Title Author(s) Citation Issue Date Doc URL Soybean Production and GMO Issues in Brazil Altoé, Simone Mattar; TANAKA, Noriko; HISANO, Shuji 北海道大学農經論叢, 57, 135-155 2001-03 http://hdl.handle.net/2115/11215 Type bulletin (article) File Information 57̲p135-155.pdf Instructions for use Hokkaido University Collection of Scholarly and Academic Papers : HUSCAP AUH~Hi Vol. 57 (2001) Mar. pp. 135-155 The Review of Agricultural Economics Soybean Production and GMO Issues in Brazil Simone Mattar ALTOE, Noriko TANAKA, Shuji HISANO Summary Based on data collected and research done in Brazil, this paper tries to show the situation of soybean production in Brazil. Soybean production is in a time of great change, technologically and sociologically speaking, due to the commercialisation of GMOs. In the midst of this change arises the question of whether one should adopt the new products and ideology created by transnational corporations. Brazil's two most important competitors, the U.S.A. and Argentina, have already adopted the new technology and increased their soybean production. This situation has made the Brazilian government and farmers insecure and willing to accept whatever helps increase their productivity and the economy. Indeed, one may well ask whether the country will be able to survive in the international market if it does not adopt the new reality. However, this is not the only concern regarding these changes; consumers in Europe, Japan and even the United States are questioning the usefulness and safety of the new technology. NGOs and some scientists are concerned about its effect on the environment. Lawyers in Brazil are pushing for legislation to make labeling the products developed with this new technology mandatory in order to let consumers know how they were produced. The decision-makers do not know what to do about this difficult situation, with economics on one side and environmental and consumer concerns on thc othcr. It scems that only time will tell where Brazil will find itself in this situation. Meanwhile, small family farmers are struggling to survive against heavy competition and stay away from the political controversy over GMO issues. In this paper, we also examine their situation and provide some alternatives to help them. on Brazil's agriculture and economy. 1. Introduction This paper is based on the information col- Brazil is a great producer of agricultural lected during interviews and a field survey con- products. Among them, soybeans lead the agri- ducted in Brazil, August 2000. What we are cultural sector in terms of production value. No mainly concerned with here is the current and other export products approach the value of soy- future situation of Brazil's soybean industry un- bean complex exports. Since the 1970s, a soy- der the global market restructuring caused bean boom has happened in Brazil, as a result partly by the commercialization of new biotech- of growing demand for soybean products and nology, because soybeans are one of the main the industry's response to changes in capacity targets of genetic engineering. that have been shaped by public policy. In the The introduction of genetically modified or- mid 1990s, soybeans occupied about 25 per cent ganisms (GMO) in the international market is of total area harvested. Now, Brazil is the changing beliefs and raising questions about world's second largest soybean producer and ac- food safety into the country. The entire world is counts for 20 per cent of world production and discussing what to do about the new biotechnol- 21 per cent of world exports. The soybean indus- ogy and its products. Currently, in Brazil, it is try's rapid expansion has had profound impacts forbidden to grow GM crops on farmland, bring- 135 ing a lot of controversial debates inside and out- opment, (v) holding down food price increases, side the country. One part of the Government is and (vi) territorial occupation, as soybeans have interested in approving such seeds, while con- been regarded as the engine of demographic sumers and NGOs are concerned about food and and economic growth of the cerrado region environmental safety. Some countries that im- (central western and northern Brazil). In sum- port soybeans from Brazil don't want to buy GM mary, national and international political econ- products, while the Brazilian competitors in the omy factors together contributed to the develop- international market are improving their pro- ment and rapid growth of Brazil's soybean in- ductivity due to the new biotechnology, threat- dustry. Soybean is grown in two main regions: the ening the position of the second largest soybean exporter. So, the point we must clarifY in this traditional (southern and south-central Bra- paper is how competitive market conditions and zil) and the cerrados as shown in Figure 1. The global disputes over GMOs are influencing Bra- traditional region includes the States of: Rio zilian policies, industries' responses, and con- Grande do SuI, Santa Catarina, Parana and Sao sumers and farmers' attitudes. Paulo. The cerrado region includes the States of: Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do 2. Soybeans in BraziF SuI, Goias, Tocantins, Distrito Federal, Bahia 2. 1 Outline of Soybean Production and Maranhao. Various conditions brought about the Bra- Although production has traditionally come zilian soybean boom. The most popular answer from relatively small farms, agriculture in the is that Brazil's soybean production growth was traditional region, especially in Parana and Sao simply a response to sharp shifts in domestic Paulo, was regarded as the most modern in Bra- and world demand for soybean products. How- zil. In 1995,4 states in the traditional regions ever, even this most important external factor is together produced about half of all national soy- not simple. In the early 1970s, there was a series bean production. But, the entire traditional re- of events, including the official devaluation of gion has shown little change in production or the US. dollar in 1971, the Soviet Union's pur- yield over the past twenty years. Since 1980, chasing of the US. grain crop in 1972, and the most of Brazil's soybean output growth has failure of the anchovy harvest off the Peruvian come from the cerrados. Comparing the two re- coast due to the harsh EI Nino of 1972-73, which gions using harvested area and yield, we can contributed to high soybean prices. Also, the US. observe that soybean production in the cerrados embargo on soybeans and soy-meal in June 1973 has been more dynamic. Brazilian cerrados oc- forced Japan and European countries to look at cupies an estimated 207 million hectares - 24 Brazil as an alternative source of soybeans. In per cent of the nation's territories, providing a addition to these external factors, Brazil's soy- huge capacity to further increase soybean pro- bean boom was stimulated by the following po- duction. Although it was believed that the cer- (i) saving foreign ex- rados could not be cultivated, from 1980 to 1995 litical economy goals; change by import substitution of vegetable oil regional production rose from 2 to 13 million and processed foods, (ii) increasing foreign ex- metric tons because of the development of new change earnings by growing soy-meal and soy- varieties suitable for local conditions and the oil exports, (iii) improving the national diet by improvement of soils and infrastructures. Large, stimulating increased production of poultry fed corporate-like farms that are highly mecha- on soy-meal, (iv) stimulating industrial devel- nized dominate productions in the cerrados, un- 136 Soybean Production and GMO Issues in Brazil StateJDistrict Abbreviations ~ Name AC Acre Alagoas Amapa Amazonas Bahia Ceara Distrito Federal Espirilo Sanlo Goills Malo Grosso do SuI Minas Gerais Malo Grosso Maranhao Paraiba Parana AL AP AM BA CE OF ES GO MS MG MT MA PB PR PA PI PE RJ RN RS RO RR SC SP SE TO Para Piaui Pernambuco Rio de Janeiro Rio Grande do Norte Rio Grande do SuI RondOnia Roralma Santa Catarina Siio Paulo Sergipe Tocantins PRODUCTION REGIONS f:Z2.l CERRADO TRADITIONAL m Source: Warnken [36], p.23. Figure 1 : Brazilian Cerrado and Traditional Soybean Production Regions like the traditional regions. gion is suffering from the conflict between the The difference between these two regions is GMO-free policy ofthe state government and