DECENTRALIZED DISASTER GOVERNANCE IN URBANIZING ASIA 5-6 MARCH 2015 Organized by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, held at the ARI Seminar Room, Tower Block, Level 10, Bukit Timah Road Disaster Governance for Sustainable Recovery of Infrastructure and Housing in Tacloban MARK KAMMERBAUER School of Applied Sciences Nuremberg, Germany mark.kammerbauer@nexialist.com DERLIE MATEO-BABIANO School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Management, The University of Queensland, Australia imateo@unimelb.edu.au 1. Introduction This paper deals with governance in post-disaster recovery in the case of the city of Tacloban in the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan (local name Yolanda) in 2013. Tacloban is one of the country's fastest growing cities and an important regional hub. The category 5 typhoon hit the Philippines on 08 November 2013, leaving millions of its people homeless and thousand others dead. The event has caught significant attention not only from the local but also from the international arena. The large-scale disaster impact has brought to the fore that governance for the recovery of Tacloban should not only include local governmental units and impacted communities and their residents, but national governmental institutions as well as international organisations. And as research indicates, the decentralisation of governance in the context of Asian cities is extremely important if we are to achieve resiliency and sustainability goals within such processes. After this catastrophic event, the aim was to achieve the resilient and sustainable recovery of the city. The Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP) was drafted to support rebuilding and reconstruction. It is underpinned by "good governance" and based on the principles of "building back better." The plan outlines the city's rebuilding priorities and planning initiatives in particular for infrastructure and housing. It defines growth-oriented projects to support a reduction of disaster risk according to "safe zones", including a project for 7000 new houses in the city's north. The plan is also a result of the cooperation between the city government and UN-Habitat. International aid organisations and various non-government organisations (NGOs) arrived in the aftermath of Haiyan with the goal of helping impacted residents with their recovery. But has the recovery to-date proceeded too quickly and too much out-of-sync with local (city) recovery planning needs? How successful are concepts of recovery aimed at "building back better" and making residents more resilient and less vulnerable? Findings indicate that while progress has been made, much still needs to be done. In addition, residents who quickly recovered (informally) or who are still living in tents along the coast are even more vulnerable than they were before Haiyan. There is a clear gap between national and local government responses during the rehabilitation and recovery phase. Even in one country, the capacity to address disaster risk is different from one constituent to another, depending on local government priorities and the strength of local government structures that are in place. Often, private sector and civil society rehabilitation and recovery initiatives are sometimes duplicated or are not properly coordinated because of a lack of disaster governance structures at the local level. Governance frameworks as basis of rehabilitation and recovery plans are typically established at the national level while implementation responsibilities lie at the local level. Rehabilitation responses also need to enable broad inclusion and participation among members of communities. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to examine the relationship between decentralisation and disaster governance in Tacloban after Typhoon Haiyan against the backdrop of the visions and progress to-date in the rebuilding of the city. The recovery plan seems to be more of a wish-list that possibly diverges from the reality of recovery, giving rise to a gap between aspirational planning goals and the implementation of the plan. People are still in shelters and informal recovery has already taken place. The argument is made that governance in recovery is weak; some aspects have been achieved, but progress is slow. In this context, local governance models are relevant, and the cooperation between NGOs and the city government comes under scrutiny. This also points out the need for external helpers to adapt to local governance cultures. 1 DECENTRALIZED DISASTER GOVERNANCE IN URBANIZING ASIA 5-6 MARCH 2015 Organized by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, held at the ARI Seminar Room, Tower Block, Level 10, Bukit Timah Road A discussion of key terms of disaster recovery, governance, and Asian cities will offer a theoretical starting point to illustrate the planning context of Tacloban. Empirical research was conducted in Tacloban in October 2014 by the use of qualitative methods such as semi-structured expert interviews and a focus group discussion. Participants include involved stakeholders, members of local governmental institutions, non-profit organisations, private businesses as well as impacted residents. Findings from these interviews will be presented and discussed. In conclusion, a critical assessment of governance in recovery in the case of Tacloban will be offered. The aim is to contribute to sharing knowledge and proposing planning recommendations within a discussion on just, sustainable and resilient recovery in the context of Asian cities impacted by environmental disasters. 2. Conceptualising disaster governance, vulnerability and recovery in Asian cities Governance, vulnerability, and recovery are terms that can be used and defined differently according to various disciplines and research foci. The following discusses these terms in the context of (environmental) disaster and according to their relevance for Asian cities. Governance is seen to include not only government, but also participants from the private sector and civil society within policy and planning processes. In this regard, urban governance relates to particular scales in terms of policy and space and can be defined as "direction-setting, policy making and implementation that incorporate the roles and responsibilities of government, the private sector and civil society in urban settings, as well as the partnerships and conflicts amongst them" (Minnery 2007: 333). Beyond that, actors who are "external to the locally territorialised players" (Minnery 2007: 336) or come from "higher levels of government" (Minnery 2007: 332) may also be involved in urban governance processes. With regards to disaster, governance is seen as the "umbrella under which disaster risk reduction takes place" (UNDP 2010). It can serve to create awareness of risk