eliminativism
The view that, because mental states and properties are items posited by a protoscientific theory
(called folk psychology), the science of the future is likely to conclude that entities such as
beliefs, desires, and sensations do not exist. The alternate most often offered is physicalist and
the position is thus often called 'eliminative materialism'.
Details:
Introduction
Like its predecessor, the mind-brain identity theory, eliminativism claims that it is an empirical
fact, rather than a conceptual necessity, that mental states are identical with brain states, and that
this fact is justified only by scientific evidence. But most historians of science now believe that
scientific progress usually does not establish identities between the entities described by old
theories and new ones. The eliminativists argue that there is thus no reason to assume that such
identities will be found when science develops a detailed alternative to the folk psychological
view of mental states.
Most criticisms of eliminativism center around the claim that folk psychology is somehow
different in kind from the theories that the eliminativists are advocating as replacements.
Sometimes the argument is made that mental entities are different in kind from theories, because
they are directly given to us, or are part of practical activities rather than theoretical discourse. It
is also argued that folk psychology must remain autonomous with respect to physical or
neuroscientific theories. Some justify claims of autonomy on the assertion that psychology
cannot be reduced to neuroscience. Others say that folk psychology is irreducibly normative,
and because science is only descriptive, reducing folk psychology to a scientific theory would be
attempting to derive an ought from an is.
Other criticisms are that the principles and scientific evidence used to justify eliminativism
imply a pragmatist theory of truth, which does not support the traditional view of truth and
reference that eliminativism presupposes. Some pragmatist views of truth would require us to
say that the posits of folk psychology must be true in some sense because they are so useful.
Also, some recent theories of reference claim that even if a theory is false, we cannot infer from
this that what it describes does not exist, or that its terms do not refer.
Origins of the Debate
How Identity Theory gave rise to Eliminative Materialism
The identity theory of mind was first suggested by E. G. Boring (1933), although it was made
popular in philosophy by U.T. Place (1956) further developed by Place in dialogue with D.M.
Armstrong (1965), J.C.C. Smart (1959) and others. Identity theorists claimed that mental states
are really brain states. However, they did not claim that this was a conceptual truth. Identity
statements between minds and brains are contingent identities, which we accept as true only
because scientific research tells us they true. However, it was far from clear that it was possible
for science to prove that brain states were identical to mental states. Scientific research does
discover causal connections between brain states and mental states, but connections are not
identities. As Shaffer put it "For one property to be reducible to another, they must be different;
something cannot be reducible to itself" (p. 120 in Borst 1970). Feyerabend (1963) also pointed
out that if the connection between material facts and mental facts is an identity, it has to be
expressed as a biconditional. This biconditional " not only implies , as it is intended to imply,
that mental events have physical features; it also seems to imply (if read from the right to the
left) that some physical events, viz. central{brain} processes, have non-physical features" (p. 172
in Rosenthal 1971).
Furthermore, any claim that the mind-brain identity is a scientific fact has to take into account
how science actually operates. When we consider the most recent developments in the history
and philosophy of science, eliminative materialism emerges as an alternative to the mind-brain
identity. Eliminative materialism appeared to dissolve the problems with establishing identities
between mental states and brain states , but it also created a whole set of new problems.
Eliminative Materialism and Philosophy of Science
In philosophy of science, arguments by Wilfrid Sellars and W.V.O. Quine prompted many
philosophers to reject the idea that the properties of our mental states are directly given to us.
These arguments criticize what Sellars called "the Myth of the Given" (Sellars 1963) and what
Quine called a "Dogma of Empiricism". (Quine 1961) Quine's arguments show that science
does not rest on a foundation of immediately given experience, but is theoretical "all the way
down", even to our experience of ordinary physical objects. Sellars takes the implications of this
even further, saying that even our experience of our own inner states is theory-based. This
means that if scientific evidence is what justifies the claim that mental states are brain states, it
does so by establishing a relationship between mental concepts and neurological ones. This
relationship is not significantly different from what occurs when one scientific theory advances
beyond another one, which means that the history of science becomes an essential discipline for
philosophers of mind.
When philosophers of science began to take history of science seriously, it seemed natural at
first to assume that a new theory always had some sort of identity relation with its predecessor.
This relationship was supposedly maintained by what Ernst Nagel called "Bridge Laws", (Nagel
1961) which established just the sort of connections between old and new theories that the
identity theorists needed for brain states and mental states. But thanks to historical work done by
Kuhn (1962) Feyerabend (1962) and Laudan (1977,1981) it became clear that progress in
science does not usually result in bridge laws. Most scientific progress comes from what Kuhn
called 'Normal Science', which rarely, if ever, introduces new terms into scientific discourse, and
thus does not need bridge laws. Scientific discourse usually adopts new concepts to refer to
newly posited or discovered entities during what Kuhn called scientific revolutions. The thing
that makes the introduction of these new concepts revolutionary, rather than evolutionary, is that
there aren't anything like bridge laws to relate new theories to old ones. Instead the old theory is
often eliminated, and replaced with a better theory that rejects or ignores the ontological
assumptions of the old theory. For example, there are no identity relationships between the
alchemical essences and the chemical elements, because we now claim that there are no
alchemical essences.
Rorty (1965) and Feyerabend (1963a and 1963b) thus concluded that if scientific progress was
the model for the relationship between brain states and mental states, then there is no need to
establish identities between the two. Once we have a sufficiently sophisticated neuroscience, we
may be able to simply say that there are no mental states. This effectively disposes of the
problems raised by Shaffer and Feyerabend mentioned above. The differences between identity
and causal correlation were no longer of significance, because we were now talking about only
one entity--the brain state-- the mental state having been consigned to the ontological trash heap.
History of the Idea of Eliminative Materialism
Feyerabend, Rorty and the Churchlands
Feyerabend had nothing more to say on this subject after writing the two articles cited above.