nearly equal to the difference between small illegal GMOs smuggled in from neighboring family farms and large corporate-like farms (Ta- countries, in addition to the national level con- ble 1 ). In this paper, we focus mainly on the troversy over GMOs. traditional region, not only because it consists of small family farms, but also because this re- 137 Table 1 : Comparisons between Brazil (total), the State of Mato Grosso (cerrado) and the States of Rio Grande do SuI and Parana (traditional), by Size Groups, in1995/96 a. Number of Farms Producing Soybeanstremporary-plantations by Size Groups Size Gourps of Total Area (ha) Less than 10 From 10 to less than 100 From 100 to less than 1, 000 Number of Farms, Number Number % and Parana' Number % % 57,203 23.5 5,951 14.7 256,452 37.5 157,148 64.7 21,267 52.7 383,236 56.1 24,7l3 10.2 10,373 25.7 40,361 5.9 3,774 1.6 2,576 6.4 3,020 0.4 From 1,000 to less than 10,000 More than 10,000 TOTAL Rio Grande do Sui Mato Grosso' Brazil 153 0.1 221 0.5 17 0.0 242,999 100.0 40,3AA 100.0 683.086 100.0 'Data of number of soybean farms by size groups in each state/region are not available. We use data of number of temporary plantation including soybean and other crops here. b. Harvested Area of Soybeans by Size Groups Size Gourps of Total Area Harvested Area, (ha) ha Less than 10 Rio Grande do Sui Mato Grosso Brazil ha % and Parana ha % % 195,068 2.1 1,316 0.1 183,891 3.9 From 10 to less than 100 2,328,920 24.6 4,127 0.2 2,072,453 44.4 From 100 to less than 1,000 3,759,820 39.7 383,055 22.0 1,984,049 42.5 From 1,000 to less than 10,000 2,809,816 29.6 1,121,895 64.5 425,794 9.1 386,171 4.1 229,999 13.2 5,015 0.1 9,479,893 100.0 1,740,392 100.0 4,671,202 100.0 More than 10,000 TOTAL c. Production Value of Soybeans by Size Groups Size Gourps of Total Area Production Value, (ha) 1,000R$ Less than 10 From 10 to less than 100 Rio Grande do Sui Mato Grosso Brazil 1,000R$ % and Parana 1,000R$ % % 75,336 1.8 578 0.1 70,290 3.3 1,042,391 24.6 1,517 0.2 922,393 42.8 From 100 to less than 1,000 1,728,286 40.7 160,663 21. 9 950,760 44.1 From 1, 000 to less than 10, 000 1,229,123 29.0 474,380 64.7 207,042 9.6 166,952 3.9 95,691 13.1 3,177 4,242,124 100.0 732,828 100.0 More than 10,000 TOTAL 2,153,662 0.1 100.0 Source: IBGE, CensoAgropecuario, available in the website (www.sidra.ibge.gov.br) 2. 2 cent being crushed for soy-oil and soy-meal. Internal Market and Exportation In Brazil, the internal commercialization of There are several barriers, including a bit- soybeans as a food is very low and the consump- ter taste, that must be overcome before soy- tion is primarily of soy-oil (cooking-oil, lecithin, beans will be accepted by Brazilian consumers2. etc) and soy-meal (animal feed). As shown in To solve this specific problem and to increase Figure 2, 27.4 per cent of the domestic soybean soy-food consumption in the domestic market, supply is exported, and with the other 66.4 per EMBRAPA has tested grains and found a spe- 138 Soybean Production and GMO Issues in Brazil Beginning Stocks 2% DOMESTIC SOYBEAN SUPPLY (32.6 million tons) Domestic Consumption 63% Domestic Consumption 40% Exports 33". Exports &ding Stocks 4% &ding Stocks 58Y. 2". Figure 2 : Soybean Product Marketing Channels in Brazil Source: ABIOV (Brazilian Vegetable Oils Industry Association) and Warnken (37) cific enzyme producing the taste, which can be chain, because expanding supplies of soy-meal neutralized using a thermal shock. EMBRAPA have permitted rapid growth of Brazil's poultry has made many campaigns to increase con- industry. sumption, distributing recipes and trying to make the population aware ofthe advantages of 2.3 International Competition eating soybeans - but everything has been in Brazil is the second largest producer of soy- vain. Brazilians don't accepted soybeans in beans in the world and a leading exporter. The their daily diets and don't even consume it as situation of the country in the international tofu or natto . So, only specific niches exist in the market was stable for years. But, it is reported domestic market for soybean consumption, like that the productivity of the world's first and the Japanese community or naturalists. third largest soybean producers are increasing The demand for soy-oil accounts for 90 per because of improvements in technology and the cent of all vegetable oil available in the internal introduction of GM seeds. Although these com- market. Almost all soy-oil production is con- petitors' advantages don't only come from tech- sumed in Brazil and only a small amount ex- nology, but are also supported by public policy, ported. Increased supplies of soy-oil have met recent trends in technology leads Brazilian growing demand and helped hold down con- farmers and economists to worry about competi- sumer price increases. Soy-meal, which is not tiveness in the international market. The Bra- consumed as a human food, has been a vital in- zilian government also is worried about loosing termediate product in the animal protein food market share. But the government is neither in- 139 vesting enough in agriculture nor giving incen- payments be implemented for the 1996-2002 tives to the farmers like the governments ofthe crops of soybeans and other commodities 3• The United States and Argentina, making it even prevailing rate for crop years 1997 to 2000 was harder for Brazilian farmers to keep up with $ 5.26, above the average market price in these three years (USDA [31]). It can be said that their overseas competitors. marketing loan benefits are expected to support 2. 3. 1 United States of America In the United States, in 1999, Soybeans soybean net returns that are comparatively bet- were planted on a record 73. 8 million acres ter than other commodities, and that, at least (29.9 million hectares), which is about 23 per during the period oflow market prices, this sup- cent of total planted area. U.S. soybeans stand portive policy can keep soybean producers on out among the world market, representing 46 the farm. Nevertheless, the uncertain and un- per cent of the world's soybean production, 60 stable situation of the current competitive mar- per cent of the world's soybeans exports and 16 ket can not be avoided, which explains the fact per cent of soy-meal exports (United Soybean that the U.S. farmers have quickly and mas- Board [30J). sively adopted GM soybeans with expectations of profitability and convenience in growing In 1999, the average price paid to U.S. farmers was $ 4. 65 per bushel ( $ 171 per metric ton) , practices (Hisano [l9J). According to the Na- the lowest average price since 1972. This repre- tional Agricultural Statistics Service of USDA, sents a 36 per cent decline over the last three about 54 per cent of soybean acres were planted years (USDA [31J ). However, the U.S. govern- in GM varieties during 2000 crop season, while ment gives financial supports to farmers so that, 25 per cent of corn and 61 per cent of cotton even when the price and the production of soy- were GM varieties (USDA [35J). beans fluctuates and the market gets more com- 2. 3. 2 Argentina petitive, farmers can receive a stable income. In Argentina is the third biggest producer of general, it is considered that the Federal Agri- soybeans in the world, with 12 per cent of the cultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of world's production in 1998, 1996 is based on a concept of'Freedom to Farm", (20%) and U.S.A. (48%). Argentinaisrespon- behind Brazil which eliminates the government's role in man- sible for 9 per cent of the world's exports and is aging production of major crops. According to the second largest soy-meal exporter, represent- the United Soybean Board, this law is helping ing 32 per cent of world trade (USDA [34J ). Ar- U.S. soybean producers compete for domestic gentina has great agricultural potential, and acreage and international markets, while allow- just began to develop during the last dacade, ing the commodities to be marketed freely and when grain and oilseed production started in- competitively. On the other hand, it has been creasing in the late 1980s. suggested that this law should be titled "Free- A great part of the recent gains in produc- dom from Farming", for it has turned into an tion are due to area expansion and dramatic in- economic disaster for the nation's family farm- creases in yields because of improved