Studia Philosophiae Christianae
UKSW
54(2018)1
MIchał PIekarskI
two argUMents sUpporting tHe tHesis
of tHe predictiVe natUre of reasons for action
Abstract. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy of action is that, to explain
an action we need to provide a reason for it. A reason is what rationalises an action.
According to Donald Davidson, before we can describe a reason we must identify the need
that accompanies the performance of a given action, as well as the specific attitude
of the agent to the action. The author of Action, Reason and Cause believes that the proattitude/belief pair helps determine the reason for action, which is at the same time
the action’s cause. Davidson’s view has a lot of supporters today and is strictly related
to the so-called post-Humean theories of action. The objective of the present analysis is
to demonstrate that the primary reason for action is not provided by the pro-attitude/belief
pair, but by predictions due to which agents act in such and such a way. This expands on
Elizabeth Anscombe’s intuition according to which each intention is predictive in nature.
I will support the thesis about the predictive nature of reasons for action by means of two
arguments. The first argument relies on the analysis of the Knobe effect concerning
the asymmetry between attributing intentionality and attributing responsibility for actions;
the other draws upon the theory of predictive processing.
The remainder of this paper has the following structure: in §1, I will discuss Donald
Davidson’s theory. §2 will focus on Elizabeth Anscombe’s conception. In §3, I will examine
an argument drawn from the analysis of the Knobe effect, according to which an agent
will intentionally perform a given action when he can predict the effects of performing
it. §4 will introduce the problem of providing reasons for action in the context of folkpsychological explanations. §5 will examine the theory of predictive processing. §6 will
demonstrate that predictions serve a specific, normative role in the decision-making
processes, whereas §7 will advance the argument from predictive processing whereby
to explain an action is to identify specific predictive reasoning which caused the action
to be performed . In the Conclusions, I will show the consequences of my main thesis for
the problem of the nature of actions and explanations, as well as the rationale for using
folk-psychological categories.
Keywords: reason for action, agency, normativity, Knobe effect, predictions, predictive
processing, folk psychology, uncertainty
1. Introduction. 2. The conception of reasons for action in Donald Davidson’s approach. 3. Elizabeth Anscombe’s conception of intention for action. 4. The problem of reasons for actions and
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the Knobe effect: a first argument. 5. Reasons for action and folk psychology. 6. Action-oriented
predictive processing. 7. Decision-making from the perspective of predictive processing.
8. The case from predictive processing: a second argument. 9. Conclusion.
1. introdUction
The aim of the present analysis is to demonstrate that reasons for
action are predictions due to which the agent takes such and such
action. This expands on Elizabeth Anscombe’s intuitions according
to which each intention is predictive in nature. I will support
the thesis of the predictive nature of reasons for action with two
arguments. The first argument relies on the analysis of the Knobe
effect concerning the asymmetry between attributing intentionality
and attributing responsibility for actions; the other draws on
the theory of predictive processing.
The remainde of this paper has the following structure: in §2
I will discuss Donald Davidson’s theory. In §3 I will focus on
Elizabeth Anscombe’s conception. In the next section I will examine
an argument drawn from the analysis of the Knobe effect. I will
conclude that the agent will perform a given action intentionally when
he can predict the consequences of performing it. In §5 I will discuss
the problem of providing reasons in the context of folk-psychological
explanations. §6 will examine the theory of predictive processing.
In §7 I will demonstrate that predictions serve a specific, normative
role in the decision-making processes, whereas §8 will advance
the argument from predictive processing whereby to explain an action
is to identify the specific instance of predictive reasoning which
caused the action to be perfomed. In the Conclusions, I will show
the consequences of my main thesis for the problem of the nature
of actions and explanations, as well as the rationale for using folkpsychological categories.
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TWO ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE THESIS OF THE PREDICTIvE NATURE
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2. tHe conception of reasons for action
in donald daVidson’s approacH
In Actions, Reasons and Causes Davidson begin his analysis by
discussing the question of the nature of the relation between
the reason for action and the action itself. This question is important
because it is the reason that is supposed to explain a given action. In
a way, therefore, reasons rationalise actions. According to Davidson,
rationalisation consists in a variety of causal explanations. If someone
did something because of some reasons, he may be described as: a)
having some sort of pro-attitude or grounds to act in such and such
a manner; and b) believing (knowing, noticing, remembering, etc.).
Davidson understands pro-attitudes as desires, urges, promptings,
moral views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, social
conventions, public and private goals, etc.1
Thus, to provide a reason for an action performed by the agent is
to single out a certain pro-attitude2 and belief shared by the agent.
Davidson called the pro-attitude/belief pair the primary reason.
Primary reasons explain why the agent performed an action. Providing
such a reason is essential and sufficient to understand how a reason
of any kind rationalises an action. Davidson claims that it should
therefore be treated as a cause for a given action. Let us consider
a simple example: when I press the light switch, I turn on the light
and the room becomes illuminated. I pressed the switch because
I wanted to turn on the light. By saying that I wanted to turn on
the light, I explain (give reason, that is rationalise) why I pressed
the switch. By giving such a reason, however, I do not rationalise
1 D. Davidson, Actions, Reasons and Causes, The Journal of Philosophy 60(1963)23,
685–686.
