online issn: 1307-6892 irc 2021 XV. international research conference proceedings open science index 15 2021 october 28-29, 2021 lisbon portugal international scholarly and scientific research & innovation TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 2 3 Tribological Properties of 3d-Printed Polymeric Materials Used in Sliding Systems Georgiana Chisiu The assessment of structural concrete with recycled aggregates in Terms of sustainability Jakub Niedoba, Sabina Hüblová Impact of Combined Heat and Power (CHP) Generation Technology on Distribution Network Development Sreto Boljevic 1 2 3 Application of Electrical Resistivity Surveys on Constraining Causes of Highway Pavement Failure along 4 Ajaokuta-Anyigba Road, North Central Nigeria Moroof, O. Oloruntola, Sunday Oladele, Daniel, O. Obasaju, Victor, O Ojekunle, Olateju, O. Bayewu, Ganiyu, 4 O. Mosuro 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Diagnose of the Future of Family Businesses Based on the Study of Spanish Family Businesses Founders Fernando Doral Significant Impact of Social Marketing on Social Entrepreneurship and Social Innovation: Comparative Studies of Afghanistan and Turkey Elaheh Isaqzadeh Relationship Between Entrepreneurial Orientation and Performance of Family Owned Enterprises in Nairobi County, Kenya Racheal Mugure, Teresia Kyalo Powder Characterization in Non-Ambient Conditions: A High and Low Temperature Ring Shear Testing Denis Schuetz, Timothy Aschl Composite Materials from Epoxidized Linseed Oil and Lignin R. S. Komartin, B. Balanuca, R. Stan Algorithmic Generation of Carbon Nanochimneys Sorin Muraru Geospatial Monitoring of Urban Sprawl and Physical Environment in Central NCR Region, Delhi: A Case Study of Delhi Bahadurgarh Corridor Pooja Roy Text-to-Model: Transformation Framework to Support Requirements Analysis and Modeling Gayan Sedrakyan, Asad Abdi, J. Van Hillegersberg 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Analysis of Bycatches of Two Related Anadromous Shad Species in Fisheries along the Galician Atlantic 13 Coast (Nw Iberian Peninsula, Southwest Europe): Assessment of the Problem, Data on Biology and Ecology and Proposals for Protection and Management 22 David José Nachón, Rufino Vieira-Lanero, Sandra Barca-Bravo, María Del Carmen Cobo, Fernando Cobo 14 15 16 17 Excellent Combination of Tensile Strength and Elongation of Novel Reverse Rolled TaNbHfZrTi Refractory High Entropy Alloy Mokali Veeresham The Impact of Capitalism Phenomenon on the Faith of the Tuna Satak Bathi Sanak PhilosophyAngkringan on Traders in Yogyakarta Gita Dewi Nawangwulan, Salmanira Fahala Ratya Utami, Latifah Nirmala, Destiara Nuzulita, Sartini Autobiographical Features of a Biopic Film Paulo Filipe Monteiro Thesis: Text Mining to alleviate the Cold Start Problem of Adaptive Comparative Judgments Michiel De Vrindt 23 29 30 31 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Formal History Teaching and Lifeworld Literacies: Developing Transversal Skills as an Embodied Learning Outcomes in Historical Research Projects Paul Flynn, Luke O’Donnell Cultivating Individuality and Equality in Education: A Literature Review on Respecting Dimensions of Diversity within the Classroom Melissa C. Ingram Managing Student Internationalization during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Three Approaches That Should Endure beyond the Present David Cobham English Freezing Injunction in a Comparative Perspective Anna Bicz-Kordonets Evaluating Closed-List Proportional Representation System and Its Compatibility in Contemporary Indonesian Election Ridho Al-Hamdi, Sakir, Tanto Lailam Value Co-Creation in a Digital Ecosystem: The Role of Infrastructure in a Nascent Museum Camilla Marini, Michela Arnaboldi Pueblos Mágicos in Mexico: The Loss of Intangible Cultural Heritage and Cultural Tourism Claudia Rodriguez-Espinosa, Erika Elizabeth Pérez Múzquiz Developing a Tissue-Engineered Aortic Heart Valve Based on an Electrospun Scaffold Sara R. Knigge, Sugat R. Tuladhar, Alexander Becker, Tobias Schilling, Birgit Glasmacher Degradation Kinetics of Cardiovascular Implants Employing Full Blood and Extra-Corporeal Circulation Principles: Mimicking the Human Circulation In vitro Sara R. Knigge, Sugat R. Tuladhar, Hans-Klaus HöFfler, Tobias Schilling, Tim Kaufeld, Axel Haverich Chromoblastomycosis by Exophiala Jeanselmei Associated with Squamous Cell Carcinoma Jiaqi Wang The Emerging Role of Cannabis as an Anti-Nociceptive Agent in the Treatment of Chronic Back Pain Josiah Damisa, Michelle Louise Richardson, Morenike Adewuyi Asymptomatic Intercostal Schwannoma in a Patient with COVID-19: The First of Its Kind Gabriel Hunduma The Lessons Learned from Managing Malignant Melanoma During COVID-19 in a Plastic Surgery Unit in Ireland Amenah Dhannoon, Ciaran Martin Hurley, Laura Wrafter, Podraic J. Regan A Short Review on Gastric Cancer Sneha Dey, Lalita Das Palliative Care Team Does Good! Good