INTAS Project
Poliry in Ukraine:Anthropological,
,,Language
Linguisticand FurtherPerspectives"
(.d.)
JulianeBesters-Dilger
LanguagePolicy
and LanguageSituation
in tlkraine
Analysisand Recommendations
PETERLANG
'S(/'ien
Frankfurt am Main . Berlin . Bern . Bruxelles . New York ' Oxford .
LanguagePoliciesandLanguageAttitudesin
Post-Orange[Jkraine
Voloorurr.Kwvr
This chapterlooks at languagepolitics from the point of view of the political process,in
which participants strive for power and accordinglRcompetewith one another and
seekto producea favourableimpressionon their putativeconstituencies.Although I do
not arguethat officialsand politicianshaveno ideologicallymotivatedpreferences,I do
not seethese asunambiguousor unchangeableand examinehow they are modiffed in
view of speciffcpolitical taskslargelydeterminedby a power configurationin a particular period. After describingsome generalcharacteristicsof post-SovietUkrainian politics, I analysehow they influence policy-makingin one particular domain, the use of
languagesin public practices.My focus is on the time after the Orange Revolution,
which I further divide into three shorterperiods defined by considerablydifferent dispositions of key playersin the political process.The bulk of the chapterconsistsof a
chronologicallyorganisedstory of conflicting attemptsby theseplayersto changethe
regulationsin the languagedomain so that they correspondto their respectivepreferencesand benefit their target constituencies.Then I try to analyseprospectsfor the future by presentingviews of politicians from major partieswhom I intendewedregarding their perspectiveson the languageproblem in Ukraine today, preferablesolutions
and intended stepsto achievethem. Finalln to assesshow warrantedthe politicians'
viewsare by the attitudesof citizensthey keepreferringto, I take a closelook at preferencesof different groups of the population as revealedby a masssurvey conducted
within the frameworkof this project.
Political and social context of flkrainian language policy
Political discourseand policy-makingon languagemattersrevealcertainfeatureswhich
are characteristic of Uluainian political process in general and largely determine
policies in various domains. The most important of these featuresis the deficient
nature of Ukrainian democraqywhich scholarshave alternately labelled as delegative
democrary, electoral or competitive authoritarianism,or a hybrid state combining
democraticand authoritarian elements(Kubidek L994; D'Anieri 2001; Levitsky and
Way 20O2;Balmaceda2007). Unlike representativedemo$^sy in Western countries,
suchmixed regimemeetsthe formal requirementsof demoCaCft but is far from democraticin political practice.Sincethe most obviousmark of (semi-)authoritarianismis a
strongleaderinstitutionallyunconstrainedin his/her behaviouron a popularmandate,
l6
LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-Orangetlkraine
VolodyrnyrKulyk
it could be arguedthat Ukraine had this type of rule duringLeonid Kuchma'sassertive
presidency,but not after the OrangeRevolution and a concomitantconstitutionalreform which significantlyrestrictedpresidentialpowers.However,while the reform reintroduced genuinecompetition betweenalternativecentresof power, it did not actually facfitate their accountability through institutions capableof 'calling into question
and eventuallypunishing (O'Donnell 199229)improper waysof political behaviourin
periodsbetweenthe elections.Moreover,the rivalling poliUcalforceshavejointly contributed to discreditperhapsthe most important of suchinstitutions,the judiciary.The
presidentis no longer the sole govemor of the countryr but competingpolitical actors
are not held responsiblefor the ways in which they act and the conformity of those
wayswith the promisesthey gaveduring the elections,at leastnot until a new election
comes.
A secondimportant characteristicof post-soviet Ukraine is passivityand atomisation of societyresultingin its inability to pressurethe stateand make it act in accordancewith the preferencesof the bulk of societyor its constituentparts.In particular,interestgroupswhich are,in a democraticcountry,a "primary means(along with periodic elections) for societyto make demandson the state" but which, unlike elections,
'permit
societaldemandsto be articulatedclearln speciffcallyand continuouslyover
time" (D'Arrieri 19992327),in Ukraine :ue - or at leastwere under Kuchma - scarce
and largely controlled by the state itself (tcubicek 2000a). Such "weak" societythus
makesit possiblefor the authoritiesand political partiesto ignoremany of its problems
and set their own agendasfocusingon thoseissuescrucialfor respectivepeople'saccumulation ofwealth and power. Ratherthan encouragingpopularinitiative in discrediting and ousting irresponsiblefigures and organisations,suchbehaviour of prominent
oficials and politicianscontributesto generaldistrust ofpolitics and scepticismregarding citizens' ability to changethe situation in the country. This passivity is usually
ascribedto the legaryof Soviettotalitarianismwhich did not allow any independentsocial organisationand to policies of the Kuchmaregimewhich soughtto keep societyin
an atomisedstate(O'anieri 1999;Riabchuk2003). The OrangeRevolution seemedto
demonstratethat thesepolicies had failed to prevent the gowth of a civil societycapable of mobilising for the defenceof its perceivedvital interests.However,this capacity tumed out to be short-livedand societysincehasnot visiblylirnited the state'sfreedom to act asit seesfft. It is not (parts of) societythat makesdemandson the statebut
rather political elites use popular discontentwith the state policies to discredit and
checktheir rivals.
Another featurehaving to do with the legacyof totditarianism is political culture
markedby intoleranceof different viewsand behaviours,unwillingnessto compromise
and lack of trust in peopleand institutions (Kubidekl994; Holovakha t997).In policymaking it manifestsitself in the widespreadperception thereof as a zero-sumgame
which encouragesplayersto seekto clearlywin or at leastto leavean issueundecidedin
T7
a hope of musteringenoughresourceslater.This strategTwasratherskilfulb appliedby
Kuchma,but it is with the decentralisationof powers after his demisethat its use by
competing political forceshas become routine, so they do not evenbother to hide it
from citizen'seyes.Ratherthan negotiatingwith the proponentsof a different coursein
searchof a compromisesolution, maior political partiestry to weakenthe rivals'resistanceby bribing threateningor otherwiseinfluencing prominent figures.While such
behaviouras representedin the media contributesto those parties'disreputewith the
constituency,the latter hardly seesany alternative,all the more so becausea deep divide within societylimits a list of options which eachregionaland linguo-culturd part
canchoosefrom.
The existenceof a deep ideologicaland cultural divide is another characteristicof
Ukrainian societyinfluencingpolicy-makingin generaland languagepolicy in particular. Due to different ethnic compositions,establishedpracticesof languageuse,life trajectoriesand socialmemories,residentsof different parts of the country hold radically
dissimilarviewsof the issuesof ethnicity,language,history and foreignpolirywhich are
clusteredaround Llkraine'srelationswith Russia(,trel and Khmelko 1996;Barrington
1997;Kubicek 2000b). These dissimilaritiesare reflectedin the stnrcture of political
partiesand eagerlyexploitedby them in order to mobilise the respectiveparts of the
. population and thus gain influencein nationalpolitics. In particular,those partiesseen
asrepresentativesof the more denselypopulatedSouthernand Easternpart of Ukraine
have preferred to strengthencontrol over'their" part by stressingits distinctiveness
rather than seekingto widen their geographicalbaseby downplayingregional differences(Wolczuk 2007). The Orange Revolution exacerbatedthe polarisation of the
Uhainian electoratenot only by reintroducing overt political competition but alsoby
creatinga senseof defeatand rejection in the predominantly anti-OrangePart of the
country which its political elite could then use as a meansof revenge.Although the
latest parliamentaryelection of September2007 demonstratedpartial penetration of
two most popular partieson eachother'sterritory of predominancet,regionalpolarisation persists.By limiting the freedomof choicefor voters in eachpart of the country,it
of electionsasa meansof citizens'pressureon politicians
diminishesthe effectiveness
state.
andthe
The language question in lJtu'ainian politics
One of the most salientdimensionsof Ukrainian politics for the pasttwo decadeshas
beena controversyover the'language question",first and foremostthe statusof Russian vis-l-vis LJkrainian.This controversyheightenedperiodicalln usually in times of
elections,and was all but forgoffen in the meantime.The stancesof major partiesremain sharply divergent,and little effort hasbeen made to reacha compromise.Some
1
BYuT i'Rehiony' pronykaiut' na'chuzhi' tetytorii. Hazetopo-ukrains'ky,5October 2007' 12.
l8
LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine
VolodymyrKulyk
partiesexPloitthe unresolvedproblem in the hope of an electord profit; othersdownPlayit in public discoursewhile tacitly pressuringfor administrativemeasureswhiclr, in
tum, givetheir opponentsmore groundsfor accusations.[n any case,it is the politicians
who dealwith this problem on behalfof citizens;there areno massmovementsor influential public organisationsemphasisingit, while the only interestgroupsactivelyseeking to influencethe statepoliciesarethosewhosebusinessdependson languageregulations suchasbook publishersor movie distributors.
The languagequestion was first openly raised in Ukraine, as in other parts of the
former USS& in the late 1980swhen the reformist policy of peratroilca madeit possible for non-Russianelites to publicly articulate their complaints and suggestionsas
well as mobilise largemassesin their support.In responseto theseincreasinglycriticd
and demandingvoices,the regimeagreedto take measuresagainstthe marginalisation
of titular languagesin the respectiverepublics,which were believedto forestall the radicalisation of nationalist demands,but insteadturned out to be facilitating them. Although thesemeasuresincluded passingnew legislationand evenamendingthe repub[can constitution, the Communist party leadership'sfull control over the Ukrainian
parliamentprior to the ffrst relativelyfree electionof 1990effectivelypreventedserious
controversybetweenrepresentativesof different regionsand languagegroups (fUyt
1998,1999;Nahaylo 1999).While rymbolicallyelevatingUkrainianto the statusof the
only state languageof the Ukrainian SS& the languagelaw of 1989 was ambiguous
about its practicalinteractionwith Russiandefinedasthe "languageof interethniccommunication of the peoplesof the Union of SovietSocialistRepublics' (Law 1989,[preamble]; seealsoArel 1995a;Scheu 1997).Similarly,administrativemeasuresof the regime prior to the disintegration of the USSR aimed at creatingconditions for better
knowledge and wider use of Ukrainian but did not actually infringe upon the dominanceof Russianin most public domains.Not onlywould attemptsat radicaltftrainianisation of public spherehave been titky i" terms of antagonisingMoscow and Russophonepopulation in Ukraine, but also the Ukrainian nomenklaturaitself preferred
bilingualismwith prevdenceof eachlanguagein regionsof its preferreduseby the population to unequivocaldomination of lJlaainian in all social practices (arel 1995a;
Kulyk L999,2006a).
The proclamationof independencein August 1991both signiffcantlymorliffedthe
state'spriorities and rnadeit possiblefor regionalelitesto opposethe implementation
thereof. True, the former nomenklaturawtich under President Leonid Kravchuk
Qeet-l99a) had becomethe ruling elite of the newly formed state,refrainedfrom resolutely introducing Ukrainian as the dominant languagein all public domains for fear
of provoking protestsby speakersof other languages,ftrst andforemostRussian.In p*ticular, Kravchuk did not initiate the revisionof the languagelawwhich could haveremoved ambiguities,shortenedthe term of its implementationand envisagedpenalties
forviolations (Arel l995ai Kolyk 2002).At the s:rmetime, in searchof legitimisationof
L9
the new stateand political supportfor his institution-building effort,he took overmuch
of the national-democraticopposition'sprogrammeon the mattersof ethnicity and languageand offeredexecutivepoststo someprominent opposition figuresto overseeits
implementation.It is true that the implementationremainedlimited and discourseon
ethnolinguistic matters blamed Russianimperialism but stressedequal .ightt of all
people in Ulaaine. Despite this, some aspectsof discourseand policy did in fact hurt
and antagonisemanypeopleidentifring with Russianastheir nativelanguageor preferring it in everydaylife (Motyt f995; Arel 1995b;Kulyk 1999,2005a).While tbe state's
attitude toward languagesand cultures other than Ukrainian was quite favourable,it
failedto recognisethe specialposition of the Russianswho were treated at leastat the
legislative level, as a minority like any other. Moreover, by failing to envisagecultural
legislation,in
rights basedon an identity other than ethnic one,the post-independence
effect, denied social legitimacy to millions of RussophoneUkrainians (Kulyk L999,
2006a).In practice,theywere still ableto usetheir prefenedlanguagein most domains.
