,396,000 $3,072,000 $1,956,000 Note: In large current UN missions, training averages less than one percent of total personnel costs for international civilians and UN police not in formed units. (MONUC=.83 percent, UNMIL=.85 percent, MINUSTAH=.41 percent; UNMIS invests a larger fraction of personnel costs in training, 1.28 percent, but mostly in materials, while travel dominates training costs in the other three operations). The US Army's training expenses were roughly 11 percent of total personnel costs for active duty personnel in fiscal year 2000 and seven percent in fiscal year 2006. Two to five percent training costs for a standing UN police/rule of law support service reflect much more training than common at present for UN missions on the whole, but that a well-trained force would not need as extensive or as costly a training regimen as the US Army. Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2000–01 and 2006 eds, 25–34 and 29–40, respectively. US Department of Defense, President's Budget, FY 2001 and FY 2007, Exhibits M-1, O-1. United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/653, 19 January 2006; United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/728, 28 March 2006, United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/840, 8 May 2006; United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/726, 20 March 2006. 90 Deployed reservists* Non-deployed reservists** Retainer costs at two assumed rates of average salary Training costs as percentage of average salary 4,900 11,270 Average Salary A*** Average Salary B**** Annual Retainers, Average Salary A Annual Retainers, Average Salary B $15,150 $29,100 $17,074,485 $32,795,990 $8,537,242 $16,397,995 5.0% Police Division support for the reserve (15 posts): Cost range: low average salary and non-specialist police versus high average salary and only specialist police: $2,785,000 $28,396,727 $51,978,985 Notes: Estimated annual salary for officers from developing countries calculated at $1,200, based on an analysis of mid-level government salaries in TimorLeste, Kosovo, the DRC, Liberia, Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Haiti. The estimated annual salary for officers from developed countries is calculated at $57,000, based on a mid-sized California (US) city as a proxy. *Equal to number of individual UNPOL deployed as of end 2006. Reimbursements and operational costs for deployed reservists will vary by mission and be included in mission budgets (see main text Table 12 for estimated cost of deployed police reservists, UNMIL example). **Includes ten percent margin to allow for illness and other sources of individual non-availability. ***Assumes 25% of individual police sent by developed states; actual 2006 UN average. ****Assumes 50% of individual police sent by developed states. Sources: Michael Carnahan, William Durch, and Scott Gilmore, “Economic Impact of Peacekeeping, Final Report,” UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, March 2006, 32; City of Monrovia, “Police Officer Recruitment,” brochure, www.ci.monrovia.ca.us/city_hall/human_resources/Police%20Officer.pdf. Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Table A3.4: Annual Apportioned Cost Estimates Associated with Incentive-Based UN Police Reserve System Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 91 Table A3.5: Individual Senior Reserve Roster, Marginal Annual Per Capita Costs Assumed base salary and benefits when activated (for training and retainer cost calculations) Senior Officer Contracted for Rapid Deployment Retainer Cost for Officers Contracted for Rapid Deployment (within 30 $5,400 days)* Training costs, incl. transport** Total annual per capita cost, non-deployed $180,000 Senior Officer Not Contracted for Rapid Deployment $0 $9,000 $9,000 $14,400 $9,000 Notes: The assumption of training costs equal to roughly five percent of personnel costs is based on a blend of average training costs for UN missions and the United States Army. See Table A3.3 for more details. * Retainer cost is based at three percent of estimated salary and benefits when deployed. Could be raised or lowered based on changing demand for senior personnel willing to deploy on short notice. ** Training cost estimates are based on five percent of salary and benefits when fully deployed. It assumes an annual training session for all members of the SRR. Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2000–01 and 2006 eds, 25–34 and 29–40, respectively. US Department of Defense, President's Budget, FY 2001 and FY 2007, Exhibits M-1, O-1. United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/653, 19 January 2006; United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/728, 28 March 2006, United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/840, 8 May 2006; United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/726, 20 March 2006. 92 31-Oct 30-Nov 31-Dec 31-Jan 29-Feb 31-Mar 30-Apr 31-May 30-Jun Police and Rule of Law Professional Posts Authorized* Professional Posts Assumed Filled Individual Police Authorized Personnel Actually Deployed 24 0 755 0 24 0 755 41 24 0 755 72 24 24 755 168 24 24 755 278 24 24 755 311 24 24 755 392 24 24 755 550 24 24 635 569 - Hypothetical ROLCAP/Reserve Deployment Core ROLCAP Deployment Team Mobilized UN Police Reservists Total ROLCAP + Reservists Deployed 50 500 550 50 705 755 50 705 755 50 705 755 50 705 755 50 705 755 50 705 755 50 705 755 50 585 635 - $0 $0 $0 $0 $179,888 $36,000 $4,584 $43,177 $179,888 $0 $2,952 $43,177 $179,888 $0 $2,952 $43,177 $179,888 $0 $2,952 $43,177 $179,888 $0 $2,952 $43,177 $179,888 $0 $2,952 $43,177 $1,079,325 $36,000 $19,344 $259,061 $0 $220,472 $182,840 $182,840 $182,840 $182,840 $182,840 $1,134,669 $451,500 $0 $184,500 $89,952 $636,000 $451,500 $0 $184,500 $89,952 $636,000 $451,500 $0 $184,500 $89,952 $636,000 $451,500 $0 $184,500 $89,952 $636,000 $451,500 $0 $184,500 $89,952 $636,000 $451,500 $0 $184,500 $89,952 $636,000 $451,500 $0 $184,500 $89,952 $636,000 $4,063,500 $75,000 $1,762,500 $809,565 $6,710,565 UNMIL's Costs for Police and Other Rule of Law Professional Posts Personnel Costs $0 $0 Travel** $0 $0 Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA)** $0 $0 Estimated Operations Costs $0 $0 Total Mission Costs, Police and Other RoL Professional Posts $0 $0 TOTALS UNMIL's Estimated Costs If Startup Had Been Supported by ROLCAP Personnel Costs Travel** MSA** Estimated Operations Cost Total Estimated Costs of Using ROLCAP Marginal Costs of Using ROLCAP (total costs less actual mission costs for the same functions) Continues on following page… $451,500 $75,000 $286,500 $89,952 $813,000 $451,500 $0 $184,500 $89,952 $636,000 $5,575,896 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Table A3.6: Estimated Costs to the UN Mission in Liberia of Using ROLCAP and Police Reserve, for the Mission Start-up Period, October 2003–June 2004 Table A3.6: Continued UNMIL's Costs for Seconded Individual Police Travel** MSA** Operations Costs (estimated) Police $0 $0 $0 $0 $61,500 $234,930 $73,760 $308,690 $46,500 $328,920 $129,530 $458,450 $144,000 $815,760 $302,238 $1,117,998 $165,000 $1,250,220 $500,131 $1,750,351 $49,500 $1,214,910 $559,499 $1,774,409 $121,500 $1,611,720 $705,221 $2,316,941 $237,000 $2,351,820 $989,468 $3,341,288 $28,500 $2,138,370 $1,023,650 $3,162,020 $853,500 $9,946,650 $4,283,498 $15,083,648 $826,260 $0 $2,601,450 $1,268,318 $4,696,028 $826,260 $0 $2,601,450 $1,268,318 $4,696,028 $826,260 $0 $2,601,450 $1,268,318 $4,696,028 $826,260 $0 $2,601,450 $1,268,318 $4,696,028 $826,260 $0 $2,601,450 $1,268,318 $4,696,028 $685,620 $180,000 $2,158,650 $1,052,434 $4,076,704 $7,055,440 $1,237,500 $23,652,000 $10,830,181 $42,775,121 UNMIL's Estimated Costs If Startup Had Been Supported by Police Reserve $586,000 $750,000 $2,865,000 $899,517 $5,100,517 $826,260 $307,500 $3,019,650 $1,268,318 $5,421,728 $826,260 $0 $2,601,450 $1,268,318 $4,696,028 Marginal Costs of Using Police Reserve (total costs less actual mission costs for the same functions) $27,691,472 UNMIL's Apportioned Share of ROLCAP and UNPR Basing, Training, and Related Costs:^^ $12,280,585 Percentage Improvement in Individual Police Capacity Using Reservistaugmented ROLCAP (infinite) 1741% 949% Notes: * UNMIL was also authorized three FPUs, the first two of which arrived in December; the 3rd unit did not arrive until June, when a fourth was authorized and also deployed. ** Travel cost estimate = $1,500 one way. MSA for UNMIL: first month = $191/day; following months = $123/day. ^ Police Reserve reimbursement estimates based on standard UN reimbursement rates: Pay and Allowance = $1,028/mo; Specialist allowance = $303/mo; Personal gear = $68/mo. This estimate assumes 25 percent of deployed police reservists are specialists. ^^ Assumes that 25 percent of UN Police Reserve are officers from developed countries, which was the actual proportion as of December 2006. Should the percentage of reservists from developed countries increase, support costs for non-deployed reservists would be higher. 