among populations and thus contribute to enhancing coping capacities in relation to the "political will to set policy and allocate appropriate resources" (UNDP 2010). Governance is described as good if it includes "participation, transparency, accountability, efficiency and responsiveness" (UNDP 2010). Disaster can be conceptualised as an interaction between a particular (environmental) hazard and the vulnerability of the impacted population. According to international frameworks vulnerability leads to an increase of "the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards" (UN/ISDR 2007:1). Within the disaster research discourse, the social character of disaster is repeatedly stressed (Gaillard et al.). Such perspectives regard vulnerability as a social construction that can be defined as the lacking capacity of individuals, groups and systems to cope with disaster (Bürkner 2010:26) in relation to the "economic and political allocation of resources" (Cannon, Müller-Mahn 2010:12). It can be indicated by characteristics including gender, ethnicity, age, health, limited mobility or lacking social networks. Planning needs to take into consideration that these characteristics can change over time (Birkmann et al. 2012:75). Factors that can contribute to vulnerability include urbanization processes in areas subject to risk. Emergency and disaster management institutions utilise the concept of the disaster cycle, which encompasses the phases of planning and preparedness, response, and recovery and reconstruction. The recovery and rebuilding of settlement spaces impacted by disaster are viewed as "windows of opportunity (...) in a way that will build community resilience and reduce vulnerability to future disaster risks" (UN/ISDR 2007:5). Research on disasters points out that definitions of postdisaster recovery may vary, that sustainability and equity constitute important goals, and that the responsible government units are those on local levels (Olshansky et al. 2009:201). Available funds, leadership, cooperation and participation play important roles (Olshansky et al. 2009:206-208). While quick recovery appears to be generally favourable, it may be complicated by the time needed to improve upon what has existed before disaster. The significance of such improvement lies in the aim of reducing vulnerability after disaster. In particular, the vulnerability of impacted populations is viewed as related to the conditions that existed before disaster. Research states that recovery "in the same vulnerable locations reproduces not only the problem and risk, but it can also create increased and additional risks" (Wamsler 2004:19). "Building back better" can help reduce risks by employing standardised and adaptive building measures and appropriate land-use planning. Resettlement due to disaster is a possible option, but not commonplace (Sipe, Vella 2015:5). While resettlement schemes can lead to a reduction of exposure to an environmental hazard, they may also contribute to a rise of vulnerability, e.g. due to the separation of populations from their prior livelihoods or exposure to alternative risk (Okada et al. 2014:20). Research also points out the 2 DECENTRALIZED DISASTER GOVERNANCE IN URBANIZING ASIA 5-6 MARCH 2015 Organized by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, held at the ARI Seminar Room, Tower Block, Level 10, Bukit Timah Road difficulty in measuring the success of recovery in general (Olshansky et al. 2009) or resettlement in particular (Okada et al. 2014). Cities in Asia are increasingly becoming the locus of risk and disaster, due to the massive and increasing numbers of people living in Asian mega-urban regions (MURs). In the impacted urban agglomerations, questions on equity and livelihoods arise in relation to land-use planning, housing, transportation, and urban services. As result, the scope of responses to disaster is seen to require governance approaches that facilitate the inclusion of all actors, institutions and sectors within impacted societies. Douglass defines five key effects that serve to emphasise the interrelationship of urbanization processes in Asia in regard to disaster: "agglomeration and the formation of megaurban regions; spatial polarization in high-risk zones; new forms and magnitudes of vulnerability; compound disasters; and the expanding ecological reach of cities" (Douglass 2013:4). Urban agglomerations that experience strong population growth also face rising disaster risk due to the locations they are situated in. These agglomerations can include multiple administrative units and municipalities and comprise areas with both urban and rural land-use characteristics (Douglass 2013:3-5). If the spatial polarisation of these mega-urban regions is focused in riparian or coastal environments, related risks are amplified by the emergence of informal settlements and slums fuelled by rural-urban migration (Douglass 2013:8-9). Therefore, it becomes necessary to consider the vulnerability of populations at risk and employ governance approaches to deal with resulting problems and conflicts in an inclusive way (Douglass 2013:11). In this context, disasters triggered by environmental hazards may coalesce into compound disasters in relation to industrial uses or prior urban planning decisions. Flooding comprises "the most pervasive and frequent form of disaster in Asia" (Douglass 2013:12). Increased coverage in urban environments or lack of retention areas can exacerbate their impact. A further aspect is how disasters in combination with the "expanding environmental resource reach of cities" (Douglass 2013:14) extend beyond urban administrative borders towards regional, national, and even global levels. In sum, the five key effects require governance approaches that facilitate participation as a "framework for society-wide engagement in all phases of disaster experiences and responses" (Douglass 2013:4). The goal is to achieve "social and environmental justice" (Douglass 2013:17) that could affect planning outcomes, e.g. in relation to resettlement schemes and livelihood needs. Critical scales include the neighbourhood, city region, and trans-border region (Douglass 2013:24). 