Educational Insights | Volume 8, Number 2, 2003 | Joyce Mgombelo | Cartesian Subjectivity and the Question of Knowledge
Mgombelo, J. (December 2003). Cartesian Subjectivity and the Question of Knowledge Educational
Insights, 8(2). [Available:
http:/ / www.ccfi.educ.ubc.ca/ publication/ insights/ v08n02/ contextualexplorations/ sumara/ mgombelo.html]
Genealogical Tree Collaboration
Cartesian Subjectivity and the Question of Knowledge
Joyce Mgombelo
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Opening Thoughts
The collected works of English mathematics educator, Mary Boole, might
be invaluable for education and curriculum research that attempts to
understand the question: “what counts as knowing?” Even though it was
written before 1916, Boole’s work allows curriculum researchers and
teacher educators interested in the question to experience a significant shift
in thinking. For example, in the following excerpt from the collected
works, Mary Boole informs our view of education and provides us with an
initial, though not so clear, orienting statement:
Education means the educing of faculty. Children need many things
besides education; many things which can best be given and—some of
them can only be given under a regime of orderly routine. Among
these good things are discipline and training. But it would be well to
remember that, during the time that these other good things are going
on, education itself is not going on. Education proper is given by rare
and episodical occurrences, which give to those dormant faculties
which disciplinary routine is holding down and keeping quiet
opportunity and stimulus to start into active life (Boole, 1972, p.16).
Mary Boole does not provide us with a theoretical language sufficient to
deal with the question of knowledge in education. My contention here is
that Boole’s work can be supplemented by other domains of intellectual
practice interested in those elements of the formation of consciousness or
identities that are central in understanding the question of knowing:
Lacanian psychoanalysis, Buddhism, Neuroscience, Enactivism and so on.
I believe that today curriculum and education concerns cannot be dealt
satisfactorily without addressing the question of subjectivity. This is
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especially important in this era of postmodernism and poststructuralism in
which the decentering of the subject in many subject positions has raised
numerous questions such as those of responsibility and ethics based on a
hidden set of rules such as tolerance and acceptance of difference (Zizek,
1997).
Today, in academic and education research, it is commonplace to question
the validity of Cartesian subjectivity and epistemological claims about the
objectivity of knowledge that underlie this subjectivity. As Zizek, in his
introduction to Ticklish subject: The absent center of political ontology
(1999) puts succinctly, Western academia is haunted by the spectre of the
Cartesian subject (Interestingly, David Jardine calls this Descartes’
Nightmare):
All academic powers have entered into a holy alliance to exorcize
this spectre: the New Age obscurantist (who wants to supersede the
‘ Cartesian paradigm’ towards a new holistic approach) and the
postmodern deconstruction (for whom the Cartesian subject is a
discursive fiction, an effect of decentred textual mechanisms); the
Habermasian theorist of communication (who insists on shift from
Cartesian monological subjectivity to discursive intersubjectivity)
and the Heideggerian proponent of the thought of Being (who
stresses the need to ‘ traverse’ the horizon of modern subjectivity
culminating in current ravaging nihilism); the cognitive scientist
(who endeavours to prove empirically that there is no unique scene
of the Self, just a pandemonium of competing forces) and the Deep
Ecologist (who blames Cartesian mechanicist materialism for
providing the philosophical foundation for the ruthless exploitation
nature); the critical (post-) Marxist (who insists that the illusory
freedom of the bourgeois thinking subject is rooted in class division)
and the feminist (who emphasizes that the allegedly sexless cogito is
in fact a male patriarchal formation). (Zizek, 1999, p.1)
And “Where is the academic orientation which has not been accused by its
opponents of not yet properly disowning the Cartesian Heritage?” (p. 1).