2 Ralf Stoecker highlights the fact that Davidson’s concept of an attitude is replaced
by philosophers with the concepts of “wanting” or “desire”. R. Stoecker, Davidson, in:
A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, ed. T. O’Connor, C. Sandis, Blackwell, Oxford
2010, 598.
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the act of turning on the light or illuminating the room. Reasons may
rationalise an action by setting out the necessary requirements for its
primary reason. Generalising from this example, Davidson claims:
“R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under
the description d only if R consists of a pro attitude of the agent
toward actions with a certain property, and a belief of the agent that
A, under the description d, has that property”.3
We may now ask how my wanting to turn on the light becomes
part of the primary reason. According to Davidson, there is a verbal
parallelism between the statements “I turned on the light” and
“I wanted to turn on the light”. The first refers directly to an event; we
can conclude that the second concerns the same event. It is obvious,
of course, that the event of my turning on the light is not related
to these sentences in the same way as the existence of the event is
related to the truth of “I turned on the light”, but not to the truth
of “I wanted to turn on the light”. If the reference were the same
in both sentences, the second sentence would contain the first.
However, that is not the case. The sentences are logically independent.
Davidson says that wants and desires are shaped by physical objects.
The sentence “I want that gold watch in the window” does not identify
a primary reason and does not explain why I went into the shop.
It only suggests a primary reason contained in the sentence “I wanted
to buy a watch”.
Since the sentences “I turned on the light” and “I wanted to turn
on the light” are logically independent, the first can be used to identify
a primary reason only to the extent that the second sentence is true.
The reason gives minimal information. It implies that the action is
intentional, and that wanting requires some attitude such as a sense
of duty or obligation. This is closely related to the action itself and
the context of explanation.
3 D. Davidson, Actions, Reasons and Causes, op. cit., 687.
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TWO ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE THESIS OF THE PREDICTIvE NATURE
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To know a primary reason is to know an intention with which
the action was performed. To know the intention, however , it is not
necessary to know the primary reason. If John went to church with
the intention of pleasing his mother, then he must have an attitude
towards pleasing his mother. However, we need more information
to be able to tell whether his reason is that he enjoys pleasing his
mother, or thinks it his duty or obligation. Even though the expression
“the intention with which John went to church” has the outward
appearance of a description, it is in fact syncategorematic4 and cannot
therefore be taken to refer to some objects, states, dispositions or
events. In this context, the expression generates new descriptions
of actions in terms of their reasons. The sentence “John went to church
with the intention of pleasing his mother” is a new, fuller description
of the action previously described as “John went to church”.5
Davidson claims that when we ask an agent why he acted as he
did, we want to obtain an interpretation. His behaviour may seem
strange, alien and incomprehensible; or perhaps we cannot recognise
an action in it. When we learn his reason, we have an interpretation,
a new description of what he did that fits into a familiar picture.
Such a picture includes beliefs and attitudes of the agent, but it can
also refer to his goals, principles, etc. It does not identify the agent’s
intention, however, as a given rationalised action may be triggered by
many different causes. We can never be sure which particular cause
overlaps with the intention of the agent.6
In conclusion, Davidson’s conception is focused on the analysis
of reasons understood as causes of a given event. To identify a reason
4 Syncategorematic terms do not have an independent meaning. Their role is limited to serving a specific syntactic function. They are logical links and modifiers such as each; and;
or. Categorematic terms have full semantic meaning. Depending on the context, they may
occur as names or functors. Examples of categorematic terms include Paul, S, P, blue.
5 D. Davidson, Actions, Reasons and Causes, op. cit., 690.
6 D. Davidson, Freedom to Act, in: D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon
Press, Oxford 2001, 79.
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is to rationalise an action, that is provide its cause expressed in terms
of the agent’s attitudes and beliefs.
3. elizaBetH anscoMBe’s conception of intention for action
Anscombe begins her discussion by saying that, when analysing
the concept of an intention we must distinguish between three basic
ways of its linguistic expression. These are:
1. expression of an intention, e.g. I intend to open the window;
2. action as intentional, e.g. I am opening the window;
3. intention with which actions are perfomed , e.g. I am opening
the window to cool down the room.7
Right at the beginning, the author of Intention underlines
that, despite these semantic differences, there is only one sense
of the concept of an intention. Its spectrum, however, is very wide:
from the pure intention of doing something to acting in line with
a certain intention to intentional action. The expression of an intention
is a prediction of practical rather than theoretical nature. Intention
as prediction refers to the future, that is to states of affairs that have
not happened yet. As a result, Anscombe concludes that intentions
do not refer to any mental states.
If intentions do not refer to states of the agent, how can intentional
actions (if they exist at all) be differentiated from events that are
not intentional? Anscombe has a ready answer to this question.