However,the policiesin educationwhere sharesof schoolswith instruction in different
languageswere beingbrought into concordancewith ethnic,ratherthan linguisticcomposition of the respectiveregion'spopulation seemedto betoken that this exceptional
curency of Russianwould be short-lived (Arel 1995a, 1995b;Janmaat2000; Kulyk
2oo2).
and their lanThis rather radicaldemotion of the statusof Russians/Russophones
guagecausedmassdiscontentin the Easternand Southernregions,which was elracerbatedby a drasticdeclineof living standardsdue to the government'sincoherentmanagementof the transitionto market economy.The discontentwas eagerlyexploitedby
re-emergingleftpartiesand, more importantln regionalelitesseekingto gain influence
in national politics. By combining criticism of Kyiv's economicpolicy with attackson
theseforcesmobilisedthe populathe allegeddiscriminationagainstRussian-speakers,
tions in the predominantlyRussophoneEastand South.Their main sloganswerethose
'restoration of broken ties" with Russiaand other republicsof the former USSR
of the
and the elevationof the Russianlanguageto an official status,which they perceivedas
beingiust below that of Ukrainian.At a regionallevel this statuswasin 1993-1994proclaimedin severalEasternand Southernoblastsbut their elitesdemandedsucha status
nationwide,asa sfmbolic marker of equalityof speakersof the two languagesand a legal barrier againstUkrainianisation(erel 1995b; Kulyk 2002). In the parliamentary
electionof 1994,the leftistsdominatedin the Eastand Southwhich thus stood in sharp
contrastto the West and Centre where the national democrats(moderate Ukrainian
nationalists)emergedvictorious (Birch 1998).The regionalpolarisationturned out to
be even more pronouncedin the presidentialelection later that year,when Kravchuk
wasdefeatedby the seeminglypro-integrationistand pro-RussophoneKuchma.As sociologistshave shown,the choice betweenthe two was largely determinedby voters'
LanguagePoliciesand LanguageAttitudesin Post-OrangeUkraine
VolodymyrKul',k
view of the languageproblem which significandycorrelatedwith their everydaylanguageuse (Arel and Khmelko 1996;I(hmelko andWilson 1998).
The election of the new presidentpavedthe way for more active participation of
Russophoneelitesin decision-makingat the national leveland their fuller control over
their respectiveregions. This did not, however, result in a radical change of language
policy (or foreign-poticyorientation), since Kuchma followed Kravchuk in seeking
moderatenationalists'support for his reform initiatives andpromoting nation-building
as an important componentfor the legitimisationand strengtheningof the new independent state.Not only did he fail to keephis promise to initiate the elevationof the
statusof Russianbut alsohe continuedthe policy of gradualtransition to Ukrainian in
educationand the (written) work of stateinstitutions, evenin the predominanttyR*sophoneregions.While thesedevelopmentswere deploredby the leftist and pro-Russophoneparties,the Kuchma regime alsotolerated continuedor even increaseddominance of Russianin the media, popular culture and many other domains,which was
perceivedby many Ulrainophone politicians and intellectualsas an evidenceof its
"anti-[Jkrainian"orientation (Kulyk 1999,2002; Riabchuk 2001). Perhapsmost importantly,the Presidentdownplayedlanguageissuesin both official discourseand practical policy-makingfocusinginsteadon political and economicreformswhich werepartially intended to strengthenhis personalpower. He encouragedthe mutual antagonism of the Ukrainian nationalistsand communistswhich preventedthem from reaching a compromiseon controversialpolitical issuesand led to their gradualmarginalisaUon (Kulyk L999, 20O6a;Wilson 2000). The only exception was the agreement
between the left and right factions in the Parliament on severalsymbolically important
provisionsof Ukraine'spost-SovietConstitution,including an article regardingthe use
of languageswhich was left somewhat ambiguousbut with the designation of Russian
as a minority languagerather than an official one (Constitution 1996,art. l0). This
compromisewas facilitated by Kuchma'sthreat to hold a referendumwhich would
haveseenhis draft adopted,Sving the Presidentmuch more powersat the cost of the
Parliament(Wilson 2000;Wolczuk 2001).
When this threat was gone, the opposingforces found themselveslocked in confrontation over how to translate constitutional provisions into laws and practical
policies.Occasionallnone of the campsgaineda victory. Thus, in December1999the
Constitutional Court, on an appealby pro-Ukrainophonedeputies,issuedan inteqpretation of the languagearticlesof the Constitution which excludedthe useof Russianin
centralpower bodies.Later the samemonth, however,the proponentsof ofrcial bilingualismgot the EuropeanCharter for Regionalor Minority Languagesratfied in a version that provided for a wide scopeof use of Russianin many lJlrrainian regions,includingthe city of Kyiv (but then the ConstitutionalCourt declaredthe ratfication law
unconstitutional)2(furyk 2002). More often,the confrontadonresultedin a stalemate
on languageand other ideologicallysensitiveissues,with none of the rivalsbeing strong
enoughto win orwilling to compromise.One of tle most vivid illustrationsis the Parliament'sinability to passa new languagelaw for more than ten yearsafter the adoption
of the new Constitution which required that all legal acts should be brought in conformancewith its provisions.Although most parties agreedthat the valid law of 1989
was outdated and dysfunctional,they preferredto retain it for the time being rather
than allow rivalsto passtheir preferredversion.It was only when one of the campsfelt
confident enoughthat it pressuredfor the adoption of its draft but then the other camp
did its best to prevent such an outcome. In November 2001, the Parhamentfinally
cameto consider,dong with the government'spro-Ukrainianisationdraft, severalothers which were submitted by pro-Russophonedeputies and provided for an official
statusof Russian.However,the parliamentaryleadershipdid not hold a vote, allegedly
fearingthat one of the bilingudism-oriented bills would be approved,as many nonaligneddeputiesmight seekelectoraldividendsin the predominantlyRussophoneregionson the eveof an election (tr(u$k 2o02,2006b).
It is such "centrist" politicians who did not have clear stanceson ethnoculturalissuesand were largelycontrolledby Kuchmathat increasinglydeterminedthe courseon
theseissuesboth in the nationallegislativeand in regionaland local councils.More and
more parliamentaryseatswere takenby pro-presidentialparties,and many of the deputies nominated by more ideologically determined parties joined the pro-presidential
"middle ground" afterthe election under the pressureof the increasinglyauthoritarian
executive(Wilson 2000). The centrists' seeminglynon-ideologicalposition stressed
the supposedlycorlmon values of stability and wellbeing while integrating some of
their opponents'postulatesinto a mixture ambiguousenoughto allow thesepartiesto
attract ideologicallyundecidedvoters and make ad hoc allianceswith either leftists or
status
rightists/nationalists.In particular,the centristsfavouredthe post-independence
quo on the languagequestionand downplayedits importancein their public discourse.
Although they did not support a changein the statusof Russian,most of them did not
seeir expedientto limit its public cuffency(fUyk 2OO6a,2006b).Their influenceon
popular attitudes,largely due to their control over mainstreammedia, contributed to
disreputeof those politicd forceswhich continuedto stressideologicallydivisiveethnocultural and foreign-policyissues,asfust becameclear in the parliamentaryelection
of 1998 (Kubicek I999i Knlyk L999;Wilson and Birch L999).Nor were theseissues
decisivein the presidentialelectionof 1999when Kuchma managedto split and weaken moderateopposition and then defeatthe communist leaderPetro Symonenkowho
2
This led to a long controversy over repeated ratification
which I will discuss in detail below.
and implementation
of the charter
22
was portrayed in the pro-regime discotrse as embodying a "red revenge" (Wilson
2000).
To preventtheir marginalisatiorycommunistsand moderatenationalistsgradually
shifted their emphasisto socialissues.That is, they presentedthemselvesas defenders
not of a languagegFoupallegedly discriminated againstbut of the bulk of the population robbed of their wellbeingand human dig.ty by thosein power. On the one hand
the opposition's unintended alliance with the regime in prefening issuesof social
policy and democraqfto those of languageand culture helpedmarginalisethe latter in
public discourseand consciousnessand thus make large-scaleviolation of rights of
membersof different ethnoculturalgroupsunnoticed and unopposed(Kulyk 2006a).
On the other han4 the increasedpopularity of nationalists-turned-democrats
who, under the leadershipof the popular former premier Viktor Yushchenko,won the parliamentaryelectionof 2O02and were likely to win the president'spost inz0}4, prompted
the regime to re-emphasiseethnoculturalissuesin order to presentthe non-leftist opposition ashostile to Russophonesand Russiaand thus excludeits support in the East
and South. When this did not seemsufficientfor preventingYushchenko'svictory, it
was decidedto drop the pretenceof a linguo-culturalbalanceand call for a changeof
policy in favour of Russian-speakers
who were expectedto help Kuchma's protdg6
PrirneMinister Viktor YanukovychdefeatYushchenkoand thus, in effect,prolong the
existenceof the Kuchmaregime (Wilson Z}Oi;Wolczuk 2007).
Language and the Orange Revolution
In late September2OO4,just a month before the election Yanukovychunexpectedly
calledfor grantingRussianan official status3.
This call stoodin a sharpcontrastnot only
to his exemplary"centrist" statementsduring his two yearsas prime minister (futyt
2006b), but alsoto his election programmepublished only ten weeks earlier.In that
programme,he only wanted'free development'for Russianwhile promising to "consistently strengthenthe state status' of lJkrainian (Peredvyborchaprohrama 2004).
The electoralpurposeof this move was obvious,if only becauseit repeatedKuchma's
promiseof 1994which hadbeen forgottensoon after he hadbecomepresident(Haran'
2004). flowever, assomeexpertsuped, togetherwith a number of pro-Russianinitiativesand, more importantly, initiativeson socialpolicy it contributedto an increasein
Yanukovych'sratings,although it was hardly enough to win in an honest contest4.At
the sametime, his supportfor the Russianlanguageand Ulaaine'sintegrationwith Russiafurther antagonisedWestern regionsaswell as Ukrainophoneintelligentsiaall over
3
4
LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine
VolodlnnyrK"tyk
Yanukovychpovtoryvpiar-khid lGchmyi zakr''vsobi dorohu na Zakhid. Ukrains'lcapravda,
27.O9.2004,http :/ / pravda.com.ua/news/2004/ 9/ 27/ LZI83.htrn.
Yanukovych vyishov na I mistse, zabrarnhy elektorat Symonenka. Ukrains'kn Pravda,
14.10.2004http:/ /pravda.com.ua/news/2004
/ l0/ 14/ 12676.htm.
the country who perceivedit as further evidencethat Yanukovych'svictory posed a
threat not only to the Ulaainian language,but also the nation, statehoodand democraqf. If anything the use of a "languagecard" increasedalreadypronouncedregional
polarisationof the Ukrainian electoratewhich revertedto the 1994pattern,albeit a dividing line shifted considerablyto the East and South and therefore,Yushchenko
couldwin whereKravchukhad lost (Khmelko andWilson I998;Wolczuk 2007).
The perceivedthreat to their country'sfuture aswell asto their own was perhaps
the primary reasonfor the surprisinglygreatsuccessofYushchenko'sapped to his supportersto resolutelyprotest againsta large-scaleelectoralfraud in the secondround of
the electionwhich had madeit possiblefor the regimeto declareYanukovych'svictory.