3. Planning context: Tacloban after Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 While most of the literature on urbanization in the Global South focuses on mega-urban regions, the unprecedented growth of small and medium sized cities (SMCs) 1 in urbanising Asia also presents a different set of complex expectations and challenges. Douglass (2013) focuses on mega-urban regions (MURs) since size and scale influence disaster impacts and affect disaster recovery. Among the top mega-urban regions in Asia, there is only one Philippine city. Manila, with more than 20 million inhabitants, ranks at number 6 in terms of population count behind Tokyo-Yokohama, Jakarta, Seoul-Incheon, Delhi and Shanghai (Douglass 2013:6). Tacloban is classified as a small to medium sized urban centre, which accounts for 60% of Asian cities compared with MURs (comprising a third of the population in Asia). While Tacloban may not qualify as an MUR, it constitutes a major regional hub. Tacloban is also the capital of the Eastern Visayas Region – Leyte and Samar – and home to a regional airport. Before the typhoon, it had a population of 200,000 – among them a large percentage of urban poor (Oxfam 2013). When speaking of Asian cities, it is important to emphasise the distinctiveness of Tacloban City in terms of being a small to medium sized urban administrative unit as it is the capital of the Eastern Visayas region as well as a coastal community. The Local Government Code of 1991 mandates decentralisation of central functions. The Code provides the overarching framework of local governance in the country. Through a process of decentralisation, it sets the requisites for the creation of local government units (LGUs). LGUs enjoy local autonomy and are also responsible for addressing disaster management. The city consists of traditional neighbourhood communities that are known as Barangays. Barangays are the smallest political and administrative LGUs in the country and are managed by a locally elected Barangay 1 urban populations of 200,000 to 1 million 3 DECENTRALIZED DISASTER GOVERNANCE IN URBANIZING ASIA 5-6 MARCH 2015 Organized by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, held at the ARI Seminar Room, Tower Block, Level 10, Bukit Timah Road chairman. Typically, a Barangay consists of 70 to 100 households. 28 of the 138 Barangays in the city of Tacloban were classified as "danger zones" (City of Tacloban et al. 2014: 7). On 08 November 2013 Typhoon Haiyan made landfall along the coast of the Philippine island of Leyte. The typhoon is locally known as Yolanda and became one of the strongest tropical storms ever recorded. Strong winds were followed by a storm surge. At least 7,000 casualties were reported. More than half a million houses were damaged and destroyed. Tacloban "sustained the greatest damage to housing, business, and infrastructure" (City of Tacloban et al. 2014). The overwhelming majority of destroyed dwellings were located along the coastline. The local institutions responsible for disaster response were also affected. After the disaster, available housing was rare and costs for building materials increased. The need for a comprehensive and integrated recovery process arose. Infrastructure and housing comprise key components of the rebuilding efforts. The governance constellation that emerged is key to the implementation of official recovery planning aims. The Philippine Climate Change Act of 2009 and the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act 2010 are two statutory laws that provide important guidance for disaster planning response and recovery. They mandate an integrated approach to development as a way to reduce risks and vulnerabilities to disasters in the country. Particularly, the Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act (PDRRM) was influenced by the Hyogo Framework for Action. It aims at decentralising authority and reallocating responsibility to local governmental levels. However, lacking capacities and political will are viewed as hindrances in achieving these aims. While evacuation warnings were given, reports state that citizens "did not completely understand the extent and true nature of the typhoon" (Makhoul 2014:17). Buildings and infrastructure experienced damage and destruction throughout impacted regions, more than 1 million houses were damaged, debris made roads impassable. Due to the scale of the disaster impact, international organisations "agreed to assist the Filipino government and (...) the local authorities directly" (Makhoul 2014:26). An action plan, the Haiyan Action Plan, was co-funded by the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and member states of the UN (OCHA-Philippines 2013). Coastal areas received the majority of shelter assistance. While many evacuees are noted to have returned in January 2014, they also "used the emergency shelter material to rebuild on the areas which were affected by the typhoon" (Makhoul 2014:22). Official "No-Build Areas" were declared by the national government, and "more than 100,000 families" (Philippine Humanitarian Country Team 2014) were affected by this policy. Fishermen in Tacloban protested against the designation of "No Build Zones" in coastal areas by the national government. A need for "solutions at community level" (Makhoul 2014:26) to include communities "in the development of protection networks and design of response mechanisms" (ibid.) as well as to "improve coordination and management between the different actors" (ibid.) is noted. Lacking transparency, unequal distribution of funds, land ownership, and housing tenure are perceived as major problems affecting returning residents. However, Because of the magnitude of Typhoon Haiyan’s impact, the national government saw the need to create an extraordinary mechanism, the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR), to oversee the rehabilitation and recovery of typhoon-affected areas, including Tacloban City. OPARR’s mission is to unify the efforts of the government along with other agencies involved in post-Yolanda rehabilitation and recovery. It is also mandated to establish an overall strategic vision and to develop integrated short-term, medium-term, and long-term plans and programs for recovery and reconstruction. In performing its mission, OPARR coordinates with the NDRRM Council and consults with LGUs such as Tacloban City. In Haiyan’s aftermath, OPARR introduced a bottom-up and piecemeal approach to empower affected LGUs by enabling them to formulate their respective rehabilitation plans. Complemented by UN’s cluster framework approach, LGUs were required to develop their own action plans and programs in coordination with local government plans. With support by UN-Habitat, the city developed a plan for the rebuilding of the city after Haiyan. The "Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan" (TRRP) formulates recovery visions and aims based on the principle of "building back better." The plan is intended as a guide for a redevelopment of the city that is "socially, environmentally, economically and culturally balanced" (City of Tacloban et al. 2014: 3). The recovery plan points out areas further inland within the city municipality that are suitable for urban development and safe from flooding. Land uses in coastal areas at risk are to be reconsidered. Construction labor in the rebuilding process is viewed as an economic opportunity. In particular, the TRRP features a resettlement scheme for impacted residents north of the city centre. This new development is intended