She believes that actions can be addressed with a special sense
of the “why?” question, according to which the answer to this
question contains the reason for a given action.8 This question does
not concern situations where someone says, for example, “I was not
aware I did this”. The knowledge necessary to answer the “why?”
question is not based on evidence, testimony or observations. It
7 G.E. M. Anscombe, Intention, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1957, 1.
8 Ibidem, 9.
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must be non-observational. The subject’s surprise at what he did
would provide the most convincing evidence that a given action was
not performed intentionally. Knowledge of our actions is similar
to knowledge about the position of our limbs. The latter is not based
on any acts of will, behaviours, etc.9
Mental states are strictly related to motives which we cannot know
through observational knowledge, just like in the case of intentions.
According to Anscombe, motives determine directly a series
of actions as their driving force. This is why there is a tendency
to consider motives or believes a type of mental causes. This approach,
however, is wrong. To borrow a phrase from the late Wittgenstein,
we are confused by the external form of declarative statements about
motives.10
According to Anscombe, it makes sense to differentiate between
actions and non-actions only when the answer to the “why?” question
indicates a motive: a past event, an interpretation of a given action or
an event to happen in the future. There is no sense in answers such as
“I was not aware when I was doing it”, “I observed what I was doing”
or answers based on testimony or indications of a cause, including
mental causes. Anscombe’s key argument is that we must be able
to answer the “why?” question by referring to what was intended
rather than intentionally done. The answer to the “why?” question
9 Anscombe underlines that we can also know our “mental states” – feelings, thoughts
and moods – without observation. This does not mean, however, that they can be used
to explain actions. This remark is important in the context of the discussion of Hume’s
conception of a cause as something we know without observation. On this, see J. McDowell,
Anscombe on Bodily Self-Knowledge, in: Essays on Anscombe’s Intention, eds. A. Ford,
J. Hornsby, F. Stoutland, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 2011, 128–146.
10 Anscombe identifies three types of motives: (1) backward-looking motives – retrospective
motives, e.g. revenge, pride, remorse; (2) motives-in-general – general motives that allow
us to interpret or describe an action as such and such; and (3) forward-looking motives –
predicting motives. They are intentions describing future states of affairs. The last class
of motives is particularly relevant to my discussion. G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention, op. cit.,
18–21.
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must be reducible to the following – “If I do p with intention Q, then
Q”. The expression “with intention” indicates an internal, teleological
structure of action.
Anscombe gives the famous example of a man who pumps water
to replenish a water-supply in a house, moving his arm up and down.11
The water is poisoned and the man pumping the water does not know
it. He is convinced that he is supplying the people living in the house
with clean water. Anscombe is interested in what the man is doing
and how his actions can be described. We may ask the man: “Why
are you performing action X?”. In this specific case, the question
would be: “Why are you moving your arm up and down?”. The man
can answer this question in the following ways: (1) “I’m pumping”;
(2) “I’m drawing water from the well”; (3) “I’m supplying water
to the household residents”. He cannot say, however, (4) “I want
to poison the household residents”. Anscombe is particularly interested
in statement (3) as it focuses not on what the man is doing, but
on what he intends to do or achieve. It expresses a future-oriented
intention, an intention to act, rather than the intention with which
he performs a given action. Anscombe claims that in in the case
of the man who pumps water, we have one action which may be
described in several ways. Each description depends on different
circumstances, and each is a description making the subsequent
description possible. Anscombe concludes that human actions are
similar in their teleological structure (sometimes simple, sometimes
more complex), which consists in the different stages of what the agent
is doing. In this example, the action will be intentional under
the description “I supply water to the inhabitants of the house”, but
not under the description “I want to poison the household residents”.
11 Ibidem, 37–38.
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TWO ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE THESIS OF THE PREDICTIvE NATURE
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The man intentionally supplies water to the residents, unintentionally
poisoning them.12
In the account advanced by the philosopher, the structure
of the intentional action is also the structure that explains the action.
The answer to why a person is doing what he is doing refers directly
to the internal reason explaining the action. Rather than describing
some internal state of his mind, the intention of the person who
pumps the water serves the function of the cause-and-effect action.
Thus, the reason of a given action is an intention as prediction.
Anscombe’s conception relates reasons to the predictive dimension
of practical intentions. Intention, however, is not mental or cognitive;
rather, it is primarily captured by statements expressing the agent’s
intentions. Actions are intentional under certain descriptions. It seems
that this solution allows Anscombe to avoid reducing the explanation
of activities to the language of folk psychology.13 A close analysis
of the example she provides, however, might give one the impression that,
to some extent, identifying the intention ultimately depends on the state
of the agent’s knowledge – the man knew he was pumping water, but
did not know that he was poisoning the people living in the house.14
4. tHe proBleM of reasons for actions and tHe KnoBe effect:
a first argUMent
In his article Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language, Joshua Knobe brought attention to an asymmetry in attributing
12 In a way, Anscombe anticipates Davidsons’ thesis whereby all actions are intentional
under a certain description. A given action may be intentional under one description,
but not under another.
13 I will address the problem of folk psychology later in this article.
14 It is important to remember that knowledge of intentions is not observational. It is operational knowledge-how, rather than theoretical knowledge-that. This is why we cannot
unequivocally put Anscombe into the category of thinkers acknowledging the important
explanatory role of folk-psychological concepts. This issue, however, must remain at
the margins of the present analysis.
