Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations:
An International Journal Vol. 4, No. 3, Dec. 2018, pp. 1107-1149
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Geo-Strategic Significance of East China Sea
Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS-ADIZ):
A Threat-Import Analysis
Al Chukwuma Okoli* and Uchenna Simeon**
Federal University Lafia, Nigeria
Abstract
This study aims at evaluating the strategic implications of the East China
Sea Air Defense Identification Zone for regional security. On November
23, 2013, China announced the establishment of an Air Defense
Identification Zone on her East Sea axis. This was in its determination to
assert control over disputed maritime territories, and to respond to the
United States’ Asia Pivot role geared towards containing and encircling
China on one hand, and support for Japan’s remilitarization on the other
hand. In its declaration, China demanded that all aircraft transiting the
zone must comply with the identification rules, threatening that noncompliance will attract emergency defensive action. This move was
necessitated by the imperative for safeguarding Chinese sovereignty,
territorial and airspace security, as well as to maintain flight order in
pursuit of self-defense. The manner in which the Chinese ADIZ was
declared, particularly its coverage that goes beyond Chinese airspace,
stretching into the disputed maritime territory, has generated
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considerable anxiety among regional and international stakeholders.
Relying on qualitative analysis of secondary data, and guided by a
threat-import approach to securitization, the study posits that the creation
of the East China Sea ADIZ portends a geo-strategic threat capable of
engendering tension in the wider Asia-Pacific. The paper recommends
that, rather than resorting to armed build-up and possible confrontation,
the parties involved should seek a pacifist resolution to the maritime
question based on regionally mediated diplomatic tradeoffs.
Keywords: aircraft, Air Defense Identification Zone, disputed maritime
territories, East China Sea, identification rules
1. Introduction
Every state in contemporary international system exists and functions
within a strategic environment comprising allies and adversaries. Arising
from this, the pattern of a state’s interaction within its strategic milieu is
predicated upon its perception and interpretation of stimuli emanating
from its surroundings. Historical and empirical evidence clearly reveals
that actors have at various times responded both negatively and
positively to overt and covert stimuli from their strategic locality. In
1907, for instance, Britain widened its alliance with France to include
Russia under the umbrella of Triple entente fearing that Germany’s
rising power could make it become isolated and affect its capacity to
defend its distant empire. Germany, in return, seeing it encircled,
tightened her partnership with Austria and Hungary under the Triple
alliance (Nye, 2003).
Recently in Eastern Europe, as the boundaries of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization advance ever closer to the territory of the Russian
Federation, Russia responded to what it perceived as an attempt by the
United States and its allies in the European Union to militarily encircle
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Russia and perhaps render inoperable Sevastopol (Black Sea docking
facilities) which has been an essential nucleus to advance Russia’s naval
capability on a global platform, by superintending over the organization
of a referendum in Crimea that paved the way for the former’s
annexation of the later in the aftermath of the Western-backed Colour
Revolution that ousted pro-Russian Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovich in February 2014 (The Guardian, 2014; Owen, 2014;
Walberg, 2014).
The foregoing illustrations are a pointer to the significance of a
country’s strategic milieu and the need for states to react to stimuli
emanating from the same. As Owen (2014, para. 3) rightly noted:
“spheres of influence exist in the minds of many nations even if not
formally acknowledged in international law”. The People’s Republic of
China is not left out in this statecraft. In reaction to the escalation of
military apprehensions in the Asia-Pacific region precipitated by the
Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” foreign policy (anti-China
strategy) which is fundamentally targeted at isolating and encircling
China both diplomatically and militarily and checking China’s challenge
to United States’ dominance in East and South Asia by supporting
Japan’s remilitarization (Chan, 2013, November 25), the Chinese
government, in the exercise of its right to self-defense as enshrined in
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and in accordance with
international practice, on November 23, 2013, announced the
establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China
Sea with the aim of safeguarding state sovereignty, territorial land and
air security and preserving flight order (Erickson, 2013, November 23).
Before the recent Chinese declaration of an ADIZ over the East
China Sea, the US military, in acknowledging different countries’ de
facto valid control over their territories, had after the World War II and
during the Korean War, demarcated the existing ADIZs in the Northeast
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Asia in such a manner as to disallow overlap between the existing
ADIZs; consequently, in order to avert an accidental clash, South Korea,
Japan and Taiwan took over these lines (Osawa, 2013).
In spite of its multilateral implications for two thirds of the East
China Sea, the Chinese ADIZ was announced suddenly and apparently
without consultation with countries, in this case US and Japan, and other
neighbours like South Korea and Taiwan, whose civilian and military
aircrafts will be affected by the declaration (Metcalf, 2013; Osawa,
2013). The Chinese ADIZ overlaps with other ADIZs in the region: it
overlaps with Taiwanese ADIZ by comparatively diminutive 23,000
square kilometres (Taipei Times, 2013) as well as the Japanese and South
Korean ADIZs. Also, the East China Sea ADIZ covers an area of ocean
where South Korea has a marine research station built on a sub-merged
rock (South Korean-claimed Socotra Rock) (Gale, 2013); it encompasses
the disputed maritime territories known as Senkaku (
) in Japan and
Diaoyu (
) in China but currently under Japanese control. At the
same time, the East China Sea ADIZ includes some joint training
airspace of the US Air Force and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, as
well as US military firing and bombing ranges in the East China Sea
(Osawa, 2013).
Another problem with the East China Sea ADIZ is that unlike most
countries’ ADIZs which only require identification for aircrafts intending
to enter their national airspace, China in its declaration has demanded
that aircraft flying in the zone identify themselves even when their
destination is not the Chinese mainland (Laird and Timperlake, 2013)
thereby contradicting with the basic early warning and traffic control
purposes of an ADIZ (Metcalf, 2013, 1 as cited in Erickson, 2013).
Moreover, though there is no internationally legally binding rules
governing the declaration and operation of an ADIZ, the US and Japan,
in their submission during the International Civil Aviation Organization
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(ICAO) Council meeting held in Montreal in March averred that by
contemplating the adoption of defensive emergency measures to respond
to aircraft that do not cooperate in the identification, China’s ADIZ
contravenes the principle of “freedom of over flight” in high seas as
codified in Article 87 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Lee, 2014).