to offer 7,000 new permanent housing units. The revision of the 4 DECENTRALIZED DISASTER GOVERNANCE IN URBANIZING ASIA 5-6 MARCH 2015 Organized by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, held at the ARI Seminar Room, Tower Block, Level 10, Bukit Timah Road existing building code is supposed to contribute to provisions and policies aimed at an increase of resilience and to guide future construction tasks and projects (City of Tacloban 2014:14-40). Tacloban City government submitted its Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan to OPARR in May 2014. The TRRP was approved one year after Haiyan struck the country and the city. According to reports, lack of available land, limited resources, and bureaucracy were responsible for delays in approving the plan (Reuters 2014). Tacloban’s Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP) was aimed at determining the immediate, required actions and operational strategies for the process of recovery, rehabilitation, and sustainable development of the city after the disaster. The TRRP is seen as an innovative and important plan to address issues associated with post-disaster management. The TRRP also emphasises "building back safer" principles and actions that are consistent with the city’s long-term development vision, goals, and policies. There are five key result areas (KRAs) of the TRRP, including shelter, social services, economy, infrastructure, and environment (Tacloban City Government 2014). The guiding principles adopted by the TRRP throughout the planning process are: • • • • • • Inclusive and holistic: socially, environmentally, economically, and culturally balanced redevelopment, consider disaster recovery as an “opportunity”; Building back better and safer: reduce future risk exposure, engage in action to address vulnerabilities and promote risk reduction; Multiple resource generation/financial resources: achieve broad base impacts; Need-based and result oriented: consider both pre- and post-disaster realities, complement existing capacities; Use emergency responses/actions as building blocks: aim at long term recovery objectives; Collaborative multi-sector participatory: engage all national and local level stakeholders, especially the local communities. 4. Methodology Empirical field research was conducted between 16 and 23 of October 2014 in Tacloban. Qualitative methods were used, including expert interviews and a focus group discussion, complemented by site visits and photo documentation. The participants included members of government, civil society, and the private market sector in Tacloban who were or are active in the recovery and rebuilding of the city after Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. Those who participated within the expert interviews and the focus group discussion were identified as experts in their field of work or representatives of groups and institutions active in the recovery and who carried particular responsibilities within that activity (cf. Flick 2012:214-215). Participant concerns were addressed by a withdrawal proviso. The number of participants in the expert interviews and focus group discussion was 8. All were 18 years of age or older. Participants were obtained through email contacts facilitated by the authors and referrals made by key contacts. Potential participants initially received an invitation letter that explained the purpose of the research. A Participant Information Sheet was attached to the letter, which explained the research project in detail. Participants were asked to contact the authors whether they wished to participate. By inviting people to take part, the authors were able to avoid approaching people who might not wish to be interviewed. Before the interview, participants who were willing to be interviewed were requested to sign a Participant Consent Form. Open-end interviews and the focus group discussion were recorded digitally and documented in form of written notes under the approval of the participant. The questions were formulated in an interview guideline. The semi-structured interview approach and the character of the questions permitted a degree of openness in the expert interviews and the focus group discussion. Their analytical categories and topics of inquiry are based on the theoretical approach. The interview transcripts were used for a qualitative content analysis. For this paper, results are contextualised in relation to the initial research questions (cf. Flick 2012:409-410). Identifying information about participants is kept confidential. 5 DECENTRALIZED DISASTER GOVERNANCE IN URBANIZING ASIA 5-6 MARCH 2015 Organized by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, held at the ARI Seminar Room, Tower Block, Level 10, Bukit Timah Road 5. Results and findings The open-end interviews and focus-group discussion dealt with the roles of participants within governance processes for the recovery of the city, how they interact with other actors, whether this process is considered successful or unsuccessful, how help is provided to impacted residents, and how planning can reduce future disaster risk. The interviewees highlight their diverse, yet similar onthe-ground experiences right after Typhoon Haiyan hit the area. They expose the major barriers and constraints in creating an urgent response and discuss the latest developments and actions in the area. "Rebuilding Tacloban" was identified as the shared goal of those involved. The following will present findings from these interviews. 5.1 Expert interview: Senior member, city building department, 19.10.2014 The interviewee's role is primarily to design buildings for the city. City planning was not seen to function effectively and required help. The interviewee is also in charge of the building code. For its revision, the city receives help from UN Habitat. New Master Plan: At the time of the interview, several meetings sponsored by UN Habitat took place in order to help the city rework its master plan. The plan is divided into three segments. The short and medium term segments are to last three years, the long term segment even up to 10 years. "Of course it’s just a plan, it can change, but at least we have a general idea where we are going." As part of the master plan the city proposed a reclamation project along Magallanes Barangay. The reclaimed area needs to be elevated to prevent a future storm surge. JICA proposed to elevate the roads along the coastline towards the new settlement in the north. They mapped the actual height of the surge. However, it is very costly to build elevated roads. Yet, as result less houses need to be protected. While construction can still take place on the other side, it has to be on stilts. Sleeping quarters shall no longer be on ground floor levels, but instead on upper floors. Uses could include restaurants or resort hotels, where the