349% 172% 143% 93% 37% 12% Financial Impact of Using ROLCAP and Reserve on Mission Startup Costs: Total UNMIL expenditures through 30 June 2004: Total Marginal Cost of Using ROLCAP/Reserve in UNMIL Start-up, 2003-04, plus Apportioned Share (21%) of the basing, training, and related costs of each. Added cost of using and supporting ROLCAP and Police Reserve, as percentage of actual mission expenditures, 1 August 2003–30 June 2004: $548,278,700 $45,547,953 8.3% Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch Per Capita UN Reimbursement to Sending State Police Agency^ Travel** MSA** Estimated Operations Costs Total Estimated Costs of Using Police Reserve Sources: United Nations, Budget for the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 August 2003 to 30 June 2004, Report of the Secretary-General , A/58/539, 29 October 2003; United Nations, Performance report on the budget of the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the Period from 1 August 2003 to 30 June 2004, Report of the Secretary-General , A/59/624, 20 December 2004; United Nations, Performance report on the budget of the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/715, 26 January 2007, para. 8; Michael Carnahan, William Durch, and Scott Gilmore, “Economic Impact of Peacekeeping, Final Report,” UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, March 2006. 93 94 Table A3.7: Calculating Marginal Costs of UN Police Reserve, Applied to UNMIL, 2005–2006 UNMIL Police 2005-06 UNMIL with UN Police Reserve and Senior Reserve Roster on 12 month rotations. Average number deployed Senior Reserve Roster UN Police Reserve Marginal travel costs (assumes 12-month rotation) Cost of UNPR reimbursements Marginal cost of full-deployment UNPR MSA and operations Combined annual total: 577 $52,123 $11,222 $36,550,100 31-Jul-05 635 6 31-Aug-05 635 6 30-Sep-05 635 6 31-Oct-05 635 6 30-Nov-05 635 6 31-Dec-05 635 6 31-Jan-06 635 6 28-Feb-06 635 6 31-Mar-06 635 6 30-Apr-06 635 6 31-May-06 755 6 30-Jun-06 875 6 629 629 629 629 629 629 629 629 629 629 749 869 TOTALS $737,188 $785,817 $785,817 $785,817 $785,817 $785,817 $785,817 $785,817 $785,817 $898,037 $1,150,897 $478,876 $9,551,532 $346,589 $240,509 $240,509 $240,509 $240,509 $240,509 $240,509 $240,509 $240,509 $240,509 $795,529 $1,350,549 $4,657,245 $1,161,777 $1,026,325 $1,026,325 $1,026,325 $1,026,325 $1,026,325 $1,026,325 $1,026,325 $1,026,325 $1,138,546 $1,946,426 $1,829,425 $14,208,777 $78,000 Cost of non-deployed ROLCAP, 2d year onward (derived from table 12) $33,508,200 Cost of non-deployed UNPR, derived from table A3.4 (low est/current developed state participation) $28,396,727 Share of Non-deployed ROLCAP (from PSA/Brindisi cost alloc'n), 05-06 $4,343.59 monthly $935.17 monthly $5,278.76 monthly $9,966,693 Includes recurring costs for ROLCAP basing, training, HQ support, and non-deployed personnel 16.1% = percent of UNMIL's apportionment for PSA/Brindisi, based on Table 2 in A/61/786 (expenditures) SOURCE: UN Performance report on the budget of the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 -- Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/715, 26 January 2007, and Stimson Center operations expense allocations. Financial Impact of Using Reserve System on Mature Mission Costs: Actual UNMIL personnel and operational costs for individual police, 2005–06: Estimated additional MSA and travel due to full deployment of police from reserve Estimated cost of reimbursements to reserve-based police contributors: UNMIL's share of non-deployed ROLCAP, based on its 2005–06 share of PSA/Brindisi: Total UNMIL expenditures 1 July 2005-30 June 2006: Reserve-based cost difference as percentage of UNMIL expenditures, 2005-06: $9,966,693 $36,550,100 $4,657,245 $9,551,532 $9,966,693 $707,368,900 3.4% Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Average number deployed Average per capita personnel cost Average per capita operations cost Total cost Table A3.8: UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) Expenditures, 