Judging Jena’s D.A.: The Prosecutor
and Racial Esteem
Andrew E. Taslitz *
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Prosecutor Reed Walters’s Actions
This Article uses the views of the Jena Six prosecutor, Reed Walters,
concerning the justifications for his role in the Jena Six affair, as a foil for
exploring the proper role of prosecutors more generally in our system of
justice.1 Walters’s actions indicate that he favors the traditional prosecutoras-advocate role, which is focused on the individual case. In addition to
other attendant harms, this role ignores how each such case harms the social
esteem of the suspect’s racial group. A better conception of the prosecutor’s
role would recognize his part in this economy of racial disesteem.
The Jena Six were African American students at Jena High in Louisiana, who were arrested for their alleged assault on a white student, Justin
Barker.2 The assault on Barker occurred in the wake of a series of events
that began when three white students hung nooses on a “white tree” after
black students sat under it.3 The details of the case are well-summarized
* Welsh S. White Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, 2008-09, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; Professor, Howard University School of Law; former Assistant District
Attorney, Philadelphia, PA.; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1981; B.A., Queens
College, 1978. The author thanks his wife, Patricia V. Sun, Esq., for helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article; his research assistants, Stacy Chaffin, Adrienne Moran, and Nicole Smith, at Howard University, and Emily A. Mari and Melissa Catherine Bancroft, at the
University of Pittsburgh, for their excellent work; and the Howard University and University
of Pittsburgh Schools of Law for their funding of this project.
1
See Reed Walters, Op-Ed., Justice in Jena, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A27.
2
Detailed citations supporting the brief fact summary here can be found earlier in Andrew
E. Taslitz & Carol Steiker, Introduction to the Symposium: The Jena Six, the Prosecutorial
Conscience, and the Dead Hand of History, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 275 (2009).
3
See Richard G. Jones, In Louisiana, a Tree, a Fight, and a Question of Justice, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2007, at A14; All Things Considered: Beating Charges Split La. Town Along
Racial Lines (NPR radio broadcast July 30, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyid=12353776 [hereinafter All Things Considered]; Barbara Mikkelson &
David Mikkelson, SNOPES.COM, Jena 6 (Dec. 30, 2007), http://www.snopes.com/politics/crime/
jena6.asp (reprinting and analyzing a widely forwarded e-mail about the Jena Six events);
Nightly News: In Depth; Racial Divide in Jena, Louisiana (NBC television broadcast July 31,
2007). The Jena Six teens were originally arrested and charged with aggravated second-degree
battery, but on December 11, 2006, the prosecutor amended the charges to attempted seconddegree murder and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. See Supplemental Motion for
New Trial at 1, Louisiana v. Bell, No. 82112 (La. Dist. Ct. Sept. 4, 2007). On the eve of Bell’s
trial, prosecutor Reed Walters amended his complaint once more, this time charging Bell again
with aggravated second-degree battery and conspiracy to commit aggravated second-degree
battery. See id. Second-degree murder is a charge for which a juvenile over the age of fifteen
must be tried in adult court upon return of an indictment or a finding of probable cause that the
394
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
elsewhere in this Symposium, and I will refer to a few of them later in this
Article. What matters for the purposes of this Article is the central role that
the local prosecutor, Reed Walters, played in these events. Notably, Walters:
• declared, at a student assembly in which black students say he addressed his comments specifically at them, “I can be your friend or
your worst enemy. I can ruin your lives [and/or make them disappear]
with the stroke of a pen”4;
• sanctioned charging a white assailant of one of the soon-to-be Jena Six
with simple battery, resulting in a sentence of probation only5;
• permitted some members of the Jena Six to be charged with robbery
and assault for snatching a rifle away from a white male who
threatened to use it on them6;
• tried and convicted one of the Jena Six, Mychal Bell, as an adult,
exposing him to a potential twenty-two-year sentence for an assault
that resulted in Barker’s hospitalization for two hours7;
• refused to charge the noose-hangers with any crime whatsoever8; and
offense was committed. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305A. However, the juvenile procedures
transfer statute does not require mandatory transfer of attempted second-degree murder. The
statute grants the prosecutor discretion whether to seek transfer to adult court of attempted
second-degree murder or a second or subsequent aggravated battery but not of a first charge of
aggravated second-degree battery. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305B. Neither provision permits transfer solely on conspiracy charges. See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305; see also
Motion in Arrest of Judgment at 1, Louisiana v. Bell, No. 82112 (La. Dist. Ct. July 27, 2007).
Therefore, the late reduction of the charges may have created the appearance of charge-manipulation by the prosecutor to empower him to seek trial in adult court. Cf. Memorandum in
Support of Motion in Arrest of Judgment, at 5-6, Louisiana v. Bell, No. 82112 (La. Dist. Ct.
July 27, 2007) (arguing that indictment was defective due to its lack of several critical details).
These observations explain why I say that the prosecutor “chose” to proceed in adult court.
4
See Jason Whitlock, Jena 6 Case Caught Up in Whirlwind of Distortion, Opportunism,
KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 30, 2007, at B11; All Things Considered, supra note 3.
5
See Whitlock, supra note 4; Abbey Brown, Official Sought to Clear Up ‘Jena Six’ ‘Misinformation,’ TOWN TALK (Alexandria, La.), July 31, 2007, http://www.thetowntalk.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/99999999/NEWS/399990004.
6
See Whitlock, supra note 4; All Things Considered, supra note 3 (describing the
incident).
7
See Supplemental Motion for New Trial at 1, Louisiana v. Bell, No. 82112 (La. Dist. Ct.
Sept. 4, 2007); Abbey Brown, Jury Unanimously Convicts First ‘Jena 6’ Teen to Face Trial,
NEWS-STAR (Monroe, La.), June 29, 2007, at 1B. However, an appellate court eventually
overturned the transfer to adult court, resulting in sentencing for Bell as a juvenile. See
Mychal Bell of ‘Jena 6’ Ordered to Juvenile Facility, CNN.com, Oct. 12, 2007, http://edition.
cnn.com/2007/US/law/10/11/bell.jail/index.html.
8
See Brown, supra note 5; Walters, supra note 1 (attempting to defend this refusal); see
also Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting the Jena 6, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1285, 1302-06 (2008)
(arguing that an “outsider’s perspective” should have governed Walters’s decisions and that he
could and should have charged the noose-hangers with a crime); David Luban, The Inevitability of Conscience: A Response to My Critics, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1462-65 (2008)
(arguing that Walters had no legal route for prosecuting the noose-hangers but that many of
Walters’s actions and positions were unconscionable and either disingenuous or deluded in
being portrayed as race-neutral actions beyond Walters’s control).
R
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
395
• approved Barker’s release on $5000 bond on a charge of bringing a
loaded rifle onto school grounds, while requesting bonds of between
$70,000 and $138,000 for the various Jena Six members.9
B. Do-Justice Adversarialism
Walters ultimately defended his actions in an op-ed piece published in
several leading national newspapers.10 The details of his op-ed piece will
follow later in this Article.11 The piece’s primary importance is that it reflected Walters’s embrace of a purely adversarial prosecutorial role. Walters
focused solely on the case before him, ignoring the history that brought
Mychal Bell and the other black students to this point, and likewise ignoring
whether Bell’s case was being handled in an equal fashion to those involving
the white students. Walters saw himself as having “no choice” but to prosecute Mychal Bell as an adult on the most serious conceivable charge.12 Walters expressed no feelings of an obligation to calm the racial tensions at Jena
High or to heal the community.13 In Walters’s view, he achieved Justice by
playing the role of zealous advocate for his client (the “People”), where zeal
meant seeking the greatest possible prison sentence.
Although Walters articulated a purely traditional adversarial role—
much like that played by most lawyers other than prosecutors—the dominant model of prosecutorial ethics is one that I call “Do-Justice Adversarialism.”14 This model recognizes that prosecutors must moderate their zeal so
that they may “do justice.” This ambiguous and contested term is usually
understood to mean avoiding conscious and overt actions in an individual
case that undermine fair procedures, where “fairness” is narrowly defined.
For example, hiding indisputably exculpatory evidence from the defense
9
See Court Rules ‘Jena 6’ Defendant to Stay Behind Bars, CNN.com, Sept. 21, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/09/21/jena.hearing/index.html (stating the bond amounts
for the Jena Six); Abbey Brown, Student May Be Expelled for a Year, TOWN TALK (Alexandria,
La.), May 12, 2007, http://www.thetowntalk.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/99999999/
NEWS/70916032 (discussing Barker’s bond). Bell’s high bond reportedly resulted from his
having a prior juvenile conviction arising from a December 25, 2005 battery, and facing juvenile charges arising from three other incidents allegedly connected to the Jena noose-hangings
while Bell was still on probation for the first offense. See Abbey Brown, “Jena Six” Defendant’s Criminal History Comes to Light; Bond Denied, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Aug. 25, 2007,
http://www.shreveporttimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070825/NEWS03/708250353.
State and federal prosecutors investigating the case concluded, however, that the assault on
Barker was unconnected to the noose-hanging incident, see Walters, supra note 1, although the
media, protestors, and many students and parents reached very different conclusions, see generally Jena 6, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jena_Six (serving as a compendium of public views
on the case, if not necessarily a recounting of the true events).
10
See Walters, supra note 1.
11
See infra Part V.
12
See Walters, supra note 1.
13
See id.
14
See infra Parts IV and V.A (coining and explaining this term).
R
R
R
396
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
would be “unfair.”15 Do-Justice Adversarialism can, however, be understood to entail certain broader prosecutorial obligations than are generally
currently recognized, resulting in a “Modified Do-Justice Adversarialism”
that requires greater deliberation about the raced cultural meanings of
prosecutorial actions. I will in this Article elaborate on just what those obligations are.16
C. The Medical Model
Do-Justice Adversarialism has its place—an important place—in models of prosecutorial conduct, but there are times when an alternative model
of prosecutorial ethics, one increasingly recognized in prosecutorial practices across the nation, better serves social welfare. I call this model the
“Medical Model,” for it views both crime and aspects of how society addresses crime as illnesses afflicting the political nation or its subsets.17 That
nation, or “the People,” is the patient, and the prosecutor has an obligation
to cure the patient, not simply to excise some of the disease.
The Medical Model has three broad tenets: first, prevention (of crime)
is better than treatment; second, if treatment is necessary, at least do no
harm; and third, treat the Body of the People holistically, recognizing that
the health of the mind (including the subconscious mind) and the health of
the Body interact. These broadly stated guiding principles do not alone
solve particular ethical problems, but the same is true of concepts like “zealous representation” and “doing justice.”18 The metaphor of treating the patient suggests new avenues for prosecutorial ethical reasoning not entailed
by the metaphor of adversarial combat. In particular, the prosecutor must at
least consider the third-party effects of her decisions: the innocents temporarily ensnared by the system, the neighborhoods devastated by both underenforcement (stealing citizens’ safety) and over-enforcement (breeding more
crime and disrespect for the law) by the state, the tarnished reputations of
individuals never suspected of crime but linked by their group membership
to the stigma of crime. These are issues that Walters entirely ignored, especially as they affected the fate of racial minority groups. My articulation of
the Medical Model will suggest how Walters could have better addressed
these issues.
D. On the Esteem Economy
A case for both Modified Do-Justice Adversarialism and for its supplement by the Medical Model turns primarily on understanding the prosecu15
See infra text accompanying notes 383-84 (summarizing the roots of this obligation in
both constitutional case law and ethics codes).
16
See infra text accompanying notes 415-20.
17
See infra Part V.B (summarizing the elements of the Medical Model).
18
See infra text accompanying notes 363-82.
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
397
tor’s role in the economy of racial disesteem.19 The details of that role
occupy the bulk of this Article. I prefer to leave the reader in suspense about
those details in the Introduction. It is sufficient to note here that “esteem” is
a comparative attitude of approval of a person or group’s actions or dispositions for which observers conclude the person or group may fairly be held
responsible.20 Esteem can be directed toward individuals or groups, including racial groups, and brings with it material and psychic rewards, just as
disesteem brings corresponding punishments.21 Because esteem is scarce,
competition for it is intense, creating an “esteem market.” One of the criminal justice system’s purposes is to interfere with this market’s operation by
imposing deserved disesteem on the criminal law’s violators. The system
goes awry when it imposes excessive disesteem or visits it upon the undeserving, such as when it affects the fate of entire racial groups. Prosecutors
are too often unaware of how their own actions—from charging, to making
statements to the media, to negotiating plea deals, to going to trial—can help
the system go wrong. Self-awareness of how this happens and what can be
done about it is the first step in reform. Promoting such self-awareness is
part of this Article’s task. But, as I will argue, acting on that awareness is
best served by changes in the structure of prosecutor’s offices and the philosophy under which they operate rather than by new ethics rules potentially
subjecting prosecutors to discipline. The war I wage here thus appeals to the
prosecutorial conscience.22
E. A Roadmap to Esteem
Part II explains what “esteem” is and how it can operate in a world of
market exchange. Part II also addresses the special role of racial disesteem
and offers an overview of how the law can alter operation of the racial disesteem market for good or for ill. Next, Part III explores in detail the primary
ways by which well-meaning prosecutors can tilt the esteem economy
harshly against minority racial groups. Part III discusses in particular the
prosecutors’ role in the charging decision (what I call the “pricing” decision
in plea bargaining) and in anti-defendant publicity—a role that controls
raced social norms, regulates the standards for esteem-allocation, and denies
procedural justice. For each of these actions, Part III explores the potential
harms prosecutors can inflict by ignoring group esteem and disesteem.
Part IV compares the traditionally understood role of the prosecutor
with an evolving one. Five prosecutorial functions contribute to the evolu19
See generally GEOFFREY BRENNAN & PHILIP PETTIT, THE ECONOMY OF ESTEEM (2004)
(first articulating a theory of the esteem economy).
20
See id. at 15-23 (defining “esteem”).
21
See Part II, infra, for detailed support for this summary of the esteem economy.
22
See generally Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
1573 (arguing that prosecutors’ duty to “seek justice” should give rise to a host of obligations,
not shared by other lawyers, that are not sufficiently recognized in existing ethical codes).
398
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
tion of this new role: the preventative, healing, procedural justice, unconscious non-adversarialism, and accuracy functions. This new model requires
prosecutors to consider the impact of their choices on the economy of racial
disesteem and to act to minimize its harmful effects.
Part V suggests solutions to the problem, outlining and defending the
“Modified Do-Justice Adversarial” and “Medical” models of prosecutorial
ethics. It then examines the actions of Jena prosecutor Reed Walters, evaluating his conduct in light of the proposed models.
Part VI concludes the piece with a summary and an eye toward the
future.
II. THE ECONOMY
OF
ESTEEM
Understanding the prosecutor’s role in the racial esteem economy first
requires defining what constitutes esteem and disesteem, and why we care.
Likewise, it is important to understand with specificity the role of racial
groups in this economy. Laying this groundwork is the task of this section.
A. Defining Terms
To reiterate, esteem is a comparative attitude of approval of a person or
group’s actions or dispositions for which observers conclude that the person
or group may fairly be held responsible.23 Although esteem is an attitude,
not an action, it is linked to action because esteem stems from one’s performance on some expressed good characteristic. Esteem must, unlike its close
cousin, social status, be earned.24 Furthermore, esteem, though bestowed
based upon actions, is often seen as revealing a deeper character trait of a
virtuous nature.25
23
See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 15-23.
See id. at 16-17; MICHAEL MARMOT, THE STATUS SYNDROME: HOW SOCIAL STANDING
AFFECTS OUR HEALTH AND LONGEVITY 1, 11 (2004) (defining status as “[w]here you stand in
the social hierarchy”). Marmot notes that income and one’s parents’ social class are important
determinants of status. Id. at 15. Parents’ social class at a child’s birth, I note, is logically
independent from whether the newborn child has yet done anything to deserve his good fortune. This distinction between earned and unearned status is my own. Brennan and Pettit did
not address this distinction and sometimes conflate “status” with “esteem.” See BRENNAN &
PETTIT, supra note 19, at 26-28, 31-33; see also Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1003, 1031 (1995) (defining “social status” as the aggregation of esteem judgments).
Status and esteem and their respective economies are certainly importantly linked, and the
study of each concept informs the other, but as will soon be clear, the emphasis here on esteem
as being perceived as earned—rather than simply inherited—is critical to understanding its
role in the criminal justice system.
25
Brennan and Pettit put it this way: “If I esteem someone positively I will do so for their
being kind or fair, brave or bold, a good parent, a conscientious colleague. . . . And if I
disesteem someone I will do so for their being cruel or unjust, cowardly or snide, an uncaring
parent or a sloppy colleague . . . .” See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 17. For an
explanation of how and why we readily make character judgments (general judgments about
someone’s disposition to think or act in a certain way across some specified range of situa24
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
399
Because esteem is comparative, it requires some understanding of average performance.26 The absence of esteem occurs, therefore, if others view
someone as merely an average achiever.27 “Disesteem” occurs whenever
someone is seen as being above average on a negative trait,28 such as being
crueler than others.
B. Why Esteem is Valued
Esteem is valued by those who hold it for both instrumental and inherent reasons. Those holding us in high esteem trust us, increasing the chances
that they will aid our endeavors and seek closer relationships with us.29
Closer relationships themselves bring material benefits, perhaps in job or
educational opportunities.30 Like social status, high esteem also brings political power, longer lives, better health, and more resource-rich mates.31
Those holding high status or esteem receive the deference of those lower on
the totem pole, are perceived as more competent and credible, and gain more
speaking time and attention in public settings.32 They are thus more effective persuaders, increasing access to money, psychic satisfaction, and
power.33
Esteem is valued as of inherent worth, too.34 The inherent psychic
value of esteem is so great that, for example, some professors might sacrifice
money and family peace to accept an offer to teach at a more prestigious
tions), see Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice through Psychological
Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 89-91 (1993) [hereinafter Taslitz, Myself Alone].
26
See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 69, 92-94.
27
This point seems implicit in the idea that esteem and disesteem are assigned relative to
an average or zero point, though Brennan and Pettit do not clearly say so. See id. at 17-18
(discussing zero point idea on an esteem/disesteem scale); id. at 92-94 (discussing average
performance).
28
See id. at 17-18.
29
See id. at 26 (noting esteem-trust connection and resulting relationship advantage).
30
See ABRAHAM TUCKER, THE LIGHT OF NATURE PURSUED 179 (1805) (“[W]e find it so
extremely and continually useful to have the good opinion and esteem of others, which make
them friendly and obsequious to our desires, that this is enough to give us a liking to esteem,
and consequently to those actions or qualities tending to promote it.”). Cf. ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 112 (1999) [hereinafter TASLITZ, RAPE
AND CULTURE] (discussing material benefits of high status).
31
Cf. BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 26 (noting that another instrumental benefit of
enjoying the esteem of those whom one esteems is providing one with grounds to think well of
herself, too); MARMOT, supra note 24, at 1-12, 154-58 (arguing that higher social status—
independent of other factors—leads to longer, healthier lives and that low social status reduces
marriageability); TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 30, at 112 (“High status may also
bring . . . more access to money, jobs, and political power.”).
32
Cf. TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 30, at 69-74 (defending similar point,
albeit concerning gendered status).
33
See id. at 111-13.
34
Compare BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 29 (arguing that esteem has intrinsic
value), with ALAIN DE BOTTON, STATUS ANXIETY 3 (2004) (summarizing instrumental value of
high social status as including “resources, freedom, space, comfort, time and, as importantly
perhaps, a sense of being cared for and thought valuable—conveyed through invitations, flattery, laughter (even when the joke lacked bite), deference and attention”).
R
R
R
R
R
R
400
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
institution in a remote corner of the country. They will do so merely to
receive the enhanced esteem from being associated with the new academic
home.35 Commentators from ancient Greece to modern times—including
Cicero, Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Voltaire, Hume, Kant, and John Adams—
have sung esteem’s praises.36 Philosopher Adam Smith phrased the point
thus:
Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an
original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his
brethren. She taught him to feel pleasure in their favourable, and
pain in their unfavourable, regard. She rendered their approbation
most flattering and most agreeable to him for its own sake; and
their disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive.37
Modern disciplines as diverse as neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, and
behavioral and bio-economics confirm the factual accuracy of Smith’s position.38 It is important to remember that Smith spoke of “unfavourable regard” too—of disesteem. Disesteem is esteem’s mirror, bringing just the
opposite ill consequences to esteem’s positive ones.39
35
See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 71 (using similar example).
See id. at 24-25.
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 212 (Liberty Classics, 1976)
(1759).
38
Brennan and Pettit argue that biology probably explains why esteem has inherent, not
solely instrumental, value for human beings:
36
R
37
[T]here is evidence that to some extent esteem also has an intrinsic or unconditional
hold on us, being something that nature has primed human beings to find attractive,
perhaps for reasons of biological fitness. We often care about esteem where there is
little or nothing to be gained in pragmatic or evidentiary terms. We care about our
standing among people we are unlikely to meet—say, those who come after us—and
among people who know so little about us that their opinions can hardly give evidentiary support to our view of ourselves.
BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 29. Cf. DONALD W. PFAFF, THE NEUROSCIENCE OF FAIR
PLAY: WHY WE (USUALLY) FOLLOW THE GOLDEN RULE 61-79, 99-120 (2007) (arguing that
there is a biological basis for the Golden Rule rooted in our ability to view ourselves as connected to others and nurtured by reciprocal social relationships of mutual care and concern);
Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 497 (1995) (discussing
psychological evidence of the central value of belongingness in humans).