The Chinese ADIZ has also been adjudged as an anomaly or an
irrational act challenging multiple players in the Pacific, having fallen
within the strategic quadrangle in the Pacific, that is, a central area
where the US and several core allies such as Japan, South Korea,
Australia, India, Singapore et cetera are reaching out to shape
collaborative defense capabilities to ensure defense in depth (Laird and
Timperlake, 2013, as cited in Keck, 2013). Noting that the freedom to
operate in the quadrangle is a baseline retirement for allies, Laird and
Timperlake (2013, as cited in Keck, 2013) have warned that with the
East China Sea ADIZ, the People’s Republic of China is putting down its
marker unto the quadrangle and if not properly addressed, will definitely
expand its definition of air and maritime defense outward.
In the light of the foregoing, the following questions have become
imperative: Does the ECS-ADIZ escalate tensions in the Pacific and
even beyond? Does the ECS-ADIZ pose a threat to global peace? In
responding to these vital analytical posers, the study maintains a threatimport analytical approach, which emphasizes the strategic implications
of ECS-ADIZ as a veritable security threat in the geo-strategic context
of the East China Sea. This investigation is justified on two reasons: the
first is that it helps to bridge the knowledge gap occasioned by overreactions trailing the East China Sea ADIZ declaration; the second
justification derives from the fact that given deep-seated hostilities
between China and its neighbours, especially Japan where territorial
dispute over pockets of islets in the East China Sea has assumed a
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disturbing dimension as well as hegemonic struggle between China and
US over the control of resources in the Pacific, these new air traffic
restrictions and the first of its kind by China has the propensity of
escalating these tensions into a full-blown war in the event that China
decides to embark on military enforcement of its ADIZ rules.
This paper is divided into seven segments: part one deals with
introduction; part two addresses on the historical and contextual issues
concerning ADIZ; part three explores the background of ECS-ADIZ
declaration and the reactions it generated; part four focuses on the rules
and procedures for aircraft identification; part five assesses the
implications of the ECS-ADIZ declaration for security in the AsiaPacific region; part six examines the repercussions of the ECS-ADIZ on
global peace while part seven is the conclusion.
2. Historicizing and Contextualising ADIZ
Though the origin of the concept of an ADIZ is not a recent development
in international politics as it dates back to the 1950s, as a result of the
controversy generated by China’s declaration of an ADIZ in the East
China Sea, it has become imperative that we attempt a resolution of
contending issues surrounding the ADIZ phenomenon.
Page (2013) asserts that an ADIZ has no foundation in international
law and is not administered by any international organization. As such,
definitions and rules differ among diverse countries. Characteristically,
such zones extend well beyond a country’s airspace to provide its
military time to respond to potentially hostile inward bound aircraft.
According to him, ADIZ declaration requires foreign military aircraft to
identify themselves and their flight plans on entering the ADIZ or else
such aircraft will often be intercepted and escorted inside the ADIZ but
will not be repelled or forced to land unless it is regarded as a threat.
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From the American initiative, the Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ) means an area of airspace over land or water in which the ready
identification, location and control of all aircraft (except for Department
of Defense and law enforcement aircrafts) is required in the interest of
national security (Air Defense Identification Zone – Code of Federal
Regulations 2015, para 1). An aircraft entering the ADIZ is mandated to
radio its intended course, destination and any supplementary information
about its trip through the ADIZ to a higher authority, typically an Air
Traffic Controller, and any aircraft flying in the ADIZ without approval
may be branded as a threat and treated as an enemy aircraft, potentially
leading to interception by fighter aircraft. From this perspective, ADIZ
applies only to commercial aircraft aspiring to enter US airspace; ADIZ
procedures do not apply to foreign aircraft not intending to enter the
United States airspace and do not recognize the right of a coastal state to
apply its ADIZ guidelines to foreign aircraft not intending to enter their
national airspace (The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations, 2007, as cited in Abeyratne, 2011).
Ma (2013) defines Air Defense Identification Zone as an area of
airspace demarcated by a state to guard against potential air threats with
the aim of securing enough time for the Air force to discover and
identify aircraft in the interest of national security. According to him,
following rapid scientific development since World War 1 which has
persistently challenged the conventional air defense system as the latest
model of hostile aircraft equipped with advanced technology and tactics
give too little time for it to correspond to unexpected activities, several
states embarked on the creation of ADIZs beyond their territorial
airspace over high seas and the extension of early warning spaces has
become a common practice to guarantee enough interception time so as
to prevent some unidentified aircraft from intruding into the territorial
airspace by accident.
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For Sevastopulo (2013), ADIZ is a zone that provides an early
warning system to help a country detect possible incursions into its
sovereign airspace. He argues that the zone stretches beyond the
boundary of a country’s national airspace. If an aircraft enters an ADIZ
without warning, the country in question may scramble fighter jets to
visually identify the aircraft and determine whether it poses a threat or
not.
Abeyrante (2011, para, 1) in his own contribution conceptualizes the
Air Defense Identification Zone as an area in airspace over land or water
which may not be over the sovereign territory of a state in which the
ready identification, location, and control of all aircraft are required in
the interest of national security. According to him ADIZ must not be
confused with Flight Information Regions (FIRs) which are areas
established for the facilitation of airspace and air traffic management,
generally involving a subjacent state that has undertaken responsibility
for providing air traffic control services.
Answering question on the meaning of an Air Defense Identification
Zone, Yomiuri Shimbun (2013) averts that there are no international
treaties or agreements that set legal conditions for Air Defense
Identification zone (ADIZ); hence, each country has to set its ADIZ
through domestic laws or ordinances. Arising from this, he posits that
countries cannot legally force others to comply with their ADIZ
regulations such as imposing duties to report aircraft flights, stressing
that in contrast, countries’ exclusive rights are recognized in their
territorial airspace.
It can be deduced from the preceding analysis that ADIZ does not
derive its doctrinal foundation from any international legal framework.
The zone is not identical with prohibited airspace or no-flight zone
within which flights are prevented from operating; rather the ADIZ aims
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at creating sufficient time for early warning to enable the country
discover potential incursions into its sovereign airspace for national
security reasons. Its content, terms and composition can best be
comprehended within the context of its establishment as its practice
cannot in anyway be standardized because it varies from country to
country and is subject to modifications as circumstances permit.
However, while setting the rules care must be taken in order not to
infringe on the over flight right of legitimate users.
3. Background to the East China Sea ADIZ Declaration and
Reactions Trailing It
In an effort to promote and bolster affirmative and fruitful association
with China after the World War II in addition to securing Chinese
assistance in checkmating British, Russian and Japanese expansion in
Asia, then United States President Franklin Roosevelt proposed the
Cairo Conference in 1943 as a means of conveying public confidence in
the Republic of China. At the series of meetings in Cairo, Egypt,
between November and December of 1943, President Roosevelt met
with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Chinese President
Chiang Kai-shek to consider the progress of the war against Japan and
the prospect of post-war Asia (“The Cairo Conference, 1943” – see: U.S.
