The Dynamic Relations between Power Politics and Institutionalization

UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) The Dynamic Relations between Power Politics and Institutionalization: A NeoGramscian Intervention Freyberg-Inan, A. Publication date 2019 Document Version Final published version Published in International Institutions and Power Politics License Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Freyberg-Inan, A. (2019). The Dynamic Relations between Power Politics and Institutionalization: A Neo-Gramscian Intervention. In A. Wivel, & T. V. Paul (Eds.), International Institutions and Power Politics: Bridging the Divide (pp. 185-196). Georgetown University Press. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). 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No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or rnechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The publisher is not responsible for third-partv websites or their content. URL links were active at time of publication. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Wivel, Anders, editor. Paul, T.V., editor. Title: International lnstitutions and Power Polities : Bridging the Divide / Anders Wivel and T.V. Paul, editors. Description: Washington, DC : Georgetown University Press, 2019. Identifiers: LCCN 2018058553 (print) 1 LCCN 2019980424 (ebook) 1 ISBN 9781626167001 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1 ISBN 9781626167018 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1 ISBN 9781626167025 (ebook: alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: International agencies-Congresses. 1 International relations-Congresses. Classification: LCC JZ4850 .15837 2019 (print) 1 LCC JZ4850 (ebook) 1 DDC 341.2-dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018058553 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019980424 1 @This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials. 20 19 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 First printing Printed in the United States of America. Cover design by Jeremy John Parker. Contents vii zyxwvutsrqpo ix List of Illustrations Aeknowledgments . No part of this book may be :ronic or mechanica!, including ,ge and retrieval system, without x their content. Part I: Introduetion CHAPTER 1 Exploring International lnstitutions and Power Polities zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXW 3 zyxwvutsrqponm Anders Wivel and T.V. Paul zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Part Il: Theorizing Power Polities and International Institutions CHAPTER 2 ging the Oivide CHAPTER 3 'ress, zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA 2019. 124 (ebook) 1 ISBN 6167018 (pbk, : alk. CHAPTER 4 International '.4850 (ebook) 1 DDC CHAPTER 5 )424 :quirements of the r Printed Library Materials. Realist lnstitutionalism and the lnstitutional Meehanisms of Power Polities ]. Samuel Barkin and Patricia A. Weitsman 23 A Neoclassieal Realist Explanation of International lnstitutions Norrin M . Ripsman 41 Pyrrhie Vietory: A World of Liberal lnstitutions, Teeming with Tensions Georg Serensen 53 Making Power Polities Great Again? Oiseursive lnstitutionalism and the Political Eeonomy of World Polities after Globalization Ben Rosamond 73 Part III: The Processes of Power Polities and International Institutions CHAPTER 6 Maximizing Seeurity through International lnstitutions: Soft.-Balaneing Strategies Reeonsidered Anders Wivel and T.V. Paul 89 vi zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Contents CHAPTER 7 zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA The Power in Opaeity: Rethinking Information in International Organizations Austin Carson and Alexander Thompson CHAPTER 8 Revisionists, Networks, and the Liberal Institutional Order Stacie Goddard 101 117 zyxwvut Part IV: The Power Polities of Global and Regional lnstitutions CHAPTER 9 Struetural Modifiers, the Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime, and Fostering a Less Competitive International Environment 137 Steven EzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGF . Lobell and Brad Nicholson CHAPTER 10 The Power Polities of United Nations Peaee Operations Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Lou Pingeot, and Vincent Pouliot CHAPTER 11 Variable Geometry: Power and Institutions in the European Union John A. Hall and Frédéric Mérand 149 167 Part V: Conclusions CHAPTER 12 CHAPTER 13 The Dynamie Relations between Power Polities and lnstitutionalization: A Neo-Grarnscian lntervention Annette Freyberg-Inan 185 197 International Order and Power Polities Daniel H. Nexon zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPO Referenees List of Contributors Index 215 255 257 CHAPTER 12 The Dynamic Relations between Power Polities and lnstitutionalization: A Neo-Gramscian lntervention Annette Freyberg-lnan zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUT W hat D o W e K now and W hat D on't W e? zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSR There is, in fact, a whole lot we already know. We know that power differences between states matter for the design and content of international institutions: the powerful have more influence on thern, and power