Business-to-business External Sources of Technology (BEST) and
Innovation: A Dynamic Portfolio Approach
Anna Sabidussi1
Harry J. Bremmers1 Geert Duysters2,3
S.W. F. Onno Omta1
1Department of Business Administration, Wageningen Universiteit,
6700 EW Wageningen, The Netherlands
2 UNU-MERIT, 6211TC Maastricht, The Netherlands
3Department of Technology Management, Technishe Universiteit Eindhoven,
5600MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands
(E-mail:anna.sabidussi@wur.nl,harry.bremmers@wur.nl,g.m.duysters@tm.tue.nl,
duysters@merit.unu.edu, onno.omta@wur.nl )
Abstract Especially in complex technological contexts, companies engage in external relationships
and use Business-to-business External Sources of Technology (BEST) in order to innovate. The way this
relationship has to be organized (should it be a merger or an alliance?) is a critical strategic choice.
Despite the relevance of the above decision, the topic has not been often addressed by the literature and
the existing guidelines provide little support to decision makers. Adopting a Dynamic Portfolio approach,
the present papers designs a decision system where the governance modes is not conceived as a simple
binary choice (either M&A or SA) but as their balance and integration within a dynamic portfolio. In
doing so, the present works contributes to the literature releasing the limitations of previous studies and
provide support to managerial practice.
Key Words dynamic portfolio, strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions, decision system
1 Introduction
The number of strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions has systematically increased in the last
decades [1, 2]. Innovation has become one of the most cited motivations to enter in partnering activities,
especially in high technology industries [3]. These facts seem to confirm that an “open innovation” [4]
framework is prevailing, especially in industries characterized by rapid technology evolution.
Companies are keen to use external sources to develop new technologies (BEST, Business-to-business
External Sources of Technology) to foster innovation, embedding those technologies in new products
and processes. Once a company has recognized the opportunity of an external technological relationship
and identified a suitable partner, still the governance mode, the way this inter-firm relationship is going
to be organized, has to be defined. The governance mode decision has been mainly framed as choice
between Strategic Alliances (SA) and Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A). Despite the managerial
relevance of the governance choice decision, the criteria to choose among different governance modes is
a topic not often addressed by academic research [5]. Knowing in which situations an alliance or a
merger is more suitable represents a critical strategic decision [6]. The failure rates of alliances and
mergers can be imputed to the fact that managers, not knowing when to choose an M&A or a SA, simply
do not compare the alternatives, “making a mess of both acquisitions and alliances"[7] .
Wang and Zajac [8] identify two research lines in the literature: the first approaches SA and M&As
as undifferentiated forms of governance, the second isolates one of the two alternatives and focuses on
either SA or M&A. A third line of research proposes comparative criteria for selecting the governance
mode that improves the technological innovativeness of companies (for example 9, 102, 10, 5, 11,
12,13). Criteria suggested by the former research stream, however, 1) conceive the governance choice as
a decision isolated from other existing governance modes in which the company is involved, 2) are
useful if considered separately but often conflicting if taken in an integrated fashion to built a decision
system, 3) hint only marginally the effect of time dynamics on the governance choice decision.
The main objective of the present work is to design a decision system for choosing BEST
governance choices aimed at innovationthat accounts for interactions among different governance
choices and that adopts a dynamic, time dependent, perspective.
In order to answer these research questions, we consider that a portfolio approach is the most
adequate and we motivate our choice with three main reasons. First, a rich body of literature has
recognized the superiority of approaching external relationships from a portfolio perspective in order to
enhance innovation [14, 15, 16, 17). Second, the portfolio approach allows to face the complexity of
multiple contemporaneous relationships (18, 19) providing a better understanding of the
interrelationships and complementarities existing among different relationships (20, 21). Companies
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have started to recognize that considering inter-firm links as “one-offs” – “independent relationships
pursued separately” is perilous (22). A recent report from McKinsey (23) motivates the need for a
portfolio approach arguing that, otherwise, companies collect over the years, a “random mix” of
linkages whose contribution to corporate strategy is unclear. Finally, one of the main advantages of a
portfolio approach is to comfortably deal with time dynamics [20, 24]. Although, portfolio approach has
been mainly adopted for alliances, we enlarge the reasoning to M&As as well.
