The rise and demise of local governments: The case of Island Garden City of Samal

The rise and demise of local governments: The case of Island Garden City of Samal, Philippines1 Local governments are ubiquitous politico-administrative units. The Philippines is invisibly divided into these subnational territories that affect the lives of local communities in various aspects, particularly service delivery, taxation, and political participation. When citizens are enveloped in these omnipresent units, one wonders: who decides in creating or changing local political boundaries, and how are decisions made? Local territorial reform in the Philippines is predominantly characterized by fragmentation. Since 1987, eight new provinces and at least 45 new municipalities were created through division, as opposed to only two new local governments through amalgamation. Municipal amalgamation is an extraordinary case in Philippine history especially after redemocratization in 1987 and decentralization in 1991. The literature on territorial reorganization, particularly on municipal amalgamation, is scant. Municipal amalgamation—particularly its nature, and politics—has not been comprehensively investigated in the Philippines. Accordingly, the main thrust of this study is to explain why and how municipalities consolidated in the Philippines. Put differently, it is puzzling how a municipal government, with its local administrative authorities and residents, was able to bequeath territory, authority and autonomy to join a new consolidated local government. This study does not examine the impact of amalgamation. Conceptual Framework The Cambridge Dictionaries Online defines amalgamation as the process ―when separate organizations unite to form a larger organization or group.‖ Amalgamation is also known as consolidation, merger, and may sometimes refer to annexation2 as definition varies across time and space. For this paper, the author uses the term consolidation to refer to both amalgamation and annexation, while amalgamation refers only to the creation of new territorial units through union of at least two independent units, and annexation to the process of expansion of jurisdiction through addition of adjacent territories. Merger and annexation have occurred simultaneously in some countries (e.g., the United States, Canada, Japan) and are defined clearly (e.g., Canada, the US, Australia) or loosely (e.g., Japan, South Korea). Territorial reform has occurred in countries with either one- or two-tiered local government system. Local government consolidation is an old phenomenon that can be traced back in the nineteenth century, mostly in the form of annexation. For some countries (e.g., Australia, Japan), it formed part of statewide or nationwide local government reorganization efforts. Consolidation occurs in democratic (e.g, Australia, Canada, the US) and non-democratic countries (e.g., Poland and former Czechoslovakia in 1970s and 1980s) and in federal (e.g., the US, Canada, Australia) or unitary (e.g., Japan, New Zealand, South Korea) type of government. The rationale for territorial reform varies according to comprehensive reviews by several scholars (e.g., Ferrazzi, 2007; Fox & Gurley, 2006; Kitchen, 2005; Skaburskis, 2004). Ferrazzi (2007) categorizes the main rationale for territorial reform into three: (1) service delivery and efficiency, (2) financial incentives, and (3) political motivations, which include better representation, control of groups and parties, and opportunities for patronage, and economic development. 1 2 Also available at Ocenar and Tapales (2013). Local Government in the Philippines: A Book of Readings, Vol. IV. Quezon City: CLRG, UP-NCPAG. This paper draws from my master's thesis The Politics of Territorial Reform: Municipal Consolidation in Post-Decentralization Era in the Philippines submitted to Kobe University in July 2011, as well as from my PhD research on the same topic. This definition of annexation, extended at the subnational level, is derived from its old definition of ―a formal act whereby a state proclaims its sovereignty over territory hitherto outside its domain,‖ which is usually ―preceded by conquest and military occupation‖ (Encyclopædia Britannica). Thus, subnational annexation may refer to the enlargement of an existing territorial unit through the consolidation of adjacent, smaller units. Feiock and Carr (2001, 2000) and Feiock (2004) examined boundary changes in local governments by developing an institutional choice framework. They view boundary change as a collective action, but see free-riding as a problem. Solutions, according to them, include (1) the reduction of the need to solve collective action problem by enacting laws that do not require public participation (e.g., referendum, petition signatures); (2) the presence of special groups to pursue territorial reform; (3) the presence of an elite group (entrepreneur) in spearheading the reform. The third solution is the focus of their paper. They also view boundary change as a two-step process: to get the issue on the agenda, and to adopt the proposed agenda. Based on the works of other scholars on political entrepreneurs in territorial reform, they identified the following as key actors and their respective collective and selective goals: Actor Table 1. Definition and goals of boundary actors Definition Collective goals Selective goals Public officials Municipal elected officials County elected officials Government employees Community leadership Community leadership Public service Political power and reelection Political power and reelection Job protection and greater autonomy Business associations Chamber of commerce and merchants, media Manufacturers Developers and contractors Community image and status Economic development Economic development Financial gain Civic groups, good government organizations Academics and professional organizations (ASPA) African-American community, racial and ethnic minorities Homeowners associations; tax control groups Accountability and ―good government‖ Progressive reform and ―good government‖ Representation Status, prestige, and membership Influence and program expansion Greater influence, access to government Lower individual taxes, exclusion Resident/citizen organizations Lower taxes, greater access, and efficiency Financial gain Financial gain Source: Feiock, 2004, p. 299; Feiock & Carr, 2001, p. 393 According to Feiock and Carr, the emergence of potential institutional entrepreneurs as well as the choices they make are influenced by two kinds of state-level rule: ―classificatory‖ rules or those powers that are devolved to local governments, which constitute the ―prize‖ that entrepreneurs may seek in such reform (Burns, 1994 as cited in Feiock & Carr, 2001); and the ―constitutive‖ and ―reconstitutive‖ rules or those procedures that the entrepreneurs must follow to pursue reform. This study adopts this framework and examines both collective and selective goals of various actors, particularly the behaviors of the local elected officials or political elites, resident-voters and civic organizations including media, academe and business. Methodology This study employed a case study approach to document and investigate the rare phenomenon of municipal consolidation. The Island Garden City of Samal was selected as a case as it bundles two concurrent issues: amalgamation of three municipalities (i.e., abolition of these local units), and creating a new city. The investigation employed both data triangulation—by the use of archival records, documents and interviews—and respondent triangulation, by selecting numerous respondents, representing various positions on the issue, and positions in the community in all three former municipalities. Interviews were conducted from February to June 2011 with a total of 30 interviewees: eight political leaders, including Governor Rodolfo del Rosario, three councilors and four barangay officials; six employees, including one city administrator, who represented thenMayor Aniano Antalan; and 16 resident-voters, including residents who were members of civic organizations. Political leaders representing all former municipalities were selected based on their role in the decision-making process. Employees and resident-voters were selected based on convenience sampling, where all three former municipalities were represented. Archival research was carried out at the city hall and at the Commission on Elections district office in Kaputian district, as well as at the office of Davao Integrated Development Program in Davao City and the House of Representatives