dynamics characterize decision-making processes within forma! institutions (see, e.g., Gruber 2000; Steinberg 2002; Stene 2004; Drezner 2008; Dreher, Sturrn, and Vreeland 2009; Thompson 2010; Copelovitch 2010; Lim and Vreeland 2013; Allen and Yuen 2014). Thus, power is exercised through and can be augmented by institutionalization. We also know that, while it provides them with benefi.ts, institutionalized cooperation simultaneously constrains states in their exercise of power and may even affect their relative power positions (see, e.g., Lake 1999; lkenberry 2001; Voeten 2001; Thompson 2009; Kreps 2011; Weitsman 2014). lnstitutions can sometimes shift the outcomes of interaction between states away from what they would likely have been without them. Thus, institutionalization can counteract power polities. As argued by the editors in the introduction to this volume, it makes no sense to juxtapose a world of self-help and power polities with one of institutionalization and cooperation. Not only is "institutionalized cooperation ... often the result of the 'power polities of peace,' for example, balancing threat or power or exercising hegemony" (see also Wivel 2004), it is also evident that no matter how deeply institutionalized the polities, power struggles will never be absent from them (see the chapters by M artin-Br ûlé, Pingeor, and Pouliot and by Hall and .roint of view suspecting such institutions of irrelevance. As pointed out by Mérand, in this volume). The previously cited and many other studies have Ripsman, neoclassical realism moves us significantly beyond structural realist expanded our understanding of the co mplex dynamics linking power polities accounts by pointing out that while "states construct foreign policy to respond and intern ational institutionalization, enough so to reject as evidently silly the to international imperatives," "domestic politica! arrangements . . . have an juxtaposition of a cliché structural realist vision of institutions as epiphenomenal intervening influence between systemic pressures and national foreign policy to power polities with a cliché liberal-co nstructivist vision of power polities' responses." This also helps explain why states, and even great powers, find benedeath by institutions (see the chapter by Scrensen). However, as a rule, relevant fits in setting up, joining, maintaining, and supporting international institutions. intern ational relations (IR) scholarship remains wedded to a realist-inspired In his contribution Ripsman also shows that the perceived legitimacy associated view of power as material, relational, and the prerogative of states. This is also with operating through international institutions and therebv bestowed on the illustrated by most (though not all) contributions to this volume. I wilt instead policies of institutionally cooperating states matters both domestically and interadvocate a neo-Gramscian perspective and argue that we need to leave state nationally with direct consequences for governmental power. This is an importcentrism and strictly material and relational conceptions of power behind to ant observation to which I wilt return later. However, remaining wedded to shed more light on the central question posed by this volume: zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA What is the rela- realism, Ripsman does not see this as potentially enhancing the power of institutions in ways that could transform world polities away from a predominance of relative state power. It is not clear why not. From a range of alternative theoretiHow would we know if it can? Institutionalization constraining power polica! perspectives, one may legitimately ask whether (and when) the power payoffs ties would emphatically not have to mean that states would no langer be key of the legitimacy (and other benefits) granted by institutionalized cooperation actors in world polities nor that it would no longer matter how powerful states are may not lead to an "embedded realism"-or even an "embedded liberalism" (see vis-à-vis their peers. However, it would have to mean that relative power would at the chapter by Rosamond)-in which state decision making is in fact so heavily least occasionally fail to predict the policy outcomes of international interaction. constrained by institutional commitments that power has in good part gone Explicitly or implicitly, all contributions to this volume admit that this may wel! elsewhere. happen or in fact does happen. Yet all fail to embed this recognition in a fully Barkin and Weitsman's "realist institutionalism" addresses the same question developed analytica] framework, and most fai] to take seriously the opening this and comes closer to the position I wil! defend later. lt is evidentlv true that insticonstitutes for potential fundamental change to world affairs. The reason for the tutions both bestow power and pose constraints on its operation (see also Barnen second lacuna is their commitment to various versions of IR realism. Realistand Duvall 2005), and it is useful to knowhow they do so, as the authors begin inspired contributions to the debate adopt a state-centric ontology and preto show. It is furthermore important to relax the focus on