Zeitschrift für Sozialen Fortschritt
Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 3–20
The Rise of Hedge Funds: A Story of Inequality
Jan Fichtner
Abstract
he rise of hedge funds from the almost unnoticed beginnings in the late 1940s to the pinnacle of global
inance seventy years later is one of the most pivotal developments for the international political economy. It
is the central thesis of this paper that the rise of hedge funds can only be explained by the notion of inequality:
inequality between nearly unregulated hedge funds and the regulated rest of inancial market actors; inequality between ofshore inancial centers that provide minimal regulation and low taxation to hedge funds, and
onshore jurisdiction that do not; inequality between very rich private individuals that invest in hedge funds and
the „bottom 99 percent“ that do not. Two countries play a central role for the rise of hedge funds, the US and
the UK. Both adhere to the paradigm of „indirect regulation“ of hedge funds, and both tolerated a drastically
increased income inequality since the 1980s that fueled the rise of hedge funds. It is only in these two countries
that the story of inequality that drives the rise of hedge funds could be ended.
Keywords: hedge funds, inequality, regulation, inancial crisis
Der Aufstieg der Hedge-Fonds: Eine Geschichte der Ungleichheit
Zusammenfassung
Der Aufstieg der Hedgefonds von den fast unbemerkten Anfängen in den späten 1940ern an die Spitze der
globalen Finanzmärkte siebzig Jahre später ist eine der bedeutendsten Entwicklungen für die Internationale
Politische Ökonomie. Die zentrale hese dieses Papers ist, dass der Aufstieg von Hedgefonds nur durch den
Begrif der Ungleichheit erklärt werden kann: Ungleichheit zwischen fast unregulierten Hedgefonds und dem
regulierten Rest der Finanzmarktakteure; Ungleichheit zwischen Ofshore-Finanzzentren, die Hedgefonds minimale Regulierung und niedrige Besteuerung bieten, und Onshore-Jurisdiktionen, die dies nicht tun; Ungleichheit
zwischen sehr reichen Individuen, die in Hedgefonds investieren und den „unteren 99 Prozent“, die dies nicht tun.
Zwei Staaten spielen eine zentrale Rolle für den Aufstieg von Hedgefonds: die USA und Großbritannien. Beide
halten an der „indirekten Regulierung“ von Hedgefonds fest, und beide tolerierten eine drastisch gestiegene Einkommensungleichheit seit den 1980er-Jahren, die den Aufstieg von Hedgefonds befeuerte. Nur in diesen beiden
Staaten könnte die Geschichte der Ungleichheit, die den Aufstieg von Hedgefonds antreibt, beendet werden.
Schlagwörter: Hedgefonds, Ungleichheit, Regulierung, Finanzkrise
Jan Fichtner, Institut für Politikwissenschat, Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main, Robert-Mayer-Straße 5, D-60054
Frankfurt am Main, email: ichtner@soz.uni-frankfurt.de
Fichtner: The Rise of Hedge Funds: A Story of Inequality
the US and the UK; they refrain from any strict direct
regulation of the funds’ activities and also provide the
important ofshore legal domiciles. Income inequality
and the rise of hedge funds is the topic covered in section four. Income inequality increased drastically since
the early 1980s – especially in the two centers of hedge
funds, the US and the UK. he fact that the super-rich
top 0.1 percent of the US population increased their
income more than threefold from the late 1970s to
2010 is crucial for the rise of hedge funds, as these high
net worth individuals were the largest source of capital
by far. Section ive takes up the vital topic of income
inequality and discusses whether this stark inequality
coupled with hedge fund activities in subprime derivatives represents one of the root causes of the inancial
crisis. In addition, this section exposes that in the US
and the UK hedge funds and their very rich managers
increasingly convert their unequal wealth into political
inluence. Finally, the sixth section concludes.
1. Introduction
Hedge funds, in particular their allegedly ingenious managers, were called the new „Masters of the
Universe“ in 2008 when the old ones, the large Wall
Street investment banks such as Goldman Sachs,
Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers,
almost entirely went down (Wolfe 2008). Hedge fund
proponent Mallaby (2010: 391) sees them as the worthy
successors of investment banks: „Today, hedge funds
are the new Goldmans and Morgans of half a century
ago.“ Hence, the rise of hedge funds from the almost
unnoticed beginnings in the late 1940s to the pinnacle
of global inance seventy years later is one of the most
pivotal developments for the contemporary international political economy.
Rather than to mystify hedge funds as masters
of the universe or as the „new elite“ (Mallaby 2010),
this paper seeks to contribute to the demystiication of
hedge funds. herefore – in contrast to many studies
by mainstream economists –, the rise of hedge funds
is analyzed in a broad historical, socio-economic and
socio-political context. It is the central thesis of this
paper that the rise of hedge funds can only be explained
and comprehended by referring to diferent dimensions of inequality: inequality between nearly unregulated hedge funds and the regulated rest of inancial
market actors; inequality between ofshore inancial
centers that provide minimal regulation and low taxation to hedge funds, and onshore jurisdiction that do
not; and, inally, inequality between very rich private
individuals that invest in hedge funds and the „bottom
99 percent“ that do not. Various notions of inequality
work to the beneit of hedge funds and provide them
with the singularity that distinguishes them.
In order to tell this story of inequality thoroughly
and comprehensively this paper is divided into six
sections. Subsequent to this introduction section two
discusses the history of hedge funds and describes how
the story of inequality began. his section argues that
we have to separate the rise of hedge funds into two
periods, the irst one from the late 1940s to the early
1970s when most hedge funds collapsed, and the second
one from the early 1980s until today. Section three discusses the regulation, or rather, the non-regulation of
hedge funds. Today hedge funds are arguably the least
regulated major inancial market actor; this unequal
regulation vis-à-vis other inancial market actors is a
distinct advantage to hedge funds. Two single countries
make this unequal regulation of hedge funds possible –
2. The history of hedge funds – how the story of
inequality began
Most accounts regarding the history hedge funds
begin by mentioning that Alfred Winslow Jones created the irst hedge fund in 1949. However, as Lhabitant
(2007) reports, indicators of hedge fund-like activity
can be traced back to the US in the early 1930s. Karl
Karsten, an academic primarily interested in statistical research, published two books which already then
described many key principles of hedge funds that
are still valid today. Karsten reportedly even created a
small fund drawing on savings by himself and his colleagues in order to test the forecasts of his six devised
„barometers“ of national economic activity (ibid.: 7).
He invested according to his „hedge principle“ that
combined buying stocks he believed would rise and
short-selling stocks that were deemed to fall. World
War II then halted most of inancial market activity in
the early 1940s, including this proto-hedge fund.