Rorty, however, continued to defend his position against critical articles ( such as Cornman
1968a and 1968b, Lycan and Pappas 1972, and Bernstein 1968). Rorty had originally called his
position the disappearance theory of mind, but he later adopted the term eliminative materialism,
which had first been used by Cornman in his 1968a. Besides responding to many of Cornman's
and Bernstein's objections in Rorty 1970, he also devoted all of Chapter II of Rorty 1979 to a
more detailed version of the thought experiment in Rorty 1965.
Lycan and Pappas 1972 point out that if Rorty claimed that it is only possible in principle to
replace mental talk with neurological talk, this would mean that mental states are as real as tables
and chairs, because in principle all talk about tables and chairs could be replaced by talk about
atoms and molecules. This would make Rorty's brand of eliminative materialism only trivially
true. Lycan and Pappas claim that Rorty was somewhat equivocal in his 1965 and 1970 papers
about whether the elimination of mental language was actually desirable, or only possible in
principle. Paul and Patricia Churchland, however, developed a more aggressive form of
eliminative materialism. They claimed that the elimination of talk about mental states was not
only possible and desirable, but a fully viable goal for a neuroscientific research program.
It is important, however, not to confuse the Churchland's eliminative materialism with the more
extreme and widely publicized position of B.F. Skinner. Because the Churchland's work is also
discussed by non-philosophers in the cognitive science community, it is quite common for
people trained in psychology to react negatively to eliminative materialism because they are
reminded of passages like this from B.F. Skinner's "Beyond Freedom and Dignity."
Aristotle argued that a falling body accelerated because it grew more jubilant as it found itself
nearer home. All of this was eventually abandoned, but . . . Almost everyone who is concerned
with human affairs. . . continues to talk about human behavior in this prescientific way. ( Skinner
1971. pp. 8-9)
The implication of this and other passages in Skinner was that any talk that presupposed
something like folk psychology had already been proven to be false, and that talk about mental
states could be successfully replaced right now by Skinner's own behaviorist psychology. These
philosophical presuppositions of Skinnerian behaviorism were a serious impediment to many
kinds of psychological research, and have now justly been relegated to the history of
psychology. It is natural for psychologists to assume that the Churchlands are making the same
claims for neuroscience that Skinner once made for behaviorism, and to resist eliminative
materialism for fear that it would compel a similar narrowness of focus. The Churchlands
recognize, however, that as long as there are important nuances in folk psychology that the
neuroscientific view cannot capture, folk psychology is not ready to be eliminated. As Paul
Churchland puts it "If and when the change ever happens, it will be because we are all gleefully
pulled rather than grudgingly pushed. We will be pulled, if at all, by the manifold, personal,
social, and practical advantages of the new framework: by the clarity it represents, by the
freedoms it makes possible, by the cruelties it diverts, and by the deeper interactions it affords."
(Churchland 1998)
Misunderstanding is also encouraged by the fact that the Churchlands alternately emphasize two
different aspects of their message, which can sometimes create an illusion that they believe that
folk psychology is already on the way out. On one hand, they admit that our current neurological
language has a long way to go before it could eliminate mental language, and that it is purely an
empirical question whether folk psychology will actually be eliminated. But they also insist that
folk psychology does have some very serious problems, and that current developments in
neuroscience appear to be on the way to solving those problems. This is why they see
eliminative materialism not as a mere logical possibility of interest to no one but philosophers,
but as a genuine empirical possibility that deserves serious scientific attention. Many of the
Churchlands' critics actually accept that the elimination of folk psychology is possible, and
attack only the claim that elimination is probable. (such as Horgan and Woodward 1985, Horgan
and Graham 1990). The Churchlands have less at stake with respect to these kinds of criticisms,
and have in fact softened their position in response to some of them. But this should not be taken
as an abandonment of the core principles of eliminative materialism.
Stich and the Case against Belief
Stephen Stich (1983), claims that logic-based cognitive science provides evidence against the
validity of folk psychology, because it is based on what Stich calls a syntactic theory of mind.
(STM). This means that it must focus exclusively on processes that are assumed to take place
entirely within the brain, and ignore how those processes relate to the outside world. The folk
concept of belief, however, is necessarily semantic, not just syntactic. The belief that Paris is the
capitol of France is what it is not only because of its relationship to other sentences, but also
because of its relationship to Paris and France. Consequently, there is no place for the folk
concept of belief in the ontology of cognitive science.
Stich 1983 devotes several pages to the Churchlands' eliminativism, stating their numerous
agreements and relatively few disagreements with him, and Patricia Churchland returns the
compliment in P.S. Churchland 1986. Stich has also argued that Dennett should be an
eliminativist about beliefs, given the numerous criticisms they both have of the concept. (Stich
1980, 1981). But, as Susan Haack points out, the Churchland and Stich arguments to some
degree work against each other. One of Churchland's arguments for eliminative materialism is
that we have good reason to believe that all sciences will be ultimately reducible to the physical
sciences. Stich's syntactic theory of mind, in contrast, is justified by the need to keep
psychology autonomous (and thus not reducible to physics) (Haack 1993 pp. 159-160) Haack's
argument against Stich is strengthened by Fodor's many arguments that logic-based cognitive
science is a refinement of the principles that underlie folk psychology and thus would only refine
and not eliminate folk psychology. [1] Also, Fodor 1994 uses something like Stich's argument
to cut in the opposite direction, arguing that cognitive science is on the wrong track because it is
incapable of explaining reference and other semantic properties of language. The fact that some
scientists and philosophers now claim that cognition cannot be understood without making
reference to an organism's environment also shows that Stich's syntactic theory of mind is
perhaps not even the best, let alone the only, option. (Clark 1997, Bechtel and Abrahamsen
1993).
Ramsey, Stich, and Garon 1990 brought Stich's arguments somewhat more in line with the
Churchlands by demonstrating that at least one connectionist model of the mind was also
incompatible with the folk psychological concept of belief. But Stich eventually became a critic
of eliminativism, for reasons that we will discuss later on.