forma! institutions, dominantly material and relational conceptions of power.1zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA These theoretica! which characterizes most of this book, to understand that power also operates commitments, while delivering a range of valuable payoffs, also result in several through and is constrained by informal institutions, unwritten rules, and norms. blind spots when one explores the relationship between institutionalization and However, also in this contribution, a realist commitment to state centrism prepower. The remainder of this section wil! show how. The next section will then vents us from fully grasping the dynamics of interaction between power polities develop my own neo-Gramscian take and explain its added value. lt wil! show and institutionalization as processes that transcend interstate relations. On the how we can recognize that power polities remains a care feature of international positive side, Barkin and Weitsman carne closest to actually theorizing the relerelations even as international institutions are becoming ever more numerous vance of the legitimacy benefits for state policy provided by institutions for bath and comprehensive, and yet simultaneously take a more open stance with respect domestic and international audiences. This is made possible by taking on board to the possibility of political transformation. constructivist thought on power as both material and ideational (e.g., Barnett and Duvall 2005; Mattern 2001; Krebs and Jackson 2007; Barkin 2010). This is Realist Contributions nota bad idea, but I argue that there is a better one: a neo-Gramscian take on the power politics-institutionalization dynamic is more appropriate because it Opening the conversation in this book, the chapters by Barkin and Weitsman allows us to analyze the workings of material and ideational power together and and by Ripsman divert the discussion from the relationship between power polito see how such complex power can become embedded in institutions in ways ties and institutionalization to the Abbott and Snidal (1998) question: Why do that can both enhance and undermine the operation of power polities. states (including great powers) spend so much time, resources, and influence on Lobell and Nicholson's contribution in part 4 of this volume takes up one side international institutions? Obviously, this is puzzling from a structural realist of the power politics-institutionalization dynamic and addresses the question of tionship between power polities and institutionalization? Can the latter constrain or even overcome the farmer? how institutions limit zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA the pursuit of power. Their answer is that they operate as structural modifiers (see Snyder 1996), affecting states' interaction capacity, competition, socialization, and, hence, behavior. They make the important observations that structural modifiers may be ideational and thar a hegemon mighr not be necessary to create and enforce the rules, both of which are crucial to understand the transformative potential of institutionalization. However, they remain wedded to both structuralism and a predominantly material conception of power when they argue that "successful practices [i.e., socialization] are determined by the structure of the system itself and not by individual leaders, their regime type, or leaders' beliefs and ideas." I wil! argue later thar we should instead include ideas as immaterial sources of power within our conceptualization of structure, which simultaneously grants a greater role to agency and thus to potential for change than found in materialist structuralist accounts. This allows us to see more comprehensively why and how institutionalization both enables and constrains the operation of power and also how, as implied by Lobell and Nicholson, international socialization does not necessarily have to lead state behavior to diverge from realpolitik, as often uncritically assumed by liberal-constructivist approaches. Wivel and Paul's contribution in part 3 takes up the opposite side of the power politics-institutionalization dynamic and addresses the question how institutions enable the pursuit of power. It specifically focuses on the ways in which they can support states' soft-balancing strategies. Once again, institutions are characterized as important sources of legitimacy for state policy, in addition to ether benefits. This contribution also sheds important light on how institutionalization can actually counteract the logic of power polities, by arguing that "states use institutional soft balancing to counter violations of the rules of the game in international relations, in particular when these violations are committed by great powers." Also, that "states use institutional soft balancing in cases of threats and violations of the territoria! integrity of friendly states and coalition partners" cannor but strengthen the consensus on which the relevant institutions are based, thus contributing to stabilizing institutionalization trends. In this manner, we can see how the use of institutions for soft balancing may not only reduce the amount of international aggression (thus having a pacifying effect) but also strengthen