Building on financial Portfolio Theory [25,26], the present paper proposes to answer the research
question adopting a Dynamic Portfolio (DP) approach as conceptual tool for supporting the governance
choice. The main conclusion of the present work is that the decisions on governance modes are not to be
conceived as a simple binary choice (either M&A or SA) but as their balance and integration within a
dynamic portfolio.
The present paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of the literature
on criteria for governance choice. A discussion of the challenges left unsolved by previous studies
follows and the motivation for a new theoretical approach is introduced. In the third section, the
conceptual pillars from financial portfolio theory are presented and interpreted in a governance mode
context. In section four, the Dynamic Portfolio approach to design a decision system is presented
Implications for research and managerial practice are discussed in the final remarks.
2 Governance Choices Decisions: Theoretical Overview
2.1 The spectrum of BEST organizational modes
BEST organizational alternatives can take different forms that can be conceived as resting on a
continuum, depicting various degrees of organizational integration [10]. Approximating the level of
integration by the degree of equity participation, the spectrum is ranging from relatively simple
contractual transactions to full equity integration in the form of M&As (see Table 1).
Table 1 Spectrum of BEST organizational modes and associated characteristics.
Sources: adapted and modified from [6] and [10].
Business-to-business External Sourcing of Technology (BEST) spectrum
Contractual transactions
Contract (Supply, Distibution,
Strategic Alliances
Manufacturing
Outsourcing)
Low
High
Integration
Control
Integration
Termination cost
Transaction costs
Life spam
Opportunistic
behavior risk
Formalization
Capital intensity
Low
Low
Low
High
Limited
High
Joint
promotion /
marketing
Licensing
Non
equity
alliance
(joint
R&D)
Equity
alliance
M&A
Joint
venture
Acquisition
Merger
High
High
High
Low
Unlimited
Low
Low
High
Low
Low
High
High
From a governance choice perspective, Strategic Alliances (SA) and Mergers and Acquisitions
(M&A) constitute the main asset classes. Strategic Alliances refer to “cooperative efforts in which two
or more separate organizations, while maintaining their own corporate identities, join forces to share
reciprocal inputs” [5]. According to Dussage and Garette [27], an alliance can be qualified as strategic
when “when it contributes significantly to the strategies pursued by the partner companies”. The term
“strategic alliances” indicates many different partnering modalities including equity as well as
non-equity linkages [28]. M&As refer to situations in which one company acquires the control over
another corporate entity. In the case of a merger, the acquirer absorbs the other entity (that ceases to
exist) while in the case of an acquisition the two identities keep on functioning as juridical entities.
Mergers are relatively rare and many transactions called mergers constitute in fact acquisitions [29].
The characteristics of the governance choices change moving along the continuum. Highly
integrated forms display lower levels of flexibility compared to SA [30, 10] and therefore the possibility
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to adjust to changing conditions is constrained. More hierarchical forms of governance, like acquisitions,
provide, however, higher levels of control and present reduced levels of opportunism treat [31]. The cost
to terminate a partnership increases with the degree of integration [32], M&As representing also
typically a larger investment compared to SAs [33]. Governance modes lying on the left side of the
continuum, like alliances, are more concerned by worries about the appropriability of the results
achieved by the joint activities. Especially when the scope of the alliances is broad, the possibility to
control the partner is limited and the risk of opportunistic behavior is higher [34]. Therefore, SAs are
typically concerned with the costs of managing and controlling the relationship. On the other side,
governance forms with higher level of integration, like M&As, are typically associated with difficulties
of integration that can hurt innovation performance in the post merger phase [35,36, 37] . With respect
to the time dimension, moving along the continuum to higher integration forms implies that the life span
of the relationship increases [30]. In M&As, the acquirer obtains immediate access and control over the
resources needed [10] while, in SAs, partners are involved in joint activities to develop new
technological knowledge [30]. Highly integrated forms, like M&A, however, need longer time span to
affect innovation (around five years) while lower degrees of integration like alliances display their
effects sooner (around three years or less) [3].
