INTAS Project Poliry in Ukraine:Anthropological, ,,Language Linguisticand FurtherPerspectives" (.d.) JulianeBesters-Dilger LanguagePolicy and LanguageSituation in tlkraine Analysisand Recommendations PETERLANG 'S(/'ien Frankfurt am Main . Berlin . Bern . Bruxelles . New York ' Oxford . LanguagePoliciesandLanguageAttitudesin Post-Orange[Jkraine Voloorurr.Kwvr This chapterlooks at languagepolitics from the point of view of the political process,in which participants strive for power and accordinglRcompetewith one another and seekto producea favourableimpressionon their putativeconstituencies.Although I do not arguethat officialsand politicianshaveno ideologicallymotivatedpreferences,I do not seethese asunambiguousor unchangeableand examinehow they are modiffed in view of speciffcpolitical taskslargelydeterminedby a power configurationin a particular period. After describingsome generalcharacteristicsof post-SovietUkrainian politics, I analysehow they influence policy-makingin one particular domain, the use of languagesin public practices.My focus is on the time after the Orange Revolution, which I further divide into three shorterperiods defined by considerablydifferent dispositions of key playersin the political process.The bulk of the chapterconsistsof a chronologicallyorganisedstory of conflicting attemptsby theseplayersto changethe regulationsin the languagedomain so that they correspondto their respectivepreferencesand benefit their target constituencies.Then I try to analyseprospectsfor the future by presentingviews of politicians from major partieswhom I intendewedregarding their perspectiveson the languageproblem in Ukraine today, preferablesolutions and intended stepsto achievethem. Finalln to assesshow warrantedthe politicians' viewsare by the attitudesof citizensthey keepreferringto, I take a closelook at preferencesof different groups of the population as revealedby a masssurvey conducted within the frameworkof this project. Political and social context of flkrainian language policy Political discourseand policy-makingon languagemattersrevealcertainfeatureswhich are characteristic of Uluainian political process in general and largely determine policies in various domains. The most important of these featuresis the deficient nature of Ukrainian democraqywhich scholarshave alternately labelled as delegative democrary, electoral or competitive authoritarianism,or a hybrid state combining democraticand authoritarian elements(Kubidek L994; D'Anieri 2001; Levitsky and Way 20O2;Balmaceda2007). Unlike representativedemo$^sy in Western countries, suchmixed regimemeetsthe formal requirementsof demoCaCft but is far from democraticin political practice.Sincethe most obviousmark of (semi-)authoritarianismis a strongleaderinstitutionallyunconstrainedin his/her behaviouron a popularmandate, l6 LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-Orangetlkraine VolodyrnyrKulyk it could be arguedthat Ukraine had this type of rule duringLeonid Kuchma'sassertive presidency,but not after the OrangeRevolution and a concomitantconstitutionalreform which significantlyrestrictedpresidentialpowers.However,while the reform reintroduced genuinecompetition betweenalternativecentresof power, it did not actually facfitate their accountability through institutions capableof 'calling into question and eventuallypunishing (O'Donnell 199229)improper waysof political behaviourin periodsbetweenthe elections.Moreover,the rivalling poliUcalforceshavejointly contributed to discreditperhapsthe most important of suchinstitutions,the judiciary.The presidentis no longer the sole govemor of the countryr but competingpolitical actors are not held responsiblefor the ways in which they act and the conformity of those wayswith the promisesthey gaveduring the elections,at leastnot until a new election comes. A secondimportant characteristicof post-soviet Ukraine is passivityand atomisation of societyresultingin its inability to pressurethe stateand make it act in accordancewith the preferencesof the bulk of societyor its constituentparts.In particular,interestgroupswhich are,in a democraticcountry,a "primary means(along with periodic elections) for societyto make demandson the state" but which, unlike elections, 'permit societaldemandsto be articulatedclearln speciffcallyand continuouslyover time" (D'Arrieri 19992327),in Ukraine :ue - or at leastwere under Kuchma - scarce and largely controlled by the state itself (tcubicek 2000a). Such "weak" societythus makesit possiblefor the authoritiesand political partiesto ignoremany of its problems and set their own agendasfocusingon thoseissuescrucialfor respectivepeople'saccumulation ofwealth and power. Ratherthan encouragingpopularinitiative in discrediting and ousting irresponsiblefigures and organisations,suchbehaviour of prominent oficials and politicianscontributesto generaldistrust ofpolitics and scepticismregarding citizens' ability to changethe situation in the country. This passivity is usually ascribedto the legaryof Soviettotalitarianismwhich did not allow any independentsocial organisationand to policies of the Kuchmaregimewhich soughtto keep societyin an atomisedstate(O'anieri 1999;Riabchuk2003). The OrangeRevolution seemedto demonstratethat thesepolicies had failed to prevent the gowth of a civil societycapable of mobilising for the defenceof its perceivedvital interests.However,this capacity tumed out to be short-livedand societysincehasnot visiblylirnited the state'sfreedom to act asit seesfft. It is not (parts of) societythat makesdemandson the statebut rather political elites use popular discontentwith the state policies to discredit and checktheir rivals. Another featurehaving to do with the legacyof totditarianism is political culture markedby intoleranceof different viewsand behaviours,unwillingnessto compromise and lack of trust in peopleand institutions (Kubidekl994; Holovakha t997).In policymaking it manifestsitself in the widespreadperception thereof as a zero-sumgame which encouragesplayersto seekto clearlywin or at leastto leavean issueundecidedin T7 a hope of musteringenoughresourceslater.This strategTwasratherskilfulb appliedby Kuchma,but it is with the decentralisationof powers after his demisethat its use by competing political forceshas become routine, so they do not evenbother to hide it from citizen'seyes.Ratherthan negotiatingwith the proponentsof a different coursein searchof a compromisesolution, maior political partiestry to weakenthe rivals'resistanceby bribing threateningor otherwiseinfluencing prominent figures.While such behaviouras representedin the media contributesto those parties'disreputewith the constituency,the latter hardly seesany alternative,all the more so becausea deep divide within societylimits a list of options which eachregionaland linguo-culturd part canchoosefrom. The existenceof a deep ideologicaland cultural divide is another characteristicof Ukrainian societyinfluencingpolicy-makingin generaland languagepolicy in particular. Due to different ethnic compositions,establishedpracticesof languageuse,life trajectoriesand socialmemories,residentsof different parts of the country hold radically dissimilarviewsof the issuesof ethnicity,language,history and foreignpolirywhich are clusteredaround Llkraine'srelationswith Russia(,trel and Khmelko 1996;Barrington 1997;Kubicek 2000b). These dissimilaritiesare reflectedin the stnrcture of political partiesand eagerlyexploitedby them in order to mobilise the respectiveparts of the . population and thus gain influencein nationalpolitics. In particular,those partiesseen asrepresentativesof the more denselypopulatedSouthernand Easternpart of Ukraine have preferred to strengthencontrol over'their" part by stressingits distinctiveness rather than seekingto widen their geographicalbaseby downplayingregional differences(Wolczuk 2007). The Orange Revolution exacerbatedthe polarisation of the Uhainian electoratenot only by reintroducing overt political competition but alsoby creatinga senseof defeatand rejection in the predominantly anti-OrangePart of the country which its political elite could then use as a meansof revenge.Although the latest parliamentaryelection of September2007 demonstratedpartial penetration of two most popular partieson eachother'sterritory of predominancet,regionalpolarisation persists.By limiting the freedomof choicefor voters in eachpart of the country,it of electionsasa meansof citizens'pressureon politicians diminishesthe effectiveness state. andthe The language question in lJtu'ainian politics One of the most salientdimensionsof Ukrainian politics for the pasttwo decadeshas beena controversyover the'language question",first and foremostthe statusof Russian vis-l-vis LJkrainian.This controversyheightenedperiodicalln usually in times of elections,and was all but forgoffen in the meantime.The stancesof major partiesremain sharply divergent,and little effort hasbeen made to reacha compromise.Some 1 BYuT i'Rehiony' pronykaiut' na'chuzhi' tetytorii. Hazetopo-ukrains'ky,5October 2007' 12. l8 LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine VolodymyrKulyk partiesexPloitthe unresolvedproblem in the hope of an electord profit; othersdownPlayit in public discoursewhile tacitly pressuringfor administrativemeasureswhiclr, in tum, givetheir opponentsmore groundsfor accusations.[n any case,it is the politicians who dealwith this problem on behalfof citizens;there areno massmovementsor influential public organisationsemphasisingit, while the only interestgroupsactivelyseeking to influencethe statepoliciesarethosewhosebusinessdependson languageregulations suchasbook publishersor movie distributors. The languagequestion was first openly raised in Ukraine, as in other parts of the former USS& in the late 1980swhen the reformist policy of peratroilca madeit possible for non-Russianelites to publicly articulate their complaints and suggestionsas well as mobilise largemassesin their support.In responseto theseincreasinglycriticd and demandingvoices,the regimeagreedto take measuresagainstthe marginalisation of titular languagesin the respectiverepublics,which were believedto forestall the radicalisation of nationalist demands,but insteadturned out to be facilitating them. Although thesemeasuresincluded passingnew legislationand evenamendingthe repub[can constitution, the Communist party leadership'sfull control over the Ukrainian parliamentprior to the ffrst relativelyfree electionof 1990effectivelypreventedserious controversybetweenrepresentativesof different regionsand languagegroups (fUyt 1998,1999;Nahaylo 1999).While rymbolicallyelevatingUkrainianto the statusof the only state languageof the Ukrainian SS& the languagelaw of 1989 was ambiguous about its practicalinteractionwith Russiandefinedasthe "languageof interethniccommunication of the peoplesof the Union of SovietSocialistRepublics' (Law 1989,[preamble]; seealsoArel 1995a;Scheu 1997).Similarly,administrativemeasuresof the regime prior to the disintegration of the USSR aimed at creatingconditions for better knowledge and wider use of Ukrainian but did not actually infringe upon the dominanceof Russianin most public domains.Not onlywould attemptsat radicaltftrainianisation of public spherehave been titky i" terms of antagonisingMoscow and Russophonepopulation in Ukraine, but also the Ukrainian nomenklaturaitself preferred bilingualismwith prevdenceof eachlanguagein regionsof its preferreduseby the population to unequivocaldomination of lJlaainian in all social practices (arel 1995a; Kulyk L999,2006a). The proclamationof independencein August 1991both signiffcantlymorliffedthe state'spriorities and rnadeit possiblefor regionalelitesto opposethe implementation thereof. True, the former nomenklaturawtich under President Leonid Kravchuk Qeet-l99a) had becomethe ruling elite of the newly formed state,refrainedfrom resolutely introducing Ukrainian as the dominant languagein all public domains for fear of provoking protestsby speakersof other languages,ftrst