Grief Rounds Facilitated across Disciplines in an Academic Hospital Improves Factors Shown to Alleviate Burnout Katie Morrison, Ann Navarro-Leahy, Nicole Rondinelli, William Jensen, Erin Nielsen Assessment of Palliative Care Attitudes and Climate before and after Antiracism Education and Training Intervention Kelly Arnett, Allison Wolfe, Ann Navarro-Leahy, Jeanie Youngwerth Who Knew It Would Work so Well? Using Cough Medication to Relieve Pain in a Patient with High Iv Opioid Requirement, History of Iv Heroin Use and Metastatic Breast Cancer Ann Navarro-Leahy, Katie Morrison, Sarah Norskog The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Nursing Workforce in Slovakia Lukas Kober, Vladimir Littva, Vladimir Siska Risk of Type 2 Diabetes among Female College Students in Saudi Arabia Noor A. Hakim 32 33 38 42 43 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 37 38 Impact of Preoperative Physiotherapy Care in Total Hip Arthroplasty in Slovakia and Austria Peter Kutis, Vladimir Littva Empathy in the Work of Physiotherapists in Slovakia Vladimir Littva, Peter Kutis 64 65 Conference Proceedings, Lisbon Portugal October 28-29, 2021 Evaluating Closed-List Proportional Representation System and its Compatibility in Contemporary Indonesian Elections Ridho Al-Hamdi, Sakir, Tanto Lailam Abstract—During the democratic period of 1999-present, Indonesia has consistently applied a List Proportional Representation (List PR) system in the parliamentary election. Between 1999 and 2004, it adopted the Closed-List Proportional Representation (CLPR) system. In the meantime, it employed an Open-List Proportional Representation (OLPR) system from 2009 to 2019. Recently, some parties intended to propose the application of CLPR while others are still consistent in adopting OLPR. An unfinished debate is taking place. Thus, this article aims to evaluate the application of CLPR in Indonesia and, in turn, analyze its compatibility in the contemporary parliamentary election system. From a methodological standpoint, it is qualitative research by applying a case study approach. Data gathering relies on field data, mainly Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and indepth interviews with political parties, Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), NGO activists, and scholars spread in six provinces and nine regencies/cities across the country. Using SWOT analysis and the compatibility of CLPR and embedded democracy framework, the finding demonstrates that CLPR is no longer relevant for contemporary Indonesian elections. This paper recommends OLPR by considering that CLPR has numerous weaknesses and threats that can jeopardize embedded democracy. More importantly, CLPR can remove inclusive suffrage significantly. Keywords—Closed-List Proportional Representation, Embedded Democracy, Indonesia, parliamentary election. I. INTRODUCTION T HE third democratization wave began in 1974 when military elites effectively defeated the autocratic regime of Portugal. Since the tragedy of “the 25 coup”, various states of the globe changed from dictatorial to democratic. The impact of democracy is the death of the dictatorship regime to create free and fair elections where society can vote for political leaders to earn stability in all aspects of life. In the basic concept, democratization consists of a threefold level: the death of a dictatorial regime, the installation of a democratic system, and the consolidation of a democratic system [1]. Moreover, people have numerous channels to articulate their interests not only to influence policies, but also to check the exercise of state power continuously [2]. Similarly, the democratic system invents desirable goals: evading tyranny, protecting fundamental rights, guarantying general freedom, allowing self-determination, presenting moral independence, advocating human development and peace-seeking, struggling for political equivalence, and realizing welfare [3]. Consolidated democracy is needed to ensure popular representation, stability, and good governance that developing countries desperately want. It is similar to climbing a steep ladder where the risk of falling is as great as the prospect of achieving the wanted peak. In various cases, the positive growth of a consolidated democracy is counterbalanced by a situation that renders the new democracies increasingly unstable and defective. Scientists agree that unconsolidated democracy is typified by poor democratic institutions, the domination of patrimonialism in social relations, weak law enforcement, the lack of power distribution, the application of violence in a political contest, the instrumentalization of ethnoreligious sentiments by political elites, and so forth [4]. Therefore, the impact of the democratic transition does not only present socalled “embedded democracy”, but also provides two other prospects: the decline of democracy (comprising disintegration and dictatorial