Conflict or Avoiding Evil: Hampshire’s Negative
Justification for Procedural Justice
Nicolaï Abramovich
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Nicolaï Abramovich. Conflict or Avoiding Evil: Hampshire’s Negative Justification for Procedural Justice. International Colloquium on Global Ethics of Compromise, CESPRA, EHESS,
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/COMPROMIS, Mar 2019, Paris, France. hal-03112355
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Global Ethics of Compromise, EHESS, 7-8 March 2019
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Conflict or Avoiding Evil:
Hampshire’s Negative Justification for Procedural
Justice1
Nicolaï Abramovich
Department of Philosophy, Sorbonne University - France
Abstract: The aim of the paper is to demonstrate a) that there is a link between
Hampshire’s philosophy of knowledge and his political theory and b) that the
distinction operated by the English philosopher between procedural justice and
substantial justice is also a consequence of his negative approach of rational morality.
Therefore, the article will focus mainly on his own political work since the main
purpose is to highlight an internal bridge between Stuart Hampshire’s metaphysics
and politics and to underline the author’s rationale to consider ethics and politics as
tools which main goal is not to produce good but to avoid evil. More precisely, the
thesis of the following study seeks to put in evidence that Hampshire’s concept of
imagination leads to a diversity of substantial definitions of justice whereas
Hampshire’s notion of reason leads to the unitary idea of procedural justice. The latter
is necessary to make live together the former and most of all to avoid unbridled
conflicts that would put at risk civil and social cohesion.
1
This paper was presented at the International Conference on Global Ethics of Compromise, EHESS
(CESPRA), Paris, in March 2019 [Editor’s note].
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1. Reason and Imagination
It is important to start by recalling Hampshire’s general theory of the human
mind2 because there is a link between his political philosophy and his philosophy of
knowledge. The British philosopher sustains that the two principles that define the
human mind are Imagination and Reason.
On the one hand, we have Imagination that leads our development of a unique
and particular point of view on the world. In other words, we built our individuality
using imagination. We collect our memories, our emotions, our feelings among other
circumstances and we create a particular and unique perception of the world. The
paradigm of this principle of human nature would be the work of art. For instance,
Van Gogh and Dali have two completely different individual perceptions of the world.
The style and images of their canvases testify that both are two distinctive and unique
individuals. The Sunflowers from Van Gogh and Living Still Life from Dali are two
examples of still life paintings; yet, they could not be more different. They enhance
the originality of each artist and they demonstrate that individuals are irreducible
universes. Van Gogh and Dali are humans. Van Gogh and Dali are painters. But Van
Gogh is unique and Dali is unique. Artists are the most evident examples, but the
principle is valid for everyone. It explains, for instance, why some of us prefer
chocolate and some others like strawberry better or why some people prefer to stay at
home and watch a movie eating popcorn while some other people prefer to go out
dancing all night long. In that sense, Imagination guides and fosters our creativity and
our personal vision of the world. Therefore, the principle of imagination describes the
human diversity.
On the other hand, we have reason. When we use the principle of noncontradiction to elaborate or understand a demonstration or when we apply the
Euclidean axioms of geometry to study objects and space, we use reason. No matter
who we are, what we do for a living or what are our personal preferences, when we
use reason, we all apply the same system of procedures. It does not matter if we are a
Caruso, Justin Bieber or if we only sing in the shower, we all use the same principles
HAMPSHIRE Stuart, “Chapter 1: Parts of the Soul” in Innocence and experience, Cambridge,
Harvard University, 1989, p. 23-48
2
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when we think rationally. In other words, reason is indifferent to individuality. This
means that rationality gathers humanity together. It describes human unity.