andforemostRussian.In p*ticular, Kravchuk did not initiate the revisionof the languagelawwhich could haveremoved ambiguities,shortenedthe term of its implementationand envisagedpenalties forviolations (Arel l995ai Kolyk 2002).At the s:rmetime, in searchof legitimisationof L9 the new stateand political supportfor his institution-building effort,he took overmuch of the national-democraticopposition'sprogrammeon the mattersof ethnicity and languageand offeredexecutivepoststo someprominent opposition figuresto overseeits implementation.It is true that the implementationremainedlimited and discourseon ethnolinguistic matters blamed Russianimperialism but stressedequal .ightt of all people in Ulaaine. Despite this, some aspectsof discourseand policy did in fact hurt and antagonisemanypeopleidentifring with Russianastheir nativelanguageor preferring it in everydaylife (Motyt f995; Arel 1995b;Kulyk 1999,2005a).While tbe state's attitude toward languagesand cultures other than Ukrainian was quite favourable,it failedto recognisethe specialposition of the Russianswho were treated at leastat the legislative level, as a minority like any other. Moreover, by failing to envisagecultural legislation,in rights basedon an identity other than ethnic one,the post-independence effect, denied social legitimacy to millions of RussophoneUkrainians (Kulyk L999, 2006a).In practice,theywere still ableto usetheir prefenedlanguagein most domains. However,the policiesin educationwhere sharesof schoolswith instruction in different languageswere beingbrought into concordancewith ethnic,ratherthan linguisticcomposition of the respectiveregion'spopulation seemedto betoken that this exceptional curency of Russianwould be short-lived (Arel 1995a, 1995b;Janmaat2000; Kulyk 2oo2). and their lanThis rather radicaldemotion of the statusof Russians/Russophones guagecausedmassdiscontentin the Easternand Southernregions,which was elracerbatedby a drasticdeclineof living standardsdue to the government'sincoherentmanagementof the transitionto market economy.The discontentwas eagerlyexploitedby re-emergingleftpartiesand, more importantln regionalelitesseekingto gain influence in national politics. By combining criticism of Kyiv's economicpolicy with attackson theseforcesmobilisedthe populathe allegeddiscriminationagainstRussian-speakers, tions in the predominantlyRussophoneEastand South.Their main sloganswerethose 'restoration of broken ties" with Russiaand other republicsof the former USSR of the and the elevationof the Russianlanguageto an official status,which they perceivedas beingiust below that of Ukrainian.At a regionallevel this statuswasin 1993-1994proclaimedin severalEasternand Southernoblastsbut their elitesdemandedsucha status nationwide,asa sfmbolic marker of equalityof speakersof the two languagesand a legal barrier againstUkrainianisation(erel 1995b; Kulyk 2002). In the parliamentary electionof 1994,the leftistsdominatedin the Eastand Southwhich thus stood in sharp contrastto the West and Centre where the national democrats(moderate Ukrainian nationalists)emergedvictorious (Birch 1998).The regionalpolarisationturned out to be even more pronouncedin the presidentialelection later that year,when Kravchuk wasdefeatedby the seeminglypro-integrationistand pro-RussophoneKuchma.As sociologistshave shown,the choice betweenthe two was largely determinedby voters' LanguagePoliciesand LanguageAttitudesin Post-OrangeUkraine VolodymyrKul',k view of the languageproblem which significandycorrelatedwith their everydaylanguageuse (Arel and Khmelko 1996;I(hmelko andWilson 1998). The election of the new presidentpavedthe way for more active participation of Russophoneelitesin decision-makingat the national leveland their fuller control over their respectiveregions. This did not, however, result in a radical change of language policy (or foreign-poticyorientation), since Kuchma followed Kravchuk in seeking moderatenationalists'support for his reform initiatives andpromoting nation-building as an important componentfor the legitimisationand strengtheningof the new independent state.Not only did he fail to keephis promise to initiate the elevationof the statusof Russianbut alsohe continuedthe policy of gradualtransition to Ukrainian in educationand the (written) work of stateinstitutions, evenin the predominanttyR*sophoneregions.While thesedevelopmentswere deploredby the leftist and pro-Russophoneparties,the Kuchma regime alsotolerated continuedor even increaseddominance of Russianin the media, popular culture and many other domains,which was perceivedby many Ulrainophone politicians and intellectualsas an evidenceof its "anti-[Jkrainian"orientation (Kulyk 1999,2002; Riabchuk 2001). Perhapsmost importantly,the Presidentdownplayedlanguageissuesin both official discourseand practical policy-makingfocusinginsteadon political and economicreformswhich werepartially intended to strengthenhis personalpower. He encouragedthe mutual antagonism of the Ukrainian nationalistsand communistswhich preventedthem from reaching a compromiseon controversialpolitical issuesand led to their gradualmarginalisaUon (Kulyk L999, 20O6a;Wilson 2000). The only exception was the agreement between the left and right factions in the Parliament on severalsymbolically important provisionsof Ukraine'spost-SovietConstitution,including an article regardingthe use of languageswhich was left somewhat ambiguousbut with the designation of Russian as a minority languagerather than an official one (Constitution 1996,art. l0). This compromisewas facilitated by Kuchma'sthreat to hold a referendumwhich would haveseenhis draft adopted,Sving the Presidentmuch more powersat the cost of the Parliament(Wilson 2000;Wolczuk 2001). When this threat was gone, the opposingforces found themselveslocked in confrontation over how to translate constitutional provisions into laws and practical policies.Occasionallnone of the campsgaineda victory. Thus, in December1999the Constitutional Court, on an appealby pro-Ukrainophonedeputies,issuedan inteqpretation of the languagearticlesof the Constitution which excludedthe useof Russianin centralpower bodies.Later the samemonth, however,the proponentsof ofrcial bilingualismgot the EuropeanCharter for Regionalor Minority Languagesratfied in a version that provided for a wide scopeof use of Russianin many lJlrrainian regions,includingthe city of Kyiv (but then the ConstitutionalCourt declaredthe ratfication law unconstitutional)2(furyk 2002). More often,the confrontadonresultedin a stalemate on languageand other ideologicallysensitiveissues,with none of the rivalsbeing strong enoughto win orwilling to compromise.One of tle most vivid illustrationsis the Parliament'sinability to passa new languagelaw for more than ten yearsafter the adoption of the new Constitution which required that all legal acts should be brought in conformancewith its provisions.Although most parties agreedthat the valid law of 1989 was outdated and dysfunctional,they preferredto retain it for the time being rather than allow rivalsto passtheir preferredversion.It was only when one of the campsfelt confident enoughthat it pressuredfor the adoption of its draft but then the other camp did its best to prevent such an outcome. In November 2001, the Parhamentfinally cameto consider,dong with the government'spro-Ukrainianisationdraft, severalothers which were submitted by pro-Russophonedeputies and provided for an official statusof Russian.However,the parliamentaryleadershipdid not hold a vote, allegedly fearingthat one of the bilingudism-oriented bills would be approved,as many nonaligneddeputiesmight seekelectoraldividendsin the predominantlyRussophoneregionson the eveof an election (tr(u$k 2o02,2006b). It is such "centrist" politicians who did not have clear stanceson ethnoculturalissuesand were largelycontrolledby Kuchmathat increasinglydeterminedthe courseon theseissuesboth in the nationallegislativeand in regionaland local councils.More and more parliamentaryseatswere takenby pro-presidentialparties,and many of the deputies nominated by more ideologically determined parties joined the pro-presidential "middle ground" afterthe election under the pressureof the increasinglyauthoritarian executive(Wilson 2000). The centrists' seeminglynon-ideologicalposition stressed the supposedlycorlmon values of stability and wellbeing while integrating some of their opponents'postulatesinto a mixture ambiguousenoughto allow thesepartiesto attract ideologicallyundecidedvoters and make ad hoc allianceswith either leftists or status rightists/nationalists.In particular,the centristsfavouredthe post-independence quo on the languagequestionand downplayedits importancein their public discourse. Although they did not support a changein the statusof Russian,most of them did not seeir expedientto limit its public cuffency(fUyk 2OO6a,2006b).Their influenceon popular attitudes,largely due to their control over mainstreammedia, contributed to disreputeof those politicd forceswhich continuedto stressideologicallydivisiveethnocultural and foreign-policyissues,asfust becameclear in the parliamentaryelection of 1998 (Kubicek I999i Knlyk L999;Wilson and Birch L999).Nor were theseissues decisivein the presidentialelectionof 1999when Kuchma managedto split and weaken moderateopposition and then defeatthe communist leaderPetro Symonenkowho 2 This led to a long controversy over repeated ratification which I will discuss in detail below. and implementation of the charter 22 was portrayed in the pro-regime discotrse as embodying a "red revenge" (Wilson 2000). To preventtheir marginalisatiorycommunistsand moderatenationalistsgradually shifted their emphasisto socialissues.That is, they presentedthemselvesas defenders not of a languagegFoupallegedly discriminated againstbut of the bulk of the population robbed of their wellbeingand human dig.ty by thosein power. On the one hand the opposition's unintended alliance with the regime in prefening issuesof social policy and democraqfto those of languageand culture helpedmarginalisethe latter in public discourseand consciousnessand thus make large-scaleviolation of rights of membersof different ethnoculturalgroupsunnoticed and unopposed(Kulyk 2006a). On the other han4 the increasedpopularity of nationalists-turned-democrats who, under the leadershipof the popular former premier Viktor Yushchenko,won the parliamentaryelectionof 2O02and were likely to win the president'spost inz0}4, prompted the regime to re-emphasiseethnoculturalissuesin order to presentthe non-leftist opposition ashostile to Russophonesand Russiaand thus excludeits support in the East and South. When this did not seemsufficientfor preventingYushchenko'svictory, it was decidedto drop the pretenceof a linguo-culturalbalanceand call for a changeof policy in favour of Russian-speakers who were expectedto help Kuchma's protdg6 PrirneMinister Viktor YanukovychdefeatYushchenkoand thus, in effect,prolong the existenceof the Kuchmaregime (Wilson Z}Oi;Wolczuk 2007). Language and the Orange Revolution In late September2OO4,just a month before the election Yanukovychunexpectedly calledfor grantingRussianan official status3. This call stoodin a sharpcontrastnot only to his exemplary"centrist" statementsduring his two yearsas prime minister (futyt 2006b), but alsoto his election programmepublished only ten weeks earlier.In that programme,he only wanted'free development'for Russianwhile promising to "consistently strengthenthe state status' of lJkrainian (Peredvyborchaprohrama 2004). The electoralpurposeof this move was obvious,if only becauseit repeatedKuchma's promiseof 1994which hadbeen forgottensoon after he hadbecomepresident(Haran' 2004). flowever, assomeexpertsuped, togetherwith a number of pro-Russianinitiativesand, more importantly, initiativeson socialpolicy it contributedto an increasein Yanukovych'sratings,although it was hardly enough to win in an honest contest4.At the sametime, his supportfor the Russianlanguageand Ulaaine'sintegrationwith