According to Zizek, two things are worth noting. First, despite the strong
criticisms against it, Cartesian subjectivity continues to dominate and to be
acknowledged as a powerful intellectual tradition in academia (curriculum
studies, teacher education etc.). Second, it is about time that the “partisans
of Cartesian subjectivity should in the face of the whole world publish their
views, their aims, their tendencies and meet this nursery tale of the Specter
of Cartesian subjectivity with the philosophical manifesto of Cartesian
subjectivity itself” (p. 2). This however as Zizek quickly notes does not
mean that we return to the cogito as manifested in modern thought, the self
transparent thinking, but rather reassert the forgotten and unacknowledged
obverse of this cogito, the subject of the unconscious as articulated in
psychoanalysis.
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What Zizek’s contentions begin to make apparent in academia (education)
is the following: There seems to be a ‘ self’[1] or better yet counterpart of
the Cartesian subject (the unconscious) that is not acknowledged in many
of our criticisms of Cartesian subjectivity. This lack of realization of this
other-self crystallizes to the apparent impasse in education and curriculum
theory and research: How are we to return to the Cartesian cogito without
falling into the trap of its manifestation in modern thought (self-transparent
and self-awareness subjectivity)? How are we to locate our critic of the
traditional view of knowledge in education and its correlate Cartesian
cogito without falling into the trap of our nostalgia of things as they were
before? As Jardine warns us, despite our effort to critic Cartesian
subjectivity, we cannot return to “what Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1970)
called a nostalgia for ‘ our relationship to Being such as they were prior to
self-consciousness.’ Since we owe our idea of and our taste for primordial
ontology to just this self-consciousness” (1998b, p. 12).
The thesis that I attempt to bring is that there “exists” a different or an otherself that is not the self transparent Cartesian cogito that we in academia are
all against and that the rejection or unacknowledgement of this other-self
in our criticisms of the Cartesian subjectivity correlates to the occulting of
the kind of human knowledge or knowing that is at the center of our
actions. It is within this frame that I discuss the question of “what counts as
knowing?” by mainly drawing from two fields, Trungpa (Tibetan)
Buddhism and Lacanian psychoanalysis, that have problematized the self
transparence–ego self by bringing to light this other necessary other-self: I
argue that it is this realization of this other-self that might shed light in
understanding what Mary Boole’s work might contribute in education.
Beyond Cartesian Ego-Self
The problem of ego-self and the realization of the other-self have been
discussed by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) in The embodied mind.
However it is Varela’s work in Ethical know-how (1999), that is of interest.
In this work, Varela discusses the contribution of Eastern traditions on the
pragmatics of knowledge that is at the center of human action, ethical
know-how. In addition, Varela suggests that it is psychoanalysis, in
Western tradition and its notion of an unconscious subject, that we must
look to for understanding the pragmatics of this ethical know-how. To
demonstrate how this notion of other-self as counterpart or obverse of the
Cartesian ego-self is dealt in Buddhism and psychoanalysis, let us begin
with what Varela (1999) offers as a way of realizing the other-self (virtual
self) from an inaccurate sense of self (ego-self). Here Varela discusses the
methodology offered by Tibetan Buddhist tradition of transforming of the
constituents of our virtual mind (of self) into wisdom:
Th[e] sense of transformation does not mean going away from the
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world and getting out of mental functioning, since the very
constituents on which the inaccurate sense of self and world are based
are also the basis of wisdom. The means of transforming mental
constituents into wisdom is intelligent awareness, that is, the momentto-moment realization of the virtual self as it is—
empty of any egoistic
ground whatsoever, yet filled with wisdom. (p.73)
Everything seems to be condensed in this paragraph. Is not this moment to
moment realization of the virtual self as empty, what Boole calls episodical
occurrences? More importantly is how the nature of this virtual self (otherself) or the relationship between the other self and ego-self is discussed; it
is not that this other-self exists outside, or behind or beyond the ego in a
transcendental way[2]. The other-self is already present, it is not something
that one attains—
not transcendental. It is important to understand this
paradoxical nature of other-self or else we fall into a trap of falling back to
the Cartesian (modern) self transparency subject or the nostalgia of things
as they were before the Cartesian ego-subject. It is also important to
understand this nature of the other-self since, in later following Lacan, I
contend that the subject of the unconscious in psychoanalysis is the
Cartesian cogito.