regime) and the democratic stagnation (defective democracy) [5], [4]. The phrase “embedded democracy” is aimed to explain the consolidation of democracy. Stable constitutional democracies are implanted in two ways. Internally, the specific interdependence/independence of the five indicators of a democracy secures its normative and functional existence. Externally, these five indicators are embedded in spheres of enabling situations for democracy that protect it from outer and inner shocks and destabilizing tendencies. On the contrary, if one of the five indicators of the embedded democracy is impaired, it tends to be characterized as a defective democracy. Hence, some influential factors which affect defective democracy are established: the path of modernization, the level of modernization, economic trends, social capital and civil society, state and nation-building, the type of dictatorial predecessor regime, transitional ways, political institutions, and the global context [6]-[8]. Moreover, Hadiwinata and Schuck hypothesize that Indonesia is oscillating between a defective and a consolidated democracy. Some growths denote positive signs, while others designate stagnation [4]. Furthermore, this paper presents positive and negative facts of Indonesian democratization. There are seven positive things: first, a lot of political parties are emerging with distinctive types; second, five free and fair election cycles are established; third, the amendment of the 1945 Constitution was taking place; fourth, women in public spaces are empowered; fifth, police-military representatives in the legislature and state control over societal organizations were removed; sixth, freedom of association and press is supported; and seventh, the power distribution is instituted. In the meantime, the weaknesses are: first, the lack of basic human needs in various regions; second, corruption and bribery of 5LGKR $O+DPGL LV ZLWK WKH 8QLYHUVLWDV 0XKDPPDGL\DK <RJ\DNDUWD,QGRQHVLD HPDLOULGKRDOKDPGL#XP\DFLG  43 Conference Proceedings, Lisbon Portugal October 28-29, 2021 officials are rampant; third, patrimonial ties and nepotism encroaching on democratic institutions are still robust; fourth, religious and tribal tolerance amongst society is still disrespected; fifth, the economy is stagnant; sixth, human rights enforcement for marginal people is useless; seventh, extremeradical religious groups, separatist movements, and terrorist deeds are rising [9]-[14]. In Indonesia’s post-Soeharto regime, Indonesia adopted two different kinds of the electoral system. From 1999 to 2004, it adopted the Closed-List Proportional Representation (CLPR) system. Between 2009 and 2019, it applied the Open-List Proportional Representation (OLPR) system. Nevertheless, this paper focuses on evaluating the former. Numerous countries use CLPR because they assume it is compatible with the values of democracy and civic engagement. A study in Ukraine demonstrates that the alteration of the Mix-Member Proportional (MMP) system to CLPR in Ukraine in 2006 affects some major parties’ strategies in selecting candidates in the parliamentary election. Two new strategies are prioritizing inclusion and prioritizing cohesion [15]. In Russia, the adoption of CLPR gives parties domination on access to the national legislature [16]. In Argentina, party leaders tend to encourage legislators to satisfy their constituencies despite the cost of party loyalty as long as it benefits the party’s electoral prospects. It is the so-called cartel theory, where it is part of a calculated strategy [17]. Under Portugal CLPR, although localness matters in which political parties prioritize local candidates in the parliamentary election, it is not a valuable asset for Portuguese political parties. It is caused by the fact that MPs in Portugal represent all citizens and not a specific constituency. Thus, district magnitude has an insignificant contribution in explaining locals’ presence in party lists [18]. In terms of gendered political recruitment under the CLPR system, all political parties in Spain discriminate against female candidates, although the number of women elected to legislatures has risen drastically worldwide [19]. In Italy, parties have a different reaction to the preferences of rational or behavioral voters under CLPR. In the former case, parties prefer to allocate their loyal candidates to safe seats. In the latter case, parties offer a few experts in the top position while filling the rest of the party-list with loyalists [20]. Under Japanese CLPR with multiple districts and separate competition, parties can rank PR districts according to how many additional votes are needed to win an additional seat. With divisor-based formula, parties will need the fewest additional votes in districts that capture the fewest seats. We call these a party’s ‘marginal’ PR district [21]. The adoption of CLPR in Indonesia’s 1999 and 2004 elections