iv International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014
GUEST EDITORIaL PREfaCE
Special Issue on How to
do IT more Carefully:
Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues
(ELSI) in IT Supported Crisis
Response and Management
Monika Büscher, Centre for Mobilities Research, Mobilities.lab, Department of Sociology,
Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
Michael Liegl, Centre for Mobilities Research, Mobilities.lab, Department of Sociology,
Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
Caroline Rizza, Economics, Management and Social Sciences Department, Telecom
ParisTech, Paris, France
Hayley Watson, Trilateral Research and Consulting, London, UK
INTRODUCTION
It seems clear that ‘technology that provides the
right information, at the right time, and in the
right place has the potential to reduce disaster
impacts’ (Koua, MacEachren, Turtun, Pezanowski, Tomaszewski, & Frazier, 2010:255).
In a century of disasters (eScience, 2012) where
nothing is so certain as that another crisis is
around the corner and emergency response
services are under intense pressure to produce
more efficient, collaborative and effective
responses and plans, investment in information technology (IT) is often seen as pivotal.
Enquiries into the implications of ever deeper
integration of IT into emergency response and
management for humanity, justice, liberty,
and the social contract between societies and
emergency responders may seem a burden,
but design that is sensitive to ethical, legal and
social issues (ELSI) is also recognised as critical
to leveraging the potential of new technologies. If emergency services are to utilise (and
to control media operated) Remotely Piloted
Aerial Systems (RPAS), for example, if they
should engage the public with the help of social
media, or share information between different
agencies and information systems in line with
data protection laws, technologies must support
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International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014 v
awareness of ELSI and practices of addressing
them. This is a complex challenge.
Repeated, sometimes spectacular failures
of IT projects highlight the transformative
momentum inherent in IT innovation and raise
questions about the straightforward usefulness
of technology (Ellebrecht and Kaufman, this
issue). Worldwide, up to 85% of IT projects
fail, at an estimated cost of over $6.2 trillion
(Sessions, 2009), and crisis management has a
long history of such failures. In two prominent
examples of major technology investment – the
London Ambulance System in 1992, and more
recently the UK FiReControl project, the systems failed because they did not support, indeed
incapacitated the local practices of responders.
They were abandoned, wasting millions of
pounds (Shapiro, 2005; Committee of Public
Accounts, 2011). The failure of such systems
has ethical, legal and social causes and implications that go far beyond the financial aspects.
Indeed, some analysts argue that ‘the belief that
more data or information automatically leads
to better decisions is probably one of the most
unfortunate mistakes of the information society
(Hollnagel & Woods 2005: 7). It is important
to recognise that technology cannot ‘provide’
the right information at the right time, in the
right place, but people can. People gather, sort,
visualise, analyse, reason about, and reason
with information, they assess its accuracy, relevance, quality, they share or withhold it, they
can make sense of it, or not, they may discount
it, or draw others’ attention to information in
ways that communicates their judgement about
its relevance, quality or import. Technology
can greatly enhance these practices, but it can
also undermine, obstruct, or transform them.
Increased reliance on technology can
make emergency response and management
more dependent on fragile network and data
infrastructures, make the work more complex
and error-prone and it can engender far-reaching
transformations of the emergency services and
society. For example, emergency situations
can call for exceptions to fundamental and
constitutional rights. At a recent symposium,
European security experts debated the impor-
tance of ELSI research for innovation in Border
Surveillance and Search and Rescue1, calling
for the law to catch up with technological innovation, so that, for example, restrictions on
the interconnection of information systems for
CCTV, face recognition and databases of known
convictions for hooliganism could be lifted in
France. Yet many European states, especially
countries like Romania or Germany, who have
experienced totalitarian regimes, are suspicious
of such suspension of normal legal and moral
rules and values, often fuelled (but not always
warranted) by fear of a breakdown of public
moral order in emergencies (Barnard-Wills
2013). Their unease is due to the experience
that such exceptions can erode important civil
liberties, and the fact that ‘the wrong kind’ of
IT innovation in crisis management can amplify a detrimental ‘securitization’ of society
(Aradau & Munster, 2011, Büscher, Perng &
Liegl, this issue).
Against this backdrop, some fundamental
ethical questions arise for emergency response
practitioners, politicians, policy makers, citizens, non-citizens (such as tourists, legal and
illegal immigrants), designers and researchers:
How can IT design and implementation be done
more effectively, more mindful of transformative effects and wider societal implications?
How can it be done more benignly? Concerns
over IT project failures, the insufficiency of
‘more information’ for good decisions, and the
effects of creeping securitization on civil liberties may suggest ‘Don’t do IT’ as an answer for
some. However, the increase in the frequency
and severity of disasters in the 21st century of
disasters, involving increasingly urbanized and
ageing populations is also a massively powerful
engine for IT innovation in crisis management.
Indeed, it seems that the IT juggernaut into
emergency response is unstoppable. Moreover,
IT can uniquely enhance risk analysis, communication and collaboration. Thus ‘Do IT more
carefully’ would be a better maxim. But how
can this be achieved?
To clarify what ‘more careful’ might mean,
there is a need to better understand ethical,
legal and social issues relating to IT supported
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vi International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014
emergency response. With this special issue, we
contribute six papers to shape more proactive
and integrated ELSI-aware design approaches.
In this introductory overview, we begin by
providing a short review of the socio-political
context. This is followed by a discussion of the
positively and negatively disruptive nature of IT
innovation in crisis response and management,
and specifically the role of ‘unintended consequences’. The individual papers that follow
focus on considerations related to IT innovation
and use in crisis management and response in
different contexts, ranging from IT support for
triage in mass casualty incidents (Ellebrecht
and Kaufmann) to restrictions placed on use of
mobile devices in organisations (Ford, Stephens
& Ford), to the use of social media and the Internet during the 2010 Eyjafjallajokull volcano
eruption (Watson & Finn), the 2011 Vancouver
riots (Rizza, Guimarães Pereira & Curvelo), and
the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing (Tapia &
LaLone). The special issue concludes with a
discussion of the relationship between privacy,
security and liberty in the context of efforts to
support emergent interoperability between multiple information systems and stakeholders in
‘smart city’ contexts (Büscher et al.). We briefly
summarise key insights these papers allow.
By exploring diverse impacts on the
organisation of emergency response and the
people involved, these papers build on contributions from the Information Systems for
Crisis Response and Management (ISCRAM)
community, where a long-standing commitment to explore ethical and social aspects of
innovation in crisis response and management
exists. The papers have been developed from
contributions to special tracks on Ethical, Legal
and Social Issues (ELSI) at ISCRAM conferences in 2013 and 2014. The individual papers
illuminate several different, important dimensions of ELSI and we summarise them here to
chart core themes. A key insight is that while
ethical, legal, and social issues are a matter of
material, socio-technical practices and the ways
in which people use technology, it is critical to
acknowledge – carefully and creatively – that
technology itself is not neutral. It actively enacts
and shapes morality. A ‘disclosive’ approach
to ethical, legal and social issues can reveal
emergent ethical implications – which may pose
both challenges and opportunities. By providing
a summary of a study that illustrates this in an
exemplary way, we prepare for a conclusion
that calls for more careful IT innovation in crisis
response and management. Here, we delineate
what future work is needed to translate the
long-standing commitment within ISCRAM to
understand ethical, legal and social aspects of innovation into critical, constructive and creative
debates about what might constitute ‘better’ IT
supported crisis response and management, and
how ELSI research can inform ‘better’ design
and use of technologies.
ELSI aND THE
INfORMaTIONaLIZaTION
Of CRISIS RESPONSE
Technology has always played an important
role in the laws, ethics and social and material practices of emergency response. Physical
technology such as breathing apparatus for
fire-fighters, fire engines and fire fighting
technologies, portable defibrillators for medical personnel, guns and body armour for police
have augmented the capabilities of emergency
responders for many decades. Policy tools,
such as incident command systems, too, have
shaped the nature of response (Buck, Trainor,
& Aguirre, 2006; Moynihan, 2009). What or
who can be rescued or protected changes, as
do the processes and practices involved, and
therewith the ethics and politics of emergency
response. IT introduce another dimension of
augmentation.
There has been an ‘informationalization’ of
crisis response and management, following in
the footsteps of similar developments in other
industries and services. The term refers to an
ever more intimate integration of ever more information into economic processes and practices
with the help of information technology, starting with the just-in-time logistics for materials
and goods in post-fordist economies (Lash &
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International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014 vii
Urry, 1994), and leading into contemporary
forms of ‘knowing capitalism’ and ‘Lifeworld.
Inc’ (Thrift 2005, 2011), where pervasive collection and processing of data about people’s
everyday interactions and complex actuarial,
‘qualculative’ analytics allow corporations
ever greater prediction, agility and control. In
emergency response, informationalization can
support enhanced risk assessment, preventative
measures and learning from past events, as
well as increased surge capacity, data sharing,
communication and collaboration between
emergency responders, closer engagement with
people affected by disasters and mobilization
of ‘collective intelligence’. But informationalizing socio-economic processes can also
engender far-reaching transformations of these
processes. In the domain of crisis management,
the use of digital radio in over 125 countries in
the world2 and the rise of social media (Palen,
Vieweg, Sutton & Liu 2009; Letouzé, Meier,
& Vinck 2013) have fundamentally changed
emergency communications practices, for example. Furthermore, when data can be shared
more easily and to greater effect, exceptions
from data protection regulations may foster
surveillance and social sorting and erode values
of freedom and democracy. The recent scandal
over NSA surveillance starkly highlights the
challenges to informational self-determination
and privacy arising in the context of IT use in
security policy and practice. The ways in which
IT are designed and appropriated are deeply
entangled with how societies conceive of risks,
respond to crises, and facilitate freedom. The
informationalization of emergency response is
a form of ‘disruptive innovation’, that is, innovation that transforms the social, economic,
political, and organizational practices that shape
this domain (Chesbrough, 2003).
Yet, even a recently edited comprehensive
compendium of research in emergency ethics,
law and policy (Campbell, 2012) pays little
attention to technology, and IT ethics in crisis
management is somewhat of a new field of
study. One of the first publications to tackle the
challenge explicitly is Jillson’s chapter ‘Protecting the Public, Addressing Individual Rights’
in Van de Walle, Turoff and Hiltz’ Information
Systems for Emergency Management (2010).
She discusses ethical opportunities, such as the
capability of emergency management information systems (EMIS) to extend surge capacity, to
maximize availability and enable more equitable
distribution of services, and to enhance risk
communication. But she also shows how the
informational and communicative advances that
EMIS can enable can complicate adherence to
core ethical principles of non-maleficence and
beneficence, respect for human dignity, and
distributive justice (equal access).
In their current use of IT, emergency responders often air on the side of caution when
faced with ethical, legal or social uncertainties,
such as doubt about informational boundaries in
multi-agency collaboration. They often choose
not to share data. Fragmentation of response
through ‘silo-thinking’ is a common result and
a challenge to ethical conduct (Cole, 2010).
Paradoxically, this is, at least partially, a result
of the very capability of information systems
to support data sharing. ELSI research shows
that the reasons raise complex questions about
accountability, responsibility and the social
contract between society and emergency service
professionals and volunteers. The social contract
idea stipulates that society grants emergency
responders a range of benefits in return for their
commitment to save others even in the face of
personal risk. Such benefits include ‘perhaps
most importantly, a great degree of professional
autonomy’ and the provision of adequate training and tools (Jennings & Arras, 2008:110).
Digital logs provide new opportunities to learn
from experience in post-disaster reviews of response efforts, but they also allow new ways of
holding professionals to account (Bech Gjørv,
2012; Cartlidge, 2012), transforming ideas
of professional autonomy. In an environment
where IT enable ever more detailed post-disaster
expert reviews of disaster response efforts
based on extensive records of professional
communications and decisions, such data can
be treated as evidence for malpractice in a way
that lacks appreciation of the real time context
of these communications and decisions. It may
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viii International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014
attract blame and punishment and as a result,
professionals may become uncertain about
their reluctant to express themselves freely and
clearly or take risky decisions.
(Un-) Intended Consequences
Technology can engender such unintended
consequences for ethical, lawful and socially
responsible and effective conduct, ranging from
impacts on professional integrity and judgement
to a securitization or militarization of everyday
life. Before we delve into concrete detail through
a review of the contributions to this special issue
and an example from the wider literature, it is
useful to examine the concept of ‘unintended
consequences’.
The notion of ‘unintended consequences’
features prominently in the literature on risk, especially on risk assessment of technology (Beck,
1992; Merton, 1936), but it is unclear whether
such consequences are considered avoidable or
inescapable, whether they are known, unknown
or unknowable in advance. Furthermore, what
precaution could be taken to avoid or mitigate
them? Is this something that can be done before
a technology gets implemented or need there be
an ongoing monitoring process, for detecting
and managing such consequences:
For and by whom were these consequences
unintended? Does ‘unintended’ mean that the
original intent was not achieved, or that things
happened outside the scope of that imagined
intent? The notion also carries an implied
exoneration from blame, since anything ‘unintended’ was implicitly unforeseeable, even if
things somehow subsequently went awry. [...]
The narrative of unintended consequences sets
aside the possibility of acting irresponsibly
on inadequate knowledge … (Wynne & Felt,
2007, p. 97).
For designers and practitioners engaged in
IT innovation in emergency response and management this statement implies a need to take
responsibility for unintended consequences,
by trying to notice, anticipate and know them,
to amplify positive effects and to mitigate or
avoid negative ones. If we examine the 10
core ethical principles of emergency response
as defined by the International Federation of
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Code of
Conduct and their translation into components
of emergency services in relation to practices
and virtues needed to accomplish them, we
formulate some examples of how capacities
to perform such services, practices and virtues
are transformed in interaction with IT (Table
1). A complex pattern of sometimes contradictory intended and unintended effects becomes
visible. For example, compassion, charity,
hope, empathy, resilience, respect and effective communication can be supported through
technologies that allow more immediate and
richer communication, and mapping and visualization of vulnerable populations, needs
and available resources. As such, IT can help
provide services that alleviate suffering faster
and more generally support enactment of ethical principles of humanity. At the same time,
such technologies could increase information
overload and overwhelm responders’ capacities
to compile information in a meaningful way.
Similarly, the tireless, unbiased application of
computational logic could be used to support
impartiality through fair and equal distribution of resources, but it can also allow forms
of identifying vulnerable or risky populations
and techniques for social sorting that undermine
values of impartiality (Table 1).
Many of the ambiguities listed here are
explored in depth in the individual contributions
to this special issue. They show that core ethical
principles, practices and virtues of emergency
response can be pursued in a number of ways
and IT can support or obstruct their realisation.
Several dimensions of influence on the lawfulness, ethics, sociality and social responsibility
of technologically augmented practice become
visible:
•
•
•
The ways in which technologies are used
The technology itself
The economic, social and cultural
environment
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International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014 ix
Table 1. Ethical principles, practices and virtues and intended and unintended effects of IT use
Ethical
Principles
Definition/Components of Service
Practices and Virtues
Some Effects of using IT
Humanity
• Prevent and alleviate suffering
• Respect for and active protection of
dignity
• Particular attention to the vulnerable
• Safeguard and restore environment and
social ties
Compassion, charity,
hope, empathy, resilience,
respect, effective
communication
Faster, more efficient and
more informed response.
Information overload for
responders.
Impartiality
• Non-discriminating
• Based on need
• With neutrality, that is, without
ideological debate
Non-judgement,
tolerance, justice, fairness
Tireless, unbiased
application of logic.
Novel capabilities to
identify vulnerable
populations.
Social sorting.
Solidarity
• Responsibilities and benefits shared
equitably
• Regardless of political, cultural,
economic differences
• Respect for sovereignty
Integrity, trustworthiness,
respect, effective
communication
Enhanced capabilities for
communication and resource
distribution.
Potential for ‘witchhunt’ and
spreading of rumours.
Cooperation
• Integration – e.g. with information
sharing agreements
• Inform & enable participation from all
relevant parties
• Direction – clarity of purpose
• Subsidiarity
Prudence, improvisation,
effective communication,
respect, intersubjectivity,
resilience
New ways of dynamically
sharing information about
capacities.
Distributed collaboration
makes it more difficult to
know who is doing what.
Information
Sharing
• Appropriate accuracy, precision, depth
of detail
• Consider effects of not sharing
• Collect, process and share lawfully
• Data minimization and sharing of
aggregated data
• Accountability & transparency
• Evaluate effects on data subjects and
informants
• Avoid duplication
Prudence, integrity,
trustworthiness, respect,
empathy, effective
communication
Enhanced technical
interoperability can support
compatibility between
different information
systems.
Interfere with cultural and
organisational practices.
Human Rights
• Rights to privacy, freedom of
movement, association, expression are
actively protected
• Compulsory evacuation is explained
Prudence, respect,
empathy, non-judgement,
justice
Easier to contact and
communicate with
populations.
Enhanced capabilities for
information sharing can
promote surveillance.
Preparedness
• Reduce vulnerabilities
• Anticipation – e.g. through risk analysis
& training
• Continuity – grounded in familiar ways
of working
• Prepare for interoperability
Attitude of wisdom,
prudence, respect,
diligence, effective
communication
Information visualisation
and expert systems can
augment human capabilities
of risk analysis.
Technology can introduce
more complexity and slow
people down.
Social contract
• Accountability to those in need, funders
and society
• Training and support for emergency
responders
Prudence, respect,
effective communication
Digital logging can make
decisions more transparent.
It can expose responders to
unreasonable liabilities.
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x International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014
At every level both positive and negative
effects can be produced, often simultaneously
and in complex ways. The papers in this special
issue provide concrete insight into the dynamics
of this in a variety of different contexts.
CONCRETE INSIGHTS
THROUGH IN-DEPTH STUDIES
Ellebrecht and Kaufman provide in-depth
insight into some of the complexities of sociotechnical effects through a study of e-triage.
They elaborate a critique of pervasive claims
that IT enables efficiency gains and thereby
build a very useful foundation for all of the
contributions to this special issue. Their argument is based on findings from a four-year
research project in Germany, aimed at creating
and implementing IT to support ‘Immediate
Rescue in Large-Scale Accidents with Mass
Casualties’ (SOGRO). Following actor network
theories in the social sciences, Ellebrecht and
Kaufman describe the work required to carry out
triage and rescue in such situations as a complex programme of actions that is transformed
in interaction with new technologies. During
a series of large scale exercises they observed
how the capabilities of digital triage technologies and their appropriation into practice were
problematised by the emergency responders
involved in the exercises. At the heart of the
responders’ experience are concerns with efficiency. The SOGRO system is promoted as
a system that ‘improves emergency treatment
significantly by saving time, providing a more
detailed situation overview and integrating
the flow of information between all parties
involved’. This is said to ‘help save lives’. Ellebrecht and Kaufman focus on three areas of
friction they observed: time savings, improved
decision making capabilities, and the claim that
the new technologies provide a comprehensive
overview. They find that, in terms of time savings, the system responds to – and drives and
further legitimizes – currently contested changes
in the organization of triage in German emergency response organizations. There are two
elements. Firstly, in Germany, mass casualty
incident triage was traditionally carried out by
physicians and documented by paramedics. This
is a costly, labour intensive and relatively slow
practice with high quality standards. SOGRO
supports paramedic triage, that is, a shift of
responsibility from emergency physicians to
(cheaper and more numerous) paramedics, who
can be prompted or strictly guided by a ‘simple
triage and rapid treatment’ protocol (START)
captured in an algorithm that takes the paramedic
through a series of diagnostic steps. Secondly,
the SOGRO system enables a shift from traditional practices of treating victims at the incident
site to a ‘scoop and run’ technique that prioritise
transporting victims over on-site treatment,
seeking to facilitate treatment en-route and
in available hospitals and treatments centres
through dynamic, computationally augmented
analysis of capacity and resources. Based on
their analysis, Ellebrecht and Kaufmann argue
that any efficiency gains that are generated at
this contexture of social, organizational and
technical innovation reflect the ‘co-constitution of technology and society’ rather than
any simple technology based improvement.
Moreover, the changes explored during these
exercises remain contested, especially with a
view to questions about the quality of care and
judgement in the comparison between the two
different modes of practice. Ellebrecht and
Kaufman find similarly complex ambiguities
in relation to claims of technology ‘providing’
an overview and enhancing decision making
capabilities. Particularly remarkable are their
observations on responders’ worries about increased transparency in relation to professional
liability law suits. In a survey of participants
76.6% of surveyed paramedics agreed with
the statement that they ‘occasionally had one
foot in prison’. Unintended consequences of
such concerns could be a lack of willingness to
take risky decisions which could risk lives. By
highlighting a series of ambiguities arising in
the co-constitution of technology and society,
Ellebrecht and Kaufmann’s study sensitises the
reader to the entanglement of social practice,
societal values and technological potential.
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International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014 xi
Ford, Stephens and Ford call for circumspect attention to a different set of unintended
consequences in relation to organizational policies of banning mobile devices and their impact
on crisis communication. They show that while
some employees, especially knowledge workers, may be expected to carry mobile devices
24/7 to stay connected with their colleagues and
managers, others are prohibited from using or
even carrying their personal mobile devices.
In crisis situations this can lead to severe
communication difficulties. Ford, Stephens
and Ford carried out focus group discussions
with 46 participants from two very different
organizations where such mobile device bans
were in place and found many examples of
lost information, disconnected and even forgotten workers, isolated and hard to locate.
The employees of a fast food company and
a company providing cleaning and janitorial
services reported frequently missing critical
information, for example about emergency
drills. Their supervisors were so overwhelmed
with the need to coordinate selective information
flows that they missed informing some of their
workers altogether, even in emergencies. In one
situation, the distributed janitorial workforce
was not informed of a severe weather event
until all public transport had been suspended.
While their supervisors, secretarial and managerial colleagues had been informed in a timely
manner and were safely ensconced at home,
cleaning crews and janitors were stranded and
without means of communication. Apart from
putting workers in discomfort or even danger,
organizational policies and practices of banning
mobile devices create experiences of inequality and relative deprivation, which are harmful
to workers’ sense of well-being and justice.
They can also undermine their loyalty to the
company. Overall, the study reveals that there
are complex digital inequalities and varying
degrees of access to technology beyond socioeconomic determinants that have a significant
impact on crisis communication. Far from being
a binary, mostly economically defined distinction between digital haves and have-nots and
physical/economic access to technology, the
digital divide can be a temporary, structurally
defined, humiliating and unequally risk-laden
experience.
In their article ‘Ethical and Privacy Implications of the Use of Social Media During the
Eyafjallajokull Eruption Crisis’, Watson and
Finn broaden the focus on organizational policies on digital communications by examining
information flows between corporations and
their customers during the most severe global
flight disruption since 9/11. With over 100,000
flights cancelled and 1.2 million passengers
affected, the particle cloud generated by the
Eyafjallajokull eruption in 2010 overwhelmed
corporate and institutional call centres. Stranded
and unable to find information through official
channels, thousands of passengers, their colleagues, friends and family turned to social
media. Through a study of two different forms
of support for information exchange using social
media, Watson and Finn highlight positive outcomes such as increased surge capacity and the
mobilisation of social capital, but also explore
problematic issues of inequality, exploitation
and privacy infringement. The site ‘Stranded
in Europe’ was created by an Ericson employee
to support self-organised information exchange
between travellers, combining SMS messaging
and Facebook. This greatly broadened access
to the service. Once travellers had found the
service using the Internet, the site allowed them
to seek and exchange information via SMS,
without the need for an online connection. This
enhanced individuals’ resilience by improving
the prospect of gaining correct information from
fellow travellers faster and more reliably than
other sources allowed, and supported a creative
response to the crisis. In some cases, information
provided by people affected was also useful for
professional emergency responders, reflecting
a broader trend towards integrating social media information into crisis response efforts. In
parallel, many umbrella organisations – such as
the European Organisation for the Safety of Air
Navigation – as well as individual airlines, travel
agents and service providers offered corporate
or institutional information services using social
media, from Youtube to Twitter and Facebook.
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xii International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014
Many gained thousands of new followers and
fans through these services within days, and
they used these channels in three ways: as a
broadcast medium, as a means for direct communication with customers, and as a means
to crowdsource information from customers.
Watson and Finn highlight that this corporate
turn to social media was highly effective, but
also problematic in a number of ways. First,
those unable to access digital technologies were
‘disproportionately impacted by their inability
to gather information and communicate’ in the
absence of appropriate levels of offline information services. Corporations and institutions
sometimes provided online services instead of
traditional services such as staff on the ground
or in call centres. Second, the corporate practices
created information asymmetries where those
who were able to access online resources were
often unaware that personal information they
provided to gain support (name, age, location)
could later be used or passed on to other operators to target advertising. Even if they did
know, there often was no alternative source of
information, eroding expectations of privacy
and notions of consumer consent. Corporations
also exploited consumer and public labour,
effectively ‘outsourcing’ some aspects of their
information services. Watson and Finn call for
deeper critical reflection before social media are
deployed in crisis response and management –
be it through corporations or in the context of
official efforts. They call for designers to be
aware of opportunities and challenges as well as
grassroots ‘social hack’ innovations such as the
use of a #noshare hashtag to control the sharing
of personal information, because greater sensitivity may avoid the need for costly retrofits on
technologies designed without circumspection
for ethical, legal and social issues.
In the contribution by Rizza, Guimarães
Pereira and Curvelo we see that debates
on ethical, legal and social issues are often
dominated by concerns over privacy and data
protection. The authors challenge this overly
narrow conception of ELSI with a study of
“Do-it-yourself justice” following the 2011
Vancouver riots. As the Vancouver Canucks
were losing against the Boston Bruins during
the 2011 Stanley Cup, some groups watching
the game on large screens in the city began to
orchestrate riots that lasted for several hours,
lighting fires and destroying cars and property
in the centre of Vancouver. The public reacted
angrily to the destruction and when Vancouver
Police Department (VPD) issued a call for help
in identifying rioters on different social media
platforms, they reacted with great energy. This
public support had the potential to enhance collaborative resilience, and images submitted or
tagged by members of the public led to hundreds
of convictions, but it also sparked attempts at
vigilantism and ‘do-it-yourself justice’. This,
in turn, sparked a lively and very critical debate
within traditional media and Rizza, Guimarães
Pereira and Curvelo use frame-analysis to
identify key ethical, legal and social issues in
public discourses articulated in the media. This
analysis reflects potent imaginaries and fears
circulating amongst the public, the emergency
services and governing authorities. Rizza,
Guimarães Pereira and Curvelo identify a range
of such concerns, including a lack of legal
regulation for the use of evidence generated by
engaging citizens via social media in criminal
investigations. The authenticity, completeness
and reliability of the evidence could be seen
as questionable in some cases and this should
have affected its admissibility in court, but
did not, in some cases. The media suggest that
VPD were seduced by the potential of social
media communication with the public, and
acted without considering how they would deal
with the results. This is framed as a matter of
institutional unpreparedness and linked to the
spread of unintended forms of do-it-yourself
justice, and wider societal consequences such
as a slide into an ‘unintended “do-it-yourself”
society’ where mob behaviour and vigilantism
are allowed to exacerbate oppressive tendencies within a surveillance society. Social media
become ‘leaky containers’ in this maelstrom,
mixing public and private, official and social
in new ways and making criminal investigation
part of social interactions. Citizens became empowered as surveillors of others and as judges
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International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014 xiii
of deviance in ways that spun out of control.
By presenting an analysis of these challenges to
justice, fairness, responsibility, accountability
and integrity, Rizza, Guimarães Pereira and
Curvelo scrutinize complex reverberations of
using social media in crises and enable a critical
engagement with wider societal implications of
socio-technical innovation in the relationship
between the emergency services, legislative and
judiciary governance and public engagement.
Tapia and LaLone’s study ‘Crowdsourcing
Investigations: Crowd Participation in Identifying the Bomb and Bomber from the Boston
Marathon Bombing’ explores some of the issues raised by Rizza, Guimarães Pereira and
Curvelo in greater depth as well as analysing
how traditional media contributed to ethical
dilemmas. Two years after the events in Vancouver, the social media response to the Boston
Marathon – in part encouraged by the FBI, in
part self organised through leading social media
groups like Reddit and Anonymous – revealed
that the frontier land of crowd participation in
criminal investigations still teems with ethical,
legal and social frictions. Within hours of the
Boston Marathon bombing, which killed four
people and injured 264 others, the FBI called
for bystanders to share images and video of
the bombing. Online groups also responded
to the events, trying to position themselves
as hubs for self-organised investigations and
crowdsourcing of information and support for
survivors. The activities of two such groups,
Reddit and Anonymous played a part in ethical
lines being crossed during the crowdsourced
investigation. By using sentiment analysis of
public responses to the activities of Reddit
and Anonymous expressed in over 23 million
tweets, Tapia and LaLone are in a position to
trace these moments when lines of ethical acceptability were crossed. They show that Reddit,
in particular, attracted intensely emotional reactions, understandable as a highly charged public
response to the highly charged nature of the
events. To begin with, the colour of this emotion
was overwhelmingly positive, reflecting public
support for activities such as organising pizza
and water for survivors and the Boston Police
Department, or helping loved ones to contact
known survivors. It was also seen as positive
that Reddit provided timely and accurate news
about the events, outshining mainstream media
such as CNN. However, this assessment shifted
radically, when Reddit spearheaded news that
falsely identified two people as suspects and
posted images of them, especially tragically
wrongly blaming Sunil Tripathi, a teenager who
had gone missing from his home and who was
later found to have committed suicide. Public
sentiment condemned this with comments
that expressed very negative evaluations of
the ‘irresponsible amateur sleuthing’ that had
been encouraged by the online group. Tapia
and LaLone discuss how these and other ethically problematic activities, were exacerbated
by a lack of interaction between the official
investigation teams at Boston PD and the FBI
and a lack of judgement and restraint from
mainstream media. Long established national
media treated the online sources like news
agencies, accepting and broadcasting ‘news’,
including statements about Sunil Tripathi
without questioning. Tracing public engagement in criminal investigations historically,
Tapia and Lalone draw links between printed
‘Wanted’ posters, televised appeals and crime
reconstructions and the use of social media for
involving the public in criminal investigations.
The ‘remediations’ or transformations that are
associated with technological affordances in
this current round of innovations seem significant. The crowd is without the training or
understanding of ethical and legal constraints
that professionals have, but it is equipped with
more power and reach, especially when amplified through mainstream media, and Tapia and
LaLone call for a reassessment of practices of
crowdsourcing investigations that could have
significant real-world implications in situations
that demand ‘socially responsible, careful,
considered action’.
The final paper in this special issue examines transformations of privacy engendered in
the context of socio-technical innovation in IT
supported crisis response and management,
especially when it is connected into smart city
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xiv International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014
technology. Büscher, Perng and Liegl question
the common assumption that privacy and liberty
must be sacrificed for security and explore
design for privacy as an approach that can support people in finding a better balance between
privacy and security. By identifying three key
trends that underpin the informationalization of
emergency response, they set the scene for a
study of privacy as a lived practice of boundary
management. First, there is great technological potential for gathering, sharing and utilising more information about populations and
environments affected by, or at risk of, crisis.
Second, people produce more personal information than ever before, richly and dynamically
documenting their lives and the world around
them through mobile technologies and interactions online. Third, real and perceived increases
in risk have generated a ‘culture of fear’ that can
be leveraged to justify surveillance, increased
information sharing and preventative measures.
People’s capabilities to separate public and
private have been transformed in this forcefield
of innovative momentum and with this, democratic cornerstones of liberty, freedom, dignity
and humanity have been worked loose. Current
attempts to counterbalance this, for example
through ‘privacy by design’, are inadequate.
Privacy is not a binary state of either withdrawal
into a sealed private sphere or transparent public
exposure, but a practically achieved and contextual matter of far more diversified boundary
management. What is to be made public or kept
private changes depending on what role one
is in and what dimensions of time and space
are involved. Fire fighters may be willing to
share intimate physiological data about their
breathing with colleagues, they might need to
manage disclosure of their precise location to
other responders in the course of the unfolding
response, and they might happily disclose such
information in an anonymised form for future
training simulations. New technologies and
practices of their appropriation have turned
documentary records of entire populations’
physiological data, movements, communications and social networks into indentifying
personal information as precise as fingerprints.
These new affordances make it difficult for
people to control the spread and use of personal
information, especially given the often silent and
invisible operation of technologies that analyse
such data. A range of challenges arise here
around the spread of surveillance, social sorting,
an erosion of civil liberties, and a securitization
of everyday life. To respond proactively to these
challenges and the transformations of people’s
capacities to modulate privacy, Büscher, Perng
and Liegl question the use of ‘privacy by design’
approaches, specifically their aim to ‘hardwire’
compliance with regulations into technologies.
In the context of emergency response, where
role improvisation, creativity and flexibility
as well as clear discipline and procedures are
essential aspects of effective practice, and
where ‘emergent interoperability’ and ad-hoc
assemblies of systems of systems are a powerful
possibility, it seems more promising to focus
on designing for material and social practices
of privacy boundary management. Such human
practice based approaches can respond more
directly and more carefully to the opportunities
and challenges inherent in the positively and
negatively disruptive innovation that shapes
the future of crisis response and management.
These concrete explorations can help us
understand better how ethics is distributed
between people, technology, and the economic,
social and cultural environment. Core questions for analysts, designers and practitioners
involved in IT innovation in crisis response and
management are how does technology become
ethically problematic or “good”? and how might
we control this? when ‘the multistable nature
of artefacts means that they may become used
in ways never anticipated by the designers or
originators’ (Introna 2007:16). Furthermore, in
many societies, ethics has become pluralized,
and ethical values are relative and subject to
dynamic processes of change and negotiation
over time. Such change should be the subject of
open democratic debate (Rawls, 1971; Habermas, 1996) and for that to happen, ethical issues
have to be noticed and turn from matters of fact,
that is, accepted, unnoticed, taken for granted,
common-sense facts of life, into ‘matters of
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International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014 xv
concern’, that is, interrogated, dissected, contested objects of critique (Latour, 2005). Another
key question for an ethically circumspect approach to IT innovation in information societies
therefore is how to make ethical opportunities,
challenges and risks public? and how to engage
and include (which?) stakeholders?
Unless technology is analysed and made as
one element within a nexus of values, practices
and ‘environmental’ conditions, unintended
consequences are likely to be hard to notice
and know in sufficient detail soon enough, to
anticipate, mitigate or avoid. Introna and Wood
argue that:
…the politics of technology is more than the
politics of this or that artefact. … we cannot
with any degree of certainty separate the purely
social from the purely technical, cause from
effect, designer from user, winners from losers,
and so on. (2004, 179)
A range of methodologies exist that respond
to these challenges, including responsible research and innovation (Von Schomberg, 2013),
collective experimentation (Wynne & Felt,
2007), disclosive ethics (Introna 2007), value
sensitive design (Friedman, Kahn & Boring,
2006), co-realization (Hartswood, Procter,
Slack, Voß, Buscher, Rouncefield, & Rouchy,
2002) and ‘design after design’ (Ehn, 2008). We
will briefly discuss these in relation to a roadmap
of future work that concludes this introduction.
However, before we do so, it is necessary to
acknowledge that the ‘multistable’ nature of
technologies does not mean that they can be
used in any which way users deem appropriate.
Technology is not neutral nor endlessly malleable. It actively enacts and shapes morality.
By summarising an exemplary disclosive ethics
enquiry into technological moral effects and
adding this to the collection of studies compiled
in this special issue, we seek to sharpen the
senses even further to the fluid morality and
politics of IT innovation in crisis response and
management, a domain where morality matters
perhaps more than anywhere else, because crises
can set precedents that may seep into normality
with far-reaching consequences.
Disclosive Ethics: Morality and
facial Recognition Systems
Two contributions to this special issue explore
how social media technologies have been used
by local authorities, police and citizens to identify persons during the 2010 Vancouver riots
(Rizza et al.) and the 2013 Boston bombing
investigations (Tapia and LaLone). Alongside
such innovation, since 9/11 there has been
an increase in investment in face recognition
systems (Introna and Wood 2004, Gallagher
2013). They compare images of the faces of
people captured by video or still cameras with
a database of images of faces. The functionality is threefold:
•
•
•
Verification: Are you who you say you are?
Identification: Who are you?
Watch list comparison: Are we looking for
you? (Phillips, Grother, Michaels, Blackburn, Elham & Bone 2003:6)
The system presents matches to human
operators and, when watchlist monitoring,
it can highlight matches to persons who are
wanted - ‘bad guys’ in a sketch by Phillips et al
(2003). For crisis management and emergency
response, Facial Recognition Systems have been
used for preventive policing to avert crises. For
example, during the London 2012 Olympics,
the already famed London CCTV infrastructure
was extended with facial recognition software
and London became ‘the most watched Olympic
Games in modern history, but not just in the
traditional sense of sporting spectators’ (Army
Technology, 2012). The US Department of
Homeland Security is currently testing Face
Recognition Systems with audiences and volunteers at mega sports events. This interest is
based on expectations that such systems may
be useful in the emergency response phase, for
example to identify perpetrators during or in
the immediate aftermath of violent attacks or
for victim identification (Gevaert & de With,
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xvi International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014
2013). In an experiment, researchers at Michigan State University were able to identify one
of the Boston Marathon bombing suspects from
law enforcement video (Klontz & Jain, 2013,
although see Gallagher 2013 for a discussion on
how facial recognition failed in this instance).
Advantages of such systems over human
face recognition practices are the number of
faces that can be processed in this way, and the
impartial, tireless and consistent application of
procedures. Indeed, face recognition is often
hailed as less biased than humans. Introna and
Wood cite statements not only from manufacturers and vendors, but also from prominent
security forums, such as ‘Face recognition is
completely oblivious to differences in appearance as a result of race or gender differences’
(2004:191). In light of concerns over social sorting and discrimination especially against Muslim populations in security measures (Vertigans
2010) such promises are powerful incentives
for ethically and socially responsible innovation champions. However, closer inspection
actually reveals bias to be an integral part of the
technology. A 2002 Face Recognition Vendor
Test of the most powerful algorithms found,
for example, that males were 6-9% points more
likely to be identified than females (Phillips,
cited in Introna and Wood 2004:190). Givens,
Beveridge, Draper, & Bolme (2003) also find
racial and age bias. Their experiments show that
Asians are easier [to recognize] than whites,
African-Americans are easier than whites, other
race members are easier than whites, old people
are easier than young people (cited in Introna
and Wood 2004:190)
This bias is not due to any intentionally
built in weighting; it is accidental: A function
of the absence of strong shadows on male
faces as well as darker and older faces, the
nature of images and their processing by this
face recognition system. The problem is that
being easier to recognize also makes being
classed as a false positive and being exposed
to investigations more likely. Thus, rather than
being neutral, some Face Recognition Systems
can (unintentionally) amplify political, cultural,
and institutional forms of discrimination. At
this juncture it becomes clear that morality is
not purely human but effected by collectives
of humans, technologies, and socio-economic
and political circumstances, ‘what Foucault
called dispositifs’ (Latour, in Introna 2007:13),
and technology can can play an active part in
its own right if it is not designed with careful
attention to unintended consequences. There is,
in this example, no clearly identifiable single
human or technological responsible agency for
morally problematic effects of discrimination:
‘there is often nobody there that “authored” it as
such’ (ibid), rather, there can be a Kafkaesque
culmination of indifference, error, abuse, lack of
transparency and accountability (Solove 2001)
that leads into moral dilemmas.
A lack of transparency is particularly
critical. Disclosive ethics is a methodology
that seeks to enable analysis of how seemingly
trivial details (such as the capacity of optical
mechanisms to process the light-reflective
quality of different types of skins) can turn
into politics and become tied to, and amplified
through other exclusionary practices (such
as political and cultural prejudice stoked by
a rhetoric of a ‘war on terror’), so that ‘what
seems to be a rather trivial injustice soon may
multiply into what may seem to be a coherent
and intentional strategy of exclusion’ (Introna
& Wood 2004:179). The method proceeds by
showing that many digital technologies are
silent as opposed to salient technologies and
opaque as opposed to transparent (Introna &
Wood, 2004:183).
Facial recognition is a particularly striking
example of a silent technology since it can be
imbedded into existing CCTV networks, making
its operation hard to notice. Furthermore, it is
passive in its operation. It requires no participation or consent from its targets. The process is
obscure, ‘non-intrusive, context-free’, based on
software algorithms that are proprietary, making
it difficult to get access to them for inspection
and scrutiny. Moreover, these algorithms are
so complex that even experts can struggle to
interpret and understand them. As a result, ‘for
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International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014 xvii
Table 2. Silent/Salient Technology (Introna &Wood 2004:183)
Silent Technology
Embedded/hidden
Passive in its operation
(limited user involvement)
Application flexibility
(open ended)
Obscure
(form/operation/outcome)
Mobile
(software)
Salient Technology
On the ‘surface’/conspicuous
Active in its operation (fair user involvement
Application stability
(firm)
Transparent
(form/operation/outcome)
Located
(hardware)
most ordinary members of society, facial recognition systems are an obscure “black box”’
(Introna & Wood 2004:183).
The lesson from this example of disclosive
ethics is that morality is not simply human.
Agency, intentionality and ethics are distributed within socio-technical systems, and it
is the particular way of ‘working together’
that makes a certain collective or network of
humans, environments and technologies have
(un-)intended, potentially undesirable ethical
effects. It would, therefore, be short-sighted to
think of technology as neutral, and to look for
the ethics of action solely in the way people use
technology. Technology can be employed with
benign intention, yet turn out to have ethically,
legally or socially undesirable effects. It is critical that the fact that just this technology in just
these circumstances produces discriminatory
effects should be notice-able and it should be
possible for this effect to be made into a matter of concern. This is in no way a technology
deterministic reading, where we claim that
technology is a ‘culprit’. Quite the opposite,
even though it is not so in this case, it could
just as well be the technology that is correcting human bias (Latour & Venn, 2002). The
consequence however has to be that efforts are
made to ‘subject [technological] artefacts to the
same level of scrutiny’ (Introna & Wood 2004:
195) as humans and to find approaches (in best
practice, legal regulation and design) to ensure
the scrutinizability socio-technical collectives,
especially in ethically highly charged areas such
as security or emergency response.
DOING IT MORE CaREfULLY:
fUTURE WORK
In the different, but related context of designing ‘solutions’ to address ecological crisis,
Bruno Latour argues ‘We have to be radically
careful, or carefully radical.’ (Latour, 2008, 7).
Supporting awareness of ELSI and practices of
addressing them in IT supported crisis response
and management is another extremely complex
challenge, in a highly sensitive and important
domain for contemporary societies, and we
would say we need to be both: radically careful
and carefully radical. Analysts, designers, and
practitioners must not only take responsibility
for (the inevitability of) unintended consequences with careful circumspection, they must
also formulate and pursue ambitious, perhaps
radical socio-technical critique and creativity.
The contributions to this special issue and the
discussion in this introduction map out a large
terrain for research and design, with some areas
uncharted and others skillfully cultivated, but
isolated from each other. In this concluding
section we suggest a roadmap for research to
develop studies that explore the unknown and
connect research in different subject areas and
disciplines (ethics, law, practice, social science, philosophy, anthropology, organizational
studies, design, computing), all with a view to
informing more careful and circumspect, yet
also ambitious and ‘radical’ ELSI aware sociotechnical innovation.
First of all, research is needed that explores
existing ethical, legal and social issues in emer-
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xviii International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014
gency response and management with a view
to how technologies might be designed and
constructively inserted to address opportunities
and challenges. Campbell’s Library of Essays
on Emergency, Ethics, Law and Policy (2012),
reflective practitioner reports (such as Larkin’s
review of the international Haiti response 2010),
post disaster reviews, or investigations into
specific challenges, such as Weick’s seminal
study of the failure of leadership and sensemaking in the Mann Gulch Disaster (1993),
Cole’s analysis of interoperability (2010) or
the UK government’s advice on data sharing
in emergencies (Armstrong, Ashton & Thomas,
2007) can serve as a quarry for inspiration, but
there is a need for more concrete and rich narratives and descriptions of ethical, legal and
social issues as they are encountered in practice.
Secondly, more studies are needed of how
the design and appropriation of new technologies generate known and ‘new’ ELSI – such as
a preference for ‘remote control’. They should
explore how these might be addressed through
innovative engineering and design as well as
innovative use and organizational policies.
Thirdly, a large range of methodologies exists for noticing ELSI and for folding critical
and creative ELSI awareness into innovation.
They currently exist in isolated pockets and
include different approaches that can sensitize
researchers, designers and practitioners to ELSI
and different design methodologies. Sensitizing
approaches are, for example:
•
•
Privacy Impact Assessment and Ethical Impact Assessment: Designed to be
embedded in innovation processes, based
on iteratively probing for ELSI through
systematic questioning of stakeholders
about the use and design of technologies
(Wright 2011).
Value Sensitive Design: A theoretically
grounded approach to integrating concern
for human values in a principled and comprehensive manner throughout the design
process, based on a tripartite methodology, consisting of conceptual, empirical,
•
•
•
•
and technical investigations (Friedman et
al, 2006).
Computer Supported Cooperative
Work: An interdisciplinary research field
that integrates insights from in-depth qualitative studies of collaborative work, often
using ethnographic methods into the design
of computer systems (Schmidt & Bannon,
1992, Suchmann, [1987] 2007)
Science and Technology Studies: A prolific, philosophically and sociologically
oriented interdisciplinary endeavour to understand the dynamic relationship between
science, technology, society and human
practice (Bijker & Law, 1992)
Responsible Research and Innovation
(RRI): A guiding concept for European
funded research, technology development
and management, aiming to ‘‘better align
both the process and outcomes of R&I,
with the values, needs and expectations of
European society.’’(European Commission
2014, Von Schomberg, 2013).
Software Studies: A relatively new field,
where researchers explore how algorithms
and computational logic function and ‘leak
out’ of the domain of computing into everyday life and examine ‘the judgements
of value and aesthetics that are built into
computing’, and the subcultures and politics of programming (Fuller, 2008).
Methods of designing in an ELSI aware
manner include
•
Privacy by Design: An approach with
several meanings and origins, specifically
focused on preserving privacy (Cavoukian,
2001; Langheinrich, 2001). Firstly, privacy
by design is about heightening sensitivity
to privacy issues during design. Secondly,
it can be about enforcing compliance with
privacy regulations through hard wiring
constraints on practices into design with
privacy enhancing technologies (PETs).
Existing examples include privacy policy
inspection, access control restriction, and
pseudonymisation tools (Pearson, 2009).
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International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014 xix
•
•
•
•
•
Collaborative Design (Co-Design): A
form of participatory design, and broadly
motivated approach to address ethical and
social aspects of IT innovation, focused on
utilising diverse forms of expertise through
engaging stakeholders as co-designers from
the earliest stages of design. The process
is iterative and based around prototypes
(Greenbaum & Kyng, 1991).
Co-Realization: Develops ideas of CoDesign through a synthesis of ethnomethodology (a particular form of sociological
enquiry) and participatory design. It moves
the locus of design and development
activities into workplace settings where
technologies will be used, emphasises
design-in-use and longitudinal involvement of IT professionals in the ‘lived work’
of users (Hartswood et al. 2002).
Critical Design: Also know as ‘design
noir’ (Dunne & Raby 2001) or ‘speculative
design’ (Sengers and Gaver 2006) straddles
into art and philosophy as it seeks to provoke and enable critical engagement. It
creatively and critically explores putative
futures entailed in contemporary technological developments, often by creating
objects that are obliquely functional but
also absurd or shocking.
Service Design: Arelatively new approach, focused on designing ‘services’
– assemblages of human, technological,
architectural, organizational components
(Meroni & Sangiorgi, 2011).
Collective Experimentation: A ‘new
regime’ of technoscientific innovation,
characterised by experimental implementation of new technologies in the context
of broad-based stakeholder engagement.
It requires new approaches to intellectual
property rights to ensure viability (such
as Open Source Software, General Public
Licence (GPL or copyleft) and ‘new forms
of interaction between scientists and other
actors, … because the traditional authority
of laboratory-based science is not sufficient’ (Wynne & Felt, 2007, 27).
•
Design for Design: An approach that
recognises that design does not end at
‘design time’. People appropriate technologies in a way that constitutes ‘design in
use’. This is often ill supported by silent
technologies and blackboxing. ‘Design
for design’ seeks to support people in
developing the skill and understanding
needed to be creative with technology as
well as knowing about the effects of using
technologies in particular ways (Ehn, 2008,
see also work discussed in Büscher, Perng
& Liegl, this issue)
There are overlaps, synergies, as well as
incompatibilities between these approaches and
there are no doubt more relevant approaches
than those listed here. What a list like this makes
plain, however, is that overviews, review essays
and handbooks are needed that draw together
the best from these different methods, prevent
researchers, designers and practitioners from
re-inventing the wheel and enabling them to
develop synergies, to make the work cumulative, not isolated. Reviews should aim to support
mixed methods – not standardisation. In addition, reflective analyses of successful attempts
and troublesome trajectories in employing these
methods would be useful, especially if they are
not focused not on the methods for methods’
sake, but the aims, practices and outcomes of
responsible research and innovation.
Finally, we need studies that review and
discuss the state of the art in ELSI innovation
in IT as well as law, policy and organizational
practice, for example privacy preserving techniques that can support multi-agency information sharing (see Büscher, Perng and Liegl, this
issue), usage and image retention restrictions
and public notice obligations for the use of RPAS
and innovative ways of supporting accountable
data flows (Cavoukian, 2012, Bracken-Roche,
Lyon, Mansour, Molnar, Saulnier & Thompson,
2014), clarification of liabilities emergency
agencies may incur when using automation and
remote controlled devices (Holloway, Knight,
& McDermid, 2014) or utilising citizen data
(Bailey Smith 2014). What regulatory instru-
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xx International Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management, 6(4), iv-xxiii, October-December 2014
ments, technologies, social or organizational
innovations could support more responsible and
circumspect emergency response and management? What exists? How does it work? How
could it be used? What is missing?
We hope you enjoy reading the papers in
this special issue and feel inspired to contribute
to this exciting field of research in the future.
Monika Büscher
Michael Liegl
Caroline Rizza
Hayley Watson
Guest Editors
IJISCRAM
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ENDNOTES
1
2
http://bssar.kemea-research.gr
http://www.tetratoday.com/news/tetras-loveaffair-with-the-asia-pacific
Monika Büscher is Professor of Sociology at the Centre for Mobilities Research at Lancaster University.
She researches the digital dimensions of contemporary ‘mobile lives’ with a focus on IT ethics and crises.
In 2011, she was awarded an honorary doctorate by Roskilde University, Denmark. She edits the book
series Changing Mobilities with Peter Adey.
Michael Liegl is Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Mobilities Research, Lancaster University.
In his research he investigates the interplay of technology, spatial organization and social relations with
a focus on the layering and hybridization of online and offline collaboration. Currently, he engages in
domain analysis and participatory design and in the exploration of social, legal and ethical implications
of IT supported emergency response in EU FP7 funded Bridge project http:/bridgeproject.eu/en. Recent
publications include: ‘Digital Cornerville’ (Lucius & Lucius 2010), and ‘Nomadicity and the Care of Place’
(Journal of CSCW 2014).
Caroline Rizza, PhD is Associate Prof. in Information and Communication Sciences, in the Economics,
Management and Social Sciences Department, Interdisplinary Institute on Innovation (i3) UMR – CNRS,
Institut Mines Telecom/Telecom ParisTech (Paris, France); member of the Observatory for Responsible
Innovation, and of the Chaire “Value and policy of personal data”. From 2010-2014, she worked at the
Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (Ispra, Italy) where she conducted research projects
on “Ethics of Social Networks”. Since then, her research has been focusing on the ethical, legal and social
issues raised by emergent IT in specific situations such as interpersonal relations, crisis situations, ICT
design (e.g. “privacy or ethics by design”, “responsible innovation”) and by special needs users. She is
currently co-leading a research project on the “silence of the chips” concept in RFID for IoT contexts
(CIPRIoT project funded by the Fondation Mines-Telecom and associated industrial partners) in collaboration with the JRC and the French CNRFID.
Hayley Watson, Senior Research Analyst, joined Trilateral in 2012. Her main area of expertise includes;
the role of technology including social media in relation to security, and she is particularly interested in
the use of ICT in crisis management. Prior to joining Trilateral, Hayley worked as a lecturer in sociology at Canterbury Christ Church University. She has published peer-reviewed journal articles on citizen
journalism in relation to security and social media and crisis management. She is actively involved in the
ISCRAM community (Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management) and co-chairs the ELSI
track and working group on Ethical, Legal and Social Issues of IT supported emergency response. Hayley
has a PhD in sociology from the University of Kent.
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