2.2 The criteria of governance choice in the literature
Criteria for choosing a governance mode, given its peculiar characteristics, have been discussed
principally within the conceptual framework of the Resource Based View (RBV), Transaction Costs
Economics (TCE), Network Theory (NT) and Real Option Reasoning (ROR). The RBV states that the
internal specific capacities of a firm (core competencies) constitute the fundamental factors that define
the competitive advantage [38]. Knowledge is one of the most important resources that companies
constantly try to develop [39]. Technological capabilities are the constituents of core competencies and
two types of activities generate them: internal R&D and technology external linkages [40]. In a RBV
perspective, the type and nature of the resources combinations involved in the relationship provide the
criteria to identify the most suitable form of governance. RBV is linked to Transaction Cost Economics
(TCE) because “combination of resources is influenced by transaction cost economizing” [41]. TCE
(mainly framed by Coase [42], Williamson [43, 44] predicts that managers should prefer the governance
mode that carries the lowest costs for coordination and control. TCE is more likely to determine the
governance mode once uncertainty is low, large investments are undertaken and the need for control
emerges. When uncertainty is high, flexible governance modes are preferred and a Real Option
Reasoning is predominant [12, 45, 29]. In Real Options Reasoning, the main criterion for the
governance choice is the level of uncertainty. Uncertainty can be exogenous (related to the phase of the
technological development) or endogenous (related to the reliability of the partner in the relationship)
(33). Both have an impact on the governance mode choice. A more recent body of literature has adopted
the Network Theory approach [46, 47, 48]. Two qualifications of networks have been addressed by the
literature [49, 46]: structural and relational. Relational aspects refer to the nature of the ties in the
relationship. Companies can be linked by direct ties when they interact directly or by indirect ties when
there is no direct contact and the relationship exists only through a third entity [ 50]. Structural aspects
may refer to the redundancy in the network. Networks can be closed or dense if all the individual firms
are interconnected with each others [48] or with structural holes or empty spaces if there are no full
interconnections among the network members [47]. In a NT approach, the governance choice is
influenced by the position of the company in its web (network) of relationships and by the nature of
these links. An overview of the literature on the choice of M&A and SA with a summary of the
suggested criteria and of their link with the supporting theories is presented in Table 2 (see Annex) .
2.3 Challenges from existing literature
Although the contribution from previous literature has been extensive, the application of the above
mentioned criteria poses a number of challenges that encourages the quest for a new approach.
1) We observe that in order to serve as a tool for managerial decisions, the guidelines proposed by
previous theories need to be presented in an integrated fashion. Even though previous literature focuses
on features relevant in the governance decision, there are situations where suggestions from different
theories diverge and it is not clear which theory, or which aspect within the same theory, should be
predominant.
Table 2 summarizes which aspects are covered by each theory and which aspects are not fully
considered. Note (see Table 2), for example, that, when dealing with mature technologies, RBV advises
the use of alliances while a ROR suggests acquisitions [10, 51]. Without a proper framework, problems
of coordination among suggestions from diverse contributions may arise. When different theories
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suggest contrasting forms of partnering, there is no obvious reason to prefer one approach over the other.
Observing that we do not dispose of a single conceptual framework, comprehensive enough, to deal
simultaneously and consistently with the several facets of the governance choice, we formulate the
following:
Constraint 1: Previous literature does not provide an integrated framework to support governance
choice decisions.
2) Existing models tend to isolate the governance choice decision. As it can be noticed looking in
Table 2, in the literature examined, the interactions between different governance modes are not central
in the previous contributions. This may be due to the unit of analysis adopted by precedent literature.
From a micro to a macro perspective, the governance choice decision can be alternatively analysed at
the transaction level focusing on the specific nature of the relationship (as in TCE and ROR), or at the
company level (as in RBV), or at the network level of external relationships (as in NT) [11]. In order to
account for interactions among governance modes, a more suitable unit of analysis has to be identified.