the trend of institutionalization itself. In response to the question of how institutionalization may enhance power polities, this contribution thus ends up arguing (at least in part) thar power polities may enhance institutionalization. It grasps the dynamic relationship berween the two without explicitly theorizing it and stops just short of recognizing the transformative potential entailed. Carson and Thompson put the two sides of the power politics-institutionalization dynamic together by studying how institutions both constrain and enable the pursuit of power. They focus specifically on how this happens through international organizations' regulation of access to and usability of information. l,nformation as a source of power within organizations can serve to further entrench the advantages of already powerful states, "but it can also make it possible for relatively weak states to leverage information-power dynamics to 'punch above their weight-class." This not only (1) zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJ shows how institutionalization may counteract power polities but also (2) clearly recognizes the relevance of ideational sources of power, as in fact "the power effects of information appear to be decoupled from more traditional [i.e., material] sources of power." The authors also (3) relax the bias in favor of power as relational, by looking at how it can be diffused and embedded in institutional environments. All three observations are important for the argument I wilt make later. However, while Carson and Thompson rightly claim to occupy a theoretica! middle ground by taking both state power and institutions seriously, I hold that we must more radically break with the realist departure point, leave state centrism more fully behind, and operate systematically with a broader definition of power as foreshadowed but not explicitly advocated in the contributions discussed so far. This wil! equip us to explore whether and how we can perceive institutionalization as affecting in significant ways, perhaps even transforming or altogether outgrowing, power polities. Alternative Contributions This volume also includes several contributions by nonrealist scholars. How do they take up the challenge of theorizing the relationship between power and institutions away from the realist ontology, and how does my contribution relate to theirs? The chapters by Martin-Brûlé, Pingeot, and Pouliot and by Hall and Mérand both illustrate how power polities operate within and around institutional contexts. While Martin-Brûlé, Pingeot, and Pouliot show this for UN peacekeeping operations, Hall and Mérand do so for European Union mernberstate relations and (crisis) governance. In both contexts institutional embedment "enables but also constrains the transfer of struggles for influence across national, regional, and international spheres" (Martin-Brûlé, Pingeot, and Pouliot). The presence, shape, and functioning of institutions affect such struggles, as they are, in turn, affected by them. Stacie Goddard, in her analysis of revisionism in and through institutions, confirms that "institutions both enable and constrain power polities." She usefu lly breaks with much received wisdom by insisting that revisionism can be exercised from within institutions; that institutions do not necessarily "tarne" the revisionists within thern; that, on the contrary, institutional dynamics may also undermine participating status quo powers; and that, precisely by employing institutions, revision or power transition do not necessarily have to take violent farms. An important take-home message here is that revisionism, or in fact much more broadly, the seeds of intentional structural change, tends not to lie outside a system with its institutions, but within zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA it. This seems to be remaining true no Tlfe ChaUenge Ahead matter how (or how deeply) polities are institutionalized. This means, on the one Most contributions to this volume have worked with a realist-inspired view of hand, that we have no reason to expect institutionalization to move us beyond power and a focus on formal and intergovernmental institutions at the expense power polities. On the other hand, it is no reason to jump to the conclusion that of other farms. Both of these biases need to be left behind if we want to achieve institutions are epiphenomenal. After all, important changes-also changes in the goals laid out by the editors: we want to understand better why and how power relations-are facilitated and steered by them. In this sense, institutioninstitutions evolve, decay, or regenerate. We want to know more about how instial(ized) polities are power polities. From this insight arises an important dilemma, tutions can be rools of revisionism (see the chapter by Goddard) or power tranwhich I will discuss in the second part of this chapter. sition and in this way support peacefut change. lt is no accident that this scholarly Georg Serensen reiterates the starting point of the volume that "streng liberinterest arises now: global systemic power transition is on the horizon, and as alism's" transformative optimism is just as unrealistic as claims that institutions