8 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989: The Case of the Serbian Orthodox Church Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović The return of the holy In late 1980s, after 40 years of social marginalization, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), along with other religious communities, returned to the public sphere and political scene in socialist Yugoslavia. In comparison with other Central and Southeast European countries, this return was several years late. The process was very similar but with one major difference: the wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia that heavily marked the first period of desecularization. Before the political system itself started to collapse, secularization had already declined due to general mistrust in the Yugoslav state, profound political and economic crisis, and internal disturbances among intellectuals who demanded more freedom in all aspects of social life, including a profound reassessment of the past. The social crisis resulted, at least partly, in a latent discontent of the citizens who turned to religion and the Church with strong political dispositions.1 In socialist Yugoslavia, this process was widely accompanied by ethnocentrism and nationalism, the official rehabilitation of which was needed in order to confirm religion in its traditional role of the keeper of national institutions and values.2 The shifts within Orthodox Christianity manifested themselves soon after the events in Kosovo of the early 1980s. The expulsion of Serbs from this province, the relationships between Serbia proper and its autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina), inclinations towards ethnic myths and symbols, the rise of nationalism, the economic crisis, and many other challenges filled the churches during major holidays, especially in urban settings. The first serious indications of a religious 180 Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 181 revival were witnessed in this period. They were soon followed by reflections on the restoration of the status and political role of the SOC. In 1984 the SOC was permitted to build the St. Sava Temple in the Vračar district of Belgrade, and a new Faculty of Theology. That same year the patriarch’s Christmas message was published in the media for the first time. The media often reported lamentations about “the tragic status of Serbian people in Yugoslavia,”3 while the elements of the so-called “urban Orthodoxy” became more prominent. Mass gatherings of the faithful were organized, panel discussions with representatives of the SOC clergy were crowded, Orthodox theologians entered the mass media, and younger bishops were elected. New Church periodicals were founded; contacts with foreign religious institutions became more frequent, while, at the same time, it was almost mandatory to emphasize the Church’s contributions to the foundation and preservation of the Serbian nation. In time, the SOC became a “safe haven” for part of the political and cultural opposition and nationally oriented intellectuals. It emphasized that ethnic identity and heritage were nurtured in the Church’s lap, including the cults of the national and religious dignitaries, national history, the Cyrillic script, and traditional rituals and values. Orthodoxy was important for the cultural and ethnic uniqueness of Serbs, their homogenization and identity that clearly distinguished them from other national and religious communities. However, the conditions in which religion was revitalized were conducive to both the nationalist and any other sort of political instrumentalization. Several important factors influenced the SOC’s stance during the Yugoslav crisis of the late 1980s and 1990s. Among them were a strong sense of victimization and an attitude that the Church is the key factor in preserving the national identity and organic unity of the nation. Accordingly, there were demands for a thorough revision of politics concerning the Church. The role of victim was related to the traumas of the past and the belief that the SOC had been sustained in a hostile environment.4 Recalling the past and warning against threats of a new genocide were frequent topics in the SOC epistles and public statements during the pre-war and wartime periods. At the same time, the fate of the Serbian people was identified with Christ’s destiny.5 The SOC considers itself a bearer of an authentic national identity. It protects, as it were, the Serbian nation as an organism that cannot survive or develop if divided or detached from its religious, Orthodox roots. Hence the perception that being a Serb means being Orthodox.6 The SOC attitude toward the war in Yugoslavia was that it was an interethnic conflict instigated by those who wanted to destroy the country. Despite 182 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989 its strong anti-communist feelings, the Church considered Yugoslavia a place that guaranteed Serbian unity. Self-determination, according to the SOC prelates, meant that Serbs who had lived in Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina for centuries had the right to choose to stay in Yugoslavia. Internal borders in the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) were seen as administrative ones, determined by a group of communists during World War Two and immediately afterwards. The SOC synod (sabor) invited the public in May 1995 not to acknowledge the “artificial” borders of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, because this would allegedly mean the legalization of an act of violent secession at the expense of the Serbian people.7 The SOC was ready to accept a reformed Yugoslavia in which Serbs would obtain “fair status.” Since this option failed, the Orthodox bishops believed that the creation of a Greater Serbia was a legitimate expression of the right to selfdetermination and a necessity to protect the rights of the Serbs living at the time in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, preserving, thus, the organic unity of the nation. The conviction that Serbs would suffer genocide if they stayed as a minority led to encouraging them to leave the areas not under Serbian control.8 In May 1996 the SOC synod issued the following statement: “Notwithstanding the dissolution of the Versailles Yugoslavia, i.e., the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church still extends to all the Orthodox on that territory.”9 In the late 1980s, the Serbian leadership was acknowledged for having made significant changes in the relations between the Serbian state structures and the SOC. At the same time, the Church demanded a thorough revision of state policies in the religious sector.10 The democratization of society implied the affirmation of many religious communities and denominations, with a privileged position occupied by the SOC. The Church was thus ready to support the state elite in those periods when the national project was dominant, because nationalism was a source of its legitimacy and dominant position in the religious sphere.11 At that time, the Church press wrote that Serbs had alienated themselves from their culture, religion, history, language, and Church. Only if they would “return” to the Church and renew their cultural institutions and religious education in schools would the Serbian people head towards real progress. According to this agenda, several other developments were also crucial: putting the SOC’s Faculty of Theology under the auspices of the University of Belgrade; renewing religious holidays and monasteries in Fruška Gora; and introducing svetosavlje12 as the basis of social life, with the Church becoming a cultural, ideological, and practical “flag keeper.” Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 183 During the 1990s the SOC continued to insist on the restoration of its former rights and privileges, but the Milošević regime largely ignored those requests, so that by mid-1991 some voices were heard within the Church that he should resign.13 In time, those demands gained intensity, especially during 1995, 1996, and 1997, when the SOC leadership openly supported the long-term public protests of citizens against the local elections fraud.14 However, the political opposition to the regime was still hesitant toward the SOC, so that in the fall of 1996, Vuk Drašković, one of the representatives of the coalition “Together” (Zajedno), opposed the enlargement of the coalition by including the SOC in it. He argued that he did not want “Serbia to become an Orthodox Iran.”15 In 1999 the patriarch urged President Milošević to resign, while the regime officials responded that they were not afraid of the patriarch and that the SOC statement, demanding the resignation of the Yugoslav president, was “nonsense.”16 On the other hand, the political leadership of the Bosnian Serbs supported, and carried out, the idea of the central role of the SOC for the Serbian people, their culture, and their historical survival. The Church fiercely opposed Milošević’s agreement to stop supporting the Bosnian Serbs, a concession to the international community. The bishops invited the international community representatives to lift sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (set up in 1992 and consisting of just Serbia and Montenegro)and called on its authorities to stop blocking the Republika Srpska.17 This pressure increased the already strong resistance of the SOC toward the West and the international community. In 1995 the patriarch’s support of Slobodan Milošević’s participation in the Dayton diplomatic negotiations on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs caused a major crisis both within the Church and between the SOC and the regime. The SOC sabor issued a statement from its special session claiming that Patriarch Pavle had been manipulated. Some bishops and clergy contended that the patriarch should have resigned.18 The Kosovo problem During the last 20 years, the situation in Kosovo has become a very important issue for the SOC. This is indicated by a great number of public statements and publications, as well as by the patriarch’s and bishops’ personal visits to Kosovo. Furthermore, this became obvious through certain international activities.19 For example, Artemije, then Bishop of Raška and Prizren, visited the United States five times between February 1998 and February 1999.20 After his stay in Rambouillet in February 184 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989 1999, he went to the United States, where he gave a lecture before the Foreign Affairs Council. During his talks with US officials he argued that the NATO intervention in Kosovo would be counterproductive because it would strengthen the Milošević regime.21 During April and May 1999, Artemije sent several letters to the state authorities in the United States and other Western countries in order to protest against the NATO bombing.22 Finally, in 2004 the Bishop urged US congressmen not to support the independence of Kosovo: The independence of Kosovo, in a situation where most elementary standards of rule-of-law simply do not exist, would lead directly to the final eradication of the Serbian Christian presence in the historic heart of its nation. It would further