Likewise, when we have to take a decision and we weigh the pros and the cons
to make our mind, we also use a type of reason that Hampshire defines as deliberative
reason. According to Hampshire’s intuition, the principles of deliberative reason
work as a device that help individuals make choices between the different imaginative
and substantial ideas they produce. Thus, if we like to eat but we also want to be fit;
times come when we have to make a choice between spending Sunday morning
having a delicious brunch or going out for a jogging at the park. The same happens
when we have to choose between reading Molière or Racine. Imagination constantly
depicts various substantial options, but how do we choose between them?
The answer is simple for Hampshire; we weight pros and cons. In this sense,
rationality comes to our rescue and provides us with a procedural system to decide
what option is good for us. It does not give us a substantial answer; it only furnishes
us the formal framework. Hence, people will take in count their particular
circumstances and make a decision according to their individuality by comparing the
available possibilities in the framework given by reason. That is why not only some
people will choose Molière and some other people will choose Racine; but also the
same individual can choose Molière on Monday and Racine on Saturday. That is how
we usually deal with internal conflict, we come up with substantial positions and we
use a formal device to choose between the available options. Human mind works
using this dual system. If we did not have this mechanism, it would be hard to make
choices and take decisions. Conflict between possibilities would be hard to resolve
and our practical thinking would suffer from a permanent chaos. On the contrary,
when Imagination and Reason work together the conflict remains irreducible, but it
can be settled.
2. Substantial Justice and Procedural Justice
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According to Hampshire3, this internal device we use to solve problem is a
mimesis of the external device the society generally uses to deal with diverse
positions that can be competitive and sometimes conflictive; namely, public debate. In
a sense, the agora of the mind is the daughter of the social agora4. Since childhood, we
observe parents, friends and people in general discuss about their individual positions
regarding multiple subjects more or less transcendent. This procedure takes place, for
instance, when critiques argument in favor or against a work of art (What is the best
film between ‘Apocalypse Now’ or ‘Raging Bull’?); or when the Assembly has to
take a vote (Should we validate or not the economic recovery policy suggested by the
government?). But it also happens when we discuss more trivial matters. For example,
when a couple has an argument deciding whether they are going to eat soup or salad
for the dinner; or when two kids have to choose if they are going to play to knights or
pirates. Usually, the different tenants present their arguments in favor of their
respective positions and eventually their arguments against the other options while the
other parties listen and then reply. In this manner, the dynamic of a conflictive
discussion arises. After exchanging for a while, generally, we choose between the
available options or sometimes we negotiate and split the baby as Solomon.
Hampshire thinks that way we deal with conflict externally shapes the way we deal
with conflict internally. Thus, when we have
competitive positions, the mind replaces its usual monologue for an artificial dialogue,
which is no more and no less than a depiction of social dialogue.
Substantial justice and procedural justice follow the same scheme. Substantial
justice is linked to the concepts of imagination and individuality whereas procedural
justice is linked to the notions of reason and unity. In this sense, there is diversity and
conflict regarding the substantial definitions of justice; but there should be agreement
and unity regarding procedural justice. The latter designates a conception of justice
determined by a particular moral conception whereas the former describes the device
HAMPSHIRE Stuart, “Justice is Conflict: The Soul and the City”, in Gretha B. Peterson (ed.) The
Tanner Lectures on Human Values Vol. 19, Salt Lake City, The University of Utah Press, 1998, p. 145171
4
Jean-Pierre Vernant defends a similar thesis applied to Ancient Athens in the chapter 3 “The Crisis of
Sovereignty” of his famous book The Origins of Greek Thought. He suggests that when the anax or
chief disappeared as the legitimate possessor of political authority in Athens, agora became then a
place where political agon or conflict could take place peacefully, without physical violence.
According to Vernant, the purpose was to find collectively and publicly the right rules to govern
legitimately the diverse groups composing the polis. Hence, we can establish a conceptual link between
Vernant’s historical and structural construction of the Athenian agora and agon to Hampshire’s
respective ideas of procedural justice (agora) and substantial justice (agon).