is still affected by the previous implementation during the New Order regime between 1971-1997. CLPR is assumed as a relevant system at the time. Various political parties emerged in the early Reformation Era. Forty-nine political parties officially participated in the 1999 election. In the 2004 election, some developments were made. For instance, the existence of the military-police fraction in the parliament was removed. Although CLPR was still applied in 2004, Indonesia can organize the direct presidential election for the first time, where voters can determine the preferred pair candidate of president and vice-president. Although the Indonesian election has been applying OLPR since 2009, this paper attempts to evaluate the relevance of CLPR and, in turn, assesses its compatibility in contemporary Indonesia by using an embedded democracy framework. It is caused by the recent debate among political parties in the parliamentary session, which wants to repropose the application of CLPR. This paper argues that a deep analysis of this topic is still fascinating. II. RESEARCH METHODS This study employs qualitative method [22], [23] by applying the multiple case study approach [24]. The case study can be defined as the intensive investigation which describes one or more cases for particular aims within a tied case or multiple cases through in-depth data collection by gathering various sources [25], [24]. More specifically, this study uses documentary, Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and in-depth interview [26], [27] as the data gathering. FGD and in-depth interviews were conducted with 150 informants, which spreading into four different institutions: The Election Commission (KPU), the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu), political parties, and academicians or NonGovernment Organizations (NGOs) activists. It takes approximately four months, from March to June 2021. Meanwhile, the documentary was carried out before, during, and after the field research. After data were collected, the last step is analyzing into four gradual steps: reducing data, displaying data, drawing and verification, and conclusion [25]. In terms of the research location, it takes six provinces and nine regencies and cities across the country. The location selection was decided based on a sevenfold consideration: many cases of electoral fraud, rampant money politics, numerous cases of the death of the Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), capital of the state, special autonomy regions, and the electorate base in the 2019 election. Based on such considerations, this research selected six distinctive provinces: Aceh, Jakarta, West Java, East Java, South Sulawesi, and Papua. Meanwhile, Banda Aceh City, Central Jakarta City, Bandung City, Indramayu Regency, Surabaya City, Bangkalan Regency, Makassar City, Barru Regency, and Jayapura City were selected as county and municipal representatives. III. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION A threefold step will be discussed in this article. First is presenting a SWOT analysis on the application of CLPR. Second is analyzing the relevance of CLPR with the framework of embedded democracy. Third is proposing an alternative design of the legislative election system in contemporary Indonesia. A. SWOT Analysis of the Application of Closed-List Proportional Representation in Indonesia SWOT is a standard method developed to evaluate policies, programs, and activities in government institutions, business sectors, even non-profit organizations. Conceptually, SWOT contains four interrelated indicators: strengths, weaknesses, 44 Conference Proceedings, Lisbon Portugal October 28-29, 2021 opportunities, and threats. In this article, this method is applied to examine the application of CLPR in the Indonesian election. Regarding strengths, the system has six advantages. CLPR has three main disadvantages. Firstly, the party has an influential authority in determining the elected candidate. It can be seen from the candidate selection where the candidate who has the smallest sequent number has a big chance to be elected. The party rules it. Thus, the party has an opportunity to select the qualified candidate, provide potential leaders, and, in turn, prioritize its internal cadres. Secondly, voters are not confusing to vote because they vote only for the party, not the individual candidate. It is a simple choice. Thirdly, it can minimize intraparty fragmentation because the candidate fights for the party platform. Thus, party cohesion can be built well, and fair competition is possible to be realized. Fourthly, money politics can be minimized because competition takes place among political parties, not individual candidates. Fifthly, the electoral budget is efficient for the Electoral Management Bodies and legislative candidates. Compared with OLPR, under CLPR, the EMBs have more simple duties, such as