Russiafurther antagonisedWestern regionsaswell as Ukrainophoneintelligentsiaall over 3 4 LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine VolodlnnyrK"tyk Yanukovychpovtoryvpiar-khid lGchmyi zakr''vsobi dorohu na Zakhid. Ukrains'lcapravda, 27.O9.2004,http :/ / pravda.com.ua/news/2004/ 9/ 27/ LZI83.htrn. Yanukovych vyishov na I mistse, zabrarnhy elektorat Symonenka. Ukrains'kn Pravda, 14.10.2004http:/ /pravda.com.ua/news/2004 / l0/ 14/ 12676.htm. the country who perceivedit as further evidencethat Yanukovych'svictory posed a threat not only to the Ulaainian language,but also the nation, statehoodand democraqf. If anything the use of a "languagecard" increasedalreadypronouncedregional polarisationof the Ukrainian electoratewhich revertedto the 1994pattern,albeit a dividing line shifted considerablyto the East and South and therefore,Yushchenko couldwin whereKravchukhad lost (Khmelko andWilson I998;Wolczuk 2007). The perceivedthreat to their country'sfuture aswell asto their own was perhaps the primary reasonfor the surprisinglygreatsuccessofYushchenko'sapped to his supportersto resolutelyprotest againsta large-scaleelectoralfraud in the secondround of the electionwhich had madeit possiblefor the regimeto declareYanukovych'svictory. In unprecedentedpopular proteststhat cameto be known asthe OrangeRevolution, hundredsof thousandspeoplestood for more than two weela in the streetsin Kyiv and many other cities of the country, making Kuchma and Yanukovychto agreeto a repeatedvote in accordancewith a fraud-protectedprocedurewherebyYushchenkothen clearly won (Wilson 2005). The opposition leaderswere careful to stressthat the protestswere directedagainstthe undemocraticregimeandYanukovychasits embodiment and not againstYanukoyych'spredominantlyEasternand Southernconstituency who was invited to ioin the supposedlyunited people.Accordingly,languagewas not made an issue;it was repeatedlydeclaredthat the Ukraine for which the protesters struggleis onewherepeopleof all nationalities,languages,regions,religiousdenominations and socialgroupsare egual,dignified and prosperous.However,asthe bulk of the Yushchenkoconstituencyand, accordingly,of the Orange Protestorscame from the Ukrainophonesof the West and Centre,the resultinginvalidationof Yanukovych'sdeclaredvictory and the ultimate coming to power of Yushchenkoand his allieswere widely perceivedin the Eastand South as a humiliating defeatwhich "instilled a sense politicalprocesses'(Wolczuk2007:540). of exclusionfrom'Orange-controlled' This senseof exclusionwas activetyfomentedand exploitedby regionaleliteswho usedit as leverageto prevent or minimise their own exclusionfrom national politics as they had done during Kravchuk'spresidency.Soon after the outbreak of the Orange protests,the Blue elites(thosesupportingYanukovych)eventhreatenedto initiate separation of their regionsfrom the rest of Ukraine but after a harshreaction from Kyiv, switchedto propagatingthe country'sfederalisation(Wolczuk 2007).In both proiects, their different language- different from that of the Orangestrongholdin the West and the Orange parties'preferencefor the whole country - becamean important element and even a sfmbol of the regional distinctivenessof the East and South (eret 2005). This sfmbolisation increasedelites'and masses'sensitivityto and prefudiceagainstthe languagepolicies of the Orange regime.Although Yushchenkotried to avoid ra&cal 5 E.g. Ulsaini zahrozhueperetvorenniana odnu z dyktatur'tretioho witu'. Zvemenniainteli/pravda.cornv/netts/2004/L0/25/12980-htrn hentsii.(Jbains'knhavda,2s.t1.2004,hapz/ VolodymyrK"lyk policiesthat might further antagonisethe Blue constituency,particularlydue to the parliamentary election scheduledfor the spring of 2OO6,evenmoderatesupport for the Ukrainian languageand the lack of official recognition of a specialrole of Russianwas bound to meet a hostilereactionamongat leastsomepartsofthat constituency. Language policy under Yushchenko A price Yushchenkohad to pay for Kuchma'sand Yanukovych'sconsentto a repeated second round of the presidentialelectionwas a signiffcantreduction of the scopeof presidentialPowers,someof which were to be transferredto the Parhamentand the coalition-formed cabinet.This reduction wasintroduced by a revisedversionof the Constitution which was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada amidst the Orange protests in December2004,but wasto take full effectafter the parliamentaryelection.Therefore, Yushchenko'spresidencyhas until the time of this writing consistedof n/yo clearly definedperiodsduring which he had very different competenciesin most domains,including the languageone. From his assumptionof power inJanuary2005 and until the formation of a post-electiongovemmentin August 2006,he almostfully controlledthe cabinetand was ableto exert a strong influenceon the Parliament.This influencewas particularlyprofound in the first months of his tenure,until the new electioncampaign beganto urge deputiesto seekto pleasetheir perceivedconstituenciesand pay lessattention to wishesof officials.After the election,however,a parliamentarycoalitionwas basedon anti-Orangeforces,the most powerful of which being Yanukovych'sParty of Regionswhoseleaderthus becamePrime Minister. Therefore,not only were the coalition and the cabinetmuch more independentfrom the presidentas a result of the constitutional reform but alsotheir anti-Orangeproftle contributedto their assertion,both during and after the 2006 election, of political priorities running counter to those of Yushchenkoand the Orangeparties.Languagepolicy, one of the sfmbolic markersof the confrontation betweenthe two slmps, was at the heart of that assertion.This conflictual dispositionchangedagainwith the formation of a new Orangegovernmentasa result of an early parliamentaryelection in September 2007,which seemsto be both closerto Yushchenkoin its viewsand due to being basedon a very thin majority in the Rada,more constrainedin the implementationof those policiesthe presidentdoesnot fully support.However,this governmentonly startedworking in December 2007when this chapterwasnearlyfinished henceits activity is beyondthe scopeof my analysis. The main characteristics of languagepolicy during the periodwhen it wasprimarily determined by Yushchenkoare, in my view, its surprisingly tow priority on the regime's agendaand the continued relianceon administrativerather than legd methodsin accordancewith the above-mentionedstrategyof pursuing one's goals as much as currently possiblerather than seekingfor a durablecompromisebetweenopposingpolitical camps. Despite widespreadhopes of his supportersand fears of his opponents, LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine 25 Yushchenkodid not take resolutestepsto promote the use of Ukrainian in varioussocial domainswhich would put an end to the ambivalentpolicy of the Kuchma regime. Although he did pay more attention to languageissuesand took a more clearlyproUkrainophonestancethan his predecessor, it was more evidentin rhetoric than actual policy. His rhetoric stressedthe needfor more activeuse of Ukrainian by citizensand its support by the state,while arguingthat therewere no problemswith the useof Russianand accordinglnno needto worry about it5.Someother prominent Orangepoliticiansand officialswere more mindful of the potential of suchrhetoricto antagonisethe Russian-speaking population and occasionallyassuredthat cultural facilities for this populationwould be preservedor evenexpandedT. The generaltone of the Orangediscourseon languageissues,however,was clearlysupportiveof the promotion of Ulnainian in various domainsand rather neglectfulof the wishesof Russian-speakers u*rose discontentwas,moreover,instigatedby discourseof the anti-Orangeoppositionclaiming to representtheir rights. This neglectleadsme to assumethat the new regime'srefrainfrom resoluteUkrainianisationpolicieshad lessto do with the realisationof their antagonisingeffecton the Russophonesand more with a low priority of languagematterson its poliUcalagenda. ln other words, the Orangeleaders,not unlike Kuchma and his "centrists",did not see any languageproblem in Ukraine or at leastdid not considerit important in comparisonto many othersthey had to copewith. To the extent they did seea problem in the languagedomain (and, unlike Kuchmists,for them it was first and foremosta problem of insufficient use of Ukrainian in many public practices),they preferredto solveit by administrative rather than legislativemeans.Yushchenko did virtually nothing to make the legislationmore suitableto protect languagerights of membersof different groups, which would primarily mean more speciftcand lessambiguous.On the one hand he failedto sign a decreeon citizens'right to useRussianand other minority languagesin communicationwith the authoritiesin areasof the country where theselanguagesare spoken,as he had promisedon the eveof the election (Kulyk 2004). On the other,he did not initiate a new languagelaw which would get rid of the ambiguousprovisions statedin that of 1989and stipulatemechanismsfor ensuringmore comprehensiveuse of Ukrainian, in particularpenaltiesfor violators,the lack of which had long been bemoanedby Ukrainophoneelites as one of the main reasonsfor the ineffectivenessof the law. Actually, severalbills providing for fuller dominanceof the titular languagein public life were submitted to the Parliamentby pro-Ulrainophone deputiesboth before 6 7 E.g. U Iushchenkanemaieproblem, iaki ie u Ianukovycha.Ukrains'koPravda,U.02.2006, http z/ / www.pravda.com.ua/ news/ 2006/ 2I U / 39 I 28.htm. E.g.Poroshenkoobeshchaetostanovit'protsesszakrytiiarusskiltr shkoli vosstanovit'v vrrzat tr g.ppy t rossiiskimiarykom obucheniia.Podrobnosti,25.02.2005, hwpz/ / www.podrobnost.ua / soaety/ 2005I 02/ 2S/ I 835I 8.html. VolodyrnyrKub* and after the regime change,while their opponents prepareda number of drafts intended to legalisea more-than-minorityscopeof Russian.InJune }O}l,as many as 13 languagedraftspresentingmany varietiesof thesetwo approachesappearedon the Parliament's agenda(Chemenko 2005), but their considerationwasput offfor no declared reasonand no such draftshave been debatedin sessioneversince.While the primary reasonfor the withdrawal might once againhave been the parliamentaryleadership's fear of the adoption of abill providingfor an official role of Russian,neitherYushchenko himself nor Orangefactionsin the Parliamentinitiated a didogue with their opponentsin order to find a compromiseon the languagelaw.Likewisethe Party of Regions and other bilingualism-orientedpartiesmadeno movesto do so either. The few lawsthat did provide for more comprehensiveuseof Ulaainian were adopted rather as a result of legislativeinertia of independenceyearsthan a post-Orange tum to unambiguousUkrainianisation.Thus, the Code ofAdministrativeJudicialProcedure was passedi" J"ly 2005 which prescribedthe use of Ukrainian but allowed thoseinstrfficientlycompetentin it to useother languages,provided they pay for translation (Kodela 2005, art. 15, 92). This formula was virtually identical to the one included in the Code of Civil Procedurewhich was adoptedin March 2004 (tqnril'nyi protsezual'nyikodeks 2004, aft. 7,86)8. In both cases,the provisionsseemedto be intended to combinethe ensuringof participants'rightswith the uniformity of legalproceedingsand the minimisation ofbudgetaryexpenses.Both codeswere supportedby a qualiftedmajority including among others,factions of Yushchenko'sOur Ulaaine and Yanukovych'sParty of Regions.It was only after the two legislativereformstook effect in September2005that the administrativecodewasroundly denouncedasdiscriminating on the basisof languageand depriving "most of the country's population of fullfledgedlegal defence'e.Ironically, the denunciationcamefrom a party whose representativesin the Radahad voted for the code two months earlier,the United Social DemocraticParty of Ukraine which now wanted to gain electoralcapitalby defending the languagerights of Russian-speakers, as