3
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of rules that particular positions must use. If we employ a helpful metaphor, we could
say that procedural justice settles the rules of the lottery game and substantial
definitions of justice are the buyers of a lottery ticket hoping to win the big prize. Yet,
just as a lottery winner cannot logically become the lottery, the tenant of a substantial
definition of justice cannot and should not take the place of procedural justice. They
are two different things, which are not interchangeable: procedural justice is the game,
whereas substantial justice represents the players. But if we have these social devices
to deal with the competitive and conflictive substantial possibilities, why have we
been and still are witnesses of unbridled violence and of moral atrocities in History so
often?
3. Against Domination: The Negative Rationale for Procedural
Justice
In the Introduction to Innocence and Experience, Hampshire recalls some
biographical circumstances that marked him profoundly and determined his approach
of political and moral theory. One of the main events that modeled his ethical thinking
was his experience as an officer of the British secret service during World War II. As
part of his tasks, he participated in the interrogation of senior SS officials.
Particularly, he interrogated Ernst Kaltenbrunner who was partly responsible for the
design and the adoption of the Final Solution. Kaltenbrunner was very well known for
his interest in finding the best the killing methods to eradicate the prisoners of
extermination camps. Thereafter, Hampshire was largely shocked by the late
revelations regarding the atrocities perpetrated in the Stalinist regime such as the
Gulag policy or the forced confessions. More generally, he was consternated by the
easiness that governments encounter when they have to engage torturers or hitmen.
These diverse empirical data convinced him that men were capable of doing evil as
well as good.
It is important to link these observations made by Hampshire with his theory of
knowledge. Indeed, if men constantly produce substantial points of view on the world
according to their individual circumstances and if men are equally capable of doing
evil as well as good; therefore, men can bring about evil substantial points of view on
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the world. Consequently, if imagination can produce a substantial definition of justice,
it can also bring about an evil substantial definition of justice.
“There is a basic level of morality, a bare minimum, which is entirely negative, and
without this bare minimum as a foundation, no morality directed towards the greater
goods can be applicable and can survive in practice. A rock-bottom and preliminary
morality of justice and fair dealing is needed to keep a balance between competing
moralities and to support respected procedures of arbitration between them.
Otherwise, any society becomes an unstable clash of fanaticisms”. 5
If there are no rules for the confrontation, then the conflict becomes a sort of
perpetual fight between the defenders of the respective particular positions on justice.
Yet, each tenant wishes to see his own view adopted by society. In this configuration,
the winner takes it all, but his position is unstable, and he could also easily loose
everything. Hence, in order to win and last, the substantial position must increase its
tendency for domination. That is why Hampshire sustains that this type of
configuration leads to a “clash of fanaticisms”, because the radical positions have
better chances to prevail.
Hence, procedural justice is paramount. By settling the framework in which
substantial definitions of justice encounter, it avoids the possibility of seeing one of
the substantial definitions completely dominate the others. If a society considers that it
should ward off the risk of seeing an evil and radical substantial definition of justice
triumph, then it needs to switch the arena of the confrontation and appeal to
procedural justice in order to settle the framework for conflict. In this manner, it will
prevent the peril that a substantial definition of justice completely dominates the
others. Without procedural justice, moral tragedies could become real and effective.
Let us go back for a moment to our metaphor. If the winner of the lottery takes
the place of the lottery then automatically the game of lottery disappears and we do
not know what the winner will do. Analogically, if a substantial type of justice
replaces procedural justice, the game of justice automatically disappears and society
would be at the mercy of the winner. Yet, in this type of disposition, there are big
chances that the winner would turn out to be evil and dominant. That is a big risk that
5
HAMPSHIRE Stuart, Innocence and experience, Cambridge, Harvard University, 1989, p. 72.
