Excerpt f rom “ THE EVOLUTION OF RETRIBUTION: I NTUITIONS UNDERMINED”
(Available f or early view in Paci f i c Phi l osophi cal Quar t er l y, please do not cit e)
Abstract: I argue that evolutionary influences on anti-consequentialist intuitions sever their
evidential connection with retributive theories of punishment. I suggest that anger places value on
actions of revenge and retribution, value not derived from the consequences of these actions. As a
result, it contributes to the development of retributive intuitions. Moreover, if anger evolved to
produce these retributive intuitions because of their biological consequences, then these intuitions
are not a good indicator that punishment has value apart from its consequences. This severs the
evidential connection between retributive intuitions and the retributive value of punishment. This
argument may generalize to other deontological intuitions and theories.
Deontological moral intuitions are revealed by widespread tendencies to judge or act 1 contrary to
an act-consequentialist evaluation of actions. 2 They are often taken to be a primary source of
evidence against consequentialist theories. Work in the last decade of empirical moral psychology
suggests that emotions are responsible for at least some of these deontological intuitions. A
prominent criticism of deontological intuitions, offered by Joshua Greene and Peter Singer, is that
plausible evolutionary explanations of altruism reveal epistemic defects in the emotions responsible
for these intuitions (Greene, 2008; Singer, 2005). If they are right, then consequentialism is
vindicated by undercutting a primary source of evidence against it. 3
One of Greene’s central criticisms is this: emotions were selected for their role in increasing
fitness and deontological intuitions are a byproduct of this evolutionary function, thus emotions
would have produced deontological intuitions whether or not these intuitions were true. The most
common objection to this argument is that it proves too much. It threatens to undercut a wider set
of evaluative intuitions (e.g. that pain is bad), ones that share the same kind of evolutionary
explanation and some of which support consequentialism and evaluative realism (see e.g. Berker,
2009; Kahane, 2011; Mason, 2011). 4 This is a problematic feature of Greene’s and Singer’s
evolutionary debunking argument, because it vitiates their aim of defending consequentialism.
Moreover, there is a suspicion that similar problems will plague any evolutionary debunking
argument pitched at the level of first-order moral discourse (e.g. Kahane, 2011; Mason, 2011;
Vavova, 2014).
My purpose here is to give an evolutionary debunking argument along these lines but that is
not subject to this criticism. Unlike Greene's argument, I focus specifically on the role of retributive
intuitions in supporting retributive theories of punishment, according to which (deserved)
punishment has positive value aside from its good consequences. And rather than undermining the
ISAAC WIEGMAN
epistemic value of these intuitions entirely, this argument severs the evidential connection between
retributive intuitions and retributive theories. Thus, the force of the argument is isolated to
retributive theories rather than also undermining the wider range of intuitions that seem to support
evaluative realism and the theories of value necessary to evaluate outcomes.
In section 1, I propose a friendly amendment to a prominent dual-process account of moral
intuition in order to pick out the kind of process that is likely responsible for retributive intuitions.
Rather than capturing the difference between retributive and consequentialist intuitions about
punishment in terms of the difference between emotion and cognition (as does Greene), I capture
the difference with a distinction between prospective and non-prospective processes. Non-prospective
processes place non-derivative value on actions (or action types), value that does not derive from the
action’s consequences. Anger is an example of a non-prospective process, because it places nonderivative value on actions like revenge and retribution.
Once this distinction is in place, I present a novel debunking argument (in section 2). If
anger produces retributive intuitions (which are one species of deontological intuition) because of
the biological consequences (e.g. increased fitness) of those intuitions, then these intuitions are not
good indicators of non-derivative value. This severs the putative evidential connection between
retributive intuitions and the non-derivative value of punishment. Thus, retributive intuitions are not
good evidence for retributive theories of punishment (according to which punishment has nonderivative value). This argument may generalize to other deontological intuitions, but it does not
uniquely favor the consequentialist theories that Greene and Singer attempt to defend. In section 3,
I address an objection that has been leveled at Greene and Singer, that the argument proves too
much.
1. The dual-process framework: reaction versus prospection
A central part of Greene and Singer’s debunking arguments is Greene’s dual-process theory
of moral intuition according to which consequentialist and deontological intuitions have distinct
psychological underpinnings. 5 Moreover, Greene and Singer suppose that the distinct evolutionary
etiologies of these psychological processes distinguish the epistemic value of the intuitions they
produce. Specifically, the evolutionary history of emotional processes, is supposed to undercut
deontological intuitions, whereas they do not undercut consequentialist intuitions, which are
supposed to be produced by a cognitive process with a distinct evolutionary history (cf. Singer, 2005,
p. 350). Nevertheless, as suggested in the introduction, a successful evolutionary debunking of
2
ISAAC WIEGMAN
deontological intuitions may also require distinguishing deontological intuitions from the broader
class of evaluative intuitions in terms of their epistemic value. Below, I make a friendly amendment
to Greene’s dual-process theory, one that identifies a distinguishing feature of processes responsible
for deontological intuitions.
The main contrast Greene employs is between cognitive and emotional processes.
Emotional processes have what Greene calls ‘behavioral valence’, meaning that these ‘alarm like’
emotions have the following properties. First, they include inclinations to behave in specific ways or
to judge those behaviors as appropriate. Second, they are elicited in response to a limited range of
factors (such as the presence/absence of personal force), and finally, once triggered they can
override cognitive processes. By contrast, cognition involves slow, flexible, and controlled processes
(see e.g. Evans, 2003; Stanovich, 2004). Cognition aligns with consequentialism because both are
‘systematic and aggregative’: ‘…the advantage of having such neutral representations is that they can
be mixed and matched…without pulling the agent in multiple behavioral directions at once…’
(Greene, 2008, p. 64) In other words, these representations are supposed to make possible the kind
of systematicity characteristic of consequentialism, because they can take all of the consequences of
an action into account. This is the most important contrast for Greene: cognitive processes can
consider an indefinite number of different factors when deciding how to act, whereas emotional
responses are triggered by only a few kinds of factors.
While Greene believes that there is a natural mapping between the content of
consequentialism and the properties of cognitive processes and ‘between the content of
deontological philosophy and the functional properties of [emotional responses]’ (2008, p. 63), these
distinctions do not align. First, it is possible to imagine processes that consider multiple factors, but
that are not fully consequentialist in their deliberations. For instance, retributivism about
punishment is a deontological theory since a retributive justification of punishment refers to what a
transgressor deserves based on what she did in the past rather than on the good outcomes that
would attend punishment. 6 Nevertheless, moral agents can weigh consideration of desert against
other considerations to yield an all-things-considered judgment. For instance, I might be motivated
to punish a person because of what she deserves, but I might nonetheless adjust the severity of the
punishment in relation to the consequences of punishing. In that case, I have a backward-looking,
non-consequentialist motive for punishment that aggregates with other factors by a process that can
consider whatever factors seem relevant to the question at hand. 7 Thus, what is distinctive about the
psychological processes that consequentialism maps onto is not that they consider or weigh multiple
3
ISAAC WIEGMAN
factors (since they could easily consider non-consequentialist factors as well), but rather that they are
prospective, or outcome based. That is, they place value on actions according to their anticipated,
internally represented, outcomes (relative to the agent) and decide what to do only based on
(positively or negatively) valued outcomes.
Notably, work in animal behavior and computational neuroscience has revealed neural
systems in human and non-human animals that place value on actions with reference to a causal model
relating the action to its outcome. 8 In contingency learning experiments, a rat learns not (only) that
pressing a bar is a good kind of action to perform, but that pressing the bar produces a specific outcome,
namely the delivery of a certain kind of food (e.g. Balleine & Dickinson, 1998). If the rat is satiated
with (or conditioned to aver) that kind of food, or if pressing the bar ceases to deliver it, the rat will
diminish its bar pressing behavior. One of the best explanations of these patterns is that the rat
develops a causal model of the outcome of pressing the bar and changes its actions when the
hedonic outcome is less favorable or when the causal model updates to include a relevant change in
contingency.
A second problem with Greene’s alignment of distinctions is that we can imagine there
being emotion-like responses that are only sensitive to one or two factors, but that nonetheless line
up with consequentialist rationales. For instance, one could design a robot with an alarm-like
response to the detection of a doomsday device. When triggered this response would do whatever is
required to destroy the doomsday device. Moreover, the emotion-like response need not take
anything else into account (besides the existence of an armed doomsday device) to accord with a
purely consequentialist judgment about what to do. Thus, being triggered in response to a few kinds
of factors is not a distinctive feature of processes that produce deontological intuitions. Rather, I
think the kinds of processes that map onto deontological intuitions, if any, are non-prospective
processes.
Non-prospective processes form a disjunctive class because there are many ways to motivate
action and moral judgment that are not prospective. For instance, some processes place value on
actions according to past experiences involving actions of that kind. In a recent experiment
(Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012), participants were asked to physically enact simulations
of harmful actions (e.g. holding a fake gun to another person’s head and pulling the trigger).
Physiological indicators of aversion prior to performing these actions were greater than when
participants performed nearly identical actions (e.g. holding a spray bottle in the air and pulling its
lever) and greater than when they observed other people physically simulating the same harmful
4
ISAAC WIEGMAN
actions. The aversive reaction to these actions is not readily understood as an aversion to their
consequences (e.g. the pain or discomfort of the ‘victim’). Rather the better explanation is that
participants had a stronger aversion to performing actions of a certain type, namely ones that
resemble taking someone’s life by putting a gun to their head and pulling the trigger.
Other non-prospective processes are reactive, in the sense that the aim of action (or the
reason for which it is selected) is represented in relation to past or present occurrences (as opposed
to internally represented future outcomes). While such a process may be directed at a future
outcome in some external sense (e.g. directed at the outcome by design), it is not guided by an
internal representation of a future outcome. For such a process, ‘…the orientation towards a future
state…can merely involve change from the present, – change from now: disappearance of pain,
disappearance of the desired object being out of reach’ (Frijda, 2010, p. 572). For instance, a heatseeking missile need not be guided by an internal representation of its target or of the ‘desired’
outcome of hitting its target. Of the many ways one could design such a missile, one of the simplest
would be for it to receive feedback signals that indicate whether a heat source is reducing or
increasing its distance in a given direction. When appropriately connected to its controls, this
feedback can guide the missile to its target. Again, one need not include in the missile’s program any
internal representation of its aim (hitting a moving object) or its physical target (such as the
geometrical structure or distinctive color patterns of the target or its spatial location relative to other
objects). It only requires feedback signals that adjust its path in reaction to the path of its physical
target and that direct it toward the achievement of its aim.
There is evidence from animal behavior, neuroscience and psychology that prospective and
non-prospective systems operate independently of each other (and sometimes antagonistically) in a
range of animal species including humans. 9 Moreover, it is likely that in many of Greene’s examples
reactive processes are producing the empirical results that Greene attributes to alarm-like
emotions. 10
2. A Novel Debunking Argument
2.1 An adaptive function of anger
With the distinction between prospective and non-prospective processes in hand, we can
now turn to the novel debunking argument. If some non-prospective processes were selected for
their fitness enhancing consequences but also cause deontological intuitions because of these
consequences, then the function of non-prospective processes (producing biologically favorable
5
ISAAC WIEGMAN
outcomes) disconnects them from the states of affairs that intuitions report (that actions have value
aside from their outcomes). Thus, these deontological intuitions are not good evidence for the
principles, beliefs, and theories that they seem to support. In this section, I sketch out this argument
with reference to a specific reactive process, namely anger.
Consider a suggestion about anger similar to those made by Greene, Singer and even Derek
Parfit (2011, p. 429): anger is responsible for the intuitions that support an anti-consequentialist,
retributive principle.
R – The value (or justification) of an act of punishment is not (or not only) derived from the
consequences of the act (or the practice) of punishment. 11
Greene appeals to evolutionary accounts of altruism to explain why an emotional response like
anger would lead to the intuitions that support R: ‘…we have a taste for retribution, not because
wrongdoers truly deserve to be punished regardless of the costs and benefits, but because retributive
dispositions are an efficient way of inducing behavior that allows individuals living in social groups
to more effectively spread their genes’ (Greene, 2008, p. 71). Here as elsewhere, Greene is appealing
to evolutionary considerations of the sort that would also undermine the theories of value that
consequentialism requires (cf. Street, 2006). For the argument to work in favor of consequentialism,
we need a slightly different story about why the evolutionary function of anger makes it
untrustworthy with respect to R.
To understand this function, it helps to get oneself in the grip of a puzzle. It is obvious that
humans cooperate in a wide range of circumstances. There is cooperation not only among people
who are genetically similar (a phenomenon that the theory of kin selection explains) and not only
among people that frequently interact (a phenomenon that theories of direct reciprocity explain) and
not only among people who signal an intention to reciprocate (a phenomenon that indirect
reciprocity and costly signaling explain) but also, puzzlingly, ‘...among genetically unrelated people,
in non-repeated interactions, when gains from reputation are small or absent’ (Fehr & Gächter,
2002, p. 137). This last kind of cooperation is beneficial because it may have allowed our ancestors
to live in larger groups and receive the benefits of doing so (E.g. Richerson & Boyd, 2005).
Nevertheless, it remains controversial how we evolved the tendency to do so. Punishment could
help explain this phenomenon, because it can help to secure cooperation. Nevertheless, punishment
is costly. Even granting that the group level benefits of punishment (the ones that accrue to
individuals in large cooperatives) outweigh the immediate costs (e.g. Boyd, Gintis, & Bowles, 2010),
what would motivate relatively short-sighted individuals to consistently punish in the conditions
6
ISAAC WIEGMAN
characteristic of life in large groups (non-iterative interactions amongst genetically heterogeneous
individuals where reputation is difficult to track)? What would make someone willing to commit to
punishment in the face of its momentary costs?
Fehr and Gächter set out to answer these questions (among others) with an economic game
(Fehr & Gächter, 2002). They set up the purest instance of the kind of interactions that we are
concerned with (ones that are non-repeating and anonymous) by having groups of four people
(anonymous to each other) play a ‘public goods’ game on computer consoles. They gave participants
an endowment of 20 monetary units (MUs) and then gave them the opportunity to invest it in a
group project. The group project would return .4 MUs to each group member for every one MU
invested in the project, and at the end of the round, each player received information about how
much the other group members donated. To see how participants changed their strategy over time
and with changing conditions, Fehr and Gächter had participants play the game several times, but
they told participants that they would never interact with anyone more than once.
The structure of this game creates incentives and costs that militate against donating much
to the project. For instance, the best possible outcome for any one individual would be to invest
none in a case where everyone else went all in. In that case, the free-rider would walk away with 44
MUs, whereas everyone else would gain a modest 4MUs, walking away with 24. Moreover, if
someone is the only one to contribute all one’s endowment, then that person will end up with less
than half of the initial endowment, while everyone else turns a profit. These incentives influence
how people actually play the game. After six iterations of one version of the game, Fehr and Gächter
report, ‘...58.9% of the subjects contributed nothing and 75.6% contributed 5 MUs or less’ (2002, p.
138).
In another version of the game, Fehr and Gächter introduced the possibility of punishment.
They told participants that at the end of the round (after receiving information about how much
others in the group invested) each participant had the opportunity to spend some of their MUs to
punish another group member. For each MU contributed toward punishing an individual, that
individual would lose three MUs (with the loss was capped at 30). With the possibility of
punishment in place, the average investment immediately shot up to more than 12 MUs. On the
sixth iteration of the punishment condition, Fehr and Gächter report, ‘...38.9% of the subjects
contributed their whole endowment and 77.8% contributed 15 MUs or more’ (2002, p. 138). Not
only was the threat of punishment effective in securing cooperation, punishment also occurred quite
7
ISAAC WIEGMAN
frequently, with more than 80% of subjects punishing at least once across the six iterations of the
punishment condition.
Conjecturing that emotions were responsible for this pattern of punishment, Fehr and
Gächter followed up at the end of the game with questions about participants’ feelings toward
another player given how that player’s investment compared to that of the rest of the group: ‘You
decide to invest [5] francs to the project. The second group member invests [3] and the third [7]
francs. Suppose the fourth member invests 2 francs to the project. You now accidentally meet this
member. Please indicate your feeling towards this person’ (2002, p. 139). Subjects rated both their
anger and annoyance at the free-rider on a seven-point scale (one being ‘not at all’ and seven being
‘very much’). Even with this rather modest discrepancy, 17.4% of participants indicated ‘very much’
anger. Moreover, the higher the discrepancy between the investment of the free-rider and that of the
other group members, the more anger participants reported (84% indicated five or greater in
response to a vignette with a greater disparity between the free rider and others). Punishment in the
public goods game followed a similar pattern. The higher the discrepancy was between the freerider’s investment and the average investment of the others, the greater the punishment (the more
MUs that were lost). Moreover, the most common form of punishment in the game was when
above-average investors punished below-average investors.
For my purposes, this study holds a pinch of evidence and a generous helping of illustration.
It provides a pinch of evidence that anger is a reactive process that results in punishment and that
punishment secures cooperation of the relevant kind. The study suggests that anger is a reactive
process in that it leads to an impulse to punish in response to the past actions of a free rider even in
cases in which anticipated outcomes (such as maximizing profits) do not favor punishment. This is plausible
because participants knew that they would not encounter the free-rider again, yet participants
punished free-riders proportionally to the severity of their free-riding. Moreover, they punished freeriders just as frequently on the last round of the game, in which no one in further iterations of the
game would benefit from punishment. Finally, the threat of punishment in the game secured the
benefits of cooperation even between people who were unrelated, who had no idea of each other’s
reputation, and who had reason to think they would not interact with each other again. Importantly
for my purposes, the study also illustrates how anger could possibly play an adaptive role in securing
cooperation across a broad range of conditions because it is a reactive process. It supports a ‘how
possibly’ explanation for the evolution of altruism according to which a reactive process was
selected for its role in securing cooperation, and that is all I really need if I want to show how
8
ISAAC WIEGMAN
evolutionary considerations could, in principle, undercut deontological intuitions without
undercutting evaluative intuitions more broadly.
2.2 Severing the evidential connection between retributive intuitions and retributive theories
Let us suppose that this adaptationist story is correct and that anger is a reactive process. In
order to secure the non-immediate consequences of cooperation, the reactivity of anger leads us to
act based on the past action of the free-rider rather than because of immediate outcomes relevant to
punishment (e.g. improved investment in a cooperative venture). In so acting, we manifest an
inclination toward punishment that is not motivated by the consequences of punishment. If so, then
in the context of punishment, anger includes a set of inclinations to act in accordance with R (to act
as if the value of punishing did not depend on its consequences). However, if we are inclined to
judge and act as if the value of punishment is not based on outcomes precisely because this feeling
was adaptive for securing good outcomes, then the feeling is not trustworthy regarding R. There is a
disconnect between, on the one hand, the value of punishment reported by intuition and, on the
other hand, the manner in which these intuitions arose. According to R, punishment (whether an act
or a policy) is supposed to have value apart from its consequences but these intuitions arose because
of their consequences.
Suppose for the sake of argument that there is some state of affairs that makes punishment
valuable independently of its consequences (or a state of affairs that makes R true). The retributive
intuitions produced by anger do not plausibly have any evidential connection to that state of affairs.
Anger produces intuitions that support R because such intuitions deter freeriding, but the fact that
these intuitions deter freeriding lacks an evidential connection to the states of affairs that R reports.
More specifically, deterrence (or any other consequence of punishment) cannot be an indicator of any
value that a punishment might have aside from its consequences (for reasons that I discuss in more
detail in the following section). Thus, the putative evolutionary function of anger in the production
of retributive intuitions shows that these intuitions are not good evidence for R. 12
Perhaps an analogy will flesh out the line of reasoning. Suppose that Geppetto is designing
the psychology of a cyborg that he calls Pinocchio. Geppetto wants to make Pinocchio very realistic,
and his aesthetic sensibilities favor a slightly scrawny boy. He foresees that this design preference
will result in real boys picking on Pinocchio. Thus, he programs into Pinocchio a strong drive to
resist bullies. He reasons that the policy of resisting bullies, even in cases where immediate
consequences militate against doing so, will lead Pinocchio to suffer less from bullies in the long run.
9
ISAAC WIEGMAN
Bullies will realize that it is less costly to pick on other scrawny boys who are less scrappy, and they
will bother Pinocchio less as a result. Geppetto wants Pinocchio to have the capacity for
prospection, but Geppetto cannot guarantee that Pinocchio will be able to consistently anticipate the
long-term value of resisting bullies. 13 Therefore, Geppetto designs Pinocchio with a drive to resist
bullies that is not derived from the immediate prospective value of doing so. This drive gives
Pinocchio an urge to react to the provocations of bullies rather than only to respond to the
immediate prospects (largely negative) of doing so. 14 To Pinocchio, the urge to resist is there
whether or not it will result in a good outcome, thus to him, the urge does not to derive from the
anticipated outcome of resisting (nor from the anticipated outcome of a policy of resisting). 15 Once
Geppetto completes his design, Pinocchio will tend to act and judge in accordance with the principle
that resisting bullies has value not derived from its consequences or non-derivative value. 16 He might
even discover that his intuitions about resisting bullies support the following principle and come to
consciously believe it.
B - The value of an act of resistance toward bullies is not (or not only) derived from its
consequences (or from the consequences of the policy of resisting).
From the third-person perspective, it seems obvious that Geppetto’s design has distorted
Pinocchio’s axiological beliefs about resisting bullies. If someone were to tell Pinocchio of
Geppetto’s design choices, he should no longer believe B. With the right information, he should
conclude that his inclinations to resist bullies are not good evidence for B. Since Pinocchio’s
inclinations to resist bullies are disconnected from any source of value that resistance might have
aside from its consequences, the intuitions are not good evidence for the principle. Therefore,
Pinocchio should not believe B on the basis of his intuitions.
If this argument is compelling in Pinocchio’s case, then it should also be compelling in the
case of R. If the adaptationist story about anger is correct, then the intuitions that support R secure
good biological consequences in the long run just as they would if they were designed to do so. As
such, they are similarly disconnected from any non-derivative value that punishment might have.
Thus, insofar as anger influences our intuitions about punishment, we are not justified in believing
that punishment has non-derivative value on the basis of intuition.
2.3 A more detailed explanation of the disconnect
The argument I have offered is supposed to sever the evidential connection between
retributive intuitions and the retributive principle R by showing that retributive intuitions are not a
10
ISAAC WIEGMAN
good indicator of non-derivative value (reported by R). How does this work? To answer this
question, let us take a closer look at the concept of indication. One state of affairs can indicate
another if the states are highly correlated with one another, either because one state of affairs causes (or
constitutes) the other or because both states of affairs have a common cause (or constitutive base) (Dretske, 1999). 17
The requirement of a causal or constitutive dependency relation between two variables, is intended
to rule out coincidental correlations between them. For instance, from 1999 to 2009 there was a
strong correlation between the number of people who drowned in swimming pools and the number
of films that Nicolas Cage appeared in (reported at www.tylervigen.com). However, this does not
mean that Cage appearances are an indicator of drowning deaths (or vice versa), because the
correlation could be entirely coincidental.
Now, even if there were a correlation between retributive intuitions (the inclinations that
support R) and non-derivative value (for punishment), it would be entirely coincidental
(notwithstanding a ‘pre-established harmony’ ordained by God). Thus, none of the relevant causal or
constitutive dependency relations are likely to obtain. To see this, consider the three possible
dependency relations that might explain such a correlation. First, suppose that retributive intuitions
cause or constitute a state of affairs in which punishment has non-derivative value. If non-derivative
value of punishment was constituted by the existence of retributive intuitions and if retributive
intuitions were selected for their deterrent value, then the non-derivative value of punishment would
depend on (either causally or constitutively) the deterrent value of retributive intuitions. Such a
dependency seems impossible. Given the definition of non-derivative value, there should be cases in
which punishment has non-derivative value but in which the deterrent value of retributive intuitions
fails to obtain. For instance, there are possible contexts in which retributive inclinations do not deter
freeriders (in public goods games like the one discussed above). When those with retributive
inclinations represent only a small percentage of a population, punishment for freeriding becomes so
unlikely as to obliterate the deterrent effect of these inclinations (see e.g. Bowles & Gintis, 2004). It
seems that if punishment has non-derivative value, then it should retain its value even in those
circumstances. But if this is correct, then any correlation between the deterrent value of the intuition
and the non-derivative value of punishment will be a coincidence, due to the fact that most of the
time, acts of punishment just happen to occur in a context in which retributive intuitions do have
deterrent value.
Second, consider the contrary dependency relation: suppose that the non-derivative value of
punishment causes or constitutes the states of affairs in which retributive intuitions exist or are
11
ISAAC WIEGMAN
manifested. This possibility seems to be almost entirely ruled out by the evolutionary explanation of
retributive intuitions. If that explanation is correct, then we would have retributive intuitions
whether or not punishment has non-derivative value. So it also seems unlikely that the manifestation
of retributive intuitions depends in any way on the non-derivative value of punishment. Moreover, if
these intuitions were selected for their good outcomes, then there is no reason to think that their
manifestation would depend on punishment having non-derivative value. Rather, their manifestation
will depend on whatever conditions are necessary for them to have deterrent value. Of course,
retributive intuitions might happen to be manifested in cases in which punishment has nonderivative value, but this would appear to be entirely coincidental.
Finally, suppose that retributive intuitions (either their existence or manifestation) and the
non-derivative value of punishment have a common cause. 18 This too seems impossible if the
evolutionary explanation is correct. Again, the existence of retributive intuitions depends only on
their deterrent effect. So it is hard to see how some other factor could cause retributive intuitions to
exist and also cause punishment to have non-derivative value. Likewise, it is hard to see how a third
factor could cause instances (as opposed to punishment generally) of punishment to have nonderivative value and cause retributive intuitions to be manifested. If these intuitions were selected
for their deterrent function and if this function depends on the frequent manifestation of retributive
intuitions, then it appears unlikely that non-derivative value would be caused by any of the
conditions that elicit retributive intuitions. This is because retributive intuitions would tend to be
elicited when punishment has deterrent value, and it is unclear why those conditions would cause
instances of punishment to have non-derivative value. If the two happen to co-occur then this
would be entirely coincidental.
The problem with all of these possibilities is that non-derivative value and deterrent value
are, by their definition, independent sources of value. As a result, they are constituted by different
facts, and any connection between the two sources of value (aside from divine intervention) will be
coincidental. Non-derivative value is constituted by facts about an action aside from its
consequences, whereas deterrent value is constituted by facts about the action’s outcome aside from
the intrinsic features of an action or what came before the action. Any overlap between these
sources of value is likely to be coincidental.
2.4 What the argument does not show
12
ISAAC WIEGMAN
This argument might tempt someone to conclude that retributive inclinations are
untrustworthy in the sweeping sense that we are never justified in acting or judging on their basis.
Additionally, one might think that the debunking argument also undermines the influence that
retributive intuitions might have on consequentialist theories of punishment, especially those that
justify retributive practices of punishment based on the consequences of such practices. Neither of
these conclusions follow from the debunking argument as I understand it.
A key feature of the argument is that it only severs the evidential connection between
retributive intuitions and the retributive principle R. It does not undercut their evidential support of
other beliefs or principles (ones that do not posit non-derivative value). The Pinocchio example
helps to illustrate this. Even if he stops believing that resisting bullies has non-derivative value,
Pinocchio may be warranted in acting on his urge to resist. Geppetto’s forethought and beneficent
design may give Pinocchio some warrant for acting on his urge to resist bullies. They have practical
value, even though Pinocchio must prune their apparent axiological implications (the existence of
non-derivative value). Likewise, my debunking argument provides no additional reason to mistrust
our retributive intuitions when applied to practical questions about when to punish as opposed to
axiological questions about whether it has non-derivative value. However, we cannot guarantee that
natural selection gives us retributive intuitions that are morally valuable.
Put in a slightly different way, the argument debunks retributive intuitions as evidence for
retributive standards of rightness, but does not present evidence against the value of a retributive
decision procedure (which might be adopted on a consequentialist theory of punishment). A
retributive standard of rightness might say that punishment is right if and only if it is deserved (given
the nature of a past offense). If my debunking argument is sound, then retributive intuitions do not
provide good evidence for such a standard, at least insofar as this standard implies that punishment
has non-derivative value (e.g. value that attaches to giving someone what they deserve). Whereas
acceptance of a retributive standard commits one to non-derivative value, acceptance of a retributive
decision procedure makes no such commitment. 19 This is because such a procedure might very well
be valuable or warranted because of its good consequences (e.g. deterrence). As a result, this
debunking argument also leaves room for consequentialist theories to accommodate the retributive
intuitions that support R.
By analogy, Pinocchio may very well be justified in accepting the following decision
procedure: if you have an urge to resist the bully, then do so. Pinocchio can follow such a decision
procedure while keeping in mind that there is really no non-derivative value that attaches to resisting
13
ISAAC WIEGMAN
bullies. Similarly, one could choose to follow a retributive decision procedure because one believes
that the consequences of doing so align with one’s moral or non-moral aims while also believing that
punishment lacks non-derivative value (or that it does not have any value aside from the
consequences of the decision procedure). On either way of putting the point, the only severed
evidential connection is that between our retributive intuitions and R. I cannot think of any reason
to think that they are untrustworthy in the more sweeping sense.
This is a key difference between my debunking argument and those of Greene and Singer. Rather
than only vindicating act-consequentialism over and above theories that accommodate deontological
intuitions (including certain consequentialist theories), it favors consequentialist theories quite
generally. This is because the main force of my argument is to undercut the evidential support of
deontological intuitions for deontological theories. These theories conflict with consequentialist
theories (in general) because they have opposing standards of rightness, ones that posit nonderivative value for various actions. In fact, my argument fits nicely with many indirect forms of
consequentialism (e.g. rule-consequentialism, virtue-consequentialism), because it may leave room
for these theories (but not deontological theories) to legitimately rely on (or conform to)
deontological intuitions. For instance, one might think that given their evolutionary function,
retributive intuitions are a reliable indicator that a retributive decision procedure can be justified by
its consequences. However, I emphasize that my argument does not necessarily provide any positive
support for this consequentialist theory of punishment.
2.5 Generalizing the argument
Importantly, the conclusion of the debunking argument only pertains to retributive moral
intuitions, not to all deontological intuitions. Nevertheless, if the evolution of other moral emotions
follows this same pattern (placing non-derivative value on action in order to improve fitness), then a
similar argument can be given concerning deontological intuitions more broadly. Greene provides
reasons to generalize (see esp. Greene, 2008, pp. 59–60, 72). The idea is that moral emotions are
domain-specific adaptations, where the specific domain of each moral emotion is a recurring
situation that constitutes one of the ‘…demands and opportunities created by social life’ (2008, p.
60). In programming us with emotions, nature declines to ‘…leave it to our powers of reasoning to
figure out that saving a drowning child is a good thing to do’ (2008, p. 60) or that hurting others and
lying are bad things to do. In other words, many moral emotions lead us to react to specific kinds of
situations (ones that involve inter alia assistance, punishment, promises, testimony, and incentives to
14
ISAAC WIEGMAN
harm) in specific ways rather than responding only to the prospective value of acting. This is
because the immediate prospects these situations present lean in favor of declining assistance,
avoiding confrontation and punishment, breaking promises, lying to others, and doing physical harm
to get what one wants. Moreover, acting against these inclinations is supposed to be adaptive for its
role in supporting human cooperation. If this is right, then we can generalize the argument to
undercut intuitions that support a broader range of deontological principles, specifically, any
deontological principle that the value of a certain action is not (or not only) derived from its
consequences. The case of anger and punishment allows us to see the kind of problem that would
be raised for other deontological intuitions. Nevertheless, from a methodological perspective, the
case needs to be made one moral emotion and one deontological principle at a time. 20
3. Objections and replies
3.1 Does the argument prove too much?
While there is room for optimism about how the argument might be extended, it seems to
face a serious objection. One might think that the argument also severs the evidential relation
between evaluative intuitions more broadly and the sources of value they report. For instance,
nociceptive processes produce intuitions that seem to support the claim that that pain is bad, and
they were selected to do so because of their tendency to aid survival. The worry is that my
debunking argument may force the acceptance of this more general debunking argument. Intuitions
about pain report the objective badness of pain, whereas nociceptive processes produce those
intuitions because of the biological badness of bodily insult and injury. If there is a disconnect
between derivative and non-derivative forms of value, this may commit one to a similar disconnect
between moral badness and biological badness. If so, then the evidential relation is also severed
between these intuitions and the principles they support. Therefore, the objection goes, the case
against non-prospective processes seems to again prove too much, since it also undercuts the
evaluative intuitions that support a theory of value (necessary for consequentialism). In other words,
the worry is that it does not undermine deontology any more than it undermines consequentialism.
3.2 Reply
While evaluative beliefs and intuitions may be on shaky footing, their footing is independent
of deontological intuitions. This is because my argument against deontological intuitions severs their
evidential relation with non-derivative value by showing that deontological intuitions cannot indicate
15
ISAAC WIEGMAN
non-derivative value. The argument severs this specific evidential connection not only because
deontological intuitions were shaped by evolution but also because of the content of the
deontological principles in question: that certain actions have non-derivative value. If an inclination
was selected for good outcomes like deterrence, then it cannot indicate that acting in accordance
with that inclination has non-derivative value (as deontological principles state). Thus, I am giving a
reason to doubt the evidential value of deontological intuitions (with respect to deontological
principles) that we do not have for doubting other evaluative intuitions (ones that do not posit nonderivative value).
It is an entirely different question whether an inclination that produces good biological
outcomes can indicate that certain actions have moral value (regardless of whether this value is nonderivative). This is the question that more global evolutionary debunking arguments attempt to
answer (e.g. Joyce, 2007; Street, 2006). Moreover, it is a question that does not hinge on whether
non-derivative value enters into the content of evaluative beliefs (as does the question I attempt to
answer). My argument focuses on the relation between derivative and non-derivative value, whereas
these debunking arguments focus on the relation between biological and moral value. There are
important differences between these relations. As I argued above (in section 3.3), non-derivative
value and deterrent value are, by their definition, independent sources of value. By contrast, there is
room in conceptual space for biological goods like survival to (partially) constitute moral goods like
flourishing (see e.g. Enoch, 2010).
The point is that the argument that I have given severs the evidential connection between
deontological intuitions and deontological principles in a way that does not apply to evaluative
intuitions more broadly (since other evaluative intuitions do not posit non-derivative value), so the
debunking argument does not prove too much. Thus, we have a clear case in which evolutionary
considerations have implications for first order moral discourse, somewhat independently of
metaethical concerns raised by the evolution of our moral faculties.
4. Conclusion
In their efforts to undercut some of the primary evidence against their theories, some
consequentialists have employed evolutionary debunking arguments against deontological intuitions.
So far, these arguments have met with little success, because the evolutionary considerations offered
may undercut a much wider range of intuitions. I presented a new argument that overcomes these
challenges. I argued that non-prospective processes – processes that motivate action for reasons
16
ISAAC WIEGMAN
aside from the consequences of action – might explain a range of deontological moral intuitions.
These intuitions seem to support anti-consequentialist principles, according to which the value of
various actions does not derive from the action’s outcome (among other things). Nevertheless, nonprospective processes cause deontological intuitions because they were selected to do so for their
biological outcomes. If so, then the evidential connection is severed between deontological
intuitions and non-derivative value.
Of central importance for the argument I have just given, the defect in non-prospective
processes is not just that they aim at reproductive fitness, but more specifically that they produce
deontological intuitions by influencing organisms to react to certain types of situation rather than approach
them prospectively. The adaptiveness of this tendency reveals a disconnect between the intuitions
that these processes produce and the states of affairs they seem to report (through their apparent
support of principles like R). This specific defect only undermines deontological intuitions. The
argument does not apply to evaluative intuitions more broadly because biological values and
objective sources of value do not necessarily have an independent constitutive base as do derivative
and non-derivative sources of value.
I intend intuitions to include non-inferential inclinations to judge a proposition only by considering its
content and non-inferential inclinations (not) to perform an action only by considering some representation
of an action or situation (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008, p. 209; Sosa, 2007, p. 233). The non-inferential
nature of intuitions refers to the fact that one can have an intuition that something is right or wrong, good
or bad without any accompanying justificatory explanation for the feeling (of the sort from which the
content of the intuition might have been inferred). On my view, ‘intuition’ is a theoretical term capturing a
set of phenomena with common explanatory elements (perhaps they are all caused by some psychological
process or another) that are explananda or objects of study in fields like philosophy, moral psychology,
behavioral economics and social psychology. Accordingly, one can have an intuition without judging its
content true or its practical conclusion prudent or morally right, but I do not think anything hinges on this
terminological decision. Some philosophers argue that intuitions are properly understood as judgments.
Whether or not there exists phenomena involving inclinations to judge or act (regardless of whether they in
fact lead to judgment or action) does not depend on how philosophical debate proceeds. If the phenomena
exist, then these phenomena are a proper object of study regardless of whether they consistently give rise to
actual judgments.
2 More specifically, they are tendencies to judge or act contrary to an act-consequentialist decision procedure:
‘On each occasion, an agent should decide what to do by calculating which act would produce the most
good.’ (Hooker, 2003). Henceforth, I use ‘consequentialism’ to refer to act-consequentialism (unless
otherwise indicated), and I use ‘deontological intuition’ and ‘anti-consequentialist intuition’ interchangeably.
Thanks to Julia Driver for pointing out the tendency of empirical moral psychologists to conflate
consequentialist decision procedures and consequentialist standards of rightness.
3 For the sake of simplicity, I follow Singer and Greene in focusing on the contrast between actconsequentialism and deontology, rather than making finer-grained distinctions between consequentialist
theories (e.g. between act-consequentialism and virtue-consequentialism). However, the debunking
argument I give in section 2 also favors other forms of consequentialism (e.g. rule-consequentialism, virtue1
17
ISAAC WIEGMAN
consequentialism and global-consequentialism) over deontological theories, for reasons that I discuss in
section 2.4. See esp. n. 11 and 19 for discussion of related issues.
4 One way of putting this point is that consequentialism is vacuous without a theory of value. Without some
idea of what outcomes should be valued or disvalued, there would be no way to determine which action
would be right by the lights of a consequentialist moral theory. One would be unable to evaluate the
consequences of actions. Moreover, intuitions about what things are valuable will inevitably influence any
theory of value. This makes consequentialism vulnerable to a well known evolutionary critique. For
instance, if the arguments of Sharon Street are correct, then we hold many if not all of our evaluative
intuitions not because they are true (in the sense required by realist theories of value) but because they
allowed our ancestors to more effectively spread their genes (Street, 2006). This applies to even the most
uncontroversial of evaluative intuitions: that pain is bad, that it is bad to hurt others, and that it is good to
help them. These arguments are supposed to result in a more global form of evaluative skepticism than
Greene wants; one that vitiates any value theory on which his consequentialism might draw. Nevertheless,
it is hard to see how he could reject this argument without denying premises on which his own argument
depends.
5 The dual-process view has actually been the most successful aspect of Greene’s research program. There is a
wide range of evidence that there is indeed more than one (though perhaps also more than two) processes
responsible for moral intuitions. However, there remains some debate about what distinguishes the two
processes and whether a division of the processes aligns with the distinction between consequentialist and
deontological intuitions. See (Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010; Cushman, 2013; Kahane, 2012; Kahane et
al., 2012; Paxton, Bruni, & Greene, 2014).
6 This remains true even if there is a valued outcome, perhaps justice, which attends deserved punishment.
The world may be a better place because I punish a transgressor, but it is not a better place only because of
the consequences of my action. The thought is that a consequentialist evaluation of action (as right or
wrong) ‘…depends only on [the action’s] consequences (as opposed to the circumstances or the intrinsic
nature of the act or anything that happens before the act)’ (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2003, emphasis mine). So
long as consequences are understood in isolation from what happened before the act of punishment, the
difference between a world in which the transgressor is punished and one in which she is not cannot only
be a difference in the consequences of my action but also in their relation to what came before my action
(the transgression). Moreover, one cannot understand the stated justification for punishment (as an act that
promotes justice) in isolation from what came before the act. Thus, one cannot understand this justification
as a consequentialist justification of punishment. I suspect that recent discussion of retributivism hinge on a
different understanding of consequentialism (e.g. Berman, 2011).
7 See Kahane (2012, pp. 531–533) for a similar argument that deontological reasoning often requires weighing
different duties against one another. This too seems like a process that can take many factors into account.
Though he does not draw the same conclusions that I do concerning prospective processes.
8 Though it is not clear to me that these models are essentially causal. Perhaps in humans they can represent
other assymetrical dependency relations such as the in virtue of relation or other non-causal explanatory
relations. Relations of these kinds seem crucial for comparing the value of different possible worlds.
9 I cannot review this evidence here, and in any case, much of it has been thoroughly reviewed elsewhere, see
Cushman (2013) and Crockett (2013). While Cushman focuses on the distinction between two learning
systems, he does not mean to exclude other kinds of non-prospective action selection mechanisms
(personal communication). The psychologist Nico Frijda has long emphasized the importance of impulsive
motivation, which has precisely the characteristics of the non-prospective processes that I discuss. See
(Frijda, 1986, 2010)
10 While space does not permit a thorough demonstration of this claim, I will consider Greene’s example
concerning retributive punishment in more detail below.
11 There is some psychological evidence for intuitions that support this principle (Carlsmith, Darley, &
Robinson, 2002; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Carlsmith, 2006). On my view, considerations of parsimony
suggest that retributive intuitions should be characterized in opposition to an act-consequentialist decision
procedure. Even so, in this case such intuitions seem to support a principle that opposes consequentialist
18
ISAAC WIEGMAN
theories more broadly (not just act-consequentialist theories). For instance, Michael Moore argues that
intuitions about punishment in specific cases uniquely support principles like R (Moore, 2010, Chapter 4).
That is, judgments about individual cases can lead one to believe that one should give a transgressor what
she deserves even if neither the act nor the practice will have good consequences. Nevertheless, this is
consistent with saying that the simplest way to characterize these inclinations (taken collectively) is in their
pattern of opposition to an act-consequentialist decision procedure.
12 I do not think this argument hinges on any conflation of biological and moral goods. It seems to me that if
the intuitions were shaped to bring about good consequences of any kind (e.g. biological or moral), then
they cannot indicate non-derivative value of any kind, whether moral or biological.
13 In any single encounter with a bully, Pinocchio would anticipate suffering immediate losses that he would
not suffer if he did not resist; losses that favor giving in over resisting.
14 Notice that when a desire is characterized as non-derivative in this way, it need not be indefeasible by
consequentialist considerations. That is, overturning or defeating such a desire with a competing desire to
maximize consequences does not make the defeated desire any more derivative. For instance, if a bully
threatens lethal force, Pinocchio might overcome his urge to resist because of the catastrophic
consequences of doing so. However, notice that this would not mean that the urge is derived from
anticipated outcomes. That is, when Pinocchio has this urge prior to the threat of lethal force, it is not an
urge to bring about an outcome. Rather, the right way to describe the situation is that Pinocchio feels an
urge to resist that does not derive from the consequences of doing so, but he does not give in to that urge
because of the catastrophic consequences of doing so. Retributive intuitions are similarly defeasible by
consequentialist considerations. For instance, I suspect that most retributivists would say that even if
punishment were good in itself, it would be reasonable and right not to punish someone because doing so
would have catastrophic consequences. That is, retributive intuitions seem defeasible in just the way
Pinocchio’s non-consequentialist urge could be.
15 Essentially, Geppetto programs Pinocchio with a subjective commitment device, a concept owing to the
work of several economists, (e.g. Frank, 1988).
16 It is tempting to think that non-derivative value is identical to non-instrumental value. However, I think
these concepts are distinct. For instance, a personal insult can be understood as instrumental for ‘getting
even’, but this is not to say that the value of the insult is derived from its consequences. Rather a successful
insult is constitutive of ‘getting even’. To me, this looks like an example in which an insult has nonderivative value (from the perspective of the insulter), but in which it is understood as instrumental for
another aim, namely getting even.
17 Dretske cashes out the dependency relation in terms of causation. I suspect that the dependency relation
that explains a correlation need not be causal; it could also be constitutive. See Berker (forthcoming) for a
detailed discussion of the grounding relation in connection with debunking arguments.
18 We need not consider the possibility that they have a common constitutive base, because as a matter of
definition, they do not.
19 At least, this is true so long as non-derivative value is understood directly in terms of the value of acting
and not in terms of value that is derived from the acceptance of a certain ethical decision procedure or
practice (which might have a consequentialist justification). Consider an example. Rawls (1955)
distinguishes between justifying actions within a practice of promising or punishing (both of which involve
ignoring certain reasons one might have not to promise or not to punish) and justifying the practice itself
(perhaps in terms of its consequences). Reasons that one accepts from within a practice (and which are
indirectly supported by the consequences or aims of the practice) do not count as non-derivative reasons if
they are ultimately grounded in the consequences of the practice. As a result, indirect consequentialist
theories need not be committed to the existence of non-derivative value.
20 For one, I am not sure that the moral emotions can all be explained in this way. For another, it is not yet
clear to me that all cases of non-derivative valuing derive from domain-specific adaptations of this kind.
19
ISAAC WIEGMAN
Bibliography
Balleine, B. W., & Dickinson, A. (1998). Goal-directed instrumental action: contingency and
incentive learning and their cortical substrates. Neuropharmacology, 37, 407–419.
Berker, S. (2009). The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience. Philosophy & Public Affairs,
37(4), 293–329. doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2009.01164.x
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2004). The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in
heterogeneous populations. Theoretical Population Biology, 65(1), 17–28.
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., & Bowles, S. (2010). Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains
cooperation and can proliferate when rare. Science, 328(5978), 617–20.
doi:10.1126/science.1183665
Carlsmith, K. M. (2006). The roles of retribution and utility in determining punishment.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42(4), 437–451. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.06.007
Carlsmith, K. M., & Darley, J. M. (2008). Psychological aspects of retributive justice. Advances
in Experimental Social Psychology, 40(07), 193–236. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(07)00004-4
Carlsmith, K. M., Darley, J. M., & Robinson, P. H. (2002). Why do we punish?: Deterrence
and just deserts as motives for punishment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
83(2), 284–299. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.83.2.284
Crockett, M. J. (2013). Models of morality. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(8), 363–6.
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.005
Cushman, F. (2013). Action, outcome, and value: a dual-system framework for morality.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 17(3), 273–92. doi:10.1177/1088868313495594
Cushman, F., Gray, K., Gaffey, A., & Mendes, W. B. (2012). Simulating murder: the aversion
to harmful action. Emotion, 12(1), 2–7. doi:10.1037/a0025071
Cushman, F., Young, L., & Greene, J. D. (2010). Our multi-system moral psychology:
Towards a consensus view. In The Oxford handbook of moral psychology (pp. 47–71).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dretske, F. I. (1999). Knowledge and the Flow of Information (p. 273). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Enoch, D. (2010). The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to
understand it, and how to cope with it. Philosophical Studies, 148(3), 413–438.
doi:10.1007/sl
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2003). In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 7(10), 454–459. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2003.08.012
20
ISAAC WIEGMAN
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415(6868), 137–40.
doi:10.1038/415137a
Frank, R. H. (1988). Passions within reason: The strategic role of the emotions. New York: Norton.
Frijda, N. H. (1986). The Emotions. The Emotions (Vol. 1, p. 564). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. doi:10.1093/0199253048.001.0001
Frijda, N. H. (2010). Impulsive action and motivation. Biological Psychology, 84(3), 570–9.
doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2010.01.005
Greene, J. D. (2008). The secret joke of Kant’s soul. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral
Psychology, Vol. 3, The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Development (pp. 35–80).
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hooker, B. (2003, December 31). Rule Consequentialism. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Joyce, R. (2007). The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Kahane, G. (2011). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments. Nous, 45(1), 103–125.
doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00770.x
Kahane, G. (2012). On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology. Mind
& Language, 27(5), 519–545. doi:10.1111/mila.12001
Kahane, G., Wiech, K., Shackel, N., Farias, M., Savulescu, J., & Tracey, I. (2012). The neural
basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment. Social Cognitive and Affective
Neuroscience, 7(4), 393–402. doi:10.1093/scan/nsr005
Mason, K. (2011). Moral Psychology And Moral Intuition: A Pox On All Your Houses.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89(3), 441–458. doi:10.1080/00048402.2010.506515
Moore, M. (2010). Placing blame: A theory of the criminal law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D. (2011). On What Matters, vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Paxton, J. M., Bruni, T., & Greene, J. D. (2014). Are “counter-intuitive” deontological
judgments really counter-intuitive?: An empirical reply to Kahane et al. (2012). Social
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 9, 1368–1371.
Rawls, J. (1955). Two Concepts of Rules. The Philosophical Review, 64(1), 3.
doi:10.2307/2182230
Richerson, P., & Boyd, R. (2005). Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human evolution.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Singer, P. (2005). Ethics and intuitions. The Journal of Ethics, 9(3), 331–352.
21
ISAAC WIEGMAN
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008). Framing Moral Intuitions. In W. Sinnott-armstrong (Ed.),
Moral Psychology, Vol. 2, The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Sosa, E. (2007). Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition. Philosophical Studies,
132(1), 99–107. doi:10.1007/sll098-006-9050-3
Stanovich, K. E. (2004). The Robot’s Rebellion (p. 358). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Street, S. (2006). A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value. Philosophical Studies,
127(1), 109–166. doi:10.1007/sl
Vavova, K. (2014). Debunking Evolutionary Debunking. In Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9 (pp.
76–101). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
22