Ater the war the activity of inancial markets
picked up again. In 1949 Alfred Winslow Jones created
what he called a „hedged fund“ (Mallaby 2007: 16). His
fund A.W. Jones & Co, set up as a general partnership,
was primarily aimed at outside investors, but Jones
also invested much of his personal wealth. Similar to
Karsten, Jones combined long positions in supposedly
undervalued stocks with short-selling stocks he and
his team believed were overvalued. In this way Jones
sought to create an investment fund whose perfor-
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Fichtner: Der Aufstieg der Hedge-Fonds: Eine Geschichte der Ungleichheit
mance (known as „alpha“) was protected (or hedged)
against the general movement of the market (known
as „beta“). In addition, he borrowed funds to amplify
returns – a method widely practiced today, known as
leverage (Eichengreen/Mathieson 1999). he fee structure of Jones’ fund was novel for that time; he only
charged a performance-based fee of 20 percent of realized proits that should align his incentives with those
of his investors (Rappeport 2007). In contrast to most
modern hedge funds that also charge an asset-based
management fee of around 2 percent, he charged no
ixed fee. he crucial diference was (and still is) that if
hedge fund managers take a share of the fund’s proits
they were taxed with the capital gains tax rate, which
was 25 percent at the time. In contrast, a management
fee was taxed at the personal income tax rate – and the
maximum personal income tax rate in the US during
the 1940s was over 80 percent, and over 90 percent
from 1950 on. Even though Jones told investors that
his fee structure was modeled ater the ancient practice
of Phoenician merchants, it seems more probable that
he was inspired by the tax law (Lhabitant 2007); this
unequal treatment of capital gains vis-à-vis regular
income marks the beginning of the story of inequality
that has propelled hedge funds ever since. In 1952 Jones
changed his fund from a general partnership to a limited partnership in order to have maximum lexibility
with constructing and managing his portfolio (Scaramucci 2012). Another important reason was that this
legal structure avoided virtually all of the regulation by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
inancial markets regulator in the US (Lhabitant 2007);
the (non-)regulation of hedge funds will be discussed
in detail in the next section of this paper.
he personal background of Alfred Winslow Jones
was extraordinary. Reportedly, he graduated from
Harvard, worked for the State Department, ran secret
missions for the anti-Nazi group „Leninist Organization“, attended the Marxist Workers School in Berlin,
and spent a honeymoon on the frontlines of the Spanish
civil war (Scaramucci 2012; Mallaby 2007). His doctoral
thesis, „Life, Liberty and Property“ was a survey among
diferent social classes concerning attitudes towards
property and became a standard sociology textbook
(Russell 1989). his personal background of Jones is
important, because it arguably enabled him to question
and defy the established Wall Street practices of his time.
Wall Street in the late 1940s saw leverage and shortselling as „too racy for professionals entrusted with
other people’s savings“ (Mallaby 2007: 23); short-selling
was seen as „un-American“ in 1950 (Scaramucci 2012).
Jones combined both techniques in a novel way and this
allowed him to achieve remarkable inancial returns by
beating the market indices for several years during the
1950s and 1960s bull market (Lhabitant 2007). Jones
reportedly generated a staggering cumulative return of
almost 5,000 percent from 1949 to 1968 (Mallaby 2007).
From 1955 to 1965 Jones’ partnership returned 670 percent, while the next best fund only achieved about 350
percent (Lhabitant 2007). Even though these rates of
return are extremely high, Jones’ investment approach
was principally concerned with avoiding market risk.
He is quoted saying: „Hedging is a speculative tool used
to conservative ends“ (Russell 1989). In 1966 an article
published in Fortune about the success of Jones’ fund
used the term „hedge fund“ for the irst time. And in
1968 a survey by the SEC found that about 140 hedge
funds operated in the US. In this period many new
hedge funds were created, among them the well-known
Quantum Fund by George Soros (Lhabitant 2007).
hen in 1969-1970 the long bull market ended,
which made the situation much more diicult for many
hedge funds, as short-selling was used infrequently by
most hedge funds at the time and primarily as a means
of partially hedging against market risk, rarely as an
investment strategy on its own as today (Eichengreen/
Mathieson 1999). Finally, the 1973-1974 recession and
the ensuing oil crisis caused heavy losses and capital
withdrawals for many hedge funds, thus ending the
irst – yet almost unnoticed – rise of hedge funds that
began in the late 1940s (Fung/Hsieh 1999). From 1975 to
1982 the stock market moved sideways and the number
of hedge funds increased again, yet very slowly. Even
though this period was extremely hard for the still
tiny hedge fund industry, it laid the foundation for the
phenomenal rise of hedge funds that would prove to
be clearly visible to all keen observers of global inance
from the 1990s onwards. In the early 1970s the US unilaterally cut the backing of the US dollar by gold and
thus disbanded the Bretton-Woods system of international monetary relations, in which the currencies of
the participating Western countries were pegged to the
US dollar at ixed, yet adjustable rates. he result was
a shit from a government-led international monetary
system to a market-led international monetary system
(Padoa-Schioppa/Saccomanni 1994); in this new
system the exchange rates were determined by private
proit-motivated actors – such as hedge funds. Subsequently also the price of gold was entirely determined
by private market forces. Together with the abolition of
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Fichtner: The Rise of Hedge Funds: A Story of Inequality
employed inancial derivatives, such as options and
futures, to enhance returns – inancial products that
did not exist when Alfred Winslow Jones operated his
fund. he strategy pioneered by Robertson and others
became known as „global macro“. Global macro hedge
funds have occasionally made large bets on the movement of currencies or interest rates. From the 1980s
onwards many (though not all) hedge funds ceased to
be hedge funds in the Jonesian sense, but should rather
be called wager or speculation funds; this period marks
the second and this time persistent rise of hedge funds.
In 1990 the private data collection company Hedge
Fund Research (HFR) began monitoring the industry.
According to HFR the hedge fund industry consisted
of about 600 funds and had nearly $40 billion in assets
under management in 1990. One of the largest, best
known and most successful bets of a global macro hedge
fund took place two years later in 1992 when the Quantum Fund run by George Soros speculated the British
pound out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM). Reportedly Soros built up a short position in
Sterling to the tune of $10 billion using leverage. Other
global macro hedge funds as well as institutional investors joined Soros. Hence, even though the Bank of England spent $15 billion of its foreign exchange reserves
and raised interest rates from 10 to 15 percent, on September 16 (since then known as „Black Wednesday“)
Britain quit the ERM. he Quantum fund of George
Soros made a proit of approximately $1 billion with this
speculative bet. Essential to the success of Soros was the
fact that hedge funds are uniquely able to concentrate
their capital in a few investments – this is yet another
important dimension of the inequality of hedge funds.