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every person desiring to avoid submission to a strong domination should be willing to
avoid. In that sense, every position respecting “the basic level of morality” should
agree that a scenario of evil and domination is a horizon society should avoid. That is
the reason why the tenants of diverse substantial types of justice should agree to have
rules of procedural justice to arbitrate even though their substantial views on moral
and justice are competitive or conflictive.
“The universal necessity of basic procedural justice, as a reasonable and arguable
restraint upon the natural drive to domination, has to be recognised as contrasting
with the variety of great goods acknowledge in different moralities. The contrast is so
great that it justifies talking of two aspects of morality: the universal and the
particular. […] If it is true that an unrestrained neutral drive to domination is the
greatest source of evil, and if evil here is neutrally interpreted as involving
destruction of life, oppression, and misery, then it is rational for each and all of the
moral sectaries to look for a non-divisive and generally accepted conception of
justice, however thin a conception this may be, amounting at its minimum only to fair
procedures of negotiation”.6
Thus, the main justification for the need of procedural justice and political
institutions to frame it is actually negative. Indeed, political institutions such as the
rule of law and the separation of powers are necessary to secure the rules of
procedural justice, and procedural justice is necessary to prevent society from a clash
of extremisms and from domination. Therefore, the rationale for political institutions
is the avoidance of the evil depicted in the nojustice scenario.
In this sense, when a substantial type of justice wants to replace the institutions
that endorse procedural justice, it becomes particularly dangerous. It happened when
Hitler dismantled the Reichstag and even more when he started to rule by decrees. He
suspended the liberties secured by Weimar Constitution and adopted the Schutzhaft or
preventive detention, which allowed the police to arrest and imprison citizens without
control and without any time limit. Hence, rules of the game of procedural justice are
tokens against the confiscation of justice and the unbearable oppression it could
produce.
6
Ibid., p. 77-78.
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“Uniting all humanity, from the nursery to the grave, the practice of promoting and
accepting arguments for and against a proposal is taken as the core of practical
rationality. The procedure is as well recognised and respected as the procedure of
counting, and as unavoidable. It is of the essence of the procedure that the pro and the
contra should both be heard and evaluated, and that the procedure should not be cut
off before all the arguments are in. The discussion of an issue of practical policy is
both an adversary procedure, with two sides represented, and a judicial one, because
in the end a Solomonic judgment will normally be made, with the acceptance of some
arguments and the dismissal of others. […] Justice and fairness are always in part
procedural notions; a decision, whether in a law court or by a deliberating person in
private, can be accepted as completely just and fair only if the reasoning that supports
it has been adequate, and the main relevant considerations have in fact been
impartially weighed in the balance”.7
If the dominant substantial position reaches a way to eradicate procedural
justice, then the tenants of the other substantial conceptions could be reduced to
silence. They would be in
weakened and uncomfortable position where they could lose their rights and be
subjugated by the dominant view. Hence, a substantial type of justice that threatens
procedural justice is essentially dangerous. That is why people should react to
political speeches that menaces to sweep political institutions or to disengage from the
rule of law because it implies to open the door to radicalism and domination.
4. Democracy and Minority: Following the Negative Rationale
Furthermore, respecting procedural justice is paramount because substantial
positions are competitive and have a natural tendency to dominance. When a
substantial type of justice gains ground in society, it tries to secure its advantages. The
strategy often used consists on presenting some of their particular moral claims as if
they were natural in order to exclude any possible discussion and reconsideration
regarding those claims.
7
Ibid., p. 53.