seed and ers (Akrebs [1 J). Although this issue is not more use of fertilizers, irrigation and machinery. our subject, we should pay attention to the fact Future growth is expected to happen in the that this "Freedom" Act maintains a number of form of higher yields, instead of area expansion. economic support devices. Although soybeans yields are still low, Argen- For example, it requires that non-resource tina will rapidly improve itself with the adop- marketing assistance loans and loan deficiency tion of higher-yielding plant varieties and more 140 Soybean Production and GMO Issues in Brazil intensive inputs. Additionally, according to the support this trend and the parallel fiscal and EU's working document, in 1999 GM soybeans agrarian reforms. They wanted to keep the Bra- represented about 75 per cent of total soybean zilian market operating as it always had been. area in Argentina, with 5.5 million hectares or Over the last decade, as policies started to 37 per cent of the world total GM soybean area change, agriculture started to develop more, (EC [12]). Although it is not sure what influ- and technology improved. In 1994, the Brazilian ence GMOs will have on productivity, the fact government restructured the Brazilian econ- that Argentina is aggressively accepting GMOs omy, creating the stabilization program known is important for the Brazilian soybean industry. as the Real Plan. The main goals of this plan Besides improvements in agricultural technol- were: the privatization of government-owned ogy, many things remain to be done. Argentine industries, lower tariffs, tight credits, "de- farmers have a lack of knowledge of grain mar- indexation" of prices and the creation of new keting techniques, and also lack basic informa- stable currency, the real - R $ - (Wainio [36]). tion on market developments and sales. At the When the Real Plan really took effect, the national level, common markets still have some Brazilian economy experienced positive real outmoded concepts, including price setting via GDP growth, less inflation and a more opened committee (Hager [17J). Because of these prob- market for external capital. And, before opening lems, the Argentine government, marketing in- even more of the market to transnational corpo- stitutions and private consultants are working rations, the Brazilian government helped soy- to transform the grain marketing system, pro- bean farmers in September 1996. The govern- viding education and promoting reforms in the ment published a law eliminating the state country. Although the Argentine government value-added tax (ICMS) on primary and semi- does not playa direct role in marketing grains manufactured exports. This law had a great im- and oilseeds, it has taken several steps to re- pact on the soybean sector, increasing soybean form the country's grain marketing system. exports to a record of 8.3 million tons in 1996/97. These changes will create an efficient soybean In 1997/98, planted soybean area was fore- marketing system with fewer price swings, casted to have grown 9 per cent and the removal benefiting all in Argentina's agricultural indus- of the ICMS helped this increase. The USDA try, and making the country even more competi- projects the growing of soybean area to more tive in the international market (USDA [32]). than 14 million hectares by 2007 (Wainio [36]). However, under the Real Plan, government 2. 4 Government Policies under Transition policy and support started changing from pater- Under such a competitive market condition, nalistic to market-oriented. The Government what is the Brazilian government doing for its gradually removed itself from direct manage- soybean sector? In general, the Brazilian gov- ment, trying to intervene as little as possible ernment has had a great influence over Brazil- and let decisions be made within the market. ian agriculture during the past several years. This means that Brazilian farmers have to get Some economic and governmental actors were involved directly in the global restructuring of making efforts to liberalize the economy; they the soybeans market. One of the big challenges wanted to offer the private sector a major role for them is the GMO issue. and integrate the country into the international market. But, there was a mixture of ideologies and a great part of the economic forces didn't 141 against CTNBio. They asked a judge to invali- 3. GMO Situation in Brazil 3. 1 date the approval for the commercialization of Roundup Ready Soybeans, stating that this Emergence of Transnationals Before the stabilization of the Real Plan product could be harmful to the environment and the discussions about a new agricultural and sufficient testing has not been conducted4• law, companies that produced or sold seeds had The argument was made that Brazilian agricul- no legal protection and had not received any fi- ture (Tropical) is different from the one where nancial reward for investing in new seeds for this product had been tested (Temperate). the Brazilian market. The idea at that time was IDEC contented that protocols should be re- to concentrate on open-pollinated varieties so quired for field trials, risk assessment for envi- that there could be free distribution and easy ronmental and food safety, registration of prod- access to seeds. The Brazilian Government (via ucts and public acceptance. EMBRAPA) was the major developer of new va- Since 1998, Monsanto has been fighting for rieties. Brazilian companies invested little in the commercialization rights of genetically research and development of new varieties, and modified crops in Brazil, with no success. The foreign companies were afraid to release their Brazilian Executive Federal Power (President own, fearing that the Brazilian Government and Ministries) is in favour of GMOs, believing would place the seeds in the public domain. that they will help decrease the use of pesticides and other chemicals. ABIA, the Brazilian In April 1997, the Government approved a law called the Cultivar Law (intellectual prop- Food Industry Association, is another proponent erty right protection) and the situation became and insists that GMOs are scientifically safe. more interesting for private companies (USDA They both want the liberalization of GMO pro- [34J). The private sector got more power and a duction. IDEC, Greenpeace and IBAMA (Brazil- great number of transnational corporations en- ian Institute of Environment and Natural Re- tered the market, making the agricultural sec- newable Resources) are opposed and are fight- tor more competitive and different from what it ing through the Brazilian Justice system and used to be. The Cultivar Law has increased the creating a political-governmental impasse in incentives to invest in biotechnology. One typi- the country. cal example is Monsanto, who has been trying On August 10, 1999, Judge Antonio Pru- to sell the genetically modified crops, especially dente prohibited the commercial plantation of Roundup Ready soybeans, in Brazil since 1998. GMOs, making it definitive rather than pre- Monsanto started the legal procedures in June liminary and rendering any appeal by Mon- of that year, and since then seeds have been im- santo less likely to succeed. It also prevented ported and tests implemented, authorized by the Ministries of Agriculture, Science and Tech- both the Ministry of Agriculture and the Na- nology, and Health from taking any actions that alter the ruling (Bell [ 3 J ). In August 2000, the tional Biosafety Committee (CTNBio) . Although there a huge polemic was created Judge reiteratively pronounced the decision in around Monsanto's product, CTNBio approved favor of NGOs and rejected an appeal brought the commercialization of a genetically modified jointly by Monsanto and the Brazilian Attorney soybean in Brazil on September 29, 1998. How- General's Office to overthrow an injunction on ever, some time before this liberalization, IDEC the planting and marketing ofGMOs. The trials, (Brazilian Institution of Consumer Defence) however, continue to go on and legal maneuver- filed an injunction against Monsanto and ings seem far from finished. 