According to Harmes (2002) the episode of the ERM
crisis clearly demonstrated that global macro hedge
funds acted as market leaders that possessed normative
authority over many institutional investors that adhered to herd mentality.
he 1990s were an extremely good decade for
hedge funds, but also a decade in which it became
increasingly evident that hedge funds no longer were
„too-small-to-matter“ – a view oten expressed by
neoclassical economists (ibid: 156). he industry surpassed the threshold of $250 billion in assets under
management for the irst time in 1996 with over 2,000
individual hedge funds operating. he next year
hedge funds played a signiicant, though arguably not
decisive, role in the Asian inancial crisis. his crisis
was not entirely caused by „crony capitalism“ in the
Southeast Asian countries most afected by the crisis,
capital controls by the US and Britain in the 1970s and
the liberalization and deregulation of their domestic
inancial systems in the 1980s a whole new universe of
investment opportunities opened up for hedge funds
and other private investors. And most importantly the
initiatives by the US and the UK forced other Western
countries to follow them: „he liberalization decisions
in the US and Britain, as well as the broader deregulatory trends within their respective inancial systems,
played a major role in encouraging similar liberalization moves elsewhere. Unless they matched the liberal
and deregulated nature of the British and US inancial
systems, foreign inancial authorities could not hope to
attract new inancial business and capitaal from abroad
or even maintain the inancial business and capital of
their own multinational corporations or international
banks“ (Helleiner 1995: 329). his international trend
towards the liberalization and deregulation of inancial markets, initiated by the US and the UK, created
numerous new investment opportunities for hedge
funds in Western Europe and East Asia from the 1980s
onwards.1
he few hedge funds that operated during the early
1980s mostly had high minimum investment requirements, „access thus being restricted to an exclusive
club of high net worth individuals informed by word of
mouth“ (Lhabitant 2007: 12); besides unequal tax treatment and the avoidance of regulation this restriction to
very wealthy individuals represents another element of
the story of inequality that is behind the rise of hedge
funds. However, during the 1980s a new breed of hedge
funds emerged whose investment approach was radically diferent from Jones’ original risk-averse concept
of investing in the stock market. he epitome of this
new kind of hedge funds was Julian Robertson’s Tiger
Fund, which had a compounded annual return of 43
percent from 1980 to 1986 (Fung/Hsieh 1999). Based on
macroeconomic analysis Robertson took massive and
purely directional bets without implementing any speciic hedging strategy.2 Furthermore, Robertson oten
1
his period has aptly been described as characterized by inancialization: „the increasing role of inancial
motives, inancial markets, inancial actors and inancial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international
economies“ (Epstein 2005: 3). he rapid rise of hedge funds
would not have been possible without the trend of inancialization that roughly began in the early 1980s.
2
Directional bets are speculative and unhedged
trades with whom the investor bets that particular securities
or entire markets move in a speciic direction.
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Fichtner: Der Aufstieg der Hedge-Fonds: Eine Geschichte der Ungleichheit
as some Western critics argued, but some problems
in these countries were surely created domestically.
Hedge funds, mostly global macro, sold hai baht
between $7 billion and $15 billion in 1997. Arguably
this behavior did not cause the Asian inancial crisis
but surely exacerbated it (de Brouwer 2001). One year
later hedge funds were again discussed widely. In 1998
for the irst time in inancial history the collapse of a
highly leveraged hedge fund made regulators fear for
the stability of international inancial markets. he
hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM),
run by well-known hedge fund managers as well as
Nobel laureates in economics, bet on the convergence
of low-quality and high-quality bond yields. Due
to overconidence in the (seemingly) sophisticated
econometric models the fund excessively leveraged
its positions: „hey turned $4 billion equity capital
into $100 billion of assets, which were then used as
collateral for more than a trillion dollars of notional
over-the-counter derivatives“ (Lhabitant 2007: 16).
What LTCM’s models did not (and of course could
not) predict was that Russia devalued the Ruble and
defaulted on its domestic debt, which caused an international light to safety and thus a widening of spreads
between bond yields – and not a convergence. Due
to its high leverage LTCMs default would have led to
an enormous selling wave. hus, LTCM was deemed
„too big to fail“, a term hitherto used exclusively for
large banks and entire countries. he Federal Reserve
Bank of New York orchestrated a bail out of LTCM
purportedly to avoid a systemic crisis. However, „a
minority of critics not only questioned the rescue at
that time but also suggested that those rescued and
those doing the rescuing had close associations, and
that this was an instance of crony capitalism on which
the Asian inancial crisis had precisely been blamed“
(de Brouwer 2001: 17). Shortly before the turn of the
century, hedge funds had almost $500 billion in assets
under management. his was the time of the dot-com
bubble when many experts said that tech stocks were
overvalued but the stock prices of „new economy“
irms just kept rising. Many neoclassical economists
proclaimed that „hedge funds are better positioned
to act as contrarian investors making markets more
liquid and eicient“ (Harmes 2002: 159). Proponents
of hedge funds usually ascribed a vital role to them for
the operation of inancial markets: „By buying irrationally cheap assets and selling irrationally expensive
ones, they shit market prices until the irrationalities
disappear, thus ultimately facilitating the eicient
allocation of the world’s capital“ (Mallaby 2007: 95).
However, reality proved to be diferent from these
neoclassical ideals; Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004)
found that hedge funds did not exert a correcting force
on stock prices during the dot-com bubble. Instead,
they have „ridden“ the bubble because of predictable
investor sentiment and limits to arbitrage.
he real breakthrough of the hedge fund industry
came during and shortly ater the dot-com bubble between 2000 and 2002 when hedge funds consistently
generated positive returns while most major stock
markets slumped. his caused a strong inlow of
capital from institutional investors, which believed
that hedge fund performance was uncorrelated to the
major stock markets. It took the hedge fund industry
about ten years (1990 to end-2000) to increase assets
under management from $40 billion to $500 billion.
he next $500 billion were added in just four and a
half years until mid-2005. hen, the next $500 billion
were added in less than two years until early 2007,
when about 10,000 hedge funds operated. hus, hedge
funds had been on an exponential growth curve until
the outbreak of the inancial crisis. he role of hedge
funds for the inancial crisis will be discussed in section ive. It suices to note here that the losses and
outlows that were caused by the crisis were recouped by the hedge fund industry by 2010. In the third
quarter of 2012, hedge funds hit a new all-time high of
$2,190 billion assets under management. Figure 1 gives
an instructive overview of the rise of the hedge fund
industry from the early 1990s until the third quarter
of 2012.
Hedge funds have grown tremendously from
the tiny beginnings in the late 1940s to become an
industry with global importance – although it has to
be noted that the assets under management of the
hedge fund industry are still only a small fraction of
the total global stock of inancial assets. However, due
to leverage and the fact that hedge funds are uniquely
able to concentrate their capital in just a few selected
investments they are able to have a signiicant impact,
as most other institutional investors such as mutual or
pension funds (have to) diversify their assets (Harmes
2002). Many observers attribute the success of hedge
funds to the allegedly superior investment skills of
hedge fund managers. However, what is oten neglected is the fact that hedge funds are considerably less
regulated than virtually all other institutional investors; this gives them a distinct advantage.
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Fichtner: The Rise of Hedge Funds: A Story of Inequality
Figure 1: Assets under management by the hedge fund industry 1990–Q3/2012 ($ billions)
2.250
2.000
1.750
1.500
1.250
1.000
750
500
250
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
19
19
19
90
0
Source: Heinz (2011), HFR (2012)
than 100 investors or investors must be „qualiied
purchasers“ – individuals who own at least $5 million
in investments or companies with over $25 million
in investments (Edwards 2004). his exemption is
crucial to hedge funds, as it enables them to perform
„short-selling“, which is betting on the decrease in
value of stocks and other securities (Oesterle 2006).
