Elvio Baccarini
University of Rijeka, Philosophy Department, Faculty Member
- Republicanism, Liberalism and Republicanism, Public Reason, Philosophy of Art, Reciprocity and Public Reason, Liberalism, and 19 moreHuman Enhancement, Gerald Gaus, Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Rawls, Ethics, Sexuality, Sex and Gender, Class, Social Sciences, Social Theory, Anarchism, Social Exclusion, Power, John Stuart Mill, Coherentism, Epistemoogy, Social Exclusion and Social Inequalities, and Social Exclusion and Inclusionedit
There are two prominent classes of arguments in the debate on mandatory biotechnological moral enhancement (MBME) of criminal offenders. Some maintain that these interventions are not permissible because they do not respect some... more
There are two prominent classes of arguments in the debate on mandatory biotechnological moral enhancement (MBME) of criminal offenders. Some maintain that these interventions are not permissible because they do not respect some evaluative standards (my illustration is represented by autonomy). Others, however, argue that this type of intervention is legitimate. One of the latter argumentative lines appeals to the reduction of the high costs of incarceration.
In this paper, I argue that such polarization in the debate suggests handling the problem of the protection of autonomy in the case of MBME of offenders as an allocative question. Moreover, I offer a novel approach to this question by adopting the Rawlsian method of public reason. According to this method, public decisions are legitimate only if they can be justified through reasons that can be accepted by each free, equal, and epistemically reasonable agent. I argue that, within this framework, for a specific class of criminal offenders, we can conclude that MBME, although undermining a certain form of autonomy, could be legitimately mandatory. Because of reasonable pluralism, the final verdict on legitimacy is made based on the results of fair procedures of decision-making among proposals supported by persons in a condition of reasonable disagreement.
In this paper, I argue that such polarization in the debate suggests handling the problem of the protection of autonomy in the case of MBME of offenders as an allocative question. Moreover, I offer a novel approach to this question by adopting the Rawlsian method of public reason. According to this method, public decisions are legitimate only if they can be justified through reasons that can be accepted by each free, equal, and epistemically reasonable agent. I argue that, within this framework, for a specific class of criminal offenders, we can conclude that MBME, although undermining a certain form of autonomy, could be legitimately mandatory. Because of reasonable pluralism, the final verdict on legitimacy is made based on the results of fair procedures of decision-making among proposals supported by persons in a condition of reasonable disagreement.
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This paper proposes a novel method for identifying the public evaluative standards that contribute to the classification of certain conditions as mental disabilities. Public evaluative standards could contribute to ascertain disabilities... more
This paper proposes a novel method for identifying the public evaluative standards that contribute to the classification of certain conditions as mental disabilities. Public evaluative standards could contribute to ascertain disabilities by outlining characteristics whose presence beyond a threshold is fundamentally important for the life of a person and whose absence or re-duced occurrence constitutes a disability. Additionally, they can participate in determining disabil-ities by delineating particularly grave difficulties, impairments, or incapacities. Our method relies on a model of public justification of evaluative standards that is inspired by Gerald Gaus’s theory of public reason. Thus, our approach recommends the justification of evaluative standards through sound deliberative routes from reasons accessible to all persons who participate in the process of justification and the convergence of what is justified in this way to each of them. We deem that disabilities could be caused both by problems in the internal characteristics of a per-son, as well as by unfairness or lack of hospitality in external circumstances. This is why the method of justification is applied to the assessment of those circumstances, as well. If social or environmental circumstances cannot be justified through the convergence of reasons accessible to all persons involved in the process of justification we have reasons to exclude the presence of a disability and ascertain the presence of inadequate external conditions.
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We discuss the proposal of Chandran Kukathas engaged in one of the goals of liberal theories: the protection of freedom of conscience. Kukathas proposes the metaphor of a liberal archipelago where different communities are sovereign in... more
We discuss the proposal of Chandran Kukathas engaged in one of the goals of liberal theories: the protection of freedom of conscience. Kukathas proposes the metaphor of a liberal archipelago where different communities are sovereign in enforcing their worldview on their territory. We share Kukathas's intention to strongly protect freedom of conscience, but we think that Kukathas's theory fails to adequately protect it. In Kukathas's view, freedom of conscience is protected through freedom of association and the related freedom to exit an association. But freedom of exit, intended only as a right not to be coerced when one wants to leave, is insufficient. It must be sustained by the provision of capabilities to leave that one can exercise, as well as by capabilities to evaluate her condition. We discuss, then, a more promising proposal of an egalitarian libertarian archipelago proposed by Michael Otsuka. After explaining why this system isn't sufficiently stable, we conclude that the constitutional egalitarian liberal state is a better candidate.