Dennett and the Intentional Stance
Daniel Dennett agrees with many of the key points of the eliminative materialists. He admits that
he sees the future of the sciences of the mind "very much as Churchland does, but with some
shifts in emphasis" (Dennett 1987 p.235). These shifts arise partly because, in Dennett 1975 and
1989, he is addressing at least part of his message to psychologists who were trained in
Skinnerian behaviorism, and are now interested in Cognitive Science.
Talking about the mind, for many people is rather like talking about sex: slightly embarrassing,
undignified, maybe even disreputable. . . .Those in other disciplines who are newly eager, or at
any rate reluctantly willing, to indulge in various mentalistic sorts of talk find that philosophers,
who have never been shy about talking about the mind, have a lot to tell them about how to do it.
(Dennett 1987 p. 1)
Dennett thus assumes that much of his audience will already be inclined to accept the
eliminativist dismissal of folk psychology. Consequently, even though Dennett accepts, and even
frequently defends, the eliminativist position, he also emphasizes how useful folk psychology is,
not only in daily life, but in scientific disciplines like Artificial Intelligence. Because
philosophers have not been shy about talking about the mind, eliminativism was a radical
position in the philosophy community. But for behaviorist psychologists, it was a stagnating
orthodoxy that needed to be transcended.
Dennett's term for folk psychology is "The Intentional Stance". He says that when we take a
certain "stance" towards other human beings, we can think of them as if they had beliefs, desires,
and the ability to make inferences from those beliefs and desires. Taking this stance makes it
much easier to predict the behavior of humans than if we assume that people are only
mechanisms governed by the laws of physics. We can, for example, use the intentional stance
to predict that Sally will go to the refrigerator and get milk, if we know that she wants milk and
believes that there is milk in the refrigerator. This stance also works, with noticeably less
effectiveness, for animals, and even for artifacts such as chess-playing computers. If we were
omnipotent, we could predict that Sally would go to the refrigerator using nothing but the laws
of physics, but because we are not, it makes sense to continue to use the concepts of the
intentional stance/folk psychology. Despite it's usefulness, however, the intentional stance must
be seen as only a stance --i.e. a way of looking at things which is strictly speaking, or in some
sense, false or incomplete. This is because it breaks down on numerous occasions. If Sally has
been has been poisoned or is suffering from a brain tumor, we cannot explain her behavior by
referring to her beliefs and desires; we need chemistry and/or neuroscience. But most of the
time, the intentional stance is by far the best conceptual system we have for predicting human
behavior. Dennett usually argues that it would be for all practical purposes impossible to do
scientific research or daily social interactions without it, at least at this point in time.
Dennett spends a fair amount of time discussing both the limitations of the intentional stance
(Dennett 1978 chapters 3, 11; 1987 chapter 5) and its usefulness (Dennett 1978 chapter 1; 1987
chapters 2,3, 4, 7). Consequently, when it comes to claims about the ontological status of the
entities described by the intentional stance, Dennett's position is more ambivalent than that of
Stich or the Churchlands. Dennett expresses his ontology of the mental in analogies (beliefs are
like voices, or centers of gravity) that get interpreted in conflicting ways by different
commentators. In Dennett 1991a, he describes his position as "semi-realism" which grants
"quasi-existence" to mental entities. (p. 1 ) But ultimately he responds to Haugeland's detailed
exegesis of that paper (in Dahlbom 1993) by saying "I am shy about drawing ultimate
conclusions about Reality, Truth. . .and the other grand topics of metaphysics and
epistemology". (p, 204). Dennett apparently prefers an equivocal position on these ontological
questions to a position that he feels would force him to either downplay or ignore the strengths
and weaknesses of folk psychology.
In Dennett's later writings, however, he does seem to be more willing to think in terms that deemphasize the intentional stance. He is overtly eliminativist about the concept of a unified self
in Dennett 1991b, (Although he softens this eliminativism with an analogy in chapter 1 of
Dennett 1991b, and concludes that book by saying that he is only replacing one metaphor with
another.) And he seems to imply in Dennett 1995 that "the universal acid" of Darwinian natural
selection in some sense falsifies or eliminates the concept of intentionality. Perhaps the only real
difference between Dennett and the other eliminative materialists is which possibilities they each
consider to be the most probable. Dennett is betting that the ultimate relationship between
neuroscience and the intentional stance will be closer to a reduction than an elimination.(at least
in his earlier writings.) The Churchlands and (the early) Stich are betting on an outright
elimination. But both sides agree that neither can be certain that the other is wrong.
Analysis of the Eliminative Argument
The basic form of the Eliminative argument is something like this [2] :
1. Folk psychology is not significantly different from obsolete scientific theories like
Alchemy, Phlogiston etc.
2. Alchemy, Phlogiston, etc. are false, do not apply to reality, and the entities they describe
do not exist.
3. Therefore, It is possible that folk psychology is false, does not apply to reality, and the
entities it describes don't exist.
Because eliminative materialism is a speculation about the future, based on analogy, this
argument is not a straight forward logical entailment. It does, however, give a good starting point
for describing the history of the criticisms of eliminative materialism. Most criticisms have
attacked the first premise, by trying to prove that in some sense folk psychology is significantly
different from other theories, or not a theory at all. This is an understandable approach, because
the eliminativist's first premise is contrary to common sense, and until Quine and Sellars, was
contrary to most philosophical thinking as well. The second premise, in contrast, seems so selfevident that any argument that denied it would seem to be a reductio ad absurdum. There are,
however, arguments raised against the second premise in Rockwell (1995) which claim that
Churchland's own pragmatism is inconsistent with the idea that alchemy and phlogiston are
unconditionally false theories, and by Stich (1996, 1998) who argued (against his own earlier
eliminativism) that there is no reason to assume that a theory does not refer to anything just
because it is false.