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intentionality to actions depending on their side-effects.15 He is specifically interested in the source of this asymmetry: when accounting
for the side-effects of an action, why do people tend to attribute
intentionality to the agent’s actions in some cases but not in others?
It seems that there must be a link between attributing intentionality
and attributing responsibility according to side-effects. Such a link
is, however, by no means clear. According to Knobe, “an asymmetry
whereby people are considerably more willing to blame the agent for
bad side-effects than to praise the agent for good side-effects. And
this asymmetry in people’s assignment of praise and blame may be
at the root of the corresponding asymmetry in people’s application
of the concept intentional: namely, that they seem considerably more
willing to say that a side-effect was brought about intentionally when
they regard that side-effect as bad than when they regard it as good.”16
15 In order to prove the existence of this asymmetry, Knobe carried out the following
experiment: 78 persons were presented with one of two scenarios: “harm” and “help”.
J. Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language, Analysis 63(2003)3,
191.
Harm scenario: “The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and
said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will
also harm the environment.’ The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about
harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new
program.’ They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.”
Help scenario: “The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and
said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, and it will
also help the environment.’ The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about
helping the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new
program.’ They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was helped.”
Most people (82%) who were presented with the first scenario decided that the CEO
provoked a side-effect (harming the environment) intentionally. Most people who were
presented with the second scenario (77%) said that the side-effect (helping the environment) was not provoked by the CEO intentionally. We analysed these experiments in:
M. Piekarski, Efekt Knobe’a, normatywność i racje działania, Filozofia Nauki 97(2017)1,
109–128. See also: K. Paprzycka, Rozwiązanie problemu Butlera i wyjaśnienie efektu
Knobe’a, Filozofia Nauki 22(2014)2, 73–96.
16 J. Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language, op. cit., 193. Discussion (inter alia): F. Cushman, A. Mele, Intentional Action: Two-and-Half Folk Concepts?
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TWO ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE THESIS OF THE PREDICTIvE NATURE
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The problem raised by Knobe sparked wide debate.17 In this article,
I am interested in the implications of Knobe’s analyses for the problem
of identifying reasons for actions. First, studies in experimental
philosophy, of which the author of Intentional Action and Side Effects
in Ordinary Language is a prominent representative, have shed new
light on traditional answers to philosophical problems broached
by analytical philosophy of action and mind. Second, such studies
undermine the so-called Simple View on the relation between actions
and intentions. According to this view, subject S performs action φ
intentionally only when S intends to do φ:
If S is φ-ing intentionally, then S has the intention of φ-ing.18
In what follows I will focus on the analysis of the problem raised by
Knobe. I will demonstrate that there are actions that do not comply
with the requirement imposed by the Simple View. Some researchers
suggest replacing the Simple View with a different conception: „View
II holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without
intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing
in: Experimental Philosophy, eds. J. Knobe, S. Nichols, New York: Oxford University Press
2008, 171–188; J. Knobe, The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses
of Folk Psychology, in: Experimental Philosophy, eds. J. Knobe, S. Nichols, Oxford
University Press, New York 2008, 129–148; A. Mele, Intentional action: Controversies,
data, and core hypotheses, Philosophical Psychology 2(2003), 325–340; E. Machery,
R. Mallon, S. Nichols, S.P. Stich, Semantics, cross-cultural style, Cognition 3(2004), 1–12;
T. Nadelhoffer, Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to Knobe and Mendlow,
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24(2004), 259–269; S. Nichols,
J. Ulatowski, Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited, Mind and
Language 4(2007), 346–365.
17 I don’t have space in this article to discuss this issue.
18 See: F. Adams, Intention and Intentional Action. The Simple View, Mind and Language
4(1986)1, 281–301; H. McCann, Rationality and the Range of Intention, Midwest Studies
in Philosophy 10(1986)1, 191–211.
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to accept A as a consequence of S’s action”. So S did A intentionally,
even when not intended, if A was perceived by S as causing a harm.19
According to Bratman, Davidson’s model of belief/desire falls within
the Simple View even though it reduces intentionality to the pair
mentioned above. The problem of the relation between intention
and intentional action is expressed in terms of a set of desires
and beliefs that is responsible for the intentionality of action.20
Elizabeth Anscombe’s conception, while approaching intention in
its predictive and anti-mental dimension, assumes implicitly that
action is intentional if it is possible to identify its reason in the agent’s
intention. Situations predicted by, for example, the Knobe’s effect
remain unexplained in Anscombe’s and Davidson’s conceptions. I do
not want to say that the Simple View is wrong, but only that it does
not make it possible to analyse many intentional actions that are not
motivated by intention. I will consider two examples:
(1) Alice intends to mow the lawn. To perform this activity,
she must complete several minor ones. She must start the mower,
move it to and from, and so on. There is no reason to say that she
performs each of these steps with a specific intention. Undoubtedly,
however, each is intentional. Leaving aside situations in which
there is an obstacle or a hindrance that requires a change of pace or
lawn mowing technique, the entire process of mowing the lawn is
intentional, albeit we may be justified in saying that its individual
stages are not based on a series of specific intentions.21 According
19 F. Adams, A. Steadman, Intentional Action in Ordinary Language. Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding? Analysis 64(2004), 173. See: M. Bratman, Intention, Plans and
Practical Reason, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1987; G. Harman, Practical
Reasoning, Review of Metaphysics 29(1976)3, 431–463; A. Mele, Springs of Action, Oxford
University Press, New York 1992.