Therefore, we formulate the following:
Constraint 2: Previous literature do not account for interaction among different governance choices.
3) The governance choice criteria proposed by previous studies appear to be essentially static,
considering only marginally the time perspective and its effects on the governance decision process. In a
RBV framework, (see Table 2) for example, an acquisition is advisable if the resources involved are
“core” to the company, at the moment of the governance decision. The contrary is valid for alliances
[13]. How could decision makers account for key technology developments that could become the new
core? As time-dynamic processes are, in the above RBV criteria, not explicitly accounted for, no
immediate guideline is available. In a NT approach, (see Table 2) prior ties between two partners make
advisable an acquisition [5]. Being the governance decision influenced by past relationships, the effect
of time is indirectly considered. However, NT approach assumes that the other conditions
(market/technology developments, or strategic intents and operational objectives of partners) remain
unchanged. There is no explicit reference also to the changes in the network of each individual partner
and to the associated effects on the governance decision. We, therefore, formulate the following:
Constraint 3: Previous literature considers only marginally the time dynamics of the governance
choice decision.
In order to release the constraints faced by previous works, the present paper proposes to that the
adoption of Dynamic Portfolio reasoning to governance choice decisions.
3 Governance Choices: a Dynamic Portfolio Approach
Adopting a portfolio approach, we propose to use as starting point Financial Portfolio Theory
[25,26] already successfully applied to R&D investment selection (see for example 52). Investment
selection is a term borrowed from financial literature and refers to the process that aims at determining
in which asset, or class of assets, it is preferable to invest for a specific individual aiming at a defined
goal (53). The reasoning that leads the choice of our theoretical framework is that when deciding which
governance structure should be selected in order to achieve technological innovation, the company is,
conceptually, facing an investment selection decision.
Financial Portfolio theory builds on three main pillars that, in the next sections, will be interpreted
in the context of BEST governance decisions. Finally, we add a dynamic interpretation showing the time
dependent links among the main building blocks. The resulting dynamic decision system is shown in
Figure 3.
3.1 The risk-return profile
In a Portfolio theory framework, the main criteria to decide the asset to invest in, is based on its
risk-return profile: preference is given to the asset that displays the highest expected return for a given
level of risk (or vice versa), (28). Due to the conceptual similarity between investment selection and
governance decision, we extend the Portfolio Theory criteria to the choice of BEST governance mode:
Conceptual Pillar 1: In Financial Portfolio Theory, the two basic characteristics of an asset are
expected returns and risk. Similarly, in a BEST governance choice context we can affirm that the most
relevant characteristics of a governance mode can be defined by a specific profile of expected returns
and associated risks.
Figure 1 summarizes the dimensions used to conceptualize the risk and return concepts of a
potential governance choice. The dotted line represents the risk-return profile of a hypothetical
governance choice.
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Figure 1 The Risk-Return profile of a single governance choice
In summary, using suggestions/prescriptions from RBV, TCE and ROR, we identify two
dimensions for expected returns (exploration and exploitation) with four related modalities for achieving
them (transaction costs, management costs, speed and timing) and two typologies of risks: endogenous
and exogenous risk (see Fig.1, Phase 1). In the next paragraphs, the above dimensions are presented.
3.1.1 Expected Returns
In a governance choice perspective, expected returns can be considered as the benefits foreseen
from engaging in a relationship. We define the nature of those expected benefits in the framework of
innovative activities merging the insights gained from RBV, TCE and ROR. In the RBV framework,
companies benefit from generating or acquiring technological knowledge and the value expected from
partnerships derives from this knowledge exchange [54]. Depending if the companies aim at expanding
existing knowledge or at expanding the use of the same knowledge over different applications, two
broad technological scopes of inter-firm agreements can be identified based on the dichotomy proposed
by March [55]: technology exploration (point A, in Figure 1) and technology exploitation (point B in
Figure 1) [56, 57, 15]. Explorative partnering is aimed at “discovering new opportunities” while in
exploitation inter-firm relationships are oriented to the maximization of the benefits deriving from
“existing knowledge” (15). Radical innovations as those associated with “revolutionary changes in
technology” and incremental innovations as “minor improvements in current technology” [58].