Objections against the First Premise
Eliminative Materialism is Self-Contradictory
Many people claim that folk psychology is different from scientific theories because it is
impossible to think without it. The simplest version of this argument is that when eliminativists
say that they believe that there are no such things as beliefs, they are contradicting themselves,
and therefore their arguments are invalid. Despite the fact that this argument has been answered
by both Churchlands (P.M. Churchland 1989 p. 22; P.S. Churchland 1986 pp. 397-398) and in
Ramsey 1990, it continues to reappear. (Rudder-Baker 1987; Haack 1993 pp. 179-180; Putnam
1987 p.16; Miller 1992 ). Patricia Churchland's answer is as follows:
What the eliminativist is fumbling to say is that folk psychology is seriously inadequate as a
theory. Now within the confines of that very theoretical framework we are bound to describe the
eliminativist as believing there are no beliefs; however, this is not because folk psychology is
bound to be true, but only because we are confined within the framework the eliminativist
wishes to criticize and no alternative framework is available. . . It would be foolish to suppose
folk psychology must be true because at this stage of science to criticize it implies using it. All
this shows is that folk psychology is the only theory available now. (pp. 397-398)
She goes on to add that a similar argument could be made in defense of vitalism, if one argued
that anyone who denied the existence of vital spirit must be asserting that she herself is dead.
A closely related argument is that the empirical research that the Churchlands claim supports
eliminativism actually refutes it. Herman Philipse (1998), for example, reminds us that the
network theory of meaning defended by Quine and Sellars was the primary justification for
eliminativism, and he claims that eliminativism necessarily accepts Sellars' claim that all
awareness is a linguistic affair. Philipse claims that because contemporary neuroscience shows
that thought is fundamentally non-linguistic, it contradicts the network theory of meaning and
therefore contradicts eliminativism.
This would be a valid criticism of Rorty, who repeatedly quotes and paraphrases the Sellars
slogan mentioned above as a defense of eliminativism (in Rorty 1970, among other places). But
Paul Churchland has been aware of these possibilities from the beginning. As he points out in
Churchland 1998, the last chapter of Churchland 1979 is devoted entirely to the possibility that
all thought is fundamentally non-linguistic. In his first formulations of eliminativism,
Churchland did claim that we should see folk psychology as a set of law-like sentences from
which the folk make logical inferences (Chapter one Churchland 1989). But, in chapter one of
Churchland and Churchland 1998, he also gives reasons why his current connectionist arguments
show that "The claim that FP {folk psychology} is a corrigible theory need not be hobbled by its
initial logical positivist dress." (p.15). The fact that he first had to compare scientific and folk
theories by thinking of them in linguistic terms is really no more surprising than the fact that he
has to say he believes there could be no such thing as beliefs. At the time Churchland wrote
those words, the best description we had of folk psychology, or any other theory, was to call it a
set of sentences from which logical inferences could be made. The fact that we are now groping
towards a better description doesn't invalidate the general point that Churchland was trying to
make: whatever we use to explain the workings of scientific knowledge is equally applicable to
folk psychology.
As for the point that the network theory requires accepting a linguistic theory of knowledge, the
holistic nature of neural networks makes them every bit as capable of supporting eliminativism
as were linguistic networks. The characteristic of the network theory of meaning that made
eliminativism unavoidable was not the fact that the networks were made of words. It was the fact
that the network theory eliminated the idea of perception as an immediately given foundation for
thought and science. However, this idea of perception as direct awareness of the given is still so
deeply ingrained that many philosophers still attempt to use it as an argument against
eliminativism, as if Quine's and Sellars' arguments against the given had never been written.
Theory vs. the Experienced World
Phillipse is not the only one to insist that "surely a change of theory will not transform the
phenomenal content of perceptual and inner awareness." (p. 887) Bernstein made almost the
exact same objection against Rorty (Bernstein 1968 p.218 in Rosenthal 1971). John Haldane
claims that 'theory. . .may filter down to the observational level. However, such penetration does
not eliminate pretheoretical observation." (p. 269 in Christensen/Turner 1993). And Searle
(1992 ) asserts that "Beliefs and desires, unlike phlogiston and caloric fluid, were not postulated
as some special theory, they are actually experienced as part of our mental life"(p.60). The
Churchlands have no answer to these objections, because they believe that Quine and Sellars
have already answered them. ( see Churchland and Churchland 1998 p. 26) Until someone
shows why Sellars and Quine are wrong about the points that support eliminativism, there is no
reason for eliminativists to formulate separate answers of their own. The only critic who makes
these sorts of points who cannot be dismissed with a Quine or Sellars footnote is Susan Haack,
whose "foundherentism" is a genuinely new alternative to both the network theory and classical
empiricism. Interested readers will find a clear presentation of this view in Haack 1993.
However, tangled in amongst these empiricist arguments there is another set of arguments that
requires a different answer. Bernstein (1968) has a quote from Merleau-Ponty saying that "the
whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced. . .we must begin by
reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second order expression."
(p. 200-201 in Rosenthal 1971) The claim that there is a unified basic experience of the world is
completely untouched by the Sellarsian arguments against immediately given and independent
sense data. Sellars' critique was against the idea that what was given in immediate experience
was propositional, i.e. that one could make inferences based on bits of information which were
presented to us in single observations. The arguments against sense data in Sellars 1963, which
were the basis of the holism that lead to eliminativism, do not dispose of the possibility that there
exists something like a lebenswelt, or world of lived experience, distinct from the world of
scientific knowledge.
Sellars was arguably not in complete agreement with this more holistic concept of experience,
advocated by writers such as Dewey and Merleau-Ponty. Rorty's interpretation of Sellars does
not permit this kind of distinctness, for he claims in his reply to Bernstein that the very idea of a
non-linguistic awareness is what Sellars is saying we should give up (Rorty 1970 p. 229). But
there are interpretations of Sellars which claim he is advocating something like this kind of nonlinguistic awareness for what he calls the Manifest Image. And although Paul Churchland never
uses the Continental terminology, he believes strongly that there is a distinction between
knowledge and experience. He argues at some length in Churchland 1979 that there is an
important difference between knowing a theory and experiencing the world in its terms. (pp. 2545) For him, the thing that is most exciting about eliminativism is that it holds forth the
possibility of experiencing the world in scientific terms, which is very different from merely
knowing the facts of science. Churchland does not believe that the experienced world is
autonomous with respect to the world described by science. But he did see experiencing as
distinct from knowing, even though the two are locked in a dialectical embrace that makes them
constantly reshape each other. (And because Merleau-Ponty frequently cites scientific
experiments in his phenomenology of lived experience, he probably agreed with Churchland on
this.) This is the main significance of what Churchland calls "the Plasticity of Perception".