did the Party of Regionsand some other political forces.In addition to electoralcalculations,this apparentchangeof mind may haveresultedfrom the belatedrealisationof large-scalediscriminationof non-tJkrainophone citizensthat the implementation of the above-mentionedcodeswould entail. While the original supportby "centrist" partiesof theseand other bills might be based on the assumptionthat their languageprovisionswould be implemented'reasonably' 8 9 {gtudln the 2005 code was somewhat more benevolent to the use of other languages.Unlike the 2004 acr,it prescribed providing a participant in the legd process withtranslation free of chargeif the court concludes that'as a result of one's inability to pay for translator's serviceone would be deprivedof legaldefence"(Kodeks 2009 art. 68). SDPU(o) zaiavliae pro dyskryminatsiiu ?a movnoiu oznakoiu. (Jkralns'kn Prauda L2.09.2005,http://www.pravda.com:ua/ news/ 2005/ 9/ lZ / 33292.htm. LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUlraine ratherthan literally, in the post-Orangecontext the authorities could use theseprovisionsto pressurefor more comprehensiveuseof the statelanguage. Another post-Orangelaw having to do with languageuseseryesas a vivid illustration of the thorough implementation of Ukrainianisingprovisionswhich many deputiesvoting for them might preferto remaininactive.A newversion of the law on television and radio which was adoptedinJanuary2006 virtually restatedan ambiguouslanguagearticle of a previouslaw of 1993t0.On the one hand the articledeclaredthat television and radio stations"shall broadcastin the state language"and on the other, allowed,in "certain regions",broadcastingin a "languageof nationalminorities residing compactlyon that territory" (Zakon L993,art.9).While a literal readingof this formula excludedany use of languagesother than Ukrainian on those stationsbroadcastingnation-wide, it was consideredclearlyunrealisticby broadcastersand politiciansalike.Instead stationswere expectedto adhereto the provision of their broadcastinglicences stipulatinga minimd shareof airtime in LJkrainian.Moreover, eventhis provisionwas routinely violated,but the National Televisionand Radio Council, a body in chargeof issuinglicencesand monitoring their observance,did not for yearstake resolutemeasuresto prompt broadcastersto meet the licenserequirements(Riabchuk2001). In the 2006 law, the above-quotedformulaewere supplementedwith provisionsstipulating the 75-per cent minimum of Ukrainian-language airtime for nation-widebroadcasters and the mandatory audio-dubbing of programmesin other languages,that is, inadequacyof subtitling only (Zakon 2006, art. 10). The fact that the law was supported not only by the Orange factions but dso by the bilingualism-orientedcommunists meansthat no seriousproblemswere eryectedafter it had taken effect.Soon,however, they proved wrong.A new post-Orangemembershipof the National Council took advantageof a clearerlegalprovision and its own expandedpowers(under a new law on the body adoptedin March 2005) and startedpressuringbroadcastersto comply with the languagerequirements.Its remarkablesuccessin making televisionand ra&o stationsincreasethe shareof airtime in Ukrainianis perceivedby defendersof Russianasa threatto the language'scurency in this domainwhich they tend to interpret asa violation of its speakers'rights(e.g.Kolesnichenkointerview 2007). It should be stressedthat this successresultednot so much from a revisedlegalprovision as from administrativeeffort to ensureits implementation.The increasedeffort to promote the use of Ulaainian primarily distinguisheslanguage poliry under Yushchenkofrom that of the Kuchma period even though its strength and results differedconsiderablyfromone domainto another.The mostvisiblechangestookplace in the medi4 partly becauseOrangepoliticiansand officialsconsideredthe situation of the Ulaainian languagein that domain flagrantlyinadequate.In the first months of the l0 For a detailed discussion of the situation in the media, see the chapterbyJuliane BestersDilger in this volume. I only treat media-related decisions as part of national politics. VolodymyrK"tyk LanguagePoliciesand LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeLlkraine Orange rule Mykola Tomenko, Deputy Prime Minister in chargeof humanitarianissuestried to encourageradio and televisionstationsto broadcastmore Ul<rainianJanguagemusic and other productsby'educational and administrative'means(meetings media managers,initiating promotion campaigns,etc.) ratherthan insistingon the full observanceof legalprovisionstt.Although later efforts by the National Televisionand Radio Council were backedby its punitive power, the councilsoughtto engagebroadcastersin a deal on the gradual increaseof the share of IJlrrainianup to the level as statedin their licence,being readyto toleratetheir violationsfor sometirne on the condition that they would progressivelyreducetheir scope.This deal was formalisedin memorandathat the council repeatedtysignedwith televisionand radio stationsin 2005 to 2007 until broadcasterswere fir"lly required to comply fully with the law (Kulyk forthcoming). tn contrast,the government'sattempt to unilaterally prescribe, by a resolution of January 2;006,the gradual transition to the use of Ukrainian in cinemaswasresolutelyopposedby most distributorsand soonreversedby the court in responseto their apped.After this failure,inJanuary 2007the Ministry of Culture and Tourism initiated its own memorandum with distributors stipulating a more limited and gradual increaseof the use of Ukrainian.This memorandum,however,was only partially implementedwhich might havebeen causedby a lack of effort on the part of Yanukovych'sgovernmentwhosekey officialswere not nearlyasinterestedin promoting Ukrainian asthoseofthe Orangecabinets. al parliament or nation-wide referenda. The central government and the Orange parties denounced the idea as an election strategy having nothing to do with the protection of language rights of Russian-speakers. The Central Election Committee of Ukraine banned the Crimean authorities from holding a referendum on the day of the election (Tyshchenko 2006). Despite its predictable vainness for legislative pu{poses, the initi- Language issue in and after the 2005 election tions (Kulyk 2002). In May 2003, the Rada ratified the charter once again, in a more limited version which nevertheless provided for the use of Russian and 12 other minority languages in many public domains in the entire territory of Ukraine (Zakon 2003). The vagueness of the charter's provisions compounded with a lack of specific conditions of their applicabitity in the ratification law (e.g. a minimal share of a certain language's speakers in the population of a locality) rendered this instrument rather ineffective as a means of protecting the language rights of Ukraine's minority members. However, the very no'regional or minority language" as usable, in principle, throughout the whole tion of a territory of the country offered the pro-Russophone parties an opportunity to legalise The parliamentaryelection of March 2006 brought about a new tide of confrontation betweenthe Orangeforcesand their opponentsled by the Party of Regions,with languagepolicy being a cnrcialissuethereof.In an attempt to mobilise its constituencyin the East and South,Yanukovych'sparty basedits campaignon highlighting the differences between broadly defined Eastern and Westem Ukraine an4 accordingln presentingitself as a defenderof the Easternpart's particularinterestsand values,including (the useof) the Russianlanguage.The parry put a particularstresson the issue of that language'sstatuswhich now gainedmore prominencethan in the 2004 campaip. In Crimea,the regional branch of the parfy initiated a regionalreferendumon the statusof Russianasa secondstatelanguage. After Blueactivistscollectedmore than 300,000signaturesin support of the initiative,the representativebody of the Crimean autonomyadopteda resolution on holding a referendumsimultaneouslywith the election in order to reduce expensesand ensure a high voter turnout. However, the autonomy'sprosecutorappealedthe resolutionas running counterto the constitutional provision stipulatingthat the useof languagesmay only be decidedon by the nation11 Chat-konferentsiia z vitse-prem'erom z humanitarnykh pytan' Mykoloiu Tomenkom, Ilkrains'lcnprauila,17.05.2005,hftp2/ /wv,rw2.pravda.com.ua/arctive/2005/may/ l7/chat.htrnl. ative might have been rather successful as a means of mobilisation. At the same time, the Party of Regions used an international instrument ratified by Ukraine, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, in order to make Russian a de facto official language. Actualln the proponents of an official status for Russian had been trlnng to use the charter for this purpose for nearly a decade. Although this instrument is primarily intended for the protection of lesser used languages, in Ukraine it became a means of ensuring continued currency of a language which is spoken by more than half of the population but demoted to the stahrs of a minority language. As one of Ukraine's obligations assumed at the time of joining the Council of Europe in 1995, the charter was signed in May 1996 but only put into effect ten years later because of attempts by pro-Russophone politicians to use it as a substitute for the unachievable official status of Russian and their opponent's resolution to Prevent this. When it was ratified in Decemb er 1999 in a version that granted Russian a de facto official status (in terms of a scope of use it provided for) on nearly half of Ukraine's territory pro-Uluainophone deputies appealed to the Constitutional Court which in mid-2000 declared the ratification law unconstitutional due to alleged procedural viola- the use of Russian far beyond those minority-dominated regions or localities where the Ulrainian legislation allowed official use of languages other than LJkrainian. It is in view of this opportunity that the Kuchma regime delayed depositing the instrument of ratification in Strasbourg for nearly two years after the adoption of the ratification law. And it is this opportunity that the Orange government made real when it finally took this step in September 2005 and thus enabled the charter's coming into force for Ukraine at the beginning of 2006 (K"lyk 2006c; Antonovych and Bowring forthcoming). That they preferred this risky step to both further delays and a revision of the ratification law shows the Orange elite's effort towards close cooperation with Western institutions, VolodymyrKulyk LanguagePoliciesand LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine but it may alsobe seenasanotherillustrationof their underestimationof the legislative dimension of languagepolicy. Given the long-time inaction of the languagelaw and some other legislativeacts, the Ukrainian leaders did not seem to believe that the charter'srathergeneralprovisionswould rnakea significantdifferencein terms of actualpolicy. It turned out, however,that the Blue immediatelyseizedthis opportunitywhich allowed them to make a plausibleelectoralpromiseand then demonstrateits fulfilment. Soon after the chartercameinto effect,a number of regionaland city councilsin Eastern and SouthernUkraine adoptedresolutionsproclaimingthe Russianlanguagea'regional' languagein their territories,allegedlyin accordancewith the chartert2.The first suchresolutionwaspassedin I(harkiv in earlyMarch2006, threeweeksbeforethe election when the deputiessought to pleasethe city s predominandy Russian-speaking constituencyt3. victory in regionaland municipalelecThe Partyof Regions'impressive tions in the Eastand Southmadeit possibleto passsimilarresolutionsin other councils asa demonstrationof the party'sconcernfor (speakersof) the Russianlanguageand its generalpolitical responsibility,activity and strength.Yushchenko'sexecutiveand proUkrainophonepartiesvehementlyopposedthesemovesarguingthat the protection of Russianin placesof