"Hegel and Foucault Re-visited"

Hegel and Foucault Re-visited C H A P T E R ELEVEN Hegel and Foucault Re-visited Evangelia Sembou I t is commonly assumed that Hegel and Foucault are so different thinkers that they are beyond comparison. Hegel is one of the foremost modernist philosophers, a systematic thinker, associated with teleological grand narratives. By contrast, Foucault is a postmodernist, poststructuralist thinker and a deconstructionist. Foucault himself regarded Hegel’s philosophy as a closed system and criticized Hegelianism, although his remarks are often quite ambiguous (e.g. 1966: 318, 338, 339, 342, 345/2002a: 335, 356, 357, 361, 364; 1971a: 74-79/1981a: 74-76; 1977a: 145/1980c: 114115; 1980d: 43, 48, 49-50/2002b: 241, 246-247, 248, 249; 2001: 29-30, 466467/2005: 28, 477-489). I will suggest that, their differences notwithstanding, Hegelian ‘phenomenology’ and Foucauldian ‘genealogy’ make a common contribution to philosophy by questioning the ‘correspondence theory of truth’, that is, the theory that asserts that truth consists in a correspondence between thought (the subject) and the objective world. My claim is not that the central concern of Hegel and Foucault is to overthrow the ‘correspondence theory’; rather, my aim is to show that Hegel’s ‘phenomenology’ and Foucault’s ‘genealogy’ can bring important insights to the central theme of philosophy, namely, truth. Hegel and Foucault had a lot to say about truth, although no reference is made to either of them in discussions on (the nature of) truth carried out by analytical philosophers. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to make a substantive contribution to discussions on truth by bridging the gap between ‘analytical’ and ‘continental’ philosophy, so as to enable a fruitful dialogue. Moreover, I will suggest that the aforesaid approaches share a nonfoundational conception of knowledge.1 My reading of Hegel falls into that tradition of Hegel scholarship that advances a non-metaphysical and nonfoundational understanding of Hegel (e.g. Hartmann, 1972; Westphal, 1979; Rose, 1981; Houlgate, 1986 & 2004; Maker, 1994; Sallis, 1995; Hutchings, 2003). Hegel’s ‘Phenomenology’ Hegel defines his Phenomenology of Spirit as ‘Science of the experience of consciousness’ (PhG: 74/PhS: 56). ‘Consciousness’ is internally divided into two aspects (‘moments’), the knowing subject and the object (PhG: 32/PhS: 21). 1 All citations will be from the relevant English translation, unless otherwise stated. 99 An Anthology of Philosophical Studies ‘Consciousness’ develops into ‘spirit’, and the Phenomenology consists in an exposition of this development. Because the Phenomenology presents this development as necessary, it is ‘Science’ (‘Wissenschaft’) (PhG: 74/PhS: 56). The Phenomenology challenges what underlies the ‘correspondence theory’, namely, the idea that there is a fundamental distinction between the subject and the objective world, by showing that consciousness is the dynamic cognitive interrelationship between the knowing subject and the known object (PhG: 70/PhS: 52). Therefore, there is no need of an external criterion to determine the validity of consciousness’s knowledge at each stage of its development. Consciousness attempts to make its subjective and objective aspects correspond to each other (PhG: 71/PhS: 53). It in turn takes one of its aspects to be necessary (or stable) and measures the validity of its other aspect against it. Thus, there is nothing for the philosopher to do but ‘simply to look on’. In the course of this self-examination, consciousness is both ‘consciousness of the object’ and ‘consciousness of itself’. Once consciousness realizes that one of its ‘moments’ (the subject) does not correspond to the other (the object), it alters it. But, following the change of the subjective aspect (‘knowledge’), the object changes as well, for the knowledge in question was ‘a knowledge of the object’. Consequently, what consciousness took to be the object or ‘the in-itself’ turns out to be ‘an in-itself for consciousness’. Consciousness now takes another object to be the truth and, insofar as this emerges from within consciousness itself, consciousness undergoes a ‘dialectical movement’. This constitutes its ‘experience’ (‘Erfahrung’) (PhG: 72-73/PhS: 54-55). From a phenomenological point of view, it is irrelevant whether there are any objects outside consciousness’s experience; what matters is the way(s) consciousness cognitively interacts with the world. Consequently, ‘the True’ is not an independent entity (an ‘in-itself’) but ‘the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself’ (PhG: 73/PhS: 