In unprecedentedpopular proteststhat cameto be known asthe OrangeRevolution,
hundredsof thousandspeoplestood for more than two weela in the streetsin Kyiv and
many other cities of the country, making Kuchma and Yanukovychto agreeto a repeatedvote in accordancewith a fraud-protectedprocedurewherebyYushchenkothen
clearly won (Wilson 2005). The opposition leaderswere careful to stressthat the
protestswere directedagainstthe undemocraticregimeandYanukovychasits embodiment and not againstYanukoyych'spredominantlyEasternand Southernconstituency
who was invited to ioin the supposedlyunited people.Accordingly,languagewas not
made an issue;it was repeatedlydeclaredthat the Ukraine for which the protesters
struggleis onewherepeopleof all nationalities,languages,regions,religiousdenominations and socialgroupsare egual,dignified and prosperous.However,asthe bulk of the
Yushchenkoconstituencyand, accordingly,of the Orange Protestorscame from the
Ukrainophonesof the West and Centre,the resultinginvalidationof Yanukovych'sdeclaredvictory and the ultimate coming to power of Yushchenkoand his allieswere
widely perceivedin the Eastand South as a humiliating defeatwhich "instilled a sense
politicalprocesses'(Wolczuk2007:540).
of exclusionfrom'Orange-controlled'
This senseof exclusionwas activetyfomentedand exploitedby regionaleliteswho
usedit as leverageto prevent or minimise their own exclusionfrom national politics as
they had done during Kravchuk'spresidency.Soon after the outbreak of the Orange
protests,the Blue elites(thosesupportingYanukovych)eventhreatenedto initiate separation of their regionsfrom the rest of Ukraine but after a harshreaction from Kyiv,
switchedto propagatingthe country'sfederalisation(Wolczuk 2007).In both proiects,
their different language- different from that of the Orangestrongholdin the West and
the Orange parties'preferencefor the whole country - becamean important element
and even a sfmbol of the regional distinctivenessof the East and South (eret 2005).
This sfmbolisation increasedelites'and masses'sensitivityto and prefudiceagainstthe
languagepolicies of the Orange regime.Although Yushchenkotried to avoid ra&cal
5
E.g. Ulsaini zahrozhueperetvorenniana odnu z dyktatur'tretioho witu'. Zvemenniainteli/pravda.cornv/netts/2004/L0/25/12980-htrn
hentsii.(Jbains'knhavda,2s.t1.2004,hapz/
VolodymyrK"lyk
policiesthat might further antagonisethe Blue constituency,particularlydue to the parliamentary election scheduledfor the spring of 2OO6,evenmoderatesupport for the
Ukrainian languageand the lack of official recognition of a specialrole of Russianwas
bound to meet a hostilereactionamongat leastsomepartsofthat constituency.
Language policy under Yushchenko
A price Yushchenkohad to pay for Kuchma'sand Yanukovych'sconsentto a repeated
second round of the presidentialelectionwas a signiffcantreduction of the scopeof
presidentialPowers,someof which were to be transferredto the Parhamentand the coalition-formed cabinet.This reduction wasintroduced by a revisedversionof the Constitution which was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada amidst the Orange protests in
December2004,but wasto take full effectafter the parliamentaryelection.Therefore,
Yushchenko'spresidencyhas until the time of this writing consistedof n/yo clearly
definedperiodsduring which he had very different competenciesin most domains,including the languageone. From his assumptionof power inJanuary2005 and until the
formation of a post-electiongovemmentin August 2006,he almostfully controlledthe
cabinetand was ableto exert a strong influenceon the Parliament.This influencewas
particularlyprofound in the first months of his tenure,until the new electioncampaign
beganto urge deputiesto seekto pleasetheir perceivedconstituenciesand pay lessattention to wishesof officials.After the election,however,a parliamentarycoalitionwas
basedon anti-Orangeforces,the most powerful of which being Yanukovych'sParty of
Regionswhoseleaderthus becamePrime Minister. Therefore,not only were the coalition and the cabinetmuch more independentfrom the presidentas a result of the constitutional reform but alsotheir anti-Orangeproftle contributedto their assertion,both
during and after the 2006 election, of political priorities running counter to those of
Yushchenkoand the Orangeparties.Languagepolicy, one of the sfmbolic markersof
the confrontation betweenthe two slmps, was at the heart of that assertion.This conflictual dispositionchangedagainwith the formation of a new Orangegovernmentasa
result of an early parliamentaryelection in September 2007,which seemsto be both
closerto Yushchenkoin its viewsand due to being basedon a very thin majority in the
Rada,more constrainedin the implementationof those policiesthe presidentdoesnot
fully support.However,this governmentonly startedworking in December 2007when
this chapterwasnearlyfinished henceits activity is beyondthe scopeof my analysis.
The main characteristics
of languagepolicy during the periodwhen it wasprimarily
determined by Yushchenkoare, in my view, its surprisingly tow priority on the regime's
agendaand the continued relianceon administrativerather than legd methodsin accordancewith the above-mentionedstrategyof pursuing one's goals as much as currently possiblerather than seekingfor a durablecompromisebetweenopposingpolitical camps. Despite widespreadhopes of his supportersand fears of his opponents,
LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine
25
Yushchenkodid not take resolutestepsto promote the use of Ukrainian in varioussocial domainswhich would put an end to the ambivalentpolicy of the Kuchma regime.
Although he did pay more attention to languageissuesand took a more clearlyproUkrainophonestancethan his predecessor,
it was more evidentin rhetoric than actual
policy. His rhetoric stressedthe needfor more activeuse of Ukrainian by citizensand
its support by the state,while arguingthat therewere no problemswith the useof Russianand accordinglnno needto worry about it5.Someother prominent Orangepoliticiansand officialswere more mindful of the potential of suchrhetoricto antagonisethe
Russian-speaking
population and occasionallyassuredthat cultural facilities for this
populationwould be preservedor evenexpandedT.
The generaltone of the Orangediscourseon languageissues,however,was clearlysupportiveof the promotion of Ulnainian in various domainsand rather neglectfulof the wishesof Russian-speakers
u*rose
discontentwas,moreover,instigatedby discourseof the anti-Orangeoppositionclaiming to representtheir rights.
This neglectleadsme to assumethat the new regime'srefrainfrom resoluteUkrainianisationpolicieshad lessto do with the realisationof their antagonisingeffecton the
Russophonesand more with a low priority of languagematterson its poliUcalagenda.
ln other words, the Orangeleaders,not unlike Kuchma and his "centrists",did not see
any languageproblem in Ukraine or at leastdid not considerit important in comparisonto many othersthey had to copewith. To the extent they did seea problem in the
languagedomain (and, unlike Kuchmists,for them it was first and foremosta problem
of insufficient use of Ukrainian in many public practices),they preferredto solveit by
administrative rather than legislativemeans.Yushchenko did virtually nothing to make
the legislationmore suitableto protect languagerights of membersof different groups,
which would primarily mean more speciftcand lessambiguous.On the one hand he
failedto sign a decreeon citizens'right to useRussianand other minority languagesin
communicationwith the authoritiesin areasof the country where theselanguagesare
spoken,as he had promisedon the eveof the election (Kulyk 2004). On the other,he
did not initiate a new languagelaw which would get rid of the ambiguousprovisions
statedin that of 1989and stipulatemechanismsfor ensuringmore comprehensiveuse
of Ukrainian, in particularpenaltiesfor violators,the lack of which had long been bemoanedby Ukrainophoneelites as one of the main reasonsfor the ineffectivenessof
the law.
Actually, severalbills providing for fuller dominanceof the titular languagein public life were submitted to the Parliamentby pro-Ulrainophone deputiesboth before
6
7
E.g. U Iushchenkanemaieproblem, iaki ie u Ianukovycha.Ukrains'koPravda,U.02.2006,
http z/ / www.pravda.com.ua/ news/ 2006/ 2I U / 39 I 28.htm.
E.g.Poroshenkoobeshchaetostanovit'protsesszakrytiiarusskiltr shkoli vosstanovit'v vrrzat tr g.ppy t rossiiskimiarykom obucheniia.Podrobnosti,25.02.2005,
hwpz/ / www.podrobnost.ua / soaety/ 2005I 02/ 2S/ I 835I 8.html.
VolodyrnyrKub*
and after the regime change,while their opponents prepareda number of drafts intended to legalisea more-than-minorityscopeof Russian.InJune }O}l,as many as 13 languagedraftspresentingmany varietiesof thesetwo approachesappearedon the Parliament's agenda(Chemenko 2005), but their considerationwasput offfor no declared
reasonand no such draftshave been debatedin sessioneversince.While the primary
reasonfor the withdrawal might once againhave been the parliamentaryleadership's
fear of the adoption of abill providingfor an official role of Russian,neitherYushchenko himself nor Orangefactionsin the Parliamentinitiated a didogue with their opponentsin order to find a compromiseon the languagelaw.Likewisethe Party of Regions
and other bilingualism-orientedpartiesmadeno movesto do so either.
The few lawsthat did provide for more comprehensiveuseof Ulaainian were adopted rather as a result of legislativeinertia of independenceyearsthan a post-Orange
tum to unambiguousUkrainianisation.Thus, the Code ofAdministrativeJudicialProcedure was passedi" J"ly 2005 which prescribedthe use of Ukrainian but allowed
thoseinstrfficientlycompetentin it to useother languages,provided they pay for translation (Kodela 2005, art. 15, 92). This formula was virtually identical to the one included in the Code of Civil Procedurewhich was adoptedin March 2004 (tqnril'nyi
protsezual'nyikodeks 2004, aft. 7,86)8. In both cases,the provisionsseemedto be intended to combinethe ensuringof participants'rightswith the uniformity of legalproceedingsand the minimisation ofbudgetaryexpenses.Both codeswere supportedby a
qualiftedmajority including among others,factions of Yushchenko'sOur Ulaaine and
Yanukovych'sParty of Regions.It was only after the two legislativereformstook effect
in September2005that the administrativecodewasroundly denouncedasdiscriminating on the basisof languageand depriving "most of the country's population of fullfledgedlegal defence'e.Ironically, the denunciationcamefrom a party whose representativesin the Radahad voted for the code two months earlier,the United Social
DemocraticParty of Ukraine which now wanted to gain electoralcapitalby defending
the languagerights of Russian-speakers,
as did the Party of Regionsand some other
political forces.In addition to electoralcalculations,this apparentchangeof mind may
haveresultedfrom the belatedrealisationof large-scalediscriminationof non-tJkrainophone citizensthat the implementation of the above-mentionedcodeswould entail.
While the original supportby "centrist" partiesof theseand other bills might be based
on the assumptionthat their languageprovisionswould be implemented'reasonably'
8
9
{gtudln the 2005 code was somewhat more benevolent to the use of other languages.Unlike the 2004 acr,it prescribed providing a participant in the legd process withtranslation
free of chargeif the court concludes that'as a result of one's inability to pay for translator's
serviceone would be deprivedof legaldefence"(Kodeks 2009 art. 68).
SDPU(o) zaiavliae pro dyskryminatsiiu ?a movnoiu oznakoiu. (Jkralns'kn Prauda
L2.09.2005,http://www.pravda.com:ua/ news/ 2005/ 9/ lZ / 33292.htm.
LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUlraine
ratherthan literally, in the post-Orangecontext the authorities could use theseprovisionsto pressurefor more comprehensiveuseof the statelanguage.
Another post-Orangelaw having to do with languageuseseryesas a vivid illustration of the thorough implementation of Ukrainianisingprovisionswhich many deputiesvoting for them might preferto remaininactive.A newversion of the law on television and radio which was adoptedinJanuary2006 virtually restatedan ambiguouslanguagearticle of a previouslaw of 1993t0.On the one hand the articledeclaredthat television and radio stations"shall broadcastin the state language"and on the other, allowed,in "certain regions",broadcastingin a "languageof nationalminorities residing
compactlyon that territory" (Zakon L993,art.9).While a literal readingof this formula
excludedany use of languagesother than Ukrainian on those stationsbroadcastingnation-wide, it was consideredclearlyunrealisticby broadcastersand politiciansalike.Instead stationswere expectedto adhereto the provision of their broadcastinglicences
stipulatinga minimd shareof airtime in LJkrainian.Moreover, eventhis provisionwas
routinely violated,but the National Televisionand Radio Council, a body in chargeof
issuinglicencesand monitoring their observance,did not for yearstake resolutemeasuresto prompt broadcastersto meet the licenserequirements(Riabchuk2001). In the
2006 law, the above-quotedformulaewere supplementedwith provisionsstipulating
the 75-per cent minimum of Ukrainian-language
airtime for nation-widebroadcasters
and the mandatory audio-dubbing of programmesin other languages,that is, inadequacyof subtitling only (Zakon 2006, art. 10). The fact that the law was supported
not only by the Orange factions but dso by the bilingualism-orientedcommunists
meansthat no seriousproblemswere eryectedafter it had taken effect.Soon,however,
they proved wrong.A new post-Orangemembershipof the National Council took advantageof a clearerlegalprovision and its own expandedpowers(under a new law on
the body adoptedin March 2005) and startedpressuringbroadcastersto comply with
the languagerequirements.Its remarkablesuccessin making televisionand ra&o stationsincreasethe shareof airtime in Ukrainianis perceivedby defendersof Russianasa
threatto the language'scurency in this domainwhich they tend to interpret asa violation of its speakers'rights(e.g.Kolesnichenkointerview 2007).