its dominancenot only contradictedto the charter'spurposebut that self-governmentbodieswere alsonot authorisedto decideon mattersof language use,a competencybelongingto the nationalparliamentra.The initiators of the resolutions respondedthat the councils in questionwere not grantingRussiana new status but rather recognising in their respectiveterritories, the status which had been providedby the law on the charter'sratification (Wolczuk 2007). Moreover,a prominent Blue politician YevhenKushnariovarguedthat sincethe centralbodieskept refusing to solvethe languageproblem "in a civilisedwan in accordancewith the European charter of regionallanguages",then "this function will be assumedby the local power bodieswithout preliminaryp ermission[yavochnymporiadkom]" rs. Whether the councils' "recognition' amounted to interference with the Parliarnent's affairs and accordirgly, whether their resolutions violated the Constitution should have been clarified bythe Constitutional Court. However, the courtwas inoper.rtive for more than a yeiu, as the Parliament had refused to appoint its part of judges rnd swear in those appointed by the President, which was meant to prevent the court's expected abrogation of the constitutional reform. In the absence of a generally recognised authority, the parties' attempts to ovemrle each other's decisions contributed to While not identicd to the status of a'regional or minority language"dealt with in the charter 'regional" itself, the status was not the Blue's self-made abbreviation either. Paradoxicdly, the Orange government itself presentedthe pro-Berssophoneparties with a suitable way to bypassthe fact of non-minority currency of Russianwhen it designated in the Instnrment of Ratification, those languagesto be protectedby the charter as "regionaf rather than'languagesof national minorities" as they had been called in the ratification law (Antonovych and Bowring forthcoming). l 3 U Kharkovi daly'zelenewitlo' rosiiskii moi. Ukrains'knPratda,06.03.2006, http z/ / pr avda.com.ual new s/ 2006/ 3/ 6ft9 a3&.htn. L+ Vitse-prernier pohrozhuedeputatamsudorn Wrains'ka Pravda,n.0+,2006, http;//pravda. com.ua/news/2006/4/2U4l334.htm; Yushchenkopoprosit KostitutsionnyiSud porabotat' s iazykom.I(onapondent.net,l9.05.2006,http:/ /www.korespondent.net/main/L542I0 /. 1 5 Yanukovychtsi poshyriuiut' rosiis'ku movu v oblastiakh. Ukrains'lca Pravda, 26.04,2006, http z/ / pr avda.com.ualn ews/ 2006/ 4/ 26/ 4 1298.htrn.. 3l political confrontation rather than legal solution. In May, the Ministry ofJustice issued .r "legal inteqpretation' of resolutions which declared them illegal, in particular, because of the alleged transgression of constitutional competencies by the councils in question (Legal Intelpretadon 2006). On their part, the Party of Regions argued that the Ministry itself exceeded its authority by assuming the right to interpret the Constitution - a nght belonging exclusively to the Constitutional Court (Declaration 2006). Similarly, when the prosecutors of the respective regions and cities appealedthe councils'resolutions at Yushchenko's request, the Blue maiorities of those councils refused to revoke them, although this had been common practice with such appeals, at least under Kuchma. So it was left to the courts to annul the resolutions, but the councils appealed to higher courts, hence it took more than a year until their acts were ultimately invalidated. Moreover, even as some courts were pronouncing iudgements, councils in other regions passed similar resolutions to those just declared illegalt5. Although quite impressive as a demonstration of effort to keep an electoral Promise, these resolutions were not exclusively (or maybe not even primarily) about language.By showing its control over (self-government bodies of) the East and South and its determination in pursuing policies considered dangerous by the Orange, the Blue continued to exert pressure on the latter (or, as interpreted by one Orange politician, "blackmail") in order to prevent their own exclusion from the post-election Power constellationrT (Wotczuk 2007). Although Yanukovych's party won a plurality of seats in the new parliament ( tS0), it was much less than the combined result of the three postOrange parties which commanded a majority (Z+3 out of a50). As clashes of ambitions within the Orange camp complicated the formation of its own coalition, the Party of Regions sought to form a so-called broad-based coalition with one of the Orange forces, Yushchenko's Our Ukraine. When the two parties were negotiating this matter t 6 U Yushchenka ne budut' zastosovuvag sylu do movnykh separatystiv. [Jkrains'lcnPravda, 3l .05.2006, httpt/ / pravda.com.ua/news/2006/ 5/3L / 42330.hUn;Donets'kyi sud skasuvav nadannia rosiis'kii movi statusu rehional'ncii. Telekrytyl<n,01.06.2006,http://www.tele 'zAaly' rosiis'kii kritika.kiev.ua/news/146/O/t9317/; Zaponzhzhia ta Khersons'ku oblast' (Jkrohts'lr http://pravda.com.ua/news/ Pravda,0s.07.2006, movi, a v Odesi vy*nrtylysia. 2006/7/5/43954.htrn; Sud vidmovyv Donets'ku v rosiislcii movi. Ukrcins'kn Pravda, 28.L| .2007,http :/ /www.pravda.com.ua/ news/ 2007/ LL/ 28/67 5I 8.htn. 'Nashoukrarntsi'viddadut'Yanukovychuvitse-spikera,shchobtoi nikoho ne shantazhuvav?. t7 IJkr ains'kn Prauda, 08.06.2006, http :/ / pr avda.com.ualn ews/ 2006/ 6/ 8/ 42664.htn. 32 VolodymyrK"lyk inJune, the Blue leaderstried to conveytheir readinessto makepragmaticconcessions to their partnerswhile not overtly guing up their programmaticstanceson language and other sensitiveissues.After they madea dealwith anotherOrangeforce,theSocialist partyr thus forming a coalition of their own in earlyJuty, the leadershipof the Parry of Regionsincreasedtheir bargainingpower.However,they still attemptedto persuade Our Ulaaine to join the coalition, which was seenas a precondition for Yushchenko's consentto Yanukovych'sbecomingPrimeMinister. In order to bind the future govenrmentby clear commitmentson crucial political issues,Yushchenkoinitiated the so-calledDeclaration(Universal)of National Unity to be signedby.ll parliamentaryparties.After a heateddebate,the documentwassigned in a compromiseversion.As far aslanguageuseis concernedthe signeddocumentreplicated the constitutionalformula but supplementedit, on the one hand, by the designation of lJkrainian ,rsa'foundation for the identification of the people and the state" and, on the other, by a referenceto the EuropeanCharter as a yardstick for citizens' "free use of Russianor other native languagefor all vital needs' (Universal 2006)rE. One Western commentatorqualifiedthis formulation as"the armisticeanong political forces"which, togetherwith compromiseson other controversialissues,markedthe reversionto'the political statusquo that had prevailedbeforethe Orangeupheavaland the Blue reaction'(Socor2006). However, assoon asYanukovychwasappointedPrimeMinister on 4 August 2006 (*d, under the revisedConstitution, becameimmune to Yushchenko'sattempts to dismisshim), the Party of Regionsproved reluctant to adhereto the provisionsof the forced armistice.If sometimesYanukovychsoundedratherlike Yushchenko,it wasbecauseof his willingnessto presenthimsef both domesticallyand internationally,as a mature and responsibleleaderof the entire country, equalto the Presidentin statusor at leastin influence.Thus, a week after assumingoffice,he saidat a pressconferencein Kyiv that although"the Russianlanguagemust not be discriminatedagainst"and "forcible Ulaainianisationleadsto the opposite [results]', "th. Ukrainian languageneeds to be developed.The Russian-speaking regions need a consistent program for the Ukrainian language'Ie.In an interviewwith the BBC two weekslater, he went evenfirrther by admitting that "in the Southernand Easternregions,there is no problem of the Russianlanguage.There is a problem of the Ukrainian language"which, tLerefore, should be supportedby the statevia a specialprogramme.At the sametime, he called for the adoption of a new languagelaw stipulatingthe useof both/all languagesand de- l 8 The referenceto'native'languages madeit possibleto avoiddesignatingRussianaseither a 'minority" or a'regional" languagewhich would havebeen unacceptablefor one party or the other. l 9 Yanukorych zahovorlruslovamyYushchenka.Ukrains'ka Pravde,I 0.08.2006, httpz/ / pravda.com.ualnews / 2006/ I / l0l459 I 3.htrn. LanguagePoliciesand LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine 33 clared his intention to zubmit a draft to the Parliament in the near future20.But on visits to Russian-speaking regions or Moscow where he sought, respectively, to demonstrate his adherence to the electoral promises and present himself as a friendly leader of a partner state completely unlike his Orange opponents, Yanukovych emphasised a different aspect. He argued that although at the moment the parliamentary coalition had no constitutional majority and thus could not "fulfiIthat fundamental decision fpromise] on the Russian language", "as soon as a constitutional majority appears we will raise this issue'2r. After a period of vacillation, he finally took the pro-Russophone stance, all the more so because Our Ukraine had decided not to join the coalition and the Party of Regions had become more interested in finding ways to blpass Yushchenko rather than courting him. The main means by which the coalition and the cabinet were able to accumulate powers at the cost of the president were: the use of ambiguities in the revised Constitution and other legislation; ltowing control over the judicial branch which thus came to support the government in its disputes with Yushchenko, and gaining over hesitant deputies from the opposition factions for the coalition with the aim of gradually increasing its number up to a constitutional majority afterwhich it would be able to ignore the President altogether. The obvious shift of power from Yushchenko to Yanukovych caused a tipping effect and urged more politicians and officials to change sides. However, the Party of Regions did not seem to be willing to use its gowing power for solving the language problem in accordance with its declared preferences. While Blue leaders, in particular Kushnariov, regularly announced plans to adopt a new language law, securing a majority of votes in the Rada would require either engaging the Orange parties in a conceptual compromise on language policy or making an opportunistic deal with some of them (gaining their support for the coalition's draft in exchangefor some concessionson its part)".As it tumed out, the Party of Regions and its coalition partners were ready for neither. A draft submitted to the Rada by Kushnariov and two deputies from other coalition parties in late November provided for the use of the languages listed in the law on the charter ratification alongside Ukrainian in a number of practices far exceeding those stipulated in the charter itself. Unlike the ratification law, these languages designated as "regional" were to be used in specific territories where the share of their speakers exYanukovych zaspokoiv Iewopu i skazav,shcho osnannie slovo za nynm.Ukratns'knPrauda, 23.08.2006,httpt / / pravda.com.ualnews / 2006/ I / 22146393.htm. z l Yanukovych zibransia porushuvaty Universal?. Ukrains'ka Pravda, 16.08.2006, http :/ / pr avda.com.ualnews/ 2006/ 8/ | 6/ 46| 1g.htm. /2 The best-knowt exampleof such a deal is the adoption of a law on the Cabinet of Ministers which gaveYanukovych additional powers and therefore,w,rsunacceptableforYushchenko. The President'sveto was overtrunedin January2007 with votes of one oppositionalfaction, Yuliia Tymoshenko'sBlock which won in exchangethe coalition'ssupport for two drafu beneficial to the opposition. VolodyrynKulyk LanguagePoliciesand LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine ceeded l0 per cent of the population following a decisionby a respectivecouncil (Proekt 20O6;seealso Kulyk 2OO7).Both the choice of term for theselanguagesand tJreway in which their usein a certainterritory