20 M. Bratman, Two Faces of Intention, The Philosophical Review 93(1984)3, 375–376.
21 A. Mele, Decisions, intentions, and free will, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24(2005),
150.
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TWO ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE THESIS OF THE PREDICTIvE NATURE
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to Bratman, this is a case of an intentional action that are is driven
by specific intentions.
(2) A sniper intends to kill an officer. At the same time, he knows
that when he takes the shot he will betray his location. It seems
reasonable to say that the sniper does not intend to alarm the enemy, but
does it regardless. The sniper does not have the intention of informing
the enemy about his location; however, by shooting the enemy officer
he does it intentionally. Let us now imagine that the sniper is aiming
at the officer (with the intention of killing him), but does not want
to raise the alarm. He does raise it, however, by accidentally pulling
the trigger and killing the officer.22 How should we assess his action
now? If he took the shot accidentally, then, even though he intended
to shoot, there is a tendency to say that the pulling of the trigger was
not an intentional action, just like the shivering of the hands is not
intentional in a stressful situation. Taking the Simple View as our
point of departure, it is difficult to answer the following question:
if the sniper did not want to shoot at that specific moment, does it
mean he did not kill the officer intentionally? All things considered,
it does seem that the killing was intentional.
The examples above prove that the Simple View has a limited
scope. There are a number of actions whose intentionality cannot be
explained by referring to the agent’s intentions.
Let’s now go back to the problem raised by Knobe. The perspective
he adopts concerns not so much the question about actions themselves
as their relation with the so-called side-effects. Knobe claims that
the result of an action is a side-effect if (1) the agent was not particularly
trying to achieve it, but (2) he performed an action which he predicted
will bring a given result.23 Hence, the side-effect of an action is
unintended and is not an object of wanting, even if it is predicted
to a certain extent.
22 G. Harman, Practical Reasoning, op. cit., 433.
23 J. Knobe,The Concept of Intentional Action, op. cit., 132.
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Based on the analysis of the two cases above and the concept
of a side-effect, it is reasonable to say that what is crucial for
the intentionality of some actions24 is their relation to predictions.
S performs an action φ intentionally when S predicts the consequences
of φ:
If S is φ-ing intentionally, then S predicts the consequences
of φ-ing.
Alice’s mowing of the lawn is an intentional act because she
predicted the consequences her action will bring. The sniper killed
the officer intentionally because he predicted that his shot will cause
the officer’s death. Even though the shot was accidental, the action
was intentional. Similarly, the absence of his intention to alarm
the enemy does not make his action unintentional because he knew
the consequences that the action of shooting the rifle will bring.
5. reasons for action and folK psycHology
My view is very close, but not identical, to that suggested by Adams,
Mele and Bratman. The models of intentional action discussed in
analytical philosophy of action attach considerable importance
to the explanatory role of folk psychology (FP). In simple terms,
folk psychology may be described as:
(FP1) a common-sense way of understanding different mental
phenomena and a way of attributing beliefs, desires, intentions or
emotions to others;25
and
24 That is intentional actions that cannot be explained by the Simple view.
25 Knobe, for example, does not want to reduce folk psychology only to a method for
predicting and explaining human behaviour. He also treats it as a functional tool that
facilitates the making of moral judgements. J. Knobe, Folk Psychology and Folk Morality:
Response to Critics, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24(2004)2, 270;
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TWO ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE THESIS OF THE PREDICTIvE NATURE
107
(FP2) a basic way of explaining and predicting human actions.26
My account differs from the non-standard conception as it rejects
FP2, while retaining FP1. I believe that any attempt to explain
the intentionality of actions by identifying their reasons – understood
as mental or psychological entities such as beliefs or desires – is
doomed to fail. One example of this approach is Davidson’s view that
the (physical) cause of action is some non-physical state embodying
the wanting/belief pair. Elizabeth Anscombe was aware of this aporia
when she tried to analyse intentions in non-mental terms.27
To conclude this part of my analysis – there are many actions
whose reasons are predictions of their potential consequences. To
explain such actions, we must identify which of their reasons have
the character of predictions. As for the belief in the explanatory
value of folk-psychological concepts popular in analytical philosophy
of action, I concluded that it restricts the analysis of action only
Experimental Philosophy, eds. J. Knobe, S. Nichols, Oxford University Press, New York
2008, 127. Although this is a very fertile account, we are not going to discuss it here.
26 I. Ravenscroft, Folk Psychology as a Theory, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
ed. E. N. Zalta, (Fall 2016 Edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/
entries/folkpsych-theory/>. (accessed on 12.04.2017).