To elaborate on the Buddhist method, let us take a brief detour through the
work of Trungpa (1987) in Cutting through spiritual materialism.[3]
According to Trungpa, the Buddhist approach to spirituality begins with
acknowledging our confusion and suffering and work through unfolding
their origin. The origin of this confusion and suffering comes from our
inaccurate sense of self—
a sense of self that is continuous and solid. “This
sense of self is actually a transitory, discontinuous event” (p.5) which we
confuse to be solid and continuous. Our confused view of this nature of the
self leads us to the struggle to maintain it as solid and continuous when
experience reveals to us its transitory and discontinuous nature. It is this
struggle to maintain a solid or continuous self that is the action of the ego.
The ego-self is the mental construction that gives us the illusion of a selfconscious or self-transparent self.
To demonstrate this action or function of the ego, Tibetan Buddhism
invokes a metaphor of the three lords of materialism: the lord of form, the
lord of speech and the lord of mind. The lord of form represents the ways
we are preoccupied with looking for external things from our environment
or physical surroundings for comfort, security and pleasure. These things
might include any that are essential in our daily life such as food, work,
drugs, books, television and so on. The problem is not the things
themselves but our incessant preoccupation with them in order to escape
from the raw and unpredictable aspects of our daily life.
The lord of speech represents the ways we use our intellect in relating to
our world. In particular, it involves the way we are preoccupied with our
beliefs in all the “isms” such as political, ecological, psychological, and
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spiritual (such as Buddhism, Christianity, and so on) or existentialism.
Trungpa notes that the most definable products of this lord are ideologies
or systems of ideas that we develop in order to rationalize our reality.
Again there is nothing wrong with our intellect or ideas themselves; it is
the ego’s preoccupations with these ideas in order to interpret anything that
threatens or irritates it in order to neutralize the threat. The most developed
products of this lord are narrow-mindedness and prejudice against other
people’s ideas.
The third lord of materialism, the lord mind is represented in ways we try
to maintain our self-awareness (awareness of our consciousness). In this
case, this lord might be manifested in the way we are preoccupied with
using psychological or spiritual disciplines and techniques such as prayer,
meditation, drugs, and various psychotherapies to provide us with selfawareness.
We should note that even though the ego is a mental construct or false
sense of self, this does not mean that it will dissolve once one is informed
of its illusory nature. Trungpa notes that, the Buddha himself was troubled
by the question of why our minds follow these lords and whether there is
another way. He found out that the lords seduce us by creating the myth
that we are solid beings. The word seduce here should be taken in its literal
meaning. It shows how giving up the ego is not easy. The ego is capable of
converting everything to its uses even the sense of transitory self. The
Buddha noticed that the key to unravelling the myth and our suffering
resulting from ego’s belief in it is to cut through “very elaborate defences
erected by the three lords to prevent their subjects from discovering the
fundamental deception which is their source of power” (p.9). The method
that the Buddha discovered for cutting through these defences is
meditation. According to Trungpa, meditation is neither a trancelike state
of mind as some people think nor training in the sense of mental
gymnastics. Rather, meditation involves just letting be—
learning to see the
lord’s defences for what they are and working with their pattern. That is to
say, meditation involves learning to transform mental constituents into
wisdom through realization of the gaps between the ego’s struggle that is
moment-to-moment realization of the virtual self (no-self or selfless in
Buddhism) as it is empty of any egoistic ground or solidity as discussed by
Varela.
Let us now move to the Lacanian notion of the subject—Freudian
unconscious.. Lacanian’s notion of the subject is a difficult one. As Davis
(2000) notes “Lacan perversely for (post-)structuralists includes both
‘ structure’ and ‘ agency’ in his model” (p. 7) of subjectivity. Put differently
“Lacan attempts to grasp the paradoxical relationship between ‘ structure’
and ‘ agency’ rather than attempting to dissolve either one of them or both
of them and in which the subject is the empty place in the structure” (p. 7).
It is within this empty place of the structure that Lacan locates the
Cartesian cogito.