It should be stressedthat this successresultednot so much from a revisedlegalprovision as from administrativeeffort to ensureits implementation.The increasedeffort
to promote the use of Ulaainian primarily distinguisheslanguage poliry under
Yushchenkofrom that of the Kuchma period even though its strength and results
differedconsiderablyfromone domainto another.The mostvisiblechangestookplace
in the medi4 partly becauseOrangepoliticiansand officialsconsideredthe situation of
the Ulaainian languagein that domain flagrantlyinadequate.In the first months of the
l0 For a detailed discussion of the situation in the media, see the chapterbyJuliane BestersDilger in this volume. I only treat media-related decisions as part of national politics.
VolodymyrK"tyk
LanguagePoliciesand LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeLlkraine
Orange rule Mykola Tomenko, Deputy Prime Minister in chargeof humanitarianissuestried to encourageradio and televisionstationsto broadcastmore Ul<rainianJanguagemusic and other productsby'educational and administrative'means(meetings
media managers,initiating promotion campaigns,etc.) ratherthan insistingon the full
observanceof legalprovisionstt.Although later efforts by the National Televisionand
Radio Council were backedby its punitive power, the councilsoughtto engagebroadcastersin a deal on the gradual increaseof the share of IJlrrainianup to the level as
statedin their licence,being readyto toleratetheir violationsfor sometirne on the condition that they would progressivelyreducetheir scope.This deal was formalisedin
memorandathat the council repeatedtysignedwith televisionand radio stationsin
2005 to 2007 until broadcasterswere fir"lly required to comply fully with the law
(Kulyk forthcoming). tn contrast,the government'sattempt to unilaterally prescribe,
by a resolution of January 2;006,the gradual transition to the use of Ukrainian in
cinemaswasresolutelyopposedby most distributorsand soonreversedby the court in
responseto their apped.After this failure,inJanuary 2007the Ministry of Culture and
Tourism initiated its own memorandum with distributors stipulating a more limited
and gradual increaseof the use of Ukrainian.This memorandum,however,was only
partially implementedwhich might havebeen causedby a lack of effort on the part of
Yanukovych'sgovernmentwhosekey officialswere not nearlyasinterestedin promoting Ukrainian asthoseofthe Orangecabinets.
al parliament or nation-wide referenda. The central government and the Orange parties
denounced the idea as an election strategy having nothing to do with the protection of
language rights of Russian-speakers. The Central Election Committee of Ukraine
banned the Crimean authorities from holding a referendum on the day of the election
(Tyshchenko 2006). Despite its predictable vainness for legislative pu{poses, the initi-
Language issue in and after the 2005 election
tions (Kulyk 2002).
In May 2003, the Rada ratified the charter once again, in a more limited version
which nevertheless provided for the use of Russian and 12 other minority languages in
many public domains in the entire territory of Ukraine (Zakon 2003). The vagueness
of the charter's provisions compounded with a lack of specific conditions of their applicabitity in the ratification law (e.g. a minimal share of a certain language's speakers in
the population of a locality) rendered this instrument rather ineffective as a means of
protecting the language rights of Ukraine's minority members. However, the very no'regional
or minority language" as usable, in principle, throughout the whole
tion of a
territory of the country offered the pro-Russophone parties an opportunity to legalise
The parliamentaryelection of March 2006 brought about a new tide of confrontation
betweenthe Orangeforcesand their opponentsled by the Party of Regions,with languagepolicy being a cnrcialissuethereof.In an attempt to mobilise its constituencyin
the East and South,Yanukovych'sparty basedits campaignon highlighting the differences between broadly defined Eastern and Westem Ukraine an4 accordingln
presentingitself as a defenderof the Easternpart's particularinterestsand values,including (the useof) the Russianlanguage.The parry put a particularstresson the issue
of that language'sstatuswhich now gainedmore prominencethan in the 2004 campaip. In Crimea,the regional branch of the parfy initiated a regionalreferendumon
the statusof Russianasa secondstatelanguage.
After Blueactivistscollectedmore than
300,000signaturesin support of the initiative,the representativebody of the Crimean
autonomyadopteda resolution on holding a referendumsimultaneouslywith the election in order to reduce expensesand ensure a high voter turnout. However, the
autonomy'sprosecutorappealedthe resolutionas running counterto the constitutional provision stipulatingthat the useof languagesmay only be decidedon by the nation11 Chat-konferentsiia z vitse-prem'erom z humanitarnykh pytan' Mykoloiu Tomenkom, Ilkrains'lcnprauila,17.05.2005,hftp2/ /wv,rw2.pravda.com.ua/arctive/2005/may/
l7/chat.htrnl.
ative might have been rather successful as a means of mobilisation.
At the same time, the Party of Regions used an international instrument ratified by
Ukraine, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, in order to make
Russian a de facto official language. Actualln the proponents of an official status for
Russian had been trlnng to use the charter for this purpose for nearly a decade. Although this instrument is primarily intended for the protection of lesser used languages,
in Ukraine it became a means of ensuring continued currency of a language which is
spoken by more than half of the population but demoted to the stahrs of a minority language. As one of Ukraine's obligations assumed at the time of joining the Council of
Europe in 1995, the charter was signed in May 1996 but only put into effect ten years
later because of attempts by pro-Russophone politicians to use it as a substitute for the
unachievable official status of Russian and their opponent's resolution to Prevent this.
When it was ratified in Decemb er 1999 in a version that granted Russian a de facto official status (in terms of a scope of use it provided for) on nearly half of Ukraine's territory pro-Uluainophone deputies appealed to the Constitutional Court which in
mid-2000 declared the ratification law unconstitutional due to alleged procedural viola-
the use of Russian far beyond those minority-dominated regions or localities where the
Ulrainian legislation allowed official use of languages other than LJkrainian. It is in view
of this opportunity that the Kuchma regime delayed depositing the instrument of ratification in Strasbourg for nearly two years after the adoption of the ratification law. And
it is this opportunity that the Orange government made real when it finally took this
step in September 2005 and thus enabled the charter's coming into force for Ukraine at
the beginning of 2006 (K"lyk 2006c; Antonovych and Bowring forthcoming). That
they preferred this risky step to both further delays and a revision of the ratification law
shows the Orange elite's effort towards close cooperation with Western institutions,
VolodymyrKulyk
LanguagePoliciesand LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine
but it may alsobe seenasanotherillustrationof their underestimationof the legislative
dimension of languagepolicy. Given the long-time inaction of the languagelaw and
some other legislativeacts, the Ukrainian leaders did not seem to believe that the
charter'srathergeneralprovisionswould rnakea significantdifferencein terms of actualpolicy.
It turned out, however,that the Blue immediatelyseizedthis opportunitywhich allowed them to make a plausibleelectoralpromiseand then demonstrateits fulfilment.
Soon after the chartercameinto effect,a number of regionaland city councilsin Eastern and SouthernUkraine adoptedresolutionsproclaimingthe Russianlanguagea'regional' languagein their territories,allegedlyin accordancewith the chartert2.The first
suchresolutionwaspassedin I(harkiv in earlyMarch2006, threeweeksbeforethe election when the deputiessought to pleasethe city s predominandy Russian-speaking
constituencyt3.
victory in regionaland municipalelecThe Partyof Regions'impressive
tions in the Eastand Southmadeit possibleto passsimilarresolutionsin other councils
asa demonstrationof the party'sconcernfor (speakersof) the Russianlanguageand its
generalpolitical responsibility,activity and strength.Yushchenko'sexecutiveand proUkrainophonepartiesvehementlyopposedthesemovesarguingthat the protection of
Russianin placesof its dominancenot only contradictedto the charter'spurposebut
that self-governmentbodieswere alsonot authorisedto decideon mattersof language
use,a competencybelongingto the nationalparliamentra.The initiators of the resolutions respondedthat the councils in questionwere not grantingRussiana new status
but rather recognising in their respectiveterritories, the status which had been
providedby the law on the charter'sratification (Wolczuk 2007). Moreover,a prominent Blue politician YevhenKushnariovarguedthat sincethe centralbodieskept refusing to solvethe languageproblem "in a civilisedwan in accordancewith the European
charter of regionallanguages",then "this function will be assumedby the local power
bodieswithout preliminaryp ermission[yavochnymporiadkom]" rs.
Whether the councils' "recognition' amounted to interference with the Parliarnent's affairs and accordirgly, whether their resolutions violated the Constitution
should have been clarified bythe Constitutional Court. However, the courtwas inoper.rtive for more than a yeiu, as the Parliament had refused to appoint its part of judges
rnd swear in those appointed by the President, which was meant to prevent the court's
expected abrogation of the constitutional reform. In the absence of a generally recognised authority, the parties' attempts to ovemrle each other's decisions contributed to
While not identicd to the status of a'regional or minority language"dealt with in the charter
'regional"
itself, the
status was not the Blue's self-made abbreviation either. Paradoxicdly,
the Orange government itself presentedthe pro-Berssophoneparties with a suitable way to
bypassthe fact of non-minority currency of Russianwhen it designated in the Instnrment of
Ratification, those languagesto be protectedby the charter as "regionaf rather than'languagesof national minorities" as they had been called in the ratification law (Antonovych
and Bowring forthcoming).
l 3 U Kharkovi daly'zelenewitlo' rosiiskii moi. Ukrains'knPratda,06.03.2006,
http z/ / pr avda.com.ual new s/ 2006/ 3/ 6ft9 a3&.htn.
L+ Vitse-prernier pohrozhuedeputatamsudorn Wrains'ka Pravda,n.0+,2006, http;//pravda.
com.ua/news/2006/4/2U4l334.htm; Yushchenkopoprosit KostitutsionnyiSud porabotat'
s iazykom.I(onapondent.net,l9.05.2006,http:/ /www.korespondent.net/main/L542I0 /.
1 5 Yanukovychtsi poshyriuiut' rosiis'ku movu v oblastiakh. Ukrains'lca Pravda, 26.04,2006,
http z/ / pr avda.com.ualn ews/ 2006/ 4/ 26/ 4 1298.htrn..
3l
political confrontation rather than legal solution. In May, the Ministry ofJustice issued
.r "legal inteqpretation' of resolutions which declared them illegal, in particular, because
of the alleged transgression of constitutional competencies by the councils in question
(Legal Intelpretadon 2006). On their part, the Party of Regions argued that the Ministry itself exceeded its authority by assuming the right to interpret the Constitution - a
nght belonging exclusively to the Constitutional Court (Declaration 2006). Similarly,
when the prosecutors of the respective regions and cities appealedthe councils'resolutions at Yushchenko's request, the Blue maiorities of those councils refused to revoke
them, although this had been common practice with such appeals, at least under
Kuchma. So it was left to the courts to annul the resolutions, but the councils appealed
to higher courts, hence it took more than a year until their acts were ultimately invalidated. Moreover, even as some courts were pronouncing iudgements, councils in other
regions passed similar resolutions to those just declared illegalt5.
Although quite impressive as a demonstration of effort to keep an electoral Promise, these resolutions were not exclusively (or maybe not even primarily) about language.By showing its control over (self-government bodies of) the East and South and
its determination in pursuing policies considered dangerous by the Orange, the Blue
continued to exert pressure on the latter (or, as interpreted by one Orange politician,
"blackmail") in order to prevent their own exclusion from the post-election Power constellationrT (Wotczuk 2007). Although Yanukovych's party won a plurality of seats in
the new parliament ( tS0), it was much less than the combined result of the three postOrange parties which commanded a majority (Z+3 out of a50). As clashes of ambitions
within the Orange camp complicated the formation of its own coalition, the Party of
Regions sought to form a so-called broad-based coalition with one of the Orange
forces, Yushchenko's Our Ukraine. When the two parties were negotiating this matter
t 6 U Yushchenka ne budut' zastosovuvag sylu do movnykh separatystiv. [Jkrains'lcnPravda,
3l .05.2006, httpt/ / pravda.com.ua/news/2006/ 5/3L / 42330.hUn;Donets'kyi sud skasuvav
nadannia rosiis'kii movi statusu rehional'ncii. Telekrytyl<n,01.06.2006,http://www.tele
'zAaly'
rosiis'kii
kritika.kiev.ua/news/146/O/t9317/; Zaponzhzhia ta Khersons'ku oblast'
(Jkrohts'lr
http://pravda.com.ua/news/
Pravda,0s.07.2006,
movi, a v Odesi vy*nrtylysia.