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“That animals have no souls and therefore no feelings that demand respect; that
primitive societies are always by nature morally inferior to advanced and civilised
societies; that variations on a single pattern of sexual intercourse are unnatural
perversions – these are a few of the false fixities designed to protect particular ways
of life”.8
Having a framework for open discussion – available to all the members of
society – restrains that risk and its possible corollary, namely, a tyranny of the
majority. When a society respects procedural justice, it also asses that substantial
definitions of justice do not have a natural status because they rest on particular moral
systems, which is also a way of stating that the minority views have an equal right to
be heard. For instance, decisions as the sentence of judge Johnson that allowed Martin
Luther Kings’s march for the equality of rights to pass by the state of Alabama in
1965; or the decision by the Conseil d’État in France that overruled in 2018 Cannes’s
maire decrees on burkini would not have been possible without procedural justice. It
has a crucial status, to a large extent, because it gives to the minorities the possibility
to be listened. It protects them from the abuse of the majority. Therefore, when a
society does not respect procedural justice, then minorities and the tenants of other
substantial definitions of justice are in danger.
Following the same logic, democracy plays also an important role in
preserving and defending procedural justice:
“Democracy has usually been advocated as the form of government that will ensure
the most complete and fair representation of all citizens of the state, as far as this is
possible. The implication is that the more democratic the state is in this sense the
better, because it is a good thing that the most popular policy, the most strongly
supported, should prevail. This is a substantial moral claim, perhaps to be further
defended by some specific theory of freedom or of natural rights. But I see no reason
myself to accept this claim. When a majority, following a natural tendency, advocates
wrong policies perhaps in the punishment of crime, in treatment of ethnic minorities,
in immigration policy, in foreign policy, and elsewhere -the popularity of the policies
cannot for me, for my conception of the good, mitigate the errors and the evil. Rather,
the value of a democratic constitution lies in the defense of minorities, not of
8
Innocence and experience, Op.Cit., p. 57.
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majorities. One needs to ensure, for the sake of justice, that the minorities are
properly heard and that they play their necessary part in the process.”9
Here, Hampshire defends democracy using a negative approach. Democratic
constitution and democratic configuration should not be defended because of their
capacity to represent the largest part of the population but because of their capacity to
give shelter to minorities from domination and oppression. Hence, the reason why
democracy should be defended is because it contributes to the protection of procedural
justice and it avoids, in fine, cruel practices that minorities could suffer if they were
subjugated by a substantial view of justice. In this sense, rules of democracy are a
subchapter of the book of procedural justice. Democracy is not a good per se. It has a
functional value. The democratic device is important because it limits evil and
dominance.
5. Why Justice is Conflict
The more or less mysterious title of Hampshire’s book Justice is conflict seems
now to make sense. The purpose of justice is to preserve a space for deliberative
rationality so that the different moral conceptions can fairly discuss and confront,
thanks to their commitment to rules and procedures. Conflict is not bad. It is just
ineluctable. Conflict is the device that describes the way we reason when we have to
make a decision: we weight the pros and the cons. The diverse arguments we analyze
in this process convey reason but also feelings, passions, values, memories,
circumstances, convictions etc.
“I have been arguing that the diversity and divisiveness of languages and of cultures
and of local loyalties is not a superficial but an essential and deep feature of human
nature – both unavoidable and desirable – and rooted in our divergent imaginations
and memories. More fundamentally, our stronger sentiments are exclusive and
immediately lead to competition and conflict, because our memories, and with them
our imagination, are focused upon particular persons, particular inherited languages,
particular places, particular social groups, particular rituals and religions, and
particular tones of voice; and hence our stronger loyalties are similarly focused. We
9
HAMPSHIRE Stuart, “Justice is Conflict: The Soul and the City”, Op.Cit., p. 170-171
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want to serve and reinforce the particular institutions that protect us, and to extend
their power and influence at the expense of their rivals”.10
Hence, the path we follow towards a practical resolution is often a rocky road.
When an individual defends a political or moral position, he invests its own person
and its own identity. Therefore, moral judgments should not be considered as futile
because their
psychological and emotional weight is heavy. Yet, moralities are particular objects
and that is why it seems difficult to get to a definitive agreement on morality.
Nonetheless, people give importance to their moral convictions because they define,
at least partially, their individual personality.