was to be introduced revealedthe authors'attempt to continue an approachtakenin the earlierresolutionsof the Southern and Easterncouncils.It is not surprisingthat this draft wasopposedby the Orangefactions and therefore,rejected by the Committee for Cultural and Spiritual Matters, which was designatedas the primary parliamentarycommitteeto deal with this and other language-related drafts.Taking advantageof an alternativeprocedurestipulated by the parliamentaryregulations,in late February 2O07the coalition voted for the inclusionof this and a number of otherbilingualism-orienteddraftsin the springsession's agendain spite of the fact that the committeehad rejectedthem (Kolesnichenkointerview 2007; Yavorivs'kyi interview 2008). However, these drafts were considered neither during five weeksbeforeYushchenkoissueda decreeon the dissolutionof the Parliamenton 2 April 2007 nor at those sittings of dubiouslegality that the BlueJed majority held for severalmonths after that, until it ffndly agreedto an earlyelectionon 30 September.But evenif any of thesedrafu had been adopted the Presidentwould havecertainlyvetoedthem, and the coalitionwould havelackedseveraldozenvotesin order to be ableto ovemrlehis vetoes23. Ircnicalln it is the coalition leaders'ardentzeal to obtain a constitutionalmajority as soon as possiblethat prompted Yushchenkoto dissolvethe Parliamentin order to preventthe monopolisationof power by the Partyof Regionsand its allies. While political rhetoric of the period of "dual power" differed from that under the Orange domination by an assertiveand confrontationaltone, practicalpolicy on langpagemattersshoweda high degreeof continuity with the times of Yushchenko'sand evenKuchma'srule. As far as the statefunding is concerned budgetaryfiguresfor language-relatedprogrammesremained unchanged(but then the Orange governments significantly increasedfunding for the "development and use of the Ukrainian language' in both 2005 and 2008). The main problem in this regardwas inability of authorised organisationsto usea largepart of the supposedlyallotted funds (e.g.for producinglJkrainian-language moviesor purchasingboola for libraries) due to prohibitive bureaucraticregulationsto.Although Yushchenkooccasionallycriticised the govern- ment for its lack of support for the Ukrainian language2s,this deficit seems to have been caused more by the general ineffectiveness of bureaucrary than some officials' prejudice against the titular language. Prejudice against, or at least politically motivated opposition to supporting the Ukrainian language was more noticeable at regional and loc- The communist deputy Oleksan& Holub arguesthat the Parg of Regions'failure to adopt this law had to do with its reluctance to further antagoniseYushchenko,as the Blue leaders supposedly had still hoped to make a deal with the President.According to him, the communist deputies repeatedly uqgedtheir partrrersto consider the submitted drafts in the session, but the latter kept sayingthis wasuntirnely (nohb interview 2008). Hanzha, L.2007lurii Bohutslcyi: rishennia,iakoiu buty Ukraini, pryimaiet'siane v Ukarni. T elekrytykn,06.07.2007, http://www.telelaitika.kiev.ua/articlesll23/0/9468/boh_min_iniZOOT/ . allevels where several councils in the East and South backed their language resolutions with special programmes for the promotion of Russian which were better funded than continuing programmes for Ukrainian26. No less important was a change in governmental attitudes toward the language use in non-state practices in which the state could more or less actively interfere to ensure its priorities. Orange officials tried to use the leverage at its disposal to stimulate increased use of Ukrainian by non-state actors such as television and radio stations, book publishers or movie distributors. In contrast, Yanukovych's government prefened to refrain from intervention, which amounted to support for the status quo reproducing the dominance of Russian in these:ueas. In particular, prominent Blue figures in the executive and legislative branches harshly criticised the abovementioned Ukrainianisation measures implemented by the National Television and Radio Council and the resolution on the use of Ukrainian in cinemas2T.While the council was immune to any at, tempts to dismiss its members ahead of time and could thus continue its effort, the resolution on cinemas was invalidated due to a suit by one of the distributors and Yanukovych's government refusal to appeal to a higher court under a ridiculous pretext of the'respect for the court's decision"28.As argued above, the memorandumbetr^/een the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and distributors was only implemented in part because of the government's reluctance to insist on its observance. Therefore, the fullfledged introduction of Ukrainian in this domain was delayed by more than a year, until the Constitutional Court decided in December 2007 that the valid legislation required every film copy produced in a foreign language to be either dubbed or voiced-over in Ukrainian, or accompanied by Ukrainian subtitles (RishenniaZ}OT). E.g Yushchenko chitko vkazav, iak Yanukovych porushuie Universal, Ilkrains'kn Pravda, 05.10.2006,httpt//pravda.com.ualnews/2006/10/5/48579.htn;Yushchenkospytavu Az arova,iaku movu vin finansuie.Ukrains'lcnPravda,04.09.2}07, http z/ / www.pravda.com .aa/ news/ 2007/ 9/ 4/ 63467.htrn. 26 E.g. Na Luhanshchyni maizhe vidsutni ukrainomovni k"frhly. Telekrytyka, 04.09.2006, www.telekritika.hev.ual news/ 146/ 0/ 2034f / . 27 Eg. Proty'Tacholi i 'Pirativ' ulcains'loiu protestuiut''rehionaly'. Wainskn havda,23.l02OM, http://pravda.com.ua/news/2006/l0/23/49447.htrn;Olena Bondarenko:'Eto ne menia Natsrada dopekla,a televizionshchikov,kabel'shchikov,radiishchikov'.Tebloytyka, 12.122W7, http :/ /rvrvw.telelaitika.ualmedia-corp /Lyuil / 2007-L2-LZ/ 3 5479. Tabachny{<napotahaiena vidmori vid ulaaiirstoho dubliazhu?Wairc'kn havda,09.112006, http :/ /pravda.com.ualn ews/ 2006/ | L/ 9/ SM7z.hfi . Volod;nnyr Kulyk The 2OO7election and the prospects for lJtrainian languagepolicy The early parliamentaryelection in September2O07brought about a new waveof language-related political rhetoric and then a new configurationof the legislativeand executive which startedto pursueconsiderablydifferent policiesfrom those of the Blue-led coalition and cabinet.The programmaticpositions of main political forceson the languageissueremainedvirtually unchanged although someof them shifted their campaip emphases. In particular,the Party of Regionsinitially put much lessstresson the statusof Russianthan in 2006,arguablyinan attempt to avoiddivisiveissueswhich was seenas a precondition for getting support among formerly Orange constituenciesin Central and Western regions.It is as late as three weeksbefore the election that the parryturned to this issuewhich one of its former deputiespublicly recognisedashaving been causedby the party'sdeclining rating2e. By initiating the collection of citizens'signaturesfor a referendumon the stafusof Russianand severalother issues3o, the Party of Regionsreplicateda similar move of other anti-Orangeforcesin the 2006 campaign. Thus it made clearthe purely electoralpu{poseof this move,which was immediately stressednot only by its Orange opponentsbut also by Russophone-oriented rivals3r. While seekingto discredit the Blue initiative ashaving nothing to do with genuine support for Russian-speakers, the Orangeforces&d not want to emphasiselanguageor other divisiveissuesin their own campaignseither. Even the more nationalist-minded Our Ukraine, in an alliancewith the newly createdPeople'sSelf-Defence,took on the democraticand socialpriorities of the latter,while downplayingethnoculturalmatters. The more eclecticBloc of Yuliia Tymoshenko(BYuT) soughtto attract voters in the predominantly Russophoneregionsby denying its prejudiceagainstthe Russianlangpageand intentionsto limit its use.At the sametime, it stressedthe unacceptabilityof the elevation of that language'slegal status,particularly in its campaigpin the West where it soughtto prevail over Our Ukraine - People'sSelf-Defence(wU-NS, Nasha Ulrrarna- Narodna Samooborona)32( Tyshchenko2OO7) . Although the Party of Regionsretainedits electorateand evenslightly increasedits shareof votes (l+.+ percent),the stunningsuccessof BYuT (lO.Z per cent,an increase 29 Regional Boldyrev obvinil v porazhenii PR na vyborakh amerikanshkh polittechnologov vo glaves Manafortom. T elekrytyka,06.10.2007, http z/ / www.telelaitika.ua/ news/ 2007- | 0-06/ 342SZ. 'Regiony' 30 sklykaiut' referendum shchodo rosiistoi mory i NATO. Ukrains'kn Pravda, 05.09.2007,httpt//***'.pravda.com .ua/nevrs/ 2007/ 9/ 5/ 63525.htrn. 3l E.g.: U Tymoshenko kazhut', shcho Yanukovychi skoro zrobliat' monholis'ku derzhavnoiu movoiu. Ukrains'ka Prauda, 05.09.2007, httpz//www.pravda.com.v/news/2007/9/S/ 63547.htrn; Smaliulhivska, O. 2007 Vitrenko nazyvaierderendum'Rehioniv'reklamoiu. Haztta po-ukrains'ky,L2.O9.ZO07,http://www.gpu-ua.info/inderphp?&id= l8 14{1. 32 Tymoshenko navchylas'ukrai'ns'koi v Yushchenka,a 'feniu' ne rozumie. Ulcrains'lcaPravda, L6.09.2007,http://www.pravda.com .ua/news/ 2007/ 9/ | S/ 63985.htrn. LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-Orangetlkraine 37 of more than one third from 2006) enabled the formation of a coalition of the two Orange forces, albeit by a very thin majority. Having learned a bitter lesson from the previous parliament, both forces acted more quickly and concertedly and kept their promise of an Orange coalition, even though Yushchenko and some members of Our Uluaine once again made an attempt to form an alliance with the Blue. In order to ensure the support of Our Ukraine's nationalists and the President, BYuT agreed to their proUkrainophone priorities in the coalitions'and the cabinet's programmes (as well as to their candidates for ministerial positions in the humanitarian domains). AccordinglR both programmes included provisions on the adoption of a new language law and a revised law on the ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages which would be in "conformity with the purpose and object" of the charter (Uhoda 2;007,sec. 1.4; Prohrama 2008, sec. 1.4). If these laws are adopted Yushchenko is most likely to sign them, but it is far from certain that the coalition and the govemment will quickly put these declarations in practice, either because of the realisation of their destabilising potential or because of their low priority for many influential actors. At the same time, the very composition ofthe parliament in general and those committees dealing with language matters in particular virtually precludes the adoption of any legislation upgrading the status of Russian or e4panding the scope of its public use. Therefore, the choice is between a more resolute Ukrainianisation and some version of status-quo, at least until the 2009 presidential election (or another early election of the parliament). It is clitrcult to predict which of the two altematives will become a realiry given the precarious balance of power in the Parliament and the considerable diversity of views within the coalition itself on how important the language issue is, what it consists in and how it should be dealt with. As my interviews with them reveal, even .unong those Orange politicians who define the language problem first and foremost as that of inadequate use of Ukrainian in most social domains, there is no ageement on whether legislative changes are necessarFto remedy this situation. For example, the BYuT deputy and head of the parliamentary Committee for Cultural and Spiritual Matters, VolodymyrYavorivs'kyi considers such changes the most important task of the Orange forces in the language domain, now that they have, as he believes, enough parliamentary votes to pass them. He hopes that a newlanguage lawwith unambiguous provisions on the use of Ukrainian in all public domains will be adopted by the end of 2008 (together with another