2006/7/5/43954.htrn; Sud vidmovyv Donets'ku v rosiislcii movi. Ukrcins'kn Pravda,
28.L| .2007,http :/ /www.pravda.com.ua/ news/ 2007/ LL/ 28/67 5I 8.htn.
'Nashoukrarntsi'viddadut'Yanukovychuvitse-spikera,shchobtoi nikoho ne shantazhuvav?.
t7
IJkr ains'kn Prauda, 08.06.2006, http :/ / pr avda.com.ualn ews/ 2006/ 6/ 8/ 42664.htn.
32
VolodymyrK"lyk
inJune, the Blue leaderstried to conveytheir readinessto makepragmaticconcessions
to their partnerswhile not overtly guing up their programmaticstanceson language
and other sensitiveissues.After they madea dealwith anotherOrangeforce,theSocialist partyr thus forming a coalition of their own in earlyJuty, the leadershipof the Parry
of Regionsincreasedtheir bargainingpower.However,they still attemptedto persuade
Our Ulaaine to join the coalition, which was seenas a precondition for Yushchenko's
consentto Yanukovych'sbecomingPrimeMinister.
In order to bind the future govenrmentby clear commitmentson crucial political
issues,Yushchenkoinitiated the so-calledDeclaration(Universal)of National Unity to
be signedby.ll parliamentaryparties.After a heateddebate,the documentwassigned
in a compromiseversion.As far aslanguageuseis concernedthe signeddocumentreplicated the constitutionalformula but supplementedit, on the one hand, by the designation of lJkrainian ,rsa'foundation for the identification of the people and the state"
and, on the other, by a referenceto the EuropeanCharter as a yardstick for citizens'
"free use of Russianor other native languagefor all vital needs' (Universal 2006)rE.
One Western commentatorqualifiedthis formulation as"the armisticeanong political
forces"which, togetherwith compromiseson other controversialissues,markedthe reversionto'the political statusquo that had prevailedbeforethe Orangeupheavaland
the Blue reaction'(Socor2006).
However, assoon asYanukovychwasappointedPrimeMinister on 4 August 2006
(*d, under the revisedConstitution, becameimmune to Yushchenko'sattempts to
dismisshim), the Party of Regionsproved reluctant to adhereto the provisionsof the
forced armistice.If sometimesYanukovychsoundedratherlike Yushchenko,it wasbecauseof his willingnessto presenthimsef both domesticallyand internationally,as a
mature and responsibleleaderof the entire country, equalto the Presidentin statusor
at leastin influence.Thus, a week after assumingoffice,he saidat a pressconferencein
Kyiv that although"the Russianlanguagemust not be discriminatedagainst"and "forcible Ulaainianisationleadsto the opposite [results]', "th. Ukrainian languageneeds
to be developed.The Russian-speaking
regions need a consistent program for the
Ukrainian language'Ie.In an interviewwith the BBC two weekslater, he went evenfirrther by admitting that "in the Southernand Easternregions,there is no problem of the
Russianlanguage.There is a problem of the Ukrainian language"which, tLerefore,
should be supportedby the statevia a specialprogramme.At the sametime, he called
for the adoption of a new languagelaw stipulatingthe useof both/all languagesand de-
l 8 The referenceto'native'languages madeit possibleto avoiddesignatingRussianaseither a
'minority"
or a'regional" languagewhich would havebeen unacceptablefor one party or the
other.
l 9 Yanukorych zahovorlruslovamyYushchenka.Ukrains'ka Pravde,I 0.08.2006,
httpz/ / pravda.com.ualnews
/ 2006/ I / l0l459 I 3.htrn.
LanguagePoliciesand LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine
33
clared his intention to zubmit a draft to the Parliament in the near future20.But on visits
to Russian-speaking regions or Moscow where he sought, respectively, to demonstrate
his adherence to the electoral promises and present himself as a friendly leader of a
partner state completely unlike his Orange opponents, Yanukovych emphasised a different aspect. He argued that although at the moment the parliamentary coalition had
no constitutional majority and thus could not "fulfiIthat fundamental decision fpromise] on the Russian language", "as soon as a constitutional majority appears we will raise
this issue'2r.
After a period of vacillation, he finally took the pro-Russophone stance, all the more
so because Our Ukraine had decided not to join the coalition and the Party of Regions
had become more interested in finding ways to blpass Yushchenko rather than courting him. The main means by which the coalition and the cabinet were able to accumulate powers at the cost of the president were: the use of ambiguities in the revised Constitution and other legislation; ltowing control over the judicial branch which thus
came to support the government in its disputes with Yushchenko, and gaining over
hesitant deputies from the opposition factions for the coalition with the aim of gradually increasing its number up to a constitutional majority afterwhich it would be able to
ignore the President altogether. The obvious shift of power from Yushchenko to Yanukovych caused a tipping effect and urged more politicians and officials to change
sides. However, the Party of Regions did not seem to be willing to use its gowing
power for solving the language problem in accordance with its declared preferences.
While Blue leaders, in particular Kushnariov, regularly announced plans to adopt a new
language law, securing a majority of votes in the Rada would require either engaging
the Orange parties in a conceptual compromise on language policy or making an opportunistic deal with some of them (gaining their support for the coalition's draft in exchangefor some concessionson its part)".As it tumed out, the Party of Regions and its
coalition partners were ready for neither.
A draft submitted to the Rada by Kushnariov and two deputies from other coalition
parties in late November provided for the use of the languages listed in the law on the
charter ratification alongside Ukrainian in a number of practices far exceeding those
stipulated in the charter itself. Unlike the ratification law, these languages designated as
"regional" were to be used in specific territories where the share of their speakers exYanukovych zaspokoiv Iewopu i skazav,shcho osnannie slovo za nynm.Ukratns'knPrauda,
23.08.2006,httpt
/ / pravda.com.ualnews
/ 2006/ I / 22146393.htm.
z l Yanukovych zibransia porushuvaty Universal?. Ukrains'ka Pravda, 16.08.2006,
http :/ / pr avda.com.ualnews/ 2006/ 8/ | 6/ 46| 1g.htm.
/2 The best-knowt exampleof such a deal is the adoption of a law on the Cabinet of Ministers
which gaveYanukovych additional powers and therefore,w,rsunacceptableforYushchenko.
The President'sveto was overtrunedin January2007 with votes of one oppositionalfaction,
Yuliia Tymoshenko'sBlock which won in exchangethe coalition'ssupport for two drafu beneficial to the opposition.
VolodyrynKulyk
LanguagePoliciesand LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine
ceeded l0 per cent of the population following a decisionby a respectivecouncil
(Proekt 20O6;seealso Kulyk 2OO7).Both the choice of term for theselanguagesand
tJreway in which their usein a certainterritory was to be introduced revealedthe authors'attempt to continue an approachtakenin the earlierresolutionsof the Southern
and Easterncouncils.It is not surprisingthat this draft wasopposedby the Orangefactions and therefore,rejected by the Committee for Cultural and Spiritual Matters,
which was designatedas the primary parliamentarycommitteeto deal with this and
other language-related
drafts.Taking advantageof an alternativeprocedurestipulated
by the parliamentaryregulations,in late February 2O07the coalition voted for the inclusionof this and a number of otherbilingualism-orienteddraftsin the springsession's
agendain spite of the fact that the committeehad rejectedthem (Kolesnichenkointerview 2007; Yavorivs'kyi interview 2008). However, these drafts were considered
neither during five weeksbeforeYushchenkoissueda decreeon the dissolutionof the
Parliamenton 2 April 2007 nor at those sittings of dubiouslegality that the BlueJed
majority held for severalmonths after that, until it ffndly agreedto an earlyelectionon
30 September.But evenif any of thesedrafu had been adopted the Presidentwould
havecertainlyvetoedthem, and the coalitionwould havelackedseveraldozenvotesin
order to be ableto ovemrlehis vetoes23.
Ircnicalln it is the coalition leaders'ardentzeal
to obtain a constitutionalmajority as soon as possiblethat prompted Yushchenkoto
dissolvethe Parliamentin order to preventthe monopolisationof power by the Partyof
Regionsand its allies.
While political rhetoric of the period of "dual power" differed from that under the
Orange domination by an assertiveand confrontationaltone, practicalpolicy on langpagemattersshoweda high degreeof continuity with the times of Yushchenko'sand
evenKuchma'srule. As far as the statefunding is concerned budgetaryfiguresfor language-relatedprogrammesremained unchanged(but then the Orange governments
significantly increasedfunding for the "development and use of the Ukrainian language' in both 2005 and 2008). The main problem in this regardwas inability of authorised organisationsto usea largepart of the supposedlyallotted funds (e.g.for producinglJkrainian-language
moviesor purchasingboola for libraries) due to prohibitive
bureaucraticregulationsto.Although Yushchenkooccasionallycriticised the govern-
ment for its lack of support for the Ukrainian language2s,this deficit seems to have been
caused more by the general ineffectiveness of bureaucrary than some officials' prejudice against the titular language. Prejudice against, or at least politically motivated opposition to supporting the Ukrainian language was more noticeable at regional and loc-
The communist deputy Oleksan& Holub arguesthat the Parg of Regions'failure to adopt
this law had to do with its reluctance to further antagoniseYushchenko,as the Blue leaders
supposedly had still hoped to make a deal with the President.According to him, the communist deputies repeatedly uqgedtheir partrrersto consider the submitted drafts in the session, but the latter kept sayingthis wasuntirnely (nohb interview 2008).
Hanzha, L.2007lurii Bohutslcyi: rishennia,iakoiu buty Ukraini, pryimaiet'siane v Ukarni.
T elekrytykn,06.07.2007,
http://www.telelaitika.kiev.ua/articlesll23/0/9468/boh_min_iniZOOT/ .
allevels where several councils in the East and South backed their language resolutions
with special programmes for the promotion of Russian which were better funded than
continuing programmes for Ukrainian26.
No less important was a change in governmental attitudes toward the language use
in non-state practices in which the state could more or less actively interfere to ensure
its priorities. Orange officials tried to use the leverage at its disposal to stimulate increased use of Ukrainian by non-state actors such as television and radio stations, book
publishers or movie distributors. In contrast, Yanukovych's government prefened to
refrain from intervention, which amounted to support for the status quo reproducing
the dominance of Russian in these:ueas. In particular, prominent Blue figures in the executive and legislative branches harshly criticised the abovementioned Ukrainianisation measures implemented by the National Television and Radio Council and the resolution on the use of Ukrainian in cinemas2T.While the council was immune to any at,
tempts to dismiss its members ahead of time and could thus continue its effort, the resolution on cinemas was invalidated due to a suit by one of the distributors and Yanukovych's government refusal to appeal to a higher court under a ridiculous pretext of
the'respect for the court's decision"28.As argued above, the memorandumbetr^/een the
Ministry of Culture and Tourism and distributors was only implemented in part because of the government's reluctance to insist on its observance. Therefore, the fullfledged introduction of Ukrainian in this domain was delayed by more than a year, until
the Constitutional Court decided in December 2007 that the valid legislation required
every film copy produced in a foreign language to be either dubbed or voiced-over in
Ukrainian, or accompanied by Ukrainian subtitles (RishenniaZ}OT).
E.g Yushchenko chitko vkazav, iak Yanukovych porushuie Universal, Ilkrains'kn Pravda,
05.10.2006,httpt//pravda.com.ualnews/2006/10/5/48579.htn;Yushchenkospytavu Az
arova,iaku movu vin finansuie.Ukrains'lcnPravda,04.09.2}07,
http z/ / www.pravda.com .aa/ news/ 2007/ 9/ 4/ 63467.htrn.
