Nuove ricerche sulla dimensione passiva della coscienza in Edmund Husserl

2016

This paper aims to examine the two main issues of Husserl’s phenomenology, intentionality and reduction, as well as the issue of consciousness in Antonio Rosmini. This should be done not by searching a possible combination between the two authors, but by investigating the differences and trying to grasp the stakes of their reflection. So, without trying to compare the incomparable, with Rosmini we will investigate some issues that also Husserl intended to deal with. From another point of view – or, perhaps, from completely different points of view – we will finally search for that common viewpoint that avoids too easy comparisons and, according to different paths, asks to look at ‘the things themselves’.

Husserl e Aristotele, 2011

Philosophy Kitchen #12, La presenza impossibile. Husserl e le sintesi passive , 2020

The aim of this paper consists in analyzing the flowing of Husserl's thought during the genetic analysis and the primordial constitution of transcendental consciousness. The start point is represented by the archaeological, regressive inquiring about perceptual field and the elaboration of passive synthesis as foundational elements to understand the hyletic dimension, the primal time-consciousness and the rise of the unconscious level. The genesis of Abbau, conceived as a dismantling method, allow us to investigate the possibility of experience constitution, critical issue of a keen and correct epistemology. This lead us to the transition from the structure of noetic consciousness to the question about the possibility of experience in itself: how perception is organized in its dynamic relation with the hyletic sphere? How can we get the identical object in the flowing of experience? How is structured, at genetic level, the egological identity? In this exposition I shall study in...

Trópos. Rivista di ermeneutica e critica filosofica, 2020

The contribution aims to focus on the notion of negation in Edmund Husserl, with particular reference to its thematization offered by the so-called genetic phenomenology. By analysing the passages of Husserl's work in which this element is dealt with and the different theses put forward by the bibliography on the subject, an attempt will be made to highlight the oscillation of Husserl's thought between the two extremes represented by Franz Brentano and Gottlob Frege, showing the problems that emerge in both cases. In accordance with the project of a genealogy of logic, we will try to support, through the reference to Alexius Meinong, the necessity of an admission of the "not" at the ontological level, showing its essentiality in order not to fall into a monistic ontology of Parmenidean type.

Elaborato di Laurea Triennale in cui discuto l'origine del metodo fenomenologico di Husserl e la sua applicabilità relativamente ai problemi logico-matematici e scientifici in generale (crisi delle scienze). Graduation essay in which I treat on the phenomenological assessment method by Edmund Husserl, with specific regard to what conceives logical and mathematical problems as well scientific problems (as those pointed out with the expression "chrisis of european sciences").

Master Thesis, 2012

Giornale di metafisica, 2010

Deleuze’s theory of paradoxical constitution of sense is closely connected to Husserl’s Sinngebung. The fundamental element of this connection is the return to a stoic conception of meaning as something “expressed”. Through an analytical comparison between Deleuze’s Logic of sense and Husserl’s Idea I, this article describes Deleuze’s Auseinandersetzung regarding the problem of expression in Husserl. In this connection, in his reading of Logical researches, Ideas I and Cartesian meditations, in fact, Deleuze radically criticizes some Husserlian “presuppositions” that could not make it possible to break with doxa. Deleuze’s interpretation – which admittedly deforms Husserl’s theoretical stance – outlines a particular relationship between “expression” and “signification” that Husserl, according to Deleuze, had not seen: this relationship is based on the key rule of nonsense in the transcendental determinability of sense and signification.