55). Phenomenological experience is distinctive in that the knowing subject’s realization of the untruth of its first object does not come about once the subject runs across another object by chance; nor does the second object come externally, as it were. Rather, the new object is the result of ‘a reversal of consciousness itself’. Without intervening with the experience of consciousness, the phenomenological observer (the ‘we’) elevates consciousness’s successive reversals ‘into a scientific progression’ (PhG: 7374/PhS: 55), as he is able to see that the negation of one object does not result in nothingness but in a new object.1 This occurs ‘behind the back of consciousness’, however (PhG: 74/PhS: 56). By perceiving the consecutive reversals of consciousness and presenting them in a phenomenological account, the philosopher shows their necessity. Within this phenomenological exposition the different ways in which consciousness attempts to grasp reality appear as ‘patterns of consciousness’ (‘Gestalten des Bewußtseins’) (PhG: 74-75/PhS: 56). ‘Phenomenology’ takes the object of knowledge to be an aspect of cognition itself; so the acquisition of knowledge and the development of the object are closely associated. In the course of the Phenomenology both the 1 PhG: 68-69/PhS: 50-51 (‘determinate negation’). 100 Hegel and Foucault Re-visited knowing subject and the object of knowledge become more and more comprehensive. Initially, the subject appears as consciousness (‘sense-certainty’, ‘perception’, ‘understanding’) and the object first as external reality (a mere ‘This’ in the form of ‘Now’ and ‘Here’, then a ‘Thing’) and subsequently as consciousness (the notion of force, the ‘realm of laws’, ‘infinity’). As soon as consciousness realizes that its conception of the world as external is inadequate, it reconsiders its interaction with the world. Now the subject appears as ‘desire’ and the object as life in its totality. But the subject as ‘desire’ cannot reach satisfaction; once it destroys (consumes) one object, it is overcome by a new desire and this process goes on forever. The subject becomes a selfconsciousness and its object (another) self-consciousness (life-and-death struggle, master-slave relation, stoicism, scepticism, the unhappy consciousness). Self-consciousness reaches its limits in the experience of the ‘unhappy consciousness’, which cannot reconcile its changeable and unchangeable aspects and thereby collapses; out of it emerges another form of understanding, namely, ‘Reason’. Now self-consciousness is certain that it is all reality (idealism); reason permeates reality, it has both a subjective and an objective aspect. Following its failure (as ‘observing Reason’) to adequately comprehend its object (it foolishly grasps the essence of the self to be the skull) (PhG: 240ff/PhS: 197ff), the subject gives up its attempt to find itself in objects and tries to impose itself on the objective world through action (the hedonist, the romantic and the quixotic self-consciousness; the ‘spiritual animal kingdom’; ‘reason as lawgiver’ and ‘reason as testing laws’). Once ‘Reason’ proves to be untenable on its own terms (anything can pass the universalizability test inasmuch as it is formally self-consistent), a new form of understanding emerges, namely, ‘Spirit’. Each ‘shape’ of spirit has both a subjective and an objective aspect, and an immanent development is brought about by the failures of all forms of life (Greek antiquity, the Roman Empire, feudal Europe, prerevolutionary and revolutionary France, the moral world-view and the community of ‘beautiful souls’) to attain an adequate understanding of the principles underlying their existence. In ‘Religion’ the subject is self-conscious spirit and the object is absolute spirit. The religious form of understanding develops from ‘Natural Religion’ through the ‘Religion of Art’ to the ‘Revealed Religion’ as self-conscious spirit attempts to attain an awareness of itself. Although in the ‘Revealed Religion’ self-conscious spirit comes to grasp its essence, its self-understanding is imperfect due to the form of its knowledge (‘Vorstellung’) (PhG: 480/PhS: 416).1 ‘Absolute knowing’2 is the realization that all attempts by humans to grasp reality in terms of the ‘correspondence theory of truth’ have failed on their own terms (immanent critique).3 To say that Hegel’s ‘phenomenology’ is an 1 Miller translates ‘Vorstellung’ as ‘picture-thought’. It is knowing (Wissen), not knowledge (Kenntnis); this implies that it is an approach or stance. In Hegelian terminology ‘absolute’ is something that is not conditioned by anything else, hence self-determining. 