Department of State, 2001-2009 Archive).
Delineating his vision for post-war Asia, Roosevelt told the
assembly that he needed a cooperative world order in which a dominant
power in each major region would be responsible for maintaining the
peace. Based on this mental picture, the need to institute China as one of
his “Four Policemen” became exceedingly imperative to help prevent
Japanese expansionism and supervise decolonization under a trustee
system. The outcome of this Conference was the Cairo Declaration
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jointly released by the United States, the Republic of China and Great
Britain on December 1, 1943, where the allies pledged to continue the
war against Japan and expel Japanese forces from all territories it had
occupied including the Chinese territories, Korea and The Pacific Islands
(“The Cairo Conference, 1943” – see: U.S. Department of State, 20012009 Archive).
The main points of the Cairo Declaration which was broadcast
through radio on December 1, 1943, were (Cairo and Potsdam
Declarations, 1943 – see: Chen and Reisman, 1972):
• The Allies are not fighting Japan for their own territorial expansion.
• The Allies are resolved to bring unrelenting military pressure against
Japan until it agrees to unconditional surrender.
• Japan shall be stripped of all islands she has seized or occupied in the
Pacific since the beginning ofWorld War I in 1914.
• All the territories Japan has taken from China such as Manchuria
(Dongbei), Formosa (Taiwan), and the Pescadores (Penghu), shall be
restored to the Republic of China.
• The Allies are determined that Korea shall become free and
independent.
• Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has
taken by violence and greed.
A confirmation of the Cairo Declaration was contained in Section
eight (8) of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, which is referred
to by the Japanese Instrument of Surrender and it stated that the terms of
the Cairo Declaration shall be executed and Japanese sovereignty shall
be restricted to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and
such minor islands as we determine (Cairo and Potsdam Declarations,
1943 – see: Chen and Reisman, 1972). On September 2, 1945, Japan
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inked the Instrument of Surrender popularly and distinctively
acknowledged the terms of the Potsdam declaration, which incorporated
by reference the terms of the Cairo Declaration:
We, acting by command of and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the
Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General
Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions set forth in the declaration
issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, China,
and Great Britain on 26 July 1945, at Potsdam, and subsequently
adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which four
powers are hereafter referred to as the Allied Powers.
(Instrument of Surrender, 1945, para 1 – see:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1949)
The United States, having used China to secure victory over Japan,
realized that the tossing of those islands in the Pacific to China was an
error of strategic judgment that needed to be checked. As George
Kennan rightly observed:
… this thoughtless tossing to China of a heavily inhabited and
strategically important island which had not belonged to it in recent
decades, and particularly the taking of this step before we had any
idea of what the future China was going to be like, and without any
consultation of the wishes of the inhabitants of the island, produced a
situation which today represents a major embarrassment to United
States policy, and constitutes one of the great danger spots of the postwar world.
(Kennan, 1960: 376-377, 2
as cited in Chen and Reisman, 1972)
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The time became ripe for double standard and high-level conspiracy
between the United States and its foremost ally, the United Kingdom.
The duo started with self-serving interpretations of the Cairo
Declaration. On December 27, 1950, the United States in its aide
memoire interpreted the Cairo Declaration in these words:
The Cairo Declaration of 1943 stated the purpose to restore
“Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores to the Republic of China.”
That Declaration, like other wartime declarations such as those of
Yalta and Potsdam, was in the opinion of the United States
Government subject to any final peace settlement where all relevant
factors should be considered. The United States cannot accept the
view, apparently put forward by the Soviet government, that the views
of other Allies not represented at Cairo must be wholly ignored. Also,
the United States believes that declarations such as that issued at
Cairo must necessarily be considered in the light of the United
Nations Charter, the obligations of which prevail over any other
international agreement.
(Carlyle (ed.), 1953: 622-623, 3
as cited in Chen and Reisman, 1972)
For the British, its Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated that the
Cairo Declaration “contained merely a statement of common purpose”
(Parl. Deb., 1955 4 – see: Chen and Reisman, 1972).
Not yet satisfied with this, to further expedite action in its desire to
control and oversee affairs in the far east, on September 8, 1951, at the
city of San Francisco, the United States and Japan signed the Mutual
Security Treaty that paved the way for the stationing of United States
troops on Japanese soil for the defense of Japan. On March 8, 1954, the
two countries signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement which
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allowed for the presence of United States armed forces in Japan for the
purpose of peace and security while simultaneously encouraging Japan
to take on more responsibility for its own defense, rearming in a manner
suited for defensive rather than offensive purposes (US and Japan
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, 1954). These two agreements
(Cairo Declaration and Mutual Security Treaty) involving US and China
on one hand and US and Japan on the other no doubt have serious
implications for Asians. The two deals were aimed at entrenching rivalry
between the two dominant powers (China and Japan) thereby hindering
any form of cooperation that would foster regional solidarity, a scenario
the US would leverage on to achieve its foreign policy goal of
controlling and superintending over the affairs in the region.
During the Cold War, there was a change of attitude towards China
as the United States treated China as an ally against Russia after
President Nixon’s popular engagement with China in the early 1970s.
With the demise of the Cold War, United States-China association
recommenced with the later serving as an export processing platform for
the former’s multinational corporations (Smith, 2013). This sudden
romance with China was however deep-rooted in fundamental
contradictions. The United States having being economically
incorporated with its key international contender depended on Chinese
credit to maintain the deficit and cheap labour to boost the bottom lines
of United States corporations and facilitated the off-shoring of
production to China by United States corporations. As this was going on,
the United States and its corporations became increasingly clashing with
the Chinese state and capital (NBC News, 2007).
To manage this contradiction, the United States combined the policy
of engagement with a subordinate policy of containment (Friedberg,
2011: 88, 5 cited in Smith, 2013). At the peak of United States’
engagement with China during the Clinton administration, the American
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Department of State portrayed China as a “strategic partner” while at the
same time nourished its military capability all through Asia as a
deterrent to China to the level of staging the single largest military
operation ever since the Vietnam war in 1996 to obstruct China’s threat
against Taiwan (Smith, 2013).
During the Bush administration, after the United States found itself
engaged in a ruthless confrontation with China over a collision between
a Chinese fighter jet and an American spy plane over China, Washington
re-named China a “strategic competitor” (ibid.). President George W.
Bush, however, backed off his antagonistic approach toward China to
search for the latter’s support in the war against terror after the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attack in the United States. This is in
addition to campaigning for China’s admission into the World Trade
Organization as a means of integrating China into the global capitalist
system controlled by the United States (ibid.).