deputy from BYuT, he submitted a draft in late January which he would like to become a basis for that law). Yavorivs'lqFi also believes that it is necessary to revise a law on the ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority l,anguages which would be based on a new, supposedly more adequate translation of the charter and exclude Russian from the list of languages covered by the document ( Yavorivs'kyi interview 2008). VolodpnyrKulyk In contrast,two politicians from NU-NS arguethat legislativechangesareinappropriate in the near future, although they give somewhat different reasons.Yurii Kliuchkovs'kyi,a prominent member of Our Ukrainewith a national-democraticbackgound considersa newlanguagelawinexpedientdue to possibleexacerbationof conflict in society and unnecessaryin view of availableopportunidesfor a "realisticbut purposeful policy" in support of the Ukrainian language.He seessuchpolicy asbasedprimarily on the constitutional article regarding the "comprehensiveuse and functioning of the Ukrainian languagein all domainsof sociallife on the entire territory of Ukraine" and its assertiveinteqpretationsby the ConstitutionalCourt, which make it possibleto take necessaryadministrativemeasures(Kliuchkovs'lcyiinterview 2008). Oles' Donii, a member of the People'sSelf-Defencepart of the bloc, believesthat by adoptinga radically pro-Ukrainianisationlanguagelaw,the Orangeforceswould'ra&cally antagonise 50 per cent of the population'and provokea Blue triumph in the nort electionwhich would lead to the adoption of laws precluding any promotion of the ulaainian languageand culture.And unlessit wasa part of a'purposeful but long-term program"intended to createconditions for knowledgeand use of lJkrainian,he is surethat sucha lawwould be doomedto sabotageby the population and officialsalike,all the more so becausethe lJlaainiansarenot accustomedto observingthe law. Moreover, unlike Yavorivs'kyi,Kliuchkovs'kyiand most other Orange politicians, Donii doesnot considerradicalUkrainianisationwith vfutualexclusionof Russianfrom all pubhc domainsa justsolution to the languageproblem in llkrainer gven a considerableportion of the population'spreferencefor Russianand pursuit of its official status. He is the only Orange politician I have heard of openly declaringhis support for a charter-basedstatusof Russianand other languagesusedin someparts of Ukraine asa possiblecompromisebetweenthe two political camps.However,he insistson applying this solution to localitiesrather than regionsin order to avoidthe imposition of the cities' Russianon the largely Ukrainophone countrysideof the East and South and the separationof the country into two parts using different languages(Donii interview 2008). At the sametime, both I(liuchkovsb *d Donii saythat if a languagelaw is proposedby their more radical colleaguesfrom the Orangefactions,they would not oPPosethem (although the latter arguesthat it would dependon what exactlythe law says),so it is still possible- evenif far from certain- that sucha law could receivea majority ofvotes, especiallyif supportedby somedeputiesfrom the middle-groundfaction headedby the former speakerVolodymyr Lytuyn. As for deputiesfrom the clearly anti-Orangeforces,the Party of Regionsand the Communists,they vehementlyobject to the perceivedexacerbationof legal disparity betweenthe two main public languages, but do not seemto be ready to accepta compromise that falls short of their full formal equality. Ivan Popesku(Ion Popescu),a prominent activist of the Romanianminority in Chernilrtsioblast and a long-term defender of its rights,who lately cameto believethat they could be best ensuredin co- LanguagePoliciesand LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine operation with the Party of Regions, argues that a compromise might not pertain to the (ssenceof a legal :urangement on the status of Russian but only to the time-frame of its adoption. That is, his parfy will not officially grve up its insistence on the status of Russian as equal to that of Ukrainian, even if it were to make a coalition with Our Ukraine which, at the time of my interviewwith Popesku, many Blue politicians had still hoped for. His preferable legal solution would include the adoption of a framework document called the Concept of the State's Ethnicity Policy and then a language law elaborating on it, both conforming to the language charter and other minority-related acts of the Council of Europe. As a first step toward that goal, Popesku sees the full implementation of the charter in the scope provided for by the valid ratification law but with clear mechanisms which he believes could be enacted by decisions of relevant executive agencies (Popesku interview 2007). Another Party of Regions' deputy, Vadym Kolesnichenko who has lately become the most active Blue politician in dealing with language matters, does not consider the state status of Russian a realistic prospect in the foreseeable future, glven that it requires not only a qualified majority in the Parliament but also a referendum which he seesas a politically risky and socially divisive endeavour. Thus he argues that his party's initiative 'proposal on a referendum was rather a for the so-called political elites to sit down at the negotiating table and come to an agreement" which has so far been reiected by the Orange. His preferable version of such an agreement would be either a special law on the use of Russian or a revised law on the ratification of the charter which would provide for different scopes of the use of respective languages depending on the proportion of speakers in a certain territory. Both ways would put Russian, practically and symbolically, much higher than minority languages even if not making it quite equal to Ulaainian (Kolesnichenko interview 2007). Kolesnichenko's declared readiness to accept a regional status of Russian as a compromise solution is largely undermined, however, by his legislative practice. Due to his proposed amendments to a number of laws on particular public practices in order to change their language regime from Ukrainian only to both Ukrainian and Russian, he has become notorious among the Orange politicians as a persistent agent of Russification and thus can hardly be a negoti' ating partner for them33. At the same time, his and other Blue politicians'hopes for support for their legislative initiatives on the part of another anti-Orange force, the communists may not be forthcoming. Oleksandr Holub, a deputy of the parliament and editor-in-chief of the party publication Kommunist told me that the communists differed from their former coalition partners in that they considered a regional status of Russian dangerous as a 33 Nor will contribute to his acceptabilityhi" intention to demonstrateto the Europeaninstitutions Ulaaine's supposedviolation of the rights of Russian-speakers in order to "erect a wall before Ulaaine in the Council of Europe if she doesnot want to fulfil her obligationsto the Council of Europe" (Kolesnichenkointerview 2OO7). VolodymyrKulyk factor contributing to a division of LJlaaine.Therefore,they would insist on the application of any solution on the statusof languagesto the entire country. Holub's preferablesolution would be a constitutionally-entrenchedsecondstatestatusof Russianor, more realistically,a somewhatlower official statusas stipulatedby a speciallaw or an amendedlaw on languageswhich would provide for its uninhibited use in education, judiciary,public servicesand other domains,while relyingon the charterto regulatethe useof minority languages. As a first step,however,he would like to seethe charterimplementedby a more specfic ratificationlaw or at leasta specialresolution of the Parliament,a solution not unlike that proposedby Popeskualthoughmuch lessprioritised (Holub interview2008). Whateverchangesopposition deputieschooseto initiate,they aremost likely to be opposedand voted down by the codition. Even if someof the BYuT or NU-NS deputies fail to supporttheir colleagues'radicalUkrainianisationdrafts,theywill hardly dare to break the faction disciplineto the point of supportingthe oppositions'pro-bilingualism moves.Therefore,the anti-Orangeforceswill not giveup their maximalistslogans asthis would questiontheir consistencyand responsibitityto their electoratewithout ensuringthem any legislativeor administrativegains.For the time being they will opby sabotaginglaws and PosePerceivedinfringement on the Russian-speakers'rights governmentprogrammesat the local level,while seekingto demonstratetheir concem for these rights by meansof parliamentaryinitiatives and specialprogrammesfor the support of the Russianlanguageand cultureadoptedby thosecouncilswhich they control. Until a reconfigurationof political forcesin the wake of a new election,a compromise on the languageissuemay only result from an initiative by moderatepoliticianswithin the Orangecamp which can be supportedby (. part o0 the Blue politiciansor, perhapsmore likely, an opportunisticdealbetweenone of the Orangefactions and the Party of Regionsaimed at weakeningthe rival Orangeforce on the eveof the 2009 presidentialrace. Popular attitudes and policy options It is clear,then, that the politicians arereluctantto reacha compromise,if only because they considerit profitable in electoralterms to demonstrateunyietdingdefenceof the perceivedrights and valuesof their core constituencies.But is this stancewarrantedby popular attitudeswhich politiciansusuallyreferto? Are the massesaspolarisedand uncompromisingin their languagebeliefsasthe elitesseekingto representthem?To what extent do political parties'viewsreflectthoseof their constituencies? Due to spacelimitations, I cannot answerthese questionsin a comprehensivemanner, so I will only presentsome key characteristicsof languageattitudes of the Ulcrainianpopulation in generaland its politically significant segmentsin particular.Further, I will only deal with declaredattitudesand preferencesasrevealedby a masssurveywhich wasconduc- LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine 4l ted in late 2006 by the Hromadslca Dumlca Centre within the framework of this project, while leaving aside focus group data which can provide an insight into citizens' underlying beliefs and experiences. Finalln as my focus is on political/electoral stimuli which the mass attitudes provide and constraints they impose, I will limit my analysis to language Policypreferences of main regional and tinguo-demographicd parts of the population which politicians seek to attract, rather than studying interrelations between these preferences and various social, cultural and ideological factors3a.In other words, I will look at what (different parts of) the Ukrainians believe - rather than why they do so - and what that means in terms of available policy options. In general, the survey data confirms the well-known divergence between language attitudes of different parts of the Ukrainian population. While some indicators such as sex, education, social status and income do not have a significant impact on the respondents' opinions and preferences, a cluster of characteristics related to language use and language identity strongly influences their views of actual and desirable policies in the language domain. That is, those people speaking (mostly) Ukrainian generally prefer a policy aimed at making that language the primary or even the only public language of the country, while those speaking (mostly) Russian tend to prefer a policy allowing equal coexistence of Uluainian and Russian3s.However, it is not just a language people speak that influences what they believe the state should do in this regard, but also a language they identirywith, one they consider their native language. The relative importance of the two determinants seems to depend on which of them primarily distinguishes a group in question from the bulk of the population, in other words, makes it what it is. Given that native language is often considered to be the language of one's nationality rather than one's own use (ea 19es; Arel zooz), many people speaking mostly or even exclusively Russian still declare their native language to be Ukrainian. Accordingln this declaration does not determine the respondent's policy preference, as it may result from dlflbrent patterns of everyday use and different cultural orientations (particularly because after the Ukrainian state discontinued the Soviet practice of its institutionalisation as an unchangeable hereditary characteristics, nationality is increasingly perceived in civic rather than ethnic terms). Even more ambiguous is the declaration of one's Ukrainian nationaliry which encompassesnot only different language practices but also different language identifications (in our sample, 30 per 34 For a study of suchinterrelations,seethe chapterby Hanna Zdizniak in this volume. 