3 Therefore, I disagree with Harris (1997) and Westphal (1997) when they say that Hegel has a ‘correspondence theory of truth’. Harris sees a ‘correspondence theory of truth’ of a special 2 101 An Anthology of Philosophical Studies immanent critique of the ‘correspondence theory’ is not the same as to say that its purpose is to abolish the subject/object distinction. This interpretation sees ‘absolute knowing’ as something positive, to wit, an adequate, comprehensive form of knowledge.1 Rather, I mean that its purpose is negative;2 that is, to demonstrate what philosophical thinking is not. Hegel’s ‘phenomenology’ shows that knowledge is conditioned by spirit, as all the ‘shapes of consciousness’ prior to ‘Spirit’ presuppose spirit, which is intersubjective and self-determining, defined as ‘“I” that is “We” and “We” that is “I”’ (PhG: 140/PhS: 110).3 Foucauldian ‘Genealogy’ Foucault’s Nietzschean genealogy attacks the notion of ‘origins’. Nietzsche had used the terms ‘Ursprung’, ‘Entstehung’ and ‘Herkunft’ mostly interchangeably (NGH (F): 137-138/NGH (E): 77-78). For Foucault, genealogy opposes ‘Ursprung’ in particular. First, ‘Ursprung’ suggests ‘“that which was already there”’, a primeval truth. Nevertheless, genealogy uncovers that the essence of things is a product of history and that the notion of the ‘origin’ is one of those metaphysical ideas that have dominated philosophy. The idea of the origin implies the ‘correspondence theory’ because it presumes that the origin is some ‘fact’ to be discovered; truth would then consist in a relation of correspondence between a proposition and this ‘fact’. However, groping into the ‘history of reason’, the genealogist discovers that it emerged from chance, from the competition among scholars (NGH (F): 138/NGH (E): 78), what Nietzsche called the ‘will to truth’ (1976b: 30-31/1980a: 66). Second, ‘Ursprung’ connotes that the beginning is always the moment of perfection. As such, it appears as an objective reality, a ‘fact’ to be found. However, genealogy uncovers that ‘historical beginnings are lowly’. Third, ‘Ursprung’ implies ‘the site of truth’, ‘...the point where the truth of things corresponded to a truthful discourse...’ (NGH (F): 139/NGH (E): 79). But genealogy demonstrates that faith in an original truth subsequently veiled by historical development is just a metaphysical illusion. Actually, the very idea of ‘truth’ is an error (NGH (F): 139-140/NGH (E): 79-80). Genealogy concerns itself with ‘Herkunft’ and ‘Entstehung’. A genealogical analysis of ‘Herkunft’ (descent) is an exercise of deconstruction; it fragments what were considered to be unitary entities and decomposes ideas into their constituent elements. Genealogy concentrates on the accidental, the event (NGH (F): 140-141/NGH (E): 80-81); and it shows that there is no given reality to which language could correspond. Moreover, genealogy explores the emergence kind in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and not what is ordinarily understood by ‘correspondence theory of truth’ (p. 11). 1 Most commentators support this view; e.g. Bloch (1951/1949), Findlay (1958: 144-148), Taylor (1993/1977: 48-49, 119, 214-221), Hyppolite (1946), Kojève (1947), Gadamer (1971), Pöggeler (1973), Heinrichs (1974), Fulda (1975), Lauer (1976), Westphal (1979). 2 I am following Bubner (1970) and Maker (1994: Part One, esp. 71-82, 86-89, 89-93, 100106). 3 My reading here owes much to Rose (1981) and Hutchings (2003: 32-44). 102 Hegel and Foucault Re-visited (‘Entstehung’) of a battle which determines a space (NGH (F): 143-144/NGH (E): 83-84); this latter is ‘a “non-place,” a pure distance, which indicates that the adversaries do not belong to a common space’. Consequently, emergence ‘always occurs in the interstice’ (NGH (F): 144/NGH (E): 85). Genealogy also challenges the ‘correspondence theory of truth’ by denying there is ‘something’ to be interpreted. It uncovers that the history of humankind is but a sequence of interpretations and that each new interpretation is contingent on some newly emergent configuration of power (NGH (F): 145-146/NGH (E): 86; cf. Foucault, 1977a: 145/1980c: 114). The dominance of the ‘correspondence theory’ has largely been due to the commonsense belief that ‘Whether what is said about the world is true surely must depend on how the world is’ (Rundle, 2005: 178). But genealogy’s refusal to acknowledge the existence of a substratum of reality strikes a blow, as it were, to any attempt to establish a supposedly exact correspondence between thought and objective reality.1 And, if in his early work Foucault had presupposed a primordial essence of madness (1961; 