In a bid to reinforce its majestic affirmation of world’s only
surviving superpower and simultaneously deflect manifest threats from
core imperial rivals such as China, Russia, India, Brazil among others,
after the forceful invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and botched
endeavours at regime dethronement in Syria and Iran with the objective
of controlling the greater part of Middle East, its energy reserves,
shipping and pipeline routes triggered both strategic and economic
catastrophe, the Obama administration, just as committed as his
predecessor George Bush, in January 2012 issued a new Defense
Strategic Guidance targeted at altering United States’ global overlordship to the Asia-Pacific, which analysts envisage will be the centre
of twenty first century capitalism (ibid.).
This momentous swing in United States’ foreign policy from a
Middle Eastern/European preoccupation to an East/South Asia one
“Pivot to East Asia” regional strategy has as its major concerns:
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strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening of United States’
working relationships with emerging powers, including China; engaging
with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment;
forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and
human rights (Clinton, 2011).
According to Clinton (2011), with almost half of the world’s
population residing in the Asia-Pacific, the region’s significance in
furthering United States’ economic and strategic interests cannot be
over-emphasized as open markets in Asia present the United States with
unparalleled prospects for investment, trade and access to cutting-edge
technology. Moreover, United States’ economic recovery at home will
depend on exports and the capacity ofAmerican firms to take advantage
of the enormous and growing consumer base ofAsia. Finally, she noted
that strategically maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific
is increasingly central to global advancement, whether through
protecting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering
the nuclear proliferation efforts of North Korea, or guaranteeing
transparency in the military activities of the region’s key actors.
As anticipated, President Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy
elicited mixed reactions from countries within the region with different
states responding in various ways depending on their perception of this
policy modification. For the People’s Republic of China, this turning
point in the United States’ foreign policy strategy that aimed at
maximizing its interest in the Pacific to the detriment of China needs to
be checkmated; hence, the declaration of an Air Defense Identification
Zone covering much of the East China Sea, including the disputed
maritime territory of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands which are under Japanese
control at the moment. The zone includes the airspace within the area
enclosed by China’s outer limit of the territorial sea and the following
six points: 33º11’N (North Latitude) and 121º47’E (East Longitude),
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33º11’N and 125º00’E, 31º00’N and 128º20’E, 25º38’N and 125º00’E,
24º45’N and 123º00’E, 26º44’N and 120º58’E (Statement by the
government of PRC, 2013 – see: Erickson, 2013, para. 5).
Figure 1 Diagrammatic illustration of the East China Sea
Air Defense Identification Zone Overlapping
Those of Japan and South Korea
Source: Chinese Defense Ministry (as cited in BBC News, 2013, December 8).
Justifying the establishment of the Zone, the Chinese Ministry of
National Defense in a statement issued on November 23, 2013, in
Beijing stressed that the government of the People’s Republic of China
pronounced the creation of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification
Zone in accordance with the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
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National Defense (March 14, 1997), the Law of the People’s Republic of
China on Civil Aviation (October 30, 1995) and the Basic Rules on flight
of the People’s Republic of China (July 27, 2001) (Statement by the
government of PRC, 2013 – see: Erickson, 2013).
Despite clarifications by the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of
National Defense that the East China Sea ADIZ is not a no-fly zone and
as such will not affect freedom of over flight of other countries’ aircraft
in compliance with international laws and that the zone does not aim at
any specific country or target, rather that its purpose is to set aside
adequate time for early warning to defend China’s airspace, several
countries have expressed reservations over the manner the ADIZ was
proclaimed including the coverage (Erickson, 2013, November 23).
Australia, through its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, has
voiced its disapproval to any coercive or unilateral actions to alter the
status quo in the East China Sea stressing that the timing and mode of
China’s proclamation are disturbing in view of existing regional
apprehensions, adding that it will not contribute to regional stability
(ABC News, 2013, November 28a). Tensions between China and Japan
over the disputed maritime territories in the ECS are of great concern to
Australia. Economically, three (China, Japan and South Korea) of
Australia’s four leading trading partners are located in Northeast Asia
while sea lanes vital to Australian trade run through the waters of the
East China Sea; strategically and politically, two US allies are based in
this region and America maintains a strong forward military presence
there (Bisley and Taylor, 2014).
For the European Union, its worry about the ADIZ declaration
stems mainly from the statement by China’s Ministry of National
Defense that it will take emergency defensive measures in case of noncompliance, stressing that the East China Sea ADIZ proclamation
amplifies the threat of escalation and contributes to increasing anxiety in
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the region (European Union, 2013). It noted that under international law,
rights to the legitimate use of sea and airspace are essential for security,
stability and prosperity, and hence, the need for all sides to exercise
caution and restraint (ibid.).
Even though Chinese ADIZ overlaps with Taiwanese ADIZ by a
comparatively diminutive 23,000 square kilometers, official response
from Taiwan was primarily muffled giving rise to remonstrations from
the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and some academics
that the government was falling short of affirming Taiwan’s sovereignty
(for instance, according to Chris Huang, an associate professor at the
Institute of Law for Science and Technology at Taiwan’s National Tsing
Hua University – see: Taipei Times, 2013). Reacting to the development,
the Taiwanese government declared that the East China Sea ADIZ
demarcation is not an issue about territorial airspace or territorial
sovereignty, and hence it directed that flight plans for planes flying
through the zone should be submitted to Beijing as requested (ibid.). On
the other hand, Laird and Timperlake (2013, as cited in Keck, 2013),
employing the concept of “strategic quadrangle”, highlighted how
Taiwan fits into the East China Sea ADIZ controversy and declared thus:
We have placed the ADIZ down upon the strategic geography we have
identified and a key reality quickly emerges. Just by chance, the zone
covers reinforcements to Taiwan. That is, the ADIZ happens to cover
the exact areas that the US or Japan would have to traverse in order to
promptly respond to a PLA invasion ofTaiwan.
On the basis of this, they averred that the US would be unable to use its
immense military resources in South Korea and Japan to defend Taiwan,
since China can deny it (US) and allied forces to operate in the waters
and airspace covered by the ADIZ.