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The Lacanian subject might be understood by comparing it with the
Heiddeggerian notion of a being-in-the-world and the poststructuralist
notion of subject positions. Following the tradition of phenomenology,
Heidegger, along with others, elaborated on a conceptual framework that
allows us to reject the notion of a rational (modern) subject as an
autonomous agent who, excluded from the world, processes data given to
him or her by senses in a computer-like computational way. In opposition
to this notion of a disembodied agent, Heidegger developed the notion of
being-in-the-world as an irreducible and unsurpassable embeddedness in a
concrete and ultimately contingent life world. According to Heidegger, “we
are always already in the world, engaged in existential project against a
background that eludes our grasp and forever remains the opaque horizon
in which we are ‘ thrown’ as finite beings” (Zizek, 1999, p. 62).
Against this background, it is common to oppose consciousness and
unconsciousness along the same lines—
disembodied rational subject as the
subject of consciousness and the opaque background that eludes us because
we are already engaged in it as the unconscious. For Lacan the
unconscious has nothing to do with this structurally necessary opaque
background. “The unconscious stands for the rational subject in so far as it
is originally out of joint, in discord with its contextualized situation: the
unconscious is the crack that makes the subject’s primordial stance
something other than being in the world” (p. 62). Like the Buddhist notion
of no-self, Lacan subject is not outside the ego-self or beyond or behind, it
is paradoxically within the same mental constituents that the ego uses to
give us the illusion of a solid self.
Lacan’s subject can also be understood as a subject of language. Put
differently, in Lacanian terms, the subject is that which is represented by
the signifier; is produced by the failure of representation; the subject is the
excess which escapes signification and this excess is produced by the very
attempt at signification. Against the notion of Lacanian subject as a subject
of language, it is common to see the appropriation of Lacan’s notion of
decentred subject in Poststructuralism. However, the Lacanian subject is
not the subject position(s) as articulated in poststructralism and
postmodernism. As Zizek (1997) elaborates:
‘ Decentrement’ thus first designates the ambiguity, the oscillation
between symbolic and imaginary identification—
the undecidability as
to where my true point is, in my ‘ real’ self or in my external mask,
with the possible implication that my symbolic mask can be ‘ more
true’ than what it conceals, the ‘ true face’ behind it. At a more radical
level, it points towards the fact that the very sliding from one
identification to another, or among ‘ multiple selves’ presupposes the
gap between identification as such and a void of $ (the ‘ barred
subject’) which identifies itself—
serves as the empty medium of
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identification. In other words, the very process of shifting among
multiple identifications presupposes a kind of empty band, which
makes the leap from one identity to another possible, and this empty
band is subject itself. (p. 141)
Is not what Zizek elaborates above similar to the notion of the self as
transitory and discontinuous and the moment to moment realization of the
no-self in Buddhism?
Earlier we saw that the realization of the no-self or selfless in Buddhism
involves wisdom to cut through the workings of the ego. Likewise, Lacan
(1998) in his seminar Encore elaborates on the knowledge that is involved
with the subject of the unconscious. This is the knowledge that is at the
centre of the subject’s subjective truth. This knowledge involves no
inherent relation to truth and no subjective position of enunciation, not
because it dissimulates the subjective position of enunciation but because it
is itself non-subjectivised. Sometimes Lacan refers to this knowledge as
the knowledge that does not know itself (it just knows). It is Ram Dass
(quoted in Nisker, 1999) who summarizes the kind of knowledge or
wisdom that is involved in both Buddhist and Lacanian sense of other-self
and ego-self:
You can either be wise or you can know knowledge. But you can’t
know wisdom, you have to be it. Wisdom has simplicity to it. What
the spiritual path offers is a way to come back into balance, to develop
our intuition and the wisdom of our heart, so that the intellect is no
longer the master, but instead is the servant of our heart…the part of us
that brings us to unity with our selves and all others. (p. 118)
That is to say the knowledge or knowing that results in our realizing this
other-self is transformative as opposed to being informative. It is at the
centre of our action as opposed to the reactive mode of the ego-self. It is at
the heart of our cognition as opposed to the recognition mode of the egoself. What then are the implications of this kind of knowledge for
education?