1995/1971), by the 1970s he had come to see that there was no substantial reality to be grasped. Additionally, genealogy questions the very notions which the ‘correspondence theory’ presupposes, namely, the subject and the object. It explores how the constitution of objects (e.g. madness or criminality) takes place within history. Simultaneously, it queries the idea of the ‘constituent subject’ and analyzes ‘the constitution of the subject within a historical framework’ (Foucault, 1977a: 147/1980c: 117; ‘dé-subjectivation’/‘desubjectivation’, 1980d: 43/2002b: 241). Genealogy shows that the human body too is dissected, ‘cut into pieces’ (NGH (F): 147/NGH (E): 87). Challenging essentialist notions of the self like the Cartesian ego and the Kantian self, genealogy demonstrates that the subject is constructed (Foucault, 1982). The subject is constructed by investing a body with certain habits; it is then a subject in the double sense of being subject to disciplinary mechanisms and of being a subject of experience (SP/DP). Moreover, power manufactures subjects as sexual beings; concurrently, this understanding of subjectivity is implanted in people’s minds (HS1 (F)/HS1 (E)). Challenging traditional history, genealogy as ‘effective history’ queries the assumption that there are ‘facts’ to be interpreted; rather, ‘facts’ themselves are constructions. As opposed to the ‘correspondence theory’ which asserts that there is only one correct relation of correspondence of thought to objective reality, viz. one truth, genealogy reveals that there is no single truth but truths instead, these truths being no more than interpretations. For example, Discipline and Punish shows that from the Middle Ages until the great penal reforms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ‘to judge was to establish the truth of a crime...’; one needed to have ‘Knowledge of the offence, knowledge of the offender, knowledge of the law...’ (SP: 26/DP: 19). However, following the penal reforms, the question is no longer simply whether a crime has been committed, by whom and on the basis of what law the perpetrator should be 1 The best (and, perhaps, only) study that considers Foucault’s challenge to the ‘correspondence theory of truth’ is Prado (2000). 103 An Anthology of Philosophical Studies punished, but ‘“What is this act...? [...] Is it a phantasy, a psychotic reaction, a delusional episode, a perverse action?”’, what were the perpetrator’s motives and how can the offender be rehabilitated? (SP: 27/DP: 19; Foucault refers to a ‘scientifico-juridical complex’.) According to article 64 of the 1810 Code, there was no offence if the perpetrator was mentally ill. Gradually the judges came to interpret this as stating that the gravity of the offence should be determined according to the degree of sanity or insanity of the malefactor (SP: 27-28/DP: 19-21). Consequently, nowadays psychiatrists, psychologists, educationalists, officials who implement the sentences and prison officers are involved in ‘the administration of the penalty’ (SP: 29/DP: 21); psychiatry is called to advise on the criminal’s ‘medico-judicial treatment’ (SP: 29/DP: 22). So genealogy uncovers that what underlies the decreasing severity of punishment is ‘a whole new system of truth’, which ‘becomes entangled with the practice of the power to punish’ (SP: 30/DP: 23). To mention another example: In The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, Foucault asks in respect of what he calls the ‘repressive hypothesis’: ‘Is sexual repression truly an established historical fact [une évidence historique]?’ (HS1 (F): 18/HS1 (E): 10) The explosion of discussion about sex in the Victorian age was due to a ‘type of power’ which bourgeois society ‘brought to bear on the body and on sex’. A genealogical study shows that this power operated by producing (different kinds of) sexuality and making it a defining characteristic of individuals (HS1 (F): 64-65/HS1 (E): 47). So, far from being an historical fact, sexuality is ‘a historical construct’ («un dispositif historique») (HS1 (F): 139/HS1 (E): 105). Therefore, the real questions are whether prohibition and censorship are not forms of power rather than repression and whether all this discourse on sex is not itself part of the power it criticizes as ‘repression’ (HS1 (F): 18/HS1 (E): 10). In sum, genealogy unmasks the politics of truth. Foucault usually refers to ‘régimes of truth’ («régimes de vérité») (1977a: 143, 158, 160/1980c: 112, 131, 133).1 Truth/knowledge and power (relations) implicate each other (Foucault, 1977a: 158-160/1980c: 131-133; 1977c: 175-176/1980b: 93; SP: 36/DP: 27; HS1 (F): 80-81/HS1 (E): 60),2 hence Foucault’s term ‘powerknowledge’ («pouvoir-savoir») (SP: 36/DP: 27-28). However, truth and knowledge are not reducible to power. For Foucault, the attempt to think of truth/knowledge as either distinct from (opposed to) power or as determined by power is to yield to ‘the intellectual and political blackmail of “being for or against the Enlightenment”’ (1984c: 573/1984d: 45).3 Actually, Foucault insisted that power presupposes resistance and vice versa (HS1 (F): 125-127/HS1 (E): 95-96).4 1 For a ‘régime of truth’ versus ideology see Foucault (1977b: 183-184/1980b: 102). For genealogy versus a critique of ideology see Owen (2002). 