sea can pass through the ground floor. Housing: about 14,000 housing units are needed. The national government signalled the National Housing Authority to start with housing construction projects. Accredited construction companies were invited to submit bids. Contractors are responsible for the acquisition of required land, because the city of Tacloban lacks available land. About 80 hectares of property are available in the north of the municipality. This area was originally intended for a light to medium industry growth centre in the early 90s. It remained unaffected by the storm surge and lies in a natural mountain terrace that covers the area from any typhoon. The city is re-masterplanning the area, determining where the road network and commercial uses will be. Construction has already begun. However, the required roads are not yet ready. The developers are responsible for building the connecting roads to the main highways. Project management is multi-sectoral and occurs "hand in hand with the other agencies." Some of the properties were loaned to the city for free, to be used for a year. The city also acquired its own properties. Negotiation serves to consolidate lots, since there may be several owners involved. However, speculation on land is taking place: "it’s a sellers market." This also involves farmland, and as result, the farmers are being displaced. About two to five hectares are plotted per site. The allocation for every house is 40 square meters per lot, with 22 square meters per house. Housing types include loft, duplex, or row houses with up to five units. Single detached housing is considered too costly. While most construction is one-storey, two-storey houses are under consideration in order to make the project more viable. Housing units are intended for an average of 5 individuals per family. Construction of the 14,000 required houses is estimated to last one year. However, less than 2000 houses have been built to-date. Numerous pledges have been made by NGOs including Habitat for Humanity or GMA Kapuso, who already started building. Some of the impacted populations are still in the transitory bunk houses. The city is also responsible for moving people in tents into permanent housing. 200 families were still in tents waiting to be transferred. The temporary sites will eventually feature permanent housing. The people now living in temporary housing are properly documented, DWSD knows which houses will resettle where. The informal settlers in the airport area also need to be relocated, due to a planned expansion of the airport. The population was counted to prepare the relocation, indicating that more than a thousand families live in the area. The NHA is funding the relocation. The airport itself is owned by the DOTC and the CAAP (national level). Due to Yolanda, the relocation problem was compounded, and many more residents need to be relocated. 6 DECENTRALIZED DISASTER GOVERNANCE IN URBANIZING ASIA 5-6 MARCH 2015 Organized by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, held at the ARI Seminar Room, Tower Block, Level 10, Bukit Timah Road Cooperation: Some developers didn’t bother to get permits. The city needs them and the houses they build, and therefore processes their applications while construction is already underway. Otherwise the city might be accused of hindering the work progress. Coordination meetings serve to inform those involved what will happen next. The NHA briefs the involved parties. Regular updates are expected, because the recovery is considered a long-term project. Sometimes NGOS don’t coordinate with the city. Still, their contribution is considered as a good thing. The Barangays play a very crucial role because they have direct contact with the people. Whatever happens to the Barangay, they know. There is a flow of hierarchy and communication that goes from the Mayor to the Barangay. What the Mayor intends to do is easily transmitted. There is a close link with the Barangays, and at the city level there is a person who is in charge of Barangay affairs. The need to provide jobs for the resettled residents is recognised. Most of them are currently seen to work in the city. However, the city is inviting light and medium industry to the resettlement area, including aquaculture or a solar farm company for sustainable energy as new job opportunities. A new deep seaport for all inter island vessels in Babatmon town is also supposed to help create jobs. 5.2 Expert interview: Senior member, city government, 17.10.2014 The city government focuses on providing social services and creating security. The aim is to support an environment that becomes conducive to the economy and enables families to feel safe and plan their future. "We boast of a good and strong economy in Asia but we don’t have the right mechanisms now to address the plight of the poor." New Master Plan: To craft the master plan, the city partnered with UN Habitat. One goal was to plan a new township. For this purpose, an economic strategist studied the economic activity. "Now we can build up and build back the lives of the people better. We cannot fight the storm surge, neither can we fight the tsunami." Resettling away from the "danger zone" serves to reduce risk for the population. The city is also building a school and a hospital in the area. The problems related to livelihood are acknowledged. The new township project under construction in the northern part of the municipality is less subject to risk than the coastal areas. People who resettled there were apprehensive at first, eventually that changed. It is considered necessary to have their cooperation to focus on the recovery and ensure the success of the project: "what’s important to them is seeing that light at the end of the tunnel." Resettlement within the borders of the city municipality means that they remain within the city's jurisdiction: "I can make sure that what happens there it’s my call." Managing expectations is considered important: "I’m not promising you a rose garden, but we’re doing the best we can." The idea is to build back better the lives of the people. Daily urban system: Tacloban City constitutes an urban centre. The population increases during the day by 400 percent. As result, there is a related need for services. In the four universities in the city, 80% of the students are not from Tacloban City. 75%, sometimes 80% of patients who are not from the city frequent the regional hospital. The disaster occurred mid-day: "where do you put 400 percent more people?" The city only had evacuation centres for 240,000 people available. "How do you feed 1 million if you only have infrastructure for your normal population?" Tacloban was also an urban centre in the disaster response. The hospital, drug stores, or banks are located there. "To receive help from relatives who send you money, you’ll go through a bank. To