Because our theories shape our perceptions, we should not be satisfied with merely knowing the
truth of science. We must experience the world in scientific terms as well.
There are also versions of this argument that come out of the Oxbridge ordinary language
tradition. Wilkes 1991 tries to drive a wedge between the abstract concepts of science and the
engaged experience of everyday life when she says that common sense psychology (CSP) "has
countless other things to do besides description and explanation. . . {such as} joking, jeering,
exhorting, discouraging, blaming, praising. . . This means that not only is CSP not a theory; it
could never become one, and nobody should wish it to" (p. 176 in Christensen and Turner 1993).
It is also possible to interpret the above Searle quote in this manner, given Searle's repeated
arguments that "the background" of experienced life is what makes linguistic knowledge
possible. (Searle 1992 Chapter 8). Paul Churchland replies to this objection, not by resisting, but
by accepting it and going one step further. (Churchland and Churchland 1998, chapter 3.)
Scientists, like everyone else, have experiences that are shaped by their practices. A scientist not
only knows things that other people don't know, he can do things that other people can't do, and
perceive things that other people can't perceive. In order to be a practicing scientist one must do
many things besides describe and explain: one must know how to operate lab equipment,
perform diagnoses etc. and these skills require the ability to perceive subtle differences in colors
and shapes e.g. that appear on the screens of laboratory measuring devices. Churchland
believes that knowledge, experience, and practice always condition each other, and that some of
the practices and perceptions of science could trickle down and transform the practices and
perceptions of ordinary experience. He is not claiming that theoretical knowledge can ever
replace practice and experience.
The Normative vs. Descriptive Argument
In Epistemology Naturalized, (Quine 1969), Quine argued that because there could be no such
thing as a first philosophy which provided a foundation for all other inquiry, epistemology and
the natural sciences could not be separated from each other. In many ways, the Churchlands'
Neurophilosophy is a concrete application of the project described in that essay, for it is based
on the assumption that studying the brain is an essential part of figuring out how the mind knows
things. The Churchlands' eliminativism derives from the belief that as we continue our scientific
study of the mind/brain, we may come up with an epistemology that eliminates our current ones,
which are based on Folk Psychology.
Jaegwon Kim argues (in Kim 1993, chapter 12) that no physical science could ever replace
epistemology, because the physical sciences are merely descriptive and epistemology is
necessarily normative. He claims that even the concept of belief (which is essential to
epistemology and all other aspects of folk psychology) is necessarily normative. This is because
we can make no sense of the idea of an organism having beliefs unless we presuppose that those
beliefs are part of a network of rationally interrelated concepts. Because the concept of
rationality is normative, the concept of belief also presupposes normative categories. Kim
acknowledges that we must have purely descriptive criteria for recognizing when something that
occurs in the world conforms to a norm. But this does not mean that the norm is itself reducible
to such a description. Kim accuses Rorty of making precisely this mistake in his defense of
eliminativism in Rorty 1979. Kim claims that the relationship of Supervenience, which is the
main topic of Kim 1993, is the only concept that can explain the relationship between the
normative and the descriptive. McCauley 1988 and 1992 applies similar arguments to the
Churchlands' eliminativism, claiming that "attempts to completely eliminate the normative will
be either forever incomplete or inimical to the progress of science" (McCauley 1988 P.14).
Paul Churchland acknowledges that "it may be true that normative discourse cannot be replaced
without remainder by descriptive discourse" but claims that the most important point is that "it
is only the autonomy of epistemology that must be denied". (Churchland 1989 p. 196 ) In other
words, epistemology should be informed by science, but this need not imply that science can
replace it. Churchland's claim that "normative issues are never independent of factual matters"
(ibid.) is at the very least compatible with Kim's supervenience relationship between the
normative and the descriptive. Churchland, however, sees norms as being guided by prototypes
of the sort that Kuhn calls paradigms. To see a human activity as guided by prototypes is not to
describe it purely factually. In a prototype-based value system, certain activities, practices and/or
artifacts are considered to be exemplary, and all others are judged by how close they come to
both fulfilling and extending the ideal exemplified by those prototypes. But the prototypes are
real pieces of exemplary work or behavior in the world, they are not abstract Platonic ideals.
Consequently, new scientific work will always influence those ideals, and it is in this sense that
Churchland's epistemology is both normative and naturalized. Old norms may be eliminated in
favor of new norms, but this does not mean that normativity itself will be eliminated. The fact
that Paul Churchland now frequently writes about ethics (for example in Churchland 1995)
shows that he now wants to contribute to normative discourse, rather than eliminate it.
The Autonomy Arguments
There are several arguments against eliminativism which claim that folk psychology is a
conceptual system with some kind of autonomy with respect to the physical sciences. These
arguments often concede that folk psychology may be reduced or even eliminated by scientific
progress. But they claim that scientific psychology, not physics, will replace folk psychology,
and psychology will remain in some sense autonomous from the physical sciences.
Horgan and Woodward 1985 accept that it is unlikely that the categories of folk psychology will
be identified with anything in the categories of neuroscience, even if the latter eventually
"provide a marvelous account of the nature and behavior of Homo Sapiens" (p. 149 in
Christensen and Turner 1993). But they claim that this would not make folk psychology false, if
we accept the anamolous monism of Donald Davidson. Horgan and Woodward claim that
Davidson's position is naturalistic and materialist without being reductive or eliminative, and if
he is right, psychology would not be reducible to any physical science. Jaegwon Kim, however,
argues at some length that Davidson's non-reductive materialism is inconsistent, and that we can
be either materialist or non-reductive but not both. ( Kim 1993 chapter 11). If Kim is right about
this, then Davidson provides no aid and comfort to those who want an autonomous scientific
psychology.