Exploration activities are associated with radical innovations while exploitation activities are mainly
aimed at incremental innovations [59]. Consistently with the TCE approach, the expected returns are
higher if the same objective can be reached at a lower cost. The rationale is that costs sharing with
external partners can lead to the reduction of the overall costs of developing new technologies [60,
61,62]. Additionally, developing new products at lower cost increases the chance of acceptance in the
market place [63]. The consideration of costs is at the essence of the TCE framework where the cost of
the performing an activity determines the organizational governance of the activity - market,
hierarchical or hybrid [64]. According to Calantone and Stanko [65], transaction costs (point D in the
Figure 1) include three typologies of costs: adaptation, safeguarding and measurement costs. Adaptation
costs are sustained when the contract has to be changed due to new circumstances (time-related changes
in the relationship, in the corporate goals, strategic positioning, market and/or technology). Safeguarding
costs are costs sustained to control opportunistic behavior from partners. Measurement costs are those
related to control whether the goals of the relationship are met. In line with White and Lui [66], TCE can
be complemented expanding the typology of costs to include those inherent to managing the relationship
itself (managing costs) (point C in the Figure 1). Those costs can refer to activities related to alliance
(cooperation costs) or to an acquisition (coordination costs) referring to the organizational expenses
sustained for combining and integrating the resources provided by the entities involved in the
relationship [66, 67]. All typologies of costs need to be considered as expenses associated with
managing the external relationship can offset the initial benefits of cost sharing [68]. A recent work
suggests, however, that cost considerations should be balanced versus time concerns [69]. Time
considerations can be approached from two perspectives: a corporate and a market point of view. For the
company, the urgency of the technological need determines the speed ( point F in the Figure 1) at which
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exploitation and/or exploration needs to be reached. Companies that have a weak expertise in a
technology that is expected to have a high competitive impact in the future may need to catch up [70].
Companies use, therefore, BEST forms to increase the speed of developing innovations [71] as being
late can have costly consequences [72]. In technologically intensive sectors, an increasingly relevant
form of competition is based on shortening the time to market in product development [ 73, 74]. From
the market point of view, ROR approach suggests that, over time, new information becomes available
about the potential benefits of new technologies or the feasibility of new applications and companies
adjust their activities over time, at the rate this information becomes available [75, 76]. The timing
(point E in the Figure 1) of exploitation/exploration depends, therefore, on adapting to changing
situations, that is a typical behavior of flexible organizations [77].
3.1.2 Risks
In financial portfolio theory, the precise quantification of an expected return is, however, not trivial.
Expectations about returns can oscillate affected by a series of factors that influence the prospected
outcome. How much an expected return can fluctuate depends on the level of the associated risk. The
consideration that uncertainty affects investment decisions and governance choices is essentially a ROR
approach [76]. From a governance choice point of view, the returns expected from partnering activities
can fluctuate due to two types of uncertainties: endogenous and exogenous (33, 29), (see Figure 1 Phase 1, points G and H). Endogenous uncertainty refers to the possibility of failure of the relationship.
Exogenous uncertainty refers to the unknown evolution of technologies and of markets conditions. It
increases proportionally to the level of technological newness and the novelty of the potential
applications in the market. Both exploration and exploitation are affected by exogenous uncertainty.
MacMillan and McGrath [78] have adopted a ROR perspective to categorize, in terms of market and
technological uncertainty, the innovation options available to the companies. Technological options that
preserve the position of the company in a technological area that is still unclear display high level of
technological uncertainty but low or medium level of market uncertainty. When technological
opportunities refer to unknown applications of a not yet developed technology they display high levels
of technological and market uncertainty. The two above categories can be associated with the
characteristics of exploration activities. Options that are aimed at expanding market opportunities, that
have a more exploitative nature, display high levels of market uncertainty but lower levels of
technological uncertainty as the technology is already known. The above considerations about the level
of risk of exploration and exploitation are consistent with the literature on product and technology life
cycle and diffusion [79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84] where uncertainty is higher in exploration activities and in
early stages of technological development, when both the technology and the potential application are
still not well understood. Compared to the results of exploration activities, the outcome of exploitation is
less insecure, temporally more close to the actions taken and more influenced by the experiences gained
by the company [55].