in Quezon City. The main analytical strategy employed in this study is within-case analysis particularly process tracing and use of counterfactuals. Legal Framework and Politics The 1987 Constitution and the 1991 Local Government Code provide for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial boundary alteration of local government units using income, population, and land area as criteria. Such reforms in local government jurisdictions (province, city or municipality level) in the Philippines can only be carried out by an act of Congress, subject to plebiscite. According to the 1987 Constitution, ―no province, city, municipality or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected‖ (Section 10, Article X). However, the creation and conversion of local government units is limited according to ―verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services‖: income, population, and land area (Local Government Code of 1991, Section 7). By extension, local governments are required to comply with the same requirements for the division and consolidation of existing local government units (Section 8). For the creation of a new city, either through consolidation or merely conversion of municipality or a cluster of barangays into a city, the Code specifically provides for the following requisites: an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least twenty million pesos (PHP20,000,000.00) for the last two consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices; and either of the following requisites: a contiguous territory of at least one hundred square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or, a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office (Section 450). Republic Act 9009 amended such provision to increase the average annual income from PHP20 million to PHP100 million (based on constant prices in the year 2000). Amalgamation, or any substantial alteration of boundaries of local governments (province, city or municipality) in the Philippines, can only be carried out by an act of Congress, subject to approval by the concerned voters through plebiscite.3 The legislative process at Congress begins at bill preparation at the House of Representatives, followed by first reading, (committee consideration/action, if necessary), second (and third, if necessary) reading, before the approved bill is transmitted to and acted on by the Senate (which has the same legislative process of readings), and, finally to the President for action (see Appendix A). The decentralization law in 1991 altered some structures that form part of the rules of political game: the significant increase in the financial resources of local governments due to the increase in internal revenue allotment or IRA4 and the increase of taxing powers by local governments, which vary according to tier.5 According to Brillantes (2003), local budgets increased by 500 percent for 3 4 5 Sections 441, 449 and 460 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The internal revenue allotment or IRA is the local governments' share of revenues from the central government. According to the Code, a two-step sharing formula is executed: firstly, the aggregate total (which is 40 percent of the actual collections) is divided among all local governments: 23 percent for province, 23 percent for cities, 34 percent for municipalities, and 20 percent for barangays; secondly, the share of respective local government (e.g., province) is then apportioned to all concerned local government units according to population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). Under the Local Government Code (Section 133), only municipalities and cities can levy community and business taxes. Real property taxes are imposed only by cities and provinces, but proceeds are shared with lower levels of governments. Additionally, cities and provinces are authorized to levy tax on the following: franchises; sand, gravel and other quarry resources; transfer of real property, amusement places; professionals; delivery vans and trucks; and idle lands. many municipalities and cities. However, although the IRA share of local government increased, compared to the national budget, the increase was negligible, particularly during the first decade of implementation. Brillantes explains that, in 1997, only 14.4 percent of total national budget was earmarked for IRA; in 2003, it increased to 17.4 percent. Moreover, dependency of local governments on IRA is high, particularly for municipalities and provinces. According to Manasan (2004), dependency on IRA from 1992 to 2003 was 47 percent, 74 percent and 81 percent for cities, municipalities and provinces, respectively. She also reports that, on average (1992-2001), more than half (55.3 percent) of the municipalities' budget went to personal services (i.e., salaries of local officials and employees). Politics and culture. Politics in the Philippines is characterized by clientelism and the rule of elites. Interspersed across the archipelago are strong elites, i.e., political families or dynasties. Political dynasties have been successfully established since the introduction of electoral politics in 1901 by the Americans (Teehankee, 1999 as cited in Cuarteros, 2010). According to Simbulan (2007), there are at least 250 political dynasties, with at least one in each of the 80 provinces. Alongside these elites is the long-established patron-client system. The culture of clientelism in the Philippines is rooted in land ownership and is nurtured by its political structure. The nature of the relationship between patron and client has evolved from controlling resources and distributing support through land ownership to controlling resources through local elective offices (Scott, 1972). The evolution was significant, particularly after the fall of the dictatorial Marcos regime, and necessary due to the introduction of agrarian reform program. However, such program became controversial as several landowners received preferential treatment, thus rendering the traditional patron-client relationship interminable. According to Lande (1964 as cited in Sidel, 1995), the common exploiters of patron-client relationships are tenants, landlords, barangay leaders, mayors, congressmen, provincial governors, senators and presidents. Gutierrez (1994, p. 9 as quoted in Sidel, 1995) identifies ―jobs, medical help, and intervention in disputes . . . business favors and solicitations‖ as common demands in patron-client transactions. KBL or kasal (wedding), binyag (baptism), and libing (funeral) is the most common apparatus for patronage and political longevity. Evidences of patron-client system are found not only in parochial rural communities, but also in highly urbanized cities. Rocamora (1995, p. xxi) argues that ―the highly personalized language of coffee and pan de sal breakfasts and funerals‖ epitomizes everyday politics in the Philippines. This patron-client system is fostered by culture, according to scholars. For instance, Wurfel (1963 as cited in Scott, 1972, p. 109) argues that politicians in the Philippines invoke reciprocity as an obligation created through individual clientship. The Filipino value of utang na loob (debt of gratitude) embodies such reciprocal obligation. This particular value, as Timberman (1991 as cited in Rood, 1998) reports, has been ingeniously exploited by political candidates during election campaigns. While Sidel acknowledges the popularity of the patron-client relationship as the leading analytical framework in understanding local politics in the Philippines, Rood (1998) argues that the weakening of the landed elite has started to take root due to increased number of contested seats at local politics, introduction by the media of new challengers mostly from the growing middle class, reduced elite dependency due to improved income, better education and more global awareness. However, evidences on how they impinge on patron-client relationship remain scant. Through patron-client system, among other political tactics, elite domination a democratic setting is perpetuated. Cuarteros (2010) reports that, in the twelfth Congress (2001-2004), more than half of the members were from political families. Specifically, from 1998 to 2007, 64 to 80 percent of all provinces were under the domination of political clans.6 Likewise, Gutierrez (1992 as cited in Cuarteros, 2010) reports that almost half (46 percent) of the winners of the elections immediately 6 Recently, Philippine politics saw the entrance of new actors outside the political clans (e.g., former Isabela Governor Grace