142 Soybean Production and GMO Issues in Brazil Besides the discussion about Roundup "provide feasible solutions for the sustainable Ready soybeans and GM crops, there is also the development of Brazilian agribusiness by gen- new competitive environment that was created erating, adapting and transferring knowledge with the new law. In recent years, many seed and technology that benefits Brazilian Soci- companies were acquired by transnationals ety" (EMBRAPA [ll]). The initial objective of (Paula [28] ). Sometimes these companies were EMBRAPA is to find and implement technologi- not completely bought, only their genetic mate- cal solutions for the development of a competi- rials were purchased. In the soybean case, a tive agricultural market, increasing productiv- great change happened after 1997 -Monsanto ity, enhancing the quality of products, improv- acquired 18 per cent of the seed market and ing the performance of production chains, and EMBRAPA saw its share decline from 70 per making more efficient use of resources and in- cent to 65 per cent. Not only did Monsanto move puts. These technological solutions should also strongly into the Brazilian market, but other promote the sustainability of commercial farm- transnational corporations went to Brazil and ing activities while ensuring the development made acquisitions in the same way, as shown and conservation of the natural resources base, in Table 2. without sacrificing production efficiency and environmental quality. 3. 2 Networking through 37 research units, 3 A Role of EMBRAPA Because of the new market reality, public services and 15 central units, EMBRAPA is institutions like EMBRAPA had to restructure present in almost all the States of Brazil, each to find more financing to do their research, forc- with its own unique ecological conditions. ing them to look for associations with other EMBRAPA-Soja is located in Londrina, Parana companies or agricultural entities. Known State, and has as its priority the development of worldwide, it is impossible to discuss Brazilian technologies, services and products to provide agriculture without mentioning EMBRAPA. solutions for the soybean sector. EMBRAPA- EMBRAPA is an institution linked to the Soja has released more than 100 new high yield- Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture and Food Sup- ing and disease resistant cultivars, and devel- ply. It was created in 1973 with the mission to oped the first cultivars adapted to tropical re- Table 2 : Latest M&A of Seed Companies by Transnationals in Brazil Buyers Acquired Seed Company (year) IT Sementes de Soja (1996) Monsoy (1996, the largest soy-seed producer) Monsanto Agroceres (1998, the largest corn seed producer) Cargill Seeds (1998, subsidiary ofU. S. company) Braskalb (1998, subsidiary ofU. S. company) Granja 4 Irmaos do Grupo Josapar (1998) Sementes Ribeiral (1999) AgrEvo Mitla Pesquisa Agricola Sementes Fartura (1999) Hibridos Colorado (]998) Dinamilho Carol (1998) Dow AgroSciencies Sementes Hata IT Biogenetica de Milho (1998) Agropecuaria Dois Marcos de Soja (1999) PioneerlDuPont Source: Gazeta Mercantil ,June 16th, 1999, and Seedling, September 1999. 143 gions, which made possible the production of netic resources and technologies remain un- soybeans in the cerrados region. For several solved. years, EMBRAPA had a great income to fund 3. 3 its own studies. The Government directed its in- External Pressures to Reject GMOs 3. 3. 1 vestments towards biotechnology and agricul- Europe Europe is a great importer of Brazilian soy- tural innovation. At that time, the private sector wouldn't invest in this area due to lack offa- beans, and 70-80 per cent of Brazilian soybeans vourable business conditions, leaving the entire go to the EU market. In other words, EU domestic soybean production covers only a small per- market to EMBRAPA. However, at the end of the 1980' s, EM- centage of consumption; the degree of self- RRAPA'R hudget started to diminish and Gov- sufficiency varied between 6 per cent (soy-meal) ernment expenditures on research and techni- and 18 per cent (soy-oil) in 1998/99 (EC [12J). cal services reduced by 26 per cent from 1986 to Therefore, at least with respect to soybeans, it 1987 (EMBRAPA [11]). In addition to that, in is understandable that European nations are 1997, after the approval of the Cultivar Law, the concerned about food safety, just like Japan, market situation changed and it became more whose self-sufficiency rate in soybeans is only feasible for private companies to develop their 3 percent. own seeds or to import them from foreign coun- Data from the fourth Eurobarometer sur- tries. The Brazilian Government incorporated vey carried out in NovemberlDecember 1999 new concepts in technological development and suggested that Europeans have become increas- market competition, forcing EMBRAPA to ingly opposed to GM foods (INRA-ECOSA adapt itself to the new environment. Under [23J) . The public is worried about the product these drastic government policy changes, EM- safety and cultural identity, and not willing to BRAPA could not get enough money to compete accept the risks of the new technology. A consid- at the same level as its private competitors. As erable percentage of the citizens feel insuffi- a result, EMBRAPA is starting to collaborate ciently informed about the topic and is worried with transnationals, like Monsanto, in research about the "unnaturalness" of biotechnology. The and development of GMOS5 . Europeans believe that biotechnology perceived EMBRAPA is establishing two forms of as- to have only modest benefits, is usefulness and sociation in the competitive market (Paula have no support, even though the risks may be [28J). The first one is a partnership with some modest. And, around 50 per cent of supporters of foundations of seed producers. Through these GM foods say that they would be prepared to partnerships in more than 7 States, 67 soybean buy them, suggesting that even those who are varieties have been released, satisfying a great in favour of the new technology would endorse number of producers in different regions. The the demand for the labelling ofGM foods (INRA second one is a partnership with private compa- -ECOSA [23J). nies, particularly Monsanto, to develop and re- Traditionally, cultural identity - a unique search genetically modified varieties. In this relation maintained with the traditional food, agreement, Monsanto authorizes EMBRAPA- as a source of pleasure, and an act of socializa- Soja to use Roundup Ready technology to de- tion and communication - has been considered velop original varieties that will belong to EM- to be important value within European society BRAPA, although the controversial issues re- (Menasche [27J). The new food reality is affect- lated to the intellectual property rights of ge- ing European culture to the point where it is be- 144 Soybean Production and GMO Issues in Brazil coming harder for Europeans to accept the ge- the government called for a five-year ban on netically modified foods and changing the opti- the commercial growing of Bt and herbicide- mism they had about biotechnology. The "use- resistant crops and retailers have banned GM lessness" and absence of consumer benefits may products, while others are actively looking for accentuate concerns about safety and moral is- sources of soybean and maize that are not ge- sues (Gaskell [15]). netically modified (Cornerhouse [7 J) . It has also been noted Al- that consumers in EU countries already had though the EU allows GM seeds and products some problems with food safety in past years already approved to enter the region, and some and don't want to feel insecure about what they products are not labelled due to lack of effective are going to eat. The last great problem was the regulation, current and future legislation in the "mad cow disease" that started in the United EU on GMOs will have a significant impact on Kingdom and is still prevailing in European the Brazilian soybean industry and related poli- countries. cies. 3. 3. 