For that reason, it is important to have a space where moral views can be
expressed. Otherwise, without rules to play the game of moral disagreement fairly,
tensions between positions could ratchet up. Then, conflict would be solved
differently and very probably in a bloody way.
“The two elements in procedural justice – a universal rational requirement of twosidedness and respect for locally established and familiar rules of procedures – are
linked as two natural forces of our minds in their practical and political working. If
either the rational requirement or respect for custom breaks down and ceases to
operate, we should expect catastrophe. Conflicts will then no longer be resolved
within the political domain but will be resolved by violence or the threat of violence,
and life will become nasty, brutish, and short. Whatever one’s conception of the good,
such anarchy will generally be reckoned a great evil, alongside starvation and nearstarvation, disease, imprisonment, slavery, and humiliation”.11
6. Rawls and Hampshire: Positive and Negative Justification
At this point, it seems important to compare Hampshire’s approach of justice
to Rawls’s approach because it represent a different way to deal with conflict and
pluralism. We would like to underline the reasons why Hampshire strategy might be
more efficient in setting rules without being accused of comprehensivism.
10
11
HAMPSHIRE Stuart, Justice is Conflict, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 37-38.
Ibid., p. 97-98.
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We can see that unlike the principles of justice, procedural justice has no
content. The only condition is to respect a set of rules. But the main difference seems
to be based on the distinction of rationale given to justify justice. In contrast to
Rawls, Hampshire does not give a positive justification but a negative one. Justice
does not promote good; it avoids evil. In Rawls’s approach, there should be a
consensus on the principles of justice based on rationality or reasonableness. The
principles of justice should be chosen because injustice should not be natural,
therefore, society should allow every individual to carry out its project of life and they
let exist every conception of the good. That is what the principles of justice and the
priority of liberty rule do12. In Hampshire’s approach, procedural justice should be
defended exclusively because it averts from domination and violence.
One of the main critics that suffered Rawls’s position is that the argument in
favor of the priority of liberty required the use of a liberal morality that considers
individual autonomy as the primary good in order to justify it. 13 Hampshire’s
approach is resistant to that critic not only because he does not defend the necessity of
a liberal society – even though a liberal society does respect procedural justice – but
mainly because of the negative structure he uses to defend justice.
7. Conclusion: The Asymmetry of Good and Evil and Procedural
justice
The emphasis put by Hampshire in procedural justice seems to work as a
return and a renewal of the Solonian notion of justice:
“The point of Solon's message is rather to fix imaginatively a frame of reference
within which the occurrence and effects of stasis could be properly appreciated. Stasis
is not an isolated event that comes only when willfully fomented by the "lover of dread
civil strife" (II. ix. 64). It is an integral part of a breakdown of the state of social wellbeing, which Solon called eunomie. Consequently, (1) any act of injustice, impairing
the "good order," "good sense," and "soundness" of the common life, is a real, though
quite likely unintentional, cause of civil strife; and (2) the distemper of the body
12
RAWLS John, A Theory of justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 266.
See HART H.L.A, “Rawls on liberty and its priority” in University Chicago Law Review, Vol. 40,
N°3, 1973 p. 534-555 & TAYLOR Robert S., “Rawls’s defense of the priority of liberty: a Kantian
reconstruction” in Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 31, N°3, 2003, p. 246-271.
13
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politic, evidenced by stasis, is all comprehensive in its effects. It is a "plague which
comes to all the city" (Frag. 4. 17); a "public calamity which comes home to
everyone," invading the private security of the family. Therefore, any act of injustice,
impairing the common security, threatens everyone's individual security and family
solidarity can interpose no effective protection”.14
It is a return to the origins of Greek justice because procedural justice’s first
goal is also to avoid the destruction of social order by preserving by allowing an open
space for conflictive discussion. Solon’s justice and Hampshire’s justice are negative:
they wish to avoid an evil: stasis for the former and oppression for the latter.