Second, hedge funds typically try to be exempt from
the Securities Act of 1933 in order to prevent having
to reveal proprietary trading strategies and other
information. herefore, hedge funds have to restrict
themselves to private placement, which means that
they are not allowed public advertisement and marketing of their funds. In addition, hedge funds may
only accept „accredited investors“, which have a net
worth that exceeds $1 million at the time of purchase
(Edwards 2004). hird, to be exempt from the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, hedge fund managers (or
„investment advisors“) had to restrict themselves to
less than 15 clients (i.e. individual hedge funds) per
year and do not advertise themselves publicly as an
investment advisor (Stulz 2007). his, however, changed with the Dodd-Frank Act of 2011; since March
2012 hedge fund managers have to register with the
SEC. Hedge fund managers advising only funds with
3. The (non-)regulation of hedge funds – the first
ingredient of inequality
As mentioned before, Alfred Winslow Jones
structured his hedge fund as a limited partnership in
order to avoid SEC regulation. In fact, the legal structure of the limited partnership is still the dominant
model for domestic US hedge funds today. Limited
partnerships provide pass-through tax treatment;
that means that the hedge fund itself does not pay
any taxes on its investment returns, but the returns
are passed through so that all individual investors
pay tax with their personal income tax bills (Connor/
Woo 2004). Since the mid-2000s, however, an increasing number of hedge funds has been structured as
limited liability companies, particularly in Delaware
as this US state has completely aligned its legal system
to business needs (Lhabitant 2007). In order to avoid
regulation, US domestic hedge funds traditionally
structured themselves in a way that takes into account
four central pieces of legislation: First, to be exempt
from the Investment Company Act of 1940, which
contains disclosure and registration requirements
and imposes limits on the use of certain investment
techniques, hedge funds need to either have less
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less than $150 million in assets under management in
the US, however, are exempt from this rule (SEC 2011).
Fourth, in order to avoid being afected by certain
parts of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which
contains strict registration and disclosure requirements, hedge funds must ensure that they have less
than 500 investors (Horsield-Bradbury 2008).
It is this exempt legal status that deines hedge
funds and gives them their uniqueness. In fact, strictly
legally speaking there is no such thing as a hedge
fund. Hedge funds are best characterized by their
unparalleled freedom to pursue all investment strategies they suppose are proitable: „A legal structure
that avoids certain regulatory constraints remains a
common thread that unites all hedge funds“ (Connor/
Woo 2004: 9). Edwards (2004: 34) gives a concise, yet
also comprehensive deinition of hedge funds: „hey
can buy and sell whatever assets or inancial instruments they want to, trade any kind of derivatives
instrument, engage in unrestricted short-selling,
employ unlimited amounts of leverage, hold concentrated positions in any security without restriction,
set redemption policies without restriction, and can
employ any fee structure and management compensation structure that is acceptable to their investors.
In addition, hedge funds have very limited disclosure
and reporting obligations, to regulators, the public,
and their own investors.“
During the irst decades of the industry practically all hedge funds were legally domiciled in the US.
his has changed drastically. In 2010 only 22 percent
of assets under management by the global hedge fund
industry belonged to funds domiciled in the US –
virtually all of them based in Delaware. But the most
important global legal domicile of hedge funds by far
were the Cayman Islands. he hedge funds registered
there managed 52 percent of global hedge fund assets
in 2010. he British Virgin Islands (11 percent), Jersey
(ive percent) and Bermuda (four percent) occupied
the third, fourth and ith place, respectively (Jaecklin
et al. 2011). Hence, about 72 percent of all hedge fund
assets belonged to funds that were domiciled in these
four ofshore inancial centers. However, these territories are not just random „sunny jurisdictions“ (Lhabitant 2007: 87); they are so-called „British Overseas
Territories“ (except for Jersey that is a UK „Crown
Dependency“), which means that they have autonomy
in areas such as tax legislation, but ultimately remain
under British sovereignty. In fact, it is legally correct
to still describe these territories as „colonies“ of the
UK (Hendry and Dickinson 2011: 4). hese ofshore
inancial centers – also called tax havens – attract
hedge funds by ofering very low levels of taxation
and regulation. For example, the Cayman Islands
Monetary Authority tolerates that a small group of
„jumbo directors“ sits on the boards of hundreds of
hedge funds (Jones 2011). Directors should in theory
be independent and protect the interests of investors.
It seems extremely diicult to fulill this duty for four
individuals that hold more than 100 directorships
each, another individual even held 567 directorships
in Cayman Islands-based hedge funds (ibid.). Ofshore inancial centers that are under the sovereignty
of the UK, such as the Cayman Islands, ofer political stability and the familiar Anglo-Saxon system of
common law – pivotal facts that distinguish them
from other sunny jurisdictions such as the Bahamas,
Barbados or Belize. In this context, Delaware has to
be described as a „de facto“ ofshore inancial center
or as a „domestic tax haven“ of the US (Dyreng et al.
2012); Delaware performs exactly the same role as the
UK tax havens by providing low levels of regulation
and taxation, as well as a high degree of stability.
Including Delaware almost 95 percent of global hedge
fund assets are domiciled in ofshore jurisdictions
that are under the sovereignty of the US and the UK.
Of course, hedge fund managers usually do not work
in these ofshore territories but predominantly in
onshore inancial centers.
At the end of 2011 roughly 70 percent of all hedge
fund managers worked in the US, mainly in New York
and Connecticut. Nearly 20 percent worked in the
UK – 18 percent in London and nearly two percent
in the „Crown Dependencies“ of Jersey and Guernsey
(heCityUK 2012). Hence, approximately 90 percent
of all global hedge fund managers worked in just two
single countries, the US and the UK. his is an extreme – and arguably sui generis – concentration of
one major global inancial industry in just two countries. hus, it seems justiied to call hedge funds an
exclusively Anglo-American industry. Both countries
traditionally adhered to the so-called „indirect regulation“ of hedge funds. „he indirect model“, writes
Fioretos (2010: 702), „is based on the principle that
unfettered markets impose discipline on hedge funds
in whose self-interest it is to adopt responsible trading and leverage strategies. Because counterparties
acting as prime brokers (typically investment banks)
manage derivatives and lend the money that enable
high levels of leveraging, the indirect approach is
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Fichtner: The Rise of Hedge Funds: A Story of Inequality
based on the principle that regulators can also guard
against systemic risks by imposing disclosure requirements and leverage ratios on counterparties rather
than directly regulate hedge funds.“ It is important to
note that this indirect model of hedge fund regulation
does not require a distinct legal status of hedge funds.
herefore, the hedge funds themselves do not have
to register in the US and the UK, but only the hedge
fund managers. hat is also the reason why the managers of hedge funds are the targets of the Alternative
Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) directive by the
European Union. he AIFM directive will come into
force in mid-2013 and introduces some moderate
regulations mostly concerning disclosure and transparency of hedge funds. he directive does not, however, bring about a strict international regulation of
hedge funds, as there are important exemptions until
2018 and funds that do not actively market themselves
within the EU are not afected by the directive at all
(Norton Rose 2012). Hence, the AIFM directive does
not directly threaten the exempt legal status of hedge
funds in the UK and the US.