destabilize the region which is so desperately in need of peace and stability.23 Between 1987 and 1990, the SOC held its sabor in Kosovo three times and this was repeated in 1998. As early as 1995 the bishop of Raška and Prizren stated in his sabor report that the major obstacle for the SOC in Kosovo was “high uncertainty and insecurity for the Serbian people in any respect.” In July 1998, Bishop Artemije said that no Serbian problem, including Kosovo, could be resolved under the ruling regime. According to him, Serbia needed substantial changes that could not be made without a change of authority. Until then, one should pursue the cessation of armed conflict.24 In early November 1998, the Serbian sabor in Kosovo decided that this province must remain an inalienable part of Serbian territory, while President Slobodan Milošević was warned again that he had no right to participate in negotiations about Kosovo on behalf of its Serbs or, for that matter, sign any agreement or plan.25 An SOC delegation visited Paris in February 1999, during the Rambouillet negotiations, but, since the delegation was not allowed to participate, part of it traveled to the United States where its members emphasized that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was counterproductive because it strengthened the Milošević regime.26 With its Easter epistle of 1999, the SOC stressed that Kosovo was the cradle of Serbia and a spiritual center of Orthodoxy for Serbs in general, and that the Serbian people there should live peacefully and freely with the Albanians.27 In a series of statements, the SOC condemned the NATO attacks and appealed to the civil and military authorities in Yugoslavia to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. The Church condemned the destruction of the Serbian historic and religious monuments (many of which were of immense cultural and historic significance) and opposed violence against Serbs living Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 185 in the province. A wave of ethnic violence in March 2004 provided an additional reason for reopening this issue and contacting governmental officials and international representatives.28 Ecumenism and the pope’s visit Apart from Kosovo, one of the focal issues that burdened the SOC–state relations in the last two decades was the pope’s visit to Serbia and the SOC’s attitude towards ecumenism. In 1965 the SOC actively joined the World Council of Churches (WCC) so that the Church representatives were able to monitor the Second Vatican Council despite its general antiecumenical stance.29 Patriarch German Djorić, who was the head of the SOC from 1958 to 1990, claimed that the arrival of the pope in Belgrade should lead through Jasenovac30 and be preceded by the pope’s public repentance and apology to Serbs because of the Ustaša crimes which had been supported by some of the Croatian Catholic clergy. During the 1990s, after German’s death, the SOC prelates had different opinions about the pope’s visit and their further participation in the ecumenical movement. By the 1994 synod decision, Bishop Artemije was nominated to submit a report on the SOC–WCC relations. He proposed that the sabor should make a decision about the SOC’s withdrawal from the WCC and the cessation of any ecumenical activity in “godless ecumenical manifestations.” In his report, Bishop Artemije was extremely critical of the attitude of the ecumenical patriarch, Athenagoras, and his successors regarding the ecumenical movement and work of the WCC. As a direct consequence of his position, and by the ecumenical patriarchate’s decision of 1996, Bishop Artemije was banned from visiting Mt. Athos.31 The requests for withdrawal from the WCC were made even later (1998), but this never happened.32 Even before the conflicts in Yugoslavia, the relations between the SOC and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) were burdened by many problems. Between 1991 and 1994, Patriarch Pavle met Franjo Cardinal Kuharić, the archbishop of Zagreb, on several occasions. The correspondence between the leader of the SOC and the president of Croatia was also active, but those relations remained tense.33 During 1999 it seemed that the relations were getting better. In March of 1999 the head of the SOC visited the bishopric of Zagreb-Ljubljana and all of Italy, meeting, on his way, the highest state and Church officials in the republics of Croatia and Slovenia. This was the patriarch’s first visit to Croatia since the beginning of the War of Yugoslav Succession. He addressed local Serbs and encouraged them to respect the Croatian constitution and 186 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989 laws.34 In Šibenik, the bishop of Dalmatia, Fotije, was also enthroned. He supported “the preservation of the Christian attitude toward the Church hierarchy and believers of the RCC and authorities in the Republic of Croatia.”35 The RCC representatives directed their calls from various bishops’ conferences for lifting sanctions from, and providing humanitarian aid to, all citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whereas Pope John Paul II gave financial support to Patriarch Pavle for Serbian children in Kosovo. At the session of the Episcopal Conferences of Europe, held in Rome in 1999, the Albanian bishops were asked to influence their countrymen to establish peace and not “to request the impossible – independence of Kosovo,” because the most they could get was “wide autonomy.”36 The issue of the papal visit was launched on many occasions after the election of Patriarch Pavle: first in 1994, and then, again, in May of 1999, during the bombing of Serbia, when the SOC rejected the initiative of the Vatican for Pope John Paul II to visit Belgrade. The pope visited Croatia three times (in 1994, 1998, and 2003) but, despite the hopes of the SOC, he never visited Jasenovac. Even Patriarch Pavle was against a papal visit to Serbia because he did not want to risk divisions within the SOC, but he stated that the Church would not oppose a state invitation to the pope. The relations between the patriarchate and the Holy See were intensified during 2003, when an SOC delegation visited the Vatican. The departure of the delegation was accompanied by peaceful protests in front of the patriarchate building on the part of the opponents of cooperation with the RCC. The SOC delegation received financial aid from the pope, and Patriarch Pavle expressed his gratitude, for the first time, in a letter. A delegation from the Vatican also visited Serbia and, on that occasion, common liturgies and other joint events were held. Finally, in late November 2003, representatives of the Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant faiths met in Budapest and discussed future ecumenical activities. In turn, high Serbian officials visited the Vatican, stating that the potential papal visit to Serbia and Montenegro would represent one of the decisive steps in the EU accession process. In early 2003, both Church and state representatives predicted that the pope’s visit could be feasible as early as 2004, but added that it would have to be prepared properly. In the meantime, in June 2003, the pope visited Bosnia-Herzegovina, including Banja Luka, the capital city of the Republika Srpska. The central celebration was held in the monastery Petrićevac, associated with the massacre against the Serbs in 1942. At the last moment the SOC leader cancelled his trip to Banja Luka. Orthodox archbishops understood the pope’s decision to say mass in Petrićevac as Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 187 a provocation to Serbs, and this was one of the reasons why the proposal of the minister of foreign affairs of Serbia and Montenegro that Patriarch Pavle could receive the pope in Banja Luka was ultimately rejected. According to the Serbian Church, the pope indeed asked for repentance but did not apologize. Accordingly, his visit to Serbia was postponed until some other time. This decision is still valid. In the meantime, and within the Vatican preparations for the pope’s visit to Serbia, Roman Catholic prelates in Croatia commemorated the Jasenovac victims twice. The SOC saw John Paul II’s successor as pope, Benedict XVI (admittedly, a very controversial head of the Catholic Church), as canonically closer to Orthodoxy than his predecessors. In fact, both the Serbian Church and the state appreciated his not recognizing the independence of Kosovo. During his visit to the Vatican in 2009, the Serbian president, Boris Tadić, stated that he had received the Vatican’s support for the integration of Serbia into the EU, as well as for its integrity and sovereignty in Kosovo. The position of the SOC regarding its cooperation with the RCC and the ecumenical movement has also largely depended on the view of other Orthodox Churches. The new Russian patriarch, Kiril, claims that the Orthodox and Roman Catholics should act as allies, not foes, and this attitude could have some positive repercussions in Serbia, too. No wonder, then, that a similar view was expressed by the new Serbian patriarch, Irinej, who stated that his personal wish was that the pope should come to Niš for the 1,700th anniversary of the Edict of Milan (to be celebrated in 2013). Representatives of both Churches have emphasized the need for rapprochement, with the common goal of fighting secularization and defending traditional Christian values in Europe, as a counterbalance to Islam. Relations with Orthodox in Macedonia and Montenegro All of the recent schisms within the SOC have been politically, and not religiously, motivated. Some of them have lasted more than 30 years, such as the diaspora schism of 1963 and the Macedonian Orthodox Church controversy. Others, such as the developments in Montenegro and Croatia (the renewed requests in 1996 and 2009 to re-establish the Croatian Orthodox Church), are more recent, but with an extended prehistory. In 1993 a common liturgy, served in Belgrade by Patriarch Pavle and Metropolitan Irinej Kovačević from the United States, signified reconciliation, but not the end to the problems concerning the diaspora schism. The conflict about the new, uniform Church constitution, as 188 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989 well as about property disputes, has continued. Patriarch Pavle traveled to the United States several times, trying to contribute to a solution, but this issue is still open. In the case of Macedonia, the SOC has revived the long-term, and partly resolved, issue of autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC). The idea was to challenge its autocephaly without denying the very existence of the Macedonian Church. The “Macedonian question” was reopened during the 1990s and then, again, in spring of 2002. This time the SOC suggested a solution. The 2002 proposal suggested that the MOC should abandon its autocephaly in exchange for autonomy. However, the MOC synod rejected this offer. In turn, Patriarch Pavle appealed on behalf of the synod to bridge the “schism” and renew the canonical unity of the SOC. Through this, he indirectly acknowledged the readiness of the SOC to accept individual bishoprics (eparchies) on its turf. This invitation was accepted by the metropolitan of Veles-Povardarje, Jovan, causing