39
Cf. DE BOTTON, supra note 34, at 3-5 (noting that “status anxiety” about lost, losing, or
low status can give us the sense of being stripped of human dignity and respect; that status
anxiety leaves us in constant worry that our status hangs in the balance should we fail to
achieve; and that from failure stems humiliation, “a corroding awareness that we have been
unable to convince the world of our value and are henceforth condemned to consider the
successful with bitterness and ourselves with shame”); MARMOT, supra note 24, at 1-12 (noting that low social status causes poor health); TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 30, at
69-75, 136-37, 141-45 (noting the ill effects of low social status of women in the context of
sexual assault). Marmot posits that low status harms health and lifespan because it decreases
autonomy (the sense of control over the direction of our lives) and social integration (the sense
of connectedness to others). See MARMOT, supra note 24, at 11, 158-63. Marmot argues,
therefore, that some of the ill social effects of status inequality can be reduced via social
R
R
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
401
C. How the Economy of Esteem Works
i. Basic Model
Because esteem is scarce, competition for it is fierce, creating a market
for it.40 The quest for esteem can be conscious or subconscious, and most
details of its operation are unimportant here.41 A few key points are relevant, however. First, esteem is “demanded” because people are willing to
pay in time, money, and other resources for the tools to achieve it.42 Second,
esteem-bestowal works as a reward, and its denial as a punishment, even if
we are unaware that it does so.43 For example, if we target a behavior for
reasons unrelated to esteem, that behavior will be reinforced by esteem-bestowal and extinguished by esteem-denial.44 Third, esteem cannot be directly supplied because it is an attitude. Direct purchase would not bring
true esteem because the latter requires sincere belief that it has been earned,
not bought.45
Persons or groups can, however, supply “esteem services.”46 Such services can include agreeing to pay attention to another’s performance, for one
cannot esteem another for actions of which the former is unaware.47 Another
institutions being modified so that low status does not translate into minimal autonomy and
high social isolation. See id. at 240-57.
Professor Robert Fuller, the former President of Oberlin College, concedes that power differences cannot be eliminated, and that what he calls “rank differences” closely “reflect power
differences.” See ROBERT W. FULLER, SOMEBODIES AND NOBODIES: OVERCOMING THE ABUSE
OF RANK 4 (2003). But abuses of rank—using power differences “as an excuse to abuse,
humiliate, exploit, and subjugate”—are a social ill that can be cured, he insists. Id. at 4.
Indeed, as he maintains, accurate ranking based on fair standards and limited solely to the
domain in which an individual performs—and not extending to his entire character and life—
is a social good essential to economic efficiency, electoral choice, and political legitimacy.
See id. at 15-17. Yet just this sort of global ranking occurs when race becomes the basis for
judging value. The ranking is factually defective—race does not determine individual performance or value—and is normatively defective—an unacceptable standard of judgment in a
society purportedly constitutionally committed to the fundamental equality of individuals. Cf.
infra text accompanying notes 103-107 (explaining the disesteem that attaches from a felony
conviction). Furthermore, esteem—based on perceived performance—differs from recognition or respect, that is, from treating others in a way that recognizes the fundamental equality
of all humans in certain crucial respects, an equality not to be denied even to those who have
done evil deeds. Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 27-28 (2003) [hereinafter Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment] (defining “respect”).
40
See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 2-3, 34.
41
See id. at 34-77 (recounting those details).
42
See id. at 35 (“[S]ocial esteem is something that everyone desires, and . . . how much
esteem people receive depends on how they perform in this or that domain.”). This observation does not mean that “effective” demand therefore arises in the usual sense of that term, but
it does arise often in an analogous, “virtual” sense of demand. See id. at 35, 40.
43
See id. at 40-46.
44
Cf. id. at 36-37 (making a similar argument).
45
See id. at 52.
46
See id. at 55.
47
See id. at 56. See generally RICHARD A. LANHAM, THE ECONOMICS OF ATTENTION:
STYLE AND SUBSTANCE IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION (2006) (articulating one theory of an
R
R
402
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
esteem service is to “testify” or speak on another’s behalf in an effort to
enhance the breadth and depth of various audiences’ esteem for that other.48
If testimony is highly effective, it may lead to “common belief” in the
other’s virtue—just about everyone thinking well of her.49 Common belief
can stem from informational cascades in which so many people value you
that more “choose” to share the belief, creating a bandwagon effect.50 Once
common belief in virtue is achieved, it is hard (though far from impossible)
to dislodge by contrary evidence.51
ii. Strategies for Gaining Esteem
There are a variety of strategies to compete for esteem. A performancebased strategy specializes performance in the areas in which one does best
and seeks the maximum performance achievable at an acceptable cost.52 A
publicity-based strategy aims to publicize and categorize positively a person’s achievements in as large and diverse an audience as is feasible.53 Correspondingly, the performer can seek to hide or downplay her failures.54 A
related tactic is to aim publicity only at those audiences likely to be receptive
to the person’s performance.55 A rabid liberal chooses to give a red-meat
speech to left-wing Democrats, not equally rabid right-wing conservatives.
The quality of the audience matters too. The acclaim of the Democratic
Presidential Convention means more than that of a local block captain.56
Presentation strategies offer a third option.57 The effort here is to challenge the standards for esteem rankings: what qualities or accomplishments
should be valued more than others? What dimensions and persons should be
the comparators, and what measurement used to determine the average?58
The debate on many law school faculties about the relative merits of teaching versus scholarship as grounds for merit pay is just such an effort to mold
esteem-evaluative standards.
attention economy); MAGGIE JACKSON, DISTRACTED: THE EROSION OF ATTENTION AND THE
COMING DARK AGE (2008) (analyzing the social and psychological forces that erode or promote attention).
48
See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 56-57.
49
See id. at 57.
50
See id.; accord CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 84-85, 90-91 (2007).
51
See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 57.
52
See id. at 69-70.
53
See id. at 70.
54
See id. at 70-71.
55
See id. at 70 (“[T]hey will want the audience to share a common awareness that their
relative merits [but not demerits] are recognized.”); id. at 142, 204 (analyzing audience
choice).
56
See id. at 204-08 (analyzing audience quality).
57
See id. at 70-71.
58
See id.
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
403
D. Racial Groups and the Esteem Economy
Esteem and disesteem can accrue to groups as well as individuals.59
Some of these groups are voluntary, some involuntary.60 It is the involuntary
ones on which I want to focus here. Involuntary associations are those for
which membership is “thrust upon” members by society, with no individual
or collective ability to exit or disband the group and no collective veto over
membership.61 A person sharing the characteristics defining the group is an
automatic member.62 Stereotypes, cognitive biases, and cultural narratives
define the group collectively, and its members individually, as sharing certain traits and behaviors associated with fundamental moral qualities.63
These assertions may be conscious or unconscious.64 In either case, however, their moral connotations mean that the group and its members gain
presumptive esteem or suffer disesteem based on group membership. In the
case of disesteem, racial minority groups serve as the clearest example.65
The United States Supreme Court, speaking both about reputation and
esteem, has recognized this interactive link between a racial group’s fate and
that of its members. In Beauharnais v. Illinois,66 the President of the White
Circle League challenged his conviction under a criminal statute prohibiting
the defaming of groups of people, arguing that free speech guaranteed him
the freedom to distribute a pamphlet spewing racial hatred. The pamphlet
read: “If persuasion and the need to prevent the white race from being mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then the aggressions . . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns, and marijuana of the negro surely will.”67 The Supreme
Court affirmed Beauharnais’s conviction and rejected his free speech claims,
explaining:
It would, however, be arrant dogmatism, quite outside the scope of
our authority in passing on the powers of a State, for us to deny
that the Illinois legislature may warrantably believe that a man’s
job and his educational opportunities and the dignity accorded him
59
See id. at 195-96, 223.
See id.
61
See id. at 223-24.
62
See id.
63
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 121, 124-29 (2006) [hereinafter Taslitz, Wrongly Accused]
(discussing moral associations triggered in many whites’ minds upon seeing a black face).
64
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity of Color-Blind Criminal Justice, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Taslitz, Racial Blindsight] (analyzing barely
conscious racial biases); Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux: How Race Contributes
to Convicting the Innocent: The Informants Example, 38 SW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009)
[hereinafter Taslitz, Redux] (analyzing subconscious racial biases).
65
See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 222-29. Brennan and Pettit note that even
mere association between esteemed and disesteemed groups’ members reduces the former
group’s esteem. See id. at 228.
66
343 U.S. 250 (1952).
67
Id. at 252.
60
R
404
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
may depend as much on the reputation of the racial and religious
group to which he willy-nilly belongs as on his own merits.68
Although Beauharnais has never been expressly overruled, its current precedential vitality is in doubt. Its insight, however, is not.69
Disesteemed group members have several options. Exit is costly and,
for racial group members, generally impossible.70 One strategy to improve
esteem, therefore, is to look to the group itself for affirmation rather than to
the broader society.71 This can be a positive approach if the group accepts
generally-stated societal standards for evaluation but rejects society’s low
rating of the group as based upon factual inaccuracies.72 This inner-focused
approach can also be helpful if the group instead rejects broader evaluative
standards, replacing them with reasoned and morally-defensible alternatives.73 But the approach can be destructive if it adopts anti-social standards
for awarding esteem—for example, by approving of violence rather than
peace, theft rather than honesty, ignorance over education.74 Where group
members or sub-groups choose this strategy, social disesteem of the group
can end up increasing crime.75 Moreover, this anti-social strategy by subgroup members can feed group stereotypes that are attributed to all group
members, even if most group members take more positive approaches to
their plight.76
Groups can take more outward-looking approaches as well. They can
seek to publicize group members’ accomplishments of which the larger society approves and to hide those of which it disapproves.77 Groups and their
68
Id. at 262-63 (emphasis added). The Court subsequently equated reputation with esteem, noting the plausibility of group defamation harming an individual “whose position and
esteem in society” are inextricably linked to those of her group. See id. (emphasis added).
69
See generally Jon B. Gould, The Precedent That Wasn’t: College Hate Speech Codes
and the Two Faces of Legal Compliance, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 345 (2001).
70
See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 222-23, 226-28.
71
See id. at 227-29 (explaining that members of disesteemed racial groups who do well on
wider societal performance measures still face disesteem or reduced esteem merely by virtue
of membership in the excluded group, and that they therefore form their own “esteem associations” of persons like them to esteem one another; they do so without rejecting the wider
society’s values, other than the value that disesteems them simply by virtue of their skin color).
72
See id. at 225.
73
See id. at 226-27. Brennan and Pettit choose a less than laudatory term for this approach, describing it as a subset of the “sour grapes” outsider response. See id. at 225 (arguing that an outsider group member “will find herself inclined to the view that the values that
make for the esteem of others are wrong-headed or pretty silly or not to be taken too
seriously”).
74
See id. at 225-26 (describing the rise of countercultural groups, which may or may not
adopt normatively undesirable alternative evaluative standards). Cf. ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE
OF THE STREET (2000) (offering an extended examination of a negative set of countercultural
norms); Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power
to Inspire Political Action, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 284-87 (2003) [hereinafter Taslitz,
Racial Auditors].
75
See infra text accompanying notes 317-21.
76
See infra text accompanying notes 322-60.
77
See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 230, 234-37 (analyzing “secrecy” and “publicity” strategies).
R
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
405
members can, alternatively, agitate to change the broader societal standards
by which they are judged.78 Because esteem is a scarce commodity and
brings with it money, power, and life satisfaction, any change in the existing
group distribution of esteem means losses for some and gains for others.
Many of those standing to lose will mount counter attacks.79 Struggles over
esteem become struggles over emotionally meaningful symbolism, over the
existence, meaning, and evolution of social norms, and over basic principles
of social and political morality.80 Because so much is at stake, and because
collectivities can mount more resources than individuals, struggles waged
over esteem by disesteemed minorities contending with esteemed majorities
can be particularly brutal.81 Once again, much of this struggle can be waged
unconsciously.82 Because of the law’s power to reflect and shape social
norms and the central moral role assigned to criminal law in our culture, the
criminal justice system—and the primary voice of the state in that system,
the prosecutor—plays a particularly important role in waging esteem
warfare.83
78
See id. at 236-37.
See RICHARD ABEL, SPEAKING RESPECT, RESPECTING SPEECH 69-124 (1999) (describing
struggle for respect when respect is a zero-sum game).
80
Reference to these “broader societal standards” is but another way of explaining the
link between the esteem economy and social norms—regularities in behavior in society or a
group. See Lynn Stout, Social Norms and Other-Regarding Preferences, in NORMS AND THE
LAW 1, 28 (John N. Drobak ed., 2006) (defining “social norms”). A regular behavior is a
norm only if most persons in a society comply with it and people generally approve of those
complying with it and disapprove of those doing the opposite. See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra
note 19, at 270. The approval or disapproval, whether conscious or not, must partly explain
the behavior. See id. Furthermore, the approval or disapproval manifests itself with strong
moral overtones, and moral talk plays a role in the rise, fall, and evolution of social norms.
See generally EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF MORALITY: CROSS-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES
(Leonard D. Katz ed., 2000) (discussion of the role of evolution in development of morality).
Expression of the attitudes here called esteem and disesteem are thus both shaped by norms
and instantiate them. See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 285-87. Cf. RICHARD THALER
& CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS
67-68, 180-82 (2008) (illustrating how people change behavior based upon perceived social
norms). Changing norms can therefore change economies of esteem and disesteem and viceversa. See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 285-88. Brennan and Pettit describe using
esteem to prompt good behavior and discourage bad by harnessing or modifying social norms
as the “intangible hand.” See id. at 246.
81
Cf. ABEL, supra note 79, at 7-23 (illustrating this point); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Inadequacies of Civil Society: Law’s Complementary Role in Regulating Harmful Speech, 1 U. MD.
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 306, 376-79 (2001) [hereinafter Taslitz, Civil Society]
(analyzing this point’s implications for regulating harmful speech).
82
This observation follows from the frequently “virtual,” unconscious operation of the
esteem economy. See supra Part II.C.1.
83
See infra Part III.
79
R
R
R
R
406
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
III. THE PROSECUTOR’S ROLE
IN THE
[Vol. 44
ESTEEM ECONOMY
A. Criminal Prosecution and (Racial) Disesteem
Understanding the prosecutor’s role in the economy of racial esteem
first requires understanding the criminal justice system’s broader role in that
economy. The key point is that the criminal justice system, in theory and in
practice, is designed to impose disesteem on individuals. However, the system has the effect of imposing such disesteem on racial minority groups,
particularly African Americans, as well. The system imposes disesteem via
three primary mechanisms: (1) the speech act of conviction; (2) the expressive function of conviction and sentence; and (3) the continuing incapacities
facing convicted persons even after serving their sentences.84
i. Speech Acts
a. General Concept
“Speech acts” occur when words themselves are deeds.85 Kent Greenawalt thought the phrase “situation-altering utterances” more clearly expressed the idea, defining such utterances as a “means for changing the
social context in which we live.”86 The legal system is filled with such utterances—words that, merely by being spoken or written, and regardless of the
truth of their content, alter individuals’ legal status and obligations and,
thereby, their social world.87
Consider the marriage ceremony. The priest, rabbi, other religious
leader, or magistrate asks each member of the couple: “Do you promise to
love, honor, and cherish your soon-to-be spouse in sickness and in health, in
wealth and in poverty, until death do you part?” So long as a valid marriage
license has been prepared (itself another speech act), each member of the
couple changes her legal status by merely speaking the words “I do.” They
are no longer simply “John and Mary” but “husband and wife.”88 This new
status carries with it a wealth of new rights—presumptive joint ownership of
property, access to a portion of the other’s social security benefits, inheritance rights, and eased access to joint medical insurance benefits being but a
84
See infra Part III.A.1.
See FRANKLIN S. HAIMAN, “SPEECH ACTS” AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10-11 (1993)
(explaining the “speech acts” concept, which is rooted in the work of philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein). See generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962) (examining the broad spectrum of possible interpretations of mere utterances); JOHN R. SEARLE,
SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1970) (offering a theory of
speech acts and their meaning).
86
See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 57 (1989).
87
Every law student is exposed to the speech act concepts when studying “verbal acts” as
a classic example of words that are not hearsay. See, e.g., STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND, PAUL BERGMAN & ANDREW E. TASLITZ, EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 359-61 (2000).
88
See id.
85
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
407
few of the prominent examples.89 Similarly, the new status carries with it
legal obligations. For example, in fault-based divorce states, spouses have
the obligation of sexual fidelity to one another.90 Furthermore, marriage also
changes a couple’s social status, for parents and friends now treat them differently. Finally, marriage further enhances a couple’s power resources—the
material and psychic gains from pooling their finances, social support systems, and affections.91 The combination of these factors with the exalted
status of marriage in our culture means that marriage both reflects and improves the esteem in which many others hold the new couple.92
b. Criminal Convictions
A criminal conviction can be understood as a negative counterpart to
the marriage example. An accused felon is legally presumed innocent unless
and until she is convicted.93 The conviction consists of a single word spoken
by the jury foreperson on behalf of the jury: “guilty.”94 Only then does the
89
See, e.g., John G. Culhane, Beyond Rights and Morality: The Overlooked Public Health
Argument for Same-Sex Marriage, 17 L. & SEXUALITY 7, 14-15, 17, 26 (2008) (noting many
of the legal rights created by marriage).
90
See, e.g., Diosado v. Diosado, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
a post-nuptial agreement providing penalties for adultery was unenforceable because it reintroduced a fault-based concept of divorce that California has now rejected); Goodridge v. Dep’t of
Public Heath, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003) (noting that many of marriage’s benefits are
available only to those who have “accepted the correlative responsibilities of marriage”);
Karin Johnsrud, Same Sex Relationships: From “Odious Crime” to “Gay Marriage,” 35 INT’L
J. LEGAL INFO. 301, 301 (2007) (noting that adultery can be the basis for dissolution of marriages); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Evaluating Marriage: Does Marriage Matter to the Nurturing
of Children?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 842, 867 (2005) (“Marriage tends to instill and bring
with it certain relational benefits for the adults, like permanence, commitment, and even sexual
fidelity, which redound to the benefit of children in the household. . . .”).
91
See EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (2008) (cataloguing many of the benefits of marriage, including better health, longer life, and greater overall happiness); JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR
STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA 18-28 (2004) (summarizing the material, social, and
psychological benefits of marriage, including enhanced social status, the behavior and attituderegulating effects of “social opinion,” the creation of kin, and the individual and social support
stemming from the expression of firm commitment to another’s well-being).
92
Cf. RAUCH, supra note 91, at 20 (“Marriage confers status: to be married, in the eyes of
society, is to be grown up.”); id. at 21 (explaining that the mere prospect of eventual marriage
to someone creates pressure to “reach for respectability” and “try to build status”).
93
See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”);
Larry King, How Do Juries See Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?: A Historical View, in BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT (Larry King ed., 2008).
94
Philosopher Antony Duff and his colleagues powerfully capture the “performative” or
speech act nature of a guilty verdict and its social consequences:
[W]hat is being said, what is being done, when the fact-finder brings in a verdict of
‘Guilty’ (or of ‘Not Guilty’)? . . . [Partly it is] a finding that this person committed
this offence. But the formal declaration of a verdict of ‘Guilty’ in open court . . . is
not just the assertion of a proposition, but a performative that condemns the defendant as a criminal wrongdoer. Its meaning lies not only in the proposition that the
defendant committed the crime charged, but also in what is done by this formal
R
408
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
accused become a “felon.”95 This change in status has enormous legal, psychological, and social consequences for the new felon. She may lose many
rights, including the rights to vote, to locomote freely, to pick her social
companions, and to choose what she will eat and when she will sleep, work,
and travel.96 She has new and painful obligations too: to report to a probation or parole officer or return to a halfway house, or instead risk imprisonment.97 She may be barred from certain jobs, or required to register as a
“sex offender,” or compelled to submit to treatment for substance abuse or
psychological therapy.98 Even if the sentencing judge shows leniency by, for
example, granting probation with few conditions when the law permitted far
harsher sanctions, the individual’s freedom is then bestowed upon her by the
court; the probationer does not possess rights to these conditions.99 These
diminished rights and enhanced obligations mark the felon as an “other,”
outside the community of citizens deserving of their full rights.100 In our
culture and perhaps most others, this mark will have powerful negative emotional resonance for observers.101 The felon’s new status—created by a
speech act—brings with it disesteem in the larger community.102 Moreover,
declaration of guilt—the condemnation of his commission of that crime. . . . That is
why for some people a conviction is itself a kind of punishment, indeed a severe
punishment: they suffer the condemnation of their fellow citizens—a condemnation
that can be acutely painful.
ANTONY DUFF, LINDSAY FARMER, SANDRA MARSHALL & VICTOR TADROS, THE TRIAL ON
TRIAL: TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 83 (2007).
95
See SEAN MCCONVILLE, The Victorian Prison: England, 1865-1965, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON 132, 132 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995) (defining
“felon”).
96
See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY
105-06, 130-33 (2003) (summarizing some of the many legal restrictions imposed upon felons,
including frequent loss of voting rights); Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison, 1965Present, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 95, at 227, 227-59 (describing
life in prison and, more briefly, in less restrictive environments).
97
See PETERSILIA, supra note 96, at 55, 82-83, 98-100.
98
See id. at 82, 112-20, 127-29, 175-82.
99
Cf. Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and Population
Trends, in PRISONS 63, 102 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999) (discussing how
parole and probation give judges control over the population entering prisons).
100
Criminologist Joan Petersilia notes that the law marks convicts as outsiders—as “back
in society but not free”—in myriad ways even long after their sentences have ended. See
PETERSILIA, supra note 96, at 105. For example, they often lose their right to vote and hold
public office, or to obtain certain occupational or professional licenses. Id. Likewise, “[t]heir
criminal record may also preclude their receiving government benefits and retaining parental
rights, be grounds for divorce, prevent their serving on a jury, and nearly always limits firearm
ownership.” Id.
101
See id. at 106 (noting the stigmatizing effect of a criminal conviction).
102
Criminologist Howard Zehr makes the point in a particularly powerful way:
In the popular view, guilt is not merely a description of behavior but a statement of a
moral quality. Guilt . . . has a “sticky,” indelible quality. [It] adheres to a person
more or less permanently, with few known solvents. . . . A person found guilty of
theft becomes a thief, an offender. A person who spends time in prison becomes . . .
an ex-con. This becomes part of his or her identity and is difficult to remove.
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
409
the criminal law purports to right public, not private, wrongs.103 The jury’s
declaration of the offender’s “felon” status thus labels her a community
predator deserving of disesteem by all who learn of her status. Therefore,
the speech act of finding a defendant “guilty” has significant social consequences. New status brings a new reality.
ii. The Expressive Function
Fully appreciating how the speech act of a conviction changes an offender’s social status requires understanding law’s expressive function, its
ability to send messages about right and wrong thought, actions, and character—messages often capable of changing behavior, hearts, and minds.104
The criminal law’s expressive role is particularly important.105 Scholars endlessly debate what the purpose of criminal law should be.106 I will not rehash these debates here, but will simply note that the character-based variant
of “communicative retributivism” is the theory I find most convincing and
that best illustrates the points I want to make here.107
HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES 68-69 (1990); see also NELL BERNSTEIN, ALL ALONE IN
THE WORLD: CHILDREN OF THE INCARCERATED 193 (2005) (“Stigma ‘sticks’ to the families of
the afflicted as well.”).