27 Rejection of FP2 is not tantamount to accepting eliminativism (let us recall: eliminativism
claims that if (1) FP assumes the existence of beliefs and desires; (2) FP is false because
it does not comply with the formal and pragmatic requirements of a scientific theory;
and (3) the objects postulated by false scientific theories do not exist; then (4) beliefs
and desires do not exist. P.M. Churchland, Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional
Attitudes, Journal of Philosophy 78(1981), 570; S. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive
Science, MIT Press, Cambridge MA 1983. Rather, I want to demonstrate that explaining
intentional actions requires a broader research perspective than the one offered by
analytical conceptions. In a way, this belief is expressed by Knobe in his later article
Experimental Philosophy is Cognitive Science. There, he claims that the aim of experimental philosophy is the ultimate discovery of the cognitive mechanisms that will make
it possible to explain specific mental processes having a critical relation to reasons and
the intentionality of actions.
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MICHAŁ PIEKARSKI
[16]
to the relation between mental states and actions, whilst ignoring
the entire cognitive and environmental context.
Based on the reflections above, I can now advance my first
argument in support of the thesis of the predictive nature of reasons
for action. The argument is as follows (weak version):
A1W – there can be actions that cannot be explained by reference
to the category of intention, desire or belief.
The strong version of the argument goes as follows:
A1S – there are actions that cannot be explained with the categories
of FP, that is with the language of propositional attitudes.
The argument may also be formulated in its radical version:
A1R – no actions can be explained with the categories of FP.
It is not possible at this stage to determine unequivocally which
of the versions of A1 is true. I will answer this question later in
the article.
6. action-oriented predictiVe processing
According to the proponents of the theory of predictive processing,28
the predictive attitude to perception is supposed to give access to all
levels of sensory cognition. These levels are understood here as having
a hierarchical order. The predictive attitude is sensitive to perceptive
diversity, rather than just to the subtleties of conceptual categorisation
as in the case of many other theories. In this conception, cognition
is founded on hypotheses (predictions) about the causal structure
of the world. These hypotheses impose a top-down structure on
the bottom-up flow of sensory signals. They are determined, on
the one hand, by the internal world model of a given cognitive
28 See: A. Clark, Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive
science, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36(2013), 181–204. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X12000477;
A. Clark, Surfing Uncertainty. Prediction, Action and the Embodied Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016; J. Hohwy, The Predictive Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford
2013.
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TWO ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE THESIS OF THE PREDICTIvE NATURE
109
system, and, on the other, by changeable information coming from
the world. These two layers are mutually restrictive, being dynamically
interdependent.29 Drawing on knowledge of the causal relationships
in the world, the mind advances hypotheses about the probability
of certain events that minimise the so-called prediction error.30 These
findings are based on the observation that sensory information does
not influence perception directly. Rather, sensory stimuli are actively
selected and appropriately used. Our expectations are driven by what is
perceived and how individual aspects of our perception of the world are
integrated. Hence, the problem of perception concerns the use of data
that reach the brain through sensory inputs in such a way as to prevent
the organism from making prediction errors. The errors, in turn, are
caused by ignorance of the sources causing our sensory excitations. In
practice, such ignorance may pose a threat to the organism.
We can never fully know how to act and which pieces of information
reaching us through sensory channels will prove true. This is why I need
to agree with Andy Clark’s statement that perception is an actionoriented predictive process.31 This is an important observation, which
allows us to treat perception as the very element in our psychophysical structure able to explain the dynamics and involvement
of the organism in a specific environment – not only its method
of cognition, but also its method of acting which is strictly correlated
with actions.32 The purpose of predictions is to organise specific
29 J. Hohwy, The Predictive Mind, op. cit., 69–70.
30 The mind does this in two ways: (1) by reviewing the generative model and the hypothesis
adopted (passive inference); or (2) by acting in the world in a manner that helps maintain
the hypothesis advanced by the model (active inference). K. J. Friston, The free-energy
principle: A unified brain theory?, Nature Neuroscience 11(2010), 129.
31 A. Clark, Whatever next?, op. cit., 184.
32 This statement is supported by neurological arguments provided by the analysis of visual
processes carried out by Milner and Goodale. The authors evocatively demonstrate that
perceptive coding is subordinate to and directly dependent on coding related to action
control. A.D. Milner, M.A. Goodale, The Visual Brain in Action, Oxford University Press,
Oxford 2004.
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[18]
cognitive and non-cognitive aims pursued by organisms. Therefore,
they serve a specific normative function in all interactions between
a cognitive system and its environment.33 Among other reasons,
the function is normative because perceptive situations are always
marked by normative uncertainty. Normative uncertainty is closely
related to our ignorance of how we should act in an environment that
is always indeterminate. The implications of this uncertainty are not
only moral, but also, and primarily, non-moral to the extent that they
relate to the problem of making decisions and taking appropriate
action in the world given through perception.34 I will examine this
issue further in what follows.
7. decision-MaKing froM tHe perspectiVe of predictiVe
processing
The hypothesis of predictive processing can be employed not only
to explain brain activity, 35 but also as a basis for understanding
such phenomena as action, cognition, learning, and many others.36
According to Christopher Burr, the predictive hypothesis can also
be used in relation to embodied decision-making processes.37
33 See: M. Piekarski, Normativity of Perception and the Predictive Processing, in: Die
Philosophie der Wahrnehmung und Beobachtung / The Philosophy of Perception and
Observation, eds. Ch. Limbeck-Lilienau, F. Stadler, Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society,
Kirchberg am Wechsel 2017, 199–201; M. Piekarski, Commentary: Brain, Mind, World:
Predictive Coding, Neo- Kantianism, and Transcendental Idealism, Frontiers in Psychology
(2017), 8:2077, DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02077.