Robert McCauley has argued in several articles (McCauley 1986, 1987, 1996) that the
Churchlands have mistakenly conflated intralevel reductions with interlevel ones. Intralevel
cases are concerned with successive theories at the same level of analysis; for example when
chemistry replaced alchemy. McCauley acknowledges that elimination frequently occurs during
these intralevel reductions. But he claims that it is far less common for elimination to occur with
interlevel reductions e.g. reductive relationships between a science operating at lower level (such
as physics) and one operating at a higher level (such as psychology).
In interlevel cases corrections can arise because the upper level theory is insufficiently fine
grained to handle certain problems. By contrast, in intralevel cases corrections always arise
because the earlier theory is wrong--by a little in evolutionary cases, by a lot in revolutionary
ones (McCauley 1996 p.31)
For this and other reasons, McCauley claims that there is little historical evidence to support the
conjecture that psychology will be eliminated by neuroscience. McCauley also claims that
Patricia Churchland implicitly accepts this in Churchland 1986 when she says that psychology
and neuroscience co-evolve i.e. that each is constantly shaped by the need to account for the
discoveries of the other. McCauley quotes Churchland and Sejnowski as saying "the co-
evolutionary advice regarding methodological efficiency is 'let many flowers bloom'"
(McCauley 1996 p.33), McCauley sees this maxim as consistent with a position he calls
"explanatory pluralism", which he claims is in some sense inconsistent with the Churchland's
earlier eliminativism.
Paul Churchland offers some historical examples of his own to counter McCauley's claim that
eliminations do not occur in interlevel reductions (McCauley 1996 pp. 222-225). And he says
that even if a more abstract level is needed to account for psychological phenomena, we need not
assume that folk psychology is the best framework to account for that abstract level.
"Legitimating the office need not legitimate the current office holder." (ibid. p. 225)
Nevertheless, this concession implies that Churchland now acknowledges that a unified science
is not essential to his position, which is a significant departure from eliminative materialism as
he first defended it. In Churchland 1989 chapter 1, many of his arguments for Eliminative
Materialism were based on the claim that folk psychology could not be integrated into the
unified structure which is modern physical science.
Fodor 1975 and Putnam 1975 advocated somewhat different versions of the multiple
realizability argument for the autonomy of psychology. (also called the functionalist argument).
Fodor points out that psychological and sociological categories have too many different physical
ways that they could be instantiated for them to be reduced to single physical predicates. For
example, a monetary exchange could be instantiated physically by handing over a dollar bill, or
by writing a check, or by using a string of wampum, and it would obviously be only an
improbable coincidence if any of these actions had anything in common physically. (Fodor 1975
p. 15) Because physics only studies what things are made of, psychology and the other sciences
of the mental must necessary be autonomous with respect to physics. The underlying assumption
of the social, psychological, and biological sciences is that the things they study are constituted
by how they function, not by what they are made out of.
At one point Putnam was willing to consider the possibility that human minds were functionally
equivalent to Turing machines, which meant that computer science was the functionally
autonomous science of mind that could never be reduced or eliminated by any of the physical
sciences. Although he specifically rejected this position in Putnam 1975 chapter 14, he still
believed at that time that it was necessarily true that "[m]entality was a real and autonomous
feature of our world" (ibid. p.291). In Putnam 1988, however, he renounced functionalism
altogether, because he claimed that the relationship between the mental and the computational
was every bit as problematic as the relationship between the mental and physical. Fodor,
however was more cautious in Fodor 1975, claiming only that "The world could turn out to be
such that every kind corresponds to a physical kind . . . It's just that as things stand, it seems very
unlikely . . ." (Fodor 1975 p.15).
Paul Churchland agrees that even the most radical eliminative materialist must endorse
functionalism "construed broadly as the thesis that the essence of our psychological states
resides in the abstract causal roles they play in a complex economy of internal states mediating
environmental inputs and behavioral outputs" (1989 p.23). But he argues that multiple
realizability with respect to physics has nothing to do with whether a theory is true or not. He
points out that alchemy describes the behavior of macroscopic substances in a way that could be
multipley realized by a variety of submicroscopic theories. (ibid. pp. 12-14) Consequently, he
claims we could conclude from the functionalist arguments that alchemy is not a false theory,
which is obviously absurd. The terms used by alchemists do not refer to anything, because there
are no alchemical essences.
Few people will question the intuition that the terms used by many obsolete sciences describe
things that do not exist. We all agree that there is no such thing as phlogiston, or caloric, or the
aether. Eliminativism, however, invalidates many of the assumptions about truth and language
that support that intuition. It is thus possible to use the eliminativist's radical new assumptions to
undercut the second premise of the eliminativist argument i.e. the assumptions that obsolete
sciences are 1) false, 2) do not apply to reality, and 3) the entities they describe do not exist. The
pragmatist argument described below questions all three of the claims in the second premise,
without distinguishing among them. The reference argument accepts the first claim (that obsolete
theories are false) but denies that this must imply the other two claims.
Objections to the Second Premise
The Pragmatist Argument
The philosophy of science that made eliminativism possible had other implications, some of
which created problems for many of the presuppositions of eliminativism. Laudan 1981 argued
that scientific realism, as it was commonly defined, could not be defended once we admitted that
new scientific theories eliminated old ones. And although Paul Churchland continued to refer to
himself as a scientific realist, he clearly accepted Laudan's interpretation of the scientific
historical record.