2 The labelling rules under Regulation 258/ Japan 97, known as the Novel Foods Regulation, re- Some studies and statistics have shown quires that GM food products that consist of or that the Japanese market has remained rela- contain GMOs must be labelled as such. Regu- tively calm regarding foods containing ingredi- lation 1139/98 and Regulation 49/2000, both ents developed through biotechnology (Hoban targeted to GM plants authorized before legisla- [20J, [21J), and that Japanese consumers are tion of Regulation 258/97, i.e. Roundup Ready giving more support for biotechnology than con- soybean (Monsanto) and Bt corn (Novartis), sumers in the U.S.A. and Europe (Macer & also requires that products containing less than Chen [26J). However, a major worldwide re- 1 per cent of GM materials don't have to be la- search study on consumer awareness of GMOs belled. These labelling measures, however, do released by the Angus Reid Group states that not apply if neither protein nor DNA resulting the percentage of consumer negativity towards from genetic modification is present in the final GM foods in Japan is 82 per cent, which is far product because of destruction due to successive higher than Germany (73%), France (71 %), stages of processing. Therefore, food products u.K. (58%), and using soy-oil may be excluded from mandatory Reido Group [2 J) . the U.S.A. (51 %) (Angus labelling, although any official "negative list" of Since the 1960s, with the rapid expansion of such products has not been drawn up yet. Fur- the economy, Japanese consumers have become thermore, there is no specification about label- concerned about food safety. And their worries ling of GM feed (EC [13J, Dewar [8 J). Still, increased after a series of food poisoning inci- according to the Eurobarometer, only a small dents, including the Morinaga incident in 1955 number of opponents of GM food said they and the Kanemi Rice Oil case in 1968, as well as would buy GM foods such as cooking oil (9 %) the Minamata Poisoning of 1953 in Kumamoto or eat eggs from chickens fed on GM corn ( 7 %) . and 1964 in Niigata that made Japanese citi- Some governments in Europe already have zens aware of environmental degradation and taken some other actions against GMOs besides its affects on food safety (Jussaume et al. labelling. Austria and Luxembourg banned the [24J). Until the present year, problems with import of Bt maize and France brought in a food poisoning continue to happen in Japan, two-year ban on commercial growing of an like the Snow Brand Milk case, which made u.K. , more than 14 thousand consumers seriously herbicide-resistant oilseed rape. In the 145 Table 3 a: Consumers' Concern about Food Safety sick. It is also important to see the increasing awareness over how heavy dependence on im- Are you concerned about safety of ... ? ports might affect food safety and security, be- Imported source offoods 88.9% cause Japanese people experienced the U.S. soy- Process of agricultural producing 79.1% bean embargo of 1973, and the use of a lot of Restaurants or fast-food shops 74.3% Process of food manufacturing 68.5% post-harvest chemicals on imported agricul- Are you not concerned about safety of ... ? tural products. These concerns are reflected in a survey released by the Japanese Ministry of Ag- Cooking at home 62.4% riculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) in Process of distributing 52.4% May 2000, proving that almost all respondents (1,020 housewives) have great concern about Table 3 b: Consumers' Concern about GM Soybeans food safety in general (Table 3 a). Although the Do you like to purchase GM soybean products? information for common citizens was not suffi- Prefer non-GMO, even if the price is higher cient and consumers were not aware of all the positives and negatives aspects in the begin- 2.0% Not worried about ingredients ning, several surveys have shown growing con- Don't know cerns about new biotechnologies (Table 3 b, Ta- 81.1% 4.3% Prefer GMO, ifthe price is lower 12.0% Source: MAFF, Consumers Monitor Report, May 2000. ble 4). Not only are common citizens worried about these new technologies, but Consumers' Table 4: Consumers Attitude toward GMOs (Nov. 1999) Cooperatives and supermarkets are also unwilling to have GM food and crops in their products' list, in part because of their customers' attitude towards GMOs (Jussaume et a1. [24J). Consumers' Cooperatives (74 co-ops, March-June 1999) and supermarkets (42 chains, March-April 1999) were interviewed by the Japanese NGO Very concerned 45.7% (28. 6%in April 1998) Somewhat concerned 41. 0% (39. 8%in April 1998) Unwilling to buy 82.7% * Female only 89.1% Not so unwilling to buy 15.0% Not at all unwilling to buy 2.3% Source: Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation (AFC) # The questionnaire was sent to randomly selected 2,300 people who live in the main cities on each prefecture of Japan (excluding Okinawa) ;600 people answered. known as the "No! GMO Food Campaign". The results of this survey are shown in Table 5 below. After considering the findings of its technical sub-committee, in August 1999, MAFF published draft legislation proposing that GM food products will have obstacles to overcome in the be subject to mandatory labelling from April Japanese market and also that GMO-free pro- 2001. The Ministry of Health and Welfare is al- ducers will be able to find a profitable market. ready considering shifting its guideline for According to MAFF's labelling rule, however, GMO safety evaluation to a "law" in order to most processed foods using just soy-oil or leci- strengthen the risk assessment process. thin, including soy-source, will be excluded from The Japanese market is very important for mandatory labelling. About 80 per cent of soy- soybean producers, due to the fact that tofu, bean demand is in the form of soy-oil and soy- natto, shoyu (soy source) and miso are daily meal, and only a quarter of all soybeans, includ- products in this country and are all soybean ing those produced domestically, are used for based. All data mentioned above show that GM soy foods. Nevertheless, many manufacturers 146 Soybean Production and GMO Issues in Brazil Table 5 a: Supermarkets' Attitude toward GMOs and Non-GMOs Have you already sold or had a plan to sell products labelled non-GMO? No,38% Yes,26% I Planning, 19% I I No Answer, 17% I No Answer, 12% I No Answer, 24% I No Answer, 6. 7% I OthersIN.A. ,4.6% I No Answer, 5. 8% Have you sold domestic products (so far, non-GMO) as a marketing strategy? Yes,67% I No,21% I Do you think that non-GMO sales appeal to customers like in the EU? Yes, 45% I No,21% I Don't know,IO% Table 5 b: Consumer Co-ops' Attitude toward GMOs Are there requests for non-GMO from your members (consumers)? Yes, 89. 2% I No,4.1% I How do you access to non-GMO sources? Domestic, 55. 6% I Area specification, 33. 3% I Organic, 6. 5% Do you have a plan to develop your original GMO-free products? Yes, 82. 6% I No, II. 6% I Source: The No! GMO Food Campaign ucts containing genetically modified products. and distributors are already utilizing a voluntary GMO-free labelling scheme, even on non- As mentioned before, IDEC (Brazilian In- targeted foods, and are establishing alternative stitute of Consumer Defence) is a non-profit sources for non-GMO soybeans. So, we can say consumers' association founded in 1987. It has that the extent to which Japanese companies no ties with companies, governments or politi- and consumers will demand non-GMO soybeans cal parties. IDEC's main objectives are to con- will have a tremendous impact on the world tribute to the equity within consumers, to con- soybean market. tribute to the enforcement and enhancement of consumer-oriented legislation, and to promote a Internal Pressure to Reject GMO better lifestyle, especially on the quality of ser- Although some transnational corporations vices and products. IDEC is a full member of the 3. 