Edwards (2004: 37) argues that the exempt legal
status that hedge funds enjoy in the US „is premised on the philosophy that wealthy investors should
be free to make their own decisions unhindered by
government regulation and its associated costs, and
in return should have to bear the full consequences
of their investment decisions – good or bad. In efect,
this means that wealthy individuals and institutional
investors are able to access non-traditional ‚alternative‘ investment strategies that may provide superior
returns with possibly greater risk, while less wellof investors are protected by being excluded from
participating in these investments.“ While Edwards
stresses that ordinary investors are „protected“ by
this legislation, one could also say that hedge funds
and, by implication, their wealthy investors enjoy a
privileged or unequal treatment. his legal inequality
of hedge funds and their investors is of central importance for the rise of hedge funds. In addition, the
US and the UK enabled another important element
of legal inequality that works to the beneit of hedge
funds – the development of ofshore inancial centers
that function as legal domiciles of hedge funds. As
noted above, ofshore inancial centers, such as the
Cayman Islands but also Delaware, have levels of
regulation and taxation that are considerable lower
than „onshore“ jurisdictions. his provides hedge
funds with an advantage over other institutional
investors but also beneits very rich individuals who
transfer their wealth to ofshore inancial centers in
order to save taxes, or even to pay no taxes at all. A
recent report by Tax Justice Network estimates that
a staggering $21 to $32 trillion of wealth deposited
ofshore is unrecorded. he vast majority of this
wealth is very probably enjoyed by the top one percent
of the world’s population (Shaxson et al. 2012). Rich
private individuals, i.e. mainly the top one percent of
the world’s population, were by far the most important group of investors in hedge funds until recently.
Hence, the rise of hedge funds is inexplicable without
the enormous investments by these high net worth
individuals. hus, when we analyze the rise of hedge
funds we necessarily have to study income inequality.
4. Income inequality and the rise of hedge funds –
the second ingredient
In order to have a broad overview of the historical
development of income inequality in an international
perspective, we plot the income share (excluding capital gains) by the top one percent of the population for
ive selected countries between 1920 and 2010 (Figure
2). he data are taken from the seminal World Top
Incomes Database, which for the irst time enables
cross-country comparisons of income inequality for
long periods of time (Alvaredo et al. 2012; Atkinson
et al. 2011). he US and the UK have been selected
because they form the core of the hedge fund industry,
as described above. In addition to providing the legal
domiciles for hedge funds and being the two dominant centers for hedge funds managers, both countries are the two largest sources of capital invested in
hedge funds today; in 2010 approximately 54 percent
of the investors in hedge funds were US-based, while
12 percent came from the UK (Preqin 2011). France,
Japan and Sweden have been selected as points of reference to the US and the UK. France to a certain degree
represents continental Europe, Japan is one of the
few Asian high-income countries, and Sweden is the
classical case of a highly egalitarian country. Furthermore, these three countries have a higher availability
of data regarding the income of the top one percent
for the selected time period than most other countries
covered by the World Top Incomes Database.
Figure 2 clearly shows that from 1920 to the early
1940s there was a high level of income inequality in
all ive countries. Just before the stock market crash of
1929, the top one percent in the US had nearly 20 per-
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Fichtner: Der Aufstieg der Hedge-Fonds: Eine Geschichte der Ungleichheit
Figure 2: Top 1% income share excluding capital gains 1920–2010 (%)
Figure 2: Top 1% income share excluding capital gains 1920–2010 (%)
21
19
17
15
13
11
9
7
5
France
Japan
Sweden
United Kingdom (from 1937)
10
20
05
20
00
20
95
19
90
19
85
19
80
19
75
19
70
19
65
19
60
19
55
19
50
19
45
19
40
19
35
19
30
19
25
19
19
20
3
United States
Source: Alvaredo et al. (2012)
cent of the national income. he same is true for Japan
in 1938. Although Sweden is generally below the other
four countries, in 1935 the top one percent had still over
12 percent of the national income. he period from
the mid-1940s until the early 1980s can be described
as the „Great Convergence“ or „Great Compression“
(Goldin/Margo 1992); the income share of the top one
percent of the population dropped signiicantly in all
ive countries during the 1940s and 1950s and stayed in
a narrow range roughly between six and nine percent
of total income (except for France during the 1960s
and Sweden where it dropped below ive percent in the
1970s). hus, income inequality decreased signiicantly
in all ive countries. his period ended in the early or
mid-1980s when the „Great Divergence“ began (Krugman 2007; Noah 2010); income inequality increased
again. his trend is particularly pronounced in the US
and the UK. In the US the share of the top one percent
(i.e. approximately the top 1.56 million families) more
than doubled from eight percent in 1981 to well over 18
percent in 2007. During the same period the share of
the top one percent increased from over six percent to
over 15 percent in the UK. he share of the top one percent also increased in France, Japan and Sweden, but
to a much smaller extent. Hence, the development of
the share of the top one percent in the US and the UK
from 1920 to 2010 has a „U“-shape, whereas in France,
Japan and Sweden the graph rather has an „L“-shape,
i.e. income inequality dropped in the 1940s and 1950s
and then stayed more or less on this level.
In order to belong to the top one percent income
group in the US one had to earn at least roughly
$350,000 per year in 2010 (Saez/Piketty 2012). However, the main target group of hedge funds is high
net worth individuals (HNWIs) that have investable
wealth over $1 million. hus, a better proxy for the
group of HNWIs that primarily invest in hedge funds
is the share of the top 0.1 percent, i.e. the top decile
of the top one percent – or, the top 156,000 families
of the US that each earned more than $1.49 million
in 2010. Figure 3 shows the income share of the top
0.1 percent from 1920 to 2010 including and excluding
capital gains. In addition, the top marginal income
tax rate and the capital gains tax rate are shown.
Both income shares of the top 0.1 percent display
the „U“-shape that also characterized the share of the
top one percent. However, Figure 3 shows that the top
0.1 percent beneited disproportionally from capital
gains. In 1928 the top 0.1 percent had about eight
percent of total income, which increases signiicantly
to 11.5 percent when we include capital gains, which
are mainly generated in the stock market. he graph
including capital gains clearly shows the great stock
market booms and crashes of the twentieth century.
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11
Fichtner: The Rise of Hedge Funds: A Story of Inequality
Figure 3: Top 0.1% income share and top tax rates United States 1920–2010 (%)
Source: Alvaredo et al. (2012), Citizens for Tax Justice (2012)
he drop in 1929 was of course particularly steep. he
drop in 1969–1970 marked the period when the commencing bear market sent most hedge funds out of
business and thus ended the irst rise of hedge funds –
but has also to do with the increase of the capital gains
tax rate at that time, which was raised from 25 percent
to eventually over 35 percent. he stock market crashes of 1987, 2000 and 2007 are clearly shown in steep
drops of the share of the top 0.1 percent including
capital gains. It is remarkable that this share reached
a new peak of extraordinarily high 12.3 percent in
2007, thus clearly surpassing the previous maximum
of 11.5 percent in 1928. his is in marked contrast to
the share of the top one percent, which is still below
its peak of 1928. his shows that the super-rich have
increased their income share much faster than the
rich. In fact, the income of the rich top one percent
of the US population more than doubled from 1980 to
2010, but the income of the super-rich top 0.1 percent
more than trebled, and the income of the „ultra-rich“
top 0.01 percent (i.e. the top 15,600 families that each
earned at least $7.89 million in 2010) even quadrupled
over the same period. On the other hand, the income
of the bottom 90 percent dropped by almost ive per-
cent from 1980 to 2010 (Shaxson et al. 2012; Piketty/
Saez 2012). 3 Hence, during these thirty years income
inequality in the US increased extremely with the
highest income brackets increasing their incomes at
the highest rates.