a division within the MOC, one part of which now joined the SOC. Although the SOC continually insists on episcopal unity, those who monitor the situation more closely note that there are major differences among its bishops on many issues. Various Church factions have always struggled in silence for domination within the patriarchate. Those who were able to come closer to the patriarch, or control the synod, usually prevailed. This was especially important in situations where changes were expected in the Church (e.g., the election of the patriarch in 1990– 1991). By the mid-1990s, there were rumors about the existence of two factions within the SOC: the zealots and the moderates, or “hawks and doves.” Their differences were expressed in some dogmatic issues, as well as on questions concerning the SOC’s view of national identity, political engagement, priesthood, religious education, ecumenism, and other matters.37 In the fall of 1998, the disagreements among the bishops were so great that they could have caused another schism. Professor Radovan Bigović, an SOC theologian, stated accordingly: “The claims that there are ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ within the Church are completely senseless, although I heard them many times. But I have not learned the criteria of the demarcation.” Bigović admits the existence of differences between some bishops but he does not find them substantial.38 Thus far, the greatest disturbances within the Church emerged during the process of the election of the new patriarch in 2008–2010 and regarding the retirement of Bishop Artemije. The issue of Patriach Pavle’s withdrawal from the throne was raised several times between 1995 and 2010 (the year of his death). Due to his long-term stay in hospital, some Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 189 controversial requests for retirement emerged in this period, including the announcement of his alleged replacement. In 2008 the SOC sabor discussed this issue and decided that Patriarch Pavle should stay at the helm of the SOC until his death. The opening of the sabor was secured by members of the police in reaction to the protest gathering of some paraclerical organizations. They protested against “the announced replacement of Patriarch Pavle,” and “against those who introduce new elements in church service and request the dogmatic transformation of the Church.” They wanted to protect their direction “on the path of svetosavlje, not Vaticanism.”39 The issue of the patriarch’s request for retirement from active duty and disagreements regarding his potential successor renewed the story about the divisions among bishops into a moderate or soft “reformist” faction on the one hand and conservatives or “hardliners” on the other. Moreover, the age and geographic gaps (e.g., the existence of a “Bosnian lobby”) were also stressed.40 The “reformists” were reprimanded for their attempt to reform the organization and role of the Church in society and change the age-old ways of serving liturgy,41 as well as for their allegedly strong ties with the Vatican. Against them were the so-called conservatives or staroverci, whose main feature was their fierce opposition to ecumenism, rigid adherence to the extant liturgy service, and opposition to the election of a new church leader during the life of Patriarch Pavle. Artemije, bishop of Raška and Prizren, was frequently mentioned as an informal leader of this second group. He shared similar views with a number of other bishops. In the same period the press published an internal letter, written by Bishop Grigorije to other SOC bishops. This letter, however, reached the media. Grigorije listed some of the major problems within the SOC: the fact that Belgrade, a city with 2 million inhabitants, did not have its own bishop; “washing hands” in the court scandal with Pahomije, bishop of Vranje;42 Bishop Artemije’s “building dissent”; the “public discharge of an arch-priest by Nikanor, Bishop of Banat”; the “non-Christian” hunger strike of Filaret, bishop of Mileševa; the renewed schism in the United States; the failure of religious education in Belgrade; rumors about the “Bosnian Church” and so on.43 As a consequence of publishing this letter, Bishop Grigorije was banned from speaking publicly about the Church in the future. This prohibition was authorized by Amfilohije, metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral, who temporarily replaced the patriarch in all of his functions.44 On this occasion the Belgrade Church analyst Živica Tucić stated that the momentum for dialogue had not arrived in the SOC and that it was not a democratic institution. 190 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989 There was a strict hierarchy in it, but no readiness for loud expression. He added that there was too much autonomy in the bishoprics and that the central bodies did not have the power to rule them. Another problem was the disagreement among bishops and lack of communication between them.45 A heated atmosphere was stirred up by the media front pages, referring to the lavish residences and expensive cars of some bishops, their cooperation with the secret police in socialist times, and their proximity to some political-party leaders. Patriarch Pavle was buried, according to his own wish, in the monastery of Holy Archangels in Rakovica, a suburb of Belgrade. More than 600,000 people took part in the farewell procession in the streets of Belgrade on 11 November 2009.46 Only two months later, on 22 January 2010, the new patriarch, Irinej, former bishop of Niš, was elected as the 45th head of the SOC. Soon after, bishop of Raška and Prizren Artemije was deposed. As a result, a number of monks from the monasteries in Kosovo did not comply with the Church authorities and left. Most of them were placed near Čačak, in western Serbia, at a private estate. Conflicts with the bishop escalated after he rejected the demands of the SOC sabor to accept jurisdiction of the churches and other facilities renewed according to the Memorandum of 2005, signed by Patriarch Pavle, the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo, and temporary institutions of Kosovo.47 In mid-September, the retired bishop asked, in his letter to the Church authorities, to receive the bishopric of Raška and Prizren because it had been “violently” taken away from him. Artemije accused the SOC of submitting to the state authorities and abandoning the Serbs of Kosovo. The SOC synod decided to ban this bishop’s church service until the next session of the sabor. On the other hand, Patriarch Irinej, who was officially enthroned in the monastery of Pećka Patrijaršija (Kosovo) on 3 October 2010, was against any schism, even the one between the Orthodox and Catholics. He was in favor of a compromise between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo who, in his view, should live like they used to.48 But in the Serbian media, current events within the SOC were promptly characterized as a schism. Church and state after 2000 The demise of socialism left behind an ideological vacuum. Liberal ideas of the building of civil society and European democracy required religious freedoms and a new, multicultural approach. Globalization and social changes in the majority of Eastern Europe including in the Yugoslav successor states took place during a relatively Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 191 short period, leading to a series of unexpected consequences for the majority of the population. These processes caused changes in the value systems, especially with regard to relations between an individual and society, freedom and security, ideology and pragmatism. In the Western world, many of those changes were promoted by Protestantism, while in the majority of the Balkan countries they had to be carried out without the help or mediation of any familiar ideology that could associate them with domestic or regional cultures.49 Without such mediation, new democratic values were experienced as something imported or imposed. Political elites in some Central and Southeast European countries (in Serbia only partly, and with a delay) by and large adopted a pro-Western and pro-European orientation, while the Orthodox Church became an institutional matrix that served as a medium for anxiety and discontent caused by the social changes.50 Religion was, thus, seen as follows: a fresh spiritual and emotional compensation for the dissolution of a social and value system; an efficient instrument of authority and social control (confirming a leader’s authority and promoting a new ethos); a reservoir of cultural values and collective remembrance; and a symbolical power needed to construct new national, group, and individual identities.51 Although the causes of the return of religion were similar, its influence was different in the Balkans and Russia.52 Sociologists call this process “retraditionalization,”53 “desecularization,” “respiritualization,” or “deprivatization.”54 The presence of religious communities in daily politics, their tight connection with state institutions – both civil and military – and their media position created positive conditions for the strategic advancement of these organizations. It was not rare that state bodies offered them legal concessions that went far beyond the religious rights and freedoms typical of Western democracies.55 The Serbian Church, like Orthodox Churches elsewhere, acquired a strong public voice and advocated religious solutions for various civic problems.56 Simultaneously, leftist intellectuals in many of these countries accused the Church (religion) of being a major opponent of progress towards democracy, or at a minimum its most conservative participant.57 Church–state rapprochement was interpreted as a return to the tradition of their “symphony.” But this rapprochement was often criticized by liberals who saw the imminent threat of clericalism.58 A popular perception was that organized Christianity in countries such as Russia or Poland could still side with conservative, anti-modern, nationalist forces. Churches were not perceived as renovators, but as institutions pursuing their own social and political interests. 