The article opens with the hypothesis that the default position that should guide healthcare providers when treating patients at the end of life is that patients opt for life. In the absence of an explicit request to die, we may assume that patients wish to continue living. Thus the role of the medical profession is to provide patients with the best possible conditions for continued living. The article makes a case for physician-assisted suicide legislation. It examines the ‘quality of life’ argument, and the issue of the patient’s autonomy and competence. It is argued that (1) quality of life is a subjective concept. Only the patient can conclude for herself that her quality of life is so low to warrant ending it, and that (2) only competent patients may request ending their lives. Patients’ lives should not be actively terminated by the medical team without the explicit consent of patients. The article then probes the role of physicians at the end of life, arguing that medicine should strive to cater to the wishes of all patients, not only the majority of them. Physicians should not turn their backs to justified requests by their patients. Physicians are best equipped to come to the help of patients at all stages of their illness, including their end-of-life. At the same time, in ending life, the final control mechanism should be with the patient. Thus physician-assisted suicide is preferred to euthanasia in order to lower the possibility of abuse and of ending the lives of patients without their consent and against their wishes. As matters of life and death are grave, they should be taken with utmost seriousness, requiring the instalment of ample checks against abuse and facilitating mechanisms designed to serve the patient’s best interests. The article concludes with nineteen careful and detailed guidelines for physician-assisted suicide. These are necessary measures designed to ensure that the best interests of the patients are served as they wished.

This paper argues for the permissibility of Physician-Assisted Suicide. First, based on the Thomson/Scanlon thesis on permissibility, it argues against the Doctrine of Double Effect. Second, it argues against the view held by Kant and David Velleman that because one has dignity it is impermissible to commit suicide under any circumstances. Third, it argues against both the theoretical and practical versions of the Slippery Slope Argument. Finally, it explains why the argument from abuse is not a good one. If contractualism is correct, the claims to PAS held by terminally ill patients who are in excruciating pain and want to die should override the claims of patients who would be pressurized into accepting PAS.

Eligibility criteria in voluntary assisted dying legislation determine access to assistance to die. This article undertakes the practical exercise of analysing whether each of the following nine medical conditions can provide an individual with access to voluntary assisted dying: cancer, motor neurone disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, chronic kidney disease, Alzheimer’s disease, anorexia, frailty, spinal cord injury and Huntington’s disease. This analysis occurs across five legal frameworks: Victoria, Western Australia, a model Bill in Australia, Oregon and Canada. The article argues that it is critical to evaluate voluntary assisted dying legislation in relation to key medical conditions to determine the law’s boundaries and operation. A key finding is that some frameworks tended to grant the same access to voluntary assisted dying, despite having different eligibility criteria. The article concludes with broader regulatory insights for designing voluntary assisted dying frameworks both for jurisdictions considering reform and those reviewing existing legislation.

52 Physician Assisted Suicide: An Exploration of the Dying Process Kunwar Kaur Abstract Up until about two decades ago, the practice of physician-assisted suicide was prohibited in the United States. However, the issues surrounding the legalization of physicianassisted suicide have long been the topic of debate as proponents seek to change public policy. Just as keenly, though, the opposition seeks to alienate any ideas that may even remotely resemble physician aid in dying. With such a rigorous ongoing debate, it becomes necessary to step back and examine, once again, the underlying cause for the emanation of such a request in the first place. A shared belief by both sides is that the groups of people most susceptible to the outcome of this debate are terminally ill adults and terminally ill children. Consequently, it is crucial to ask the question, how exactly does having the option to request physician-assisted suicide influence the dying process of a terminally ill patient? The ...

The question of whether a framework legalising physician assisted dying ought to be adopted in the UK engages conflicting ethical ideologies towards the value of life and the rights of individuals. Currently the law in the UK prohibits ‘mercy killing’, absolutely on the grounds of murder, irrespective of permission or good will . The law surrounding assisted suicide is however enshrined in Statute as a particular offence. The Suicide Act 1961 criminalises “an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person” . This law is unique in that it renders an accessory liable to conviction when the principal individual does not themselves commit a criminal offence . However, following a number of high profile cases involving individuals with debilitating illnesses who wished assistance in committing suicide and a growing public consensus on the desirability of pro-assistance legislation , Parliament is reviewing Lord Falconer’s ‘Assisted Dying Bill’ which aims to legalise the practice in limited circumstances. In this essay it will be asserted that the ethical desirability of legalising physician assisted suicide (PAS) and active voluntary suicide (AVE) rests upon the value of life and the ethics of suicide itself. Consequently, before any consideration of the ethics on legislation can be accurately made it must first be shown whether suicide itself can be ethically justified. This essay will address this issue by considering the conflicting ethical concepts of the inherent sanctity of life and theories on the importance of autonomy and self-determination. Upon concluding that it is indeed the latter aspects of human life that give it value, it will be argued that an ethical continuum exists that allows for the extrapolation of the ethical justifiability of suicide to PAS and AVE.