What we can generally see in Figure 3 is that there
seems to be an inverse relation between the top marginal income tax rate and the maximum capital gains
tax rate on the one hand, and the income share of the
top 0.1 percent on the other. In the mid-1920s both tax
rates were drastically lowered; this corresponds with
a peak of the income share of the top 0.1 percent of
the US population. During the Great Convergence the
top marginal income tax rate was above 90 percent
from 1950 to 1963 and remained at 70 percent until
1982. he maximum capital gains tax remained at
25 percent from 1942 to 1967, but this had not a large
impact as the stock market did not play an important
role during that period. Since the late 1970s there is a
more or less clear trend towards lowering both cen3
In comparison, P90-95 increased by more than 25
percent and P95-99 increased nearly 50 percent from 1980 to
2010 (Piketty/Saez 2012).
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12
Fichtner: Der Aufstieg der Hedge-Fonds: Eine Geschichte der Ungleichheit
Figure 4: Top 0.1% income share and top tax rates United States 1920–2010 (%)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
11
10
09
20
20
20
07
08
20
20
06
05
04
03
02
01
Funds of Hedge Funds
20
20
20
20
20
00
High Net Worth Individuals
20
20
98
99
19
19
96
97
19
19
19
92
0%
Pension Funds
Endowments & Foundations Corporations & Other
Source: Alvaredo et al. (2012), Citizens for Tax Justice (2012)
tral tax rates in the US – this is especially true for the
period since the mid-1990s, as Figure 3 shows. he
top 0.1 percent – the primary group of hedge fund
investors – has beneited enormously at the expense
of the bottom 90 percent; the share of the top 0.1
percent (including capital gains) more than doubled
from about 2.6 percent in 1978 to 5.8 percent in 1990,
then it nearly doubled again to almost 11 percent in
2000. his unparalleled surge in the income share
of the top 0.1 percent fueled the growth of the hedge
fund industry, as very rich individuals have a much
higher propensity to save, that is to invest in hedge
funds that promise high returns. Most mainstream
economists attribute the increased income inequality
in the US primarily to technological change and the
thereby changed supply and demand of skills (Chicago Booth 2012); or, in the words of Acemoglu (2003),
„technical change favors more skilled workers“. However, managing a hedge fund is not principally about
cutting-edge technology, but rather about identifying
lucrative investment opportunities. In addition, technological change also afected countries such as Japan,
France and Sweden that do not show a drastically
increased income inequality. Hence, besides tax rates,
other factors probably include (lack of) education and
welfare transfers. Another plausible explanation is
the signiicantly changed balance of power between
workers and employers in the US since the late 1970s
(Schmitt 2009). On balance, the rise of hedge funds is
inexplicable without taking into account the income
inequality in the US (and the UK) that signiicantly
increased since the early 1980s.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, wealth inequality did not increase from 1989 to 2009. he wealth
share of the top one percent stayed at about 37 percent
of total US net worth (Wolf 2010); though this igure
clearly reveals an even more extreme inequality than
regarding income. In the face of drastically increased
income inequality this is clearly a paradox: „We have
this income data where incomes are quadrupling, and
tripling, and doubling, over a period of three decades
– and the wealth igures show just a tiny, tiny little
blip in that wealth concentration. hat fantastic increase in incomes has to go somewhere“ (Shaxson et al.
2012). Undisclosed and unrecorded wealth deposited
in ofshore inancial centers – such as Switzerland,
Luxembourg, Ireland, the UK territories Cayman
Islands, Bermuda or Jersey, and the domestic tax
haven Delaware – seems to be the most plausible missing link in explaining this pivotal paradox. What is
clear, however, is that HNWIs are the one group that
beneits the most from this enormous wealth that is
hidden ofshore; as Ötsch (2012: 27) has argued: „he
ofshore economy represents a inancial and economic
system, which provides a diferent legal framework
for the beneit of elites at the expense of the majority.“
Figure 4 shows that in 1992 at least 81 percent of
all the capital invested in hedge funds came from
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13
Fichtner: The Rise of Hedge Funds: A Story of Inequality
5: Approximate
individuals
in hedge
fund industry
Figure 5: Approximate share ofFigure
individuals
in hedge share
fundofindustry
1992,
1996–2011
(%) 1992, 1996–2011 (%)
100%
94%
90%
80%
74%
71%
70%
66%
65%
65%
60%
60%
61%
58%
63%
58%
52%
50%
45%
44%
37%
40%
31%
32%
30%
20%
10%
11
20
10
20
09
20
08
20
07
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
20
99
19
98
19
97
19
96
19
19
92
0%
Source: Authors calculations based on heCityUK (2012)
HNWIs. he second largest category of investors was
„Funds of Hedge Funds“. A fund of funds adds an
additional layer between the investors and the hedge
funds; their supposed beneits are better risk diversiication, access to closed funds and better transparency through experienced funds of funds managers
(Lhabitant 2007). Furthermore, funds of hedge funds
have generally lower minimum investment requirements than hedge funds. Due to a lack of data about
which types of investors allocate how much capital to
funds of funds this category is a „black box“ when we
want to know the ultimate sources of capital of hedge
funds – and this black box grew from 14 percent to 27
percent in 2002, and even to 32 percent in 2008.
However, all types of investors allocate capital
to funds of hedge funds. herefore, due to a lack of
available data, we assume that their shares in funds of
funds are the same as in hedge funds excluding funds
of funds. In the absence of available data this method
should provide a reasonably good approximation of
the ultimate sources of capital of hedge funds. Figure
5 shows the approximate ultimate share of high net
worth individuals in the hedge fund industry in 1992
and from 1996 to 2011. In 1992 this share still was at 94
percent; from 1996 to 2003 the share of high net worth
individuals dropped from 74 percent to 58 percent.
Ater a brief rise in 2004 and 2005, the share dropped
signiicantly to a low of 31 percent in 2010.
It is not yet clear why the share of high net worth
individuals is more or less continually falling since
the early 1990s. One of the most probable explanations is that institutional investors, such as pension
funds, and corporations cast of their reluctance
towards the perceived risky hedge fund industry over
time. However, very recently there was anecdotal evidence that many high net worth individuals feel that
the fees charged by most hedge funds are too high
– the typical fee structure of hedge funds is known
as „2 & 20“: a performance-based fee of 20 percent of
proits plus a high management fee of two percent.