192 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989 Although the revitalization of religious organizations in socialist Yugoslavia had already started in the 1980s,59 the real shift in Church– state relations in Serbia took place after the political changes of 2000, with anti-communist politicians who were also declared believers. In less than 20 years, Serbia, once a highly secular country, became a society with a large percentage of religious believers, in which the Church obtained an important place in public.60 That increase in religiosity can perhaps be associated with the rise of conservatism and traditionalism in response to the social crisis and the effects of economic transition; the instrumentalization of religion with the goal of building a new Serbian nationalism; major social changes in Serbia; social conformism; the democratization of the society that facilitated the free expression of religiosity; and a new, favorable attitude on the part of the state toward religion, emphasizing its social desirability and ideological function.61 Although Serbia is a secular state – where the constitution stipulates a legal distinction between Church (religion) and state – and also a multiethnic and multireligious society with minorities adding up to one-third of the population, “state officials make efforts to express their respect toward the Church by their presence at religious events and meetings . . . where they exchange opinions on different issues, including those which do not lie within the Church’s domain (at least not in a secular state).”62 SOC representatives accompany state officials in their travels abroad. Thus, President Boris Tadić traveled to Moscow with the patriarch for a Church–state visit in 2005. As for Church–state relations, then Patriarch Pavle recommended a “symphony” model. This concept was supported by Tadić, who declared: “Even if the Church is not a part of the state, given the political context in which we live, it is certainly a part of the society and should be consulted about many vital issues relating to both individuals and the society as a whole.”63 For politicians, proximity to the Church is important in international affairs as well, due to the bishops’ excellent connections in Russia or in the Western world.64 The SOC has become more active in its reactions to political events in Serbia. In December 2003, during the political election campaign, its leadership called for a restoration of the monarchy ruled by the Karadjordjević dynasty. Furthermore, the SOC opposed the 2004 state calls to the Serbs of Kosovo to participate in local elections with Albanians. Some bishops normally attend the pre-election party activities and offer their open support to individual politicians during presidential campaigns. Apart from bishops who do not hesitate to engage in open political marketing, some others are less visible, Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 193 but occasionally they do have in-person contacts with the ruling structures in the country. The influence of various paraclerical organizations, with rightist political agendas, has also increased.65 Sometimes united with the football fan hooligans, they create enormous problems for the authorities in Serbia. In 2009, on the eve of the parliament discussion, the SOC and other traditional religious communities made requests that the antidiscrimination law be reconsidered.66 Their major concerns were related to the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered persons and in that regard the Church expressed its utmost conservatism and lack of respect for human rights and sexual freedoms. For the SOC, this is probably the most sensitive human-rights issue and a source of extremely intolerant discourse uttered by highly positioned prelates. The list of other issues that concern the SOC is long and it includes a series of secular questions related to the cultural model which would “emerge from the Orthodox faith and an all-out national unity.” The Church is also active in condemning atheism, birth control, and Western mass-culture products, prescribing the proper role of (Orthodox) women, defending the language and script (“authentic national values”), criticizing non-governmental organizations dealing with human-rights issues, and opposing European integration.67 Since their first public protest against a theatrical play about St. Sava in 1990,68 SOC prelates have not hesitated to call for the prohibition of public performances or local manifestations during fasting periods. SOC representatives also contend that the future Serbian state should be based on svetosavlje and the Serb testament, the renewal of the Serbian village, patriarchal family and parochial community, Church councils, and the restoration of monarchy.69 A ten-point declaration issued at the First Assembly of the Orthodox-National Serb Youth held at Belgrade University on 6 December 2001 (The Testamental Gate – the Position of the National Youth) has a similar tone. It begins: Belief in God is the basis of all our endeavours, and the ‘Serb Testament’ the manner in which we act through that faith. The highest ideals of the ‘Serb Testament’ are, besides Saint Sava, Saint John the Myroblete and the Holy Prince Lazar, Saint Nicholas of Žiča and Saint Justin Ćelijski; all other saints and heroes from our past are there to inspire us and assist us in the defence of the Fatherland.70 There is an apparent eschatological-messianic tone in this text, and some other “Serb Testaments,” in which a dualistic, Manichean division 194 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989 is being made between a pro-Testament and anti-Testament Serbia, in which the former is the preserve of the Serbian saints, and the latter of Serbian educators, as well as the so-called “ideologues of the New Age,” “new ideologues,” and “new atheists” who are increasingly being attacked in similar documents. Such a Manichean and authoritarian worldview, embedded in the theology and metaphysics of the SOC, stresses, in particular, the dualism between the (sacred) Testament and the (secular) Enlightenment. The number of new Orthodox churches has increased lately with the state allocating significant financial aid.71 Since November 2000, both central and local state bodies allocated significant funds for the completion of the St. Sava Temple in Belgrade as well as for the construction of churches in other parts of Serbia. For that purpose, numerous fundraisers were organized both in the country and abroad.72 During 2003 a decision was made to raise the fee for postage stamps in order to financially support construction of the St. Sava Temple. Some intellectuals in Serbia viewed this as an anti-constitutional decision and appealed to the Constitutional Court. Since 2004 the Ministry of Religious Affairs has supported clergy and monks in Kosovo.73 The 2006 law on churches and religious communities stipulates that religious organizations administer their property and funds autonomously. They can also engage in economic and other activities according to the law. The state, on the other hand, “can provide material support to Churches and religious communities with the goal of advancing religious freedoms.”74 The SOC thus receives funds to advance religious education; improve the material status of clergy and monks; support cultural, informative and building activities; and aid the SOC bishoprics outside Serbia, and monks and clergy in the border areas or underdeveloped regions. Owing to this support, the SOC clerics are able to fully cover their retirement plans and health insurance.75 According to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the SOC has 2,863 priests and 1,461 monks and nuns. Of this number, 1,962 priests and 1,065 monks/nuns live in Serbia.76 From the entire state budget, 0.12% is allocated to finance the activities of churches and religious communities. Moreover, religious organizations can fully or partly receive tax exemptions. They have a right to obtain a tax refund for the purchase of their religious vestments and symbols. The exchange of goods and services sold or provided in a religious facility is also tax free. Due to some machinations related to purchasing tax-free vehicles, this benefit was canceled. Taxes are not paid-for goods imported for religious services, although a certificate confirming that they are not available in the country must be submitted.77 Finally, the clergy does not pay any income taxes. Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 195 Apart from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Culture also provides funds for churches and monasteries as historic and cultural landmarks. The new Ministry for Kosovo-Metohija supports monasteries, churches, and other infrastructure in this province (roads, water supplies, etc.). Local authorities also have opportunities to help religious communities through their budgets.78 But one can often hear in public that it is not entirely clear how the Church controls its own finances because the state does not oversee or audit any of these activities.79 According to the 2006 law,80 there is no state religion in Serbia, but the same law acknowledges seven traditional (historical) religious communities, as follows: the SOC, the RCC, the Slovak Evangelical Church (of the Augsburg Confession – AC), the Reformed Christian Church, the Evangelical Christian Church (AC), the Islamic community, and the Jewish community. These seven Churches and religious communities are independent of the state but have the status of organizations with social and historical significance. According to the law and the constitution, all religious organizations can independently and autonomously organize and carry out their internal and public affairs. They may even perform religious services in schools, state institutions, hospitals, the army, police stations, day care and social care centers, prisons, public and private firms, private apartments, and other appropriate places. Under the law, the Ministry of Religious Affairs is expected to allocate at least 20% of its annual budget to cultural and publishing activities and other purposes of religious communities. Priests and church officials have legal immunity from civil authorities in performing their ministry.81 They participate in every sphere of public life. Religious schools have organizational and curricular autonomy. Their diplomas are equal to state-school diplomas. Churches and religious communities may trade or establish profit-making enterprises autonomously; they can also run radio and television stations.82 Although registration is not mandatory for all religious organizations (the “traditional” ones are fully exempted from that), the unregistered non-traditional ones face problems in their legal and commercial matters (bank accounts, buying and selling property, importing and printing literature, etc.). The tax laws guarantee exemptions for property and values only to registered communities. The registration procedures include several requirements: submitting the names, identification numbers, and signatures of the members of the community; providing proof that this group has at least 100 members (or 0.001% of the population, including Kosovo); enclosing the statute of the organization and the review of its religious doctrines, rituals, religious goals and 196 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989 basic activities; and supplying information about their financial sources. The law also stipulates that no religious community is allowed to register if its official name replicates the name, or only part of the name, of another, already registered community. As a result of many objections and court petitions (mainly coming from the non-traditional, minority religious communities and the “Coalition for a Secular State”), the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia organized a public discussion on 5 October 2010, with the goal of assessing the constitutionality of the Law on Churches and Religious Communities.83 In early 2013, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia ruled in favor of the 2006 Law on Churches and Religious Communities. In 2006 the Serbian parliament passed a law on the restitution of property to the religious communities, while the Directorate for Restitution of the