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Responding to ADIZ declaration by China, an announcement by the
US State Department described China’s creation of the ADIZ as a
unilateral action that constitutes an attempt to alter the existing order in
the East China Sea, adding that freedom of over flight and other globally
lawful uses of sea and airspace are essential to prosperity, stability and
security in the Pacific. The statement further adds that the United States
does not support efforts by any state to apply its ADIZ rules to foreign
aircraft not intending to enter its national airspace, stressing that the
United States does not apply its ADIZ guidelines to foreign aircraft not
intending to enter United States national airspace (US statement on the
East China Sea air defense identification zone – see: Chan, 2013). While
urging China not to execute its threat to take action against aircraft that
do not identify themselves or adhere to instructions from China, it
(United States) however, declared that the Chinese proclamation will not
in any way alter how the United States conducts military operations in
the region, asserting that the United States remains steadfast in its
commitment to its allies by reiterating its established policy that Article
V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the
disputed Senkaku Islands (US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, cited
in Erickson, 2013).
Like the US, the presence of China as the central power in the AsiaPacific and its relationship with its neighbours has equally drawn the
attention of Russia to the events in that region, territorial disputes in East
China Sea inclusive; hence, tension between China and Japan as a result
of territorial disputes continues to increase concern in the region and
beyond (Topychkanov, 2014). Though Russian interests in the AsiaPacific region dwell mainly on the economic aspects with little or no
emphasis on political issues, its interest in developing relationships with
China and its neighbours cannot be under-estimated: escalation of
conflicts in the region and disruption of trade and economic relations
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between regional countries are all of serious concern to Russia (ibid.).
The Philippines blamed China for striving to convert the area into its
domestic airspace with Filipino Aviation official John Andrews
cautioning that Beijing might undertake to set up an additional ADIZ in
the South China Sea, where the two countries (the Philippines and
China) have rival claims (ABC News, 2013, November 28b).
In its reaction, the South Korean Transport Ministry averred that the
East China Sea ADIZ did not comply with international regulations;
hence, its airlines would not recognize the Chinese ADIZ. As reported
by Yonhap (
) News Agency, South Korean Foreign Minister
Yun Byung-se argued that the East China Sea ADIZ dispute had made
“tricky regional situations even more difficult to deal with” (Gale, 2013).
One key issue of contention for South Korea is that the East China Sea
ADIZ covers an area of ocean where South Korea has a marine research
station built on a submerged rock, the South Korean-claimed Socotra
Rock (Gale, 2013; VOA, 2013).
Though Japan maintains an ADIZ in the region, its Foreign Ministry
stated that the Chinese ADIZ is completely undesirable and exceedingly
deplorable as it incorporates the Japanese territorial airspace over the
Senkaku Islands (maritime territory under Japanese control). Signaling
its disapproval over the creation of the East China Sea ADIZ, Japan
declared that unilaterally establishing such airspace and restricting
flights in the area is very risky as it may lead to miscalculation in the
area (Chan, 2013, November 25).
4. Rules and Procedures of Identification for Foreign Aircraft
In concurrence with the proclamation by the Government of the People’s
Republic of China on setting up of the East China Sea ADIZ, the
Chinese Ministry of National Defense issued a pronouncement on the
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aircraft identification rules for the East China Sea ADIZ. According to
the report, foreign aircraft in the zone will be expected to conform to the
following (Announcement of aircraft identification rules, 2013 – see:
Erickson, 2013):
1) Aircraft flying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone
must abide by these rules.
2) Aircraft flying in the East China Sea ADIZ must provide the
following means of identification:
• Identification of flight plan. Any aircraft in the East China Sea ADIZ
must report its flight plans to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China or China’s Civil Aviation
Administration.
• Radio identification. Aircraft in the zone must maintain two-wayradio communication and respond in a timely and accurate manner
to identification inquiries from the administrative organ of the East
China Sea ADIZ or the unit authorized by the organ.
• Responder/Transponder identification. Aircraft flying in the East
China Sea ADIZ, if equipped with an Air Traffic Control Radar
Beacon System transponder must keep it on throughout the entire
course.
• Logo/Sign identification. Any aircraft flying in the East China Sea
ADIZ must display insignia indicating its nationality and registration
identification in accordance with related international treaties.
3) Aircraft flying in the East China Sea ADIZ should follow the
instructions of the administrative organ of the East China Sea ADIZ
or the unit authorized by it as the Chinese Military will adopt
“emergency defensive measures” in response to aircraft that refuses to
follow the instructions or fails to cooperate in the identification.
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4) Chinese Ministry of National Defense is the administrative organ of
the East China Sea ADIZ.
5) The Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China
is responsible for the explanation of these rules.
6) These aircraft identification rules will come into force at 10 a.m.
November 23, 2013.
These rules and procedures for aircraft identification no doubt have
serious geo-strategic implications. Metcalf (2013, 6 as cited in Erickson,
2013) has argued that an ADIZ is not a provocative or negative step in
itself as it can be in the interests of stability and security of the country
enforcing it, stressing that many countries including Japan, South Korea
and the United State (which started it decades ago) have such zones. He
however, criticized the East China Sea ADIZ on the following grounds
(Metcalf, 2013, 7 as cited in Erickson, 2013, para. 3):
• It is a unilateral step, announced suddenly and apparently without
consultation with two countries whose civilian and military aircraft
will be affected, the United States and Japan.
• It includes a contested maritime area, notably the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands, and thus can be seen as a deliberate effort to change the status
quo, even a provocation.
• Its rules demanding that aircraft identify themselves and obey Chinese
direction on flights paths seem to apply to all aircraft in the zone and
not only aircraft enroute to China. This contradicts with the basic early
warning and air traffic control purposes of an ADIZ, and with longstanding Pentagon regulations advising United States military aircraft
to comply with a foreign ADIZ only when they are flying on a course
into that country’s airspace, not when they are simply on transit or
patrol.
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• It looks like a pretext for one of two undesirable security outcomes. If
foreign aircraft now regularly obeys the new Chinese rules, we will see
precedents set for the unilateral expansion of Chinese authority over
contested maritime territory. Alternatively, if foreign aircraft contests
or ignores the Chinese zone and a dangerous or deadly incident occurs
(such as a collision or forceful encounter), then China will have
prepared the way to absolve itself of legal or moral blame, making it
easier to use the incident as a justification to escalate the crisis if China
so chooses.
He wrapped it up by arguing that if China’s new zone did not include
disputed maritime territory, if its requirements for compliance applied
only to aircraft heading into Chinese airspace, and if neighbours like
Japan and South Korea had been consulted ahead of the announcement,
then, there would be little or nothing for others to object to adding that it
could have been part of a wider strategy of cooperation to reduce
maritime security risks in North Asia (Metcalf, 2013, 8 cited in Erickson,
2013, para.2).
Jen Psaki, the chief spokesperson for the US State Department, has
pointed out that China had made the pronouncement in an uncoordinated
approach which is incompatible with standard practice. According to
him, the fact that China’s declaration has caused uncertainty and
amplified the threat of accident simply further underlines the validity of
concerns and the need for China to repeal the procedures (The Guardian,
2013).