In addition, „rich private investors are turning their
backs on hedge funds because moves to attract more
conservative pension fund clients mean managers no
longer deliver the big returns they crave“ (Wilkes/
Vellacott 2012). Chapman (2012) argues that from
1999 to 2011 the „hedge fund community“ (hedge
funds plus their prime brokers) has outperformed
„the market“ (the US S&P 500 and the UK FTSE All
Share stock indices) in every single year except 2006.
However, when accounting for hedge fund fees and
prime broker fees, the ultimate returns of hedge fund
investors were below market returns in seven out
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14
Fichtner: Der Aufstieg der Hedge-Fonds: Eine Geschichte der Ungleichheit
Figure 6: Income of the top 25 highest-earning hedge fund managers 2001–2011 ($ billions)
27,5
25,3
25,0
22,3
22,5
22,1
20,0
17,5
14,4
15,0
13,4
12,5
11,6
9,4
10,0
7,5
6,5
5,5
5,0
3,7
2,0
2,5
11
20
10
20
09
20
08
20
07
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
20
01
0,0
Source: Institutional Investor’s Alpha (2012)
of these 13 years (ibid.). A study by Lack (2012) even
found that from 1998 to 2010 hedge fund managers
have pocketed a staggering 84 percent to 98 percent of
all returns generated by the entire hedge fund industry: „What investors have paid compared with what
they’ve received is almost breathtaking. Hedge fund
managers and funds of hedge funds have succeeded in
generating substantial proits. However, they’ve also
managed to keep most of the gains for themselves,
while at the same time successfully propagating the
notion that broad, diversiied hedge fund allocations
are a smart addition to most institutional portfolios.
hat’s quite a trick!“ (Lack 2012: 69)
his arguably means that HNWIs exclusively
enjoyed the high (out-)performance of hedge funds
during the 1980s and 1990s, but when institutional
investors increased their share in the rapidly growing
hedge fund industry vis-à-vis HNWIs in the mid2000s, the outperformance of hedge funds decreased
signiicantly. Although in 2008 hedge funds performed far less badly than the major stock markets,
from 2009 until 2012 the hedge fund industry nearly
continually underperformed them (Chapman 2012).
Hence, as institutional investors such as pension
funds or insurance companies (part of Corporations
& Other in Figure 5) increased their allocations to
hedge funds, a larger share of the very high (and
increasingly undue) fees was indirectly paid by people
of the “bottom 90 percent”. Lack (2012) estimates
that between 1998 and 2010 the hedge fund industry
received fees in the order of between $324 billion and
$479 billion. It should not be entirely surprising, then,
that the top 25 individual hedge fund managers alone
earned $136.2 billion between 2001 and 2011 (Figure
6).
Even 2008, when virtually all inancial markets
slumped, the top 25 highest-earning hedge fund
managers together made $11.6 billion. In 2010 the
top 25 hedge fund managers alone made $22.1 billion.
his enormous income in the hands of very few hedge
fund managers represented roughly six percent of the
total income share of the „ultra-rich“ top 0.01 percent
of the US population – the top 15,600 families that
collectively had an income of about $372 billion (Saez/
Piketty 2012). Hence, extraordinarily high income of
the top hedge fund managers is further increasing
income inequality in the US. Signiicantly increased
income inequality was identiied by many heterodox
political economists as one of the root causes that led
to the inancial crisis that began as the „Great Recession“ in 2008.
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15
Fichtner: The Rise of Hedge Funds: A Story of Inequality
hedge funds (Lysandrou 2011). Hence, they sought new
investment opportunities, such as subprime derivatives. his argument is conirmed by the fact that at the
end of 2006 the hedge fund industry held 48 percent of
the total stock of Collateral Debt Obligations (CDOs),
while its assets under management amounted to only
a little over one percent of the world’s total stock of
securities (Lysandrou 2012). his is an extreme concentration of hedge fund investments in one arcane asset
class – of course, such a concentration was only possible because of the unequal regulation of hedge funds
discussed in section three. his alternative interpretation of the inancial crisis stresses the fact that hedge
funds exerted a strong buy-side pressure to create
CDOs. Investment banks (prime brokers) passed this
demand pressure on to mortgage brokers, which then
increased the amount of subprime loans that could be
„sliced and diced“ into CDOs. As we all know today
these subprime CDOs acted as the spark that ignited
the inancial crisis.4
Many hedge funds, such as a fund called Magnetar,
reportedly realized the toxic nature of many subprime
CDOs they held. However, apparently they did not
simply sell these arcane inancial instruments. On the
contrary, Magnetar cooperated with investment banks
to design and create even more CDOs. hen, Magnetar
and other hedge funds wagered against the very same
CDOs they helped to create using another arcane inancial instrument – credit default swaps (CDS) (Eisinger
and Bernstein 2010). he hedge fund Paulson & Co
cooperated with the investment banks Goldman Sachs
and Deutsche Bank to create CDOs and then wagered
on their collapse – Goldman Sachs later agreed with
the SEC to pay a record-breaking $550 million ine
to settle the case (Economist 2011). As Zuckerman
(2009: 182) writes, some observers „argued that Mr.
Paulson’s actions indirectly led to more dangerous
CDO investments, resulting in billions of dollars of
additional losses for those who owned the CDO slices“.
It is estimated that in 2007 alone Paulson & Co made a
staggering $15 billion with such bets on the crash of the
real-estate market in the US. In that year John Paulson
himself earned about $4 billion in performance fees
from „the greatest trade ever“ (Zuckerman 2009).
5. The financial crisis – inequality and hedge funds
at work
One of the irst prominent economists to highlight the link between increased income inequality
and the inancial crisis since 2008 was Rajan (2010).
Rajan argued that the decline in their relative incomes
since the 1980 led many of the „bottom 90 percent“
consumers in the US to increase debt in order to keep
consumption high. A considerable portion of the debt
by the low-income households took the form of subprime mortgages. his behavior has temporarily kept
private consumption high, despite stagnating or falling
incomes for many households. See van Treeck/Sturn
(2012) for a comprehensive survey about this „Rajan
controversy“ and the current debates about the role of
income inequality as a cause for the Great Recession;
they conclude: „Rising income inequality seems to have
contributed to the emergence of a credit bubble which
eventually burst and triggered the Great Recession“
(ibid: 24). Some scholars, notably Livingston (2009) as
well as Kumhof/Rancière (2010), stressed high income
inequality, and thereby induced high household debtto-income ratios, as similarities between the Great
Recession of 2008 and the Great Depression of 1929.
In a recent working paper Stockhammer (2012: 1)
argued that „the economic imbalances that caused the
present crisis should be thought of as the outcome of
the interaction of the efects of inancial deregulation
with the macroeconomic efects of rising inequality“.
Extending Rajan’s analysis, Stockhammer identiied
the increased income of the rich and super rich as
one key channel that contributed to the crisis. Richer
households tend to hold riskier inancial assets than
lower income groups. Hence, according to Stockhammer, particularly the rise of subprime derivatives, but
also the rise of hedge funds, can be linked to the rise
of the super rich and their appetite for risky assets that
promise high returns.