However, it is a renewal because Hampshire’s insists on the negative side: the good
order is an open order. It is not natural and has no content. It is not a presence but an
absence, the absence of any substantial definition of justice. Or, in other words, the
only possible nature of procedural justice is the absence of any content. And that
essential feature is actually, the sine qua none condition to avoid stasis or oppression
and to protect the living together.
Hence, any attempt to replace the rules of
procedural justice by a substantial and particular definition of justice is illegitimate
and should worry every citizen because it implies breaking the conditions to dispense
justice.
If Hampshire’s argument is so effective it is because it articulates optimally
with the principle of asymmetry of good and evil. Indeed, evil seems to be
epistemically and morally
more evident than good. As moral agents, it is clearer to see what we should avoid
doing rather than what we should do. Moreover, bringing about evil actions is more
condemnable than bringing about good actions is praiseworthy. For example, if we
picture a homeless person suffering from cold in the street, would we react stronger if
we saw a passer-by take away one of his coats or if we saw a passer-by give him a
coat? Intuitively, it seems that the evil action would shake up us more than the good
action. We are more sensitive to evil than to good. Following that logic, we are more
attuned to an argument that promises to reduce evil than to an argument that swears to
14
VLASTOS Gregory, “Solonian Justice” in Classical Philology, Vol. 41, No. 2, Apr. 1946, p. 69.
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produce some kind of good.15 Hampshire seems aware and convinced of the negative
structure of moral rationality:
“There remain the unchanged horrors of human life, the savage obvious evils, which
scarcely vary from culture to culture or from age to age: massacre, starvation,
imprisonment, torture, death and mutilation in war, tyranny and humiliation – in fact,
the evening and the morning news. Whatever the divergences in conceptions of the
good, these primary evils stay constant and undeniable as evils to be at all costs
averted, or almost all costs”.16
In that sense, there seems to be an evident connection with other authors that
consider negative entities such as cruelty 17 or humiliation 18 as the moral priority
because they are epistemically and morally more evident, more urgent and probably
more universal than goods. In other words, the main purpose of ethical behavior is not
to realize a summum bonum but to avoid a summum malum. Procedural justice as a
political necessity responds to that crucial and primary ethical imperative.
The negative justification used by Hampshire not only gives sense to 1) the
need for procedural justice as well as 2) its priority over substantial justice; but it also
3) gets closer to a universal status. Hence, the changeover of argumentative structure
is efficient because it is in line with the structure of our moral rationality that follows
the asymmetry of good and evil. Exchanging the positive social aim for a negative
social aim is an effective strategy that gives solid foundations to Hampshire’s
argument. Indeed, no matter the circumstances, a society that is not a slaughterhouse
should be preferable to a society that is a slaughterhouse to every
person blessed with common sense. That is a good reason to enclose conflicts in the
limits of procedural justice.
On the asymmetry of good and evil: CHAUVIER Stéphane, “A challenge for moral rationalism :
why is our common sense morality asymmetric ?” in DUTANT J., FASSIO D. & MEYAN A. (dir.),
Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel, Genève, Université de Genève, 2014, p. 892-906; KNOBE Joshua,
«Intentional Action and sideeffects in ordinary language » in Analysis, N°63, 2003, p.190-194; ROZIN
Paul et ROYZMAN Edward B., “Negative bias, negativity dominance and contagion” in Personality
and Social Pathology Review, Vol. 5, N°4, 2001, p. 296-320; SHRIVER Adam, “The Asymmetrical
contribution of pleasure and pain to subjective well-being”, in The Review of Philosophy and
Psychology, Vol. 5, N°1, Mars 2014, p. 135-153.
16
HAMPSHIRE Stuart, Justice is Conflict, p. 43.
17
SHKLAR Judith, Ordinary Vices, Cambridge, Harvard, Belknap, 1984.
18
MARGALIT Avishai, The Decent Society, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1996.
15
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Global Ethics of Compromise, EHESS, 7-8 March 2019
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