2005–2006 Mission Total 17,557 Police in Formed Units 479 2.7% $325,248 $11,449 $269,827 $9,214 $55,421 $2,235 $60,814 $2,217 $18,373 $15,395 $33,768 Military Individual Observers Police 200 577 1.1% 3.3% International UN Civilian Staff Volunteers 525 337 3.0% 1.9% National National General Officers Srvc Staff 34 719 0.2% 4.1% $10,648 $30,075 $83,534 $14,595 $11,492 $19,236 $53,240 $52,123 $159,112 $43,309 $29,987 $14,565 $16,775 $36,010 $10,943 $64,183 $10,943 $63,066 $10,943 $170,056 $10,943 $54,252 $10,943 $40,931 $10,943 $25,509 Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch Mission average deployment: Staff distribution: Personnel costs, from budget report (000's US$): Formed unit personnel costs, less cost of contingent-owned equipment (000's US$): Formed unit COE costs (000's US$): Formed unit self-sustainment costs [a] [b] (000's US$): Total mission operational costs (000's US$): $220,065 Operational costs applicable to all personnel [c] [d] (000's US$): $93,181 Operational costs applicable only outside formed units [e] (000's US$): $60,805 Mission share of Headquarters support & of Logistics Base, Brindisi [f] (000's US$): $38,145 Average per-capita personnel cost (US$): Average per capita operational costs (US$): Total per-capita costs (US$): Troops in Formed Units 14,686 83.6% Sources: United Nations, Performance report on the budget of the United Nations Mission in Liberia for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, A/61/715, 26 January 2007; The Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2007), 204. 95 96 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law Table A3.9: UNMIL Estimated Mission Costs Worksheet Totals (000's US$) Total Category Costs SelfSustainment, by Category Category Totals, Net of Selfsustainment Facilities and Infrastructure $78,710 $33,153 $45,558 Communications $21,293 $14,257 $7,036 [a] Major operational cost categories encompassing self-sustainment : Medical $16,691 $11,843 $4,848 Special Equipment $3,800 $3,779 $21 Subtotals, these categories $120,494 $63,031 $57,463 [b] Calculating shares of self-sustainment costs: Military share of formed unit personnel 0.968 Military share of formed unit Contingent Owned Equipment 0.961 Average of military share of personnel and COE (for calculating share of self-sustainment) 0.965 Total formed unit self-sustainment costs $63,031 Military self-sustainment $60,814 FPU self-sustainment (assumes equivalent operating tempo) [c] Major operational cost categories excluded from all distributions of operational costs*: $2,217 General and Temporary Assistance $2,634 Consultants $414 Subtotals, these categories [d] Major operational cost categories Included in all distributions of operational costs: $3,049 Ground transportation $17,168 Air transportation $61,830 Naval transportation $2,479 Information Technology $3,578 Other supplies, services, and equipment $8,126 Subtotals, these categories [e] Major operational cost categories applicable only to personnel outside of formed units: $93,181 Official travel $2,342 Quick-impact projects $1,000 Categories encompassing self-sustainment [d], NET of self-sustainment: $57,463 Subtotals, these categories $60,805 [f] Mission pro-rata share, Peacekeeping Support Account** and UN Logistics Base, Brindisi: Peacekeeping Support Account UN Logistics Base, Brindisi $31,191 $6,954 Subtotals, these categories $38,145 Continues on following page… Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch 97 Table A3.9 continued Salary and Allowances +25% hazard bonus National Officer $22,539 $28,174 National General Services staff $10,900 $13,625 [g] National Staff Calculations Salary ratio: 2.1 Number National Officers 34 National Officer "GS-equivalents" (number x salary ratio) 70 National GS staff 719 Total national staff "GS-equivalents" 789 National Officer fraction of national staff personnel costs 0.089 National GS fraction of national staff personnel costs 0.911 Notes: *Excluded because these are separate personnel categories as well as 'operational' categories **Pays for UN Headquarters support to peacekeeping. 