merely providing small volumes of ballot papers, a simple method in the vote recapitulation, the cooperation occurs only with the party, not the candidate. The EMBs’ job is effective, and the administrative mistake can be reduced. Sixthly, CLPR is friendly for female candidates because the party can set its sequence number. However, it is still debatable. Concerning weaknesses, this system has six disadvantages. Firstly, the public has no chance to determine the elected candidate due to the party’s powerful authority. Voters vote for the political party, not the candidate. It is nonsense. The impact is that non-cadre candidates coming from outside of the party are difficult to be elected. Secondly, society does not know the candidate who will represent them because they vote for the party. Thirdly, it is difficult for non-cadre candidates to earn the expected sequence number. Consequently, they have no serious concern with the campaign process because it is managed by the party institutionally. Such candidates do not care about their electoral district. Fourthly, there is no direct commitment between the candidate and society. Sometimes, the elected candidate is not suitable for public expectations. Fifthly, the regime sometimes capitalizes on this system to discriminate against certain and small groups. Sixthly, it is not friendly to female candidates because the party politically prioritizes men over women. Fig. 1 SWOT Analysis of the Application of CLPR System in Indonesia’s Parliamentary Elections, 1999-2004 45 Conference Proceedings, Lisbon Portugal October 28-29, 2021 In terms of opportunities, CLPR has at least two possible opportunities. Firstly, it at least can minimize the intervention of capital owners (“cukong” in Indonesian term) inside the party. Capital owners can be seen in two kinds of pattern: 1) they are running as the legislative candidates and financing themselves; 2) they are financing the expected and potential candidate who will fight for them in the legislative arena. Secondly, the party also has a big chance to be institutionalized, and, in turn, the elected candidate is more loyal to the party. About threats, this system has three hazardous threats. Firstly, the lack of public participation in the electoral process can make society blind to politics. Political elites can capitalize on this situation to earn their interests. Secondly, nepotism deeds are increasing because the political transaction takes place among parties’ elites in setting the sequence number of candidates. The upshot, the intraparty transparency is weak and weakened. Thirdly, it can have an oligarch inside the party and, in turn, dominate the party. Such an oligarch can endanger party institutionalization, bypassing party mechanisms and procedures, including dismissing different factions inside the party. Fig. 1 denotes that, internally, strengths are more than weaknesses while externally, threats are more than opportunities. All in all, CLPR has positive and negative impacts. There is a need to address such negative impacts to reach the embedded democracy. B. The Compatibility between Closed-List Proportional Representation and Embedded Democracy Five leading indicators of the embedded democracy are applied in this paper to assess the application of CLPR in the Indonesian election. Firstly, the electoral regime has some subindicators: elected officials, inclusive suffrage, the right to candidacy, and free and fair organized elections. Secondly, political liberties have two sub-indicators: freedom of press and freedom of association. Thirdly, civil rights denote the state or private agents which have to protect individual liberties from violations of rights and guarantee equality before the law. Fourthly, the division of powers and horizontal accountability is established through legislative, executive, and judiciary branches. Fifthly, effective power to govern indicates that the elected officials can maintain an effective government. If the first and second indicators are part of vertical legitimacy and control, the third and fourth indicators imply the dimension of liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law. In the meantime, the last indicator is the dimension of effective agenda-control (Merkel, 2004: 36-42; 2007: 34-40). Among those five regimes, this paper only employs four indicators of the electoral regime to examine the CLPR application. 