leave the city because there is no medicine for seniors, you'll leave from the airport." Whatever happens in the city is seen to affect everybody within the surrounding six provinces. However, there is no built-in infrastructure for the daily population increase. Problems arise in explaining this situation to the national government. A lack of collaboration between the city and the different layers of government is noted. Funding strategies: A lack of funding mechanisms is reported. The government lacks mechanisms to cascade resources to local government units. When the World Bank provides funding to the DBP (Development Bank of the Philippines), only 80% remain when funding is passed to the local government. However, this funding should not be seen as an expense: "it’s an investment, it’s an insurance. When you respond to disaster you’ll spend hundreds of millions of Dollars more." However, a lack of knowledge on how to use funds and of related capabilities is noted. The city set aside a larger amount of money than it usually does to be prepared for future disasters. There is a need to work together with the central government, because there are mechanisms that city government is not able to deliver. One example is insurance. 75% of all government buildings 7 DECENTRALIZED DISASTER GOVERNANCE IN URBANIZING ASIA 5-6 MARCH 2015 Organized by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, held at the ARI Seminar Room, Tower Block, Level 10, Bukit Timah Road are insured by the Government Service Insurance System. The city didn't receive payouts. All government cars are insured, and it took a year before the city got paid. If the city doesn’t pay the insurance premium every month, it becomes liable. Given that "there is a mechanism in place, we activate it, why is it taking so long?" Cooperation: The cooperation with the business community seems quiet, but given prior experiences in coming to common understandings, "quiet is good." The government survives on taxes from the business community. After the disaster the city government needed to give the business community "some leeway for the survival of the city." It was therefore necessary to delay the collection of taxes in the city. As result, the city "didn't have enough resources to address major concerns." In the collaboration with the stakeholders, it is important to note that banks, utilities, and schools also belong to the private sector. The government therefore has to reach out and collaborate with the private sector "to get things moving." The cooperation with NGOs is described as very good. The Mayor asks NGOs to coordinate with the city government. The NGOs are required to understand the structure of local government and related laws: "even the central government can't build here without a permit." NGOs might build something that is not zoned properly. "I can exempt the fees but I can’t exempt the permit." The city can ensure that construction projects take place in accordance with the Master Plan, so buildings don’t have to be demolished later on. 30 to 40 days after the disaster, the national government declared a 40 m wide "No Build Zone" along the coast. However, this sent a message to the people that if they built 50 meters away from the coast, they would be safe. The measure shouldn't be the distance from the shore inward; instead, it should be based on the elevation of the land compared to the sea. The city included this into the Master Plan based on the existing risks. The city cooperates with GIZ, JICA, and AID e.g. to create a topographical map of the city's coastal areas. The city sees the need to know more to better prepare people, because they "learned the hard way in the disaster." The city is aware of the need to present data to the public and show what will happen that relates to them. A scientific knowledge base is considered critical for governance, and social capital is noted as an important element to strengthen the relationship between the city government and the people. These are seen to fight against poverty, and thus, lack the capacity to access education. However, while "some don't know how to read a book, they can definitely read you." Regarding the recovery process, "recovery for me will disappear when the people forget what happened. As long as they remember, we keep recovering." 5.3 Focus group discussion, Tacloban, 21.10.2014 The focus group discussion included members from the private market, higher education institutions, and nongovernmental organisations. Questions asked covered the situation after the typhoon, post-disaster planning and recovery, cooperation between government and other organisations and stakeholders, and particular local problems. Architect, private sector representative: 2-3 days after landfall, goods were distributed. A local bakery set a 20 Peso purchase limit so nobody could hoard food. A neighbourhood grocery store offered a 500 Peso bag that included all everyday goods. Protective barricades were set up in front of the local subdivision to protect residents from potential security threats. Mr. Lacson was named as "Rehab Czar" by the national government. The problem arose that this coordinator "doesn't call the shots". Moving to the new resettlement area is seen to possibly affect the life and culture of traditional extended families. Architect and academic (local university): In local houses, all ground floors were "washed out". Wind and heavy rain also caused damage, tops of buildings were blown off, walls collapsed. Rice straw mesh was used as temporary "tarp". Rebuilding after the typhoon became difficult, because streets were covered with mounds of debris for several days. Tools or construction materials weren't available, tradesmen and carpenters were scarce (they also had to repair own houses). Prices tripled. Being personally skilled in construction and repair was an advantage. People lived in bunk houses for up to 6 months (and longer), but new permanent houses weren't yet available. Architects from higher learning institutions were invited to the Mayor's office for consultation. The impression was that people "have to follow orders". Aims to build back better include the review and revision of the national building code. The school made recommendations, but the revision process seemed to take place too quickly: "it's being rushed!" Revision recommendations should be "research-based". However, institutions were "not going through the right stages" to accomplish this. 8 DECENTRALIZED DISASTER GOVERNANCE IN URBANIZING ASIA 5-6 MARCH 2015 Organized by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, held at the ARI Seminar Room, Tower Block, Level 10, Bukit Timah Road Architect and representative of a professional organisation: The Tzu Chi foundation (a group of local businessmen) helped and gave out cash donations. Gasoline was expensive after the