34 For more details about reasoning in situations of normative uncertainty, see T. Żuradzki,
Meta-Reasoning in Making Moral Decisions under Normative Uncertainty, in: Argumentation and Reasoned Action: Proceedings of the 1st European Conference on Argumentation.
Vol. II, ed. D. Mohammed, M. Lewiński, College Publications, London 2015, 1093–1104.
35 J. Hohwy, The Predictive Mind, op. cit., 2.
36 A. Clark, Surfing Uncertainty. Prediction, Action and the Embodied Mind, op. cit.
37 Ch. Burr, Embodied Decisions and the Predictive Brain, in: Philosophy and Predictive
Processing, eds. T. Metzinger, W. Wiese, MIND Group, Frankfurt am Main 2017. DOI:
10.15502/9783958573086.
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TWO ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE THESIS OF THE PREDICTIvE NATURE
111
Predictionism in decision theory helps avoid many mistakes made
in classical approaches, including the belief that a decision-making
process may be easily reduced to two factors, i.e. deliberative processes
(assessing the value of specific variables) and selection of appropriate
actions. In this account, decision-making is one of the many actions
typically performed by the cognitive system according to a traditional
understanding of perception as a static and passive process moving from
sensory information to representations based on such information.38
Paul Cisek suggests explaining decision-making processes on the basis
of the ACH (Affordance Competition Hypothesis) model. According
to this model, decisions emerge from distributed and probabilistic
competence occurring between overlapping representations of possible
actions and sensory-motor information. These decisions are not
determined by one specific instance in the brain, but by a region
carrying out a given action in such a way as to influence other regions.
This leads to the so-called distributed consensus. Hence, decisions are
based on a mutual influence between specific actions performed by
relevant areas in the brain (from rules of action formulated at the level
of the prefrontal cortex 39 to the activity of peripheral basal ganglia –
making predictions for other peripheral regions – to the operation
of relevant subcortical areas responsible for the correct functioning
of sensory modalities and motor skills). Cisek and Pastor-Bernier have
stressed that neural representations work as indicators of potential
actions adapted to the environment of the agent.40
38 Ibidem, 3–4; P. Cisek, Making decisions through a distributed consensus, Current Opinion
in Neurobiology 22(2012)6, 927–936.
39 It has been demonstrated that people with damage to this part of the brain have great
difficulty in matching their actions to changing environmental conditions. See M. Koenigs,
L. Young, R. Adolphs, D. Tranel et al, Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian
moral judgements, Nature 446(2007), 908–911, DOI: 10.1038/nature05631.
40 P. Cisek, A. Pastor-Bernier, On the challenges and mechanisms of embodied decisions,
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 369(2014), 4.
112
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[20]
According to Burr41 the ACH model dovetails with and is complemented by the predictive processing framework, according to which
neuronal representations of actions may qualify as predictions depending on the unstable and uncertain environment. Representations in
the ACH model, however, have satisfaction conditions, that is they
are directly involved in the process of minimizing the prediction error
(active reasoning).42 In line with the predictive hypothesis we should
conclude that neural representations of actions do have the character
of predictions, although this may change in response to a dynamic and uncertain environment.43 Importantly, the representations
postulated by the ACH model can be employed specifically to explain perceptual processes. They are rooted in specific facts relating
to the embodiment of a given cognitive system. Thus, their function
is modal.44 We should therefore conclude that the decision-making
process must be understood dynamically: the action selection process
in the ACH unfolds fluidly at different levels of the hierarchy tracking
environmental and bodily regularities at different time scales. Thus,
a specific decision is made on the basis of: (1) information coming
from the sensory signal, (2) representations of actions that qualify
as predictions, and (3) an uncertain and changeable environment.
Thus, rather than being a simple process of deliberation and making
commitments, the decision-making process is part of an embodied
cognitive process situated in the environment45.
41 See Ch. Burr, Embodied Decision and the Predictive Brain, op. cit. for a detailed analysis
of this problem.
42 See: v. Gallese, T. Metzinger, Motor ontology: The representational reality of goals,
actions and selves, Philosophical Psychology 16(2003)3, 365–388.
43 Ch. Burr, Embodied Decision and the Predictive Brain, op. cit., 6.
44 Ch. Burr, M. Jones, The body as laboratory: Prediction- error minimization, embodiment,
and representation, Philosophical Psychology 29(2016)4, 586–600.
45 See also: M. Piekarski, Commentary: Getting into predictive processing’s great guessing
game: Bootstrap heaven or hell?, Frontiers in Psychology (2017), 8:1244, DOI: 10.3389/
fpsyg.2017.01244; G. Pezzulo, P. Cisek, Navigating the affordance landscape: Feedback
[21]
TWO ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE THESIS OF THE PREDICTIvE NATURE
113
8. tHe case froM predictiVe processing: a second argUMent
The above analysis leads to the following conclusions:
(T1) the explanation of a given event is strictly related to identifying
a specific cognitive mechanism at its origin;
(T2) the relevant mechanism may be described by the theory
of predictive processing in terms of the generative model and
predictive inference;
(T3) by identifying a specific prediction (or set of predictions), we
identify a reason according to which the agent decided to perform
a given action.