So many past theories, rightly judged excellent in their time, have since proved to be false. And
their current successors, though even better founded, seem but the next step in a probably
endless and not obviously convergent journey. (Churchland 1989 p.140)
It is expected that existing conceptual frameworks will eventually be replaced by new and better
ones, and those in turn by frameworks better still, for who will be so brash as to assert that the
feeble conceptual achievements of our adolescent species comprise an exhaustive account of
anything at all? (ibid. p.52)
However, if scientific truth is this mutable, folk psychology's "falsehood" is no longer as serious
as it was from the traditional scientific realist perspective. Rockwell (1995) argues that the
eliminativist view of scientific progress requires us to believe not only that all our past scientific
theories are false, but also that our present and future theories are falsifiable. Unless we are
willing to accept some sort of quasi-Hegelian view that each scientific theory is true "for its
time", we must conclude from this that when a theory is falsified, we are actually discovering
that it was really false all along. Thus, if each theory is falsified by its successor, and every
theory is succeeded by some other theory, therefore all scientific theories that ever existed or
will exist are false. To some degree Feyerabend did succumb to these skeptical implications of
eliminative materialism, which is why he ended up writing books with titles like Farewell to
Reason, and Against Method. Churchland, however, gradually shifted towards a pragmatic
pluralism which saved him from skepticism, but which no longer supported eliminativism very
effectively.
In their later writings, the Churchlands described reduction (which validates some aspects of the
old theory) and elimination (which falsifies the old theory) as being endpoints on a continuum
rather than an either/or choice. (a position that was later developed in greatest detail in Bickle
1998). Paul Churchland's analysis of connectionist neuroscientific research also supported this
view. In Churchland 1989, he argued that, while this research showed that the learning process
in a neural net involved reducing errors by reconfiguring weight spaces "nothing guarantees that
there exists a possible configuration of weights that would reduce the error messages to zero" (
p. 194). Thus the difference between a bad theory and a good one was a difference in degree,
which was not accurately captured by the traditional either/or distinction of true/false. He also
pointed out that there could be different, even contradictory, theories of equal epistemic virtue,
"all of them equally low in error, all of them carving up the world in quite different ways . "
(ibid.). (This position is developed at greater length in chapters 15 and 17 of Churchland and
Churchland 1998). Although these changes in his thinking resulted from the exegesis of
scientific research, they seriously undermined Churchland's earlier self-described scientific
realism (Churchland 1979) and transformed it into a "pluralistic form of pragmatism"
(Churchland 1989 p. 194)
However, Churchland's later pragmatic pluralism requires him to give folk psychology
essentially the same status that Dennett gives to the intentional stance: a theory with serious
shortcomings, which nevertheless has genuine epistemic merit. The comparison to alchemy does
not reduce folk psychology to a false theory, for if Churchland denies all epistemic status to
alchemy because we now have better theories, we would have to deny epistemic status to our
current theories because they will eventually be replaced by better ones. And this would leave us
with the universal skepticism described earlier. We could save ourselves from this skepticism if
we were willing to accept the possibility that truth and falsity need not be binary, and that
alchemy and folk psychology (as well as special relativity theory and whatever theory replaces
it) all possess degrees of epistemic virtue. From this pragmatist perspective, none of these
theories would be true in the classical sense, but that does not imply they are all false, anymore
than the fact that no one possesses vital spirit implies that everyone is dead.
This pragmatist perspective also saves us from an objection to eliminativism that dates back to
Lycan and Pappas' 1972 criticism of Rorty, and which continues to resurface: the fact that
eliminativist scientific realism requires us to claim that there are no such things as tables, chairs
and the other functionally defined terms of common sense. Searle, in his 1992, dismisses
eliminative materialism by pointing out that if the entities posited by folk psychology don't exist
because they cannot be reduced smoothly to the entities of science, we must also deny
ontological status to split level ranch houses, tennis rackets, golf clubs, etc. (p.47). Similar
arguments are also raised by Andrew Cling in his 1991, and by Putnam in his 1992. However,
these arguments usually rest on a clash of intuitions that leads nowhere. The assumption is that
obviously alchemical essences do not exist, and also obviously tables and chairs exist, and
therefore the two must be different. But all the arguments that attempt to show why they must be
different have been effectively answered by the Churchlands. The pragmatist, unlike the
scientific realist, can dissolve this problem by saying that alchemy does possess some epistemic
merit , and the only reason that we no longer refer to the alchemical essences is that we now
possess a better theory which has more epistemic merit. Paul Churchland, however, has so far
refused to take this step. Instead, in his 1992, he attempts to maintain a distinction between
"(legitimately functional) tables and chairs" and (the avowedly non-existent) phlogiston, caloric,
and the four principles of medieval alchemy ". This, however, does not sit well with the thought
experiment in chapter 1 of his 1989, which is designed to show that the categories of alchemy
are functional, and therefore that functionality is no proof of legitimacy. It also seems unlikely
that a notion from vulgar discourse like "chair" is going to be more ontologically rigorous than a
concept like "phlogiston" which, in its time, was the best that the greatest living scientific minds
could produce.
Those who cannot accept the idea that obsolete theories like Alchemy have truth value might
prefer another alternative proposed by Stephen Stich: Obsolete theories are false, but that need
not imply that the terms in those theories don't refer to anything.
Eliminativism and the Problem of Reference
In Stich 1996, Stich turns from being eliminativism's dearest friend to its severest critic. His
criticisms focused on certain assumptions about truth and reference that neither side of the
eliminativist debate have questioned. Given that the central claim of eliminativism is that folk
psychology might be false, it is obviously crucial to determine what we mean by truth and
falsity. The true-false dichotomy is usually assumed to be tightly bound up with questions of
reference and existence, so that the expression "theory x is false" was assumed to inevitably
imply both "the entities described by theory x do not exist" and "the terms in theory x do not
refer to anything". Stich argues that these are three distinct claims, and that an argument is
needed to prove why they must go together. Because there is no such argument, it is possible to
acknowledge that folk psychology is wrong about most things and in serious need of
replacement, but not infer from this that the entities folk psychology describes are non-existent,
or that its terms do no refer to anything.
In chapter 1 of Stich 1996, he drags out an old argument but adds a new twist that gives it
genuine bite. The Churchlands have frequently admitted that the theory which replaces folk
psychology could be fundamentally non-linguistic; in fact they even emphasize this in their later
writings. Stich, however, points out that truth and falsity are properties of language, and if folk
psychology is constituted by tacit connectionist structures which are fundamentally nonlinguistic, this means that it cannot be either true or false. In other words, if the Churchland's
beloved connectionist theories can be developed into a complete and accurate account of the
skills and abilities that we call folk psychology, then folk psychology is neither true (as many of
the Churchlands' critics have claimed) nor (possibly) false (as the Churchlands themselves have
claimed.)