3.2 The Portfolio perspective on BEST governance choices.
In a Portfolio Theory approach, the definition of the risk-return profile can not be performed in
isolation.
Conceptual Pillar 2: In Financial Portfolio Theory, the returns and risk of each single asset are
influenced by the risk-return profile of all the other assets. In a BEST governance choice context: The
risk-return profile of each governance mode is connected with, and depends on, the risk-return profile of
all the other governance choices.
The Figure 2 shows the risk-return profile of the existing portfolio without considering the new
potential governance choice under valuation (2.1)and the new risk-return profile of the hypothetical
governance choice altered by the interactions with other governance choices of the portfolio (the bold
dotted line in 2.2).
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Figure 2 The Risk-Return profile of a governance choice with portfolio compounding
Despite the little attention attracted among scholars, the interactions of multiple relationships,
their complementarities and synergistic effects are essential to understand innovation results [21].
In line with prescriptions from financial portfolio theory, those effects need, therefore, to be
considered when deciding the governance mode.
The relationships, in which the company has engaged along the years, constituting the web of links,
the portfolio, that interact and alter the risk-return profile of the governance decision. The consideration
that the governance choice cannot be taken independently of the web of the firm’s relationships is
derived from the Network approach. In a network approach, firms interact with each other through one
or several alliances [85]. Consistently with our continuum approach, we extend the reasoning also to
include integrated forms of BEST, like M&As. Moreover, we focus on the interaction among the
relationships with the same degree (among alliances, for example) and/or with different degrees of
integration (among alliances and mergers).
In the context of the present work, these interactions can either reduce risk and/or increase returns.
In a portfolio framework, risks and returns are altered by means of two mechanisms: diversification or
synergy [19]. Adapting the definition of Wilcox Chang and Grover [86], diversification is obtained if a
firm enters in diverse and unrelated relationships. Diversification has an effect mainly on spreading
exogenous technology and market risks over different partnerships [19]. Mahnke and Overby [19]
reported that between 1998 and 2003, Motorola entered in alliances supporting two different
technological developments to reduce the risk of betting on the wrong one. Similarly, from 1999 until
2002, NTT DoCoMo entered in partnerships with different software vendors to spread the risk of low
market acceptance for their new applications. Synergies are typically generated by links among firm’s
activities [87] and by the combination of complementary assets [88]. Previous alliances between
Compaq, HP and Disney paved the way in 2000 for the infrastructure, marketing and distribution
alliance between the Disney Internet Group and Compaq [19]. Similarly, the uncertainty surrounding an
acquisition can be lowered by the existence of previous alliances with the same partner and by
reciprocal knowledge reducing the overall risk of the governance choice. A recent study confirms that
previous alliances with a target company increase the performance and the learning effect of the M&A
[89]. Additionally, the benefit expected from an M&A can be higher because of synergies and
complementarities generated by and with other existing alliances. In the acquisition of KLM by Air
France, for example, the complementarities of the routes has played a significant role, KLM having a
partnership with Northwest Airlines and Air France with Delta Airlines that allowed to cover the
principal hubs of the North America market.
3.3 A Dynamic Portfolio approach and the governance choice: a decision system
The overall decision system applying the portfolio theory into a dynamic process that leads to the
governance decision is illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3 Decision System on governance choice in a Dynamic Portfolio approach
In Phase 1, the risk-return profile of a governance decision is defined. In Phase 2, the risk-return
profile is approached from a portfolio perspective and altered by the interactions with the other BEST in
the portfolio (2.2). By explicitly considering interactions and synergies among proposed governance
choices and existing web of relationships, current governance decisions are a direct function of past
governance choice decisions, and of the unique present corporate identity (technology and market
positioning). The argument that the governance decision has to be integrated to the specific company’s
context is grounded on the concept of governance “inseparability” that suggests that past governance
choices affect the nature and the typology of future governance decisions [90]. In a financial portfolio
approach, once the risk return profile of a potential asset is defined, considering the potential
interactions with other securities, the final choice about which investment to prefer can be taken.