Theses T1–T3 allow us to advance argument A2 in support
of the hypothesis of the predictive nature of reasons for action.
The argument is as follows:
A2 – to explain a given action is to identify a relevant predictive
inference that led to the action.
By accepting argument A2, we thereby accept A1S and reject
A1W. It is difficult to ascertain whether A1R is fully justified. Our
analysis is not decisive in this respect. According to the predictive
hypothesis, each action is preceded by a process of predictive
processing. In other words, the type of coding focused on action
control and performance is subordinated to predictive processing.
We should conclude, therefore, that all unintentional actions, i.e.
behaviours, are possible only when the generative model (whereby
we can describe our mind) advances relevant perceptive hypotheses
and performs relevant active inferences. By adopting such and such
predictions, the cognitive system has access to such and such pool
of potential actions.
control as a process model of behavior and cognition, Trends in Cognitive Sciences
6(2016), 414–424.
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9. conclUsion
In this article we have presented two strong arguments (A1S and
A2) supporting the thesis of the predictive nature of reasons for
action. Accepting these arguments is of paramount importance for
the problem of the application of FP categories to explain human
behaviour. It might seem that both arguments lead to a radical
conclusion that denies any explanatory value to FP concepts such
as desires, beliefs, intentions or attitudes. Does this mean that such
concepts are devoid of meaning, or that they are nothing more
than linguistic artefacts? Not necessarily. The implication is rather
that their applicability to the problem of explaining the categories
of action is much restricted. As we have demonstrated, (1) there are
actions that cannot be described satisfactorily with the categories
of FP; and – more importantly – (2) the category of action does not
belong to FP. Actions should be considered in the context of their
relation to the entirety of the agent’s cognitive processes, preferences
and emotions, as well as his environment and the cultural and social
dimension of agency. If so, what about FP?
It does not seem that explaining human behaviour through
intentional concepts and competences is unjustified. People will
keep explaining their own actions and the actions of others with
the language of propositional attitudes. We should be aware, however,
that explanations based on the categories of folk psychology are
personal. This means that they are horizontal, i.e. intra-level as
José Luis Bermúdez puts it.46 The explanans is at the same level
as the explanandum: the former precedes the latter in time and, in
a way, causes it.47 Personal explanations should be contrasted with
46 J.L. Bermúdez, Philosophy of Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction, Routledge,
London 2005, 31–35.
47 P. Gładziejewski, Wyjaśnianie za pomocą reprezentacji mentalnych. Perspektywa mechanistyczna, FNP, Warszawa – Toruń 2015, 337–338. From the perspective of cognitive
[23]
TWO ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE THESIS OF THE PREDICTIvE NATURE
115
sub-personal explanations, that is vertical explanations. The latter
are inter-level – higher-level phenomena are explained by reference
to lower-level phenomena. Our analysis has shown that, if an action
is not isolated from other activities of the embodied agent such as
cognition, decision-making, risk avoidance, etc., it should be explained
through vertical explanations. In light of the predictive hypothesis,
this is strictly related to the process of referring to subsequent levels
of the generative model. Predictions made by the cognitive system at
lower levels of the model (for example connected to the performance
of specific intentional actions) are justified by predictions at higher
levels of this hierarchical structure.
In conclusion: to identify a reason for an action is to identify
predictions made by the cognitive system. Such predictions, however,
cannot be reduced to intentions, but to the need to reduce tension
and normative uncertainty.48 Therefore, the reason for a given action
is the need to minimise the prediction error, which may also be
described as the need to minimise normative uncertainty.
science, however, they are not strictly speaking explanations, but rather a commonsense
way of understanding mental phenomena.
48 According to proponents of predictive processing this need drives brain activity, from
the most basic cellular processes to complex mental operations. See: A. Clark, A nice
surprise? Predictive processing and the active pursuit of novelty, Phenomenology and
the Cognitive Sciences (2017), 1–14. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-017-9525-z; A. Clark, Beyond
the ‘Bayesian Blur’: Predictive Processing and the Nature of Subjective Experience, Journal
of Consciousness Studies (2017), 1–31; K.J. Friston, The free-energy principle: a rough
guide to the brain?, Trends in Cognitive Science 13(2009)7, 293–301. DOI: 10.1016/j.
tics.2009.04.005; K.J. Friston, J. Daunizeau et al., Action and behavior: a free-energy
formulation, Biological Cybernetics 102(2010)3, 227–260; P. Schwartenbeck et al., Exploration, novelty, surprise, and free energy minimization, Frontiers in Psychology (2013),
4:710, DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00710.
116
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The research for this paper was financially supported by the Polish National Science Centre, under
decision DEC-2017/01/X/HS1/00165.
MIchał PIekarskI
m.piekarski@uksw.edu.pl
Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy
Wóycickiego 1/3, 01–938 Warsaw, Poland
DOI:10.21697/spch.2018.54.1.14