For O’Hanlon and Steinberg (2013, 9 cited in White, 2013), the
problem with China’s ADIZ is that it encompasses Islands whose
sovereignty is contested between China, Japan and Taiwan, noting that
in contrast with the conventional defense zone which helps build
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stability by plummeting the likelihood of mishaps based on flawed
identity, the unilateral and forceful character of the new Chinese efforts
raises the risk of conflict. On the basis of this, Wang (2013, 10 cited in
White, 2013) opines that China’s move seems to have shot itself in the
foot, and will be used as an illustration of China’s status as a revisionist
state which will additionally reinforce the threat narrative.
In contrast, some observers are of the opinion that the barrel of
criticisms levelled against the East China Sea Air Defense Identification
Zone amount to over-reaction. According to Chen Weihua, columnist
and chief Washington correspondent for China Daily (cited in
ChinaFile, 2013), the declaration of such ADIZ should by no means be
seen as a signal that China is prepared to shoot down any foreign aircraft
entering the zone without prior reporting since China has as large a stake
in the peace, stability and prosperity in the region as anyone else. While
noting that the Air Defense Identification Zone is not a Chinese
innovation as the United States, Japan and some 20 other countries
declared such zones in their airspace long time ago, he further stressed
that China’s pronouncement of its first ADIZ in the East China Sea
echoes its dissatisfaction with Japan’s refusal to acknowledge that there
is a row over the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands, or, as the Japanese call
them, the Senkaku, pointing out that a number of times, Japan has used
its own declared ADIZ as a ploy to disparage China for interfering in its
airspace, which, in China’s observation, is disputed.
In a related development, Ma (2013) has argued that the East China
Sea Air Defense Identification Zone is not directed against any specific
country; rather, it satisfies the pragmatic requirements of national
security. He however declared that it is a modest reaction to the
incessant frustrations from certain countries against China as can be
attested to by the recent Japanese claim that it would shoot down China’s
drones and fire warning shots at Chinese aircraft entering its own ADIZ.
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According to him, Japanese ships and aircraft have carried out stalking,
surveillance, monitoring, and even precarious deeds of incursion on
Chinese normal military instruction activities for relatively a long time
and taking note of Japan’s provocations, many people are predisposed to
construe China’s establishment of the ADIZ as a response to Japan’s
impudence. Also justifying the Chinese act, Chinese Defence Ministry
spokesman Geng Yansheng (Reuters, 2013, December 3) opines that
“the East China Sea Air Defense Identification zone is a safe, not risky
zone, a zone of cooperation not confrontation”.
All the reactions trailing the East China Sea ADIZ are triggered by
individual actor’s perception and interpretation of the Chinese move. For
those who understand the ADIZ as directed at territorial claim on the
disputed maritime territories, the East China Sea ADIZ is a destabilizing
factor that has altered the status quo in the area. On the other hand,
actors that view the Chinese ADIZ as a mechanism for ensuring stability
and security through the maintenance of flight order will cooperate to
avoid possible miscalculation and accident.
5. Asia-Pacific in the aftermath of East China Sea ADIZ Declaration
The swing of the centre of gravity of global politics and economy from
the Atlantic to Pacific occasioned by the alteration in balance of power
has simultaneously created opportunity for security cooperation and
triggered regional concerns and tensions. As a home to a host of actors
with varying political, economic and social systems coupled with
divergent security perspectives, the Asia-Pacific region has become
more prone to the so-called “gray situations”, that is, situations that are
neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and
interests (Cabinet Secretariat, Japan, 2013). Therefore, in response to the
unilateral and assertive manner of the new Chinese ADIZ declaration,
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Japan, South Korea and the United States have all defied China’s new
directive by carrying out a series of daring and provocative moves in
response.
In what is regarded as disapproval of China’s ADIZ declaration, the
US flew two unarmed nuclear-capable B-52 bombers through the zone
without notifying Chinese authorities, stressing that US military aircraft
would not adhere to the new Chinese protocols (Symonds, 2014).
Following far-reaching apprehension about China’s regional capability,
South Korea is constructing a new naval base for 20 warships, including
submarines, and planning to purchase the F-35, stressing that it has to
guard critical shipping lanes in the East China Sea for its exports, as well
as loads of electronics headed to China (Sanger, 2013). In addition to
carrying out a flight operation unannounced through the newly declared
Chinese ADIZ few days after the pronouncement, South Korean navy
has not only conducted sea and air military drills in an area within the
East China Sea ADIZ but also expanded its own ADIZ more than 300
kilometres to the South which partially overlaps Chinese ADIZ with
both countries’ zones presently enveloping the airspace above a rock
called Ieodo (
) by South Korea (i.e. the Socotra Rock)
and Suyan (
) by China, which though claimed by both countries
but is administered by South Korea (BBC News, 2013, December 8).
The new zone which was expanded by about 66,480 square
kilometres (25,670 square miles) or about two thirds of the size of the
country in waters off its south coast (Business Insider, 2013), according
to Jang Hyuk, Head of Policy of South Korea’s Ministry of National
Defense, will also result in an overlap with Japan’s air defense zone
(Reuters, 2013, December 8). As reported by Yonhap News Agency of
South Korea (as cited in BBC News, 2013, December 8), this will be the
first time that South Korea has adjusted its ADIZ since it was first set up
by the US military in 1951 during the Korean War. On its part, few days
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after the Chinese declaration, Japan defied the Chinese ADIZ by
engaging in routine surveillance operation without informing China.
Besides, December 17, 2013, marked a momentous inflection point in
Japan’s history in responding to its security environment. Citing China’s
activities around Japan, the Senkaku Islands and the ADIZ, Japan
unveiled its first ever National Security Strategy aimed at maintaining
the peace and security of Japan as well as ensuring its survival (Cabinet
Secretariat, Japan, 2013).
Partly due to doubts about US commitment in the Pacific region on
one hand and as part of a basic alteration in the national orientation
toward a Japan that is more fervent and capable to defend itself than any
time since the World War II, Japan, besides planning to construct a new
army base by 2016 on a small inhabited island near the disputed
Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands (as they are known in Japan and China
respectively), is also preparing to deploy more F-15s and radar planes to
Okinawa (
), a new helicopter carrier and for the first time has
mulled over buying unarmed American drones to patrol the area, as part
of a three-year-long shift in military strategy to focus on their Southern
Islands and China (Sanger, 2013). Moreover, in a move believed by
Chinese analysts as aimed at further strengthening Japan’s maritime
capability, the Japanese government on January 7, 2014, affirmed that it
would register 280 isolated islands as state property in order to boost
their management despite the fact that its earlier resolution of September
2012 to nationalize three of the Senkaku / Diaoyu islets sparked strong
objections from China and considerably escalated tension between the
two countries (Symonds, 2014). Also on the same day, Japan proclaimed
that it scrambled fighter jets to head off a Chinese civilian aircraft (Y-12
propeller plane) that entered Japan’s ADIZ near the disputed islands in
the East China Sea (ibid.).