typhoon, and dirt had to be removed by paid labor. Some homeowners who were privately insured, i.e. those with housing loans, received reimbursement based on insurance claims. For the "UN dormitories", local architects weren't consulted. However, locals should be involved, also based on their knowledge on typical local planning issues such as drainage and ventilation. Questions on the affordability of new housing arise, such as in the new settlement. Not all relocated people are fishermen, and livelihoods may vary. Member, NGO 1: Preparation for the disaster was insufficient and responders themselves were affected. The terminology used in warnings was also a problem. Had the term "tsunami" instead of "storm surge" been used, everybody would have understood the danger of flooding. Such terms should be translated into language that can be understood by the local population. The recovery plan is considered "a wish-list." The recovery plan is viewed as poor planning, because the community wasn't involved. Poor stakeholder involvement is noted. Problems arise in terms of transparency, as data weren't made available to public. If the local government assisted in planning, the question arises "by what data? Data was not available!" Recovery funds weren't given to the local government, but to national government agencies. To receive funds, a project proposal needed to be submitted by an organised group. The process is considered bureaucratic and lengthy. Problems include the lack of money and the fact that people on the local level weren't trained for the situation. Beyond that, international NGOs are seen to have went on their own. This may have contributed to the informal rebuilding in the No Build Zone. The local context also poses particular challenges, and a need is noted to manage information and logistics in relation to the local Barangays: "when one Barangay fixes its drainage, the next Barangay floods." The reality of recovery is viewed as a grass roots process. As result, "fixed solutions" don't work. There is a perceived gap between "what is planned and what happens on the ground", a situation that is seen to particularly affect the urban poor. City council member: People underestimated the typhoon. They "never experienced flood", and didn't prepare for it. Regarding institutions, "they were not prepared" due to the "magnitude of the storm." The city had originally submitted a plan that had existed before Yolanda (CLUP, 10 years planning horizon) and was asked to provide another plan. Existing plans didn't seem to align. The interviewee attended transparency forums related to funding. Recovery is estimated to take 3-5 years. People were still living in shelters. However, the government doesn't intend to build tenements, and there are no social housing programs in the Philippines. Barangay captains are considered responsible for communicating with the city, e.g. by reporting the number of casualties. If the Barangay captain doesn't go to city hall, the Barangay doesn't receive help. A problem with time arises: "people can't wait". Tacloban is designated as urbanised area, and as result, the city receives no help from the Agricultural Department. Member, NGO 2: People are still living in tents and transitory houses (bunk houses). In the bunk houses, 5 persons live in one unit. The situation may become permanent. There isn't enough new permanent housing available. It appears unclear whether international NGOs coordinated with the government. There was a perceived lack of information, so NGOs are seen to "go on their own". Help was unevenly distributed: "in our Barangay we haven't received anything". 6. Discussion and conclusions Tacloban City, being the capital city of the Eastern Visayan region, takes on a distinct role compared to other cities in the region. It experiences a massive daytime population influx which comes from surrounding areas and provinces, and for this reason, there is an expectation that the city must provide for the daily needs and demands of this urban and regional population agglomeration. These needs and demands include social infrastructure and services at the city level, such as higher educational institutions, hospitals, and transport infrastructure, i.e. roads, ports and airports. More importantly, local economic development is fuelled by the presence of jobs and other resources offered to its surrounding six provinces. In Typhoon Haiyan’s aftermath, it was found that Tacloban was confronted by "typical" challenges associated with response and recovery: the preparation for the disaster was considered insufficient; responders were also affected; the early warning terminology was confusing, the term "storm surge" was not widely known; streets were covered with debris for several days, there was a lack of tools, construction materials, and tradesmen; prices increased. 9 DECENTRALIZED DISASTER GOVERNANCE IN URBANIZING ASIA 5-6 MARCH 2015 Organized by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, held at the ARI Seminar Room, Tower Block, Level 10, Bukit Timah Road Similar to other capital cities in the context of disasters, Tacloban experienced compounding disaster impacts. There was an expectation from people from surrounding provinces who temporarily migrated to Tacloban after Typhoon Haiyan that social services and infrastructure must support them too, and not only the city residents. Because of this, capital cities can be affected even worse than expected, due to the circumstances of the daily urban system. Thus, questions arise which population to support or to prioritise in terms of health services, disaster shelters, and funding. The interrelatedness of impacts means that even if the disaster happened in Tacloban, the resulting effects extend beyond the boundaries of the city in terms of assistance in response and recovery. Not only the city, the whole region was affected. In addition, due to the magnitude of the disaster, local institutions were overwhelmed. Thus, a context that extends beyond the city to include the region within the daily urban system is considered highly important in enhancing disaster resilience. Governance in an urban-regional, city-network or "trans-urban" context should be pursued. Because of the magnitude of the impact of Typhoon Haiyan on Tacloban, international organisations such as UN Habitat were engaged in supporting the city’s recovery in a number of ways, including sponsoring meetings, helping the city rework its master plan, and the drafting of the Tacloban Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan (TRRP). This plan outlines the city's rebuilding priorities. Its key aim is "building back better", whilst acknowledging that good governance underpins disaster recovery. The city government drafted the TRRP and it was submitted to and approved by the OPAPP. This appears to reflect proactive planning at the local