1. Elected candidates The discourse of elected officials is about the political legitimation of the elected candidates after the competition is done. The legitimation can be proven by three indicators: an official declaration issued by the authoritative institution, the absence of electoral dispute from other contestants and related parties, and the high voter turnout. Regarding the CLPR application, there is a fourfold negative trend to the elected candidate aspect. Firstly, CLPR dampens the voters’ participation to vote for the direct candidate based on their preferences. Voters cannot intervene in the candidate’s electability. Secondly, CLPR cannot demand the candidates’ accountability because voters vote for the party, not the direct candidate. Thirdly, it can potentially decrease the voter turnout as the impact of voters’ inability to determine the direct candidate, and, in turn, it can weaken the candidate legitimation. Nonetheless, three facts can indicate CLPR’s positive trends with the elected candidate aspect. Firstly, the party has candidates’ vigorous ideology. It is indeed related to the candidate recruitment mechanism inside the party. Secondly, the strong ability of the candidate is evident as the impact of the strict selection in prioritizing the internal cadres. Third, the elected candidate is determined mainly by the party elites and oligarchs. 2. Inclusive suffrage Inclusiveness is an attached part of the election to ensure electoral integrity. The fundamental principle of inclusiveness is including other related stakeholders in the decision-making process and presenting many alternative candidates to be voted. Additionally, inclusive suffrage can be acknowledged as establishing the equal right for all citizens to vote without distinguishing religion, tribes, gender, age, physical condition, and geography. Another meaning of inclusive suffrage is that voters have various optional candidates, so voters have multiple options to vote for the preferred candidate. In this indicator, some negative aspects are found. Firstly, CLPR allows voters to vote merely for the party. There is no inclusive suffrage in CLPR. Secondly, CLPR does not provide a chance for other minority groups to win the election because they have difficulties earning the smallest sequence number. Thirdly, women candidates have no equal position if they have no smallest sequence number. Unfortunately, positive trends in this context are not found anymore. 3. The right to candidacy The right to candidacy has the same privilege to nominate in the electoral stage. Regarding CLPR, this system allows all citizens who have met the legal requirements to nominate themselves as the legislative candidates. However, the political party has determined the elected candidate since the establishment of the candidate sequence number. The smallest sequence number determines the elected candidate. Therefore, it is hard for non-cadre candidates to obtain such a number and, in turn, need hard work to reach for the parliamentary seat. Conversely, CLPR encourages the internal party cadres to have a big chance to be elected as the legislator due to their outstanding commitment to the party. 46 Conference Proceedings, Lisbon Portugal October 28-29, 2021 Fig. 2 The Compatibility of CLPR and Embedded Democracy’s Electoral Indicators Source: It was processed by the NVivo 12+ Platform. 4. Free and fair organized elections Free and fair election is suitable with the Indonesian Constitution (UUD 1945) as stated in Article 22E Paragraph 1, namely, “the general election is organized directly, general, free, confidential, fair, and equal in every five times”. More specifically, it directly indicates that voters can vote for the candidate directly based on their preferences. General denotes that all citizens who met the legal requirement can take their political rights. Free signifies that voters can decide their candidate without any interventions. Confidential means the privacy of voters’ votes is guaranteed its security. Fair is that all EMBs should behave fairly, which is in line with the regulation. Equal represents an equivalent treatment for voters and the electoral participants. CLPR has two negative impacts on free and fair elections. Firstly, it does not allow society to control all electoral processes directly. They cannot protest frankly to the candidates. Secondly, CLPR cannot guarantee the transparency of political parties’ budgets, and even society cannot access it. Meanwhile, this system has a twofold positive impact. Firstly, electoral malpractices can be minimized effectively because competition only occurs among political parties and does not include candidates individually. Therefore, the number of electoral violations can be reduced. Secondly, the effective cost of election can induce the high of public honesty. As a result, CLPR can reduce vote-buying practices mainly among society. Fig. 2 demonstrates that each indicator has positive and negative trends except inclusive suffrage, which has no positive trends. Therefore, CLPR intends to remove the inclusiveness of the election. It is also contradicted with the basic principle of a free and fair election. A critical evaluation of CLPR should be executed. A Suggested Design for Indonesia’s Parliamentary Election Considering the CLPR prospect in the contemporary Indonesian election, this paper proposes to change CLPR with C. 47 Conference Proceedings, Lisbon