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Al Chukwuma Okoli and Uchenna Simeon
For China, determined to make real its threat and also prepare for
any eventuality in its resolve to increasingly assert control over islands
though uninhabited but that would confer on its owner exclusive oil,
mineral and fishing rights in surrounding waters, has not only continued
to increase its defense budget at double-digit rates but might also decide
to put in place another ADIZ in the South China Sea (White, 2013).
Furthermore, on May 24, 2014, during joint maritime exercises with
Russia, China scrambled two pairs of fighter jets and flew them
unprecedentedly close to a Japanese OP-3C surveillance plane and a YS11EB electronic intelligence aircraft, having declared the area a no-fly
zone ahead of the Sino-Russia joint naval drill (CNN, 2014). According
to a statement from Japanese Minister of Defense, Itsunori Onodera
(
), the incident was the closest that Chinese planes had
flown to Japanese aircraft, passing about 30 meters from one plane and
50 meters from another (ibid.).
Reminiscent of the arms race that characterized the Cold War era
between the West represented by the United States and East represented
by the Union Of Soviet Socialist Republic, the foregoing has shown how
China’s increasingly aggressive posture towards territorial claims
through the unilateral proclamation of an air defense identification zone
has pitted it against the United States on one hand and its neighbours,
South Korea and Japan, on the other. As Sanger (2013) succinctly noted,
as the Chinese grow more determined to assert their territorial claims
over a string of islands once vital mostly to fishermen, America’s allies
are also pouring military assets into the region thereby potentially
escalating the once obscure dispute into a broader test of power in the
Pacific.
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6. East China Sea ADIZ and Security in the Asia-Pacific: A Threat to
Global Peace
One of the greatest concerns raised over the military enforcement of the
ECS-ADIZ is the possibility of an accident or mid-air clash between
Chinese military aircraft and other countries’ aircraft operating within
the zone. As the US and China seek to assert their military capability in
the East China and South China Seas, there have been series of near
misses between Chinese and American ships and aircraft (The
Washington Post, 2014). Shortly after the ECS-ADIZ declaration, US
reported of a near-collision in the South China Sea as Chinese warships
encountered a US guided missile cruiser (BBC News, 2014).
Also, in August 2014, a Chinese fighter jet conducted a dangerous
intercept of a US Navy surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft off the
coast of China in international airspace. According to Pentagon Press
Secretary, Rear Admiral John Kirby, the Chinese J-11 fighter jet brought
one of its wingtips within 20 feet of the US Navy Poseidon P-8 patrol
aircraft, 135 miles east of Hainan island, performed a “barrel roll” at
close range and flashed past the nose of the US aircraft at a 90-degree
angle with its underside exposed, apparently to make a point of showing
its weapons (The Washington Post, 2014). Considered as the fourth such
incident since March 2014, the act in Kirby’s assertion posed a risk to
the safety and the well-being of the air crew and was inconsistent with
customary international law (BBC News, 2014).
It should be recalled that in 2001, what is today regarded as a most
serious incident occurred when a Chinese fighter jet (the Peoples
Liberation Army F-8) collided with a US Navy EP-3 spy plane killing
the Chinese pilot, causing the American aircraft to make an emergency
landing in China (BBC News, 2014). Another country that could be
affected and probably drawn into the conflict as a result of tension
between China and Japan is Australia. Bisley and Taylor (2014) have
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Al Chukwuma Okoli and Uchenna Simeon
analysed the circumstances under which conflict in the East China Sea
could occur and the implications thereof for Australia by exploring three
hypothetical East China Sea conflict scenarios thus:
First is where there is an exchange of fire involving Chinese and
Japanese air patrols occasioned by Chinese decisions to enforce
militarily the ADIZ; second scenario involves an accidental clash
between a Chinese submarine and a US destroyer that takes place during
a trilateral military exercise among America, Japan and Australia; third
scenario involves non-state actors and stems from an incident at sea
between a commercial cruise ship carrying a large proportion of retired
Chinese military officers and the Japanese Coast Guard in waters near
the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Arising from these three scenarios,
Bisley and Taylor (2014) went further to identify five facets of escalation
that will shape if and how Australia would become drawn into a
potential conflict:
1) When a conflict is clearly instigated by one side, Australia will face a
much more bleak set of choices. An incident where aggressive
Chinese behaviour has ignited a clash is, for instance, more likely to
elicit Australian involvement than one where the circumstances
around the eruption of conflict are murkier
2) How does the US respond? Regarded as the greatest determinant of
Australian involvement, an ECS conflict is very unlikely to lead to an
automatic invocation of Australia, New Zealand, United States
(ANZUS) Security Treaty. On the other hand, because of the strong
links established between Washington and Canberra in recent years as
well as the expanded strategic purpose of the alliance, if US expects
Australian involvement, then it will be very difficult to remain on the
sidelines.
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3) Does Japan request assistance? Next to the US in forging strategic
relationship with Japan is Australia; hence, Australia would be among
the first to whom Japan would turn to for support in the event of
conflict in the East China Sea. This has certainly increased the
prospects ofAustralia being caught up in a possible conflict.
4) What costs can China impose? As Chinese wealth and power grows,
China will have more ways in which it can impose costs on Australia.
As a result, Australia’s approach to conflict in the East China Sea will
also be shaped by how China responds and what leverage it can exert.
5) How much freedom of manoeuvre will Australia have? The
involvement ofAustralian nationals in any contingency, the impact of
social media, US alliance expectations, as well as statements and
positions that Australian policy makers adopt in the lead up to any
crisis will condition how much freedom of manoeuvre Australia has if
and when crisis strikes.
China’s declaration of an ADIZ over the East China Sea which is
considered by Japan as an attempt to change the status quo by coercion
against the provisions of international law within the maritime and aerial
domains has made the later intensify action towards re-militarization.
According to Topychaknov (2014), there have been discussions among
experts in Japan to the effect that in reaction to the increasing Chinese
threat, Japan will use appropriate means if all the usual conventional
means cannot stop the aggression of China, then a decision will have to
be made as to the development of nuclear weapons.