103
See generally S.E. Marshall & R.A. Duff, Criminalization and Shared Wrongs, in
CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS (Paul Robinson, Kimberly Ferzan & Stephen Garvey eds.,
forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 214-21, on file with author) (defending the idea that crimes
harm the “public,” not merely individuals, and that convictions express public condemnation
of the offender).
104
See generally Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021 (1996) (explaining the law’s expressive function, the resulting ability to alter social
norms, and the function’s limits).
105
See infra notes 107-56 and accompanying text (defending this point); see also ERIC A.
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 108-10 (2000) (arguing that criminal punishment is partly a
shaming mechanism, the intensity of the stigma imposed varying with the visibility and
memorability of the punishment and the degree to which it is associated in the public mind
with the “badness of the people who are punished”). Pointedly, Professor Bernard Harcourt
argues that moral condemnation is not the sole, and perhaps not even the primary, expressive
function of the criminal law:
[W]hile I agree . . . that there is an expressive dimension to punishment, I disagree
that morality is in fact central to that function. Punishment usually also communicates, importantly, political, cultural, racial and ideological messages. The meaning
of punishment is not so coherent or simple. Many contemporary policing and punitive practices, for instance, communicate a racial and political, rather than moral,
message—a message about who is in control and about who gets controlled.
Bernard E. Harcourt, Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the Relationship
Between The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law and The Expressive Function of Punishment, 5
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 168 (2001).
106
See Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing,
40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 548-53, 568-82 (2008) (summarizing some of the debates about the
purposes of punishment and defending her own theory).
107
See generally ELLEN S. PODGOR, PETER J. HENNING, ANDREW E. TASLITZ & ALFREDO
GARCIA, CRIMINAL LAW: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 6 (2005) (concisely defining and illustrating “communicative retributivism”).
R
410
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
Retribution and revenge are close cousins.108 Both stem from a similar
emotional need to see an offender suffer as a way of restoring the victim’s
status in the eyes of the community.109 When a wrongdoer treats a victim
badly, she devalues the victim and sends the message that the victim is unworthy of better treatment.110 When the state fails to condemn the wrongdoer, the state embraces and reaffirms that message.111 “Through
retribution, the community [instead] corrects the wrongdoer’s false message
that the victim was less worthy or valuable than the wrongdoer; through
retribution, the community reasserts the truth of the victim’s value by inflicting a publicly visible defeat on the wrongdoer.”112 The tort system contains a retributive component, but it is one that permits a more direct
infliction of injury upon the defendant for the personal wrong she has done
the plaintiff.113 Tort-based retribution channels and controls the victim’s resentment, preventing her from seeking private vengeance against a wrongdoer.114 In the criminal context, by contrast, retribution is expressed by the
community for a public wrong done to it.115 It is the community’s righteous
indignation, rather than the victim’s personal resentment, that is channeled to
social purposes.116 For this reason, a criminal conviction carries an expressive punch that a tort verdict does not.
Some important distinctions must be made here. Properly understood,
just retribution must be proportionate and not demeaning to the individual.117
Most Western liberal theories of rights are rooted in a commitment to the
equality of all persons, or at least of all citizens.118 Theorists dispute what
quality inheres in equal amounts in all persons, but all agree that some such
108
See CHARLES K.B. BARTON, GETTING EVEN: REVENGE AS A FORM OF JUSTICE 62
(1999) (noting similar, though not identical, emotional roots of revenge and retribution).
109
Cf. Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN
LAW 31, 38-39 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).
110
See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1697 (1992).
111
See MARI J. MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III, RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERLÉ
WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 48-49 (1993) (describing this effect in the context of hate speech).
Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate Crimes
Legislation Are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739, 749-53 (1999) (discussing the importance of hate
crimes legislation as a means of society expressing its disapproval of hate crimes).
112
MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 12 (1998).
113
This point follows from Alan Calnan’s similar analysis. See ALAN CALNAN, JUSTICE
AND TORT LAW 111-18 (1997).
114
See id. at 114. Calnan explains: “In this way, the judicial [tort] system serves the
ends of private justice. It allows us to receive the cathartic release of doing something ‘bad’ to
our wrongdoer, albeit in a controlled manner with strict limitations.” Id.
115
See Marshall & Duff, supra note 103 (defending this point); Taslitz, Civil Society,
supra note 81, at 348-49.
116
See Taslitz, Civil Society, supra note 81, at 348-49.
117
See id. at 335-38, 355-66.
118
See generally JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL: THE
ANATOMY OF A WESTERN INSIGHT 3-15 (1999) (analyzing the concept of human equality).
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
411
quality exists.119 That quality entitles all persons to equal respect, meaning
in part that all are entitled to some minimal set of equal human rights.120 To
“demean” someone is to treat her as unworthy of such equal respect.121 The
theory of communicative retributivism rejects any punishment that demeans
the offender, even if the offender demeaned her victim.122 Indeed, communicative retributivists generally argue that offenders always demean their victims, treating them as less than full human beings. To topple the offenders
from their unfairly assumed heights of worth relative to their targets requires
a strong message from the community.123 But the ultimate aim of criminal
punishment is to restore equality and no more.124
I do not believe that “putting criminals in their place” relative to their
victims is the only expressive function of criminal law and punishment. Although all persons have equal worth that guarantees them some minimal
level of respectful treatment, human beings are not equal in all respects, nor
will our culture treat them as such.125 In particular, Americans believe that
people should get what they deserve, however much critics may bemoan
society’s failures to realize this ideal.126 Moreover, Americans see deserving
119
See, e.g., id. at 13, 116-22 (comparing the Kantian theory of reason with a theory of
capacity to strive for “moral goodness”); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
FOUR INQUIRIES 11-41 (1998) (arguing that the idea of equal human rights is “ineliminably
religious”); WILLIAM F. SCHULZ, IN OUR OWN BEST INTEREST: HOW DEFENDING HUMAN
RIGHTS BENEFITS US ALL 17-37 (2001) (offering pragmatic arguments for accepting the ideas
of human rights and equality).
120
See SCHULZ, supra note 119.
121
Jean Hampton distinguishes among three terms: “demeaning” (treating another as less
worthy than he is entitled to be treated); “diminishing” (making the other feel like his worth
has been reduced or his true lower worth has been revealed); and “degrading” (actually lowering a person’s worth in some sense). See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS
AND MERCY 44-53 (1998).
122
See Taslitz, Civil Society, supra note 81, at 338-39, 355-66.
123
See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 121, at 52-53 (defining a wrong as demeaning
another); id. at 137-43 (justifying criminal punishment as necessary to reject the offender’s
message demeaning her victim and replace it with a message of their equal human worth).
Importantly, Professor Deborah Hellman argues that discrimination, such as racial discrimination, is wrong when it demeans another, a point to which I will return. DEBORAH HELLMAN,
WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 29-31 (2008). I am unclear about whether Hellman defines “demeaning” identically to my use here (though I think she does) because at points she
defines demeaning as treating others with unequal moral worth, see id. at 29, whereas I distinguish between unequal moral worth and unequal human worth. To do the former is to impose
disesteem; to do the latter is one way to show disrespect. See supra text accompanying notes
20-39.
124
See Taslitz, Civil Society, supra note 81, at 338-39.
125
See id. at 356 (“[W]hile each of us is of equal worth as a human being, entitled to
rights that recognize that worth, we are not of equal moral worth, and the immoral part of
wrongdoers’ natures must be rejected without denying them status as full human beings.”).
126
See Paul H. Robinson, Empirical Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra
note 103 (manuscript at 41-49, on file with author) (arguing that the criminal law must heavily
weigh popular notions of desert if rules of criminal liability are to maintain their special stigmatizing power). See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY,
AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995) (empirical study of Americans’ notions of desert in the context of criminal punishment).
R
R
R
R
R
R
412
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
behavior as reflective of a person’s fundamental nature.127 Given the criminal law’s expressive, moral educative role in condemning breaches of society’s most strongly held norms, behavior seen as indicative of core moral
dispositions—what psychologists call “personality” traits and folk wisdom
labels “character”—is of great consequence.128 Good moral behavior marks
good persons meriting rewards; ill behavior marks bad persons deserving
punishment.129 Good and bad are not dichotomous variables but relative
points on a spectrum.130 In other words, criminal punishment marks offenders as deserving of various degrees of disesteem, with the degree turning on
the severity of the harm done, the context, and the offender’s state of mind.131
Criminal punishment assumes, furthermore, that this mark will change
minds: society will in fact embrace the attitude of disesteem toward the
offender.132
This description of our criminal justice system is, I think, an accurate
one. As I have argued elsewhere, I also think it is a desirable one.133 I say
this with full recognition that it is an approach fraught with danger. If
poorly implemented or understood, it can lead to viewing offenders as so
unworthy as to be irredeemably evil, thus more demon than human.134 I
have explained, however, that appropriate safeguards against abuse are feasible, though in practice too often ignored.135 But whether I am right that a
character-based retributive criminal justice system is a desirable one, it is the
one we have,136 and the risks of its abuses are precisely why, as I shall ex127
See ZEHR, supra note 102, at 68-69.
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Race and Two Concepts of the Emotions in Date Rape, 15 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 45-52 (2000) [hereinafter Taslitz, Two Concepts] (defending a variant of
character-based morality as the most appropriate justification for criminal punishment). See
generally Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 25, at 7-9, 31-34 (1993) (discussing “personality”
and “character”).
129
See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 128, at 45-52.
130
See id. at 52 (“Evil comes in different forms and degrees and, in a complex world,
actions and persons are often likely to embody aspects of both good and evil.”).
131
See infra text accompanying notes 216-17 (illustrating how the type and severity of the
harm done affects the depth of the offender’s demeaning message and thus the type and degree
of punishment deserved); see also HELLMAN, supra note 123, at 27-29 (arguing context and
culture affect what conduct is and is not “demeaning”); Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 25,
at 3, 10-14, 21-22 (grading evil based on mental state).
132
See Robinson, supra note 126, at 41 (“[S]ome of the system’s power to control conduct derives from its potential to stigmatize violators[,] . . . [b]ut the system’s ability to
stigmatize depends upon [it] having moral credibility with the community.”). See generally
PAUL ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 139-40, 175-89, 198-212, 24760 (2008) (arguing for distributive justice based on “empirical desert,” that is, for punishment
in accord with popular intuitions about resolution of specific types of case facts, as a guide to
crafting criminal law doctrine because such an approach best promotes compliance with the
law and thus potential offender deterrence).
133
See Taslitz, Two Concepts, supra note 128, at 45-58.
134
See Taslitz, Civil Society, supra note 81, at 361-62 (“The danger . . . is that the very
punishment that denounces offenders’ immoral character may foster a sense that they are
outside the human community, that they are ‘monstrous.’”).
135
See id. at 330-42 (suggesting principles and procedures for properly limiting characterbased retributive punishment to avoid dangers of abuse).
136
See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
128
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
413
plain below, prosecutors have an obligation to take care that their role in this
disesteem-imposition system is an appropriate one.137
Acceptance that character-based communicative retribution turns on
criminal law’s expressive function does not explain, however, why only punishment sends the right message. Why not instead issue a public proclamation that the offender and the victim are of equal human worth but, in my
variant, that the former merits less esteem than the latter? Philosopher Jean
Hampton, a leading exponent of communicative retributive theory who focused solely on the equal human worth part of this moral equation, examined
this question. She discussed a heinous case in which a white farmer hung
from a tree a black farmhand and his four sons in burlap bags.138 The farmer
next sliced off one man’s penis and stuck it in his mouth, then burned all five
victims to death.139 Hampton, relying on the distinction between intended
degradation (the desire actually to reduce another’s value) and diminishment
(the message or appearance of reducing value), had this to say about the
incident:
For a judge or jury merely to announce, after reviewing the facts of
the farmer’s murder of the farmhand and his sons, that he is guilty
of murder and that they were his equal in value is to accomplish
virtually nothing. . . . Even if we believe that no . . . degradation
actually took place, to be strung up, castrated, and killed is to suffer a severe diminishment. This representation of degradation requires more than just a few idle remarks to deny.140
Hampton’s example is an extreme one, but it makes the point that actions sometimes do indeed “speak” louder than words. Hampton recognizes, and I agree, that there are punitive elements in far lesser punishments
for lesser crimes. Probation, compelled drug and psychological therapy, and
even a mandate to obtain a high school equivalency diploma can all, under
the right circumstances, serve as punishment able to send a message adequate for society to hear.141 But that message always includes a component
of at least temporary disesteem.142
137
See infra Part III.B.
See Hampton, supra note 110, at 1675.
139
See id.
140
Id. at 1686. Cf. HELLMAN, supra note 123, at 49-51 (arguing that, according to some
theories, proportionate, non-discriminatory punishment is never itself demeaning). But cf.
George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of
Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1895-1907 (1999) (arguing that many of our current punishment practices, especially felony disenfranchisement, racial discrimination, and our treatment
of sex offenders, do unduly demean offenders).
141
See generally Taslitz, Civil Society, supra note 81, at 322-23 (supporting the proposition that lower punishments are often adequate to serve a social goal).
142
See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 311-13 (discussing the unavoidable positives, and the avoidable pathologies, of the disesteem-imposing function of the criminal justice
system).
138
R
R
R
R
414
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
Critics object that there is no empirical evidence to prove that criminal
convictions and sentences are the major source of disesteem involved
here.143 To the contrary, it is simply the commission of the evil act itself that
accounts for nearly the full measure of disesteem, these critics argue.144 I
offer several brief responses. First, disesteem-imposition, even if not
phrased quite this way, is a clear goal of our criminal justice system. The
system assumes that conviction carries stigma with it and that the degrees of,
and actual imposition of, various sentences reflect degrees of disesteem.145
The burden of proving that the system fails in accomplishing this goal
should lay with the critics.
Second, there is indeed significant empirical evidence—much of which
I have reviewed in other fora146—of the criminal justice system’s effectiveness as a disesteem-generating system. For example, there is experimental
support for the idea of “delegated revenge”—that victims actually prefer a
third party imposing harsh sanctions on offenders rather than the victims
themselves doing so.147 There is reason to believe that this preference arises
from victims’ perception that the criminal conviction is a public expression
of society’s affirmation of the victim’s worth as a valued member of the
community.148 This explanation is the flip side of the expressive theory of
punishment: criminal sanctions affirm the victim’s worth by the communal
imposition of disesteem on the offender.149
Similarly, there is significant empirical data demonstrating that a criminal conviction is an obstacle to offenders getting jobs after completing their
sentences.150 Employers worry that the offenders are neither trustworthy nor
desirable enough people to welcome into the workplace.151 For serious offenders, such as sex offenders, public protests against them even residing in
certain neighborhoods seem to stem not only from fear but from “moral
panics” in which the ex-offender’s mere presence in the community is
143
See Ronald J. Allen, Theorizing About Self-Incrimination, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 729,
735-36 (2009).
144
See id. at 10-13.
145
See supra text accompanying notes 93-107.
146
I discuss this evidence in Andrew E. Taslitz, Confessing in the Human Voice: A Defense of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y, & ETHICS J. 121,
157-62 (2008), and in several forthcoming pieces.
147
See generally Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated Revenge, 87 B.U. L. REV.
1059 (2007) (empirically examining and defending this point at length).
148
See id. at 1062, 1086-91.
149
See id. at 1062 (“[V]ictims regard punishment as an important device for restoring
losses to their self-worth and social status, suffered as a direct result of their victimization[;]
. . . the status-and esteem-restoring function of punishment explains and guides the (usual)
preference for delegating revenge.”); id. at 1088-89 (arguing that empirical data now support
the philosophers’ embrace of an expressive theory of punishment).
150
See generally DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA
OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007).
151
See id. at 53-59.
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
415
viewed as a disease of the body politic.152 Ample studies of the extreme
severity of American sentences, the harshness of prisons, the resulting disruption of family ties and neighborhood bonds, and the many “invisible punishments” that plague those who long ago paid their debt to society suggest
not only that the system is effective in disesteem-generation but that it is too
effective, imposing excessive and unduly lasting stigma and even crossing
the line to demean those caught in its embrace, treating them as inhuman,
monsters more than men.153 Criminal law theorist George Fletcher put it this
way:
Despite our efforts to overcome discrimination in the areas of race,
gender, illegitimacy, and alienage (at least by state governments),
we still yield to the need to stigmatize felons and to treat them as
“untouchables.” They are the undercaste of American society.
And among the untouchables, the worst are clearly the sex offenders, who are treated as inherently suspect for the rest of their
lives.154
The stigmatizing power of criminal conviction and punishment is so powerful,155 as I explain further below, that even its mere potential corrodes an
accused’s social status. Bald accusations, arrests, and even trials resulting in
acquittals rob the accused of whatever positive social status they have.156
Mere proximity to the system is seen as a fall from grace, despite paeans to
the presumption of innocence.
152
See Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 868-70, 874-76, 882-87 (2000) (explaining moral panics
and illustrating them with our treatment of juvenile sexual predators); see also ERIC S. JANUS,
FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE
STATE 13-24 (2006) (summarizing the details of the new “sexual predator” laws).
153
See supra note 96 (recounting the harshness of prison conditions). See generally
MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE (2004) (summarizing and critiquing the severity of modern American criminal punishment policies); INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT (Marc. M. Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (collecting essays analyzing the “invisible punishments” stemming from criminal sentences, including social exclusion,
denial of government benefits, loss of political voice, distortion of family ties, mutilation of
children’s psyches, immigration penalties, and debilitating or even fatal illness).
154
Fletcher, supra note 140, at 1898.
155
It is indeed likely that the “criminal moniker” is even more stigmatizing, for example,
than the insanity label. But see CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 59 (2006) (noting that research
indicates that “the criminal moniker” is likely less stigmatizing than the “double whammy” of
the insanity label).
156
See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Duke Lacrosse Players and the Media: Why the Fair
Trial–Free Press Paradigm Doesn’t Cut It Anymore, in RACE TO INJUSTICE: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE 175, 186-97 (Michael L. Siegel ed., 2009)
[hereinafter Taslitz, Fair Trial–Free Press Paradigm] (summarizing media-coverage literature
showing that publicizing mere arrests is highly stigmatizing).
R
R
416
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
iii. Race, Disesteem, and Criminal Justice
That race still serves as a stigmatic badge is a point supported by a vast
literature. In a recent Washington Post-ABC News poll, three in ten Americans acknowledged harboring racial prejudice.157 This is a staggering percentage given the conventional wisdom that many whites will not admit to
such prejudice, even to pollsters, because doing so is generally no longer
socially acceptable.158 Other studies suggest that a common strategy employed by individuals is simple self-deception about their own racial
prejudice.159 Truly unconscious racial prejudice, even by whites thoroughly
and consciously committed to racial equality, is likely even more
widespread.160
Professor Lu-in Wang describes unconscious racial prejudice as “discrimination by default.”161 This form of discrimination operates via three
broad processes: situational racism, self-fulfilling stereotypes, and failures
of imagination. “Situational racism” involves the increase in racially-biased
behavior in “normatively ambiguous” situations, those in which the actor
can readily and consciously justify his choices based on reasons other than
racial bias.162 “Self-fulfilling stereotypes” are habits of thought based on
preconceptions, habits that can channel our thoughts and behavior, filter
what evidence we perceive, and color how we interpret that evidence—all
without our ever being aware that such stereotypes are at work.163 “Failures
of imagination” describe our limited empathy for those who, through our
stereotypes, we expect to suffer.164 Such failures of imagination lead us to
see stereotype-consistent explanations for the behavior of the oppressed, ignoring or minimizing stereotype-contradicting situational, institutional, or
character-based explanations.165 These mechanisms work so powerfully that
157
See Jon Cohen & Jennifer Agiesta, 3 in 10 Americans Admit to Race Bias, WASH. POST,
June 22, 2008, at A1.
158
Cf. CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOTT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME)
62-63 (Harcourt Books 2007) (2000) (“These days, most Americans who are unashamedly
prejudiced know better than to say so, except to a secure, like-minded audience, given that
many people live and work in environments where they can be slapped on the wrist, publicly
humiliated, or sacked for saying anything that smacks of an ‘ism’.”).
159
See id. at 63-65 (noting that racial prejudice is often suppressed because of the cognitive dissonance it creates between harboring such prejudice and the harborer’s self-image as a
moral, egalitarian, non-prejudiced person, but any stress or assault on that person’s self-esteem
readily brings prejudice to the fore); Taslitz, Racial Blindsight, supra note 64, at 4 (discussing
self-deception about racial prejudice).
160
See LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT: HOW RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE 4
(2006) (noting that whites often engage in racial discrimination unconsciously).
161
See id. at 4.
162
See id. at 17.
163
See id. Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the
Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 387, 410-33 (1996) [hereinafter Taslitz,
Patriarchal Stories] (discussing “epistemological filters” and other unconscious processes affecting our preconceptions and behavior).
164
See WANG, supra note 160, at 18.
165
See id. at 18, 83-84.
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
417
even educating the most consciously anti-racist liberal about their existence
and operation does little, if anything, to limit their effect or to encourage
their bearers to recognize them at work.166 These forces are likely to be
particularly effective when individuals are asked to make judgments in specific cases—for example, whether this individual deserves a job—rather
than on broad policy questions, such as those concerning the wisdom of
affirmative action.167 This combination means that, all else being equal, racial minorities, particularly African Americans, are likely as a group to hold
a disproportionate share of society’s stock of disesteem.168
Critics of the psychological bias literature argue, however, that even
racially prejudiced attitudes do not necessarily translate into discriminatory
action.169 But here again, ample evidence rebuts this argument,170 especially
in the criminal justice system. For example, the available studies show that a
disproportionate number of those wrongly convicted are racial minorities.171
This is not a random outcome. Abundant evidence exists of an “other race
effect”—the increased rate of eyewitness error in making cross-racial identifications, a rate particularly high where whites are asked to identify
blacks.172 Likewise, evidence also suggests the existence of both conscious
and unconscious racial profiling by the police; that is, that police are more
likely to watch, investigate, and arrest racial minority group members than
whites.173 Police are also more likely to presume guilt when questioning
166
See, e.g., CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN
CRIMINAL COURTROOM 248 (2003) (discussing why helping jurors to recognize their unconscious assumptions and giving them counter-stereotypical ways to view a situation are
important first steps in overcoming racial bias); TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 30,
at 133 (explaining why such first steps are insufficient, and “subjects who view a prejudiced
belief as wrong” must also be told by qualified experts how “it may nevertheless affect their
judgments,” for only then can bias be reduced).