Portugal October 28-29, 2021 a modified OLPR. In coping with seven negative trends of the CLPR application, this paper suggests some alternative ideas: a. To address “the public has no chance to determine the elected candidate”, this paper prefers voters to vote for the preferred candidate directly. It can be found in the OLPR system. Thus, society needs to admit potential candidates who will represent them. The impact, there is a direct commitment between the candidate and society. b. To deal with “the inability of non-cadre candidates to earn the expected sequence number”, the application of the OLPR system will make such candidates fighting for the vote collection, not the sequence number. c. To eliminate nepotism deeds mainly in the candidate selection, OLPR is suitable because all candidates have an equal position to collect votes as much as possible. OLPR will decrease the influential role of the party. Thus, society is no longer blind to politics. d. It is supported by the fact that most prosperous countries worldwide apply OLPR as their electoral system. It can be seen mainly in Scandinavian countries, like Norway, Sweden, Ireland, Denmark, and Finland. In Freedom House’s annual report, these countries are always classified as a fully democratic state. In the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) 2020 democracy index, the top big three of best democratic countries of the world belong to Norway, Ireland, and Sweden. It implies that OLPR has positive effects on state development. Fig. 3 The WordCloud of the FGD Results with all Respondents Source: It was processed by the NVivo 12+ Platform. Fig. 3 indicates that CLPR positively impacts the availability of regeneration or cadrerization inside the party. It is supported by some phrases which denote that this system suppresses money politics among society, strengthens the party institutionalization, provides the strong ideology of the party and a simple way of the election, and guarantees candidates’ loyalty to the party. Nevertheless, other negative trends are found in numerous watchwords: CLPR affects low participation, money politics inside the party, transactional deeds, patron-client relation, dynasty, and oligarchy. Therefore, the adoption of OLPR should be executed for the parliamentary election in contemporary Indonesia. IV. CONCLUSION By employing SWOT analysis, this paper argues that internally, CLPR has more strengths than its weaknesses. In the meantime, externally, it has more threats rather than opportunities. Therefore, CLPR should address these various negative impacts: the inability of the public in determining the elected candidates, the lack of ability of society in acknowledging the candidate who will represent them, the powerlessness of non-cadre candidates in reaching the expected sequence number, and the failure of society in making a direct commitment with the candidate. If CLPR cannot cope with such negative impacts, the threats are coming, in which CLPR makes society blind to politics, enlarges nepotism deeds, and is friendly to oligarchy, which can dictate the entire party. In its compatibility with the embedded democracy framework, CLPR has various negative impacts in all four indicators, jeopardizing the installation of embedded democracy in contemporary Indonesia. More importantly, the application of CLPR eventually can remove inclusive suffrage significantly. To sum up, this paper strongly recommends adopting the OLPR system for contemporary Indonesian elections. It is suggested to analyze the implication of the application of OLPR in Indonesian democracy genuinely. ACKNOWLEDGMENT The authors express sincere gratitude to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology (MendikbudRistek) Republic of Indonesia for providing a generous grant for this research under 1867/E4/AK.04/2021 and three other derivative contract numbers: 165/E4.1/AK.04.PT/2021 (between Mendikbud-Ristek and LLDikti in Yogyakarta Region), 3279.4/LL5/PG/2021 (between LLDikti in Yogyakarta Region and Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta), and 015/SP.LRI/VIII/2021 (between the Research and Innovation Institute Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta and the grantee). Our honest thanks also go to informants who spent their time and shared their fruitful experiences to improve this paper. Special thanksgiving is addressed to the local team of the data collection (Agus Mahfudz Fauzi, Wais Alqorni, Hadi Saputra, Ahmad Nur Hidayat, Masmulyadi, Margono, David Efendi, and Ubay Nizar) and the research assistants (Dyah Mely Anawati, Adibah Dhifani Gusmi, Milla Farrihatul Ahna, M. 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Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2013. G. Kamberelis and G. Dimitriadis, “Focus groups: Contingent articulation of pedagogy, politics, and inquiry,” in The sage handbook of qualitative research, N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, Eds. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2011, pp. 545-561. M. Q. Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2002. Yogyakarta. He obtained his doctorate in political science at TU Dortmund University, Germany, granted by Indonesia’s BPPLN Kemenristekdikti Scholarship (2014-2017). His research interests are political parties, election, democracy, and Islam-politics. Some of his books are Indonesian political ideology: Political parties and local governance in Yogyakarta 1998-2015 (Baden-Baden, Germany: Tectum, 2017), Ambang batas pemilu: Pertarungan partai politik dan pudarnya ideologi di Indonesia (Yogyakarta, Indonesia: UMY Press, 2020). One of his recent selected scholarly articles is “Ideological cleavage under open-list proportional representation system: Parties position toward the 2019 Indonesia’s presidential threshold” in Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, 14 (03): 205-219. Right now, he is the principal researcher for a multi-year project 2021-2023 entitled “Designing proportional representation system, threshold, and electoral simultaneity: Multiple cases in Indonesia’s six provinces and nine regencies/cities” fully granted by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, and Technology (Kemendikbud-Ristek), Republic of Indonesia. Email ridhoalhamdi@umy.ac.id Sakir is currently director of the International Program of Government Affairs and Administration, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. He was born in Kebumen, Indonesia, in 06 October 1989. He obtained BA and master’s degrees in government studies at Universitas Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta. His research interest is related to public policy and human resource management. He frequently receives numerous research grants. He is one of the members of the research project led by Ridho Al-Hamdi. Email mas.sakir@fisipol.umy.ac.id Tanto Lailam is lecturer at the faculty of law Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. He was born in Bandar Lampung, Indonesia, in 1985. He received BA degree in law at Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta and master degree in law at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta. He is currently pursuing his doctorate in comparative constitutional law at University of Cologne, Germany (2020-present). His main research is constitutional law. One of his books entitled “Politik hukum badan peradilan khusus dalam penyelesaian sengketa pilkada” (Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Pustaka Pelajar, 2019). He is also one of the members of the research project led by Ridho Al-Hamdi. Email tanto_lailam@umy.ac.id Ridho Al-Hamdi is currently vice dean of the faculty of social and political sciences, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. He was born in Metro, Indonesia, in May 1985. He earned a BA degree in theology and philosophy at State Islamic University of Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta. His master was obtained in political science at Gadjah Mada University, 49 CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE AND PRESENTATION This certificate is awarded to RIDHO AL-HAMDI in oral and technical presentation, recognition and appreciation of research contributions in ICEEL 2021: XV. International Conference on Elections and Election Law Evaluating Closed-List Proportional Representation System and Its Compatibility in Contemporary Indonesian Election Ridho Al-Hamdi, Sakir, Tanto Lailam LISBON, PORTUGAL OCTOBER 28-29, 2021 The Document Verification Service - Fast, Secure, Trusted Verify by https://waset.org/verification or by QR Code Reader Verify Code: 3335-2080-3555-0736 INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH CONFERENCE ACCEPTANCE AND INVITATION LETTER Dr. Ridho Al-Hamdi Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta October 06, 2021 Indonesia Herewith, the international scientific committee is pleased to invite you for Oral presentation at ICEEL 2021: XV. International Conference on Elections and Election Law to be held in Lisbon, Portugal during October 28-29, 2021 Visa Requirements: Many delegates will require advance visa arrangements to enter the conference host country. You are kindly requested to submit a complete and accurate visa application to the consulate or embassy of the conference host country located in your country of residence. Please apply for your visa in due time and at your own responsibility. We look forward to your participation in the ICEEL 2021: XV. International Conference on Elections and Election Law. Sincerely, International Scientific Committee ICEEL 2021 Lisbon, Portugal https://waset.org/elections-and-election-law-conference-in-october-2021-in-lisbon The Document Verification Service - Fast, Secure, Trusted Verify by https://waset.org/verification or by QR Code Reader Verify Code: 1439-5234-2615-5549