4 are already in the Brazilian market, the law is Consumers International, an international or- still cautious in the approach to GMOs. Con- ganization that articulates the activities of con- sumers, aligned with NGOs, are watching the sumer's advocates throughout the world (IDEC situation very closely. At the present moment, [22]) . products containing GM substances are being In Brazil, the discussion about the risks of commercialized, but not commercially grown in genetically modified food is causing a lot of con- the country. Brazilian importers of maize are troversies. IDEC and other NGOs, like the able to buy cheaper products from countries SBPC (Brazilian Society for the Science Pro- that grow GMOs, but are being constantly ob- gress) and Greenpeace, as well as some govern- served by consumers. Discussions are still going ment entities including the Ministry of Federal on in Brazil, about the law that prohibits GM Public, IBAMA (Brazilian Institute of Environ- seeds from being grown in Brazilian fields, and ment and Natural Renewable Resources) and concerning the push by NGOs that the Brazil- the PROCON (National Consumer Protection ian Consumers Law requires labelling on prod- System) 6, are asking for the Federal Govern- 147 ment to be careful before approving the plant- (PT), announced a new decision and declared ing and commercialization ofGMOs. These enti- all 79 ongoing GMO trials illegal. The Govern- ties are trying to represent and defend consum- ment was convinced that the introduction of GMOs would result in the loss of seed produc- ers' rights. Though IDEC, since 1996, is closely watch- tion. The Government was concerned that pat- ing the GMO situation in Brazil and doesn't ap- ented industrial seeds wouldn't be affordable prove of the way the government is handling nor appropriate for small-scale farmers, and the issue, the GMO issue is still unknown by a stated that being GM-free was a good commer- great part of the population. There is insuffi- cial move (Bell [3 J) . cient information about genetically modified In April 1999, the State of Rio Grande do products from the government to Brazilian citi· SuI \vas visited by representatives of a consor· tium ofleading European supermarkets, includ- zens. ing Sainsbury (U.K.) and Carrefour (France), IDEC believes that the approval to plant GMOs by CTNBio was not based on sufficient which had committed themselves to eliminating field research and tests, and also not based on GM ingredients from their own-brand products. the consumers' right to know about what they Actually Carrefour is reported to have signed are buying and eating. According to IDEC, there contracts with some producers in the southern are two main consumers' rights that must be re- states to buy a yearly volume of 300, 000 metric 7 That is tons of GMO-free soybeans (USDA [341). In the reason why compulsory information must August of the same year, Marks & Spencer (u. be established, and why there must be labelling K.) announced the intention to go GM-free in spected: information and free choice • about the genetic modification of each product. animal feeding and soy products, noting that IDEC also claims that there is a great resis- they will be buying the products from Brazil tance from some sectors of the government that (Bell [ 3 J) . These cases made the State Govern- receive support from private companies. These ment even more cautious of GMO commerciali- sectors would be hiding relevant information zation. about the origin, nature, quality and risks of the The Government began a new policy of en- products, disrespecting the Brazilian Con- forcing the 1991 State Biosafety Law, which re- sumer's Defence Code. quires that environmental impact assessments be undertaken before GMO trials, although 4. Farm-Level Dilemmas of Opposition to GMOs 4. 1 there have been no agreed upon criteria for environmental impact assessments. The Govern- The Case of Rio Grande do Sui ment is doing everything possible to create a The State of Rio Grande do SuI, the second GM-free, although it seems that the State Gov- largest soybean producer and the largest seed ernment and farmers think differently. It is re- producer in Brazil, has decided to go GM-free. ported in various news sources that Rio Grande In Rio Grande do SuI, 80 per cent of its agricul- do SuI's farmers are smuggling GMO seeds ture is based on small family farms, 70 per cent from Argentina and growing them even though of agricultural production comes from farmer's it is against the law. They believe that the ge- cooperatives, and about a half of all soybeans netically modified crops are not going to cause produced are exported. any harm because the United States Govern- The State Government, in January 1999, ment assures their safety. They believe that, if with the coming to power of the Workers Party the North Americans are growing GMOs, then 148 Soybean Production and GMO Issues in Brazil they should do the same. crease in productivity, and how much more free According to the Brazilian Association of time they will have if they use the Roundup Seed Producers (ABRASEM), about 300, 000 ha Ready soybeans. They were visited, at home, by 00 per cent of the soybean crop area in the representatives of the transnational corpora- state) was planted with GMO soybeans smug- tions and were informed about the "advan- gled in from Argentina during the 1998/99 sea- tages" of planting GMOs; how much they will sons. The State Government of Rio Grande do be able to preserve the environment by reduc- SuI acquired five thousand identification test ing pesticide use. They also heard from EM- kits in order to guarantee that the State is a BRAPA and the Ministry of Agriculture that GM-free zone for commercial reasons (Sampaio there is "no proof' that GMOs can cause harm [29J)9. SO far, GMO soybean production in the for the environment or consumers. state seems to be centered in the central part of Brazilian farmers have also been informed the state near the city of Cruz Alta, where the that in Argentina the farmers are increasing average farm size is larger than other part of their productivity, increasing their market the southern states and where there are also share and getting more profit by using GM strong anti-government sentiments. If the State seeds. Nobody wants to loose their place in the Government cannot cope with this problem and international market and nobody wants their assure foreign customers of the purity of their rivals to have better products, more money and soybeans, European and Japanese buyers may more free time. Brazilian farmers want all the have to focus their buying on other regions, es- "advantages" of the new technology. They be- pecially the cerrado region, where only conven- lieve that they will be doing the best for the en- tional varieties are grown because GMO varie- vironment and consumers, as well as receive ties for hot and dry conditions have not yet been more money for it. developed 10. But, actually, there are lots of concerns dis- Besides the problems with the farmers, Rio cussed all over the world; that the genetic en- Grande do SuI is facing a legal struggle with the gineering offers little prospect for reducing Federal Government, which authorized experi- chemical use; that the adoption of genetically ments with GMOs in 59 areas of the State on engineered crops is likely to reduce genetic di- February 10, 1999. Seven companies are testing versity; and that the need to buy seeds every rice, soybean and maize in 16 municipalities. year will lead to a steep rise in farmers' input J). Especially, farmers The Federal Government is strongly enthusias- costs (Cornerhouse [7 tic due to the biotech lobby, which has convinced don't have access to information about the mar- people that GMOs will be far more profitable for keting strategy developed by some TNCs, in the Brazilian economy. Even though the State which farmers will have to pay a "technological itself believes it is strategically better not to fee" when buying seeds. Generally, this fee will grow genetically modified crops, it is said that be first paid by the seed firms and then trans- the State cannot go against the Federal Govern- ferred to the farmers. And, besides having to ment for very long. buy these high-priced-seeds, by contract firms will not allow farmers to save seeds for the com- 4. 2 Farmers' Attitude towards GMOs ing year, which raises the question of increasing Brazilian farmers are very curious about farmer dependency on a limited number of seed suppliers (EC [l2J) 11. the new technology. They have heard about the "results" on North American farms; the in- Brazilian farmers are likely to hear only 149 one side of the GMO situation. The NGOs and mostly the large and corporate-like farms in the the people from the Ministries of Health and cerrado region, small family farms, especially Environment can't reach those farmers, can't go those in the traditional region, will face further to their houses and can't give speeches on the difficulties competing in the market if these Cooperatives. These institutions don't have the projects are completed. same access to farmers as the transnational Besides the transport issue, the other prob- corporations and don't have enough money to lem that farmers have to face is the huge tax use on marketing to spread their information. rates. In principle, there have been four differ- These institutions cannot make the farmers ent basic tax rates; an intrastate rate, two in- conscious of possible environmental problems, terstate rates and an export rate. But, instead the possible oligopoly of the TNCs, and the new of only four hLX rates, there are more than 400 market opportunities of GMO-free products, or- different rates in Brazil (Warnken [37J). The ganic production or other alternatives. large number of rates makes it difficult to estimate the incidence and impact of the tax on 4. 