Padaca, and former Pampanga Governor Ed Panlilio). Cuarteros (2010) attributes their success to a united democratic opposition and presence of an alternative outreach network. However, both were not able to repeat their electoral successes. following redemocratization in 1987 came from political families, whereas the ninth Congress in 1992 recorded 72 percent. Longevity and the number of political offices occupied by family members are key attributes of a political dynasty (Cuarteros, 2010). The ―key ingredients of dynasty building,‖ according to Coronel (2007), are money, machine, media or movies, marriage, murder and mayhem, myth and mergers, and their myriad combinations. Political dynasties undermine state capabilities and have constrained the development of genuine political parties in the Philippines (Simbulan, 2007). Some political dynasties maintain their own private armies that commit crimes especially during elections. There are at least 112 private armies in the Philippines in 2010 (Agence France-Presse, 2010). These despotic politicians are likened to organized criminal groups. With their own survival strategies, they attempt to control parts of the state, thus rendering it weak. Sidel refers to them as ―bosses‖ with a ―sophisticated system of brigandage,‖ whose corrupt and exploitative deeds were rendered possible through their control of elective offices (p. 43). These bosses ―construct[ed] province-wide political machines . . . exploit[ed] their access to . . . financial institutions and pork barrel funds, influence[d] over the assignment of government personnel . . . and awarding of contracts and monopoly franchises . . . [and] amassed 'private armies.'‖ (p. 388). 7 McCoy (2009) explicates that private armies have become pervasive in places not easily overseen by Manila. In addition, they are organized in areas where natural resource extraction, such as logging and mining, is rampant. McCoy explains that warlord families seek rents or state revenues to sustain their private armies, as well as to fund their patronage and electoral campaigns. Municipal Consolidation of Babak, Samal and Kaputian Historical and institutional context.8 The small archipelago of Samal is located in Davao Gulf in the eastern part of Mindanao island (see Appendix B). Prior to 1998, the islands were divided into three municipalities, were under the supervision of the province of Davao del Norte, and belonged to the second legislative district of the province. Tagum City is the capital of the province, but the highly urbanized Davao City is closer to Samal. The people of Samal island came from different parts of the country. The indigenous people (Isama) that belongs to Samal tribe is a mix of Mansakas, Mandayas and Muslims, which were once ruled by a datu (tribal chief). During the early American regime, several affluent families bought and cultivated vast areas of the island. The whole island of Samal was once a municipality of Davao from June 1948 until March 1953 when the municipality of Babak was carved and created. In June 1966, the municipality of Kaputian was created by carving out of the remaining municipality of Samal. These units were created in the spirit of local autonomy and the principle of subsidiarity. It was advocated by thenmayor of Samal, Simplicio Obenza Sr. The former municipality of Babak, an agricultural community, had 16 barangays and a land area of 8,630 hectares or 26 percent of the island. It was bounded by the former municipality of Samal in the south and by Davao Gulf in the north, east and west. In 2000, its population was 30,883, where 75 percent depended on agriculture, which is mainly coconut. In 1990, unemployment rate was at three percent. Babak was a fifth-class municipality that was envisioned to become the industrial center of the island due to its proximity to Davao City and its limited natural resources. In fact, majority of the commercial establishments in the whole island are located in Babak. In 1995, Babak had eight beach resorts, but had limited facilities, particularly financial institutions and infrastructural support (power, water, transportation and communication). A network of local telephone, radio, TV or newspaper was lacking in the whole island. Among the three former municipalities, it logged the highest total income, PHP16.9 million (1997). Babak was 7 8 While these happened in the past, similar organizations violently demonstrate their illiberal supremacy during periods of election campaign. Private armies of political dynasties received the attention and indignation of the nation when 57 people (including members of a rival political family, staff and journalists) were massacred in Maguindanao before the 2010 local elections. See Associated Press (2010) and Agence France-Presse (2010). Taken from various local government documents. The author used the most recent available data as some pertinent reports and plans were lost when offices were consolidated. ruled by several leaders (appointed or elected) since 1953: Apolonio Mahinay (1953-55), Esario Dagumay (1956-59), Ramon Anima (1960-67), Manuel Pichon (1967-79), David Uy (1980-86), Sofronio Lago (1986-88), and David Uy (1988-98). Mahinay and Lago were both appointed. In 2003, there were 27 accredited nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and peoples organizations (POs) in Babak. South of Babak was the former municipality of Samal. It was bounded by Kaputian in the south, and by Davao Gulf in east and west. It is accessible by land through Babak or by sea through its wharf. It was composed of 15 barangays. With a land area of 8,962 hectares (32 percent of the whole island), it was slightly larger than Babak. Like Babak, Samal was an agricultural community that relied heavily on coconut. In 2000, it had relatively the same population size as Babak: 27,637 inhabitants. In 1996, it had a total income of PHP10.8 million (82 percent was from IRA). In 1997, its total income was PHP13.1 million. Like Babak, it had several beach resorts but had less infrastructural support. Since 1948, the town had three elected and four appointed leaders (only the Obenzas were elected): Apolonio Mahinay (1948-51), Simplicio Obenza Sr. (1951-71), Felix Solamo (1971), Galileo Obenza (1971-86), Yolando Etaoc (1986-87), Alberto Sepulveda (1987-88), and Galileo Obenza (1988-98). In 2003, there were 30 accredited NGOs/POs in Samal district. Among the three towns, Kaputian, which is located south of Samal, was the biggest in terms of land area (11,750 hectares or 42 percent of the whole island). It was composed of 15 barangays, 12 of which were coastal. It had the smallest population among the three: 24,089 inhabitants in 2000. It was also an agricultural community, but unlike the two, 54 percent of the population relied on fishing as major source of livelihood. A large amount of the land area are under the possession of a few estate owners, thus many inhabitants in the area were also farm workers. Kaputian was included in a tourism estate project implemented by the Philippine Tourism Authority to develop resort areas. It was declared tourism zone in 1997 under Presidential Proclamation No. 1180, but much of its potential had yet to be harnessed. Unlike the other two towns, three world-class resorts are found in Kaputian. However, commercial activity was minimal and infrastructure was weak. The area can be reached by land from Babak and Samal, through air (private airstrip), or by sea through several public wharves. It had a larger income than Samal: in 1997, it had PHP15.8 million; in 1995, it had PHP12 million income (78 percent were from IRA). Since its creation in 1966 until 1998, Kaputian was ruled by only two elected political leaders: Dediano Rebong (1966-86) and Aniano Antalan (1986-1998). In 2003, there were 15 accredited NGOs/POs in Kaputian district. At least three prominent political families have ruled the province of Davao del Norte: the del Rosario-Floirendos, the Amatongs, and the Sarmientos. The del Rosario-Floiredos are currently the only active political clan in the area (see Table 1). When Amatong finished his nine-year term in governorship in 1998, Rodolfo del Rosario, who controlled the legislative seat in the area since 1978, replaced him in governorship. Amatong became the representative of the newly carved province, Compostela Valley, out of Davao del Norte, while del Rosario's vacated seat in Congress was passed on to his nephew, Antonio Floirendo Jr., whose father, Antonio Floirendo Sr., a Marcos crony, established Tadeco, the biggest banana plantation in the country. Sarmiento, on the other