Republic of Serbia started the procedure of the determination of property rights and the restitution of property.84 Patriarch Irinej and Prime Minister Mirko Cvetković talked in June 2010 about returning the inventory books seized from the SOC back in 1946.85 Orthodox Holy Friday, Easter, and Christmas are celebrated in Serbia as state holidays. Members of other religious communities have the right to take days off during their own religious holidays. State representatives in the parliament start or finish some important sessions and activities in line with the Orthodox Church calendar. Presidential candidates usually launch their campaigns on an Orthodox holiday, while ministries and their political parties celebrate patron saint celebrations (slava). Public space is decorated during the ecclesiastical holidays, while the cities celebrate their own slavas. In Belgrade, for example, traffic is stopped during religious processions in the city.86 Religion received its proper place in the electronic and other media. Activities and statements of the patriarch and other high prelates are regularly monitored and reported. The clergy increasingly uses mass communication devices in addressing the public. Even the television hosts start their programs with religious greetings on some major holidays. According to the “broadcasting law” of 2002, public broadcasters are obligated to respect the traditional spiritual, historical, cultural, humanitarian, and educational significance of religious communities. The state broadcasting agency has one cleric within its ranks and he is now even the president of this body. Public opinion polls in Serbia regularly report the highest percentage of trust in the Church, an institution with the highest credibility in the country.87 Icons, crosses, and other religious symbols are regular elements of the public decorum and iconography characteristic of this Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 197 new wave of popular religiosity. Priests are also present at many public events and openings. They often bless new buildings, institutions, and factories.88 The sign of the cross is used on a massive scale, while icon painting is also flourishing. Icons are present even on commercial flyers and materials. The number of church marriages and baptisms has increased and this also applies to the new institutions bearing the names of saints. The Orthodox temples, especially in the cities, are more frequented, while fasting is practiced on a regular basis, especially among the younger population. The collective visits to monasteries are organized, so that believers have opportunities to regularly contact their spiritual guides. Religious education has also returned to public schools.89 Not only was the SOC’s Faculty of Theology returned to the University of Belgrade (in 2004) but its students are now funded by the state, through the annual budget. With the goal of the popularization and promotion of the works of Nikolaj Velimirović – the greatest Serbian Orthodox theologian and a saint – a musical album was released in 2001, as a joint edition of the Radio-Television Serbia and Radio-Holy Mountain. This project included many pop and rock musicians who composed and performed songs written by Velimirović himself. The musical CD that resulted from this project had significant media support and was advertised as a “symbiosis of rock-and-roll and Orthodoxy,” or just as “Orthodox rock-and-roll.”90 Special relations between the SOC and the army have also been established. In December 2003, the then-minister of defence, Boris Tadić, announced the formation of a team of experts to regulate the normative, legal position of the SOC and other religious communities within the Army of Serbia and Montenegro. The first collective baptism ritual of officers and soldiers was held at a monastery in 2004. A bishop was appointed in charge of relations with the army and led a group of 50 army members on a pilgrimage to the Serbian monastery Hilandar on Mt Athos in 2002. Through the reform of the military, the Orthodox tradition, ethics, culture, and faith obtained a new role, so that the army now monitors the state of religiosity during the control of the soldiers’ operative abilities.91 Belonging without believing or knowing92 Although the rise of religiosity and the popularity of the Church in all of Eastern Europe marked the period of post-socialist transition,93 40 years of atheist education created a lot of ignorance in the religious sphere. 198 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989 Of course, there are some exceptions to this rule, but in many instances the faithful have only vague ideas about their religious roots. They are not familiar even with the basic catechism, or the proper behavior in religious facilities. After the time in “exile,” as it were, there are expectations that the reintegration of believers will be a long-lasting process with uncertain results.94 Apparently there are lots of believers among the politicians in Serbia. They celebrate slavas, some of them regularly go to church, fast, and take communion, sing in church choirs, and attend religious education. However, the analyses made during the last several years indicate that the current political elite are not familiar with, and do not respect, the religious and ethical commandments.95 When, in 2006, a tabloid conducted a poll among the MPs about their knowledge of biblical events related to Easter, the conclusion was that none of them completely knew the answers to the questions about the resurrection of Jesus Christ (even though some of them had gone on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land).96 A similar paradox between the publicly expressed religiosity and lack of knowledge about the basic tenets of one’s own faith is present on a larger scale as well. According to the 2002 census there are 7,498,001 inhabitants in the Republic of Serbia (not including Kosovo). Some 95% of them declared themselves in confessional (denominational) terms: 85% Orthodox Christians, 5.5% Roman Catholics, 1.1% Protestants, 3.2% Muslims, 2.6% atheists, and 2.6% did not declare themselves. Among Serbs there are 97.41% Orthodox Christians, 0.34% atheists, 0.08% Protestants, 0.07% Catholics, and 0.01% Muslims.97 Sociologists of religion remind us, however, that confessional self-identification expressed at the census is not a valid proof of active (actual) religiosity. Most researchers who dealt with this issue agree that a stable trend was established in Serbia with regard to religious changes since the 1990s. The number of atheists has dropped drastically, while the basic elements of religious behavior, such as prayer, liturgy, and fasting, have been revitalized. The description of a typical believer has changed, too. While earlier results indicated a greater percentage of the less well-educated female believers, senior citizens over 60, farmers, workers, and housewives, a typical believer today can be a person from either an urban or a rural setting, young or old, educated or uneducated. On the other hand, research conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000 indicated some exceptions. Only a quarter of the citizens in Serbia are considered religious by their “persuasion,” whereas over 30% are only conformist (“seasonal”) believers, with 30% agnostics and 10–20% Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 199 non-religious citizens.98 These findings have also shown that religiosity is on the rise in Serbia, even though the majority of its citizens link this notion to their belonging to the nation or tradition, and not to God. The population in general has only a rather unclear and imprecise understanding of the basic tenets of the Orthodox faith. In Serbia, there are significant numbers of those who are not certain about their religious inclinations and do not view abortion as infanticide. The majority of people are not familiar with the Ten Commandments, or think that it is impossible to obey them. They believe in Christ’s resurrection and celebrate Easter but do not associate religiosity with regular church-going or fulfilling religious duties. Finally, a great number of respondents think that the Church should be engaged in educational and humanitarian activities but not in politics. Many of them are not sure, however, as to the proper role of the Church in society.99 The 2008 data show that there are only 1.3% of respondents who visit a church more than once a week for whatever reason. An additional 4.3% go there once a week, while only 12.3% pray every day outside the church.100 A problem is seen in the behavior of believers during Church rituals and festivals: it ranges from an “aggressive, infantile showing off” to even applauding during the ritual.101 According to the World Values Study and European Values Study (2008) conducted in 42 European countries (Serbia included) and analyzed by Mirko Blagojević, the confessionally declared Orthodox believers outnumber the religious respondents. This means that the confessional self-identification in the respondents’ perceptions is not necessarily related to their personal religiosity. In Serbia, an Orthodox self-identification is regularly a more widespread phenomenon than personal religiosity. Regularity in fulfilling religious duties is expected from the standpoint of institutional religion, but the actual religious activity of the population (with the declared believers), including their acceptance of the Christian dogma, is ambivalent to say the least.102 Moreover, there is a sharp division between the secular and the religious, “an old-fashioned anti-clericalism is opposed to an old-fashioned religious anti-modernism.”103 With a church-going frequency of 7%, Serbia is almost at the bottom of the list of European countries, behind Poland, Slovakia, Italy, Belgium, Austria, the United Kingdom, Croatia, France, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria, but ahead of Russia.104 Priests themselves are suspicious about the current religious climate. They admit that progress has been made but also complain that believers now approach God too “mechanically” and arbitrarily, with no spiritual experience or preparation. For example, they do not understand the importance of prayer and fasting. Many of them believe that it is 200 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989 enough to purchase rosaries and start praying. Believers who have never fasted conduct the most rigorous fasting for several weeks, but it is only a physical, not a spiritual, experience. There are believers who eat macrobiotic food and view that as fasting. Some of them have a superficial attitude toward Holy Communion and ask their priests to give them communion without any preparation. Sacraments, rituals, and prayers are deemed as a sort of “magic” with pragmatic, imminent expectations. The external appearance of these “new believers” is also conspicuous: they show off with visible crosses and rosaries, or headscarfs combined with tight jeans and more casual outfits. Vladeta Jerotić, a theologian and an academician, writes: The Orthodox Church has become weaker among our people, or it is so distorted that one can hardly recognize its roots: it has become lukewarm, and it is traditional