3 Family Farmers' Situation in Brazil specific agricultural products. Producers are re- In general, to compete in the market with ceiving less for their products than they would in the absence of taxation. the United States and Argentina, Brazilian farmers have to overcome many barriers that In the short term, it may not be advanta- farmers from the other countries don't face. geous, especially for small farmers, to grow soy- Compared with the U.S.A. and Argentina, Bra- beans for the export market, given that they zil's soybeans and soybean products have a high have to pay all these taxes, as well as transpor- marketing cost. The first great problem for Bra- tation and additional costs for commercializa- zilian farmers is the cost of transportation tion. To get a good profit in the international (Warnken [37J). Most of the raw beans, proc- market, a farmer will have to grow crops on an essed meal and oil are transported by tracks. increasingly large scale. Even now, small farm- Thus, transportation costs are very high due to ers cannot compete in the domestic market long hauls, poor roads and equipment shortages against big producers. As long as there remains in post-harvest periods. The two other alterna- a huge gap between small and large scale farm- tives for transportation are the use of the na- ers, the adoption of GMOs is not likely to tional rail system, which is not feasible as in change and improve the economic conditions of some areas of Brazil the maximum speed the small family farmers. This can be explained by train achieves is 4 kmIh, and the use of the wa- the "treadmill of technology" theory - anytime terways, which is difficult due to the endless and anywhere family farmers are urged to problems in the poor ports. The Brazilian Gov- adopt the new technology so as to be stay in ernment wants to privatize the railroads and business, they tend to be slow adopters or non- also have some rail system construction projects adopters, and always turn out to receive less (Warnken [37J). Additionally, the Government profits and more debts (Cochrane [5 J) . is planning the construction of a waterway in Researchers at EMBRAPA believe that the Paraguay-Parana River and a major port in small farmers cannot get a great profit from the heart of the Pantanal (the world's largest planting soybeans and that they should diver- wetland) , which is very controversial at the mo- sify their operations. The small farmers should ment due to environmental issues (Halwell analyze their income and evaluate whether soy- [18J). Because these projects will benefit beans are a profitable decision or whether they 150 Soybean Production and GMO Issues in Brazil October 1998, the Ministry of Agriculture and would be better off diversifYing their production system like EMBRAPA has advised them to do. Food Supply published Directive 505 with the Small farmers should try to avoid competition purpose of establishing national standards for with big farmers and with the international the production, classification, processing, pack- market. Instead of spending their money and aging, distribution, identification and certifica- their time with a competitive grain, they should tion of organic products, and republished the try for specific (niche) markets or to sell their Directive in April 1999 after the public comment products in their neighbourhood. period. Of course it is not an easy decision. Even if This organic boom may come from growing they diversifY their farming successfully, it is consumers' concerns about food safety and envi- very hard to get money from the Banks and ronmental problems. Organic farming requires even more difficult to get subsidies from the more hard work than conventional farming. Government, for the subsidies directed to the Pest and weed control has to be without chemi- agricultural matters have been considerably cals, fertilizer has to be organic, and several re- small since 1982. But, still, it is worth to consid- quirements have to be completed to receive the ering the possibility of alternative options. certificate. In spite of these factors, farmers' benefits, such as the reduced cost of production 4. 4 (especially because the cost of agricultural in- Alternative Options for Farmers 4. 4. 1 puts is high in Brazil) or attractive prices for Edible and Organic Soybeans the In the State of Santa Catarina (Coritiba- commodities they produce (the "pre- nos) there is already a small group of farmers mium" is paid for organic producers), are con- that plant a kind of edible soybean for export tributing to increased organic production. Re- specifically to the Japanese market. EMBRAPA cently, this sift has been stimulated by the large and the Universities of Vicosa, Londrina and interest on the part of Brazilian supermarkets Sao Paulo are developing projects with these in buying organic products. According to the edible varieties 12 • USDA, there are market opportunities for sell- Some of them have partner- ships with Japanese companies, universities, ing organic foods in Brazil. Also, according to and public research institutions like JIRCAS 13 • supermarket managers, demand for these prod- But, the production of edible soybeans is very ucts is much higher than the current supply, small in Brazil, although 0.4 per cent of the particularly for vegetables, fruits and refriger- population is of Asian descent. Whether this al- ated processed foods. Organic soybeans are also ternative option will help soybean farmers or regarded as the most important product being not may depend on the possibility of developing exported to the EU (mainly Germany) and Ja- a domestic soy-food market. pan (USDA [33]). 4 . 4. 2 In Brazil, organic production began as an Researches and Extension isolated initiative in some regions, especially in EMATER is a public institution, linked to the Southern states (Fonseca & Feliconio [14]). the Brazilian Government, through the Agricul- Although commercial production is still limited, tural Ministry. State Law 6969 established growth of organic farming in Brazil is estimated EMATER in December 1977, as the public insti- to be around 20 per cent, or about US $ 150 mil- tution responsible for technical assistance and lion, annually in recent years (USDA [33]). The official rural extension to farmers. The techni- rapid growth of organic farming prompted the cians working for EMATER give assistance to Brazilian Government to regulate the sector. In farmers, going to their farms, sometimes once a 151 week, disseminating new technologies devel- leviate the poverty situation in the State, bas- oped by EMBRAPA, giving advice about what ing the help in the technological modernization to do to prevent problems at harvesting time, of agriculture and creating more jobs. This pro- announcing new meetings and helping farmers ject also wants to assist the environmental pro- to take care of their properties. The farmers tection and improve the quality oflife on family welcome these technicians and, after discussing farms. Rural Villages: the main goal of this pro- all the positive and negative aspects together, ject, developed with the Government of the they usually follow their advice. State of Parana, is to build small farms in About ten years ago, EMBRATER, a former institution of EMATER, was dissolved, and places close to the urban areas to give better life E].