hand, had ruled the first legislative district of Davao del Norte. Sarmiento also has relatives who are politicians in Bulacan province. Name Table 2. Political dynasty of del Rosario-Floirendo families in Davao del Norte Relationship to Government position Period Rodolfo Rodolfo del Rosario Anthony Rafael del Rosario Son Antonio R. Floirendo* Nephew Representative Minister, Environment and Natural Resources Representative (3rd district, Davao del Norte) Provincial governor (Davao del Norte) 1978-86 1984-86 1987-98 1998-2013 Provincial board member Vice-governor (Davao del Norte) Representative (1st district, Davao del Norte) No data 2004-07 2010-13 Barangay captain, Panabo 1989-98 Jr. Ex-officio provincial board member Representative (2nd district, Davao del Norte) 1989-95, 1997-98 1998-2007 Barangay captain, Island Garden City of Samal (Ex-officio provincial board member) 2010-13 Vicente Floirendo Nephew Antonio F. Lagdameo Jr. Nephew of his Representative (2nd district, Davao del Norte) nephew, Antonio Vincent Garcia** Nephew Representative (2nd district, Davao City) 2007-13 2001-07 Sources: Commission on Elections (2010a), Simbulan (2007), Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (2004), House of Representatives (2011); * is also related to Antonio F. Lagdameo Jr. (nephew), who is an incumbent representative (2 nd district, Davao del Norte), 2007-13; **is also related to prominent political families in Davao City (the Garcias) and in Isabela Province (the Albanos) The idea of municipal amalgamation. Documents and interviews show that the idea to merge the three municipalities in the island came from its former Congressman Rodolfo del Rosario. The intent was to merge three municipalities to create a city. According to del Rosario,9 the idea traces its origin in 1978, when he was campaigning for assemblyman and sought to create a sub-province of Samal. However, under the new constitution at that time, the sub-province was already deleted as a political unit. Del Rosario adds that the idea of consolidation had resurfaced a few years before 1998, when, after devolution and local autonomy in 1991, it became increasingly difficult for the three sets of local officials, due to local turfs and jurisdictions, to consolidate plans and propose a single master plan to develop the island. The idea of cityhood had floated as early as 1994-95, according to several respondents. Del Rosario's intention was to inject impetus for faster development in the area. In the explanatory note of House Bill No. 9451, del Rosario justifies that cityhood, through merger of three towns, would ―ensure the holistic human development and ecological integrity‖ in the island by ―consolidating and putting into place the infrastructure needed,‖ as well as ―resolve the island's lack of parity in the political life . . . due to its geographical remoteness‖ through a separate legislative representation10 in Congress. According to Cleto Gales Jr.,11 incumbent city administrator, the slow development in the island was due to its inherent handicap: physical isolation (being an island), far from the provincial capitol (Tagum City), which resulted in marginalization of funds and lesser economic activity and opportunity. Thus, the cityhood would not only allow consolidation of development plans, but would also guarantee IRA increase, taxing powers and valuation of real properties. The expected increase in IRA was significantly huge: from combined municipal IRA of about PHP45 million to an IRA of PHP250 million. However, several respondents believe that the consolidation/cityhood was purely a political move. Jaime Pichon,12 former municipal councilor of Babak, thinks the cityhood was a ―political landmark.‖ Jay-ar Orlanes,13 an NGO member from Kaputian, sees the city as an ―offshoot of RDR [Rodolfo del Rosario] political domination.‖ According to Inone Almazan,14 former NGO member and incumbent barangay chairman, part of the reason was to accommodate outgoing politicians, such as Atty. Artemio San Juan, who was on his last term in provincial council, and ran for city mayor immediately after the cityhood but lost. These observations were inescapable considering the political milieu at that time: the cityhood was not only seen as an act to strengthen RDR's political control of the island, it was part of a ―larger political gerrymandering,"15 which would expand political organization, create new local 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Del Rosario, R. (2011, February 16). Governor of Davao del Norte, and fomer congressman of the second district of Davao del Norte. Interview. This proposal never came to fruition. Gales, C. (2011, February 14 and 17). City administrator of IGaCoS and former private sector employee. Interview. Pichon, J. (2011, February 15). City councilor of IGaCoS and former municipal councilor of Babak. Interview. Orlanes, J. (2011, February 18). IGaCoS water district employee and former NGO leader in Kaputian. Interview. Almazan, I. (2011, February 15). Barangay captain of Peñaplata, IGaCoS. Interview. While the cityhood of Samal (through consolidation of three towns) as well as the creation of a new legislative positions and political seats (especially for outgoing local officials), both Gales and Mario Pacaldo,16 former planning officer of Babak, remark. Hur Camporedondo,17 an NGO leader, adds that the motive of such gerrymandering was ―to divide and rule, and protect and develop their interests.‖ Camporedondo refers to the latter as the real properties and businesses of RDR and Floirendos in the island, which would directly be benefitted once the cityhood takes effect. Key supporters and opponents. The strongest allies of then-congressman del Rosario were all the mayors of three municipalities, who were all ―last-termers‖ (outgoing officials). According to interviews, there were no significant opposing groups in Samal and Babak, whose mayors commanded their respective local councils. Moroever, there were no civic organizations that strongly opposed the idea in Samal and Babak. Camporedondo, a resident of Babak, however, identified himself as a strong opponent of the cityhood, but as a private citizen and not as a civic leader. In Kaputian, there were a few councilors who opposed. The loudest opposition was Jeffrey Prieto, an ex-officio member of the local council representing the youth. Together with Amado Asoy, Jay-Ar Orlanes and several others, they formed a small church-based group called Kaminos to oppose the idea of consolidation/cityhood. Gales adds that, in various consultations and meetings, a few businessmen were apprehensive due to the expected increase in taxes, but they did not actively participate in the campaign. Process and dynamics. Although the idea of consolidation (as a sub-province) was conceived in the late 1970s, the idea of cityhood floated as early as 1994-95. The bill to create a city through consolidation was introduced by del Rosario in 1997 as House Bill No. 9451 during the second regular session of the tenth Congress. It was approved by Congress and was signed into law as Republic Act No. 8471 by then-President Fidel Ramos in January 1998. The law was ratified by the residents through plebiscite in March 1998, and the new city commenced its corporate powers in July 1998, following the election of new set of city officials in May 1998. Before the bill was filed in Congress, del Rosario asked the support of three local mayors and convinced them that ―in the long run, it would be for the greater glory‖ of Samal. Getting their support was effortless as all mayors were under del Rosario's political party, and were all outgoing officials. Through the mayors' assistance, he then met with and convinced all members of the three local councils to pass resolutions supporting the bill. Such resolutions allowed him to strongly justify the consolidation/cityhood in Congress by explicating that such council decision was indicative of the people's will. Del Rosario himself recalls that the local councils were initially apprehensive due to the impending decrease in the number of council seats. He allayed their fears by requesting 24 seats in the proposed city council. Generally, the local councils supported the bill due to strong loyalty to the mayors and to the party, Samuel Rosario,18 former councilor of Kaputian, explains. In Kaputian, the opposition to the then-ruling party also opposed the idea of consolidation. One ex-officio councilor even established Kaminos to campaign against cityhood. However, according to Nelson Aquino,19 former NGO member, Kaputian had the strongest