Stich also claims eliminativism is inevitable only if we accept a descriptive or conceptual role
semantics, which determines the reference of a term by the place it occupies (or fails to occupy)
in a network of concepts. This has certainly been Paul Churchland's view of semantics (see
Churchland 1979 pp. 56-58.), but it is not the only possible semantics. Stich claims that if we
accepted a causal-historical semantic theory, such as those proposed by Putnam and Kripke,
(Kripke 1972, Putnam 1975), even very seriously mistaken theories would still refer to their
subject matters. For example, Norse mythology claims that the stars are holes in the skull of a
dead giant, which is about as mistaken as one could possibly be about anything. Yet when the
Vikings spoke about the stars, their talk was clearly about the stars, it did not refer to nothing at
all. The reason for this is that the stars themselves had some sort of causal relationship to the
Viking's discourse. The light from the stars themselves caused the Vikings to think and speak
about them, and thus the Vikings' speech and thought were about the stars.
The obvious objection to causal theories of reference is that surely not all causal relationships
between language users and objects are reference relations, and it is not easy to figure out which
causal relations are reference relations and which are not. If dust causes me to sneeze, my sneeze
is not "about" the dust. If my dry mouth causes me to ask for water, my question does not refer
to my mouth, it refers to the water. So how can we tell the difference between causal-reference
relations and other kinds of causal relations? Stich acknowledges that these problems have been
around for a while, and says this is largely because the defenders of the causal theory have not
considered the possibility that there is not a single reference relation at all. Stich claims that the
so-called reference relation is probably several different relations related only by a loose family
resemblance, and in many cases what constitutes a reference-fixing causal relation is probably
decided by politics and consensus.
Stich develops this position in greater detail in Bishop and Stich 1998, arguing that confusing
questions of ontology with questions of reference causes problems in other areas of philosophy
of science as well. Schouten and De Jong 1998 also extrapolate from Stich's position with regard
to eliminativism and reference. They argued that reference fixation is not arbitrary, as Stich
seemed to be implying, but acknowledge that it is "local, partial and context dependent" (p.1) In
Schouten and De Jong's view, our scientific practices are constantly creating and destroying
reference relations, all of which are provisional, and none of which are as rigid as the first
causal-historical reference theories claimed. Consequently reference is maintained even when
theories are radically falsified. The eliminativist claim that folk psychology might be false loses
much of its bite when the concept of falsity is redefined so as to permit a false concept to refer to
the world.
Eliminativism Then and Now
Both the pragmatist and the reference objections to eliminativism can be avoided by simply
redescribing eliminativism as "Whatever happened to obsolete theories like alchemy and
phlogiston could also happen to folk psychology. " If we bypass those questions in this way,
however, we are no longer committed to the claim that folk psychology could be false, as we
ordinarily understand that term. Because this claim is the most common one-sentence
description of eliminativism, it may seem to some that this is an admission of defeat. But the
essence of eliminativism is the willingness to question our ordinary understanding, which
includes concepts like truth and falsity. Churchland himself said that future epistemologies might
cause us to eliminate even the concept of truth itself. (Churchland 1989 p. 150) Perhaps the
arguments in Quine and Sellars, along with the Churchlands' analysis of connectionism, have
already led us close to this point. To claim that alchemy has some truth value, or that it is
possible for a false theory to refer, are certainly major changes in the traditional concept of truth,
which arguably edge that concept towards the eliminativist end of the reduction-elimination
spectrum. But the debates about eliminativism reveal inconsistencies in our folk psychological
concept of truth that appear to have no other way of being resolved.
Furthermore, the philosophical implications of the neuroscience which support the Churchlands'
current position are very different from the more purely theoretical considerations that originally
inspired their eliminativism. When Paul Churchland wrote "Eliminative Materialism and the
Propositional Attitudes" (chapter one of Churchland 1989.), one of the main arguments in that
paper was that folk psychology was a likely candidate for elimination because it was different
from physics in several crucial ways. As their neurologically-inspired alternative has actually
developed however, it has lead to a pluralism which has changed the significance of their
original claim that "active coherence with the rest of what we presume to know is a central
measure of credibility to any theory." (Churchland and Churchland 1998 p.6.) The need for
scientific theories to eliminate folk theories is no longer as compelling when scientific progress
is produced by a dynamic and coevolutionary process, rather than a monolithic bottom-up
reduction to physics. Active coherence is still to be strived for, but it is more likely to be a
regulative ideal than an obtainable goal.
This should be seen, however, as a natural part of the growth of our understanding of
epistemological issues . There was a time when epistemology was widely considered to be an a
priori enterprise, and the eliminativist claim that epistemologists needed to understand the brain
was considered preposterous by most professional philosophers. The ontologically cautious
downsizing of eliminativism given above still preserves the eliminativist's rejection of a priori
epistemology, and on this point the eliminativists have been decisively vindicated. Thanks to the
questions raised by the eliminativist debate, philosophers and scientists are now working
together to analyze the philosophical implications of neuroscientific data, which has given rise to
a whole new multi-disciplinary enterprise(see the articles on Connectionism and Cognitive
Science in this encyclopedia.) This research has produced a variety of theories, some of which
will surely be contradicted by future research. But naturalized epistemology, unlike it's a priori
ancestor, can take falsification of its past in stride.
Teed Rockwell
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Stich, Stephen (1996) Deconstructing the Mind Oxford UK: Oxford University Press
Notes:
[1] See Fodor 1987, among many others. For critiques of some of Stich's other arguments see
Haack 1993 pp. 159-181, and Horgan and Woodward in Christensen and Turner 1993.
[2] This analysis of the eliminative argument first appeared in Rockwell 1995. A slightly
different version of it also appears on p. 4 of Stich 1996.
Last Updated: May 2004