\LA.TER was established in each state. Among conditions to workers and families, increasing them, EMATERIPR (Parana) that we visited is their incomes and keeping them in the rural famous for its strong and well-organized exten- lifestyle. sion system. In 1999, following the directions of Support to Small Property: this project, the State Government of Parana, the Rural Ex- developed with the Ministry of Agriculture, fo- tension program had the family farms and its cuses on the development of small farmers, by organizations as a priority, developing actions giving them necessary conditions to increase based in working contracts and dealing with re- their income, increasing their productivity and sults established beforehand. The numbers of improving their competitive capacity in the contracts made by EMATERIPR for the year of market. Strengthening of the Family Farms (PRO- 1999 is shown in Table 6 below: Farmers assisted by EMATERIPR receive a NAF) great deal of information and join projects sup- : this project, developed with the Minis- try of Agriculture, is trying to improve the pro- ported by public and private institutions (EMA- ductive capacity of farmers, to increase job op- TERIPR [10]). The main projects are: portunities, and to increase the families' income Parana 12 Months: this is the main pro- and life quality. ject of the State for the agricultural sector fi- Of course, we cannot be optimistic about nanced by the World Bank. It is being imple- these projects and policies for family farms. And mented right now and the main purpose is to al- we can't deny the probability that these extension programs will be used as a way of dissemination of GMOs among small farmers. But, we Table 6 : Extension Programs ofEMATERlPR Category Family farmers 127,777 Farm labourers 12.335 Women (rural) 16,881 Adolescents (rural) Fisher-man (subsistence) Brazilian farmers to improve their way of farming and management and their quality of life without depending on imported high technology like genetic modification. 4,229 456 Farmers settled in the land 2,051 Medium size farmers 5,966 Big size farmers 5,011 Urban public dare to say here that there are many options for No. of Attendants 5. Conclusion So far we have explored the actual situation of Brazil. The country is the second biggest producer of soybeans, a great competitor in 11,407 the international market and has a growing Source: EMATERIPR production capacity. In the soybean industry, 152 Soybean Production and GMO Issues in Brazil however, the country finds itself in an odd situ- social groups and classes, between small-scale ation because of the introduction ofGMOs. family farmers and corporate-like large farms. Many of these social issues are very important On one side, consumers and environmen- for Brazilian society to cope with. talists' groups and some government institutions, as well as European and Japanese con- We must not forget that growing GM and sumers, are against GMOs. All ofthem are pres- conventional crops are not the only option for suring the Justice system not to allow the pro- the country and its farmers (especially small- duction of GM seeds. On the other side, there scale family farmers) ; there are other alterna- are the international competitors, the U.S.A. tives, like growing edible soybeans or organic and Argentina, which are already growing crops. As mentioned in the paper, some alterna- GMOs, the Brazilian Executive Federal Power, tives will help increasing the farmers' income the Brazilian Food Industry Association, some and diversify their production. So, we should farmers and transnational corporations. All of compare GMOs with these alternative options, them are in favour of the production and com- instead of comparing with conventional farming. mercialization of GM varieties, and pressuring Neither GMOs nor conventional the Justice system to allow production on do- would not make family farmers to be better off soybeans unless current market conditions could drasti- mestic fields. cally changed. What is puzzling for farmers, the government and economists is whether to become GM- As long as we could explore in the paper, we free or not. The main question is whether con- can conclude that if we set GMO issues in a dif- sumers are actually going to pay more for con- ferent context, the dilemmas that Brazilian ventional soybeans, and whether farmers can farmers and the southern states governments survive international competition by only grow- seem to be caught in would be not a dilemma ing conventional crops. Currently, the evalu- essentially. It is important to say that the inter- ation of acceptance of GM products is being est of Brazilian soybean industry as a whole analyzed. The governments are researching and the interest of each farmer are not neces- consumers' behaviour, as well as conducting sarily the same. Further investigation into the field tests. At the moment, we are not sure actual situation of Brazilian soybean farmers at whether consumers will get used to having GM local level will be made in our next study. products on the shelves or totally reject them. We remember what some researcher at EM- Notes BRAPA said to us; the current moratorium pol- l. In this and next sections, we mainly referred to icy on GMO approval ordered by the Judge sys- Warnken [37J. tem turned out appropriate strategically, be- 2. Interview with Dr. Tuneo Sediyama at University of cause it would take some years to confirm the Vicosa, Vicosa, Brazil, in August 2000. market reaction towards the products. We think, 3. For soybeans, the loan rate is set annually based on however, he should recognize that this morato- the following formula and conditions; 85 per cent rium is necessary to evaluate GMO safety is- of the 5 -year average price which disregards the sues, as well as social issues related to GMO highest and lowest years, with the floor set at $ 4. 92 commercialization, such as distribution of and the cap at $ 5. 26 perbushel. power and influence, risks of concentration of 4. Interview with Ms. Andrea Salazar, a lawyer in knowledge and technology to a few transna- charge of this case, at IDEe, Sao Paulo, Brazil, in tional corporations, relations between different August 2000. 153 Politica Nacional de Transgenicos, May 4,1999. 5. Interview with researchers at EMBRAPA-Soja, [6 J Cochrane, Londrina, Brazil, in August 2000. w.w., The Development of American Agriculture: A Historical Analysis, 2nd Edition, 6. PROCON (National Consumer Protection Sys- University of Minnesota Press, 1993. tem) consists oflocal and state consumer protection [ 7 J The Cornerhouse, "Food? Health? Hope?: Ge- bodies. netic Engineering and World Hunger", Briefing 7. Interview with Ms. Andrea Salazar of IDEC, Sao 1O,199S. Paulo, Brazil, in August 2000. [ S] Dewar, A., "Labelling of GM Foods", AGROW S. Agrow World Crop Protection News, No. 337, Octo- Reports, DSISl, November 1999. berl,1999,p.17. [9] Diario Oficial da Uniao, no. ISS, Secao 03, pg. 56, 9. The State of Parana has also started the statewide October 1 , 1998. inspection of illegal plantings of GM soybeans for the2000/0l season. Agrow World Crop Protection [l0] EMATERIPR web-site - www.emater.pr.gov.br News, No. 361, September 29 ,2000, p. 20. [ll] EMBRAPA website-www.embrapa.gov.br(here agribusiness include the farm sector) 10. These information and analysis provided by Pro Farmer Magazine are distributed through the In- [l2] European Commision's Directorate-General for ternet service named AgWeb.com, on October 10, Agriculture, Economic Impacts of Genetically 2000. Modified Crops on the Agri-Food Sector, Working Document Rev. 2,ApriI2000. 11. According to several news sources, Argentine farmers don't pay a technology fee to Monsanto due to [l3] European Commission's Directorate-General for lack of efficient control. 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[ 1 JAkrebs, A.V. , "Freedom to Farm Results in Fail- [l7] Hager, R., "Changes to Argentina's Grain Mar- ure", The Progressive Populist, April 1999. keting System Are Expected To Improve Effi- [ 2 J The Angus Reido Group, New Thoughts for ciency", USDA FAS Online, May 1995. Food: Exploring Consumer Reaction for Biotech- [lS] Halwell, B., "Where Have All the Farmers nology in Foods, June 2000 (Some tables and fig- Gone? ", World Watch Magazine, September/Oc- ures are available in the website). tober 2000. [ 3 JBell, J. , "Brazil's Transgenic-Free Zone", Seed- [l9] Hisano, S., "Idenshikumikae-Sakumotsu no ling, September 1999, pp. 2-10. Shakai-Keizai-teki Hyouka (Socio-economic Im- [ 4 J Buckley, S., "Brazil Battles Over Beans: Farm- pact Assessment of Genetically Modified Crops: ers at Odds Over Genetically Modified Crops" , Critical Review of the Legitimacy of Agricultural The Washington Post, June 27,2000. 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