scholars belonging to the declining hegemony, we would rather the transition, if are irrelevant for international governance. He takes the position of a "skeptic it must come, be peaceful. How could this work? The editors are on the right and hopeful liberalism," observing, on the one hand, that in many areas gevertrack when they suggest that this means that we need to "go beyond an inrennance is barely "good enough," piecemeal, or gridlocked but, on the other, that tional goal-oriented understanding of power" and also when they observe that "it much governance is taking place because of and through institutions, which makes little sense to decouple materialist measures of power from how policvseem by and large resilient. Serensen further agrees with Cox and Sinclair (1996) makers understand power and [its] legitimate use" (see also Guzzini 1993). But "that a stable and legitimate order is founded on a fit zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA between a power base, ... we need to go further than that. In this volume we have found examples of a common collective image of order expressed in values and norms, and an midlevel theorizing leading to a "more eclectic, but also more open, understandappropriate set of institutions." Yet he fails to go further with this important ing of international relations" than that characterizing the interparad igm debates insight: in the obvious absence of such an order, we need to be concerned with on institutions and power polities. But what overall lessons can we draw? Here 1 the processes taking place on and between all three levels identified by Cox (the take up the editors' challenge to reconnect the foregoing "to more general discusmaterial, the ideational, and the institutional), as together they determine the sions and concerns on the nature of international relations and state behavior." zyxwvutsrqponmlk nature of international order along with its perceived legitimacy and stabilitv, My later argument lays the foundations for such an investigation. In so doing it R econceptualizing Power Polities and lnstitutionalization connects most closely with the chapter by Ben Rosamond, who also observes that from a N eo,G ram scian Perspective most definitions of power polities, including the one suggested by the editors of this volume, carry strong realist connotations. Being concerned with "who gets All the above contributions have made sensible claims regarding the coexistence what, when, and how" from a state-centric and materialist point of view leads of power polities and institutionalization in contemporary world polities. But them to treat states as "the powers," power as a resource, and power dynamics as they all suffer from blind spots following from their shared realist ontological relational. Basing himself on Susan Strange (1994a, 1998), Rosamond argues that, commitments or do not go far enough in drawing theoretical conclusions from instead, we need to be able to see power as structural and structural power as drawdiverging ontologies or empirical observations. lt is clear that realists' answer to ing on "collective understandings and intersubjectivities." Placing what I see as the question of whether institutionalization may lead us away from power polities excessive emphasis on the nonmaterial dimension of (power) structures, he argues: by reducing the impact of relative state power on collective policy outcomes has "The structures of world polities, rather than being material in essence or exogeto be no. The remainder of rhis contribution will show that it is possible to accept nous to action, are best seen as intersubjective, that is, rooted in collective underthe basic realist assumption that power polities remains a core feature of internastandings that in turn define the parameters of actor behavior in both technica! tional relations while at the same time international institutions are becoming and normative senses." Further, he rightfully observes that "actor behavior, preever more numerous and comprehensive, and yet adopt a more open stance with mised [inter alia, I would add] on these braad intersubjectivities, both produces respect to the possibility of political transformation and to theorize this stance. concrete material effects and (through practice) reproduces and reifies the interTo this end 1 adopt a neo-Gramscian perspective that, aside from its openly subjective structure," making it "robust." Last, "intersubjective structures can be normative stance in favor of overcoming the status quo, differs from the realistmade 'real' [again, I add inter alia] through the design and maintenance of instituinspired takes in this volume in five key analytical respects, which will be tions that internalize their logic.'' Rosamond here makes important points, which unpacked later:' (1) it adopts a broader definition of power that explicitly includes I wil! link later in a broader, systematic argument. language, traditions, conventions, norms, rules, and other immaterial components nonmaterial power resources and can see power as diffuse and structurally of social life become part of power structures. They are not merelv structural modembedded; (2) it enables us to understand the key role of legitimacy for embedifiers, as suggested by Lobell and Nicholson in this volume. ding power in institutions, rendering it structural, and so stabilizmg world orders; zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Second, the moment we theorize ideational and material components of (3) it thereby also becomes less wedded to a state-centric ontology, allowing power together, we can no longer so easily tie power to particular actors. Following room for polities to operate through other types of actors and channels; (4) it Gramsci (1971), hegemony is a form of power that connects states to civil societies uses the language of hegemony to comprehend the ways in which power strucand is embodied in manifold politica!, cultural, and social practices. Power is not tures, thus defined, become stabilized, including through international instituowned by states but is socially embedded and diffused in society and its institutionalization; (5) it reveals the paradox of institutions becoming empowering zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA by tions (see Herman and Chomsky 1988). Power becomes less relationally defined, providing legitimacy precisely to the extent that they are perceived as counteractand more diffuse, not the propertv of specitic actors as much as an attribute of ing power polities. I briefly explain each of these points and conclude on how this social structures. This insight makes clinging to state centrism impossible (see perspective helps us understand both continuity and change in contemporary also Scholl and Freyberg-lnan 2013), as we can see how power is enacted by a world affairs. variety of types of actors, across levels of governance, in varying coalitions. This The first key intervention made by a neo-Gramscian reconceptualization of does not mean that it is impossible to locate, but it does mean that seeking the the power politics-institutionalization dynamic is an abandonment of the stress effects of power polities exclusively in relations between states overlooks a great on material at the expense of ideational power and a move to theorize the two deal of how power operates both to support and to undermine the translation of together. Gramsci (1971) conceptualized power as combining material and idepower differences between interacting politica! entities into politica! outcomes. ational components and thereby as exercised as a mixture of force and consent. This is far from trivia], as todav state centrism does not equip us to see how power While rule by force alone is unsustainable, rule by consent alone is no rule. Ït is is increasingly concentrated in transnational networks and a transnational ruling wherever force and consent are mixed that power can be enacted in ways that class (Sklair 1997) and contested between transnationalized social groups defined have lasting politica! effects. This means that alongside material capabilities, on class, ideological, and other bases.3 A neo-Gramscian conception of power as resources affecting the ability to let others see the world as one would like them operating through hegemony is, in short, more useful for understanding the transto and to persuade them to share one's point of view are absolutely crucial comnationalizing and multilevel governance world we live in. ponents of power (see, e.g., Cox and Schechter 2003). This is not something Third, we can now see how institutions, both forma! and informal, become previous contributions to this volume disagree with, as we wil! also see, but it is key components in stabilizing power relations and constructing and maintaining not something most foreground sufficiently. hegemony. ln the Marxist tradition, Gramsci (1971) theorized how in advanced Gramsci used the term "hegemony" to capture a dynamic politica! structure capitalist societies the bourgeoisie used all manner of institutions to persuade in which power is exercised as a mixture of force and consent. The concept subordinated classes to internalize its values and goals and to conceive of them merges the material and ideational components of power, makes them inseparaas genera! interest. Dominant groups in this way present their rule as legitimate ble, and reveals their interdependence. In the words of Cox and Sinclair, it is and are enabled to rule largelv through consent. This is precisely how interna- a structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that permeates a whole system of states and non-state entities .... Such a structure of meanings is underpinned by a structure of power, in which most probably one state is dominant but that state's dominance is not sufficient to create hegemony. Hegemony derives from the dominant social strata of the dominant states in so far as these ways of doing and thinking have acquired the acquiescence of the dominant social strata of other states. (1996, 151) Reconceptualizing power in this manner has five important implications. First, while the material bases ofhegemony remain absolutely crucial (Strange 1988a; see also Grieco and lkenberry 2003), the structures that represent the set of opportunities and constraints faced by politica! actors now include ideational alongside material components (Strange 1996). Knowledge, ideas, concepts, theories, tional institutions operate today to support the rule of internationally dominant actors. From good governance norms via the Washington Consensus through World Trade Organization rulings, from military alliance commitments via Security Council resolutions to responsibility to protect (R2P), international institutions serve to present and enforce the interests of powerful actors as an international common sense, which becomes increasingly difficult to contest as such institutionalization progresses. As Barkin and Weitsman write, the responsibilities and rules of international organizations "support and reinforce particular worldviews, thereby supporting those countries that share those worldviews. ... lt is generally the case that the most efficient way to get others to do what one wants them to do is to convince them that it is what they want to do, or that it is the right thing to do. And institutions can be an effective way of creating the legitimacy and knowledge that can do this convincingly" (see also Goddard liie straightfarwardly tied to states but is shared by other types of actors and embed20096). This is rule by consent supported by institutionalization and the way ded in social structures, which in this day and age are to a significant extent transinstitutionalization supports zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA power polities. nationalized. lnstitutions are the means by which power is structurally embedded. Fourth, we have by naw been repeatedly confronted with the key role of legitimacy. Perceived legitimacy is an absolutely crucial ideational power resource (see, e.g., Finnemore and Toope 2001). This has also become clear in previous contributions to this volume. For example, Wivel and Paul have shown how perceived legitimacy is crucial for the success of institutional soft-balancing strategies. Carson and Thompson have shown how it matters far harvesting the benefits of infarmational asymmetries: "To the extent that information advantages render arguments more credible and legitimate, they could lend states increased authority to set negotiating agendas and could be used far more effective strategizing and persuasion in the conduct of bargaining." A neo-Grarnscian perspective, however, brings added value by helping us understand why and how legitimacy is so important far linking the processes of power polities and institutionalization: perceived legitimacy is a prerequisite far consent, and institutions provide cheap compliance with the power relations they embody to the extent that they are perceived as legitimate. This, fifth, reveals an important paradox. As Abbott and Snidal (1998) also argue, a major source of legitimacy for international institutions is precisely that they are seen to counteract power polities. On the one hand, international institutions do allow states (and other actors) to act out interests and reflect power relations. On the other hand, their usefulness depends on their being perceived as not reflecting power relations to the full extent (and thus as not merely reproducing the interests of the powerful). To the extent that they are seen as mere transmission beits for the parochial interests of most powerful actors, they will lose legitimacy in the eyes of all observers that do not align with those interests, and they will be substantially weakened, if not abandoned, as a result.' Thus, from the perspective of states (and other actors), to be able to harness the benefits of institutionalization, it is important to ensure that institutions are perceived as transcending power polities. And only to the extent that they are seen to transcend power polities may they actually end up doing so. This, then, is the paradoxical way institutionalization can counteract power polities. lt also creates a challenge far reflexive scholarship: showing how institutionalization fits the logic of power polities undermines the potential far institutionalization to move us out of a realist world. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA For this process to be successful, their perceived legitimacy is crucial. This, finally, means that institutions are empowered to the extent rhat they are seen as transcending power polities. This institutional power can be used either to entrench or to outgrow the power structures that supported the institution in the first place. But to the extent that it is seen to do the farmer, the institution is weakened, and its power politica! benefits evaporat;. Such an approach can, last, help us comprehend bath continuity and change in the interplay between power polities and institutionalization. By becoming structurally embedded through institutionalization, power relations become stabilized and continue to have effects also after relative state power has shifted. As Barkin and Weitsman write, "lnstitutional histories are path dependent." Moving beyond state centrism and expanding our concept of power allows us to see that hegemony can continue after the hegemon is gone. This is what we are witnessing today, in an age in which the US-led global northwest has lost its post-Cold War unipolar status, but its rule over global governance still continues to be hegemonie. But importantly, the neo-Gramscian vision of power structures is not deterministic but dynamic. lnstitutionalization can stabilize such strucrures, but it can also undermine them. lt can do so gradually by creating an "embedded realism," in which states transfer power to institutions far reasons of rational self-interest, but rhereby loek themselves into a trajectory of change away from a realist world. lt may do so also in more radical ways through contestation over the farms institutionalization should take. Herein may lie hope far peaceful systemic change. This can be studied through the neo-Gramscian concept of counterhegemony, which helps us think rhrough how current orders can be challenged from within, drawing on the same sorts of resources that support the status quo in order to challenge its common sense (Rajagopal 2003, 2006; Sanbonmatsu 2004; Juris 2008; Opel and Pompper 2003; Starr 2000). In short, a neo-Gramscian approach can show why the juxtaposition of power polities with institutionalization is a false one, as the two processes are in fact tightly intertwined. By understanding that and how this is the case, we understand how they go hand in hand but also become better able to see how each process might become destabilized and thus detect possible sources of fundamental change in world affairs. Conclusion N otes 1. The contribution by Lobell and Nicholson in addition entails a commitment to strucBy adopting a neo-Gramscian perspective, I have been able to pull together a turalism. The other versions of realism we encounter in this book allow more room for agency. series of important observations made in the previous contributions, which My critique extends to them all. stopped short of theorizing them systematically, owing to their commitment to 2. Explicitly neo-Gramscian accounts appear much more frequently in international realist ontological premises or the lack of a systematic alternative framework. politica! economy (!PE; e.g., Cox 1986; Cox and Smclair 1996; Cox and Schechter 2003; Gill Power is bath material and ideational. It is relational but also diffuse. lt cannot zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA 1993, 2000; Rupert 1995; Eschle and Maiguashca 2005; Stephen 2009, 2011) rhan in the literature on international security. But in the debate surrounding institutionalization and power polities, a neo-Gramscian intervention seems called for, as critica! IPE has clone considerably more work on understanding the structural workings of power than security studies. See also the chapter by Rosamond. 3. The imporrance of the transnational dimension of institutionalization is also recognized in the chapters by S0rensen and Rosamond. Goddard as wel! recognizes the relevance of institutionalized networks, even as she unfortunately focuses her chapter narrowly on networks among states, 4. This dynamic is all roo familiar, for example, to observers ofEuropean Union polities: efforts to develop common EU policy are routinely hindered by weaker member states' perceptions of disproportionate influence of some of the more powerful. When such perceptions are less prominent, all, including the streng, members stand a greater chance of actually being able to act on their interests. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA CHAPTER 13 International Order and Power Polities Daniel H. Nexon In their introductory chapter to this volume, Wivel and Paul define power polities as "the zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA contestation among individual states using their particular resources and bargaining strength to influence the structure of relations and the conduct of other actors" and argue that "in the context of institutions," this involves "the efforts by states to influence the formulation, application, and enforcement of the rules and regulations of a given institution as well as the control of bureaucratie positions and allocations of resources within it." At first glance this formulation reflects a relatively straightforward extension of realist principles. For realists international polities is, at heart, a struggle for power and position among states. Contemporary realists, as Barkin and Weitsman (chapter 2, this volume) discuss, tend to explain this timeless feature of world polities with reference to international anarchy. Because world polities lacks a common authority to make and enforce rules, states ultimately must relv on their own capabilities to secure their politica! autonomy. In some accounts this inclines states to maximize power-to seek to dominate their neighbors (Mearsheimer 2001). In others it leads them to privilege their security and, if they behave prudently, eschew threatening efforts at achieving regional or global hegemony (Waltz 1979). In neoclassical realism how states respond to the distribution of power depends on domestic political factors (Rathbun 2008; Rose 1998). Thus, in most contemporary flavors of realism the anarchical character of international order means that international polities lacks the kind of highly articulated divisions of labor found in domestic societies. Structural variation reduces to the distribution of capabilities and perhaps a few other factors, such as the relative