Implications for Education
Felman (1987) provides us with a starting point: "As a question in which
practice, rather than theory, is at stake, the unconscious, in Lacan's view, is
grounded not so much in an ontological as in ethical experience" (Felman,
1987, p. 69). In Buddhism this ethical experience is grounded in, among
other things, compassion and generosity that are a result of wisdom
brought by the experience of meditation (Trungpa, 1987).
The question of ethics in social practices is not limited to Lacanian or
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Buddhist view. Zizek (1997) elaborates on three options of a philosophical
approach to ethics. First, that which attempts to ground ethics on some
substantial notion of supreme Good. Second, that which challenges the
substantial and the universalism of the first and giving its universalism a
proceduralist twist, and third, the postmodern option which urges us to be
aware of the fictitious nature of truth and therefore not to impose our rules
to the rules of the others. Zizek further notes that, despite their challenge to
the substantial and universalism of the first option, the second and third
options continue to function in the same way, that is they continue to
privilege a certain positive content. For example, the postmodern option
continues to impose some rules albeit at a second-level, rules such as those
of tolerance, rules of accepting the irreducible difference and so on.
Elsewhere (Mgombelo, 2002) I discussed how this last postmodern option
is manifested in the kind of the dilemma that teachers face when applying a
constructivist approach in teaching. To elaborate on this, I used an example
from a class of grade three (Ball, 1994). In this particular class, Ball’s
students drew pictures of 4/4 and 5/5 correctly but believed that they did
not represent the same amount. Ball describes the reasoning of one student
(Sheena) as follows:
It was important to me that Sheena—
a student of colour, a quiet
girl—displayed confidence in herself and her ideas to defend them in
the face of classmates’ objections. And she is right, given the question
she has framed (“Which way of cutting the cookie—into fourths or
fifths—will serve more friends?”). (p. 9)
Here we have a sense of dilemma that Ball faces which she notes as a
moral dilemma: how to help Sheena realize that the two amounts are the
same without interfering with her confidence. Is not what Ball faces here
the rules of tolerance, acceptance imposed by a constructivist approach
itself albeit at a second level? How then might ethics grounded in a
Lacanian and Buddhist approach help us to break from postmodern ethics?
It is here that I would like return to Mary Boole’s work. In a certain case,
Boole (1972) responds to the concern raised by a Professor: “students of
engineering and electricity cannot use their mathematical knowledge to
facilitate their study of real forces to anything like the extent which they
would do if their knowledge of so much arithmetic or other mathematics as
they have learned were real and vital” (p. 20). Boole argues that, this
concern raises the following question in mathematics education: “What are
the conditions which favour a vital knowledge of mathematics?” (p. 20). To
answer this question, Boole contends that: “It may surprise some readers to
be told that those conditions are almost entirely moral and spiritual rather
than intellectual” (p.20). I would like to argue that what Boole is asking is a
kind of knowledge or wisdom from educators that results from our
realization of other-self as exemplified by both Lacan and Buddhism. To
demonstrate that Boole’s work maintains this ethics of fidelity to the otherhttp://www.ccfi.educ.ubc.ca/publication/insights/v08n02/contextualexplorations/sumara/mgombelo.html (8 of 11) [12/31/2003 8:30:11 PM]
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self, let us examine her discussion about what she calls “teacher’s lust”:
The teacher …has desire to make those under [her] conform
themselves to [her] ideals. Nations could not be built up, nor
children preserved from ruin, if some such desire did not exist and
exert itself in some degree. But it has its gamut of lusts, very
similar to those run down by other faculties. First, the teacher wants
to regulate the actions, conduct and thought of other people in a
way that does no obvious harm but is quite in excess both of normal
rights and practical necessity. Next [she] wants to proselytise,
convince, control, to arrest the spontaneous action of other minds,
to an extent which ultimately defeats its own ends by making the
pupils too feeble and automatic to carry on [her] teaching into the
future with any vigour. Lastly, [she] acquires a sheer automatic lust
for telling people to ‘ don’t’, for arresting spontaneous action in
others in a way, which destroys their power even to learn at the
time what [she] is trying to teach them. What is wanted is that we
should …not go on fogging ourselves with any such foolish notion
as that sex-passion is a lust of the flesh and teacher-lust a thing in
itself pure and good, which may be legitimately indulged in to the
uttermost.