level. However, the extent to which participatory approaches to disaster recovery were considered is unclear. The TRRP seems not to have been developed in consultation with the population. Rather, the impression is that a final product was discussed with the public when it was ready for approval. Critics consider the TRRP "a wish-list" rather than a viable plan that could help encourage transformative action from the various stakeholders involved in the rebuilding process. Barriers to achieving good governance such as transparency issues, limited public availability of data and related sources, lack of financial resources, limited capacity building and training of personnel on local levels continue to be a challenge. Still, the TRRP presents an important opportunity for both the national and city governments to facilitate and develop an appropriate framework for disaster governance at the local level. Such a framework is crucial to provide a formal basis for building back the city's infrastructure and housing. Planned projects include the elevation of coastal roads and the creation of a new township and 14,000 new housing units. However, time is of the issue: less than 2000 houses have been built todate, and people are still living in tents and transitory houses. The new township, under construction in the city's north, aims at removing the population from the "danger zone" in order to reduce disaster risk. The city is also building a school and a hospital in the area. However, the resettlement will most likely affect the livelihoods and culture of residents. Farmers are being displaced, which also becomes a livelihood issue, and may compound the existing vulnerabilities. In addition, not all relocated people are fishermen, so livelihoods may vary. Still, poverty in particular continues to be a problem. The need to provide jobs for the resettled residents is acknowledged, and industrial uses are planned to complement the resettlement area. The combination of wind and flood, damage and destruction of protective structures, the impact on the airport and regional services located in the city in relation to the daily population qualify Tacloban after Typhoon Haiyan as a textbook case of a compound disaster. In this regard, it appears fair and just to consider the social vulnerabilities of the population. This extends to the relocation of people who may lose their livelihoods and the lack of options, opportunities, and amenities in new locations. Uprooting them from their community and their traditional social support systems – their families, friends and relatives who have been always nearby to provide support for years – may even contribute to an increase of vulnerability despite the aim of reducing risk. The empirical data from the qualitative interviews present different, sometimes contrasting narratives of cooperation, coordination, and management of the diverse set of actors involved in the rebuilding process. More importantly, this study illustrates the importance of the local neighbourhood unit, the Barangay, for the city's recovery. Through its Barangay chairman, it plays an important role in facilitating communication between the city and the population. However, this local context also poses challenges: the need to manage information and logistics in relation to the Barangays is noted, since help in response after the typhoon seems to have been unevenly distributed. Also, there is a call for better involvement of local professionals within the multistakeholder planning processes related to local context. Members of the academic sector were 10 DECENTRALIZED DISASTER GOVERNANCE IN URBANIZING ASIA 5-6 MARCH 2015 Organized by Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, held at the ARI Seminar Room, Tower Block, Level 10, Bukit Timah Road invited to the Mayor's office for consultation, but this was perceived as a top-down process. The city as well requests improved coordination with international NGOs who are willing to help but may not be informed of local legal requirements and authorities. Further, due to the daytime population increase, it should include the regional population: disaster governance transcends the local context. In terms of disaster governance it is critical that disaster preparedness is identified as a priority for coastal cities, because they receive a fair share of disasters in comparison to other parts of the country. Thus, while the whole country may be affected by disaster impacts, those in coastal areas are more at risk. Therefore, the required coping mechanisms and adaptive capacities must be strengthened and should be a key focus in local disaster governance. A further reason for this is the fact that disaster recovery funding is administered at the national governmental level. It has a large say in how disaster impacts are to be addressed (e.g. what particular sector should be prioritised, what infrastructure should be built). However, the authors place caution in saying that the national governmental level had a major influence in the recovery process at the local level. In terms of allocation of funds – yes; it was also approved centrally. But the basic design and implementation of the TRRP was still undertaken at the local level. In conclusion, the following four aspects stand out:     Social capital is indispensable to strengthen the relationship between city government and people. The city acknowledges the related need to know more to better prepare people for disaster. It is important to acknowledge the daily in-migration to the city, since it reflects the interrelated impacts and effects that contribute to the complexity of the city-disaster nexus. This situation requires adequate measures to reduce risk and vulnerability and achieve resilience. The Barangay captains play a special role within the governance for recovery. Since this relates to informal settlement of urban poor in the Barangays, the coupling of informal practices with formal ones becomes an important issue of local disaster governance. The recovery is viewed as a grass roots process, and timely implementation is essential. However, "fixed solutions" are not considered appropriate in order to address urgent concerns of recovery planning, given the vulnerability (and poverty) of the urban population. In this regard, the TRRP can be recognised as an important step towards a decentralised disaster governance process for the recovery of infrastructure and housing in Tacloban. Note 1: This research was approved by the University of Queensland ethics review committee. Note 2: This paper was edited in 2018 for online use. References Birkmann, J., Schanze, J., Müller, P., Stock, M. (2012 eds): Anpassung an den Klimawandel durch räumliche Planung – Grundlagen, Strategien, Instrumente. E-Paper der ARL Nr. 13, Hannover. Bürkner, H.-J. 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