167
Cf. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 163, at 399 (defending a similar point).
168
Cf. McAdams, supra note 24, at 1044 (articulating a “status production” theory of race
discrimination, using the construct of “status” to mean the aggregation of esteem judgments).
169
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477 (2007) (summarizing the literature that criticizes psychological
bias arguments and effectively refuting it).
170
See id.
171
See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused, supra note 63, at 121-23 (summarizing the most important of these studies); Samuel Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 Through
2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 545-51 (2005) (concluding that, in exonerations
made between 1989 and 2003, race played an important role in eyewitness misidentifications
in rape cases and that, for juveniles exonerated, over 90% were blacks or Hispanics—a disparity that could be due to chance, that might partly involve eyewitness misidentification in juvenile rape cases, but that also might stem from more coercive police interrogations, as 85% of
juvenile exonerees in all cases who falsely confessed were African American); Karen F.
Parker, Mari A. Dewees & Michael L. Radelet, Racial Bias and the Conviction of the Innocent, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 114, 114-28 (Saundra D.
Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001) (concluding that each of four major empirical
studies revealed that a disproportionate percentage of wrongful convictions involved racial
minorities and noting that one study found that 57% of exonerees were black).
172
See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused, supra note 63, at 124-25.
173
See Taslitz, Redux, supra note 64, at 109-18 (summarizing the empirical data on unconscious profiling, specifically the sociological and psychological research demonstrating
THE
R
R
R
R
R
R
418
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
minorities, thereby eliciting defensive responses, which police interpret as
deceptive; this in turn leads to harsher interrogation techniques, raising the
risk of false confessions.174 There is also some archival evidence that police
are more likely to believe false tips when the tipster fingers blacks rather
than whites, leading to more wrongful arrests.175 Yet, once arrests are made,
police are likely to blind themselves to alternative perpetrators, instead collecting evidence confirming their racially-biased suspicions.176 Indeed, police officers’ repeatedly believing that they have found such confirming
evidence leads them to devote ever more resources to policing minority
communities, continually raising the percentage of racial minorities ensnared
in the criminal justice system.177
Other criminal justice system actors—not only the police—seem to be
subject to similar unconscious racial bias. Thus, white jurors in death penalty cases more readily believe that blacks will continue to be dangerous in
the future, and white jurors are more likely to ignore mitigating evidence in
such cases.178 The jurors treat evidence of the defendant’s bad character as
more representative of the “true character” of her “kind” than are instances
of good behavior.179 White jurors also engage in what has been called the
“ultimate [fundamental] attribution error.”180 The fundamental attribution
error is the human tendency to attribute behavior more to individual character than to good or bad circumstances.181 Whites make this error with a vengeance when evaluating blacks, seeing all bad behavior by blacks as
stemming from some fundamental flaw in their nature, from an irredeemably
unworthy core rather than from an unfortunate situation.182 Furthermore, as
at least one commentator argues, some whites are “regressive” racists able
to accept egalitarian norms, except when their anger is aroused by racial
that, and how, white observers pay heightened attention to black faces, perceive them as
sources of threat, and react with fear and distrust). See generally DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES
IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 16-30 (The New Press 2003) (2002)
(documenting and explaining the extent of racial profiling by the police, which can be seen as
one important consequence of the unconscious profiling common among people, whether they
are laypersons or law enforcement).
174
See Taslitz, Wrongly Accused, supra note 63, at 130-33.
175
See Taslitz, Redux, supra note 64, at 133-35.
176
See id. at 118-22.
177
See id. at 122-24 (describing this “ratchet effect”).
178
See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and Capital Punishment, in BEYOND REPAIR?
AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 121, 135-39 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).
179
See id. at 135-39.
180
See CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM 203-09 (2005); Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport’s Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice, in INTERGROUP RELATIONS: ESSENTIAL
READINGS 162, 162-73 (Michael Hogg & Dominic Abrams eds., 2001) (coining the term “ultimate attribution error”).
181
See generally LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991) (constituting the seminal work on the fundamental attribution error).
182
Cf. Pettigrew, supra note 180 (describing generally this effect between “ingroups” and
“outgroups”).
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
419
insult.183 Such insult occurs, for example, in a black assault upon a white
victim, which strengthens racial stereotypes. This phenomenon helps explain the greater likelihood of a death sentence in such black offender/white
victim situations.184
Juvenile probation officers are likewise more likely to view black families as uncooperative, their misbehavior indicative of future dangerousness,
and their problems due to deeply rooted character flaws.185 Juvenile court
judges seem to buy into these judgments, for young black males are again
more likely than their white counterparts to be institutionalized.186 There is
disturbing new evidence of adult criminal court judges suffering similar bias.
An archival study found that judges were more likely to mete out heavier
sentences to those with stereotypically African American features than those
without them.187
Indeed, evidence of racial bias in decision making arises at every stage
of the criminal process—from arrest, to the setting of bail, to the effectiveness of defense counsel, to guilty-plea outcomes, to sentencing.188 Often
183
See Johnson, supra note 178, at 138.
See id.
185
See MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND
SOCIETY 140-47 (2003) (summarizing studies showing: (1) that probation officers are more
likely to write reports describing young black males’ problems as due to deep-seated character
traits than to write similar reports about whites, leading to recommendations of harsher black
punishment; (2) that black re-offenders are later treated still more harshly because they were
already institutionalized, yet that most extreme form of treatment seemingly failed to achieve
rehabilitation; and (3) that these report-writing and sentencing observations remained true even
when controlling for the relative severity of black-white juvenile crime); Taslitz, Wrongly Accused, supra note 63, at 127-28 (summarizing empirical data).
186
See BROWN ET AL., supra note 185, at 140-47 (summarizing data and noting that one
reason young black males are more likely to be institutionalized than are young white ones is
that authorities assume that black juveniles cannot get adequate parental support). More generally, as Brown and his colleagues note, juvenile justice authorities are more likely to define
black families as uncooperative than they are white families, and to favor black detention
because they are more likely to attribute black youths’ behavior to dangerousness, and white
youths’ law-breaking to situational pressures. See id.
187
See William T. Pizzi, Irene V. Blair & Charles M. Judd, Discrimination in Sentencing
on the Basis of Afrocentric Features, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 327 (2005). Some researchers
have found no racial bias in sentencing considered in isolation. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY,
MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 79 (1995) (“From every
available data source . . . the evidence seems clear that the main reason that black incarceration
rates are substantially higher than those for whites is that black crime rates for imprisonable
crimes are substantially higher than those for whites.”). A better reading of the modern data is
that pure race-based bias is geographically dispersed and modest, but that effects are much
more substantial when the interaction of race with other factors like age, gender, and class is
examined. See JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION, REPORTS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 54 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/kennedy/
JusticeKennedyCommissionReportsFinal.pdf; SHAUN L. GABBIDON & HELEN TAYLOR
GREENE, RACE AND CRIME 182-90 (2005) (concisely summarizing the literature supporting a
similar conclusion); THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITY IN SENTENCING: A REVIEW
OF THE LITERATURE 1 (2003), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/rd_sentencing_review.pdf.
188
See generally GABBIDON & GREENE, supra note 187 (documenting these effects at
every stage of the system).
184
R
R
R
R
420
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
race and class interact to produce these results, but race plays a critical role,
and disparities in offending rates do not adequately explain these differences.189 Although little, if any, empirical work has been done specifically
on unconscious prosecutorial racial biases (a topic to which I will return to
later), it is hard to believe that such biases are not afoot. First, some of the
racially-skewed outcomes—such as guilty-plea-bargaining-outcome differentials—cannot occur without prosecutorial support.190 Second, other outcomes, such as biased sentences, are unlikely to occur absent the
prosecutor’s active support, or at least the prosecutor’s non-resistance.191
Third, overburdened prosecutors often rely on the police or other justice system actors, rather than second-guessing them, reducing their role to the ratification of others’ decisions.192 Fourth, prosecutors are human beings,
subject to the same cognitive biases as the rest of us.193
The reality or appearance of bias is, however, well-understood by minority communities. As the vast psychological literature on procedural justice effects shows, when a community perceives procedures as unfair, lawabidingness and willingness to cooperate with the police decrease.194 These
effects raise crime rates in minority communities, further strengthening the
unconscious link between race and crime.195 Moreover, “bystander effects”
occur when the innocent suffer from the resulting deterioration of neighborhood services and safety, contributing to weakened job opportunities and
furthering the impression of racial minorities as poor, uneducated, or dangerous because of their own character failures.196
The stigmatizing effect of race alone in many facets of American life,
and its contributing role in other facets, cannot fairly be denied. In the criminal justice arena, that stigmatization is magnified by a perceived race-dangerousness link.197 Experimental data suggests, for example, that whites are
189
See supra note 187 and accompanying text (supporting this point in the illustrative area
of sentencing).
190
See GABBIDON & GREENE, supra note 187, at 154-55, 213 (summarizing the pleabargaining disparities literature).
191
In my practice as a prosecutor, I never once saw or heard of a judge giving a higher
sentence than that requested by the prosecutor, though I am sure this happens in rare cases.
See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 103-13 (2007) (explaining the enormous power that prosecutors hold to affect sentencing outcomes in the federal system).
192
In the run-of-the-mill case, prosecutors have neither the time nor the resources to conduct their own investigation, even through their small staff of office detectives, given the
burden of increasingly crushing caseloads. See id. at 35 (noting that prosecutors with heavy
caseloads devote “the most attention to the most serious cases”); id. at 39-40 (arguing prosecutors are often “willfully blind” to police misjudgments, errors, and abuses).
193
See TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 158, at 128-29, 131-32, 147-52, 224, 264 n.8
(arguing that many prosecutor actions can be explained by just such common human biases).
194
See Taslitz, Redux, supra note 64, at 124-28.
195
See id.
196
See id. at 128-30.
197
See LEE, supra note 166, at 175-89 (describing unconscious police stereotyping of
young black males as dangerous and explaining its connection to police use of excessive
force).
R
R
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
421
more likely to notice race first, processing generalized racial features rather
than the unique physical features identifying a person as an individual and
not merely a group member.198 Other research shows the increased involvement of the amygdala—which plays a role in identifying threat—when
whites perceive black faces.199 Two researchers explained the underlying
cognitive process connecting these observations:
[T]he brain has a propensity to detect very early in the time
course of perception, the presence of threat. Threatening objects
(or faces) . . . are important information in the environment, and
the . . . studies demonstrate that out-group members are perceived
by the brain as threatening, and thus that threat alters the information extracted from the situation.200
Thus, much damage is done by the unconscious racial disesteem inflicted by
the criminal justice system on racial minorities. All justice system actors
have an obligation to work to right this wrong. That obligation should therefore fall as heavily—perhaps more heavily, given their duty to do justice—
on prosecutors as on anyone else.201 Before prosecutors can act, however,
they must first have some sense of how they contribute to the problem.
B. How Prosecutors Promote the Over-Supply of Racial Disesteem
Rather than trying to survey in a single article all of a prosecutor’s actions that may contribute to racial-stigmatization, I offer three examples
here: (1) the charging decision; (2) guilty plea bargaining (which I call the
“pricing decision”); and (3) publicity.
i. The Charging Decision
The charging decision is a complex one. Prosecutors must decide, in
the first instance, whether to charge someone with any crime at all. Prosecutors may drop some cases not worth pursuing given limited resources.202 Al-
198
See Taslitz, Redux, supra note 64, at 110-11.
See id. at 112.
200
See Otto H. Maclin & M. Kimberly Maclin, The Role of Racial Markers in Race Perception and Racial Categorization, in PEOPLE-WATCHING: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF VISUAL PERCEPTION (R. Adams, N. Ambady, K. Nakayama & S. Shimojo eds., forthcoming)
(manuscript at 13, on file with author).
201
See MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (2007) (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); DAVIS, supra note 191, at
8 (“[S]ince prosecutors are widely recognized as the most powerful officials in the criminal
justice system, arguably they should be held more accountable than other officials . . . .”).
202
See CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR: INVESTIGATING AMERICA’S LOCAL PROSECUTORS 14-15 (2003) [hereinafter HARMFUL ERROR] (noting numerous instances of
harm from charges being filed despite inadequate proof); DAVIS, supra note 191, at 23, 31
(noting prosecutors’ charging decisions are affected by caseload pressures); JOHN W. SUTHERS,
NO HIGHER CALLING, NO GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES: A PROSECUTOR MAKES HIS CASE 67199
R
R
R
422
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
ternatively, they might reach a “pretrial probation,” sometimes called a
“diversion,” program agreement with an offender.203 Such an agreement
postpones charging to permit an offender the opportunity to prove she can
stay out of trouble and to address recidivism risk factors by, for example,
getting drug treatment or a high school diploma.204 If she successfully completes pretrial probation, the case against her is dropped, almost as if it had
never been.205 The prosecutor’s power to set conditions for successfully
completing pretrial probation gives her enormous clout in shaping a suspect’s life, at least in the short term.
If a prosecutor decides to proceed with a case, she must determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to support a particular charge or charges.
Having incomplete information at this stage of the prosecution may lead
many prosecutors, in an abundance of caution, to charge as many offenses as
their conscience will bear, a phenomenon dubbed by its critics “overcharging.”206 Prosecutors may also use the charging function to lay the groundwork for “wired pleas.”207 These pleas arise when prosecutors “charge third
parties, such as family members, in order to pressure a defendant to cooperate.”208 In one well-known case, United States v. Pollard,209 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the validity of a plea entered into by the defendant primarily because the prosecutor had threatened to charge the defendant’s wife with a crime if he did not
comply. As the court stated, “almost anything lawfully within the power of
a prosecutor acting in good faith can be offered in exchange for a guilty
plea.”210
Prosecutors may also choose not to pursue a potential prosecution, to
drop or reduce pending charges, or to recommend lenient sentences for informants who cooperate with the police in pursuing other offenders.211 Such
cooperators may reveal information, or even testify about, past crimes.212
They also may agree to work undercover, wearing wires, doing drug deals,
or otherwise participating in new criminal activity in an effort to ensnare
68 (2008) (discussing and illustrating factors affecting charging decisions, including the willingness to forgo charging a case lacking adequate proof).
203
See DAVIS, supra note 191, at 24.
204
See id.
205
See id.
206
See id. at 31; ABBE SMITH, CASE OF A LIFETIME: A CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER’S
STORY 228 (2008) (“I have represented a handful of . . . clients I believed to be innocent. I
have represented many clients who were not guilty of the crime charged . . . .”) (emphasis
added); HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 202, at 15 (“Charges should not be filed to use as leverage in plea bargaining, or to enhance a prosecutor’s political standing . . . .”) (quoting New
York City prosecutor Mark Cohen).
207
See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, “SNITCHING”: USING CRIMINALS TO MANAGE CRIME
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 40, on file with author).
208
Id.
209
959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
210
Id. at 1021.
211
See DAVIS, supra note 191, at 52.
212
See id.
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
423
other lawbreakers.213 In federal cases, in particular, there are tremendous
incentives for suspects to cooperate. By doing so, they gain release from
otherwise applicable statutory mandatory minimum sentences through a
“5K1.1 letter” from the prosecutor recommending a downward departure
from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.214 Prosecutors may also have some
discretion concerning whether to charge crimes seeking mandatory minimums in the first place.215 Likewise, as in the Jena Six case, prosecutors
may often have some discretion as to proceeding against a youthful offender
in juvenile or adult court.216 Thus, the prosecutor’s charging decision may
affect the entire course of the case—whether it is resolved by plea or a trial,
by a harsh or lenient punishment, with increased risk of physical harm to the
offender—no one likes a “snitch” —or not. But the charging decision independently has implications for the nature and degree of disesteem visited
upon an offender.217
The United States Supreme Court recognized this last point in Rothgery
v. Gillespie County, Texas.218 Rothgery was arrested for being a felon in
possession of a firearm. He was promptly brought before a magistrate judge
who apprised Rothgery of the charges against him, found probable cause to
proceed based upon an affidavit submitted by an arresting officer, and set a
low bail that Rothgery paid. The police based their arrest decision, however,
on an erroneous record. Rothgery had indeed been arrested for a previous
felony, but the felony charges against him had been dismissed after he successfully completed a diversionary (pretrial probation) program. Because
Rothgery was not a convicted felon, he had committed no crime by possessing a firearm. The current charges against him should, therefore, have been
dismissed. They were not dropped, due to a complex series of events that
boiled down to a long delay in counsel being appointed to represent him—a
delay that resulted in his indictment, re-arrest, and jailing on heightened bail
that he could not pay. The issue before the Court was whether Rothgery’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at his initial appearance before a
magistrate judge, even though no indictment or information had yet been
filed, and no prosecutor was yet involved in the case. The Court held that it
did. In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized the stigmatic impact
213
See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences,
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 647 (2004) (addressing drug deals, other criminal activity, and undercover work); NATAPOFF, supra note 207 (manuscript at 57-61, on file with author) (focusing
on wiretaps, other electronic surveillance, and undercover work).
214
See HARRY I. SUBIN, BARRY BERKE & ERIC TIRSCHWELL, THE PRACTICE OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 145-48 (2006). Even though the Guidelines are
now technically “advisory,” in practice they still control in most cases. See id. at 146.
215
See DAVIS, supra note 191, at 56-57.
216
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 139-58 (2005) (analyzing the
various approaches to when a juvenile may be tried as an adult).
217
See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 191, at 56 (noting that, after mandatory minimum legislation, prosecutors now retain “the lion’s share of the responsibility for the[ ] inequities” of
“race, class, and other disparities” in charging).
218
128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008).
R
R
R
424
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
of charges being laid, regardless of whether “the machinery of prosecution
was turned on by the local police or the state attorney general.”219 The Court
explained:
In this case, for example, Rothgery alleges that after the initial
appearance, he was “unable to find any employment for wages”
because “all of the potential employers he contacted knew or
learned of the criminal charge pending against him.”. . . One may
assume that those potential employers would still have declined to
make job offers if advised that the county prosecutor had not filed
the complaint.220
Corporations in the post-Arthur Andersen world likewise recognize the
stigmatizing power of criminal charges.221 The mere filing of such charges
can send stock prices plummeting, destroying a business before it has any
chance to defend itself.222 To avoid such a calamity, corporations readily
accept even the most onerous of “deferred prosecution agreements”—a
form of corporate pretrial probation.223 Individual white-collar offenders and
other middle-class suspects also fear the humiliation in their local communities caused by the filing of criminal charges.224 Even if individuals in some
poor neighborhoods do not fear ostracism in the local communities in which
they participate, they too will face such ostracism in the broader world.225
Indeed, as research in the area of pretrial publicity reveals, formal charges
are not even needed.226 Ostracism flows from the mere fact of arrest—or
even of potential arrest.227 Although charges may later be dropped or the
offender acquitted, the stigma of association with the criminal process
lingers.228
Does this stigma often extend beyond individuals to their racial groups?
While little, if any, hard data exists, there is good reason to think that it
219
Id. at 2589.
Id. (citation omitted).
221
See Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions: Through the
Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 KY. L.J. 1, 2 (2007).
222
See id. at 2-4.
223
See id. at 2-24.
224
See Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of
Environmental and Criminal Law Theory, 71 TUL. L. REV. 487, 506 (1996) (“Corporate officials . . . belong to a social group that is exquisitely sensitive to status deprivation and censure.”) (internal quotation omitted); Eric Masaff, Tightening the Reins on Pollution of
Maryland Waters: Enforcing Maryland’s Criminal Environmental Statutes Against Out-ofState Polluters, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 457, 462 (2008) (arguing that the mere threat of criminal
prosecution of at least certain white collar offenders is a powerful deterrent because of the
resulting social and economic stigma).
225
See supra notes 93-102, 176-96 and accompanying text.
226
See Taslitz, Fair Trial–Free Press Paradigm, supra note 156, at 186-97.
227
See id.
228
See id. at 193-97 (discussing the stigma lingering over the Duke lacrosse players, who
were proven to have been falsely charged with rape).
220
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
425
does.229 Notably, the same prosecutorial cognitive biases and institutional
forces discussed earlier will still be at work. Those forces suggest a greater
likelihood of whites getting more access to diversionary programs, lighter
charges, fewer referrals of juveniles to adult courts, fewer mandatory minimums, and “sweeter” cooperation agreements than blacks get.230 These
likely disparities may be the natural consequences of biases elsewhere in the
system so that a vastly disproportionate percentage of all offenders will be
racial minorities in the first place.231 But the other effects mentioned, from
an enhanced sense of black threat, to police and prosecutors’ tunnel vision,
suggest that even otherwise identically situated whites and blacks face different probabilities of severe stigma from the charging process.232 This is
partly so because prosecutors have enormous discretion in charging decisions. Absent proof of consciously intentional racial or similar discrimination, the prosecutor can largely do as she pleases.233 Such a wide berth for
discretion allows for the free play of unconscious biases for which there is
currently little legal redress and which consciously well-meaning prosecutors will sincerely deny anyway.234
There is also ample anecdotal support for these conclusions, some of it
particularly well summarized by professor and former DC Public Defender
Service Chief Angela Davis. Davis writes about a grand jury’s decision not
to indict her colleagues’ white client, twenty-five-year-old Georgetown University student David McKnight, on a murder charge.235 The much taller,
heavier McKnight had hacked his fifty-five-year-old, five-foot tall,
Vietnamese immigrant roommate, John Nguyen, with a machete, almost slicing him in half.236 The white prosecutor promptly invited defense counsel to
229
See DAVIS, supra note 191, at 39-40, n.31 (arguing that prosecutors’ frequent deference
to the police in making charging decisions ratifies police racial profiling and that there is
significant evidence of disparate racial impact in prosecution charging decisions concerning
powder versus crack cocaine).
230
See id. at 35-39 (using hypotheticals to illustrate how well-meaning prosecutors can
unconsciously make more lenient charging decisions when dealing with white rather than
black offenders).
231
See GABBIDON & GREENE, supra note 187, at 52, 216 (noting racially disproportionate
representation of minorities in arrests for violent crimes as well as race/class and other race
interactive factors contributing to sentencing disparities); MICHAEL TONRY, supra note 187, at
49-68, 97-104 (collecting data showing racially disproportionate arrests and convictions for
drug offenses).
232
Cf. Taslitz, Redux, supra note 64 (explaining the cumulative impact of the interaction
of these effects on racial disparities in convicting the innocent).
233
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987) (declaring that a finding of an
abuse of prosecutorial discretion based upon racial discrimination requires “exceptionally
clear proof”); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 452 (1970) (describing prosecutorial discretion
concerning the scope or initiation of criminal proceedings as “virtually unreviewable”); see
also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458-61 (1996) (refusing to permit discovery in
a civil case alleging discriminatory charging and sentencing decisions absent proof that similarly situated whites had not been prosecuted).
234
See DAVIS, supra note 191, at 35-37, 204 nn.28-29.
235
See id. at 19-20.
236
See id.
R
R
R
R
R
426
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
identify witnesses to testify before the grand jury on their client’s behalf.237
Indeed, the prosecutor told McKnight’s counsel that a good case could be
made that McKnight had acted in self-defense.238 Moreover, as the prosecutor suggested, there should be witnesses willing to testify that Nguyen had a
violent reputation, while McKnight had a peaceful one.239 The two experienced defense attorneys promptly provided the names of such witnesses
willing to testify. The witnesses did just that, and the grand jury voted not to
indict.240
Davis contrasts the McKnight case with that of Daniel Ware, a thirtyfive-year-old African American high school graduate living in an impoverished neighborhood and periodically working as a manual laborer.241 Ware
got in an argument with a local gangster, Darryl Brown, well-known as a
gun-toting, violent character who had done time for armed robbery and
weapons offenses.242 The argument arose because Brown allegedly
threatened Ware’s younger brother. The argument ended with Brown threatening retaliation against Ware, so Ware began carrying a knife. One day
Brown reached inside his jacket and threatened Ware, who promptly stabbed
Brown once in the chest, killing him. Davis, as Ware’s defender, found eyewitnesses confirming her client’s version of the events, as well as witnesses
familiar with Brown’s violent reputation.243 But, unlike in David McKnight’s
case, Ware’s prosecutor never offered to present exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury, which indicted Ware for first-degree murder.244 Yet Ware had at
least as strong a self-defense claim as did McKnight.245 Davis recognized
that many factors may have contributed to the disparity between the two
cases and that neither prosecutor harbored racial ill will. Nevertheless, Davis suggested, the white prosecutor “may very well have unconsciously empathized with McKnight as a [white] young college student with a future,
while simultaneously feeling no such empathy for Nguyen, a poor
Vietnamese immigrant” whose future lay working in a restaurant kitchen.246
This unconscious influence, Davis argued, did its work unchallenged by
savvy family members capable of agitating for the white McKnight’s punishment. Davis’s reading of the case is consistent with the sort of failures of
racial empathy described in the cognitive science literature.247
Another tale makes the impact of the charging decision on racial stigma
even sharper. Marcus Dixon, a football player at Pepperel High School in
237
Id.
Id.
239
Id.
240
See
241
See
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
See
247
See
238
id. at 19-20.
id. at 20-22.
id. at 21-22.
WANG, supra note 160, at 51-60.
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
427
Rome, Georgia, was an honor student with a 3.96 GPA, a score of over 1200
on his SATs, and a full scholarship to attend Vanderbilt University.248 Marcus, eighteen-years-old at the time, was charged with rape, sexual battery,
aggravated assault, false imprisonment, statutory rape, and aggravated child
molestation for a single incident involving a fifteen-year-old white girl.249
He claimed, however, that the sex was consensual, and a jury quickly
agreed, acquitting him of most of the charges within twenty minutes.250
Nevertheless, the jurors convicted him of the two charges for which consent
was irrelevant: statutory rape (sexual intercourse with a minor) and aggravated child molestation (sex with a minor that causes injury).251 Georgia’s
penalty for the latter charge was a mandatory term of ten years imprisonment, a sentence that a prosecutor sought and the trial judge imposed.252 At
least one of the jurors was stunned, declaring that she never would have
convicted Dixon of the charge had she known of the consequences.253 One
of the legislators who had spearheaded the statute creating the penalty publicly declared that it was intended “to protect children from predators. Marcus Dixon was not a predator.”254 The African American community clearly
perceived the conviction and sentence as a group insult, and members of that
community held “rallies and otherwise advocated for Marcus’s release, alleging that the prosecution was racially motivated.”255 The Supreme Court
of Georgia ultimately reversed the conviction for aggravated child molestation, finding “a clear legislative intent to prosecute the conduct that the jury
determined to have occurred in this case as misdemeanor statutory rape.”256
The case prosecutor, John McClellan, admitted that he added the aggravated
child molestation charge as a “backstop” in case Dixon was acquitted of
rape.257 The prosecutor, who was most concerned with forcible, non-consensual rape, apparently did not ask himself whether the mandatory ten-year
sentence for a “backstop” charge was appropriate.258 Nor did he consider
whether the charge was truly consistent with legislative intent. He did not
weigh the heightened public perception of group-based stigma likely to result from a conviction, playing into hoary stereotypes about oversexed black
men who prey on white women.259 Nor did he pause to reflect upon whether
248
See DAVIS, supra note 191, at 32-33.
Id.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
See id. at 32 (citing Nightline (ABC News television broadcast Jan. 21, 2004)).
255
Id. at 33.
256
Dixon v. State, 596 S.E.2d 147, 148 (Ga. 2004).
257
See Nightline, supra note 254.
258
See DAVIS, supra note 191, at 32 (quoting a state legislator who made a similar point
about the legislature’s intent).
259
See id. at 32-33 (making no mention of the prosecutor considering these matters); TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 30, at 8-11 (summarizing racial rape myths).
249
R
R
R
R
428
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
his own unconscious biases may have entered into the (over)charging
decision.260
ii. Guilty Pleas: The Pricing Decision
a. Criminal Justice Markets
There is a branch of behavioral economics known as “fair pricing theory.”261 This discipline addresses the emotional reaction of buyers to prices
that they perceive to be unfair.262 Its relevance here is that the United States
Supreme Court and numerous commentators have come to think of the plea
bargaining process in contract terms: an exchange of benefits and burdens
in a market economy.263 The plea itself and any conditions imposed on it
(for example, the offender agreeing to testify at trial against a more serious
offender) can be thought of as the “price” the state charges the accused in
exchange for a recommendation of more lenient treatment.264
I do not plan to address fair pricing theory here in detail, though I have
done so in a forthcoming work.265 Instead, I want to summarize those of its
teachings that are relevant to the guilty plea process to use as a framework
for understanding how that process affects the disesteem economy.
The major relevant fair price theory teachings are as follows. First,
prices that violate social norms of equity, equality, and need will be perceived as distributively unfair.266 “Equity” means getting what you pay for,
“equality” means being treated the same as others similarly situated, and
“need” means making special allowance for the disadvantaged.267 Second,
pricing processes that deny the buyer voice and choice, transparency, and
impartiality will be perceived as procedurally unfair.268 “Voice and choice”
means having some real say in the pricing decision—a sense of control and
of not being subjected to unfair advantage-taking.269 A buyer having a real
choice among a range of viable alternatives and the freedom to exit one
260
See DAVIS, supra note 191, at 32-33.
See Jon Luther, Foreword to SARAH MAXWELL, THE PRICE IS WRONG: UNDERSTANDING WHAT MAKES A PRICE SEEM FAIR AND THE TRUE COST OF UNFAIR PRICING x-xi (2008)
(summarizing many of the teachings of fair price theory).
262
See id.
263
See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanato, 513 U.S. 196, 208 (1994) (treating plea-bargaining as a market transaction in which each side buys and sells concessions akin to those negotiated in a flea market or bazaar, and approving prosecutor insistence on defense waiver of
certain evidentiary protections as a prerequisite to attempting plea-negotiations); Richard
Birke, The Role of Trial in Promoting Cooperative Negotiation in Criminal Practice, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 39, 70-79 (2007) (arguing that a steady supply of trial verdicts helps to set
plea-bargaining market prices, including the “going rate” offered by the prosecutor).
264
See Birke, supra note 257, at 70-73.
265
See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Plea Bargaining and Fair Price Theory (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
266
See MAXWELL, supra note 261, at 26, 34-46.
267
See id. at 57, 59, 64.
268
See id. at 74 tbl.9.1.
269
See id. at 76.
261
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
429
potential deal for a better one gives the buyer some measure of voice.270
“Transparency” means that the negotiating process and outcome seem rational and understandable.271 “Impartiality” means that favoritism does not
affect the negotiating process.272 Third, violations of these fairness principles trigger reciprocity norms—norms of retaliation sparked by anger at unfair treatment.273 The degree of anger and severity of the retaliatory response
will depend on the permanence of the violations, the buyer’s perceived ability to control them and to pin the violations on a particular individual seller,
and the nature of the seller’s motives.274 But the primary cause of retributive
anger, as we have already seen, is the perception of being treated as less
worthy than you are, partly meaning being disesteemed.275 The seller’s unfair treatment of a buyer in bargaining both reflects the buyer’s lower status
and marks her with it. So understood, a contract involves not only an exchange of goods and services but also of esteem and disesteem.
If the guilty plea process seems to give offenders less of a benefit than
they pay for obtaining it, treats racial minority offenders worse than white
ones, and ignores disadvantages that account for the offender’s plight and
limited bargaining power, then offenders will see themselves as being denied
distributive fairness. If, correspondingly, offenders perceive limited options
and minimal voice in plea outcomes, view the process as neither rational nor
understandable, and believe that they have not been treated impartially, they
will view themselves as having been denied procedural justice. Furthermore, if they see the wrongs done to them as relatively permanent, their own
control over and responsibility for the wrongs as minimal, and the prosecutor’s motives as ill, offenders will react with retributive anger. Such anger
will impede rehabilitation and encourage recidivism.276 Equally as important, the offenders’ perceptions likely reflect, at least at the unconscious
270
See id. at 76. Cf. ALBERT HIRSCHMANN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) (articulating the first economic analysis of the voice/exit choice but viewing the two as alternatives
rather than variants of the same phenomenon).
271
See MAXWELL, supra note 261, at 77-78.
272
See id. at 80.
273
See id. at 42-44, 85-90, 96-97, 105; Dale T. Miller & Neil Vidmar, The Social Psychology of Punishment Reactions, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ADAPTING TO
TIMES OF SCARCITY AND CHANGE 145, 145-72 (Melvin J. Lerner & Sally C. Lerner eds.,
1981). See generally Jeffrey P. Carpenter, Peter Hans Matthews & Okombdi Ong’ong’a, Why
Punish? Social Reciprocity and the Enforcement of Prosocial Norms, 14 J. EVOL. ECON. 407
(2004).
274
See MAXWELL, supra note 261, at 56-71; Margaret Campbell, Why Do You Do That?
The Important Role of Inferred Motive in Perceptions of Price Fairness, 8 J. PRODUCT &
BRAND MANAGEMENT 145, 145-53 (1999).
275
See supra text accompanying notes 118-142. Cf. SHADD MURUNA, MAKING GOOD:
HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND REBUILD THEIR LIVES 9, 74, 83, 144 (2001) (arguing that
offenders who perceive themselves as lacking control over their lives, as victims of circumstance and unable to change their future, are least likely to be rehabilitated).
276
See supra text accompanying notes 189-91. See generally JEREMY TRAVIS, AMY L.
SOLOMON & MICHELLE WAUL, URBAN INST., FROM PRISON TO HOME 10-13 (2001), available
at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410098.
R
R
R
R
430
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
level, those of the prosecutor and of broader society, making treatment of the
offender during the bargaining process a mark of disesteem.277
These flaws in the plea-bargaining process may affect whites as well as
blacks, though white ills are likely to be of a lesser degree and are less likely
to be caused by, or to be perceived as caused by, their race. The ills suffered
by blacks will likely be of greater severity, and are more likely to be, and to
be perceived as being, the result of at least unconscious prosecutorial bias
during the bargaining process. If this state of affairs indeed occurs, then it is
racial disesteem, rather than simply individual disesteem, that the plea bargaining process will reflect and promote.278
Is this imagined state of affairs an accurate description of the real-world
plea-bargaining process? My short answer, which I will now explain, is
“yes.”
b. Fair Pricing of Guilty Pleas?
1. Why Guilty Pleas Are Often Unfairly Priced
The most obvious breach of fair pricing principles in the plea negotiation process arises from the often vast disparity in bargaining power between
the muscular state and the typically weak defendant.279 This point has been
made repeatedly in the literature, so I offer but a brief summary here. Notably, the defense has limited access to information, especially early in a case.
For example, there is no general constitutional right to discovery.280 It is true
that Brady v. Maryland281 and Giglio v. United States282 require prosecutors
to produce direct and impeaching exculpatory evidence at trial. A broad
reading of the more recent United States v. Ruiz283 case, however, suggests
that no such evidence need be produced before a guilty plea.284 Statutory
and related discovery rules in even the more generous jurisdictions are also
timid next to civil discovery rules. For example, depositions are rare, and
277
See supra text accompanying notes 93-156 (analyzing communicative aspects of insulting behaviors and their role in the disesteem economy). See generally DJ Silton, U.S.
Prisons and Racial Profiling: A Covertly Racist Nation Rides a Vicious Cycle, 20 LAW &
INEQ. 53 (2002) (discussing how unconscious racism in the criminal justice system leads to
higher rates of arrest and recidivism amongst minorities).
278
See supra text accompanying notes 157-68 (defining “racial disesteem”).
279
See DAVIS, supra note 191, at 44 (“[I]n reality, the prosecutor always has the upper
hand because of her control over the process.”); Timothy Lynch, The Case Against PleaBargaining, REGULATION, Fall 2003, at 24.
280
See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 626, 629 (2002).
281
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment).
282
405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972) (holding that due process required a new trial where a
United States attorney failed to disclose evidence affecting the credibility of a witness).
283
536 U.S. 626.
284
Id. at 629 (holding that prosecutor’s failure to disclose material exculpatory impeachment evidence to the defense prior to guilty plea did not thereby render the guilty plea involuntary, but leaving the right to disclosure of direct exculpatory evidence uncertain).
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
431
defense counsel cannot compel prosecution witnesses to give even informal
pretrial interviews.285 Nor, in many jurisdictions, can defense counsel simply get the name of prosecution witnesses.286 Even jurisdictions with “open
file” policies in practice provide the defense with little information relative
to the civil system.287 “Altogether, the discovery rules pose massive barriers
to determining the facts, assessing witness credibility, and developing prior
to trial a well-informed estimate of the probability of conviction.”288 The
result, concludes NYU law professor Stephen Schulhofer, is that “plea bargains are often struck on the basis of incomplete, highly imperfect information and little more than the attorney’s guess about what a trial might reveal
if one were held.”289
Heavy caseloads result in assembly-line justice in which relatively little
time is devoted to the run-of-the-mill case.290 Contrary to the position of the
United States Supreme Court, the presence of defense counsel in such cases
does not erase the disparity between the many poor, meagerly educated inner-city defendants and the far wealthier state.291 Defense counsel are overworked and underpaid.292 This under-resourcing creates incentives to settle
cases in brief negotiations and with equally brief consultation with clients.293
The result is a system in which most cases end in pleas, promoting a caseprocessing “teamwork” approach, rather than true adversarialness, at least
for the vast numbers of cases that never get to trial.294 Lawyers under time
pressure and with inadequate information engage in stereotyping, starting to
fit cases into categories, each of which has a “going rate.” Clients are not
considered unique.295 They can often be too young, drug-addicted, or men-
285
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88; Andrew E. Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions to Plea Negotiations: “Voluntary” Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 23 CRIM. J. 14, 18-26 (2008) [hereinafter Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions] (arguing that such a reading of Ruiz is the fairest
reading of it).
286
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Wake-up Call from the Plea-Bargaining Trenches, 19 L.
& SOCIAL INQUIRY 135, 137 (1994).
287
Id.
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 25, at 18.
291
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“Defendants advised by competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial persuasion and unlikely to be driven to false selfcondemnation.”); Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions, supra note 285, at 20-23 (summarizing
social science literature demonstrating why Bordenkircher is wrong on this point).
292
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY 87-89 (2006) [hereinafter ABA, ACHIEVING JUSTICE].
293
See Schulhofer, supra note 286, at 137.
294
See id. (noting that this working environment “generates intense pressure to bypass
whatever avenues for factual investigation remain open”).
295
See Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions, supra note 285, at 21-23 (defending this
point); see also Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 25, at 18 (explaining how the criminal justice
system in practice reduces defendants to categories rather than unique persons).
R
R
R
R
R
432
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
tally-impaired to understand the consequences of their choices, and rarely
get adequate time to consider them.296
It is true that prosecutors are also often fatigued and time-pressed.297
But they have the police’s investigation efforts and forensic units, and ready
access to a significant number of their own investigating detectives. In large
cities, prosecutors have huge reservoirs of additional resources that they can
draw on where needed.298 Furthermore, the law empowers prosecutors. In
the federal system, as mentioned earlier, only prosecutors effectively have
the power to free defendants from the spectre of mandatory minimum
sentences, and cooperation with the prosecutor is the surest route for getting
a sentence below the usual guidelines range.299 The risk of suffering grave
punishment upon going to trial gives most defendants little leverage to insist
upon a trial if they dislike a prosecutor’s offer.300
Many prosecutors are eager to press their advantage. The law often
permits prosecutors to refuse to attempt mere bargaining unless defendants
first waive their rights to discovery of certain evidence, to challenge the
admissibility of some evidence, to claim prosecutorial misconduct, to waive
rights to receive later-discovered evidence of innocence, to waive rights to
appeal, and even to object on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.301
Defendants face grave trial risks if they refuse waiver; such a choice leaves
trial as the only option.302 Yet if defendants do waive these rights and no
deal is reached, they have an even greater chance of conviction at trial. They
have assisted in their own destruction.
This power disparity contributes to a client’s distrust of both her counsel
and the state.303 Negotiations are more likely to feel like coerced self-immolation than an opportunity for an effective voice in the plea-bargaining “pric-
296
See generally Abbe Smith, I Ain’t Takin’ No Plea: The Challenges in Counseling
Young People Facing Serious Time, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 11 (2007).
297
Former United States Attorney, former Colorado Springs elected District Attorney, and
current Colorado Attorney General John W. Suthers explains: “For new prosecutors who operate in the high-volume traffic and misdemeanor courts, plea bargaining is an art form requiring patience, persuasion, creativity, and quick thinking. Disposing of up to a hundred cases
per day leaves little time for extended negotiation.” SUTHERS, supra note 202, at 84 (2008);
see also id. at 85-86 (noting that docket congestion creates similar pressures even in felony
cases).
298
See DAVIS, supra note 191, at 93-122 (summarizing and illustrating in particular the
expansive power of the federal prosecutor). For this point, I am also drawing on my own
experience as a state-level prosecutor in Philadelphia.
299
See id. at 103-13.
300
See Lynch, supra note 279, at 26 (“Plea bargaining rests on the constitutional fiction
that our government does not retaliate against individuals who wish to exercise their right to
trial by jury.”). Lynch quotes Chief Judge Young of D. Mass. as saying: “[T]oday we punish
people—punish them severely—simply for going to trial. It is sheer sophistry to pretend otherwise.” Id. at 27.
301
See Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions, supra note 285, at 14-19.
302
See id. at 14-16.
303
J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT’S PERSPECTIVE 105-15
(1972) (discussing defendants’ distrust of their public defenders).
R
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
433
ing” decision.304 Limited options, all harsh, mean no real choice, no chance
to exit as a means of conveying dissent.305 When prosecutors press their
power to the fullest, defendants (and even defense counsel) fear their weakness has led to advantage-taking.306 The sense of equity—of getting equal
value for what you paid—is missing.307 Poverty, danger, and poor neighborhood educational opportunities may lead some defendants to see themselves
as in need. Society is, perhaps, partly at fault for these defendants’ plight,
yet the state offers them no “discount” for their suffering.308
Nor will the plea-bargaining process seem “transparent” (rational and
understandable) to them.309 Sentencing guidelines, for example, are notoriously complex, especially at the federal level, as are many aspects of criminal procedure.310 In routine cases, defense lawyers negotiate outside their
client’s involvement or even presence.311 Consultation time about a plea
with counsel can be so hurried as to leave the client with little real understanding of how or why a sentence was reached.312 At best, the client understands only that she will receive the “bargained-for” sentence.313 The rote,
mantra-like guilty plea colloquy reinforces the mystery of the process rather
than diminishing it.314
304
See Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions, supra note 285, at 19-20 (discussing duress in
plea bargaining).
305
See id. at 21-22 (summarizing the cognitive biases that make voluntary choice by a
defendant offered a plea deal harsh); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 163-82 (2007) (making a
more elaborate defense of this point).
306
For a powerful description of such advantage-taking by prosecutors in a case where
there was much evidence of the defendant’s innocence, see SMITH, supra note 206.
307
Cf. Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 305, at 168-69 (explaining why “time-discontinuing”—the tendency to undervalue future consequences—means that at the time a plea bargain
is struck, the defendant may not fully appreciate how much she has lost and how little she has
gained).
308
See DAVIS, supra note 191, at 50-52 (recounting the example of Erma Faye Stewart, “a
poor African American woman with very limited education and even less understanding of the
criminal justice system,” whom a prosecutor bullied into an extremely harsh plea based upon
an informant later proven to have lied, after which the prosecutor “offered no assistance and
expressed no regrets”).
309
See Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions, supra note 285, at 21-23 (summarizing the
cognitive biases and systemic flaws that make it hard for typical criminal defendants to understand plea deals fully, even when represented by counsel).
310
See SUBIN ET AL., supra note 214, at 122-43 (summarizing sentencing guidelines’ complexity); id. at 316-481 (detailing the complexity of many other aspects of criminal procedure).
311
This has been my experience and that of the many prosecutors and defense counsel
whom I have known in over twenty-five years of practicing and teaching criminal law.
312
See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Bargaining Power in the Shadow of the Law: Commentary to
Professors Wright and Engen, Professor Birke, and Josh Bowers, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 15760 (2007) (noting that non-white collar criminal defendants are not as involved with their
lawyers as are many civil law clients and that caseloads for run-of-the-mill cases are so heavy
that defense counsel must negotiate as many pleas as she can as quickly as possible).
313
See generally Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 305 (detailing criminal defendants’ limited understanding of plea deals).
314
See SUBIN ET AL., supra note 214, at 185-92 (reproducing an illustrative guilty plea
colloquy in federal court).
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
434
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
Moreover, defendants see their lawyers negotiate with a particular person—a specific prosecutor. Whatever willingness offenders might have to
take responsibility for their actions is likely to be dampened by perceived
abuses by their very human adversary, who is backed up by (and linked to)
the power of the state, including the police, whom the client might already
hold in contempt.315 The price imposed on the client is not temporary, either.
It may last five, ten, twenty years, even a lifetime.316 The client will likely
attribute ill motives to the state and be angry.
2. The Raced Impact of Unfairly-Priced Guilty Pleas
Perceived disparate racial treatment from profiling, racially biased
sentences and verdicts, and other sources detailed above likewise violates
equality norms.317 Merely being in courtrooms and prisons where a black
offender sees a sea of nearly all black faces must raise suspicions that something is amiss. Offenders’ or suspects’ retributive anger will be one factor
raising the risk of recidivism.318 But their local communities are fully aware
of the biases and abuses suffered by individuals.319 The communities desperately want safety, but not at the price of biased, otherwise flawed procedures; the frequent hassling of the innocent; the undue harshness of
penalties; and the ill community impacts of neighborhoods denuded of many
young men, and filled with others whose criminal records leave them with
little hope for useful employment.320 Neighborhoods deteriorate further
when these factors are present, as does respect for and cooperation with the
law, and crime rises as procedural justice theories suggest.321
All this in turn reinforces a popular linkage between skin color and
crime. Disesteem reigns, not just for the individual offenders but for others
of her race and class.322 Political scientist Murray Edelman explains: “[i]t
is common and easy to define various kinds of disadvantaged groups as inferior, dangerous, unworthy, or even nonhuman.”323 Such labels, argues
Edelman, seem necessary to justify continuing their unequal treatment and
315
For a summary of evidence of racial minority communities’ general distrust of the
police, see Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 39.
316
See The Sentencing Project, Comments and Recommendations Submitted to the Justice
Kennedy Commission of the American Bar Association (Nov. 5, 2003), http://www.sentencing
project.org/Admin/Documents/publications/sl_comments_kennedycommission.pdf (summarizing the ways in which federal sentencing practices are unduly harsh).
317
See generally GABBIDON & GREENE, supra note 187 (cataloguing the various racial
biases at each step in the criminal justice process).
318
Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions, supra note 285, at 24-25.
319
See Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 39, at 25-26.
320
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From “Elian to the
Internment,” 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2259-62 (2002).
321
See Taslitz, Redux, supra note 64, at 126-33 (discussing procedural justice research and
its relevance to racial bias in the criminal justice system and the resulting ill bystander effects).
322
See id. at 126-30 (discussing race-crime link); supra text accompanying notes 127-45
(discussing forces contributing to racial disesteem).
323
MURRAY EDELMAN, THE POLITICS OF MISINFORMATION 60 (2001).
R
R
R
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
435
intensifying their disadvantage.324 Crime plays a special role in this labeling
process, says Edelman, a “cover” for the often subconscious playing out of
racial and class prejudice in the actions of police, prosecutors, judges, and
juries.325 “Consciously and probably more often subconsciously, criminals
are merged with others who are feared or resented: color minorities, religious minorities, ideological minorities, ethnic minorities, and especially the
poor.”326 For some people, criminal justice institutions represent fairness
and safety, but for the oppressed minorities, these institutions are symbols of
unequal status and power.327 The result of this labeling process and division
of worldviews is to divide society into those presumed respectable and those
presumed the contrary.328 Indeed, minority groups may compete among
themselves over who gets to be in the highest rungs of the lowest part of the
ladder of social esteem, while majorities may avoid minorities, to the extent
they can.329 Even middle-class whites working with blacks of the same class
usually live in different neighborhoods and rarely socialize or form close
friendships outside the workplace.330 This polarization of the population
makes common cause with, and on behalf of, racial minorities hard. That
absence of joint political action further promotes differing worldviews and
group polarization—“us/them” thinking.331
Most racial minority group members do not, however, engage in
crime.332 Many such individuals struggle to work and get by, but often see
obstacles to their own success while watching the wicked prosper. Edelman
concludes:
Opinions about social status and about claims that particular
groups are especially worthy of esteem or of suspicion or contempt tend to persist and be exaggerated even if there is clear evidence that the claims should be discounted. Working-class people
or the poor typically have abilities and virtues that win them little
advantage or esteem, for example. They may be far more generous to other disadvantaged people than elites are, may be taxed
more onerously, or may do work that is of greater benefit. Elites
324
See id.
See id. at 60, 117.
Id. at 117.
327
See id. at 121.
328
See id. at 117; CHARLES TILLY, CREDIT AND BLAME 53-60 (2008).
329
See ABEL, supra note 79, at 7-23; EDELMAN, supra note 323, at 117-22; TILLY, supra
note 328, at 102-06.
330
See EDELMAN, supra note 323, at 118-19; Jeannine Bell, Hate Thy Neighbor: Violent
Racial Exclusion and the Persistence of Segregation, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 47, 68-70 (2007).
331
See EDELMAN, supra note 323, at 117; SUNSTEIN, supra note 50, at 69-76 (explaining
group polarization); TILLY, supra note 328, at 53-60. See generally DAVID BERREBY, US AND
THEM: UNDERSTANDING YOUR TRIBAL MIND (2005).
332
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2008, at 202
tbl.318, 212 tbl.339 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/08abstract/
law.pdf. See also William J. Stuntz, Race, Class and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1802
(1998).
325
326
R
R
R
R
R
436
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
may [sometimes] be corrupt, self-seeking, or inept at what they
claim to do, but they nevertheless experience little or no blame as
a result.333
The reaction of elites and subordinate groups alike to the criminal justice system’s role in perpetuating racially skewed distributions of esteem and
disesteem can be complex. A study of order-maintenance policing in New
York City—a police approach requiring enforcement, including arrest, of
even the most minor offenses—makes the point.334 The data show that
within every jurisdiction type—urban, suburban, rural, poor—white defendants do better than minority defendants.335 As law professor Josh Bower
explains: “[M]inorities were convicted and sent to jail more frequently,
they received longer jail sentences than whites, and they were offered fewer
ACDs [pretrial probations].”336 But across jurisdictions a different pattern
emerged. For “quality of life offenses”—annoying, minor crimes—parents
are likely to be particularly incensed at their children suffering serious punishments.337 In poor, urban, minority areas, residents usually do “not . . .
wield terrific electoral clout.”338 Nevertheless, they have the power of resistance—of non-cooperation with the police, anger, looking away from offenses they do observe—powers that procedural justice research suggests
they will use.339 On the other hand, they are less likely to resist so openly
and vigorously when serious, violent offenders are punished because,
whatever costs this may impose on the community, it leads to some apparent
gains as well in neighborhood safety.340
Police cannot ignore growing community pushback. They need some
base level of community trust, however small, to act effectively.341 The data
show how the system accommodated this tension: police still arrested minor
offenders with previously relatively clean criminal records at high rates, but
prosecutors decreased sentences dramatically upon conviction in poor urban
areas.342 Such sentencing decreases did not occur in majority white neighborhoods.343 The odd result was that most whites living in white areas suffered harsher sentences than blacks living in black areas, albeit for minor
crimes only, regardless of other circumstances.344 Bowers calls this “grass-
333
EDELMAN, supra note 323, at 55.
For a scathing critique of order-maintenance policing, see generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001).
335
Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 118 (2008).
336
Id.
337
See id. at 110-12.
338
Id.
339
See id.; Taslitz, Redux, supra note 64, at 108-09 (discussing effects of denial of procedural justice).
340
See Bowers, supra note 335, at 111-12.
341
See id.; Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 39, at 25-26.
342
Bowers, supra note 335, at 111-19.
343
See id. at 116-17.
344
See id. at 118.
334
R
R
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
437
roots plea bargaining”—community resistance alters going rates in individual cases.345
Absent such pushback, of course, punishment of racial minorities is
likely to stay significantly harsher for minorities than whites. In Bowers’
words: “[I]t seems that when prosecutors offer lenient prices of their own
volition, they typically exercise that kind of discretion to the benefit of white
defendants.”346 Moreover, disparate treatment of racial minorities in minority neighborhoods relative to whites seems to continue apace.347 Given these
minority-biased disparities, the lack of publicity for minority neighborhoods
getting a break for minor cases, the minor nature of those cases, and the
continued impact of the various cognitive biases and institutional forces discussed throughout this Article, it is unlikely that this modest “grassroots
plea bargaining” will do much to moderate the ill effects of most
prosecutorial bargaining practices on racial disesteem.348 However, the
grassroots model may contribute to early thinking about esteem-informed
systemic reform that I hope to spark in a brief discussion of the subject in
this Article’s conclusion.
iii. Publicity Strategies
Prosecutors’ use of publicity as a way to promote disesteem is important, yet it can be addressed briefly because the central points are not in
dispute. Most criminal cases escape media coverage.349 Pre-trial publicity
is, therefore, usually local, limited to the friends, family, and neighborhood
of the accused and the victims, passed along largely by word-of-mouth. In
the subset of cases that do receive media coverage, however, the coverage is
usually heavily biased against the defendant.350 This occurs for a variety of
reasons, not the least important of which is that police and prosecutors have
far more access to information early in a case than does the defense, so that
law enforcement’s version of events is what makes the evening news.351
Moreover, the press is dependent upon law enforcement for rapid access to
information needed to make deadlines, especially early in the case.352 Accordingly, the press pays a high cost in reduced access if it slants coverage in
ways disliked by law enforcement, including prosecutors. Although a variety of complex factors affect the extent to which the public attends to and is
345
See id. at 87.
Id. at 119.
347
See id. at 118-20.
348
See generally David Rudovsky, Litigating Civil Rights Cases to Reform Racially Biased Criminal Justice Practices, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97 (2007).
349
JON BRUSCHKE & WILLIAM E. LOGES, FREE PRESS VS. FAIR TRIALS: EXAMINING PUBLICITY’S ROLE IN TRIAL OUTCOMES 81, 105 (2004).
350
See Taslitz, Fair Trial–Free Press Paradigm, supra note 156, at 182-86 (summarizing
empirical data on this point).
351
See id. at 183-84.
352
See id. at 184.
346
R
438
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
affected by media crime coverage, strong evidence suggests that there are
often significant effects detrimental to the accused.353 In high-profile cases
with long time spans, the defense may over time be able to offer a counterstory, but early media coverage may have done much damage to an accused’s reputation along the way—damage that may not be entirely undone
even by an acquittal.354 Where researchers disagree is over the impact of
press coverage on trial outcomes. Pessimists believe that mechanisms that
include aggressive voir dire, sequestration, cautionary jury instructions, and
perhaps even venue change will do little to improve trial fairness, while
optimists believe the opposite.355 But even a fair trial followed by an acquittal does not necessarily erase the damage done to the accused’s esteem.356
A conviction, of course, magnifies disesteem, but where the trial was a
fair one, that is how it should be.357 In any case, disesteem imposed upon the
individual for her wrongful actions never justifies imposing resulting disesteem upon her racial group.358 Yet ample empirical evidence suggests that,
at least in racially charged cases, that may be just what happens.359 Moreover, even subconsciously racially tinged cumulative media coverage—such
as showing more blacks in “perp” walks; broadcasting black faces in connection with violent crimes, white faces for non-violent ones; covering the
causes of “ghetto” and racial gang violence—can help to associate racial
group membership with the worst of crimes.360
Ethics rules do govern the proper scope of prosecutors’ statements to
the media in individual cases.361 The rules may too often be honored in the
353
See id. at 186-87. Cf. BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 19, at 311 (discussing “unbalanced” publicity in criminal cases distorting disesteem market regulation efforts).
354
See Taslitz, Fair Trial–Free Press Paradigm, supra note 156, at 186.
355
See id. at 186-90.
356
See id. at 182-83, 191-97 (illustrating this point in the context of the Duke lacrosse
players’ rape case).
357
See supra text accompanying notes 109-24 (addressing the sometimes positive role of
disesteem-imposition by the criminal justice system and the disesteem-magnifying effect of a
guilty verdict).
358
See supra Part II (defending this point).
359
See ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND:
MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA 78-93 (2000). Entman and Rojecki conclude:
The racial stereotyping of Blacks encouraged by the images and implicit comparisons to Whites on local news reduces the latter’s empathy and heightens animosity,
as demonstrated empirically by several experimental studies. To the extent local
television news thereby undermines the fragile foundations of racial comity, it could
reduce apparent and real responsiveness of White-dominated society to the needs of
poor minorities, especially Blacks. The result, in turn, is continued employment discrimination and government unresponsiveness to the urban job loss and economic
dislocation that has so traumatized the inner city—and consequent breeding of
crime.
Id. at 91 (citation omitted).
360
Id. at 81-86. See generally Tarso Luı́s Ramos, L.A. Story: Who Gains from Framing
Gang Attacks as “Ethnic Cleansing”?, COLORLINES, July-Aug. 2007, at 33, 33-36; David
Shaw, Negative News and Little Else, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at A1.
361
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6, 3.8 (2007).
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
439
breach, and do not address cumulative racial group biases, conscious or otherwise, fostered by prosecutors’ comments.362 Few prosecutors would consciously seek to fan racial bias, though there are a small number of glaring
exceptions.363 But neither the ethics rules nor hurried legal practice require,
or even encourage, prosecutors to give thought to the broader racial impact
of their words to the press—though many careful prosecutors likely try to do
so.364 Furthermore, prosecutors simply cannot control the media statements
of many other criminal justice system actors, from victims, to interest-group
commentators, to potential jurors. First Amendment rights also limit what
can be done to restrict either these voices or the prosecutors’.365 Nevertheless, the risks of racial harm seem sufficiently high so as to counsel extreme
prosecutorial caution in dealing with the press, not only in individual cases
but also in the overall tenor of the comments flowing from various assistants
in a prosecutor’s office. Even if other societal forces may explain much of
the media’s racial bias in criminal cases, prosecutors should not contribute to
the worsening of the problem.
iv. Summing Up
Because one function of the criminal justice system is to impose disesteem on individuals, there will always be a demand for disesteem-generation
by the state. Moreover, because the criminal justice system purports to generate a particular type of disesteem—one marking serious moral harms done
to the public—it is the broader public that will generate this demand. Furthermore, because of endemic institutional and unconscious society-wide
forces, much of this demand—usually “virtual,” subconscious demand—
will be to visit disesteem not merely upon the individual but upon her racial
group, should that group be one in the minority and have a recent or longstanding history of being racially stigmatized. Finally, because most prosecutors are elected—and even the appointed ones rise at least partly through
local politics—the demand for criminal justice system-generated racial dis-
362
See id. (containing no references to race-bias); Taslitz, Fair Trial–Free Press Paradigm, supra note 156, at 191-97 (offering Duke rape case as an infamous example of the rules
being honored in the breach). But see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. (2007)
(declaring that certain expressions of racial bias by lawyers, if prejudicial to the administration
of justice, may violate a rule that itself never mentions race). This is a relatively toothless
aspirational comment that, while admirable in spirit, is likely to address only the most extreme,
overt, and conscious racist appeals by prosecutors, rather than the far more subtle issues of
racial esteem discussed here.
363
See Taslitz, Fair Trial–Free Press Paradigm, supra note 156, at 175-76, 193.
364
Cf. SUTHERS, supra note 202, at 102-08 (describing one conscientious prosecutor’s
struggles to deal with the media in a way that is fair to them, the broader public, and the
defense).
365
See Taslitz, Fair Trial–Free Press Paradigm, supra note 156, at 197-209.
R
R
R
R
440
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
esteem will also be at least partly local, varying in nature and degree from
one geographic area to another.366
This demand for racial disesteem will be for disesteem services. Prosecutors are important providers of those services. As we have seen, their
decisions on whether and what to charge, how to negotiate plea deals and for
what end, what to say to the press, and what sentences to seek can have
profound consequences in contributing to racial disesteem. The extreme example of the Jena Six may reflect a broader culture of racial disesteem in
Jena as a community. The mere existence of the “white tree,” the use of
images of lynching in response to black student dissent, and the inter-racial
violence spawned in the wake of these events all support this (informed)
speculation. If this is correct, then prosecutor Reed Walters could not have
been elected if his actions were not expected to promote some locally desired level of criminal justice system disesteem-generation. I am not suggesting conscious or overt racial bias by either Walters or the white Jena
community. But, as the review of the economy of racial disesteem above
explains, a strong system of disesteem market exchange can occur via entirely unconscious processes.
Prosecutors are, however, more than mere generators of racial disesteem in geographically and topically local economies of disesteem. They
also serve as indirect regulators of broader economies of racial disesteem.
Partly because of the special expressive power of the criminal justice system, racial group members start the daily struggle for esteem at a disadvantage. They may be marked with some measure of disesteem simply because
of their racial group membership and find it harder to gain esteem by their
actions for the same reason. By altering the initial distribution of esteem and
disesteem themselves and of esteem and disesteem services, and by making
market exchanges of all these things “stickier” for racial group members—
that is, by slowing exchange and making it more costly—racial group members find competing for individual esteem particularly hard.367 Even if one
accepts the ethic of equal opportunity, this hardly seems a model consistent
with that ethic. In light of these observations, what, if anything, should a
well-meaning prosecutor do? Space constraints limit the answer I can give
here, but I offer some brief observations concerning both parts of this question: (1) Are prosecutors obligated to do anything at all?; (2) If yes, what, at
a minimum, should that be?
366
See SUTHERS, supra note 202, at 109 (noting service both as a locally elected prosecutor and a federally appointed one); id. at 116 (“When you accept the president’s nomination to
be U.S. attorney, you know your tenure is tied to his and that your wonderful job will come to
a relatively quick conclusion.”). See generally Sheila Vera Flynn, A Complex Portrayal of
Social Norms and the Expressive Function of Law, 36 UWLA L. REV. 145 (2005).
367
Cf. CHIP HEATH & DAN HEATH, MADE TO STICK (2007) (summarizing the psychological and social forces explaining why some ideas “stick” in our culture, surviving challenges
from competitors and thereafter resisting change).
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
441
IV. PROSECUTORS’ OBLIGATIONS
A. Modified Do-Justice Adversarialism
i. Adversarialism Defined
The current ethical model for prosecutors is what I call Do-Justice Adversarialism. Adversarialism is a familiar model. Lawyers for each side
serve as advocates for their respective client’s positions. Each lawyer’s goal
is to maximize the gain for her side.368 “Gain” is often, though not always,
measured in significant part by things that can be quantified: money; years
in prison; length of time subject to an injunction.369 Within broad ethical
limits prohibiting, for example, outright lies, conflicts of interest, criminal
activities, or overt appeals purely to high-wrought emotions or to racial or
similar biases, each side in the adversarial war should do all that she can to
win.370 Moreover, combat focuses primarily on the individual case and the
individual client, rather than on the overall gain for some “cause” or another
on each side, or on net social gain, though there are variants on this model
(such as class actions and “cause lawyering”) not relevant here that may
vary somewhat this portion of the central model.371 The combat of adversaries over individual disputes is, however, thought to maximize societal welfare in the aggregate and in the long run.372 Adversarialism is thus consistent
with free market principles of an “invisible hand” moving self-interested
parties toward serving an overall social good that they never intended.373
368
See TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 30, at 103-04 (describing the nature of
the adversary system); Andrew E. Taslitz, Temporal Adversarialism, Criminal Justice, and the
Rehnquist Court: The Sluggish Life of Political Factfinding, 94 GEO. L.J. 1589, 1594-1601
(2006) [hereinafter Taslitz, Temporal Adversarialism] (describing the ideologies, benefits, and
costs underlying legal adversarialism and the broader political adversarialism that supports it).
369
Cf. TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 30, at 103 (describing the adversary system as a zero-sum game).
370
Cf. id. at 103-04; see, e.g., N.Y. LAWYER’S CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7
(2007), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ForAttorneys/ProfessionalStandardsforAttorneys/LawyersCodeDec2807.pdf (“A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law.”).
371
Cf. TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 30, at 103 (“[W]inning is all, and devotion to the client is alone what matters.”). See generally RACHEL MULHERON, THE CLASS
ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 23-46 (2004)
(describing the identifying features of class actions); AUSTIN SARAT & STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2006) (discussing special nature of various types of cause lawyering).
372
See Taslitz, Temporal Adversarialism, supra note 368, at 1594-1601 (describing adversarialism’s purported social benefits).
373
See TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 30, at 103-05 (describing the “market
metaphor” of the adversary system); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS
184-85 (Liberty Classics 1982) (1759) (coining the term “invisible hand” to capture how
markets move society toward a greater overall good likely never intended by the individual
market participants).
R
R
R
R
R
442
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
Simply stated, if each side in each case fights hard, within broad rules of
“fair play,” the market for justice will ferret out truth, however it is defined.
ii. Doing Justice
Prosecutors, especially at trial, are indeed expected to embrace the adversarial model.374 But they have another, competing obligation—to “do
justice”—that may require tempering adversarial zeal.375 The meaning of
the obligation to “do justice” is ambiguous and disputed.376 In theory, the
obligation has radical implications, for it suggests that prosecutors owe allegiance not merely to a client’s narrow interests but to a broader systemic
ideal.377 Such an allegiance implicitly recognizes that the free market for
justice will fail to achieve its goals in the criminal context if it involves the
same degree of relatively unregulated, blind competition for victory as in the
civil context. That failure, the do-justice obligation further suggests, is not
due to criminal defense counsel’s role but rather to the state’s relatively
greater access to resources and the power of the prosecutor as representative
of the state and its people.378 It is thus the prosecutor’s unmitigated combativeness that seems most dangerous and most in need of a modification of the
usual rules of adversarial battle.
The duty to do justice could be given a broad reading that requires
prosecutors to protect aggressively the innocent by maintaining grave skepticism of police investigations, by readily seeking lower, more creative
sentences matching punishment to culpability, by showing compassion for
certain offenders as well as their victims, and by emphasizing protection of
constitutional rights over conviction. Though some prosecutors do interpret
their duty in this way, most give the obligation a far less expansive role.
More specific ethical and constitutional rules codifying the duty to do
justice apply in only the narrowest professional situations.379 This establishes support for the principle that doing justice means little more than ensuring access to fair procedures.380 Yet even this minimalist conception is
374
See DAVIS, supra note 191, at 12 (“The criminal justice system is adversarial by design[;] [i]deally, a capable and zealous defense attorney represents the accused, and a similarly capable prosecutor represents the state.”).
375
See id. at 13.
376
See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607, 613-18 (1999).
377
Cf. DANIEL MARKOVITZ, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A
DEMOCRATIC AGE 41, 86-88 (2008) (discussing the unique professional responsibilities of the
prosecutor).
378
See id. See generally DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY
(1988) (arguing that criminal defense counsel need to be especially zealous advocates precisely to counterbalance the immense power of the state).
379
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8.
380
See Green, supra note 376, at 634-35. Green describes the scope of the prosecutor’s
duty to do justice:
Doing justice comprises various objectives which are, for the most part, implicit in
our constitutional and statutory schemes. They derive from our understanding of
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
443
often narrowly understood. Notably, the obligation focuses on conscious
and overt actions that may undermine fair procedures.381 For example, consciously seeking to exclude blacks from juries because “those people” do
not believe the police, consciously pitching closing arguments solely to juror
anger, or knowingly seeking to introduce blatantly inadmissible evidence for
the sole purpose of prejudicing the jury would all violate the duty to do
justice, though, as so understood, that obligation may be hard to distinguish
from the broad limits also imposed on defense counsel.382 Perhaps a clearer
example of a “do justice” rationale is the ethical and constitutional rule requiring prosecutors to produce material exculpatory evidence to the defense.383 The defense does not have a reciprocal obligation to share such
evidence with the prosecutor pre-trial, though the defense may choose to do
so.384 The do-justice model also seems to extend to some acts of
prosecutorial negligence.385 Nevertheless, as a general rule, the minimalist
conception of Do-Justice Adversarialism focuses on what the prosecutor
consciously knows or intends or what she should know given what informa-
what it means for the sovereign to govern fairly. Most obviously, these include
enforcing the criminal law by convicting and punishing some (but not all) of those
who commit crimes; avoiding punishment of those who are innocent of criminal
wrongdoing (a goal which, as reflected in the “presumption of innocence,” is paramount in importance); and affording the accused, and others, a lawful, fair process.
Additionally, most would agree, the sovereign has at least two other aims. One is to
treat individuals with proportionality; that is, to ensure that individuals are not punished more harshly than deserved. The other is to treat lawbreakers with rough
equality; that is, similarly situated individuals should generally be treated in roughly
the same way.
Id. at 634. Green characterizes this description as “a reminder of the traditional understanding.” Id. at 642.
381
See id. at 634 (cataloguing “do justice” obligations that involve primarily conscious
prosecutorial choices, though also including prosecutorial negligence-avoidance).
382
See HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 202 (listing examples of prosecutorial misconduct);
R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 95-101 (2005) (surveying ethical limits on
prosecutors’ trial and pre-trial behavior).
383
See HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 202, at 31-32 (discussing this form of prosecutorial
misconduct); CASSIDY, supra note 382, at 66-78 (analyzing the legal bases for this obligation).
384
See CASSIDY, supra note 382, at 66-67 (rooting prosecutor’s obligation to produce exculpatory evidence in the prosecutor’s unique duties not shared by defense counsel).
385
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (noting that the prosecutor’s obligation
to produce material exculpatory evidence to the defense governs “irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution”); see also supra text accompanying notes 15-16, 378-83.
Professor Cassidy elaborates:
R
R
R
R
R
There is no mens rea requirement under the Model Rule [3.8(d)]: so long as the
evidence was known to the prosecutor, it does not matter whether he understood or
appreciated the exculpatory significance of the material. Whether the prosecutor
fails to turn over exculpatory evidence due to negligence (e.g., the press of an overwhelming workload), for benevolent purposes (e.g., to protect the privacy of a victim) or for a more malevolent reason (e.g., to gain a tactical advantage) is simply
irrelevant under either ABA Model Rule 3.8 or Brady.
CASSIDY, supra note 382, at 71.
R
444
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
tion is already available to her conscious deliberation.386 Some prosecutors’
offices may by office policy, and some individual prosecutors may by preference, substantially expand upon this minimalist vision, but there is no current consensus requiring such expansion.387
iii. The Free-Market Paradigm
The United States Supreme Court has suggested that, whatever the duty
to do justice means, it does not routinely trump the competitive market
model generally governing adversarial combat. In United States v. Mezzannatto,388 the Court upheld a prosecutor’s refusal to engage in plea negotiations with a defendant absent his waiver of his right, under Federal Rule of
Evidence 410, to have any statements that he made during plea negotiations
excluded should the negotiations fail and the case go to trial. The negotiations did indeed fail, and Mezzannatto was convicted when his statements
during those negotiations were used against him.389 The Court rejected arguments that its decision would allow prosecutors to exploit weak, vulnerable
defendants; would violate notions of fair play by forcing the accused to
make impossible choices about whether to aid in her own conviction or to
forego the prospect of a guilty plea deal; and would undermine candor, truth,
and systemic accuracy.390 Instead, the Court approved the transaction as a
fair market exchange: “[I]f the prosecutor is interested in ‘buying’ the reliability assurance that accompanies a waiver agreement, then precluding
waiver can only stifle the market for plea bargains. A defendant can maximize what he has to ‘sell’ only if he is permitted to offer what the prosecutor
is most interested in buying.”391
iv. The Case Processor Strategy
Do-Justice Adversarialism has its roots in what anthropologist Catherine M. Coles and others have called the “case processor strategy.”392 Work
by historians and social scientists support the current dominance of the strategy,393 which evolved from the Wickersham Report on Prosecution,394 part of
386
See generally CASSIDY, supra note 382 (surveying prosecutors’ major ethical obligations without once addressing duties arising from the risks of unconscious or institutional
biases).
387
See HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 202, at 15 (noting that Brooklyn, N.Y. District Attorney Charles Hynes instituted an office policy requiring his personal approval of any decision
to charge a suspect based on a single witness identification).
388
513 U.S. 196 (1995).
389
Id. at 198-200.
390
Id. at 203-04.
391
Id. at 208.
392
See Catherine M. Coles, Evolving Strategies in 20th-Century American Prosecution, in
THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 177, 182 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine
Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008).
393
See id.; John L. Worrall, Prosecution in America: A Historical and Comparative Account, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, supra note 392, at 3, 10-12.
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
445
a Progressive Era attempt to professionalize criminal justice while removing
it from corrupt political influence.395 That 1931 report identified the prosecutor’s four functions as investigating crime, deciding who shall be prosecuted and tried, preparing cases for trial, and trying those cases and arguing
their appeals.396 All four functions focus primarily on the efficient and effective processing of each individual case from accusation to conclusion.
Moreover, as other reports from the era argued, the ideal for most cases was
to obtain convictions and punishments; case attrition—even plea bargaining
for reduced sentences—was seen as a sign of systemic failure.397
In 1969, based upon surveys conducted during the 1950s and 1960s by
the American Bar Foundation, criminologist Frank Miller published a report,
Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with Crime, that found
greater complexity in the actual activities of prosecutors.398 Prosecutors exercised enormous discretion, often sought alternatives to formal criminal
sanctions, weighed harm to the victim against that done to the suspect and to
the costs prosecution imposed upon the system, and sometimes even used
the justice system to address other, albeit related, social problems.399 But the
ABF study did not prove to be influential. Instead, the more important reform effort of the time was the Report of the 1967 President’s Commission
on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.400 That report discussed, but played down, the ABF’s work, and embraced a variant of the
case processing model of investigating, charging, and trying individual cases
with the primary goal of being tough on crime.401
The case processing model, as redefined by the President’s Commission
Report, its progeny, and later prosecutorial practice, has several central elements. First, the prosecution’s mission is the efficient, effective, and just
disposition of cases, each valued for its uniqueness, but with recognition that
like cases must be treated alike.402 This mission’s success is measured by
394
See U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (1931)
[hereinafter Wickersham Commission Report].
395
See Coles, supra note 392, at 182-83.
396
See Wickersham Commission Report, supra note 394, at 12.
397
See Coles, supra note 392, at 183.
398
See generally FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT
WITH CRIME (Frank J. Remington ed., 1969).
399
See Coles, supra note 392, at 183; Samuel Walker, Origins of the American Criminal
Justice Paradigm: The American Bar Foundation Survey, 1953-1969, 9 JUST. Q. 47, 67 (1992)
(noting survey’s data demonstrating that the criminal justice system was used to address an
array of social problems).
400
See Coles, supra note 392, at 183 (noting importance of this Commission appointed by
President Lyndon Baines Johnson). See generally PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
(1967); PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS (1967); PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967).
401
See Coles, supra note 392, at 183-84.
402
See id. at 184.
R
R
R
R
R
R
446
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
maximizing the felony conviction rate.403 Second, the prosecutor’s sources
of authority are rooted in her professional expertise and public mandate to
hold lawbreakers accountable.404 Third, demand for prosecutorial services is
driven by the police, who funnel work in the form of individual cases to the
prosecutor.405 Fourth, prosecutors’ offices are geographically and organizationally centralized and hierarchical.406 Fifth, each office’s primary tactic is
effective case preparation aimed at convictions via trial or plea-bargains.
Although resource constraints and equal treatment concerns may prompt office policies modifying these tactics somewhat, “they do not conflict with
the goal of seeking to maximize convictions and obtain dispositions reflecting the maximum charge evidence can reasonably sustain.”407 Sixth, prosecutors operate in an environment in which most of their decision-making is
hidden from the public, they face little judicial or legislative review, and
they are neither part of nor close working partners with other local government structures; apart from the discipline required by reelection pressure,
they operate largely independently from citizen input and control.408 The
prosecutor’s office is thus a “closed system” relatively independent of citizen preferences, focused on internal operations, and obsessed with reducing
uncertainty.409 Its prestige, power, style, methods, and outcomes are thus
also particularly reflective of the idiosyncrasies of the chief prosecutor.410
Finally, its success is usually judged based upon the numbers of convictions
and the length of sentences, particularly for serious crimes.411
v. Case Processing’s Failures and How to Correct Them
The case processing model best captures the realities of large, urban
prosecutors’ offices, though it ignores many subtleties within each office that
do not strictly fit the model, and ignores significant geographic variation.412
Nevertheless, the model captures well both the ideology and dominant practice of what Do-Justice Adversarialism means today. The model has faced
numerous scholarly assaults,413 but its most relevant problems for my purposes can be concisely stated. The free market for justice does not always
403
See id.
See id.
405
See id. at 185.
406
See id.
407
See id. at 186.
408
See id.
409
See Worrall, supra note 393, at 18-19.
410
See Coles, supra note 392, at 186.
411
See id.
412
See id. at 184.
413
See, e.g., Worrall, supra note 393, at 14 (summarizing empirical and logical flaws in
the model); see also Angela Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 51-53 (1998) (challenging the model’s case-centric focus
without using the “case processing” label).
404
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
447
work, even as modified by the case processing brand of “doing justice.”414
One important source of failure, as documented throughout this Article, is
that subconscious processes can both skew prosecutorial judgment and leave
prosecutors blind to the severity of the impacts of some prosecutorial decisions. Race can magnify these flaws. The result can be unwarranted error
rates by convicting the innocent and imposing excessively disesteem-generative punishments on the guilty. Moreover, particularly where race is salient,
the communities most harmed by crime can suffer from the state’s efforts to
punish it, and may suffer entirely undeserved group-based disesteem. The
combination of these effects can actually increase crime, or at least deter
crime less, while undermining the proportionality mandates of retributive
justice.
I therefore propose expanding the minimalist ideal in two ways. First,
prosecutors should take steps to reduce, with the aim of eliminating, even
subconsciously caused racial disesteem from their handling of individual
cases. My argument is a simple one: the evidence for inadvertent
prosecutorial contribution to racial disesteem is sufficiently strong that ignoring it is a form of “willful blindness,” a state of semi-conscious indifference so extreme as to be morally equivalent to knowingly inflicting
unnecessary and unwarranted suffering on another.415 This obligation does
not mean that prosecutors must be able to “read” their own or others’ subconscious minds in individual cases. It does mean that the prosecutor must
use care to consider the potential racial subtext of each action she takes—
from charging, to plea bargaining, to making opening arguments, to guiding
sentencing.416 In effect, this approach is a psychologically realistic variant of
the prosecutor’s duty to treat like cases alike. For example, a prosecutor
should be wary of the possibility of police overzealousness in interrogating
black suspects, and should be particularly attentive to whether the quality of
a plea deal reached with a black defendant really is equal to that given to
“similarly situated” white defendants. Prosecutors should be skeptical of
their own intuitions concerning proper bail or sentencing ranges for racial
minorities. Such heightened self-awareness is likely not beyond a prosecutor’s reach; it is a skill that can be developed with practice and education.
Self-awareness requires attention to the raced “cultural meaning” of
prosecutorial actions, so the prosecutor must be familiar with the relevant
414
Cf. TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 30, at 105-15 (examining the failures of a
free-market philosophy of advocacy to do justice in the context of rape trials).
415
See DAVIS, supra note 191, at 19-22; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On
Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 381, 413-23 (2005) (defining the
various types of willful blindness and corresponding underlying psychological processes).
416
See Davis, supra note 413, at 16, 18 (arguing that unconscious and systemic prosecutor
racial bias occurs at every stage of the criminal justice process); see also Abbe Smith, Can You
Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 400 (2001). Smith
acknowledges that prosecutors serve an important social function but nevertheless counsels
“those who are committed to social and racial justice: Please don’t join a prosecutor’s office.”
Id.
R
R
R
448
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
psychological literature.417 Various law reform entities are indeed working
on training courses to help prosecutors with just this task.418 Of course, better prosecutorial decision-making in this area requires prosecutors to compare what they do in one case to what they do in another and to be aware of
cultural and systemic influences; in short, prosecutors must think beyond the
individual case. As I have explained in detail elsewhere, for prosecutors to
successfully overcome subconscious biases requires new collaborative, deliberative decision-making structures within prosecutors’ offices rather than
leaving the matter either to individual line-prosecutor judgment or to uninformed and inflexible office policies.419 Modified Do-Justice Adversarialism
links the specific case to more general concerns. But prosecutors will always have to make judgments in individual cases, judgments that most directly affect the alleged offender, so Modified Do-Justice Adversarialism is
necessarily still a model focused largely on the individual case, albeit with a
heightened sensitivity to its social implications.
Because the harms of racial disesteem affect non-defendants too—innocents temporarily ensnared by the system, neighborhoods devastated by
poverty and despair, tarnished raced reputations of individuals neither directly brought into the system nor condemned to life in blighted locations—
Modified Do-Justice Adversarialism cannot alone cure the current dominant
model’s ills.420 To address these broader concerns, my second suggestion is
to rely on an entirely different ethical model. Modified Do-Justice Adversarialism is concerned directly with the prosecutor’s relationship with the
accused but only indirectly with its impact on third parties. My alternative
model—the Medical Model—governs the prosecutor’s direct relationship
with these third parties, institutions, and communities, and with the “People” as a whole. I recognize that a different term might be needed to capture
417
Cf. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1987) (suggesting a cultural meaning test to
identify unconscious racism). See also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the
Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988) (examining unconscious racism in criminal
justice); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 345 (2007) (presenting an empirical study suggesting that
unconscious racial bias leads judges and jurors to misremember facts in a racially biased way).
418
For example, the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section’s Committee on
Race and Racism began such an effort when I last chaired the Committee. Cf. Marc Mauer,
Op-Ed., Racial Fairness Gaining Ground in the Justice System, BALT. SUN, July 30, 2008, at
17A (discussing the federal Justice Integrity Act, proposed by Democratic Senator Joseph
Biden, Jr. and Republican Senator Arlen Specter, that, if enacted, would establish pilot programs in ten federal districts to create local advisory groups to collect and analyze “racial and
ethnic data on charging, plea negotiations, sentencing recommendations, and other factors,” as
well as state-level legislation requiring preparation of “racial impact statements” for proposed
new legislation in both Connecticut and Iowa).
419
See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness Identification, Democratic Deliberation,
and the Politics of Science, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 271 (2006) [hereinafter
Taslitz, Democratic Deliberation].
420
See supra text accompanying notes 368-419.
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
449
this model’s emphasis on the prosecutor’s lawyerly role, but the term “Medical Model” for now captures mostly clearly the controlling metaphor.
B. The Medical Model
The Medical Model is governed by three principles:
• First, prevention is better than treatment;
• Second, if treatment is necessary, at least do no harm; and
• Third, treat the Body of the People holistically, recognizing that the
health of the mind (including the subconscious mind) and the health of
the Body interact.421
The prosecutor’s duty to “do justice” stems from his representing the
People—all of the People, rather than any individual.422 The argument has
even been made that the prosecutor in part represents the interests of the
defendant, who, though suffering temporary limitations on her political and
other freedoms, is still part of the American people; the prosecutor thus
shows respect for the offender by holding her to account for her wrongs, for
she is then treated as an autonomous individual capable of making reasoned
choices and of being held responsible for her actions.423 In any event, the
prosecutor’s social role is in part to impose proportional disesteem on individual criminal offenders, not to wreak undue disesteem on the guilty or on
the innocent. Moreover, because the prosecutor represents the People, she
should do what is reasonably within her power as a prosecutor to reduce the
harm they suffer, both as victims of crime and as a result of the prosecutor’s
efforts to “treat” the symptom of disease—crime—raging within the Body
Politic. The prosecutor should not leave the patient worse off than she
would be without treatment and indeed should try to maximize the return to
421
Cf. LEONARD ROY FRANK, QUOTIONARY 347 (2001) (“As to diseases, make a habit of
two things: to help, or at least, do no harm.” (quoting Greek physician Hippocrates, stating the
fundamental principle known to modern physicians as the “Hippocratic Oath”)); id. at 601
(“Who is the skilled physician? He who can prevent sickness.” (quoting Hasidic saying)); id.
at 347 (“He who advises a sick man, whose manner of life is prejudicial to health, is clearly
bound first of all to change his patient’s manner of life.” (quoting Plato)); id. at 348 (“But
what is quackery? It is commonly an attempt to cure the diseases of a man by addressing his
body alone.” (quoting Henry David Thoreau)).
422
See Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, and the Limits of Law, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 390 (2008) (arguing that prosecutors
exercise a “fragment of sovereignty, . . . shift[ing] the conversational register from administration to the domain of politics—from seeing what prosecutors do in terms of a bureaucratic
division of labor to seeing it in terms of the allocation of political power”).
423
See CASSIDY, supra note 382, at 2-3. Cassidy argues: “A prosecutor must also appreciate that when he acts as a representative of the sovereign . . . the defendant charged with a
crime is also a member of that sovereign entity. The defendant is therefore one of the persons
that the prosecutor technically represents.” Id. See also Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial
Discretion in an Adversarial System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669, 698 (“Prosecutors represent the
interests of society as a whole, including the interests of defendants as members of that
society.”).
R
450
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
health. Thus the three Medical Model principles of helping to prevent harm,
not causing harm, and recognizing that there are holistic implications for all
the People (the patient) each come into play when we treat only the symptom, and treat it as an isolated symptom at that. Given this country’s sordid
racial history, its continuing racial troubles, and the criminal justice system’s
role in these troubles,424 the argument for application of these Medical Model
principles seems particularly strong in the area of race.
A variety of recent trends converge toward the Medical Model. Prosecutors are increasingly involved in crime prevention through such innovations as nuisance suits against owners of drug houses, anti-gang injunctions,
forfeiture of organized crime assets, community prosecutors, and promotion
of specialty courts.425 Prosecutors are also increasingly involved in minimizing the harm that they and the police do in investigating and prosecuting
crime. New ABA Standards regulate prosecutor behavior where prosecutors
investigate, and not merely prosecute, crime.426 These standards seek to
minimize informant abuse, limit undue use of wiretaps, reduce privacy invasions, and avoid a host of other harms. Prosecutors have likewise played
pivotal roles in improving procedures, such as eyewitness identifications and
interrogations, that have raised undue risks of convicting the innocent.427 In
doing so, prosecutors have implicitly recognized that they must take into
account the workings of the subconscious mind and of institutional forces
and practices in creating these risks, for these reforms rely heavily on social
science research on just these sorts of unconscious processes.428 Prosecutors
424
See supra Part II (arguing that racial disesteem has especially ill effects in the criminal
justice system). See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997) (tracing the history of racial bias in the American criminal justice system).
425
See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS, GOTHAM UNBOUND: HOW NEW YORK CITY WAS LIBERATED FROM THE GRIP OF ORGANIZED CRIME 223-33 (1999) (explaining novel remedies used by
prosecutors to combat organized crime); Darryl K. Brown, Executive Branch Regulation of
Criminal Defense Counsel and the Private Contract Limit on Prosecutor Bargaining, 57
DEPAUL L. REV. 365, 372 (2008) (discussing prosecutors’ use of federal forfeiture statutes to
garner defendants’ assets pre-trial); Catherine M. Coles & George L. Kelling, Prevention
Through Community Prosecution, 136 PUB. INT. 69, 72-74 (1999); Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey
A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1501, 1503-04 (2003); Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1125, 1128-29 (2005) (noting that in the past decade some prosecutorial programs have arisen
for “drug interdiction and rehabilitation . . . adopt[ing] a modified problem orientation, and
some localities have established community prosecution offices to keep local prosecutors in
better touch with the needs of their respective communities”); Stephanos Bibos, The Real
World Shift in Criminal Procedure, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 789, 810-11 (2003) (noting
the evolving nature of criminal prevention tactics available to prosecutors, including anti-gang
loitering injunctions, civil nuisance suits, civil and criminal forfeiture, and civil commitment
of sex offenders).
426
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INVESTIGATIVE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTOR, §§ 2-3 (2008).
427
See ABA, ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 292, at 99-107.
428
See id. Professors Bruce Green and Fred Zacharias have suggested that the duty to “do
justice” might fairly be understood as already encompassing a duty to ferret out unconscious
bias. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
837, 855-56 (noting that it is at least subject to debate whether prosecutors’ duty of neutrality,
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
451
have played a part in efforts to create or expand Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils and related reforms focused upon reducing racial bias, a mission that is a subset of a broader mission focusing upon the system’s
contribution to generating racial disesteem.429 These trends converge on an
implicit recognition of a broader prosecutorial social role in preventing and
healing harm to the Body Politic.
What I am calling the Medical Model has indeed been evolving for
some time, to one degree or another, in various prosecutors’ offices.430 Much
of the impetus for change has come from prosecutors themselves. Some
prosecutors concluded that tough-on-crime strategies were not solving the
drug problem or its corollary violence.431 Other practitioners noticed that
broader tactics, such as seeking forfeiture and civil injunctions, had made
tremendous headway in fighting organized crime.432 The rise of the victims’
rights movement led to calls by victims for attention to a wide range of their
needs, at times embracing alternatives to traditional punishments as better
serving of those needs.433 Meanwhile, minority groups “heavily impacted by
increases in crime and worsening quality of life—yet alienated from justice
institutions and political leadership—increasingly demanded more than arrests, prosecution, and incarceration.”434 These local, loosely organized
community groups sought solutions to unsafe communities and unfair policing tactics alike, wherever those solutions lay.435
The evolution of prosecutorial thinking prompted by these forces was
reflected in meetings of the Executive Session for State and Local Prosecutors that were convened by Harvard University’s Program in Criminal Justice
Policy and Management at its Kennedy School of Government between
1986 and 1990.436 Those discussions identified five prosecutorial types. The
which unquestionably bars conscious use of impermissible racial criteria in exercising discretion, also requires acting to prevent subliminal racial bias and discriminatory effects).
429
See ABA, ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 292, at 67-76; supra note 426 and accompanying text (discussing new federal and state legislation investigating, in part, prosecutorial
racial bias).
430
See Coles, supra note 392, at 188-89.
431
See id.
432
See id. See generally JACOBS, supra note 425 (analyzing New York prosecutors’ use of
such innovative tactics to defeat the mob’s dominance of certain industries).
433
See M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove, Performance Measures and Accountability, in THE
CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, supra note 392, at 91, 101 (noting that, as a
result of the victims’ rights movement begun in the 1980s, victim and witness attitudes about
their personal safety, and their satisfaction with the actions prosecutors take on their behalf and
with their experience as a whole, are now important measures of prosecutorial success); Andrew E. Taslitz, Fourth Amendment Federalism and the Political Silencing of the Urban Poor
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (explaining why victims sometimes seek less
harsh and more creative punishments than do many legislators, judges, and prosecutors).
434
Coles, supra note 392, at 189.
435
See id.
436
See id. at 190 (explaining the Kennedy School Report and its historical significance);
Nugent-Borakove, supra note 433, at 93-94 (summarizing the report); see also ZACHARY
TUMIN, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS: FINDINGS AND DISCOVERIES OF THE HARVARD UNIVERSITY EXECUTIVE SESSION FOR STATE AND LOCAL PROSECUTORS AT THE JOHN F. KENNEDY
SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, 1986-1990 (1990) [hereinafter KENNEDY SCHOOL REPORT].
R
R
R
R
R
R
452
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
first two of these—the “jurist,” seeking efficient case disposition, and the
“sanction-setter,” seeking retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence via punishment—fit the traditional case processing model.437 The other three
types—“problem-solvers,” “strategic investors,” and “institution builders”—departed from this tradition.438 Problem-solvers will use any tool, not
merely those of the criminal law, to attack crime-related problems.439 They
may mobilize varied governmental agencies and seek funding for novel programs.440 A particularly well-received recent example of a problem-solving
strategy is Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes’s creation of the Drug
Treatments Alternative to Prison (DTAP) Program.441 The program extended
drug treatment to high-risk, prison-bound drug sellers, not merely those only
using drugs, and added residential and other long-term treatment well after
release to extant, but failing, drug treatment programs.442 Hynes’s team conceived of the program, obtained funding to create it, and established a permanent in-house research unit to inform and monitor its performance and
alter its approach as needed. The team also partnered with external researchers to ensure that the most recent and reliable data informed therapy on the
ground.443 Studies of DTAP’s performance are optimistic that it has been and
will continue to be more effective than other options in aiding the local community by reducing recidivism and increasing ex-felon employment
prospects.444
“Institution-builders,” a fourth prosecutorial type, focus more directly
on fostering “the vitality of basic neighborhood institutions—families,
schools, and civic and religious institutions—against criminal disruption and
disorder, so that they could become self-sufficient and capable of regulating
their own affairs.”445 Institution-builders might, for example, reach out to
involve the community in improving school safety and student retention, in
fostering crime-prevention efforts like community watches, and in easing the
provision of health and social services to needy community members.446 Finally, the “strategic investor” does not simply take resources as a given but
rather pursues the goal of “bolster[ing] the efficacy of prosecution by adding capacities.”447 These ideal types are, of course, not mutually exclusive,
and may occur in varying combinations in any one prosecutor’s office.448
437
See Coles, supra note 392, at 190.
See id.
439
See id.
440
See id.
441
See Steven Belenko, Hung-en Sung, Anne J. Swern & Caroline R. Donhauser, Prosecutors and Treatment Diversion: The Brooklyn (NY) Drug Treatment Alternative to Prison
Program, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, supra note 392, at 111.
442
See id. at 112, 120, 128-32.
443
See id. at 130.
444
See id. at 111-12.
445
See Coles, supra note 392, at 190.
446
See id.
447
See KENNEDY SCHOOL REPORT, supra note 436, at 6-7.
448
See Nugent-Borakove, supra note 433, at 94.
438
R
R
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
453
Perhaps the most-discussed aspect of this broader model of prosecutor
behavior is the embrace by some prosecutors of the “community prosecution
strategy.”449 The elements of this strategy are the mirror image of the case
processing strategy. Accordingly, community prosecutors see their mission
as making communities safer, a mission that may mean strengthening bonds
with citizens—including those in the communities most damaged by crime
and by law enforcement—and strengthening bonds with other governmental
agencies and civic groups.450 Improving the community’s own capacity to
enhance security and justice are likewise central to the mission.451 Correspondingly, the sources of the prosecutor’s authority expand to include “relationships with specific neighborhoods and communities,” and prosecutors
gain legitimacy by “responding to discrete problems in particular locations
affecting particular individuals and groups” and drawing “support directly
from leaders and ordinary citizens in these local areas.”452 Furthermore, citizens have “a direct line to the prosecutor’s office.”453 The demand for
prosecutorial services comes not only from police arrests, but from community members who may demand different solutions to various problems.454
Permitting greater community involvement and more flexible, problemsolving strategies requires a decentralized, less hierarchical organizational
structure in which some prosecutors spend substantial time in the community and may need to work in multi-agency task forces requiring greater
exercise of initiative and creativity by line-prosecutors.455 This requires a
change in prosecutorial culture, and hiring strategies must be aimed at those
committed to both community service and problem-solving as well as litigation.456 Prosecutors must likewise expand their tactics to include “targeted
and expedited criminal prosecutions, civil remedies, nuisance abatement,
code enforcement, establishing new institutions (a day report center, or problem court), crafting legislation, developing working protocols among agencies, and fundraising for new activities.”457 A community-based strategy
further embraces transparency of operations and decision-making with
prosecutorial accountability for results—an “open” rather than “closed”
system of justice.458 Prosecutorial success should no longer be gauged solely
by convictions and sentences—though these remain relevant—but by reduced crime victimization, increased perceived community safety, measura-
449
See Coles, supra note 392, at 191.
See id. at 193.
See id.
452
See id.
453
See id.
454
See id. at 194.
455
See id. at 196.
456
See id. at 200.
457
Id. at 196.
458
See id. at 196 (analyzing the new model’s required environment of greater transparency
and accountability); Worrall, supra note 393, at 18-20 (analyzing the concepts of “closed”
versus “open” shops or systems).
450
R
451
R
454
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
ble contribution to enhancing local institutions central to overall community
health, and closer ties among citizens, the police, and prosecutors.459
The community prosecution strategy is often but an “add-on” to the
case processing mission, though a very small number of offices have reorganized their entire operational structure based upon this model.460 Political
and cultural resistance to its spread has, however, thus far proven to be
strong.461 I here suggest several strategies to promote further change in the
prosecutor’s role along analogous lines.
First, the community prosecution model is too narrowly associated with
specific, often marginal administrative programs rather than the broader lessons such programs must teach.462 The model is also sometimes perceived as
nothing more than a public relations gambit, and it does not yet focus on
prosecutor sensitivity to subconscious social forces and community conciliation as essential additional skills.463 The Medical Model seeks to make community healing central to the prosecutorial mission, and to draw on the
teachings of therapeutic jurisprudence, which looks to the therapeutic value
of lawyering practices. Too often in the criminal arena, however, these
teachings focus on the defense attorney rather than the prosecutor, and on
the specific case rather than on healing the entire community.464 Ultimately,
at least aspirational ethics standards will be required to help change the
prosecutorial mindset, and the healing imagery I suggest provides an appealing way of approaching any such efforts.
Second, although broader change is the ultimate goal, incremental
change may be the most realistic means to get there. Focusing on race seems
to me a particularly effective short-term strategy, for, as I have explained
elsewhere, racial justice is a powerful motivating and organizing tool among
459
See Coles, supra note 392, at 196-97; Nugent-Borakove, supra note 433, at 96-104
(describing ways to measure prosecutorial performance in an age of expanded prosecutorial
roles).
460
See Coles, supra note 392, at 191-92; M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove & Patricia L. Fanflik, Community Prosecution: Rhetoric or Reality?, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, supra note 392, at 211, 214-27 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine NugentBorakove eds., 2008) (analyzing the “continuum of implementation” of community prosecution in a variety of prosecutors’ offices).
461
See Coles, supra note 392, at 196; Nugent-Borakove & Fanflik, supra note 460, at 22122 (noting resource obstacles to change); id. at 226-27 (noting that no state or local prosecutor’s office has moved completely beyond reliance on specialized community prosecution units
and that all but a handful have failed to institutionalize funding to support community prosecution efforts).
462
See, e.g., THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, supra note 392 (collecting essays that discuss broader lessons but, when offering specific examples, focus on
specific programs as definitional to community prosecuting).
463
Not one of the articles that I have read has focused on the importance of subconscious
social forces as an overt consideration in crafting community prosecution programs.
464
See generally REHABILITATING LAWYERS: PRINCIPLES OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE FOR CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE (David B. Wexler ed., 2008) (collecting excerpts of the
leading published works on therapeutic jurisprudence in the criminal context, all of which
focus on defense counsel’s role and emphasize healing individuals without serious independent
consideration of healing communities).
R
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
455
poor urban racial communities.465 Indeed, congressional efforts are already
afoot to mandate that United States Attorneys’ Offices engage in a yearslong study of systemic and subconscious racial biases with the goal of embedding new procedures for combating their influence.466 Outside the prosecutor’s world, some jurisdictions have considered adopting practices of
collecting data on police encounters by race to monitor inappropriate actions
such as traffic stops.467 Focusing on race also exposes more clearly the disesteem-generating function of the prosecutor, laying the groundwork for
greater sensitivity to how to ensure its proper operation in all criminal justice
contexts, not only those involving race.
Third, the healing metaphor puts the patient’s—the Body Politic’s—interest first. Just as physical doctors must hear from and listen to the patient
to diagnose and treat her properly, and just as the patient’s autonomy requires her control over certain therapeutic decisions, so must the prosecutor
hear from his patient, giving her some measure of control over her fate. In
more concrete terms, the prosecutor must create mechanisms for real, deliberative community input into prosecutor decision-making.468 A growing
body of empirical research suggests that the greater the local community’s
input, the greater the demand for more community-therapeutic, rather than
routinely punitive, solutions to the problem of crime.469 Creating procedural
mechanisms for such community input on questions of race helps to build
political pressure for a prosecutorial therapeutic role. Consequently, it is
changes in prosecutorial management structures—whether done voluntarily,
encouraged by bar-drafted aspirational standards, or imposed legislatively—
rather than new ethical rules providing for sanctions against individual prosecutors that are most likely to promote embrace of the Medical Model.470
465
See Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 74, at 221-98.
See Mauer, supra note 418 (describing the proposed legislation).
467
See Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements as a Means of Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities, 5 OHIO ST. L.J. 19, 32-33 (2007) (proposing that jurisdictions adopt “racial impact statements” prospectively to assess the likely racial impacts of any proposed
criminal justice legislation). Cf. Davis, supra note 413, at 54-55 (recommending that prosecutors internally create their own racial impact statements to track the effects of office policies
and practices).
468
See Taslitz, Democratic Deliberation, supra note 419.
469
See Taslitz, Fourth Amendment Federalism, supra note 433.
470
See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, www.bepress.com (2007) (arguing for internal redesign of the structure of prosecutors’ offices as a way of limiting prosecutorial overreaching); Stephanos Bibas,
Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/253 (arguing, while drawing on
management literature and viewing prosecutorial flaws as reflecting a classic “agency problem,” that revised hiring, promotion, and tenure practices; new pay structures; feedback from
judges, defense counsel, and victims; better data-collection combined with greater transparency and thus more informed voters; an increased emphasis by managers on developing
office culture, norms, and ideals to embrace more than conviction and sentence-maximization;
and more creative use of office policies to promote increased deliberation, consistency, and
fairer notice will do more to improve prosecutorial decision making than will any heightened
effort at punishing prosecutors via meatier ethics codes); Davis, supra note 413, at 55-60, 62466
R
R
R
R
R
R
456
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
Finally, it is important to remember that the therapeutic model is parallel to and supplementary to the prosecutor’s modified do-justice adversarial
role. The two prosecutorial functions—generating only justified disesteem
on individuals in particular cases and helping to heal the Body Politic via
more general reforms—are conceptually distinct, though each may impact
the other. The former focuses on case-specific decisions, the latter on
programmatic, systemic ones. In the area of race, both Modified Do-Justice
Adversarialism and the Medical Model must hold sway in their respective
spheres.
V. WHAT
THE
JENA PROSECUTOR SHOULD HAVE DONE
Reed Walters published an op-ed piece in the New York Times defending his actions in the Jena Six case.471 He argued that the law prohibited him
from bringing hate crimes charges against the white students who hung the
nooses on the tree, but required him to proceed against the black students,
particularly Mychal Bell, in adult court, and to seek extremely harsh punishments.472 The accuracy of his legal analysis is subject to challenge,473 but
even assuming that his understanding of Louisiana law was correct, his ethical analysis remains questionable. Walters explained his position:
I can understand the emotions generated by the juxtaposition
of the noose incident with the attack on Mr. Barker and the outcomes for the perpetrators of each. In the final analysis, though, I
am bound to enforce the laws of Louisiana, as they exist today, not
as they might in someone’s vision of a perfect world.
That is what I have done. And that is what I must continue to
do.474
Walters also described himself as a “small-town lawyer and prosecutor”
whose job for 16 years has been “to review each criminal case brought to
me by the police department or sheriff, match the facts to any applicable
laws, and seek justice for those who have been harmed.”475 Walters portrayed himself as straight-jacketed by clear and absolute law, as if he had no
67 (arguing for publication of racial impact statements as a way to improve prosecutors’ handling of unconscious and institutional racial bias and analyzing role of electoral politics in
improving prosecutor behavior); Taslitz, Democratic Deliberation, supra note 419, at 314-18,
325 (arguing for “internal” and “external” deliberative mechanisms to help prosecutors reduce the risk of convicting the innocent); Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 74, at 293-98;
Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court: Why the First
Amendment Is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism and Ethnic Bias in the Legal Profession,
9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 781, 785 (1996) (recounting the authors’ difficulties in seeking to
amend ethics rules to bar racist and similar appeals by attorneys).
471
See Walters, supra note 1.
472
See id.
473
Bowers, supra note 335, at 119 n.165.
474
Walters, supra note 1.
475
Id.
R
R
R
R
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
457
discretion, and thus no responsibility. Though he noted that the appellate
court ultimately sent Bell’s case back to the juvenile courts, Walters saw no
need to rethink his charging decisions or his responsibilities—or even to
admit the possibility of error. He specifically distanced himself from the
question of whether “America needs a new civil rights movement,” focusing
the bulk of his op-ed piece on why he thought Bell’s alleged crime was a
heinous one and why he could not charge the noose-hangers with a hate
crime given the facts of the two cases.476 He devoted not one word to
whether he should have considered the impact of his decisions in the Jena
Six case on the local and national African American communities, on interracial conflict, on the perceptions and reality of governmental legitimacy, on
likely future crimes by others in these various communities, on the educational culture at Jena High, on the racial culture in the town of Jena itself, or
even on the rehabilitation of all the teenagers in the varied Jena High
incidents.
Walters’s defense of his actions is a classic embrace of do-justice adversarialism, as informed by case processing ideology. His job is to prosecute
all alleged criminal wrongs vigorously to verdict, then subject the new felon
to the harshest penalty “dictated” by the law, for that is what “seeking justice” means. He is a passive actor, receiving cases funneled to him by the
police and sheriff, acting only on their request. Though his actions may
heighten certain emotions (read this as, “the black community’s emotions”),
and though they may perhaps implicate equality concerns, considering such
matters would wrongly involve him in a “new civil rights movement” that
can be none of his concern as a prosecutor. Finally, he seems simultaneously to evoke an “aw-shucks” purity of heart, while offering an implied
appeal to limited resources to do other than he does, for he is “a small town
lawyer.” But the small town reference seems also to portray him as a protector of local justice against big-city outsiders, and he ends with a proud
insistence that he will continue to do what he has always done, for it is part
of his job to resist political pressures.
Modified Do-Justice Adversarialism would require more. It takes no
great training in psychology or history to understand the cultural meaning of
“noose-hangings” or the prohibition against blacks sitting under “the white
tree.” Nor is it difficult to understand how observers could see unequal
justice being done. There were also genuine factual disputes over whether
those charged with the schoolyard assault were in fact those involved in it
and over who was responsible for it—factual disputes in which race surely
must have played a role.477 Even if Walters was right that he could not bring
criminal charges against the noose-hangers, that limitation should have suggested to Walters that seeking the harshest possible penalties against the
black students might not be consistent with equal justice. That Walters
476
477
See id.
See sources cited supra note 3; Brown, supra note 7.
R
458
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
[Vol. 44
chose the most aggressive possible interpretive stance toward the relevant
law is suggested by the appellate court returning Mychal Bell’s case to the
juvenile, rather than adult, court. Moreover, Walters seems blind to the inequities wrought by seeking probation for a misdemeanor charge against a
white assailant of several of the Jena Six, arresting some of the Jena Six for
theft when they defended themselves against Matt Windham’s shotgun-bearing threats, and imposing a minor bond on Justin Barker for bringing a
loaded rifle onto school property. Walters is simply silent about these incidents in his op-ed piece.478
A better stance would have required a more aggressive and skeptical
investigation of the facts, a greater reluctance to send the cases to adult
court, and a more creative approach to sentencing than “lock-‘em-up and
throw away the key.” Additionally, Walters should have been more willing
to re-examine his own earlier decisions regarding the whites involved in the
various alleged assaults against the black students and to question whether
his leniency in those instances might have reflected his own biases.
Walters’s breach of the Medical Model’s dictates is even more severe.
If the reports are true, Walters’s only effort at crime-prevention was to
threaten at a school assembly to destroy the black students’ lives with “the
stroke of a pen.” That comment hardly portrayed him as the champion of
the entire Jena community and likely exacerbated, rather than softened, racial tensions. Walters should not have considered it outside his bailiwick to
side publicly with the school principal by seeking expulsion of the noosehangers, or at least some harsher penalty than the three day suspension. The
community as a whole needed tough action and a clear rejection of the hateful message sent by the incident. Likewise, the mere existence of a perceived “white tree” should have set off warning bells of racial tension at
Jena High, and Walters should have worked closely with school authorities
and, if need be, sought the volunteer assistance of mediators and educational
psychologists to work on healing such tensions. This would require a long,
difficult process of inter-group dialogue that would necessarily involve black
and white parents and thus the racial culture of Jena as a whole. Such an
effort may have helped to reduce tensions, and to prevent the crimes that
allegedly followed. A healer would have seen that the connection between
social institutions like schools and crime is unavoidable; both need attention.
It is not a defense for Walters to cry “resource-poor country lawyer,” for not
every criminal case or series of cases before him required this sort of effort.
Jena was an extreme case.
Furthermore, as a healer, he would be a catalyst and educator, bringing
together other governmental and private resources to do the job. No new
civil rights movement was needed. Equal justice for all persons and groups,
healing the local community, and embracing all its members, thus helping to
478
See Walters, supra note 1.
R
2009]
Judging Jena’s D.A.
459
prevent crime and social dissolution, were already his job. By not doing that
job, he became part of the disease rather than its cure.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Jena Six case demonstrates that Do-Justice-Adversarialism is an
inadequate model for modern prosecutors’ ethics. Unfortunately, change is
politically difficult and best proceeds incrementally. Focusing on race is a
good first step in continuing a paradigm change already slowly taking root
among some prosecutors, in efforts such as community prosecuting, prosecutor-crafted drug therapy programs, and persistent systemic reforms designed to protect the innocent by viewing the prosecutor’s job as more than
just processing individual cases efficiently. Although that job must continue, it must be supplemented by greater awareness of raced cultural meanings and a stronger concept of equal justice that I have called “Modified DoJustice-Adversarialism.” Moreover, when prosecutors look beyond the four
corners of individual cases, as they must, they should embrace a Medical
Model of community-healing. That model requires creative multi-disciplinary efforts to foster the health of the social institutions that otherwise breed
crime, and to satisfy the more complex true needs of justice demanded by
the community. Here again, healing the wounds inflicted by race is an excellent place to start. Reed Walters made those wounds fester. My sole
hope is, through this Article, to assist in the journey begun by a number of
prosecutors toward a better way—a way led by focusing not on professional
discipline but on creative institutional design to foster the prosecutorial virtues not only of the warrior but also of the healer.