only through formal observances during the holidays . . . without understanding their meaning, or reading the Book of Life – the Gospels of Christ.105 In his 2002 Easter epistle, the late Patriarch Pavle spoke about an extremely low degree of understanding of the Orthodox faith and ritual among Serbs and their reduction to a folklore symbolism: “Traditional Orthodox believers are inclined to understand their religious duties as optional, as a matter of free choice. This means that religious rituals are attended, but without commitment. These believers do not have the need for, or awareness of, the continual participation in ecclesiastical, liturgical life.”106 Priests themselves conclude that, by their internal lives, many contemporary believers do not differ much from nonbelievers. It appears that the renewal of religiosity in Serbia has been predominantly traditional in its character, and that it has been heavily influenced by the ideological-political climate, whereby the internal aspects of spiritual renovation have been much less important for this new type of post-socialist believer.107 Conclusion The SOC’s experience with young democracy in Serbia reflects an inconsistency, even confusion, characteristic of some other post-communist societies regarding the role and status of religious communities in the new political circumstances including their relations to the state and society in general. The new role of religion in Serbia, and especially the leading role of the SOC, enables the Churches to deal with social Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 201 problems, which was something they could not do under socialism. However, there are some relevant questions that are rarely asked in this context. For example: What is the exact scope of social or political problems that lie within the domain of religious institutions’ concerns and constitutional ramifications? How capable are religious organizations of dealing with those problems and what is their capacity to solve them? How relevant are their responses to contemporary social issues? What is their vision of society? Do religious communities consider themselves part of civil society108 or not? Finally, what is their view of democracy? In the socialist period, the state one-sidedly determined the character of its relationship to religious communities. In the post-communist period, the extension of religious rights and freedoms brought about greater responsibility of faith institutions in many areas. For example, if accession to the EU is the goal of the Balkan states, can the Church promote an anti-European discourse, thus causing confusion among the believers and other citizens? The changes that have taken place in the domain of religion–state relations in post-2000 Serbia are many. Let us just briefly enumerate some of them: • revitalization of religious life: religion is not merely a private affair any more; it has its place in public life; ◦ new laws on religious freedoms and legal status of religious communities; ◦ renovation of religious institutions, temples, and other facilities; ◦ religions obtained their place in the public and private media, being able to broadcast their own programs and establish radio and television stations; ◦ they obtain financial support of the state and restitution of their property; ◦ the new role of the religious organizations in public education, social work, and philanthropy; ◦ their role in the economy (participation in business, banking, and other economic pursuits); ◦ the new normative role of the religious communities, their ethical, as well as political-symbolic functions. In some cases the SOC, the leading religious organization in Serbia, brings a new ideological framework to institutions such as the army or public schools, filling the gap left by the demise of communist 202 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989 ideology. But its social function is not articulated enough. Much of the social space remains unused by the Church. On the other hand, one may observe its politicization or political instrumentalization both from within and from without. It seems that even the concept of society is not elaborated enough in the public religious discourse. For example, when the SOC manifests its strong ethnic emblems and ties, the concept of nation (narod) – seen as an undifferentiated, monistic category – prevails, whereby the concepts of citizenship or civil society rarely occur in public statements of SOC representatives. It seems that the SOC still copes with the idea of social pluralism, including different interests, identities, proclivities, and choices of the contemporary Homo optionis. After 5 October 2000 the SOC began to provide a new ideological framework for state institutions, such as army and school, thus filling an ideological vacuum that was created after the collapse of communism, on its own initiative and on an increasing scale. However, its social role is not at all clear. There is still much room for activities in the area of philanthropy, endowing, humanitarian, and social work. On the other hand, the SOC is very easily politicized or politically instrumentalized not only by (ultra)nationalist politicians but also by its own prelates, bishops, and other high priests who often express highly conservative political views in public. However, an even greater problem is posed by the lack of real contact between the SOC and Serbian society, including specifically civil society and individuals with their rights, special interests, and various identities which are created by life in the modern pluralistic world. It is interesting to note that after 5 October 2000 the SOC established an enviable relationship with the Serbian state but, unfortunately, there is still no real contact with civil society, as was accomplished by the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, for example, even before the collapse of communism. The SOC representatives refer to people on a regular basis but that is almost a metaphysical category, an undifferentiated group or “mass,” which is the concept that is absolutely compatible with the “tribal” character of the SOC, not to mention any more positive a view on their part on civil society and its organizations and initiatives, which are often demonized in public. However, what are the real problems of a democratic, plural society in Serbia, what interests are represented, and what are the political, social, economic and cultural preferences of its citizens? Such issues are not the subject of a coherent debate in the SOC, at least not officially. It is interesting to note that in its official statements there is almost no reference to the citizens of Serbia or to its society in that sociological sense, but mostly, almost exclusively, to people. To some degree it is a question Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 203 of the Church’s inability to cope with the new circumstances, which is characteristic of post-socialist societies. On the other hand, one may observe a certain political philosophy and ideology, which was in the background, in a specific “theatre of shadows,” for a long time due to the very fact that it was present very little in the public sphere during the period of socialism. Apart from its Euroskepticism the SOC expresses an anti-ecumenical stance toward inter-Church and inter-religious dialogue. Roughly speaking, the SOC today is dominated by two attitudes toward ecumenism. The first of them is an extreme (and minority) view of ecumenism as a “pan-heresy,” while, in turn, heresy is everything that is not Orthodox. The second viewpoint opens up some space for developing ecumenical relations with the Roman Catholic Church, and perhaps some other traditional religious communities in Serbia (e.g., the Lutheran and Reformed Christian churches). However, it is difficult to observe any openness towards new religious minorities even within the limited number of liberal Church circles. This applies mainly to evangelical denominations that are publicly discriminated against by both the Church and the state and labeled as sects or even as incarnations of the “Satanist” influence of the West. Concerning the Muslims and Jews in Serbia, one may occasionally witness anti-Jewish and antiMuslim discourse coming from the ranks of some extremist SOC priest or paraclerical organizations (e.g., Obraz, SNP Naši 1389, Srpski sabor Dveri). In conclusion, it seems that three major moments in the most recent history of the SOC and Serbian society, in general, marked the Church’s early experience with post-2000 democracy: i) the wars of the 1990s and the SOC’s inability to fully and objectively assess the recent past and its own role in those events (especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina); ii) the loss of the state’s jurisdiction over Kosovo, a historical cradle of Serbian Orthodoxy and one of the most powerful religious and cultural symbols in the SOC; and iii) the change of leadership in the Serbian patriarchate and a new division and dissent related to the Church’s Kosovo bishopric (Raška and Prizren), with the possibility of schism in that particular bishopric. On the other hand, a celebration of the 1700th anniversary of the Milan Edict (and the possible visit of the pope to Serbia on that occasion), as well as the accession of Serbia to the EU, could provide a gradual, but important, breakthrough in the SOC ecclesiastical and political orientations. As usual, it is up to the SOC to find an equilibrium between the accumulating burdens of the past and the more promising, 204 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989 imminent future in order to reposition itself historically in this “flat,” runaway world of the 21st century. Notes 1. Mirko Blagojević, “Jugoslovenski kontekst: sekularizacija i desekularizacija”, Gradina, 10–12, Niš, 1993, 209–218. 2. Srąan Vrcan, Od krize religije k religiji krize, (Zagreb, 1986) p. 149; and Mirko Blagojević, “Vezanost ljudi za religiju i crkvu na pravoslavno homogenim prostorima”, Religija rat-mir (Niš: JUNIR, 1994), pp. 207–230. 3. “Povratak bogova”, a special edition of the magazine Duga, April 1986. 4. G. F. Powers, “Religion, Conflict and Prospect for Peace in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia”, Religion and the War in Bosnia, ed. Paul Mojzes (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1998), pp. 218–245. 5. Glasnik SPC, April 1995, no. 4; Pravoslavlje, no. 674, 15 April 1995; and Marko S. Marković, Tajna Kosova (Srbinje-Beograd-Valjevo-Minhen: Hrišćanska misao, 1998), p. 29. 6. M. Radovanović, “O potrebi moralne i duhovne obnove”, Glas Crkve, 1/91. 7. Glasnik, June 1995, no. 6. See also Milan Vukomanović, “Uloga religije u jugoslovenskim sukobima”, in Nasilno rasturanje Jugoslavije: Uzroci, dinamika i posledice (Beograd: Center for Civil-Military Relations, 2004), pp. 129–132. 8. Powers, “Religion, Conflict”, pp. 218–245; and Pravoslavlje, no. 683, 1 September 1995. 9. Glasnik, June 1996, no. 6. 10. Pravoslavlje, no. 555, 1990. 11. Nonka Bogomilova, “The Religious Situation in Contemporary Bulgaria, and in Serbia and Montenegro: Differences and Similarities”, in Religion in Eastern Europe vol. XXV, no. 4 (2005), pp. 1–20. 