resistance due to lack of information. He adds that a few councilors opposed merely because they were part of the 16 17 18 19 district in the area were proposed, the creation of new province of Compostela Valley from carving one legislative district (as well as additional municipalities) from the province of Davao del Norte, cityhood of Tagum (the capitol), and the creation of a new municipality, Braulio Dujali, were all being proposed in Congress by their respective representatives, with the support of all congressmen and provincial governor, who were all on their last term. All (except the creation of new legislative district) were enacted as laws, had the same plebiscite date, and were ratified by their respective residents through referendum. Pacaldo, M. (2011, February 15). Assistant city planning and development coordinator of IGaCoS, and former planning officer of Babak. Interview. Camporedondon, H. (2011, February 18). NGO leader in Babak district, IGaCoS. Interview. Rosario, S. (2011, February 15 and 18). City councilor of IGaCoS, and former municipal councilor of Kaputian. Interview. Aquino, N. (2011, February 18). Officer-in-charge of City Tourism Office of IGaCoS, and former NGO member in Davao City. Interview. opposition party. While some were apprehensive, some saw it as an opportunity, considering that the next local election was only a few months away, Gales remarks. Table 6 shows how the votes were cast. Affirmative votes in local council in Samal and Babak were unanimous according to records and interviews. Vote Table 3. Breakdown of votes by elected officials in Samal, Babak and Kaputian, by party affiliation and rank in council* Rank in local council Party affiliation 1st to 4th 5th to 8th Samal Number of affirmative votes (8) Same party as mayor 2 4 Opposition party/independent 2 0 Same party as mayor 0 0 Opposition party/independent 0 0 Same party as mayor 4 4 Opposition party/independent 0 0 Same party as mayor 0 0 Opposition party/independent 0 0 Same party as mayor 4 2 Opposition party/independent 0 0 0 0 0 2 Number of negative votes (0) Babak Number of affirmative votes (8) Number of negative votes (0) Kaputian Number of affirmative votes (6) Number of negative votes (2)** Same party as mayor Opposition party/independent 20 21 22 Sources: Interviews with Pichon, Rosario, Olden, Municipality of Samal (1996a); * Not included are votes by ex-officio members of the council; ** One ex-officio member of the council, who belonged to opposition party, was also a strong opponent of cityhood/consolidation According to del Rosario, the bill was the result of a study conducted by his congressional office, as well as from his consultations with local officials, particularly the mayors. The bill filed in Congress was the first consolidation bill in Philippine history since decentralization in 1991, when many local government units were created through fragmentation. The bill, del Rosario adds, surprised many of his colleagues in Congress, who thought it would not materialize as it was hard enough to talk to one mayor, let alone convince three mayors to give up their respective local turfs. After the bill was filed on May 23, 1997, it was immediately read and referred to the Committee on Local Government. On a meeting on August 13, del Rosario provided certified copies of local government income, land area and population, the basic requirements to create a new local government. Council support of the three municipalities and the province in the form of council resolution as well as a development plan were submitted in accordance with the 20 21 22 Pichon, J. (2011, June 1). Telephone Interview. Rosario, S. (2011, June 1). Telephone Interview. Olden, G. (2011, June 14). Telephone Interview. implementing rules and regulations of the Local Government Code. In that meeting, del Rosario assured the Committee members that they will not be met with strong opposition. In aid of legislation, a schedule for public hearing was then set. The public hearing, chaired by Ciriaco Alfelor, was held at Samal island on August 24, just a few weeks after it was deliberated in the Committee. Though the transcript of the hearing does not show the number of attendees, one interviewee's estimate placed it at 400, including all three mayors, vice-governor, mayor of Panabo City, local councilors, barangay captains, national and local bureaucrats, residents, as well as representatives of Samal Island Business Club, religious organization. Del Rosario, in his speech, acknowledged the sacrifice being made by the affected municipal officials and local employees for the impending merger. He enumerated several reasons to merge to become a city: slow development pace, the potential of the island for tourism industry, according to a study conducted during the Marcos regime, the need to look after the interest of the whole island (as many outside investors had been accumulating low-priced land), and the need to preserve the environment. Various key actors, particularly mayors, councilors, and barangay leaders signified their strong support to the bill, while some attendees, particularly residents, remained unconvinced or distrustful. The key issues discussed include economic immaturity of the area, impending tax increase, and local equity (e.g., marginalized poor against allocation of larger budget to newly created positions). Other issues raised include the loss of elective and administrative positions. Del Rosario responded to tax increase by providing a five-year tax moratorium in the bill, and alluded to higher land valuation (which would also benefit small landowners) after the moratorium. As Alfelor denied his strong endorsement of the bill to appear impartial, both congressman were from the same ruling political party. Alfelor openly admired the ―smart proposal‖ as only 68 cities were sharing a very big pie of the IRA. He then reminded the local officials that a five-year development plan and zoning ordinance would be necessary for its Committee approval, as the bill had to be endorsed and defended by the Committee chair during the second reading. As for the impending loss of political and administrative seats, del Rosario noted that he was able to acquire the support of all three local councils in endorsing the bill to Congress. Samal Councilor Batiansela stated that, while at first they opposed the congressman, they eventually supported the bill because of the promise of better planning, budgeting and development. One attendee pointed out that the copy of the bill was received only by some people on the day of the public hearing, while another attendee observed that the primer only enumerated the advantages. Towards the end of the hearing, Congressman Lopez suggested that the proposed name be changed to Island City of Samal. On October 1, the bill was approved at the Committee Level. Congressman Reginaldo Tilanduca moved to approved the bill, which included the amendment to change the name as proposed by Lopez. The move was seconded by Congressman Perez. On its second reading on October 29, the bill was approved and was immediately distributed to all members of the House. With 136 votes, no abstention and no dissent, the House of Representatives approved the bill on its third reading on November 17. Due to the absence of available transcript, committee deliberations at the Senate level are not included in this paper. However, the interview with del Rosario reveals that, while the House approved the proposed 24 seats in the proposed city council, the Senate only agreed to 12 seats, four for each proposed district: Babak, Samal and Kaputian. Moreover, while the House amended the city name to Island City of Samal, the Senate agreed to insert the word ―garden,‖ thus the official name Island Garden City of Samal. In an interview with Marilyn Bustamante, 23 former council secretary of Samal, two types of council resolutions were formulated: discrete resolutions during the House deliberation, and a joint resolution for the Senate deliberation. 