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He spent three years teaching middle school social studies in South Texas with Teach For America and has conducted fieldwork on disarmament and reconciliation among ex-combatants in Nicaragua. He is the author of “Fighting Fear: Exploring the Dynamic Between Security Concerns and Elite Manipulation in Internal Conflicts” (Peace, Conflict, and Development) and “The Responsibility to Reflect: Learning Lessons from Past Humanitarian Military Interventions” (The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance). Mr. Smith holds undergraduate degrees in International Affairs and Anthropology from the University of Colorado at Boulder and earned his M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Victoria K. Holt is a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, where she co-directs the Future of Peace Operations program. Her recent publications include studies on the protection of civilians by military forces, African peacekeeping capacity, and rule of law aspects of peace operations. Ms. Holt joined the Center in 2001, bringing policy and political expertise from her professional experience within the State Department, Congress, and the NGO field. She previously served as Senior Policy Advisor at the State Department (Legislative Affairs), focusing on peacekeeping and UN issues. As Executive Director of the Emergency Coalition for US Financial Support of the United Nations, she directed a bipartisan coalition of leading statesmen and non-governmental organizations. Ms. Holt previously worked as a senior Congressional staffer for seven years, focusing on defense and foreign policy issues for members of the House Armed Services Committee. In addition, she has worked for other Washingtonbased policy institutes on international affairs. A graduate of the Naval War College, Ms. Holt also holds a BA (with honors) from Wesleyan University. She is a board member of Women in International Security (WIIS). William J. Durch is a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, where he co-directs the Future of Peace Operations program. His temporary secondments while at Stimson include serving as project director for the Panel on UN Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) and as scientific advisor to the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Before joining Stimson, Dr. Durch was assistant director of the Defense and Arms Control Studies program at MIT, research fellow at Harvard’s Center for Science and International Affairs, and foreign affairs officer in the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He has taught at both Johns Hopkins SAIS and Georgetown. His most recent publications include Twenty-first Century Peace Operations (USIP Press, 2006), Who Should Keep the Peace? (Stimson Center, 2006) with Tobias Berkman, and “The Economic Impact of Peacekeeping,” with Scott Gilmore and Michael Carnahan (Ottawa: Peace Dividend Trust for the DPKO Best Practices Section, 2006). He holds a doctorate in political science (defense studies) from MIT. 112 Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law ABOUT THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS PROGRAM The Future of Peace Operations program builds a broader public dialogue on the role of peace operations in resolving conflict and building lasting peace. Peace operations comprise peacekeeping, the provision of temporary, post-conflict security by internationally mandated forces and peacebuilding, those efforts undertaken by the international community to help a wartorn society create a self-sustaining peace. The program’s goals are to advance, through research and analysis, the capacity of peace operations to promote the rule of law, protection of civilians, and regional security; enhance US peace operations policy by building bridges between the Administration, Congress, international organizations, and NGOs; and to advance UN reforms for peacekeeping and peacebuilding and to bring those reforms to the attention of key public and policy audiences. The program is directed by William Durch and Victoria Holt, and supported by researchers Katherine Andrews, Alix Boucher, and Joshua Smith. To learn more about the program or to offer feedback on our work, please visit www.stimson.org/fopo or contact us at 202-478-3427. The Henry L. Stimson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security through rigorous, nonpartisan analysis and results-oriented outreach on many of the most enduring and challenging problems of national and international security.