26 E.g. Na Luhanshchyni maizhe vidsutni ukrainomovni k"frhly. Telekrytyka, 04.09.2006,
www.telekritika.hev.ual news/ 146/ 0/ 2034f / .
27 Eg. Proty'Tacholi i 'Pirativ' ulcains'loiu protestuiut''rehionaly'. Wainskn havda,23.l02OM,
http://pravda.com.ua/news/2006/l0/23/49447.htrn;Olena Bondarenko:'Eto ne menia
Natsrada dopekla,a televizionshchikov,kabel'shchikov,radiishchikov'.Tebloytyka, 12.122W7,
http :/ /rvrvw.telelaitika.ualmedia-corp /Lyuil / 2007-L2-LZ/ 3 5479.
Tabachny{<napotahaiena vidmori vid ulaaiirstoho dubliazhu?Wairc'kn havda,09.112006,
http :/ /pravda.com.ualn ews/ 2006/ | L/ 9/ SM7z.hfi .
Volod;nnyr Kulyk
The 2OO7election and the prospects for lJtrainian languagepolicy
The early parliamentaryelection in September2O07brought about a new waveof language-related
political rhetoric and then a new configurationof the legislativeand executive which startedto pursueconsiderablydifferent policiesfrom those of the Blue-led
coalition and cabinet.The programmaticpositions of main political forceson the languageissueremainedvirtually unchanged although someof them shifted their campaip emphases.
In particular,the Party of Regionsinitially put much lessstresson the
statusof Russianthan in 2006,arguablyinan attempt to avoiddivisiveissueswhich was
seenas a precondition for getting support among formerly Orange constituenciesin
Central and Western regions.It is as late as three weeksbefore the election that the
parryturned to this issuewhich one of its former deputiespublicly recognisedashaving
been causedby the party'sdeclining rating2e.
By initiating the collection of citizens'signaturesfor a referendumon the stafusof Russianand severalother issues3o,
the Party of
Regionsreplicateda similar move of other anti-Orangeforcesin the 2006 campaign.
Thus it made clearthe purely electoralpu{poseof this move,which was immediately
stressednot only by its Orange opponentsbut also by Russophone-oriented
rivals3r.
While seekingto discredit the Blue initiative ashaving nothing to do with genuine support for Russian-speakers,
the Orangeforces&d not want to emphasiselanguageor
other divisiveissuesin their own campaignseither. Even the more nationalist-minded
Our Ukraine, in an alliancewith the newly createdPeople'sSelf-Defence,took on the
democraticand socialpriorities of the latter,while downplayingethnoculturalmatters.
The more eclecticBloc of Yuliia Tymoshenko(BYuT) soughtto attract voters in the
predominantly Russophoneregionsby denying its prejudiceagainstthe Russianlangpageand intentionsto limit its use.At the sametime, it stressedthe unacceptabilityof
the elevation of that language'slegal status,particularly in its campaigpin the West
where it soughtto prevail over Our Ukraine - People'sSelf-Defence(wU-NS, Nasha
Ulrrarna- Narodna Samooborona)32( Tyshchenko2OO7)
.
Although the Party of Regionsretainedits electorateand evenslightly increasedits
shareof votes (l+.+ percent),the stunningsuccessof BYuT (lO.Z per cent,an increase
29 Regional Boldyrev obvinil v porazhenii PR na vyborakh amerikanshkh polittechnologov vo
glaves Manafortom. T elekrytyka,06.10.2007,
http z/ / www.telelaitika.ua/ news/ 2007- | 0-06/ 342SZ.
'Regiony'
30
sklykaiut' referendum shchodo rosiistoi mory i NATO. Ukrains'kn Pravda,
05.09.2007,httpt//***'.pravda.com .ua/nevrs/ 2007/ 9/ 5/ 63525.htrn.
3l E.g.: U Tymoshenko kazhut', shcho Yanukovychi skoro zrobliat' monholis'ku derzhavnoiu
movoiu. Ukrains'ka Prauda, 05.09.2007, httpz//www.pravda.com.v/news/2007/9/S/
63547.htrn; Smaliulhivska, O. 2007 Vitrenko nazyvaierderendum'Rehioniv'reklamoiu.
Haztta po-ukrains'ky,L2.O9.ZO07,http://www.gpu-ua.info/inderphp?&id=
l8 14{1.
32 Tymoshenko navchylas'ukrai'ns'koi v Yushchenka,a 'feniu' ne rozumie. Ulcrains'lcaPravda,
L6.09.2007,http://www.pravda.com
.ua/news/ 2007/ 9/ | S/ 63985.htrn.
LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-Orangetlkraine
37
of more than one third from 2006) enabled the formation of a coalition of the two Orange forces, albeit by a very thin majority. Having learned a bitter lesson from the previous parliament, both forces acted more quickly and concertedly and kept their promise
of an Orange coalition, even though Yushchenko and some members of Our Uluaine
once again made an attempt to form an alliance with the Blue. In order to ensure the
support of Our Ukraine's nationalists and the President, BYuT agreed to their proUkrainophone priorities in the coalitions'and the cabinet's programmes (as well as to
their candidates for ministerial positions in the humanitarian domains). AccordinglR
both programmes included provisions on the adoption of a new language law and a revised law on the ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages which would be in "conformity with the purpose and object" of the charter
(Uhoda 2;007,sec. 1.4; Prohrama 2008, sec. 1.4). If these laws are adopted Yushchenko is most likely to sign them, but it is far from certain that the coalition and the govemment will quickly put these declarations in practice, either because of the realisation of
their destabilising potential or because of their low priority for many influential actors.
At the same time, the very composition ofthe parliament in general and those committees dealing with language matters in particular virtually precludes the adoption of any
legislation upgrading the status of Russian or e4panding the scope of its public use.
Therefore, the choice is between a more resolute Ukrainianisation and some version of
status-quo, at least until the 2009 presidential election (or another early election of the
parliament).
It is clitrcult to predict which of the two altematives will become a realiry given the
precarious balance of power in the Parliament and the considerable diversity of views
within the coalition itself on how important the language issue is, what it consists in and
how it should be dealt with. As my interviews with them reveal, even .unong those Orange politicians who define the language problem first and foremost as that of inadequate use of Ukrainian in most social domains, there is no ageement on whether legislative changes are necessarFto remedy this situation. For example, the BYuT deputy
and head of the parliamentary Committee for Cultural and Spiritual Matters,
VolodymyrYavorivs'kyi considers such changes the most important task of the Orange
forces in the language domain, now that they have, as he believes, enough parliamentary votes to pass them. He hopes that a newlanguage lawwith unambiguous provisions
on the use of Ukrainian in all public domains will be adopted by the end of 2008 (together with another deputy from BYuT, he submitted a draft in late January which he
would like to become a basis for that law). Yavorivs'lqFi also believes that it is necessary
to revise a law on the ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority
l,anguages which would be based on a new, supposedly more adequate translation of
the charter and exclude Russian from the list of languages covered by the document
( Yavorivs'kyi interview 2008).
VolodpnyrKulyk
In contrast,two politicians from NU-NS arguethat legislativechangesareinappropriate in the near future, although they give somewhat different reasons.Yurii Kliuchkovs'kyi,a prominent member of Our Ukrainewith a national-democraticbackgound
considersa newlanguagelawinexpedientdue to possibleexacerbationof conflict in society and unnecessaryin view of availableopportunidesfor a "realisticbut purposeful
policy" in support of the Ukrainian language.He seessuchpolicy asbasedprimarily on
the constitutional article regarding the "comprehensiveuse and functioning of the
Ukrainian languagein all domainsof sociallife on the entire territory of Ukraine" and
its assertiveinteqpretationsby the ConstitutionalCourt, which make it possibleto take
necessaryadministrativemeasures(Kliuchkovs'lcyiinterview 2008). Oles' Donii, a
member of the People'sSelf-Defencepart of the bloc, believesthat by adoptinga radically pro-Ukrainianisationlanguagelaw,the Orangeforceswould'ra&cally antagonise
50 per cent of the population'and provokea Blue triumph in the nort electionwhich
would lead to the adoption of laws precluding any promotion of the ulaainian languageand culture.And unlessit wasa part of a'purposeful but long-term program"intended to createconditions for knowledgeand use of lJkrainian,he is surethat sucha
lawwould be doomedto sabotageby the population and officialsalike,all the more so
becausethe lJlaainiansarenot accustomedto observingthe law.
Moreover, unlike Yavorivs'kyi,Kliuchkovs'kyiand most other Orange politicians,
Donii doesnot considerradicalUkrainianisationwith vfutualexclusionof Russianfrom
all pubhc domainsa justsolution to the languageproblem in llkrainer gven a considerableportion of the population'spreferencefor Russianand pursuit of its official status.
He is the only Orange politician I have heard of openly declaringhis support for a
charter-basedstatusof Russianand other languagesusedin someparts of Ukraine asa
possiblecompromisebetweenthe two political camps.However,he insistson applying
this solution to localitiesrather than regionsin order to avoidthe imposition of the cities' Russianon the largely Ukrainophone countrysideof the East and South and the
separationof the country into two parts using different languages(Donii interview
2008). At the sametime, both I(liuchkovsb *d Donii saythat if a languagelaw is
proposedby their more radical colleaguesfrom the Orangefactions,they would not
oPPosethem (although the latter arguesthat it would dependon what exactlythe law
says),so it is still possible- evenif far from certain- that sucha law could receivea majority ofvotes, especiallyif supportedby somedeputiesfrom the middle-groundfaction
headedby the former speakerVolodymyr Lytuyn.
As for deputiesfrom the clearly anti-Orangeforces,the Party of Regionsand the
Communists,they vehementlyobject to the perceivedexacerbationof legal disparity
betweenthe two main public languages,
but do not seemto be ready to accepta compromise that falls short of their full formal equality. Ivan Popesku(Ion Popescu),a
prominent activist of the Romanianminority in Chernilrtsioblast and a long-term defender of its rights,who lately cameto believethat they could be best ensuredin co-
LanguagePoliciesand LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine
operation with the Party of Regions, argues that a compromise might not pertain to the
(ssenceof a legal :urangement on the status of Russian but only to the time-frame of its
adoption. That is, his parfy will not officially grve up its insistence on the status of Russian as equal to that of Ukrainian, even if it were to make a coalition with Our Ukraine
which, at the time of my interviewwith Popesku, many Blue politicians had still hoped
for. His preferable legal solution would include the adoption of a framework document
called the Concept of the State's Ethnicity Policy and then a language law elaborating
on it, both conforming to the language charter and other minority-related acts of the
Council of Europe. As a first step toward that goal, Popesku sees the full implementation of the charter in the scope provided for by the valid ratification law but with clear
mechanisms which he believes could be enacted by decisions of relevant executive
agencies (Popesku interview 2007).
Another Party of Regions' deputy, Vadym Kolesnichenko who has lately become
the most active Blue politician in dealing with language matters, does not consider the
state status of Russian a realistic prospect in the foreseeable future, glven that it requires
not only a qualified majority in the Parliament but also a referendum which he seesas a
politically risky and socially divisive endeavour. Thus he argues that his party's initiative
'proposal
on a referendum was rather a
for the so-called political elites to sit down at
the negotiating table and come to an agreement" which has so far been reiected by the
Orange. His preferable version of such an agreement would be either a special law on
the use of Russian or a revised law on the ratification of the charter which would
provide for different scopes of the use of respective languages depending on the proportion of speakers in a certain territory. Both ways would put Russian, practically and
symbolically, much higher than minority languages even if not making it quite equal to
Ulaainian (Kolesnichenko interview 2007). Kolesnichenko's declared readiness to accept a regional status of Russian as a compromise solution is largely undermined,
however, by his legislative practice. Due to his proposed amendments to a number of
laws on particular public practices in order to change their language regime from
Ukrainian only to both Ukrainian and Russian, he has become notorious among the
Orange politicians as a persistent agent of Russification and thus can hardly be a negoti'
ating partner for them33.