Building a parallel with the BEST governance choice context, we formulate the following:
Conceptual pillar 3: In Financial Portfolio Theory the investors choose to invest in the asset that
that, once introduced in the portfolio, provides the highest return for a given level of risk, to the overall
portfolio. Similarly, in a BEST governance choice context we can say that the governance choice
decision is aimed at portfolio optimization (that is, to select the governance mode that, interacting with
other BEST choices, providing the highest return for a given level of risk and maximizes the risk-return
profile of the entire portfolio).
The governance choice is selected (in Phase 3) balancing different risk-return profiles to select the
governance choice that, when added to the portfolio, optimizes the risk return profile of the overall
portfolio and that serves better the strategic orientation of the company (that is the ultimate interest that
the portfolio serves).
In the words of Koza and Lewin [57] the corporate relationships co-evolve with the firm’s strategy.
Strategy can be defined as “the scope and direction of an organization over the long run” and deals with
making choices for the future [91]. In this context, the current choice of a governance mode cannot be
considered independently of the previous choices, the past evolution of those choices as well as of the
strategic prospective orientation embraced by the company.
The approach presented in Figure 3 is dynamic as it unifies three time dimensions in the decision
process, considering jointly the future-oriented corporate strategic orientation (Phase 4), the past
decisions that led to the present portfolio (Phase 2.1) and the current characteristics of the company
(Phase 1 and 2.2). The proposed approach is dynamic because it also recognizes the need for rebalances
over time (Phase 4 in Figure 3) to account for the dynamic evolution in which the governance decision
takes place. As indicated in Phase 4, after the governance decision is taken, the external conditions
evolve over time simultaneously in terms of technology change, competitive and market conditions,
corporate profile and strategic orientation. The need of a more dynamic approach arises from the
consideration that the framework in which the governance decision takes place is fluid and dynamic as it
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is constantly changing, affected by the evolution of the markets and technologies, by the development of
the company’s profile, competitive position and web of relationships. A rich body of literature from
different disciplines confirms that technologies [92], innovation patterns [79,80,81], markets and
competitive situation [93, 94], companies’ capabilities [95, 96], and networks [97] change and evolve
over time. Also the portfolio is evolving. By the passing of time, for example, some of the SAs will
reach their termination altering the profile of the portfolio and calling for a rebalance through new
governance decisions. Consequence of the time dynamics, the same company facing a new governance
decision can opt for completely different decisions in two points in time. The process starts again
entering in a circular loop that is continuously repeated.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
The present paper proposes to adopt a Dynamic Portfolio approach as a conceptual tool to support
Business-to-business External Sources of Technology (BEST) governance decisions. In doing so the
present paper contributes to both the literature and the managerial practice.
From the literature perspective, the three main constraints identified in previous works have been
released. First, the lack of an integrated framework has been filled translating conceptual pillars into
decision steps and designing a decision system for governance decision. Second, the interactions among
governance decision, that did not attract the attention in previous works, have been accounted for
considering how the mechanisms of synergy and diversification alter the risk-return profile of a
governance choice. Third, in the proposed decision system, the governance decision is interpreted
considering simultaneously different time dimensions and the effects of their evolution. Therefore, time
dynamics have been put central.
The present work provides also a contribution to managerial practice. Firms can adopt the proposed
decision system in order to face the decision of governance. In order be able to assess the interactions
among the new governance decision and the existing portfolio of BEST, a preliminary exercise has to be
performed: companies have to classify the existing ensemble of BEST according to the dimensions of
expected returns and risks. The result is a mapping of the firms’ relationships that helps companies to
look at their relationships in an integrated fashion. The decision system can be used then to support the
firm to make the governance decision accounting for past, present and expected time effects. Moreover,
by exploiting the dynamic nature of the model, the decision system can also be used by companies, after
the initial choice, to rebalance their portfolio of BEST over time. It is worth noting that, in the proposed
approach, the focus is not on identifying a governance choice with superior absolute qualities but on
selecting the governance choice that contributes better to the portfolio over time. The governance
decision should not be conceived as alternative choice but as an element in the dynamic balance of the
portfolio.