12. Svetosavlje is the ideology of leading SOC theologians since the mid-20th century, involving the projection of a golden medieval past, the “Kosovo testament” (cult of martyrdom), and the myth of St. Sava, the greatest Serbian national saint. His relics were burnt in Belgrade by the Ottoman Turks. The biggest Orthodox temple in the Balkans was erected during the 1980s and 1990s at the historical spot of this “post mortal martyrdom”. 13. Radmila Radić, “Crkva u politici i politika u Crkvi”, in Srpska elita, Helsinške sveske (Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava, 2000), pp. 39–83 14. Glasnik, June 1996, nos 6, 11–12, November–December 1996. 15. Stjepan Gredelj, “Klerikalizam, etnofiletizam, antiekumenizam i (ne) tolerancija”, Sociologija, vol. XLI, no. 2 (1999), pp. 143–164. 16. Danas, 22 June 1999. 17. Glasnik SPC, March 1995, no. 3. 18. Pravoslavlje, no. 690, 15 December 1995 and no. 691, 1 January 1996; NIN, 19 January 1996; Argument, 23 November 1998. 19. NIN, 12 November 1998. 20. Testimony (to Foreign Relations Committee of American Senate) of His Grace Artemije, Bishop, the Serbian Orthodox Church (Washington, D.C. Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 205 17 September 1998.) http://www.georgefox.edu/academics/undergrad/ departments/soc-swk/ree/Artemije_Testimony_Oct%201998.pdf; Hriscanska misao, nos 1–4, 1998; Sveti Knez Lazar, no. 2 (18), Prizren, 1997. NIN, 25 February 1999. Sveti Knez Lazar, Prizren, no. 2 (26), 1999. ERP KiM Newsletter, 9 October 2004, ERP KIM Info-service Gracanica, 8 October 2004, http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2004/October_09/1. html. NIN, 9 July 1998. Danas, 9 November 1998; Glasnik SPC, no. 12, December 1998; and Argument, 23 November 1998. NIN, 25 February 1999. Glasnik SPC, no. 4, April 1999. Angela Ilić, “Church and State Relations in Present-day Serbia”, Part I, in Religion in Eastern Europe vol. XXV, no. 1 (June 2004), pp. 35–36; and Part II in Religion in Eastern Europe vol. XXV, no. 2 (May 2005), 40–57. Justin (Popović), Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam, Solun, 1974; and Gredelj, “Klerikalizam”, 143–164. Jasenovac was a death camp in the Independent State of Croatia during World War Two. Sveti Knez Lazar, no. 2–3 (10–11), 1995 and nos 2–3 (14–15), 1996. Sveti Knez Lazar, no. 2 (26), 1999. Danas, 11, 15, 17 and 18 March 1999; NIN, 18 March 1999; and Vreme, 20 March 1999. Pravoslavlje, nos 769–770, 1–15 April 1999. Pravoslavlje, no. 785, 1 December 1999. Blic, 30 October 1999; Politika, 3 November 1999; and Pravoslavlje, no. 784, 15 November 1999. Sveti Knez Lazar, no. 2 (18), 1997. Evropljanin, no. 19, 2 March 1999. “Vrhovni poglavar SPC uvažio odluku Sabora Patrijarh prihvatio da ostane na čelu Crkve”, Blic, 14 November 2008; R. Dragović, “Patrijarh ostaje dok je živ!”, Novosti, 11 November 2008; and B. Bojić, “Nije vreme za novog patrijarha”, PRESS, 13 November 2008. “Odložena borba za tron Srpske pravoslavne crkve Amfilohije ustuknuo pred stavom većine”, Blic, 13 November 2008. The “liturgical question”, or the polemics on how to serve liturgy, caused numerous disputes that did not end only on verbal disagreements. On several occasions the SOC sabor has emphasized that liturgy should be served “in the sperit of age-old liturgical tradition of our Church”, but the dispute concerning what constitutes “the age-old tradition” is still going on. See Jelena Beoković, “Mnoge crkvene afere i dalje otvorene”, Politika, 15 February 2010. In 2003, Bishop Pahomije was accused of pedophilia and “unnatural sexual misconduct”. Two criminal charges were dropped due to extension of the court process. “Ko (ni)je hteo da bira patrijarha?”, Večernje novosti, 8 December 2008; “Molbu pisao tuąom rukom”, Večernje novosti, 11 December 2008; “Vladika Grigorije iz Trebinja biće izbačen iz Crkve?”, http://www.san.ba/index.php? 206 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. id=4549, 11 December 2008; and “Pismo vladike Grigorija arhijerejima SPC”, PRESS, 9 December 2008. Željka Jevtić, “Amfilohije zabranio Grigoriju da govori”, Blic, 19 December 2008; and “Grigoriju zabranjeno da govori o SPC” (Svevijesti.ba/BLLIVE) 19 December 2008. “Amfilohije zabranio gostovanje”, Politika (Religija, Aktuelno) 19 December 2008. Source: B92, Tanjug; J. Beoković; and Politika [published: 19 December 2008] novinar.de online novine. “Sahranjen srpski patrijarh Pavle”, 19 November 2009, http://www.blic.rs/ Vesti/Drustvo/121365/Sahranjen-srpski-patrijarh-Pavle-video. Jelena Beoković, “Mnoge crkvene afere i dalje otvorene”, Politika, 15 Febraury 2010. “Dešavanja u SPC uvod u raskol?”, 20 September 2010. Vestionline http:// www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Srbija/83140/Desavanja-u-SPC-uvod-u-raskol; and M. Karić, “Artemije voąa raskola”, Pravda, 19 September 2010. http:// www.pravda.rs/2010/09/19/artemije-vodja-raskola/. Bogomilova, “The Religious Situation”, pp. 1–20. However, new research indicated that a greater ideological freedom, measured by a greater social role of the Church, does not have to influence the happiness of individuals in societies undergoing transformation. Orsolya Lelkes, “Tasting Freedom: Happiness, Religion and Economic Transition”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 59, no. 2 (2006), 173–194. Amos Nascimento, “Religion”, Encyclopedia of Politics: The Left and the Right. 2005, SAGE Publications. 4 September 2009. http://sage-ereference. com/politics/Article_n402.html Matthew Scherer, “Religion”. Encyclopedia of Governance. 2006. SAGE. 4 September 2009, URL: http://sage-ereference. com/governance/Article_n463.html. Bogomilova, “The Religious Situation”, pp. 1–20. Mirko Blagojević, “Desecularization of Contemporary Serbian Society”, in Religion in Eastern Europe vol. XXVIII, no. 1 (February 2008), pp. 37–50; Smiljka Tomanović and Suzana Ignjatović, “Mladi u tranziciji: izmeąu porodice porekla i porodice opredeljenja” in Mladi izgubljeni u tranziciji, Centar za proučavanje alternativa, 2004, pp. 39–65. Peter L Berger (ed), The Desecularisation of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Washington D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999); Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Martin Riesebrodt, Die Ruckkehr der Religionen: Fundamentalismus und der “Kampf der Kulturen” (Munich: Beck, 2000). Tomas Bremer, “Crkva i civilno društvo: pogled iz rimokatoličke perspective”, in Hrišćanstvo i evropske integracije (Beograd: Hrišćanski kulturni centar, 2003), pp. 115–125; Jason Kuznicki, “Separation of Church and State”, in The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 2008), at http://sage-ereference.com/libertarianism/Article_n280.html; and Antonela Capelle Pogaceanu, “Du ‘Retour de l’Orthodoxie’ dans la Romanie post-communiste”, in L’ autre Europe nos 36–37, 1998, pp. 117–139. Constantin Iordachi, “Politics and Inter-confessional Strife in post-1989 Romania: From Competition for Resources to the Redefinition of National Ideology”, Balkanologie, vol. III, no. 1 (Septembre 1999), pp. 147–168; and Ion Bria, “The Orthodox Church in Post-Communist Eastern Europe –‘Turn Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 207 to God – Rejoice in Hope’ ”, in Ecumenical Review, vol. 50, no. 2 (April 1998), pp. 157–163. Alina Aungin-Pippidi, “The Ruler and the Patriarch: The Romanian Eastern Orthodox Church in Transition”, in East European Constitutional Review, vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 85–91. Alexander Agadjanian, “Public Religion and the Quest for National Ideology: Russia’s Media Discourse”, in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, vol. 40, no. 3 (2001), pp. 351–365. The sociology of religion research in different areas of the former Yugoslavia from 1960s to 1980s demonstrated that the secularization process predominantly entered the regions with Orthodox populations. The official census of 1953, which included questions about confessional self-identification, showed only 12.6% of atheists. In the late 1960s and early 1970s this percentage became higher. In 1975 Serbia it was 25%. But in early 1980s the percentage of declared believers was more prominent. The census of 1991 showed that 80% out of 8.7 million inhabitants of the FRY identified themselves as Orthodox. Cf. Dragoljub B. Ðorąević, Bogdan Ðurović, “Sekularizacija i pravoslavlje: slučaj Srba” , in Gradina (Niš, 1993), nos. 10–12, pp. 219–224; Popis ’91, Stanovništvo, vol. 2, Beograd, 1993; Dragoljub B. Ðorąević, “Opšta socioreligijska i konfesionalna panorama stanovništva u SFRJ”, in Religija i društtvo (Beograd: Prosveta, 1988); and Mirko Blagojević, “Religijska situacija u SR Jugoslaviji od kraja 80-tih do početka novog veka”, in Teme (Niš, 2003), no. 3, pp. 412, 424. Mirko Blagojević, “Religiozna Evropa, Rusija i Srbija juče i danas: Argumenti empirijske evidencije – slučaj Srbije”,in Filozofija i društvo, vol. 37, no. 3 (2008), pp. 81–115. Snežana Joksimović, “Individualne karakteristike i religioznost adolescenata”, in Zbornik Instituta za pedagoška istraživanja (Beograd, 2005), no. 2. Miroslava Malešević, “Pravoslavlje kao srž” nacionalnog bića “postkomunističke Srbije” in Svakodnevna kultura u postsocijalističkom periodu, Zbornik Etnografskog instituta SANU 22, Beograd, pp. 99–121, http://www.etnoinstitut.co.rs. Blic Online, 12 March 2005; Danas, 12 March 2005, p. 7; this statement was interpreted in some more detail in Milan Vukomanović, What the Church Can(not) be Asked about: The Serbian Orthodox Church, State and Society in Serbia (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2005). “Svaka stranka ima svog favorita za patrijarha”, Blic, 27 November 2009. The establishment of paraclerical organizations such as the Otačastveni pokret Obraz and the association of students, Sveti Justin filozof, by the extreme rightist, Orthodox intellectuals and students took place after 2000. However, the beginnings of these movements reach back to the 1990s. They mostly organize panel discussions, write graffiti, break up Gay Pride parades. Besides them there are Srpski sabor Dveri, Nomokanon and Vitez. Their programs are very similar and focused on the idea of national renewal and resistance toward democratic values, institutions, and processes. See Barbara N. Wiesinger, “The Continuing Presence of the Extreme Right in Post-Milošević Serbia”, Balkanologie, vol. XI, nos 1–2 (31 Décembre 2008), http://balkanologie.revues.org/index1363.html. Consulté le 3 Septembre 2010. There are also several groups acting under the informal name True 208 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. Orthodox Church in Serbia (Istinska pravoslavna crkva u Srbiji – IPCS) who do not accept the jurisdiction of the SOC. Slobodan Vučetić, “Sukob crkvenih kanona i državne politike”, Blic, 13 March 2009. Malešević, “Pravoslavlje kao srž”, pp. 99–121. Radovan Kupres, The Serbian Orthodox Church and the New Serbian Identity (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2006). Vukomanović, What the Church Can(not) be Asked about, pp. 13ff. Cf. also Milan Vukomanović, “The Serbian Orthodox Church as a Political Actor in the Aftermath of October 5, 2000”, in Politics and Religion, vol. 1, no. 2 (August 2008), pp. 253ff. “Proglas prvog sabora pravoslavno-nacionalne omladine srpske na Beogradskom