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Rawlsian public reason requires public decisions to be justified through reasons that each citizen can accept as reasonable, free and equal. It has been objected that this model of public justification puts unfair burdens on marginalized... more
Rawlsian public reason requires public decisions to be justified through reasons that each citizen can accept as reasonable, free and equal. It has been objected that this model of public justification puts unfair burdens on marginalized groups. A possible version of the criticism is that the alleged unfairness is constituted by what Miranda Fricker and other authors call epistemic injustice. This form of injustice obtains when some agents are unjustly treated as not reliable, or when they are deprived of epistemic resources to utter their claims or burdened when they need to express demands.
I show that the Rawlsian model can stand the objection. Restricting justificatory reasons, at least when basic issues of human rights, liberties and opportunities are at stake, is needed in order to warrant a stable society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens.
I show that the Rawlsian model can stand the objection. Restricting justificatory reasons, at least when basic issues of human rights, liberties and opportunities are at stake, is needed in order to warrant a stable society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens.
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Like some other texts, this paper embraces the idea that, because of the scarcity of resources on the one hand, and extended requests on the other, we need to set limits in health care. Likewise, the paper endorses the thesis that such... more
Like some other texts, this paper embraces the idea that, because of the scarcity of resources on the one hand, and extended requests on the other, we need to set limits in health care. Likewise, the paper endorses the thesis that such limits must be fair. Further, it accepts and further develops the idea that limits must be set fairly through proper deliberative procedures. In addition, it defends and applies Rawls’s idea of public reason. This is the idea that, even in a fair procedure, proposals and decisions must be justified through public reasons, i.e. reasons that each agent can accept as reasonable to be legitimate. Mere majoritarian vote is not sufficient for legitimacy. Contrary to other proposals in health care justice that are immediately concerned with real world deliberation and do not attribute a proper function to the personal perspective, this paper endorses two levels of deliberation. The idealized level is needed to establish which are the strongest rights, which can be limited only if they conflict with each other, but not if they conflict with less important rights and values. Here, a set of eligible decisions is established for real life deliberation. Using the example of the methodology of justification, which considers the importance of the personal meaning of health care decisions, as well as of public reasons in ideal and in real life contexts, the thesis is defended that life prolonging therapies have a strong priority as rights.
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We argue that the mandatory moral bioenhancement of psychopaths is justified as a prescription of social morality. Moral bioenhancement is legitimate when it is justified on the basis of the reasons of the recipients. Psychopaths expect... more
We argue that the mandatory moral bioenhancement of
psychopaths is justified as a prescription of social
morality. Moral bioenhancement is legitimate when it is
justified on the basis of the reasons of the recipients.
Psychopaths expect and prefer that the agents with
whom they interact do not have certain psychopathic
traits. Particularly, they have reasons to require the moral
bioenhancement of psychopaths with whom they must
cooperate. By adopting a public reason and a Kantian
argument, we conclude that we can justify to a
psychopath being the recipient of mandatory moral
bioenhancement because he has a reason to require the
application of this prescription to other psychopaths.
psychopaths is justified as a prescription of social
morality. Moral bioenhancement is legitimate when it is
justified on the basis of the reasons of the recipients.
Psychopaths expect and prefer that the agents with
whom they interact do not have certain psychopathic
traits. Particularly, they have reasons to require the moral
bioenhancement of psychopaths with whom they must
cooperate. By adopting a public reason and a Kantian
argument, we conclude that we can justify to a
psychopath being the recipient of mandatory moral
bioenhancement because he has a reason to require the
application of this prescription to other psychopaths.
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I reply to the critics of my book In A Better World? Public Reason and Biotechnologies. The discussion is framed through several issues: normativity (I describe Estlund's difference between aspirational and concessive justice, and I... more
I reply to the critics of my book In A Better World? Public Reason and Biotechnologies. The discussion is framed through several issues: normativity (I describe Estlund's difference between aspirational and concessive justice, and I indicate that the discussion in my book is framed in terms of concessive justice; further, I explain why we must endorse a public reason justification in matters of biotechnologies), fair equality of opportunity and equal liberty (in terms of concessive justice, I reject their strict priority in relation to questions of justice about genetic enhancement), self-respect (I defend the thesis that under fair respect of the interests of the least advantaged, there are no conclusive reasons to think that unequally available genetic enhancement harms self-respect), disease and treatment (I offer a public reason defence of treatment), parental rights (they do not include the right to impose sectarian conceptions of value) and talents (there are no conclusive reasons to think that talents enhanced by genetic interventions would strongly harm social equality).