At the same time, his and other Blue politicians'hopes for support for their legislative initiatives on the part of another anti-Orange force, the communists may not be
forthcoming. Oleksandr Holub, a deputy of the parliament and editor-in-chief of the
party publication Kommunist told me that the communists differed from their former
coalition partners in that they considered a regional status of Russian dangerous as a
33 Nor will contribute to his acceptabilityhi" intention to demonstrateto the Europeaninstitutions Ulaaine's supposedviolation of the rights of Russian-speakers
in order to "erect a wall
before Ulaaine in the Council of Europe if she doesnot want to fulfil her obligationsto the
Council of Europe" (Kolesnichenkointerview 2OO7).
VolodymyrKulyk
factor contributing to a division of LJlaaine.Therefore,they would insist on the application of any solution on the statusof languagesto the entire country. Holub's preferablesolution would be a constitutionally-entrenchedsecondstatestatusof Russianor,
more realistically,a somewhatlower official statusas stipulatedby a speciallaw or an
amendedlaw on languageswhich would provide for its uninhibited use in education,
judiciary,public servicesand other domains,while relyingon the charterto regulatethe
useof minority languages.
As a first step,however,he would like to seethe charterimplementedby a more specfic ratificationlaw or at leasta specialresolution of the Parliament,a solution not unlike that proposedby Popeskualthoughmuch lessprioritised
(Holub interview2008).
Whateverchangesopposition deputieschooseto initiate,they aremost likely to be
opposedand voted down by the codition. Even if someof the BYuT or NU-NS deputies fail to supporttheir colleagues'radicalUkrainianisationdrafts,theywill hardly dare
to break the faction disciplineto the point of supportingthe oppositions'pro-bilingualism moves.Therefore,the anti-Orangeforceswill not giveup their maximalistslogans
asthis would questiontheir consistencyand responsibitityto their electoratewithout
ensuringthem any legislativeor administrativegains.For the time being they will opby sabotaginglaws and
PosePerceivedinfringement on the Russian-speakers'rights
governmentprogrammesat the local level,while seekingto demonstratetheir concem
for these rights by meansof parliamentaryinitiatives and specialprogrammesfor the
support of the Russianlanguageand cultureadoptedby thosecouncilswhich they control. Until a reconfigurationof political forcesin the wake of a new election,a compromise on the languageissuemay only result from an initiative by moderatepoliticianswithin the Orangecamp which can be supportedby (. part o0 the Blue politiciansor, perhapsmore likely, an opportunisticdealbetweenone of the Orangefactions
and the Party of Regionsaimed at weakeningthe rival Orangeforce on the eveof the
2009 presidentialrace.
Popular attitudes and policy options
It is clear,then, that the politicians arereluctantto reacha compromise,if only because
they considerit profitable in electoralterms to demonstrateunyietdingdefenceof the
perceivedrights and valuesof their core constituencies.But is this stancewarrantedby
popular attitudeswhich politiciansusuallyreferto? Are the massesaspolarisedand uncompromisingin their languagebeliefsasthe elitesseekingto representthem?To what
extent do political parties'viewsreflectthoseof their constituencies?
Due to spacelimitations, I cannot answerthese questionsin a comprehensivemanner, so I will only
presentsome key characteristicsof languageattitudes of the Ulcrainianpopulation in
generaland its politically significant segmentsin particular.Further, I will only deal
with declaredattitudesand preferencesasrevealedby a masssurveywhich wasconduc-
LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine
4l
ted in late 2006 by the Hromadslca Dumlca Centre within the framework of this project,
while leaving aside focus group data which can provide an insight into citizens' underlying beliefs and experiences. Finalln as my focus is on political/electoral stimuli which
the mass attitudes provide and constraints they impose, I will limit my analysis to language Policypreferences of main regional and tinguo-demographicd parts of the population which politicians seek to attract, rather than studying interrelations between
these preferences and various social, cultural and ideological factors3a.In other words, I
will look at what (different parts of) the Ukrainians believe - rather than why they do so
- and what that means in terms of available policy options.
In general, the survey data confirms the well-known divergence between language
attitudes of different parts of the Ukrainian population. While some indicators such as
sex, education, social status and income do not have a significant impact on the respondents' opinions and preferences, a cluster of characteristics related to language use
and language identity strongly influences their views of actual and desirable policies in
the language domain. That is, those people speaking (mostly) Ukrainian generally
prefer a policy aimed at making that language the primary or even the only public language of the country, while those speaking (mostly) Russian tend to prefer a policy allowing equal coexistence of Uluainian and Russian3s.However, it is not just a language
people speak that influences what they believe the state should do in this regard, but
also a language they identirywith, one they consider their native language.
The relative importance of the two determinants seems to depend on which of
them primarily distinguishes a group in question from the bulk of the population, in
other words, makes it what it is. Given that native language is often considered to be the
language of one's nationality rather than one's own use (ea 19es; Arel zooz), many
people speaking mostly or even exclusively Russian still declare their native language to
be Ukrainian. Accordingln this declaration does not determine the respondent's policy
preference, as it may result from dlflbrent patterns of everyday use and different cultural
orientations (particularly because after the Ukrainian state discontinued the Soviet
practice of its institutionalisation as an unchangeable hereditary characteristics, nationality is increasingly perceived in civic rather than ethnic terms). Even more ambiguous
is the declaration of one's Ukrainian nationaliry which encompassesnot only different
language practices but also different language identifications (in our sample, 30 per
34 For a study of suchinterrelations,seethe chapterby Hanna Zdizniak in this volume.
35 The impact of ageis rather ambiguous.Although younger respondents,somewhat surprisingly, d9 not display significantly geater support for policies favoring the Ukrainian language
than older cohorts do, this firdirg seeru to rezult from the mutual darnping of two opposite
tendencies. On the one hand, the young generation sped<sRussianmore often in everyday
life; on the other, young Russian-speakersare more likety to support Ukrainianisation
policies than older ones. The validity of the last statement,however,is somewhatundermined by the fact that three-dimensionalbreakdownsoften produce small sub-groupsof respondentswhoseviewscan onlybe assessedwithrather largeerrors.
VolodyrnyrKulyk
LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUlraine
cent of those defining themselvesas Ukrainiansdeclaredtheir native languageto be
therefore,the primary determinantof policy
Russianorboth). For Ukrainian-speakers,
however,napreferencesis the main languageof everydayuse. For Russian-speakers,
tive language- in this case,closelyrelatedto nationality - is of more importancebecausethefact of speakingRussiandoesnot in itself tell much about an individual'spreJin languageuse and languagepolicy. Thus the spectrumof policy preferences
erences
stretchesfrom clearlypro-Ukrainianisationviews of thosepeople using exclusivelyor
mostly Ukrainian in everydaylife to a strong orientation toward bilingualism among
those who considertheir nationdity and native languageto be Russian.As thesetwo
groups are predominantly concentratedin Western, Southern and Eastem parts of
Ukraine respectively,the divergenceof preferencesof linguistic groups results in a
strong regional polarisation,which scholarshave been pointing to since mid-1990s
(e.g.Arel and Khmelko 1996). Moreover,the differencesbetweenregionscannot be
fully accountedfor by their different languageproftles.As three-dimensionalbreakdowns of the sun'ey data show, speakersof the samelanguagehave rather different
preferencesin different regions.In particular,the residentsof the West, due to the region's persistent struggle for independenceand ethnic rights in the past, support
Ukrainianisationpoliciesmore stronglythan peoplein otherpartsof the country.Some
authorsevenarguethat the region is a more important determinantof viewsand preferencesthan language(e.g.BarringtonZO02).
As an illustration of suchmulti-dimensionaldifferentiationof languagepolicy preferences,I presentthe respondents'views of the preferableevolution of the language
situation in Ukraine in the future (question67 inthe surveyquestionnaire,seeannex),
which are broken down by nationality, native l^rgo"g., languageof everydayuse and
the regionof residence(seetable 1).
Simitarpatternscanbe found in the answersto many other questionsof the survet
which have to do with the respondents'views of desirableor actual languagepo[cy.
With only minor modifications,in dl thesecasesthe groupswith the most divergent
are residentsof the Western region (or people speaking
preferencesand assessments
Ulrainian in everydaylife) on the one hand and those consideringthemselvesRussian
(and the eponymouslanguagenative) on the others. For example,about 40 per cent of
Russophonesandresidentsof the Eastbelievethat Russian
Russians,nativeJanguage
Table l. Answersto the question'In your opiniorl how should the languagesituadonin Ukraine
developin the future [v perspektyvi]I For everydaylanguage,answers"on]y Ukrainian/Russian"
and "in most situationsUkrainian/Russian' arecombined.Four regionsaremergedinto two,
a
36 Whether residentsof the West are more or lessradicd than those people speakingUkrainian
depends on how one defines the latter gpoup.If only exclusivespeakersof that languageare
include4 their percentageof support for Ulaainianisation policies may in some casesturn
'in most
situout higher than that of resideng of the Wesg if people speakingUkrainian
ations" are adde4 the aggregatebecomesclearly less radical. However, this agglegateseen$
to be more representativeof all Ukrainophones in society. Hence when presenting the data
for everydayspeakersof Ulaainian, I will combine the two subsets.The similar consolidadon
will be applied to everyday Russophoneswho, however, are ahrvaysless radically pro-bilingudism than ethnic Russiansbut usuallymoreso than the residentsof the Eastand South.
while the West is shown separately.
Nationality
i
,;
D
&
*(
T
Native
Ianguage
ri
x
Everyday
language
Region
t
o
.t
'X
ut
tD
/,
3
o
z
.4
(!
rq
o
Q)
5
o
v)
Q
tllaainian
should
become the main
language in all com-
51.6
4.7
67.r
35.7
84.1
3.3
7.6
77.5
12.7
20.8 8 1 . 3
It.7
4s.2 6,r
7.0
1.5
6.4
88.9
50.7
16.9
munication domains
Ukraine should
becomea bilingual
country
28.3 72.9
Rerssianshould become the main language in all commu-
2.5
6.4
0.3
6.1
4.5
nication domains
should be used in Ukraine in a larger scopethan now, while 53 per cent of everyday
speakers
of Ukrainianand 6l per cent of thoseresidingin the Westwould like to seeit
usedin a lesserscope(question6). I" a no lessimpressivecontrast,76 percent of Russiansarguethat the primary task of the statepolicy in the languagedomain (question
33) is to solvethe problem of the statusof Russian
, and79 per cent of everydayUkrainophoneswant statepolicy first and foremostto promote the spreadof Ulaainian in all
domains (figuresfor the East and the West are 63 and 83 per cent, respectively).e.cordingln5l per centof Russiansand 53 per cent of peopleliving in the EastpreferYarrukovych'slanguagepolicy to Yushchenko's,while 54 per cent of everydayUkrainianspeakersand 68 per cent of Westernresidentsdeclarethe oppositepreference(question46).
However,the viewsof the Ukrainianpopulationare not only highly diversebut also
ratherambivalent;that is, not only do different people have different preferences,but
alsothe samepeopleoften want things which are hardly compatiblewith one another.
'fhus,
who preferincreaseduseof Ukrainianin society(questhe shareof respondents
+5
VolodymyrK"bk
LanguagePoliciesand LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine
tion 6) is much higher than thosewho opt for decreaseduse of Russian(question 5),
and the other way round. It is likely ttrat many of thosewho want more of one language
are ready to put up with the current amount of the other, which is hardly feasibleunless
they mean the right to use a languagerather than the actualscopeof its use.Such discrepancyis characteristicnot only of the sampleasa wholebut alsoof all its ethnic,linguistic and regionalparts aswell asall groupsof self-definedadherentsof ideologicalpolitical trends",of which the respondentswere given a list so they could identifi one
closestto their own convictions.
On the one hand the ambivalence of popular views diminishes the potential for confrontation between the supporters of different options because for many people, the adherence to one option is not as strong as to preclude the acceptance of another one,
even if it is not quite compatible. At least they can accept this undesirable option in
some form and to some extent. On the other han4 this ambivalence makes it possible
for politicians to manipulate their constituencies, stressing one part of their views over
another or different parts at different times. Thus, each of the main political camps can
Table 2 and 3.Answento question5 and6'Shoul4 in your opinion,the usageof theRussian/
Ukrainianlanguage
bewidenedremainthesameorbe narrowedascomparedto the curent
state?"Dataareshownfor selectedcategories
only,indudingadherents
of several'ideologicalpoliticdtrends'."Market+ reunifcation"is ashortfor a'polidcaltrendcombiningideas
ofmarket economywithideasof tlkraine'sreunificationwith Russia".
x
calo
.t
(-)
EEilEE$
(!