Few teachers now are so conceited as not to know that
they have a great deal to learn, and that their methods need revising
and improving, but the majority are seeking for improved methods of
doing more of what they are already doing a great deal too much of.
The improvement, which they most need is to…see their conduct,
their aims, their whole attitude towards pupils …in the light reflected
on them from those of the drunkard and the debauchee. (Boole, 1972,
p. 11)
Notice the choice of words that Boole uses. Everything is in these
paragraphs: From the Buddhist notion of lords of materialism and their
seduction of the ego to transformation as the only way to cut through
workings of the ego. Does not Boole show us how the function of ego
might be manifested in our practices such as teaching? What is important
to note is that the ego can convert even the day to day activities that the
teacher does in the classroom and that it is possible for the teacher to be
addicted to these activities by being preoccupied with them in the same
way that one can be addicted to drinking. Perhaps this explains why
teacher change is such an enigma in professional development such as
those informed by curriculum changes. Perhaps now we can note that the
key for teacher change is not how convincing curriculum changes are but
how might we touch this teacher other-self.
Concluding Thoughts
I have attempted to argue that the key to our criticism of the Cartesian
cogito in education and curriculum research is not to reject nor get rid of it
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but rather to acknowledge or reassert its forgotten obverse or other the
other-self. Drawing from Buddhism and Lacanian psychoanalysis, I have
tried to show how this other-self is acknowledged as the center of human
action: the source of wisdom or knowledge that drives our actions, and
cognition. Finally, I have argued for an ethics of fidelity to this other-self
in education as illustrated through exemplary work in education by one of
the 20th Century’s first mathematics educators, Mary Boole.
References
Boole, M. (1972). A Boolean anthology: Selected writings of Mary
Boole—on mathematical education (Compiled by D.G. Tahta). Association
of Teachers of Mathematics.
Felman, S. (1987). Jacques Lacan and the adventure of insight:
Psychoanalysis in contemporary culture. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Jardine, D.W. (1998a). “Under the tough old stars”: Ecopedagogical
essays. Brandon: The Foundation of Educational Renewal, Inc.
Jardine, D.W. (1998b). To dwell with a boundless heart: Essays in
curriculum theory, hermeneutics, and the ecological imagination. New
York: Peter Lang.
Lacan. J. (1998). On feminine sexuality: The limits of knowledge, 19721973 (Encore The seminar of Jacques Lacan – Book XX) New York: W.W.
Norton.
Mgombelo, J. R. (2002). Mathematics content-pedagogy knowledge: a
psychoanalytic and enactivist approach. Unpublished doctoral dissertation,
University of Alberta, Alberta.
Nisker, W. (1998). Crazy wisdom. Berkeley, California: Ten Speed Press.
Trungpa, Chogyam (1987). Cutting through spiritual materialism. Boston
and London: Shambhala Publications.
Varela, Francisco J. (1999). Ethical know-how: action, wisdom, and
cognition. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied Mind:
Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Zizek, S. (1997). The plague of fantasies. London: Verso.
Zizek, S. (1999). The Ticklish subject: The absent centre of political
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ontology. London: Verso.
[1] For the purpose of my arguments I will call this self the other-self as opposed to egoself of Cartesian modern subject.
[2] This paradoxical nature of the other-self can also be understood in Kant’s notion of
phenomenon and the thing in itself. The fact that phenomenon fails to represent the thing
in itself does not mean that the thing in itself is outside phenomenon, but the failure itself
is inscribed in the phenomenon and this thing in itself is empty. See Zizek (1993) work in
Tarrying with the negative.
[3] This is a collection of the series of talks that Trungpa gave in Boulder, Colorado in the
fall of 1970 and the spring of 1971 at the time of the formation of the meditation center
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