Lysandrou (2012) even argued that there was a „primacy of hedge funds in the subprime crisis“. According
to this interpretation of the crisis, hedge funds contributed signiicantly to the development of a market for
subprime derivatives through their close relationship
with the prime broker divisions of the large investment
banks. Most hedge funds found it increasingly diicult
to generate high returns in the years ater the dot-com
crash, from 2003 to 2006, due to a very low level of
interest rates, the tightening of bond yield spreads, and
higher competition by the increasing number of other
4
At the beginning of the subprime crises in mid2007 three hedge funds managed by the investment bank
Bear Stearns that were heavily invested in CDOs collapsed
and had to be rescued by the bank thus foreshadowing its
own collapse in 2008.
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Fichtner: Der Aufstieg der Hedge-Fonds: Eine Geschichte der Ungleichheit
As mentioned before, performance-based fees
of US hedge fund managers (and private equity fund
managers) – which are also known as „carried interest“ – are taxed only with the capital gains rate. he
maximum capital gains tax rate was continually lowered from about 29 percent in 1995 to roughly 15 percent since 2003 (as shown in Figure 3). In contrast,
the top marginal income tax rate is much higher at 35
percent since 2003. his unequal treatment of capital
gains beneited hedge fund managers enormously; they
could earn billions of dollars per year and only pay a
comparably low tax rate. In 2010 President Obama proposed to tax carried interest with the normal income
tax rate. Stephen Schwarzman, the founder and chairman of the large private equity company Blackstone,
iercely criticized this proposal even saying in private:
„It’s war. It’s like when Hitler invaded Poland in 1939“
(Quinn 2010). Although Schwarzman later apologized
for this obscene statement it shows the vested interests
in this unequal treatment of capital gains.
In the US rich hedge fund managers (and private
equity fund managers) started to convert their private
wealth into political inluence. Whereas in 1990 hedge
fund managers contributed just $125,000, this sum
increased to $1.6 million in 1996, to over $4 million
in 2002 and then to over $19 million in 2008. In the
2012 election cycle hedge funds contributed over $32
million – 24 percent to Democrats and 76 percent
to Republicans. Private equity and investment irms
contributed over $54 million (Center for Responsive
Politics 2012). hese are still comparably small shares
of total party contributions, but they are rising fast. In
2010 the US Supreme Court allowed unlimited private
contributions through opaque „super PACs“ (political
action committees) that theoretically operate independent of the campaigns they support, but in reality do
not (Potter 2012). Hence, contributions from ultra-rich
hedge fund managers are likely to increase further. In
the UK, hedge funds and private equity irms even
contributed a staggering 27 percent of all donations
to the ruling Conservative party in 2011 (Mathiason
2011); this arguably makes sure that the UK remains a
staunch supporter of lax hedge fund regulation. Even
though hedge fund managers could not prevent the reelection of President Obama in November 2012 with
their contributions to the Republicans, it currently
seems very probable that their political inluence in
the US – and also the UK – will further increase in the
future, as they have just begun to convert wealth into
inluence.
6. Conclusion
It was the purpose of this paper to show that the
rise of hedge funds was indeed a story of inequality.
Whereas the irst rise of the hedge fund industry –
from the late 1940s until the early 1970s when most
funds collapsed – had virtually no consequences,
the second rise – from the early 1980s until today –
impacted the global inancial markets signiicantly.
Hedge funds have risen to the very pinnacle of global
inance. he rise of hedge funds was made possible by
various interdependent dimensions of inequality: he
marked inequality between the (non-)regulation of
hedge funds and the much stricter regulation of other
inancial market actors – supplemented by the fact that
hedge funds have a distinct advantage by shiting their
legal domicile to ofshore inancial centers that provide
lower levels of regulation and taxation; furthermore, the
drastically increased income inequality since the early
1980s, primarily in the US and the UK. Both dimensions of inequality are closely connected, because hedge
funds may only accept investments by high net worth
individuals (HNWIs) that have more than $1 million
in investable wealth (and by institutional investors) in
order to be exempt from most US and UK regulation.
he exempt legal status provides hedge funds
with a number of distinct advantages over institutional investors such as mutual or pension funds. Hedge
funds (at least global macro funds) are able to concentrate their capital in a few selected investments – as in
1992 when Soros was able to „bet everything on one
card“ and succeeded in forcing the UK out of the ERM.
Hedge funds can build up high leverage to enhance
returns – but this also can drastically increase risk as
the episode of LTCM showed. In addition, hedge funds
face much lower reporting and disclosure standards
than other institutional investors. Although both the
US and the UK have recently tightened the regulation
of hedge funds a little bit, for example by mandatory
registration of hedge fund managers, both countries in
principle still adhere to the indirect regulation paradigm. he traditional rationale for refraining from
strict direct regulation was that hedge funds were too
small to matter and that HNWIs should be free from
government regulation in their investment decisions.
Both rationales have become obsolete in the course of
the inancial crisis. As Lysandrou showed, hedge funds
did play a crucial role in the inancial crisis. Hence,
they are clearly not too small to matter anymore. Furthermore, the beneicial role ascribed to them by many
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Fichtner: The Rise of Hedge Funds: A Story of Inequality
rets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2012&ind=F2700
[20.12.2012]
mainstream economists has to be doubted ater the
crisis. Financial regulation should protect the interests
of the entire population not just those of HNWIs. Drastically increased income inequality and hedge fund
involvement in the expansion of subprime mortgages
played a vital part for the inancial crisis. Hence, there
is good reason to argue that the exempt legal status of
hedge funds should be abolished and consequentially
that they should be regulated like any other institutional investor. he AIFM directive by the EU is a step in
that direction but arguably not a decisive one.
On balance, the rise of hedge funds was signiicantly driven by surging income inequality in the US
(and the UK) since the early 1980s, as HNWIs sought
(risky) investments that promised high returns. Hence,
HNWIs had the privilege to make use of potentially
very lucrative investment opportunities that were not
accessible to the rest of the population. From the 1980s
onwards many hedge funds ceased to be hedge funds
in the risk-averse way characterized by Alfred Winslow
Jones, but should rather be called wager or speculation
funds. he reemergence of global inance that began in
the 1970s – primarily enabled by the US and the UK –
paved the way for the rise of hedge funds that began
one decade later. It remains to be seen if the hedge fund
industry will really more than double to $5 trillion by
2016 as recently predicted by Citigroup (Businesswire
2012). However, it seems probable to conclude that
the rise of hedge funds will continue until the story of
inequality, which enables and fuels this rise, will inally
come to an end.
Chapman, J. (2012): Hedge fund gains are other funds’
losses. Financial Times. Online: http://www.t.com/
cms/s/0/9c8fb776-7e49-11e1-b009-00144feab49a.html
[20.12.2012]
Chicago Booth (2012): Inequality and Skills, IGM Forum.
Online: http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_0IAlhdDH2FoR
Drm [20.12.2012]
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[20.12.2012]
Connor, G./Woo, M. (2004): An Introduction to Hedge Funds.
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Dyreng, S./Lindsey, B./hornock, J. (2012): Exploring the Role
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