2 See also Foucault (1971a: 10-47/1981a: 52-64). 3 My translation. 4 Cf. Foucault (1982: 211-212, 221-222, 225-226). 104 Hegel and Foucault Re-visited Toward a Non-Foundational Knowledge The ‘correspondence theory’ is typical of foundationalism. Foundationalism starts from the assumption that there is a fundamental distinction between the subject of knowledge (the Cartesian ego) and the objective world. It follows that there must be some standard independent of knowledge whereby this knowledge can be tested. The test consists in determining whether there is a correspondence between knowledge and the object. Therefore, foundationalism is simultaneously trying to do two things: to retain the distinction between knowledge and the object, so that the comparison between knowledge and the object can be carried out; and to show that knowledge and the object coincide. Yet this is impossible.1 According to the ‘correspondence theory’, knowledge is descriptive; that is, knowledge is a mirror of objective reality. However, both Hegelian phenomenology and Foucauldian genealogy question this conception of cognition; Hegel’s phenomenology by showing that conscious experience is a dynamic interrelationship of subject and object; Foucault’s genealogy by demonstrating that both the subject and the various objects of knowledge are constituted in discourses. By questioning the idea of an objective reality apart from human experience and activity, both approaches query the notion of the ‘given’. They thus challenge one more feature of foundationalism, namely, the view that all knowledge rests on (certain) presuppositions. They also query the ground of foundationalist thinking, what May has called ‘the space of interiority’ (1993: 57). This latter is implicitly questioned in the genealogy of psychology; for what psychological discourse assumes is the existence of the mind, whose structure is conceived in ahistorical and transcendental terms. It is on the human mind that traditional philosophizing has found its foundations (May, 1993: 57-59). ‘Subjective foundationalism’2 or subjectivism assumes that the objective world lies out there separate from subjectivity, while the subject provides the foundations of knowledge. However, as shown above, Hegelian phenomenology consists in an immanent critique of the type of knowing that assumes that there is a distinction between the knowing subject and the object known. In saying that for Hegel and Foucault there is no objective reality apart from human experience and activity, I do not mean that Hegel and Foucault denied the existence of the external world. In the case of Hegel, this would mean that the objective world is a product of the human mind (extreme idealism); in the case of Foucault, it would imply that Foucault denies the existence of the world (irrealism).3 Both these positions are wrong. What I mean is that, from a Hegelian-phenomenological and a Foucauldian-genealogical standpoint, it is irrelevant what the world apart from human experience is like. What is relevant 1 See Maker (1994: 60-63). I am partially following Maker. May (1993: 59). 3 For an argument against the view that Foucault’s understanding of truth leads to irrealism see Prado (2000: Chapter 7). 2 105 An Anthology of Philosophical Studies is how humans interact with this world, how they conceptualize it and how they make sense of it.1 The question of non-foundationalism is an intricate one. What troubles critics is how such a non-foundational knowledge can justify itself.2 As regards Hegelian phenomenology, it grounds itself internally. Initially, science comes on the scene; it appears. As such, it cannot justify itself against ‘another mode of knowledge’ (PhG: 66/PhS: 48). The appearance of science (i.e. phenomenology) consists in its identifying step by step what it itself is. Hegelian phenomenology is the immanent development of foundationalist thinking and its model of knowledge. Foundationalist thinking collapses internally, as all attempts to ground knowledge in terms of the ‘correspondence theory of truth’ fail by their own standards. Therefore, Hegelian phenomenology shows what philosophical science is not like. It is in this way that the Phenomenology is an introduction to the Science of Logic. But ‘to know this is not a presupposition, simply because this negative knowledge is not necessary for science’ (Maker, 1994: 93). As to Foucauldian genealogy, a useful distinction is that drawn by May between ‘grounds’ and ‘foundations’ (1993: 11). A ‘ground’ has to do with the way one justifies one’s claims, whereas a ‘foundation’ is some ultimate truth that cannot be doubted. The ultimate truths foundationalism takes for granted are, to name just a few, the subject of knowledge, the mind and the soul. But these are notions that Foucault’s genealogies question. The issue, then, is to see how Foucault’s genealogies justify themselves, without using these or any other truths as foundations (May, 1993: 67, 71-72). However, May’s distinction between ‘justification’ and ‘truth in an ultimate sense’ is problematical (1993: 71; cf. 93). May’s reference to ‘truth in an ultimate sense’ is misleading, since this is precisely what Foucault’s genealogy calls into question.3 Considering his distinction between ‘grounds’ and ‘foundations’, May (1993) is right to point out two aspects of justification: ‘the inferential move itself and the status of the claim to which the inferential move appeals in its attempt at justification.’ The former is logical (deduction, induction); it is the latter that differentiates Foucault’s understanding of knowledge from foundationalism (p. 90). From a Foucauldian-genealogical perspective, the truth of a claim is contingent on the place it occupies and on its role within a specific discourse. Genealogy acknowledges its interested character (perspectivism) (NGH (F): 150/NGH (E): 90). Its significance lies in that it provides an alternative picture or interpretation. By practising ‘local’ criticism, genealogy allows ‘an insurrection of subjugated knowledges’ (1977b: 163/1980b: 81). Foucault distinguished between the ‘universal’ and the ‘specific’ intellectual; whereas the former establishes universal norms, the latter provides specific analyses (1977a: 159/1980c: 132). Ultimately, what vindicates genealogy is its documentary character and attention to detail (NGH (F): 136/NGH (E): 76-77; Foucault, 1980d: 44/2002b: 242). A 1 With reference to Foucault, cf. Prado (2000: 147-148). Respecting Foucauldian genealogy, the question of grounds has been raised by Fraser (1981), Dews (1988/1987: Chapters 5-7, esp. 161-170, 173-176, 180-185, 186-192, 192-199, 214-216, 218-220) and Habermas (1985: Vorlesungen IX u. X/1990: Lectures IX and X). 3 Cf. Prado, 2000: 140. 2 106 Hegel and Foucault Re-visited genealogical account can be rejected if, and only if, another historical account (a genealogy of genealogy) can prove to be more convincing.1 In fact, perhaps it is wrong to expect genealogy to justify itself in advance. Given that its purpose is to disabuse us of the foundations that have underpinned traditional philosophy, its value can be judged only retrospectively;2 its worth can be proven after it has successfully (or otherwise) enabled us to change our way of thinking (1980d: 44/2002b: 242). Therefore, both Hegelian phenomenology and Foucauldian genealogy can be assessed, as well as justify themselves, only in retrospect. Conclusion I have argued that, despite their many differences, Hegelian phenomenology and Foucauldian genealogy pose a common challenge to philosophy by questioning the ‘correspondence theory of truth’. By casting doubt on the ‘correspondence theory’, they also query foundationalism and point towards a non-foundational knowledge. Both approaches demonstrate that truth is openended; truth and knowledge are intertwined with human activity and social-cumpolitical life. This implies that the philosopher, too, is a product of his time and, hence, his philosophy is part of the given social and political context in which he finds himself.3 References Bloch, E. (1951, c.1949). Subjekt-Objekt: Erläuterungen zu Hegel. Berlin: AufbauVerlag. Bubner, R. (1970). ‘La Philosophie et ses Apparences.’ Actes du IIIème Congrès International de l’ Association pour l’ Étude de la Philosophie de Hegel. Lille: Association des Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, 6581. Dews, P. (1988, c.1987). Logics of Disintegration: Poststructuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory. London and New York: Verso. Findlay, J. N. (1958). Hegel: A Re-examination. 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