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The paper is dedicated to replies to Christiano's criticism of Rawlsian public reason. Although Christiano's criticism is successful in relation to one possible interpretation of the public reason view, a better and more fructuous... more
The paper is dedicated to replies to Christiano's criticism of Rawlsian public reason. Although Christiano's criticism is successful in relation to one possible interpretation of the public reason view, a better and more fructuous interpretation of the public reason view is at the disposition of the Rawlsian project. This view of public reason is deliberately an idealization. It shows how public justification would function in a well-ordered society where citizens are committed to liberal values. The shared reasons relevant for public justification are represented by the ideal of society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal citizens, as well as by the three features of the liberal conceptions of justice (basic rights and liberties, their priority, and the means to use them). In virtue of this view of public reason, it avoids Christiano's objection of the utopianism of shared reasons, and it replies to the inequality argument, as well as to the generality and vagueness objection, and the inconsistency argument. The advantages of the proposal in the view of public reason, in comparison to Christiano's proceduralist democratic proposal , are shown in the reply to the inequality argument.
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This paper revisits John Stuart Mill’s famous proposal for plural voting, according to which universal suffrage is conjoined with the possibility for some to claim and utilise multiple votes if they meet a particular set of... more
This paper revisits John Stuart Mill’s famous proposal for plural voting, according
to which universal suffrage is conjoined with the possibility for some to claim
and utilise multiple votes if they meet a particular set of qualifications. We observe
the proposal in the light of Mill’s own historical context, but we also evaluate it with
respect to the changing social and political conditions that ensued. Surely, the proposal
faces criticisms in both contexts taken separately, but some of the previously prominent
objections retain their force, while others recede in contemporary circumstances. Accordingly,
for instance, the paper recognises the force of the objection that the educated
experts who are to hold multiple votes are difficult to identify with the ideal of quality
decision-making and the common good in mind, but rejects dated assumptions such
as that of the overwhelming strength of class bias or the predominantly class-based motivations
for social grouping. Most importantly, although the paper ultimately rejects
Mill’s plural voting proposal, it supports his attempt to incorporate experts into quality
democratic decision-making, and investigates the practical forms of their inclusion.
First, we outline the plural voting proposal in the context in which it initially arose.
Second, we introduce the first objections to plural voting according to which such a
mechanism undermines the educative role that Mill sets for democracy. Third, we discuss
the problem of who the handlers of multiple votes – the “educated” – are supposed
to be, their class background, the expertise required, and the strength of underlying
class biases. Fourth, we look at the different stages of the political decision-making
process, in search of possible remedies for the problems brought about by plural voting.
Fifth, we assess some of the assumptions underlying Mill’s proposal in light of contemporary
society. In summary, we argue for the rejection of the plural voting scheme, but
we discuss alternative ways of including experts in the decision-making process.
to which universal suffrage is conjoined with the possibility for some to claim
and utilise multiple votes if they meet a particular set of qualifications. We observe
the proposal in the light of Mill’s own historical context, but we also evaluate it with
respect to the changing social and political conditions that ensued. Surely, the proposal
faces criticisms in both contexts taken separately, but some of the previously prominent
objections retain their force, while others recede in contemporary circumstances. Accordingly,
for instance, the paper recognises the force of the objection that the educated
experts who are to hold multiple votes are difficult to identify with the ideal of quality
decision-making and the common good in mind, but rejects dated assumptions such
as that of the overwhelming strength of class bias or the predominantly class-based motivations
for social grouping. Most importantly, although the paper ultimately rejects
Mill’s plural voting proposal, it supports his attempt to incorporate experts into quality
democratic decision-making, and investigates the practical forms of their inclusion.
First, we outline the plural voting proposal in the context in which it initially arose.
Second, we introduce the first objections to plural voting according to which such a
mechanism undermines the educative role that Mill sets for democracy. Third, we discuss
the problem of who the handlers of multiple votes – the “educated” – are supposed
to be, their class background, the expertise required, and the strength of underlying
class biases. Fourth, we look at the different stages of the political decision-making
process, in search of possible remedies for the problems brought about by plural voting.
Fifth, we assess some of the assumptions underlying Mill’s proposal in light of contemporary
society. In summary, we argue for the rejection of the plural voting scheme, but
we discuss alternative ways of including experts in the decision-making process.