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Appendix
Table 2
Basic context
Main conditions
for
selecting
technology
sourcing
governance modes
Unit of analysis
Missing elements
Criteria for governance mode and associated theories
Resource based view
Rare, valuable, imperfectly imitable and not
substitutable resources (like technological
knowledge) ensure competitive advantage.
Companies need to balance the exploitation
of existing resources and the development of
new ones in order to assure firm’s growth.
Acquisitions
-If resources are core for the company
-If synergies come from hard resources (like
manufacturing plants).
-If high levels of integration is required
among the partners’ activities (i.e. in case
reciprocal synergies are needed, when
resources necessitate to be generated by
integrated activities of the two companies).
-If technologies are initial phases of the life
cycle (fluid or transitional)
-If the content of the collaboration is very
familiar to the company
-If content of the collaboration can be clearly
defined
Alliances
-If resources refer to mature technologies
-If synergies come from soft resources (as
human resources)
-If low level of integration in partners’
activities is required (i.e. in the case of
modular synergies where resources are
independently managed and then combined)
-If content of the collaboration cannot be
clearly defined
-If the content of the collaboration is not
familiar to the company
Joint ventures
-If desired resources are linked to undesired
resources leading to problems of digestibility
-If sequential synergies are needed (one firm
completes its task and the partner continues
with its task)
The company
Risk, time as dynamic variable, synergies
among relationships, nature of the transaction
Main References
[10, 11, 102, 98 7, 29, 99, 51, 45, 5,100, 76, 101 12, 13]
820
Transaction cost economics
Individuals are boundedly rational
(they act as rationally as possible
according to the information they
dispose) and opportunistic (they act to
maximize
their
own
profit).
Information
assimetry
affects
decisions.
Acquisitions
-If high time pressure
-If low degree of cultural distance
among partners
-If high level of relative power/size of
one partner over the other
-If low appropriability regimes
-If high levels of specificity of assets
-In sectors with high needs of control
(low-tech)
Alliances
-If low time pressure
-If high degree of cultural distance
among partners
-If low level of relative power/size of
one partner over the other
-If high appropriability regimes
-If low levels of specificity of assets
-If high costs of integration with the
target firm
-In sectors with low needs of control
(high-tech)
Real options approach
An option gives to the owner the right, but not the
obligation, to take an action at a certain point in time
in the future for a certain price/cost. As the decision
to exercise the right can be postponed when more
information is available or when risk is reduced,
options guarantee the flexibility to adapt to changes
in the business.
Acquisitions
-If low level of endogenous uncertainty
-If exogenous uncertainty is low/medium (mature
technologies)
-If learning about the value of the uncertain
investment is endogenous (obtained within the
governance)
Alliances
-If high need for flexibility
-If high level of endogenous uncertainty
-If high level of exogenous uncertainty (in the early
phases of the technological development).
-If learning about the value of the uncertain
investment is exogenous (depend on factors external
to the governance)
-If longer project duration (higher uncertainity about
the potential developments)
Networking
Companies should not be considered as
independent
actors
but
as
a
constituents/components of a larger and
more complex structure, the network
The transaction
Risk, time as dynamic
corporate identity, synergies
The Transaction
Time as dynamic variable, corporate resources
involved, synergies
The network
Risk, time as dynamic variable,
corporate
resources
involved,
synergies, nature of the transaction
variable,
Acquisitions
-If prior direct ties exist
-If
companies
were
previously
positioned at the center of a network
-If the relationship is intra-industry
Alliances
-If prior indirect ties exist
-If relationship is inter-industry
-If networks are vertical (relationships
with suppliers and/or customers)