Origins and development of the trend toward value-free economics

Mpra Paper, 1997

The Positive and the Normative in Economic Thought, ed. by Badiei S. & Grivaux A., Routledge, 2022

This chapter builds on my previous work on values in economics (Małecka 2020, 2021), and it brings insights from the philosophy of science (values in science discussion) to achieve two goals. Firstly, I reflect on whether these insights shed new light on discussions about the positive and the normative in economics. Secondly, I show that they allow us to approach theoretical discussions on so-called rational choice theory from a novel and illuminating angle. The chapter starts with a review of the state of the art in the philosophy of science on the topic of values in science (Section titled ‘Values in Science: A Philosophy of Science Approach’) and from summarising current attempts to bring these insights from the philosophy of science to economic methodology (Section titled ‘Values in Economics: Recent Developments’). In the next step I argue that this approach in the philosophy of science allows us to re-evaluate the previous debates on the normative/positive distinctions that were mostly linked to the meta-philosophical views on the status of economics as a science (Section titled ‘Values in Economics: A Shift of Perspective’). Then I zoom in the focus of my analysis on the example of expected utility theory (EUT) to show how standard and well-established ways of understanding the theory are a result of value-laden interpretations of a formal framework, a point which so far has gone unnoticed in philosophical and theoretical discussions (Section titled ‘Between Rational Man and Cyborg. Values in Theory Formation: A Case of Expected Utility Theory’). The chapter concludes (Section titled ‘Conclusions’) by listing the main lessons that philosophers of economics, and possibly also economists, can learn from the vibrant debates on values in science in the philosophy of science.

A Brief History of Economic Thought

Studia Gilsoniana, 2019

This edition of Studia Gilsoniana inaugurates submission of articles on economic science based upon pre-modern principles of philosophy/science. Today, many journals address the intersection of economics and philosophy. Their contributors include practicing economists, economic historians, economist-philosophers, philosopher-economists, and economic methodologists. Research in this interdisciplinary field began to appear in the 1970s and later took shape in the 1980s with the appearance of its specialized academic journals. Today, the intersection of economics and philosophy is a vibrant area of inquiry and research. Books and journal pages are replete with references to classical philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle and their contributions to economic science. However, stronger connections need to be made related to the application of economic principles from the past to the present based upon enduring pre-modern principles of science. This is precisely what this inaugural issue celebrates.

The seminar is divided in three distinct sections that focus on the historical and methodological dimensions of economics as an autonomous science. The first section is intended to provide an overview of the history of economic ideas, from ancient and medieval to early modern economic thought and classical political economy. The second section explores the methodological controversies accompanying the rise of Economics to the status of an autonomous and well-articulated academic discipline. The particular relationship between Economics with other cognitive areas such as physics, biology and psychology, are also taken into thorough consideration. The third part investigates a set of contemporary critical approaches that seek to challenge established paradigms and traditions of economic reasoning in mainstream economics.

Journal of Business Ethics, 2024

The issue of interpersonal comparisons of utility is about the possibility (or not) of comparing the utility or welfare or the mental states in general, of different individuals. Embedded in the conceptual framework of utilitarianism, interpersonal comparisons were admissible in economics as part of the theoretical justification of welfare policies until the first decades of the twentieth century. Under the strong influence of the scientific philosophy of positivism as reflected in the works of early neoclassical economists and as epitomized by Lionel Robbins, utility comparisons were subsequently rejected as a value judgement. Robbins' methodological stance is still prevalent among mainstream economists. Despite the explicit rejection of comparability by the majority of economists, interpersonal comparisons are necessary for many key policy issues, such as progressive taxation, social welfare policies, GDP-based welfare comparisons, cost-benefit analysis, and public goods provision. In this paper, the case of interpersonal utility comparisons is discussed as an illustrative example of the usefulness of the study of the role of value judgements, and generally of the interrelationship between ethics and economics. It is argued that the current tension between theory and policy practice might be resolved through the efforts of prominent economists and philosophers to challenge positivism, and especially its problematic treatment of value judgements and of ethical assumptions in general. The discussion also provides more strength to the view that policy makers and their economic advisers cannot avoid ethical questions in their analysis of the workings of the economic system.

Artha Vijnana, 2019

A review essay of Alessandro Roncaglia’s A Brief History of Economic Thought (2017).

2023

Philosophers may find too little philosophy in this collection and economists may find too little or peripheral economic content on the fundamental questions of their science. With this risk, which we do not minimize and which we hope to prove unfounded, we offer this collection of published papers with two expected benefits. The first is to give a coherent and consistent view of the essence of economic reasoning, which we call historical reasoning. The second objective is to attract a wider audience interested in the subject by publishing them in English, the original language of publication. Some of the present contributions have been translated into Romanian in The Logic of Economic Reasoning (Cojanu 2010), but other published and unpublished texts have also been included in this volume.

Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1974

This article reviews the question of whether or not the study of values has or ought to have an important role in the study of economics. The positivist view of Robbins is criticised. Economists cannot ignore the formation of values in their assessment of welfare especially when welfare is affected by the growth and development of the economy. This is illustrated for instance by Weckstein's theory of welfare criteria and changing tastes which indicates that the variables which economists have conventionally regarded as being the determinants of an individual's welfare are not the relevant ones. Similarly the theory advanced by Scitovsky in The Joyless Economy, though different from those of Weckstein and of Marcuse, suggest that economists may not be selecting appropriate measures of welfare. Hollis and Nell, Gintis, Peacock and Rowley have also criticised the limited focus of welfare economics (Paretian welfare economics) from other points of view. The point is made that there are unresolved problems of relevance to economics concerning values·and preferences which can in principle be studied along positivist lines. There is a strong case for economists giving more consideration to these problems.