23 Bustamante, M. (2011, February 15). Assistant city council secretary of IGaCoS, and former council secretary of the Municipality of Samal. Interview. After the House agreed to the amendments by the Senate, then-President Fidel Ramos signed the bill into law as Republic Act No. 8471 on January 30, 1998. The required ratification by the citizen-voters through plebiscite was then set on March 7. Issues, debates and campaigns. Kaputian saw some apprehensions and oppositions from both the local council and the community. According to Aquino, many residents in Kaputian viewed the town as the minority and ―would be deprived of development‖ as it is the least accessible area among the three. Gaspar Valera,24 former provincial board member, recalls that, because people thought development would concentrate more in Babak and Samal, del Rosario went to Kaputian to convince local officials using the increase in IRA as the primary tool for persuasion. When the bill was under deliberation in Congress, del Rosario discussed among local officials the possibility of having only 12 councilors, as the government could not afford to pay the salaries of 24 councilors. While, at first, the councilors ―vehemently questioned it,‖ they were ―patriotic enough to accept [his] plan,‖ he remarks. Several respondents believe that people were not prepared. Camporedondo and Orlanes feared that because the process was ―fast‖ and ―abrupt,‖ people might have trouble coping with the changes it would bring. For the residents in general, the recurring issues at that time were related to taxes and social problems, such as social influx or increase in migration and criminality. Loss of identity was also cited by several respondents. For most businessmen, increased taxes was the chief cause of their apprehension, as well as competition from outside investors. The proposed cityhood, however, was favorable to owners of resorts, as the number of tourists could significantly increase. Several respondents also feared that due to impending increase in land valuation, landowners might be tempted to sell their lands, which would lessen agricultural productivity. For local officials and for those who had political ambition, reduction in the local seats was repulsive. For local employees, fears were quickly allayed when their respective mayors assured them that all regular employees would be accommodated in the proposed city hall. Early retirement program was made an option, although, for all the department heads across three towns, consolidation of departments would mean demotion for two department heads. Campaigns were waged at all levels. Del Rosario himself campaigned for consolidation/cityhood through series of meetings with local officials, while the mayors themselves met with their respective local employees and constituents. Municipal officials also held series of meetings with barangay officials. Most of the fears by the residents were allayed by the campaign teams in each municipality. For example in Babak, the campaign team comprised of councilor Orly Amit, one representative of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, and Norma Candol, an election assistant. Together, they went to all 16 barangays but with different goals. According to Candol,25 her main task was to urge the residents to vote on the plebiscite day, while the other team members were convincing and educating people of the advantages of cityhood. Aside from advocacy work in every barangay, there were series of public consultations held. A public assembly in Samal was held in a park, but information campaign was not massive, according to Almazan. As local radio and television were absent in the island, campaign was mostly done through face-to-face meetings. A few respondents recall seeing flyers. Aquino adds that, in far-flung areas in Kaputian, their campaign team used entertainers and provided snacks to attendees. In the campaign process, most issues were discussed and resolved through promises and speculations. On the side of the pro-cityhood group, the following economic incentives to convince people and dispel their apprehensions were used in their rhetoric: IRA increase, faster economic development, more infrastructure and investors, improved tourism in general, more employment and social programs, and even the pleasant image that the city name conveys. It is evident that economic development was used more prominently in arguments than efficiency or equity. Aquino adds that the charisma of the local leaders, particularly the mayors, helped in changing the mindset of the residents: ―When you say something, majority of the people will believe [it].‖ 24 25 Valera, G. (2011, February 17). City Councilor of IGaCoS. Interview. Candol, N. (2011 February 17). City election assistant of Babak district of IGaCoS, and former election assistant of the Municipality of Babak. Interview. Lastly, when some members of Congress came to hold their special committee hearing in the island, ―people [got] excited‖ but remained passive such that most of the unresolved ―issues eventually died,‖ Camporedondo recalls. As it took time to explain to constituents the pros and cons of cityhood/consolidation, Orlanes observes that awareness level among the three towns were different: both Samal and Babak had more ―professional and opinionated residents,‖ whereas Kaputian, ―not economically at par‖ with others, lacked awareness and had different political orientation. While some respondents see Kaputian as generally lacking awareness on issues, a minor opposition group emerged and created some noise in the community. The Kaminos campaigned not only among members of church-based groups, but also in several barangays. According to Merson Erandio,26 a resident of Kaputian, the group capitalized on their vast network in the barangays. With 10-15 members, they held small group meetings but were not able to sustain their campaign nor reach all constituents in Kaputian. The group argued that the island as well as its residents was not ready yet to become a city. The campaign period leading to the plebiscite in March 1998 became a timely springboard for the May 1998 local elections. Gales recounts that those who had political ambition became active participants in the campaign for or against the cityhood.27 The political party regrouping that resulted from plebiscite was quintessential local politics in the Philippines; for instance, while the then-mayors of Babak and Samal supported the party of del Rosario, then-mayor Aniano Antalan of Kaputian became opposition as he decided to let his brother, Rogelio, run for mayor.28 Role of barangay leaders, employees and civic organizations. As barangays were the closest government institutions to the people, their support was deemed significant. According to various respondents, all mayors met with barangay leaders to convince them to support cityhood/consolidation. Purok (small sector of barangay) meetings and barangay assemblies were called by barangay officials. However, according to Quirino Bastasa, 29 barangay captain of Miranda in Babak, not all citizen-voters in his jurisdiction attended the meetings. With the help of around seven purok leaders and three full-time barangay health workers, they conducted at least two public meetings, used posters, and also campaigned directly to households. Similarly, Rosario Gales,30 an NGO leader, recounts attending a barangay meeting: people were cooperative, but there was difficulty in transporting people from far-flung areas, as there were no transportation services at night, and electricity was limited only to urban areas. It was a challenge for barangay leaders to gather people, she remarks. Some local employees also became active partners of municipal governments in convincing the people. As previously discussed, some of them formed part of campaign teams. Moreover, as hinted earlier, the role of media and business council was nonexistent, as these organizations themselves were nonexistent. In Kaputian, Kaminos, a church-based group, was organized to oppose cityhood. In Babak, Camporedondo31 admits he failed to coordinate with Kaminos as well as with the parish priest in Babak, who also opposed the cityhood. He actively participated in meetings and assemblies but as a personal advocacy, and not representing an NGO that he at that time chaired. Voters education and plebiscite results. As previously discussed, a campaign team in Babak 26 27 28 29 30 31 Erandio, M. (2011, February 18). Resident of Kaputian. Interview. While many incumbent councilors ran anew and competed for limited number of seats in the new city council, several members of the opposition group, Kaminos, also ran for council. Aniano and the other mayors of Babak and Kaputian decided not to run for city mayor due to a technicality, because they were all outgoing officials (but cityhood would in fact give them a fresh start). Del Rosario fielded Artemio San Juan, who was also an outgoing provincial councilman, against Rogelio, who eventually won the mayorship of the newly created city. After ruling for nine years, he was replaced by his brother Aniano, the former mayor of Kaputian. Bastasa, Q. (2011, February 17). Resident of Babak district, and former barangay captain of Miranda, Babak. Interview. Gales, R. (2011, February 17). Adviser of Council of Women in IGaCoS, and former school head and cooperative chairperson. Interview. Camporedondo, H. (2011, June 1). Telephone Interview. was established to campaign for cityhood. Candol's role as an election officer was to urge people to vote in the plebiscite. In Kaputian, an anonymous election officer, 32 remarks that, irrespective of the campaigns, the citizen-voters were not ready at that time. In the March 1998 plebiscite,33 the voters were asked two questions: one for their decision on the creation of the Compostela Valley province (carved out of Davao del Norte province) pursuant to R.A. 8470, and the other is on the creation of the Island Garden City of Samal out of the merged municipalities of Babak, Samal and Kaputian pursuant to R.A. No. 8471. Table 4. Plebiscite results in Babak, Samal and Kaputian Municipality Total no. of Total no. of Voters' Total votes registered voters who turnout Yes Share No voters actually (in voted percentage) Share Babak 14,076 7,711 54.78 5,996 83.0 1,228 17.0 Samal No data No data *50-60 No data *80-95 No data *5-20 Kaputian 13,003 6,780 52.14 3,760 61.8 2,324 38.2 Average 76.6-79.9 20.1-23.4 Sources: Commission on Elections (1998a; 1998b); * Due to lost data, estimates based on interviews were used instead (for the affirmative votes, estimates from two local councilors were between 80 and 90, and around 95 percent). The affirmative vote won with an average share of around 78 percent of the total number of votes, thus ratifying the amalgamation and cityhood. However, turnout in all three towns was low. As shown in Table 7, among the three towns, Kaputian, where a visible opposition group emerged, had the lowest number of affirmative votes, 61.8 percent. The low turnout could be attributed to the wait-and-see attitude of the people, according to Pichon and Guillermo Olden,34 then-councilor of Samal. The lack of political awareness and readiness of the people, as expressed by Kaminos and the local election officers, might have also contributed to the low turnout. Interview with residents, employees and barangay leaders. Interviews, done through convenience sampling among residents, local government employees and village leaders, show why they supported or rejected the consolidation/cityhood Table 5. Summary of motives for supporting consolidation, according to interviews Frequency Political leaders (including congressman, representatives of mayor and congressman, councilors, barangay officials) Collective goal (i.e., IRA increase, faster development) 6 Support to mayor/congressman 2 Employees (including employees deployed by the national government) Collective goal (i.e., IRA increase, faster development) 4 Support to mayor/congressman/party 2 Selective goal for employees (i.e., higher salary) 2 Residents (including members of civic organizations) Collective goal (i.e., IRA increase, faster development) 8 Support to mayor/congressman/party 1 Selective goal for resident-businessmen (i.e., financial gain) 1 Selective goals (e.g., political power and re-election) of politicians as cited by residents and employees 32 33 34 9 Anonymous (2011, February 18). Commission on Elections officer, Kaputian district. Interview. Plebiscites are normally conducted within 120 days from the day the law (Republic Act) takes effect. Olden, G. (2011, February 15). City councilor of IGaCoS, and former municipal councilor of Samal. Interview. Source: Various interviews; * Many respondents had multiple answers, thus total responses do not match the total number of respondents Almost all respondents were aware that the consolidation was the idea of del Rosario and supported by their respective mayors. Residents of three towns supported the consolidation mostly because of general economic incentive: faster economic development. Others stated in particular the increased IRA, infrastructure projects, influx of tourists and business investments. One respondent also voted affirmatively as ―bayad utang na loob kay del Rosario dahil sa kuryente‖ (repayment of debt of gratitude to del Rosario due to his electrification project in the island). Those who opposed identified the following reasons: not yet ready to become a city, Kaputian had more local income from tourism than Babak and Samal. A few of the respondents who did not vote said they were not aware, they opposed silently, or they knew the cityhood law was going to win anyway. One respondent could not recall her vote. Most of the respondents were made aware of the issues, but not all of those who were aware attended the meetings. Only a few of the respondents said they there was no information campaign in their area. Their main source of information was the local officials (both municipal and barangay) through meetings and assemblies. For employees and village leaders, the reasons to support the cityhood were varied: many stated IRA increase and faster development, while a few mentioned better services and more development projects. One employee voted affirmatively to support her mayor, whereas another voted to support the law as well as because it would benefit the employees. At least one barangay leader supported the consolidation to support del Rosario. While no respondents in this group voted negatively, one respondent could not recall his vote. Key Findings The municipal amalgamation in Samal Island illustrates a multi-level and multi-player decision-making process in the Philippines. In the investigation of the question ―why did the three municipalities amalgamate,‖ the answers lie on the motives (both collective and selective goals) and behaviors of key decision-makers: citizen-voters, national legislators, local legislators, and the congressman, the key political entrepreneur. In the investigation of ―how did the municipalities decide to amalgamate,‖ the identification of the crucial decision points and the underlying causal mechanisms at each point proved to be instructive. Referendum. At the final decision-making level (i.e., referendum), the voters’ decision are assumed to be influenced by the salient provisions of the proposed bill or charter. The provision on tax and the expected increase in the IRA budget are the two salient issues for them. However, the mechanisms of bargaining, issue framing, cueing, and clientelism were observed. Bargaining was evident during Congress deliberations/public hearing when the congressman (and his supporters) allayed the fears of tax increase by inserting a five-year tax moratorium on the provisions of the bill. How issues are framed is equally important. According to Leland and Thurmaier (2004), economic development is a strong argument, while efficiency and equity are weak arguments. The use of weak arguments will lead to a failed merger even with the existence of a strong opposition, while the use of strong argument increases the likelihood of merger, with even odds when strong opposition is present. On the side of the pro-cityhood group, the following economic incentives to convince people and dispel their apprehensions were used in their rhetoric: budget increase, faster economic development, more infrastructure and investors, improved tourism in general, more employment and social programs, and even the pleasant image that the city tag conveys. The use of the issues of revenue share increase and economic development in framing the rhetoric of the promerger group helped garner more affirmative votes, but not overwhelmingly due to the presence of strong opposition group in Kaputian (61.8). Efficiency was never used as an argument in the campaign of pro-consolidation campaign. This finding is consistent with that of Leland and Thurmaier's predicted results based on the use of arguments. Table 6 shows how the voters mirrored the united or divided position of their local officials. The unity of local elites affected voters' decision, i.e., the share of affirmative votes varied according to position of elected local officials, whether united or divided, and the presence and strength of opposition campaign. Table 6. Plebiscite results, unity of local officials, presence of opposition group, and strength of opposition campaign Municipality Share of ProAntiStrength and reach of proStrength and reach of antiyes votes consolida consolidatio consolidation campaign consolidation campaign tion local n group officials Babak 83.0 Mayor None Strong campaign (support of Nonexistent-to-weak and local elected leaders and campaign (due to absence of whole congressman), moderate-to-wide opposition group and media) council reach (due to organized meetings in every barangay) Argument: IRA increase; faster economic development; more investments; improved tourism Samal 80 - 95 Mayor None Same as above Same as above and whole council Kaputian 61.8 Mayor Kaminos Same as above Moderate campaign (due to and organized but small majority opposition) and weak-tomoderate reach (due to of the organized meetings in some council barangays) Argument: Kaputian will be the minority area and will be left behind; increase in social problems; citizens are not ready; tax increase; loss of identity Sources: Various documents and interviews In Babak and Samal—where the key local political entrepreneurs, i.e., the mayor and the whole council, were all supportive and there was no visible opposition—the affirmative votes were very high, above 80 percent. In Kaputian, where the mayor and majority of the council were supportive but an opposition emerged, a much lower affirmative votes were garnered: 61.8 percent. Another mechanism that plays a role play in amalgamation is clientelism. The statement of one interviewee sums it up: he voted affirmatively as ―bayad utang na loob kay del Rosario dahil sa kuryente‖ (repayment of debt of gratitude to del Rosario due to his electrification project in the island). Moreover, in interview with Del Rosario, he referred to himself as responsible for ―bringing‖ electricity, water and investment in the island. National Legislation. Before the law was presented for ratification by the voters, it underwent several legislative processes. The penultimate level was at Congress. How was the agenda of amalgamation and cityhood set in Congress? Although the key actors here are national legislators, self-interest is less salient as the bill is of local origin and significance, and therefore has no direct implications to their respective jurisdictions. Hence, compliance to legal and procedural requirements would affect the decision to approve the merger bill. Had the bill not met one of the basic criteria as identified above, it would not have been approved by Congress. Moreover, had the affected local councils not supported the bill through resolution, Congress would not have approved the bill. However, several causal mechanisms might be in play: use of political influence and partisanship. Such use of influence bears similarities to influence peddling, where the entrepreneur uses his network in the government to obtain favors. In Samal's case, partisanship and political reputation might have been used to get the bill approved. Del Rosario is a veteran lawmaker (elected in Congress in 1978-98) and belongs to a political dynasty in Davao, while the Chair of the Committee on Local Government, Alfelor, is also a veteran lawmaker (1984-98) and a member of a political family in Camarines Sur. Both are from the same party, LAKAS-NUCD, the dominant party of the ruling coalition then. Moreover Congressman Tilanduca, the one who urged to approve the bill during the Committee meeting, was from NPC party, which joined the ruling coalition led by LAKAS-NUCD at that time. Local Legislation. Before the bill was approved in Congress, local council support through resolution had to be legislated. Politicians are benevolent and self-interested individuals. Their benevolence may also be construed as self-interest in disguise. In interviews, all politicians cited the increase in revenue share as a reason to support the bill. However, political survival was as stake. According to interviews, several councilors were originally against the bill due to the impending loss of many seats. Through political negotiation and partisanship, the council eventually supported the congressman. To allay the fears of councilors, the author allocated 24 seats in the proposed city government (hence, no seat would be lost). However, during the Senate deliberation, this was reduced to half. All three mayors were all under the same party as the Congressman, and thus supported the bill. All three were on their last terms, hence they were not directly affected. All councilors, who were under the same party as the mayor, also supported the bill. In interviews with local officials, some of them identified party loyalty or support to mayor/congressman as key decision factor. According to the Congressman himself, while, at first, the councilors ―vehemently questioned it,‖ they were ―patriotic enough to accept my plan,‖ he remarks. Those who had political ambition became active participants in the campaign for or against the cityhood. The campaign period leading to the plebiscite in March 1998 became a timely springboard for the May 1998 local elections. Many incumbent councilors ran anew and competed for limited number of seats in the new city council. Several members of the opposition group, Kaminos, also ran for council. While, the creation of a new city government would render the mayors qualified to run anew, this time as city mayor, but none of them ran in the 1998 elections for fear of legal technicalities. Setting the Agenda. But why did the congressman file the bill? Del Rosario’s inclusion of amalgamation/cityhood in the agenda is an act of political opportunism. Becoming a city dramatically increases the revenue share from the national government. In Samal's case, the combined municipal IRA of about PHP45 million was expected to increase to about PHP250 million. Several congressmen even admired the smart proposal of del Rosario as only a few cities at that time were sharing the biggest revenue pie from the national government. Becoming a city also increases taxing powers and valuation of real properties, as well as political leverage of the city in district, province and regional levels. If there were no strong incentives to become a city, the three towns in Samal Island would not have amalgamated at all. While the need to improve socio-economic condition was identified, amalgamation was also utilized for purposes of patronage and election sweetening in time for 1998 elections. It became a tool to strengthen political control of the area. Del Rosario, who was on his last term as congressman of the second district of the province, ran as governor in 1998 and won. Atty. Artemio San Juan, a known supporter and friend of del Rosario, who was on his last term in the provincial board, ran for city mayor immediately after the merger/cityhood was ratified but lost. His nephew, Floirendo, then-provincial board member, ran as congressman and won. Summary and Conclusion In demonstrating the causal path of amalgamation in Samal, it was necessary to identify the stages and key events and actions that took place. The decision making process involved many actors and several stages. The local council resolution, committee level deliberations at Congress and referendum are deemed as the most crucial stages in amalgamation. The decision-makers were motivated by their selective and collective goals. The salient provisions of R.A. No. 8471 constituted the prizes that they sought to alter. Citizen-voters were mostly concerned about service delivery (budget) and taxes. Tenure, promotion and salary increase were the salient issues for local bureaucrats, while political survival was at stake among local politicians. Though the crucial battlefield was at the local level, key decision points were also controlled by the national level (both chambers of Congress and the president). Hence, the key policy entrepreneur that may influence both local and national decisions is the congressman. This case study shows the importance of the advocacy and influence of the congressman, particularly in setting the agenda at the local level, and in getting the agenda approved in Congress. Likewise, the congressman is influential in uniting the local elites, whose position, whether united and divided, affects decisions at Congress as well as on plebiscite. 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Electoral politics in the Philippines. In A. Croissant, G. Bruns & M. John (Eds.), Electoral politics in Southeast and East Asia. Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Appendix A Legislative Process in the Philippines Source: http://www.congress.gov.ph/images/flow_leg_proc.pdf Appendix B Maps of the Province of Davao del Norte and the Consolidated Government of Babak, Samal and Kaputian, known as the Island Garden City of Samal Sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Davao_del_Norte, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Island_Garden_City_of_Samal, and Island Garden City of Samal Tourism Office