univerzitetu posle L.G. 1944 (6.1.2001.)”, in Lukić, Svetlana, ed., Zašto se u crkvi šapuće, Peščanik, Belgrade, 2007, p. 214. Prime Minister Djindjić headed the board for the renewal of St. Sava temple. He traveled to Germany in order to raise funds for the completion of this temple. In 2006 eight new churches were built in Belgrade, while nine other were prepared for construction. In the Novi Sad area, between 1990 and 2005, 18 new churches were built. See Malešević, “Pravoslavlje kao srž”, pp. 99–121; Angela Ilić, “Church and State Relations”, Pt. 1, pp. 40–57; Kritika klerikalizacije Srbije (Novi Sad: AFANS, Edicija anti-dogma, 2007), p. 16; The Serbian Orthodox Church and the New Serbian Identity (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2006). Miroslav Ahtik, “Klerikalizacija Srbije”, in Republika, XVI (2004), pp. 340–341. “Koliko para SPC dobija od države?”, Arhiva “Vesti” Mondo 24 Feburuary 2010, Mondo sreda, 24 Feburuary 2010. Mondo (FoNet), www.mondo.rs. “The entire budget of the Ministry of Religious Affairs allocated for churches and religious communities in 2009 was 569,645,000 dinars”, Vesna Tašić, http://www.borba.rs/content/view/9530/92/29 September 2009; and Zoran Majdin and Jovana Gligorijević, “Srpska pravoslavna crkva-Poslovi i priključenija vladika srpskih”, Vreme, no. 937, 18 December 2008. Želimir Bojović, “Softverska raspodela novca verskim zajednicama Hram svetog Save u Beogradu”, 22 September 2009, http://www.slobodnaevropa. org/content/budzet_verske_zajednice/1828631.html. Jelena Tasić, “330 miliona dinara za SPC”, 21/09/2009, http://www.danas. rs/vesti/politika/iz_budzeta_330_miliona_dinara_za_spc.56.html?news_id= 172356Iz budžeta. Milenko Pešić, “Crkva nije piljarnica” (2), Politika, 22–23 November 2006. Želimir Bojović, “Softverska raspodela novca verskim zajednicama. Hram svetog Save u Beogradu”, 22 September 2009, http://www.slobodnaevropa. org/content/budzet_verske_zajednice/1828631.html. Besides this state support, the SOC has its own funds, estates, endowments, and other sources of income. The Church business activities are monitored and approved by the SOC Patriarchate Executive Board. See Jelena Beoković, “Crkvene finansije strogo čuvana tajna”, Politika, 24 Febraury 2010. Službeni glasnik RS, no. 36/2006. Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 209 81. There was an inherent ambiguity related to Article 16 (in some versions Article 17) of the 2004 draft and the minister himself interpreted it differently on various occasions. For example, one version of this draft stated: ‘The clergy and religious dignitaries enjoy the same immunity as national deputies and judges. Their immunity can be revoked only by the Supreme Court of Serbia acting on a justified request from a public prosecutor.’ One of the subsequent interpretations, which came as a result of a fierce polemic with the minister and lawmaker, was that immunity related to confession only. Eventually the entire draft was withdrawn as biased and ambiguous. The final, 2006 version of the law (Article 8) reads: Priests and religious officials are free and independent in administering their religious services in accordance with the law and autonomous right of a church or a religious community . . . Priests and religious officials cannot be held responsible before state bodies for their religious services conducted in accordance with line 3 of this article. 82. Jovana Gligorijević, Zoran Majdin, “Poslovi i priključenija vladika srpskih”, Vreme, no. 937, 18 December 2008, at http://www.vreme.com/cms/view. php?id=776516. 83. Some controversies related to this law were discussed in more detail in Vukomanović, “The Serbian Orthodox Church as a Political Actor”, pp. 243–247. 84. Vesti: Beograd, “Vraćanje imovine Srpskoj pravoslavnoj crkvi”, 8 July 2009; Source: Studio B; Marko Lopušina, “Crkvena imovina. Vlast ne vraća 70.000 hektara njiva i šuma”, 6 September 2010, at http://www.serbianna.com/ columns/lopusina/124.shtml. 85. “Patrijarh i premijer dogovorili vraćanje matičnih knjiga SPC”, at http:// www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/drustvo/patrijarh-i-premijer-dogovorili-vracanje-maticnihknjiga-spc_192865.html, 2 June 2010. Source: Beta. 86. Malešević, “Pravoslavlje kao srž”, pp. 99–121. 87. According to the public opinion poll carried out by Faktor plus agency, the citizens of Serbia express most confidence in the Church (54.2%) and army (36.4%). Source: daily Danas, 29 July 2005. 88. Malešević, “Pravoslavlje kao srž”, pp. 99–121. 89. Zoran Djindjić’s government prepared a regulation introducing religious education into public schools in 2001. In 2002 the parliament adopted the changes of the law on elementary and high-school education to accomodate this novelty. Religious education was introduced in parallel with another, non-confessional subject (civic education), as an optional, elective subject in the elementary schools and high schools, and later on as a mandatory subject with no grading. Since it is a confessional subject, teachers are proposed by churches and religious communities. The curriculum and the textbooks are prepared by the governmental commission for religious education. The commission includes one member of each traditional religious organization, plus three experts from the Ministry of Religious Affairs and from the Ministry of Education, respectively. In order to function properly, the minimal requirement of five students are needed to set up a class. 210 Religion and Democracy in Serbia since 1989 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. See “Uredba o organizovanju i ostvarivanju verske nastave i nastave alternativnog predmeta u osnovnoj i srednjoj školi”, Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, 46 (2001); see also Miroslava Malešević, “Opravoslavljenje” identiteta srpske omladine”, Glasnik Etnografskog instituta SANU, LIII, 135–150. “Pravoslavni rokenrol”, NIN, no. 2564, 2000. “Istraživanje: U vojsci 58 odsto religioznih”, FoNet, 3 September 2009; Blic, 5 September 2009. Grace Davie, “Europe: The Exception That Proves the Rule”, in Berger (ed.), The Desecularization of the World, pp. 65–87. Emil Cohen and Krassimir Kanev, “Religious Freedom in Bulgaria”, in Journal of Ecumenical Studies, vol. 36, nos. 1–2 (Winter–Spring 1999), pp. 243–264; and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Church and State in Eastern Europe: The Ruler and the Patriarch: The Romanian Eastern Orthodox Church in Transition”, in East European Constitutional Review, vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 85–91, at http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol7num2/ feature/rulerpatriarch.html. Sabrina P. Ramet, “A Checklist of Issues to Track”, East-West Church and Ministry Report, vol. 2 (1994), pp. 2–3. Milenko Pešić, “Koliko su naši političari religiozni: ‘pravoslavlje ili istinska vera’ ”, Politika, 6 January 2007. Ibid. Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova u 2002, Stanovništvo, veroispovest, maternji jezik i nacionalna ili etnička pripadnost prema starosti i polu, Podaci po opštinama, Beograd, May 2003, http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/axd/Zip/VJN3.pdf; Osnovni skupovi stanovništva: podaci na nivou Republike, Zavod za statistiku Republike Srbije, Beograd, 2005, Podaci o veroispovestima http://www.mv. gov.rs/cir/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=254&Itemid=74, Wednesday, 7 October 2009. Dragana Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, “Religija i svakodnevni život: vezanost ljudi za religiju i crkvu u Srbiji krajem devedesetih”, Srbija krajem milenijuma, Beograd, 2002, 215–248; Dragana Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, Religioznost i tradicija, Beograd, 2006, 67; Stjepan Gredelj, “Slova i brojke oko veronauke”, Filozofija i društvo XIX–XX, Beograd, 2001/2002, 279–304. Milina Ivanović-Barišić, “Tradicionalna religioznost i revitalizacija pravoslavlja devedesetih godina 20. veka”, Svakodnevna kultura u postsocijalističkom periodu u Srbiji i Bugarskoj: Balkanska transformacija i evropska integracija, Zbornik radova Etnografskog instituta SANU 22, Beograd 2006, 123–134; Slobodan Reljić, “Obnovljena religija” NIN, no. 2574, 27 April 2000; Ilić, “Church and State Relations”, pp. 26–37; “Božić se poštuje i slavi u Srbiji”, www.antic.org; “Tema nedelje: Koliko smo religiozni, U crkvu više zbog tradicije, manje zbog molitve, Deca više veruju od očeva i majki”, Politika, 25 July 2009; Dragoljub B. Ðorąević, “Nekoliko razmišljanja o našoj crkvi”, Peščanik FM, vol. 3, Beograd 2005, 133; Malešević, “Pravoslavlje kao srž”, pp. 99–121, http://www. etno-institut.co.yu/; Svetlana Palić, “Teolozi o srpskom nepoštovanju posta”, 29 November 2005, http://www.vidovdan.org/arhiva/; Radmila Lončar, “Vesti” istražuju: koliko su graąani Srbije verujući, aktuelno tržište duhovnosti, 6 Janaury 2004, CEIR, http://www.ceir.co.rs; Ahtik, Radmila Radić and Milan Vukomanović 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 211 “Klerikalizacija Srbije”, pp. 340–341, 1–30 September 2004; Mirko Blagojević, Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva, Beograd, 2005, 308; Mirko Blagojević, “Savremene religijske promene u Srbiji i proces integracije u Evropu”, Filozofija i društvo, 1/2006, 95–111; and Blagojević, “Desecularization”, pp. 37–50. Mirko Blagojević, “O sociološkim kriterijumima religioznosti. Koliko ima (pravoslavnih) vernika danas?”, Filozofija i društvo (Beograd, 2009), no. 1, pp. 9–36. Žikica Simić, “Religijska kultura tradicionalnih pravoslavnih vernika”, in Teme, 1–2/2005, 55–76. Robia Charles, “Religiosity and Trust in Religious Institutions: Tales from the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)”, Summer 2009, iseees.berkeley.edu/working_papers; Loek Halman, Changing Values and Beliefs in 85 Countries: Trends from the Values Surveys 1981 to 2004, Leiden, 2008; European Values Study, http://www.europeanvaluesstudy. eu; World Values Survey 2005–2008, Serbia [1996], Serbia [2001], Serbia [2006], http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeQuestion.jsp; Mirko Blagojević, “Vezanost za pravoslavlje u ogledalu statistike: sociološko merenje crkvenosti”, Teme, 1, Niš, January–March 2010, 131–154. Alexander Agadjanian, “The Search for Privacy and the Return of a Grand Narrative: Religion in a Post-Communist Society”, Social Compass, vol. 53, no. 2, 2006,; 169–184, http://scp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/53/2/ 169; downloaded from http://scp.sagepub.com at Pennsylvania State University on 12 February 2008 © 2006 Social Compass. Church attendance, http://www.nationmaster.com/country/yi-serbia-and montenegro. Ahtik, “Klerikalizacija Srbije”, pp. 340–341. Žikica Simić, “Religijska kultura tradicionalnih pravoslavnih vernika”, in Teme, 1–2, 2005, 55–76. Joksimović, “Individualne karakteristike”. Hereby we adopt the definition of the civil society provided by the London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society: Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women’s organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups. (“What is civil society?”. Centre for Civil Society, London School of Economics. 1 March 2004, http://www.lse.ac.uk/ collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm)