Int.J.Curr.Res.Aca.Rev.2016; 4(3): 120-130
International Journal of Current Research
and Academic Review
ISSN: 2347-3215 Volume 4 Number 3 (March-2016) pp. 120-130
Journal home page: http://www.ijcrar.com
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.20546/ijcrar.2016.403.014
Bioterrorism: Looming Threat, Potential Consequences and Defence
Pallavi Singh1*, Naman Naik2 and Lakhan L. Naik2
1
Matrikripa, G-39, Near Manju Kumari Sinha Smriti Park, P.C. Colony, Kankarbagh,
Patna -800020, Bihar, India
2
Lotus 404, Welfare Diah Height, Chiragora, Dhanbad- 826001, Jharkhand, India
*Corresponding author
KEYWORDS
A B S T R A C T
Bioweapons,
Nuclear Device,
Chemical cloud,
Biological agent.
Biological weapons have recently attracted the attention and the resources of
the world. Discerning the nature of the threat of bioweapons as well as
appropriate responses to them requires greater attention to the biological
characteristics of these instruments of war and terror. The dominant paradigm
of a weapon as a nuclear device that explodes or a chemical cloud that is set
adrift leaves us ill-equipped conceptually and practically to assess and thus to
prevent the potentially devastating effects of bioterrorism. Strengthening the
public health and infectious disease infrastructure is an effective step toward
averting the suffering that could be brought by a terrorist’s use of a biological
agent.
Introduction
Bioterrorism is terrorism involving the
intentional
release
or
dissemination
of biological
agents.
These
agents
are bacteria, viruses, or toxins, and may be
in a naturally occurring or a humanmodified form.
intelligence communities and to those
concerned with arms reduction issues. Only
recently have the civilian medical and public
health communities begun to be engaged in
examining the practical challenges posed by
this threat. Professional societies recently
have begun to incorporate discussions of
bioterrorism in national meetings. On the
international scene, in 1998 the World
Health Organization (WHO) decided to
establish an expert group to review and
revise its 1970 landmark document, Health
Aspects of Chemical and Biological
The past years have been marked by
escalating concerns in the world about the
threat of biological weapons. Primarily,
discussions about the implications of this
threat and its possible scenarios were
confined primarily to those in the military,
diplomatic, law enforcement, and
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Weapons. Clearly, there is growing public
awareness of the threat of bioterrorism, and
there is nascent concern among medical and
public health professionals as well. This is
important because if real progress is to be
made in addressing this difficult problem, a
substantially greater input of good science,
medicine, and public health will be needed
along with constant effort of creating
awareness.
History
Other allegations occurred during the post—
World War II period (11):
The Eastern European press stated that Great
Britain had used biological weapons in
Oman in 1957.
The Chinese alleged that the USA caused a
cholera epidemic in Hong Kong in 1961.
According to the U.S. Centre for Disease
Control and Prevention a bioterrorism attack
is the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria,
toxins or other harmful agents used to cause
illness or death in people, animals, or plants.
These agents are typically found in nature,
but it is possible that they could be mutated
or altered to increase their ability to cause
disease, make them resistant to current
medicines, or to increase their ability to be
spread into the environment. Biological
agents can be spread through the air, water,
or in food. Terrorists tend to use biological
agents because they are extremely difficult
to detect and do not cause illness for several
hours to several days. Some bioterrorism
agents, like the smallpox virus, can be
spread from person to person and some, like
anthrax, cannot.
In July 1964, the Soviet newspaper Pravda
asserted that the US Military Commission in
Columbia and Colombian troops had used
biological agents against peasants in
Colombia and Bolivia.
In 1969, Egypt accused the ―imperialistic
aggressors‖ of using biological weapons in
the Middle East, specifically causing an
epidemic of cholera in Iraq in 1966.
Types of Agent
Under current United States law, bioagents which have been declared by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human
Services or
the U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture to have the "potential to pose a
severe threat to public health and safety" are
officially defined as "select agents".
Bioterrorism is an attractive weapon because
biological agents are relatively easy and
inexpensive to obtain, can be easily
disseminated, and can cause widespread fear
and panic beyond the actual physical
damage they can cause. Military leaders,
however, have learned that, as a military
asset, bioterrorism has some important
limitations; it is difficult to employ a
bioweapon in a way that only the enemy is
affected and not friendly forces. A
biological
weapon
is
useful
to terrorists mainly as a method of creating
mass panic and disruption to a state or a
country.
The CDC categorizes these agents (A, B or
C) and administers the Select Agent
Program, which regulates the laboratories
which may possess, use, or transfer select
agents within the United States. As with US
attempts to categorize harmful recreational
drugs, designer viruses are not yet
categorized and avian H5N1 has been shown
to achieve high mortality and humancommunication in a laboratory setting.
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results against the Imperial Russian Army in
Finland in 1916. In 1993, the Aum
Shinrikyo used anthrax in an unsuccessful
attempt
in
Tokyo
with
zero
fatalities. Anthrax was used in a series of
attacks on the offices of several United
States Senators in late 2001. The anthrax
was in a powder form and it was delivered
by the mail. Anthrax is one of the few
biological agents that federal employees
have been vaccinated for.
Category A
These high-priority agents pose a risk to
national security, can be easily transmitted
and disseminated, result in high mortality,
have potential major public health impact,
may cause public panic, or require special
action for public health preparedness.
Tularemia
Tularemia, or rabbit fever, has a very low
fatality rate if treated, but can severely
incapacitate. The disease is caused by
the Francisella tularensis bacterium, and
can be contracted through contact with
the fur,
inhalation,
ingestion
of
contaminated
water
or
insect
bites. Francisella
tularensis is
very
infectious. A small number (10–50 or so
organisms) can cause disease. If F.
tularensis were used as a weapon, the
bacteria would likely be made airborne for
exposure by inhalation. People who inhale
an infectious aerosol would generally
experience severe respiratory illness,
including life-threatening pneumonia and
systemic infection, if they are not treated.
The bacteria that cause tularemia occur
widely in nature and could be isolated and
grown in quantity in a laboratory, although
manufacturing an effective aerosol weapon
would require considerable sophistication.
Additional facts affecting its possible use by
terrorists include the following:
Anthrax can be cultured from almost any
soil that supports livestock. Anthrax seed
stock, however, is difficult to process and
disseminate with great success. The minimal
lethal dose for inhalation of anthrax
(reportedly 5,000 to 10,000 spores) is high
compared with other biological agents.
Most infections (about 95 percent) occur
when the bacterium enters a cut or skin
abrasion--for example, in unprotected
workers handling the wool, hides, leather, or
hair products (especially goat hair) of
infected animals. Skin infection begins as an
itchy bump resembling an insect bite; within
two days, it develops into a vesicle and then
a painless ulcer, usually 1-3 cm in diameter,
with a characteristic black necrotic (dying)
area in the centre. Lymph glands in the area
may swell. About 20 percent of untreated
cases of infection through the skin result in
death. Deaths are rare with appropriate
antimicrobial therapy.
Anthrax
Anthrax is a non-contagious disease caused
by the spore-forming bacterium Bacillus
anthracis. An anthrax vaccine does exist but
requires many injections for stable use.
When discovered early anthrax can be cured
by
administering antibiotics (such
as
ciprofloxacin). Its first modern incidence in
biological warfare were when Scandinavian
"freedom fighters" supplied by the German
General Staff used anthrax with unknown
The anthrax
vaccine is
effective
for
preventing anthrax infection through the
skin. It appears to be effective for some, but
not all, strains of inhalation anthrax in some
animal species. Testing to determine the
effectiveness and possible side effects of this
vaccine is on process.
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by aerosol in the form of pneumonic
plague. The disease has a history of use in
biological warfare dating back many
centuries, and is considered a threat due to
its ease of culture and ability to remain in
circulation among local rodents for a long
period of time. The weaponized threat
comes mainly in the form of pneumonic
plague (infection by inhalation) It was the
disease that caused the Black Death in
Medieval Europe.
Smallpox
Smallpox is a highly contagious virus. It is
transmitted easily through the atmosphere
and has a high mortality rate (20–40%).
Smallpox was eradicated in the world in the
1970s, with the aid of worldwide
vaccination program. However, some virus
samples
are
still
available
in Russian and American laboratories. Some
believe that after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, cultures of smallpox have become
available in other countries. Although
people born pre-1970 will have been
vaccinated for smallpox under the WHO
program, the effectiveness of vaccination is
limited since the vaccine provides high level
of immunity for only 3 to 5 years.
Revaccination's protection lasts longer. As a
biological weapon smallpox is dangerous
because of the highly contagious nature of
both the infected and their pox. Also, the
infrequency with which vaccines are
administered among the general population
since the eradication of the disease would
leave most people unprotected in the event
of an outbreak. Smallpox occurs only in
humans, and has no external hosts or
vectors.
Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers
This includes hemorrhagic fevers caused by
members of the family Filoviridae (Marburg
virus and Ebola virus), and by the
family Arenaviridae (for
example Lassa
virus and Machupo virus). Ebola virus
disease has fatality rates ranging from 50–
90%. No cure currently exists, although
vaccines are in development. The Soviet
Union investigated the use of filoviruses for
biological
warfare,
and
the Aum
Shinrikyo group unsuccessfully attempted to
obtain cultures of Ebola virus. Death from
Ebola virus disease is commonly due
to multiple organ failure and hypovolemic
shock. Marburg virus was first discovered
in Marburg, Germany. No treatments
currently exist aside from supportive care.
The arena viruses have a somewhat reduced
case-fatality rate compared to disease caused
by filo viruses, but are more widely
distributed, chiefly in central Africa and
South America.
Botulinum Toxin
The neurotoxin Botulinum is one of the
deadliest toxins known, and is produced by
the
bacterium Clostridium
botulinum.
Botulism causes death by respiratory failure
and paralysis. Furthermore, the toxin is
readily available worldwide due to its
cosmetic applications in injections.
Category B
Category B agents are moderately easy to
disseminate and have low mortality rates.
Bubonic Plague
Plague is a disease caused by the Yersinia
pestis bacterium. Rodents are the normal
host of plague, and the disease is transmitted
to humans by flea bites and occasionally
Brucellosis (Brucella species)
Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens
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Glanders (Burkholderia mallei)
Defence against Bioterrorism
Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei)
Effect of Biotechnology on Biological
Warfare Conventional / Traditional
Agent
Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci)
Historically, BW (Biological warfare)
agents of concern have included a selective
group of pathogens and toxins. They are all
naturally occurring organisms or their toxic
product, e.g. Anthrax, plague, botulinum
toxin, etc. Genetically Modified Agents:
with the advent of recombinant DNA
technology, an organism's genetic makeup
may be altered and genetically modified BW
agents may be produced. Examples of
potential modifications include antibiotic
resistance, increased aerosol stability, or
heightened
pathogenesis.
Importantly,
genetic modifications may epitopes or
sequences used for detection and
diagnostics, necessitating that multiple
points of reference be incorporated into
these systems and highlighting the need for
security regarding biodetection strategies.
However, genetically modified BW agents
will remain closely related to the parent
agent at the genetic level and should be
generally identifiable using traditional
diagnostics. Ultimately, these modifications
serve to increase effectiveness of a
traditional BW agent or counteract known
aspects of the target population’s biomedical
defence strategy without significantly
manipulating the parental organism in a
manner that might compromise natural
properties suitable for biological warfare
use.
Q fever (Coxiella burnetii)
Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor
beans)
Abrin toxin from Abrus precatorius (Rosary
peas)
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B
Typhus (Rickettsia prowazekii)
Viral encephalitis
(alphaviruses,
for
example: Venezuelan equine encephalitis,
eastern equine encephalitis, western equine
encephalitis)
Water supply threats (for example, Vibrio
cholerae, Cryptosporidium parvum)
Food safety threats (for example, Salmonella
Species,
E.coli
O157:H7,
Shigella,
Staphylococcus aureus)
Category C
Category
C
agents
are
emerging pathogens that
might
be engineered for
mass
dissemination
because of their availability, ease of
production
and
dissemination,
high
mortality rate, or ability to cause a major
health impact.
Advanced Biological Warfare Agents
(ABW)
Nipah virus
Hantavirus
SARS
H1N1 a strain of influenza (flu)
HIV/AIDS
Developed technologies across multiple
disciplines in the biological sciences have
revolutionized bio war by facilitating an
entirely new class of fully engineered agents
referred to as advanced biological warfare
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(ABW) agents. Emerging biotechnologies
likely will lead to a paradigm shift in
biological warfare agent development;
future biological agents could be rationally
engineered to target specific human
biological systems at the molecular level.
This is a departure from the traditional
model of BW, which is focused on the
naturally occurring agent, not the target
organism. Biological science allow BW
agent developers to identify biochemical
pathways critical for physiological processes
and engineer specific ABW agents to exploit
vulnerabilities The threat presented by
traditional agents has been increasing since
the early 20th century but eventually will
level off because of two major factors:
mischaracterized as a natural outbreak and
remain undetected.
Development of novel agents previously
unknown to the medical community would
yield BW agents that are difficult to
diagnose and treat.
Advanced agents could be developed to
circumvent vaccines or treatments designed
to counter traditional agents.
Agents could be tailored to target a specific
population based on genetic or cultural
traits.
Sterilizing, oncogenic, or debilitating agents
could be created for use as a strategic
weapon against a target population for long
term effects. These new use options likely
will make BW more attractive. Thus,
advances in biotechnology research may
lead to a coming revolution in BW
development for technologically proficient
rogue nations and possibly sophisticated
terrorist organizations.
1. Development of targeted medical counter
measures probably will reduce threats
posed by current biological warfare
agents.
2. The number of such agents that contain
properties suitable for biological warfare
is finite.
New Biological warfare Use Options
Microbial Forensics
The wide range of effects that can be
designed into ABW agents will expand
options for employment significantly.
Among these new use options, for example,
would be the opportunity to covertly target a
civilian population for strategic effect with
minimal risk of attribution. Other may
include:-
A new Forensic discipline has come up,
dedicated to analyzing evidence from a
bioterrorist attack, biocrime or inadvertent
microorganism / toxin release for attribution
purposes (who was responsible for the
crime). Microbial forensics has led to some
high-pro-file discoveries. For example,
sequencing of amplified viral fragments
from the dentist and the infected patients
supported the alleged transmission of HIV
from a Florida dentist to several patients.
Recently, using multiple locus Variable
Number Tandem Repeat (VNTR) analysis,
the Aum shinrikyo b. Anthracis bioterror
strain was identified as the veterinary
vaccine strain, Sterne 34f26.
Customizable aspects of advanced agent
development may allow for predictable,
desired results following agent release.
Unusual clinical presentation could allow a
biological
warfare
attack
to
be
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Int.J.Curr.Res.Aca.Rev.2016; 4(3): 120-130
to six hours due to its automatic response
system, whereas the previous system
required aerosol detectors to be manually
transported to laboratories. Resilience is a
multifaceted issue, one way in which this is
ensured is through exercises that establish
preparedness; programs like the Anthrax
Response Exercise Series exist to ensure
that, regardless of the incident, all
emergency personnel will be aware of the
role they must fill. Moreover, by providing
information and education to public leaders,
emergency medical services and all
employees will significantly decrease the
impact of bioterrorism.
Significance of Microbial Forensics
It will help law enforcement to identify the
source of the evidence sample. Evidence can
stand to the scrutiny of judges in the
courtroom as well as national decision and
policy makers.
1.
Prevents and deters biocrime and
identifies perpetrators
2. Having a well-prepared response plan
might discourage at least some
terrorists.
3. Cases in which infected people have
intentionally infected others may well
end up in court.
4. A major benefit, however, is that much of
the outcome would also be applicable to
tracing natural outbreaks of disease.
Aspects
of
Protection
Bioterrorism Include
Enhancing the Technological Capabilities
of First Responders: This is accomplished
through numerous strategies. The first of
these strategies was developed by the
Science and Technology Directorate (S and
T) of DHS to ensure that the danger of
suspicious powders could be effectively
assessed, (as many dangerous biological
agents such as anthrax exist as a white
powder). By testing the accuracy and
specificity of commercially available
systems used by first responders, the hope is
that all biologically harmful powders can be
rendered ineffective.
against
Detection and Resilience Strategies in
Combating Bioterrorism like that of USA:
This occurs primarily through the efforts of
the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), a part
of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), whose role is to prepare for an
emergent situation that impacts the health of
the American populace. Detection has two
primary technological factors. First there is
OHA's BioWatch program in which
collection devices are disseminated to thirty
high risk areas throughout the country to
detect the presence of aerosolized biological
agents before symptoms present in patients.
This is significant primarily because it
allows a more proactive response to a
disease outbreak rather than the more
passive treatment of the past.
Enhanced
Equipment
for
First
Responders: One recent advancement is the
commercialization of a new form of
Tyvex™ armor which protects first
responders and patients from chemical and
biological contaminants. There has also been
a new generation of Self-Contained
Breathing Apparatuses (SCBA) which has
been recently made more robust against
bioterrorism
agents.
All
of these
technologies combine to form what seems
like a relatively strong deterrent to
bioterrorism.
Implementation of the Generation-3
Automated Detection System
This advancement is significant simply
because it enables action to be taken in four
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Table.1 Examples of Biological and Chemical Warfare Use During the Past 2000 Years
Time
600 B.C.
1155
1346
1495
1675
1710
1763
1797
1863
World War I
World War II
1980–1988
1995
Event
Solon uses the purgative herb hellebore during the siege of Krissa
Emperor Barbarossa poisons water wells with human bodies in Tortona,
Italy
Tartar forces catapult bodies of plague victims over the city walls of
Caffa, Crimean Peninsula (now Feodosia, Ukraine)
Spanish mix wine with blood of leprosy patients to sell to their French
foes in Naples, Italy
German and French forces agree to not use “poisones bullets”
Russian troops catapult human bodies of plague victims into Swedish
cities
British distribute blankets from smallpox patients to Native Americans
Napoleon floods the plains around Mantua, Italy, to enhance the spread
of malaria
Confederates sell clothing from yellow fever and smallpox patients to
Union troops during the US Civil War
German and French agents use glanders and anthrax
Japan uses plague, anthrax, and other diseases; several other countries
experiment with and develop biological weapons programs
Iraq uses mustard gas, sarin, and tabun against Iran and ethnic groups
inside Iraq during the Persian Gulf War
Aum Shinrikyo uses sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system
Table.2 Biological Warfare Programs During World War II
Nation
Germany
Canada
United
Kingdom
Numbers of
workers
(estimated)
100–200
small
40–50
Japan
several
thousand
Soviet
Union
USA
several
thousand
1500–3000
Focus
Offense research forbidden
Animal and crop diseases, rinderpest, anthrax
Animal and crop diseases, anthrax, foot and mouth disease
Extensive; official information suppressed by a treaty with USA
in which all charges for war crimes were dropped for exchange
of information from experiments
Typhus, plague
Chemical herbicides, anthrax (started too late to be important)
Project Bio Shield: The accrual of vaccines
and treatments for potential biological
threats,
also
known
as
medical
countermeasures has been an important
aspect in preparing for a potential
bioterrorist attack; this took the form of a
program beginning in 2004, referred to as
Project BioShield. The Department of
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Defense also has a variety of laboratories
currently working to increase the quantity
and efficacy of countermeasures that
comprise the national stockpile. Efforts have
also been taken to ensure that these medical
countermeasures are able to be disseminated
effectively in the event of a bioterrorist
attack.
input1. The threat of a smallpox attack by
terrorists is still one of the major concern.
Of the weapons of mass destruction
(nuclear, chemical, and biological), the
biological ones are the most greatly feared ,
but the world is least well prepared to deal
with them. Virtually all federal efforts in
strategic planning and training have so far
been directed toward crisis management
after a chemical release or an explosion.
Should such an event occur, fire, police, and
emergency rescue workers would proceed to
the scene and would stabilize the situation,
deal with casualties, decontaminate, and
collect evidence for identification of a
perpetrator. This exercise is not unfamiliar.
Spills of hazardous materials, explosions,
fires, and other civil emergencies are not
uncommon events. The expected scenario
after release of an aerosol cloud of a
biological agent is entirely different. The
release could be silent and would almost
certainly be undetected. The cloud would be
invisible, odorless, and tasteless. It would
behave much like a gas in penetrating
interior areas. No one would know until
days or weeks later that anyone had been
infected (depending on the microbe). Then
patients would begin appearing in
emergency rooms and physicians’ offices
with symptoms of a strange disease that few
physicians had ever seen. Special measures
would be needed for patient care and
hospitalization,
obtaining
laboratory
confirmation regarding the identity of
microbes unknown to most laboratories,
providing vaccine or antibiotics to large
portions of the population, and identifying
and possibly quarantining patients. Trained
epidemiologists would be needed to identify
where and when infection had occurred, so
as to identify how and by whom it may have
been spread. Public health administrators
would be challenged to undertake
emergency management of a problem alien
Developing a Defence Strategy: In
formulating a biochemical defence policy,
hazard assessment is an essential factor.
Thus the utility and advantages and
disadvantages of CB (Chemical Bio
warfare)
weapons
require
careful
consideration. In general war, the use of CB
weapons would do little harm to the
infrastructure of territory to be occupied—
an advantage for the user. The fact that they
may incapacitate rather than kill outright is
an important consideration. This is because
they could overwhelm the medical and
casualty services, whereas the dead have no
need of either. However, at present,
weaponization and dispersion of CB
weapons present difficulties. Accurate
targeting is seldom possible and collateral
effects may occur in the attacker's own
troops; moreover, retribution in kind might
also follow. In CB attacks on civilian
populations the fear factor works to the
advantage of the terrorist. The use of anthrax
letters illustrates this point; additionally this
method allows for a delayed onset of
infection, enabling the perpetrators to move
away and attack elsewhere. CB agents may
be used as weapons of mass destruction by
spreading epidemics among human or
animal populations or commercial crops
while avoiding collateral damage to the
infrastructure. It is not generally recognized
that, although many CB agents are easy and
cheap to produce, effective detection and
countermeasures are as yet inadequate to
meet a large-scale challenge. Little progress
has been made on antivirals and vaccine
research, and development requires further
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How to cite this article:
Pallavi Singh, Naman Naik and Lakhan L. Naik. 2016. Bioterrorism: Looming Threat,
Potential Consequences and Defence. Int.J.Curr.Res.Aca.Rev.4(3): 120-130.
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.20546/ijcrar.2016.403.014
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