.a
.(u
4C
*al
5!
5 8-E
D
D 3-
3
q)
!
o
U
*69( !
8H
(!tr
z3
Ukrainian language
shouldbeusedmore
50.2
62.5
70.8
83.9
53.6
79.5
than now
Russianlanguage
shouldbe usedless
than now
3+.t
44.6
(u
bo
.t
(!
a
&
I
d
!H,
.=
fit
HT
E'E
usedmore than now
Ukrainian languageshould
be used lessthan now
6r.z
bo
(!
8$
'tgr Eh
40.9
.t)
.A
ta
(!
IrI
:l'o
&h.
,
tr
o
IJ
o)
q)
furssian languageshould be
s2.7
59.1
+c
!O
-g€
E
3
E'E
gE
4r.4
39.8
36.1
39.6
34.9
35.1
28.9
29.5
26.4
26.5
20.9
29.6
afford both raising an aspect of the language issue which their respective constituencies
consider most important and neglecting the issue altogether which would imply its unimportance and, therefore, acceptability of the status quo (cf. Kulyk 2006a).
The respondents' views of appropriate status of Ukrainian and Russian reveal both
diversity and ambivdence. To be sure, the members of different ethnic, linguistic, regional and ideological groups hold highly divergent views, and their location on the
spectrum corresponds to the above-described pattern. A solid majority of ethnic Russians, native- and everydaplanguage Russophones, residents of the East and South and
adherents of all but two ideological trends are inclined to believe that Russian should
have some "preferences on a legislative level" in cornparison to other national minority
languages. In contrast, a majority of Ukrainophones, Western residents and adherents
of the "nationd-democratic" and "national-radical" trends disagrees (question 38)".
However, when respondents are askedto choose among different status options (question l2), the group preferencesseem less exclusive(see table 4).
Taken together, the second the third and the forth options which correspond respectivelR to the current legal status, the current actual situation and a minimal demand by the supporters of a higher status of Russian - are supported by a majority or a
near majority of respondents in all categories.While different groups'preferences within this range clearly differ, the ambivalence of views within each goup facittates a compromise. For example, in all categories except for the residents of theWest, the percentage of people who are inclined to believe that a regional status of Russian "solves the
language issue'rather than "exacerbating" it (question 39), is much higher than that of
people who support the promotion of the status of Russian to that of a state or regional
language. That is, even in those groups which are strongly opposed to the legalisation
of a more-than-minority role of Russian, at least a quarter of people are ready to accept
a minimalist version of such legalisation, a regional status, in order to accommodate the
demands of the Russian-speakers(see table 5)
37 These majorities are comprised of those who answered
ono'and "rather
noo on the other.
hand and
'yes"
and "rather yes" on the one
VolodymyrKutyk
46
LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine
Table 4. Answersto question 12 'In your opinion, what stahrsshould the Ukrainian and Russian
languageshavein Ukraine?" The listed options are reformulated to make the statemeng briefer.
Data are only shown for the most divergent of the ethnolinguistic, regional and ideological
SrouPs.
b
frs
nF"
cc l q( !
q>.
E€
5
1. Ukrainian should
be the onlystate
language,F.ussian
?t)
c
(!
a
:1
&
I
(u
lh
3
n
14
?€
u
o
(t)
€E
c€
€
I4'
tr
E,
+.!
,E
t q8
a'=
Table 5. Answersto question 39 "Which statement do you support more strong[y?",ascomparedwith the combined shareof the three last answersto the question in the previous table.
The two opinions the respondentswere to choosefrom included'The regional status of the Russian languagesotvesthe languageproblem and doesnot threaten the development of the Ukrainian languagein those regions where Russiangetssuch a status" and'The regional statusof the
Russianlanguageaggravatesthe languageproblem in the country; ging the regiond language
statusto Russianwould lead to superseedingUlaainian totdly in theseregions; it is implemented
to makeit possiblenot to learn lJlaainian".Data areonly shownfor thosegroupswith predominant preferencesfor Ulqainianisation.
o
u
t&l
o
21.0
1 .5
25.1
5.3
4.6
26.3
6.0
Ri
FS
:EE
2.4
!!o
gE
excluded
2. tlkrainian should
be the statelanEiuage,Russiana
minoritv lansuaqe
4. Ukrainianshould
be the statelanBuage,Russianan
official languagein
those regions
38.0
t4.2
44.3
18.0
r+.4 38.6
19.5
r5.2
22.7
r0.8
17.9
13.7
9.8
19.6
14.8
10.0
22.r
8.4
19.0
23.6
7.6
r5.4
18.8
5.r
47.8
3.2
39.8 45.2
6.7
37.6
50.3
0.4
2.2
0.0
0.3
2.7
3.0
wants it
with eoual rishts
6. Russianshould
be the onlystate
language,Ulcainian excluded
E5
.^
g
qB
3
U
'=r
.=
(!
(!
q)
?f;
o
€€
r.9
1.0
Regional status of Russian solves
the language problem
37.0
28.3
14.5
48.0
25.6
Russianshould havea regionalor a
higher status
22.7
l5.l
r 1.6
28.5
14.6
9.0
where the majority
5.IJkrainian and
Russianshouldbe
state languages
9o
.AE
!do
o
o)
3. tlkrainian should
be the statelanSage, Russiana
parallel spokenlanguaqe
47
It is this minimalistaccommodationthat standsthe best chanceof being acceptedasa
compromisesolutionby membersof all major ethnolinguisticand regionaland ideologicalgroups.To be sure,it is more acceptablefor proponentsof bilingualismthan supPortersof Ukrainianisatiorywho would ratherretain the legalstatus-quoevenif thus far
it has not been adheredto in actual languagepractice.However, to prevent political
destabilisationand mass protests, the state should fust of all accommodatethose
grouPswhich are most dissatisfiedwith the current situation. And the survey data
clearlyshow that Russophonesare much more critical than Ulaainophonesof the state
Policy in the languagedomain which they tend to seeaslimiting the function of their
language(seetable6 andT)
It is interestingto note that the shareof Russophoneswho perceivethe statepolicy
aslimiting the function of Russianis much higher than the shareof those who believe
that the use of that languageshouldbe increased(seebelow). This confirms that it is
not so much the scopeof actualuseoftheir languagethat the Russophones
iue dissatisfied with, but rather its low legal statuswhich also may lead, or so they believe,to a
shrinking scopeof usein the future. Therefore,evena moderateincreasein the status
of Russianwould positively affecttheir attitudesand thus diminish a destabilisingpotential ofthe languageproblem in Ukrainiansociety.
VolodymyrK"tyk
LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine
Table 6. Answersto question32'How do you assessthe languagepolicy of the state?"
6
ci
.E
JI
D
Everyday
language
Native
Nationdity
language
6
(!
vt
4'
=
a
C6
(!
IA
a
C!
a
.E
(!
D
b=
u,
o)
u,
aA
&
D
J.
d.
Region
&
3
:Ji
gE
36
ao
Ez
ol.VD
Positively
13.8
6.6
16.0
7,2
r6.r
7.7
10.8
16.5
10.8
Rather
positively
26.0
15.2
28.2
14.5
29.9
t7.7
30.4
26.2
19.2
Rather
negatively
u.3
35.0
23.4
3r.7
23.4
30.3 26.2
20.5
30.1
Negatively
19.5
29.2
r5.9
31.9
16.2 29.0 15.3
19.8
25.7
It would not be very difficult for the partiesto persuadetheir constituenciesto acceptthe regionalstatusof Russianasa compromisesolution, shouldthey decideto do
so.The meanvalueof the answersto questionon the statusof the two languages(question 12) grvenby the adherentsof different"ideological-politicaltrends' liesbetrveen3
and4, that is, somewherebetweenthe preservationof the presentcturencyof (spoken)
Russianwell beyond its legal statusas a minority languageand the promotion of this
statusto that of a regionallanguage.Two notable exceptionsare national-democrats
who would prefer a lesserscopeof the use of Russianin accordancewith its legalstatus
(mean value 234) and adherentsof a "political trend combining ideasof market economy with ideasof Ukraine'sreuniffcationwith Russia",half of whom want more than
a regional status(meanvalue 4.16).As long asthe latter constituencyis givennothing
in terms of status,the championsof its rights in the Party of Regionswill stick to the
maximumdemandsand be rewardedby electoralsupport.
Conclusion
Table 7. Answers to the questions 35 and 36 'ln your opinion, the present languagepoliry towardsthe Ukrainian/Russianlanguage...'.Data areonlyshown forpredominantly Ukrainophone
grouPswith regardto the Uhainian languageand for predominantly Russophonegoups with regard to the Russianlanguage.
Na6onality
e
(!
t!
'!4
D
supports and stimulatesthe
function of the language
neither hindersnor
promotes its function
limibthefunction
ofthe language
43.8
G
tD
.A
fr
s.7
language
Everyday
language
ccl
tr
(!
Native
(!
(!
.a
at
}(
D
&
41.0
7.0
T
cl
d
(B
'l(
D
40.3
aD
IA
Region
pa
&
6.2
i€
'fi3
36.2
7.1
37.2 3 l . l
37.5 32.3 36.7 36.3 4r.3
40.8
n.9
r4.0 54.4
47.2
57.1
16.3
49.8
16.7
The above analysisdemonstratesthat languagepolitics in Ukraine has primarily been
determinedby political actors' striving for power which causesthem to competewith
one another and attempt to influencetheir respectiveconstituencies.While the loyalty
to voters required that politicians adhereto a clear line on sensitivequestions,the
strugglefor power within the political classoften led them to act contraryto their declaredposition or refrain from taking courseof action dictated by that position. The
ambivalenceof popularattitudescontributedto the sustainabilityof suchopportunism,
asmoderatechangesof political priorities andrhetorical emphasesdid not causepoliticiansand partiesto becomeunacceptablefor the bulk of their constituencies.This is
why it was possiblefor many political actorsto alternatebetweendeclarationsof the urgency of the languageproblem and its virtual absence.Although the confrontation
befweenproponentsof different solutionsled to a legislativestalemate,the executive
agenciescould in the meantime cautiouslypromote the Ulaainian languagewithout
provoking considerableprotestsby speakersof Russian.
However, the polarisationof the political elites and the population during the OrangeRevolution createdan incentivefor the anti-Orangeforcesto emphasisetheir defenceof particularinterestsand valuesof its Southernand Easternconstituency,including the preferencefor the Russianlanguageand striving for its official status.This emphasisled the Party of Regionsto a triumph in the 2006 electionand the resultingretum to power,but in the following electionit underminedthe party'seffort to widen its
electoral base. Finding itself once again in the opposition, the Blue are likely to
strengthenthis divisive emphasisin order to use their constituency'sdiscontent as
leverageagainstthe Orangeregime,which would contribute to the maintenanceof the
VolodyrnyrKulyk
regionalpolarisationand,therefore,pavethe way for the useof a'language card"in the
following elections.
To breakthis vicious circle,the Orangeleadersshouldsuggesta compromisesolution and then either engagetheir opponentsin a ded or make a legislativechangeon
their own and popularisethis solution with both the Blue and Orangeconstituencies.
Needlessto sap the Orange can only do this while in power. It seems,however,that
many of them would rather take advantageof this situation to further consolidatethe
legd preferencesof the Ukrainian languageand thus createpreconditionsfor its social
dominance.Shouldthis consolidationtakeplace,it will certainlycontribute to the Russian-speakers'
discontentwhich may lead to the Orange'sdefeatin the next election
and the undoing of their Ukrainianisationprogressto or even beyond the point of
Kuchma's ambivalence.However, as a considerablepart of its deputies do not care
much about this issue and would rather refrain from any legislative changes,it seems
more likely that the Orangecoalitionwill not manageto implementany resolutemeasures, all the more so becauseits leaderswill not want to undermine their electoral
chances.
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