If Japan re-militarizes, North Korea which has already embarked on
nuclear weapons programme would intensify efforts at increasing its
stockpile. South Korea will not be left out. South Korea and Japan
have been at loggerheads over a couple of maritime territories in the
East China Sea known as Dokdo (
) by Koreans (i.e. the
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Al Chukwuma Okoli and Uchenna Simeon
Liancourt Rocks) and Takeshima (
) by Japanese (International
Business Times, 2015). Already, South Korea has conducted its own
missile test and successfully launched a newly developed ballistic
missile capable of striking most of North Korea (Choe, 2014). For North
Korea, nuclear weapons have become a core element of its national
security strategy, having launched live-fire drills near the disputed
border with South Korea, test-fired ballistic missiles capable of hitting
Japan, flown rudimentary drones into the South and threatened to carry
out a “new” type of nuclear test such that the dangers of a nuclear-armed
North Korea will place added importance on a stable security
environment in Northeast Asia along with a stable and secure North
Korean posture (Roehrig, 2013).
Russia on its part is not left out in the East China Sea ADIZ saga.
Far from being enthusiastic about securing greater transparency in
China’s nuclear arsenal as well as concerned over the situation on the
Korean peninsula occasioned by North Korea’s desire to develop nuclear
weapons, Moscow will not take lightly any attempt by forces in Japan
and South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons (Topychaknov, 2014). Of
important reference here is the 60-year old disagreement between Russia
and Japan over four Islands of Kunashir known in Japan as Kunashiri,
Iturup (Eturofu), Shikotan, and the rocky Habomai islets which are
known in Russia as the Southern Kurils and in Japan as Northern
territories which has prevented both countries from signing a peace
treaty to end the World War II (BBC News, 2013, April 29). With this
dispute in place, Japan’s desire to re-militarize will definitely not be
taken for granted by Russia and this might lead to the escalation of the
conflict. A more dangerous dimension might be added to this in the
event that the US decides to take part in the crisis by invoking Article V
of the US-Japan mutual Defense Treaty which obligates the US to
defend Japan against attack.
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From the foregoing revelations, if the ECS-ADIZ controversy is not
properly managed, it is capable of triggering another World War, the
third of its kind in human history. The actors involved in the ECS-ADIZ
are numerous, most of them (US, China and Russia especially)
acknowledged as possessing nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction. If China decides to embark on military enforcement of
the ECS-ADIZ by adopting emergency defensive measures against
aircraft (belonging to perceived adversaries especially US and its ally
Japan) that do not comply with the rules of identification, it has the
propensity of further dampening the already frosty relationship between
US and China occasioned by the former’s commitment at containing the
latter’s rising both regionally and globally. If this happens, the world
might be heading for another catastrophe. Historical evidence attests to
the fact that one of the major causes of World War I was Britain’s
response to the rising German power, whose heavy industry surpassed
that of Great Britain in the 1890s and its gross national product twice
that of Britain at the beginning of twentieth century (Nye, 2003). It will
be disastrous if history is allowed to repeat itself in this twenty-first
century of high level of interdependence and de-fragmentation.
7. Conclusion
The East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone declaration of
November 26, 2013, is seen as a turning point in China’s determination
to assert control over uninhabited but disputed maritime territories and
by extension, in response to US Pivot role in Asia. What is considered
today as China’s first significant move against US interest in the Pacific
has no doubt escalated tensions capable of sparking fratricide and
cataclysm of even genocidal proportion in a fragile region. Worthy of
note here is that China’s dilly-dally approach at perfecting its interest in
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the disputed maritime territories of Senkaku/Diaoyu following the Cairo
and Potsdam Declarations (over 70 years ago) is at the epicentre of this
renewed rivalry.
Nonetheless, there are many of such zones around the world today
as can be attested to by the case of United States which not only started
this practice but maintains about four to five of such zones. Japan
established its ADIZ in 1969 (forty four years earlier than China) which
not only includes China’s Diaoyu Islands but also overlaps Chinese
Exclusive Economic Zone, and on June 25, 2010, Japan unilaterally
extended its ADIZ 22 kilometres westwards thereby overlapping with
China’s ADIZ. The duo of South Korea and Taiwan also maintains
ADIZs. In all these cases, there has not been any case of accident or
downing of an aircraft traced to refusal to observe ADIZ rules and as
such, the East China Sea ADIZ should not be allowed to degenerate into
“Armageddon”. In the absence of any international legal framework or a
universally accepted standard practice guiding the declaration and
enforcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone, like the Berlin
Conference of 1885 convened by European Imperialists to partition
Africa, diplomatic solution should be explored to resolve the territorial
disputes that have paved the way for the air traffic restriction.
Notes
*
Al Chukwuma Okoli (B.Sc., M.Sc., political science), holds Ph.D. in
defence and strategic studies from Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA). He
is a Lecturer in political science at Federal University Lafia where he
doubles as the Co-ordinator of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
programme. Dr Okoli’s research interest revolves around gender studies,
political ecology, and liberal security studies in which fields he has
researched and published widely. He has consulted for Centre for
Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations:
An International Journal 4(3) ♦ 2018
GeoStrategic Significance of East China Sea ADIZ
**
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1141
Democracy and Development (CDD) Abuja-Nigeria, Centre for Defence
Studies and Documentation - Nigerian Defence Academy, Armed Forces
Command and Staff College (AFCSC), Jaji-Nigeria, and National Open
University of Nigeria (NOUN). He is also a laureate of CODESRIA’s
Gender Institute (2018) and a Research Fellow of IFRA-Nigeria. Dr Okoli
has published in reputable academic journals, including African Security
Review, Africa Development, and Conflict Studies Quarterly. He believes in
a world governed by liberal knowledge and free thought. Dr Okoli is the
corresponding author for this paper. <Email: okochu007@yahoo.com>
Uchenna Simeon (B.Sc. political science; M.Sc. international affairs and
diplomacy) is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Federal
University Lafia, Nigeria. He is an emerging scholar in contemporary
international security and strategic studies. He has published widely in
referred journals, both locally and internationally. Mr Uchenna is currently
developing his research proposal, preparatory to his doctorate study. He
wields a peculiar research interest in the regional-cum-global geo-politics
and geo-strategics. It was his interest in these domains of scholarship that
has inspired this study. <Email: uchesim@yahoo.com>
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Rory Metcalf (2013). What’s wrong with China’s air defence identification
zone (and what’s not). The Lowy Interpreter, 27th November 2013.
CCPS Vol. 4 No. 3 (December 2018)
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Al Chukwuma Okoli and Uchenna Simeon
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zone (and what’s not). The Lowy Interpreter, 27th November 2013.
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