35 The impact of ageis rather ambiguous.Although younger respondents,somewhat surprisingly, d9 not display significantly geater support for policies favoring the Ukrainian language than older cohorts do, this firdirg seeru to rezult from the mutual darnping of two opposite tendencies. On the one hand, the young generation sped<sRussianmore often in everyday life; on the other, young Russian-speakersare more likety to support Ukrainianisation policies than older ones. The validity of the last statement,however,is somewhatundermined by the fact that three-dimensionalbreakdownsoften produce small sub-groupsof respondentswhoseviewscan onlybe assessedwithrather largeerrors. VolodyrnyrKulyk LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUlraine cent of those defining themselvesas Ukrainiansdeclaredtheir native languageto be therefore,the primary determinantof policy Russianorboth). For Ukrainian-speakers, however,napreferencesis the main languageof everydayuse. For Russian-speakers, tive language- in this case,closelyrelatedto nationality - is of more importancebecausethefact of speakingRussiandoesnot in itself tell much about an individual'spreJin languageuse and languagepolicy. Thus the spectrumof policy preferences erences stretchesfrom clearlypro-Ukrainianisationviews of thosepeople using exclusivelyor mostly Ukrainian in everydaylife to a strong orientation toward bilingualism among those who considertheir nationdity and native languageto be Russian.As thesetwo groups are predominantly concentratedin Western, Southern and Eastem parts of Ukraine respectively,the divergenceof preferencesof linguistic groups results in a strong regional polarisation,which scholarshave been pointing to since mid-1990s (e.g.Arel and Khmelko 1996). Moreover,the differencesbetweenregionscannot be fully accountedfor by their different languageproftles.As three-dimensionalbreakdowns of the sun'ey data show, speakersof the samelanguagehave rather different preferencesin different regions.In particular,the residentsof the West, due to the region's persistent struggle for independenceand ethnic rights in the past, support Ukrainianisationpoliciesmore stronglythan peoplein otherpartsof the country.Some authorsevenarguethat the region is a more important determinantof viewsand preferencesthan language(e.g.BarringtonZO02). As an illustration of suchmulti-dimensionaldifferentiationof languagepolicy preferences,I presentthe respondents'views of the preferableevolution of the language situation in Ukraine in the future (question67 inthe surveyquestionnaire,seeannex), which are broken down by nationality, native l^rgo"g., languageof everydayuse and the regionof residence(seetable 1). Simitarpatternscanbe found in the answersto many other questionsof the survet which have to do with the respondents'views of desirableor actual languagepo[cy. With only minor modifications,in dl thesecasesthe groupswith the most divergent are residentsof the Western region (or people speaking preferencesand assessments Ulrainian in everydaylife) on the one hand and those consideringthemselvesRussian (and the eponymouslanguagenative) on the others. For example,about 40 per cent of Russophonesandresidentsof the Eastbelievethat Russian Russians,nativeJanguage Table l. Answersto the question'In your opiniorl how should the languagesituadonin Ukraine developin the future [v perspektyvi]I For everydaylanguage,answers"on]y Ukrainian/Russian" and "in most situationsUkrainian/Russian' arecombined.Four regionsaremergedinto two, a 36 Whether residentsof the West are more or lessradicd than those people speakingUkrainian depends on how one defines the latter gpoup.If only exclusivespeakersof that languageare include4 their percentageof support for Ulaainianisation policies may in some casesturn 'in most situout higher than that of resideng of the Wesg if people speakingUkrainian ations" are adde4 the aggregatebecomesclearly less radical. However, this agglegateseen$ to be more representativeof all Ukrainophones in society. Hence when presenting the data for everydayspeakersof Ulaainian, I will combine the two subsets.The similar consolidadon will be applied to everyday Russophoneswho, however, are ahrvaysless radically pro-bilingudism than ethnic Russiansbut usuallymoreso than the residentsof the Eastand South. while the West is shown separately. Nationality i ,; D & *( T Native Ianguage ri x Everyday language Region t o .t 'X ut tD /, 3 o z .4 (! rq o Q) 5 o v) Q tllaainian should become the main language in all com- 51.6 4.7 67.r 35.7 84.1 3.3 7.6 77.5 12.7 20.8 8 1 . 3 It.7 4s.2 6,r 7.0 1.5 6.4 88.9 50.7 16.9 munication domains Ukraine should becomea bilingual country 28.3 72.9 Rerssianshould become the main language in all commu- 2.5 6.4 0.3 6.1 4.5 nication domains should be used in Ukraine in a larger scopethan now, while 53 per cent of everyday speakers of Ukrainianand 6l per cent of thoseresidingin the Westwould like to seeit usedin a lesserscope(question6). I" a no lessimpressivecontrast,76 percent of Russiansarguethat the primary task of the statepolicy in the languagedomain (question 33) is to solvethe problem of the statusof Russian , and79 per cent of everydayUkrainophoneswant statepolicy first and foremostto promote the spreadof Ulaainian in all domains (figuresfor the East and the West are 63 and 83 per cent, respectively).e.cordingln5l per centof Russiansand 53 per cent of peopleliving in the EastpreferYarrukovych'slanguagepolicy to Yushchenko's,while 54 per cent of everydayUkrainianspeakersand 68 per cent of Westernresidentsdeclarethe oppositepreference(question46). However,the viewsof the Ukrainianpopulationare not only highly diversebut also ratherambivalent;that is, not only do different people have different preferences,but alsothe samepeopleoften want things which are hardly compatiblewith one another. 'fhus, who preferincreaseduseof Ukrainianin society(questhe shareof respondents +5 VolodymyrK"bk LanguagePoliciesand LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine tion 6) is much higher than thosewho opt for decreaseduse of Russian(question 5), and the other way round. It is likely ttrat many of thosewho want more of one language are ready to put up with the current amount of the other, which is hardly feasibleunless they mean the right to use a languagerather than the actualscopeof its use.Such discrepancyis characteristicnot only of the sampleasa wholebut alsoof all its ethnic,linguistic and regionalparts aswell asall groupsof self-definedadherentsof ideologicalpolitical trends",of which the respondentswere given a list so they could identifi one closestto their own convictions. On the one hand the ambivalence of popular views diminishes the potential for confrontation between the supporters of different options because for many people, the adherence to one option is not as strong as to preclude the acceptance of another one, even if it is not quite compatible. At least they can accept this undesirable option in some form and to some extent. On the other han4 this ambivalence makes it possible for politicians to manipulate their constituencies, stressing one part of their views over another or different parts at different times. Thus, each of the main political camps can Table 2 and 3.Answento question5 and6'Shoul4 in your opinion,the usageof theRussian/ Ukrainianlanguage bewidenedremainthesameorbe narrowedascomparedto the curent state?"Dataareshownfor selectedcategories only,indudingadherents of several'ideologicalpoliticdtrends'."Market+ reunifcation"is ashortfor a'polidcaltrendcombiningideas ofmarket economywithideasof tlkraine'sreunificationwith Russia". x calo .t (-) EEilEE$ (! .a .(u 4C *al 5! 5 8-E D D 3- 3 q) ! o U *69( ! 8H (!tr z3 Ukrainian language shouldbeusedmore 50.2 62.5 70.8 83.9 53.6 79.5 than now Russianlanguage shouldbe usedless than now 3+.t 44.6 (u bo .t (! a & I d !H, .= fit HT E'E usedmore than now Ukrainian languageshould be used lessthan now 6r.z bo (! 8$ 'tgr Eh 40.9 .t) .A ta (! IrI :l'o &h. , tr o IJ o) q) furssian languageshould be s2.7 59.1 +c !O -g€ E 3 E'E gE 4r.4 39.8 36.1 39.6 34.9 35.1 28.9 29.5 26.4 26.5 20.9 29.6 afford both raising an aspect of the language issue which their respective constituencies consider most important and neglecting the issue altogether which would imply its unimportance and, therefore, acceptability of the status quo (cf. Kulyk 2006a). The respondents' views of appropriate status of Ukrainian and Russian reveal both diversity and ambivdence. To be sure, the members of different ethnic, linguistic, regional and ideological groups hold highly divergent views, and their location on the spectrum corresponds to the above-described pattern. A solid majority of ethnic Russians, native- and everydaplanguage Russophones, residents of the East and South and adherents of all but two ideological trends are inclined to believe that Russian should have some "preferences on a legislative level" in cornparison to other national minority languages. In contrast, a majority of Ukrainophones, Western residents and adherents of the "nationd-democratic" and "national-radical" trends disagrees (question 38)". However, when respondents are askedto choose among different status options (question l2), the group preferencesseem less exclusive(see table 4). Taken together, the second the third and the forth options which correspond respectivelR to the current legal status, the current actual situation and a minimal demand by the supporters of a higher status of Russian - are supported by a majority or a near majority of respondents in all categories.While different groups'preferences within this range clearly differ, the ambivalence of views within each goup facittates a compromise. For example, in all categories except for the residents of theWest, the percentage of people who are inclined to believe that a regional status of Russian "solves the language issue'rather than "exacerbating" it (question 39), is much higher than that of people who support the promotion of the status of Russian to that of a state or regional language. That is, even in those groups which are strongly opposed to the legalisation of a more-than-minority role of Russian, at least a quarter of people are ready to accept a minimalist version of such legalisation, a regional status, in order to accommodate the demands of the Russian-speakers(see table 5) 37 These majorities are comprised of those who answered ono'and "rather noo on the other. hand and 'yes" and "rather yes" on the one VolodymyrKutyk 46 LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine Table 4. Answersto question 12 'In your opinion, what stahrsshould the Ukrainian and Russian languageshavein Ukraine?" The listed options are reformulated to make the statemeng briefer. Data are only shown for the most divergent of the ethnolinguistic, regional and ideological SrouPs. b frs nF" cc l q( ! q>. E€ 5 1. Ukrainian should be the onlystate language,F.ussian ?t) c (! a :1 & I (u lh 3 n 14 ?€ u o (t) €E c€ € I4' tr E, +.! ,E t q8 a'= Table 5. Answersto question 39 "Which statement do you support more strong[y?",ascomparedwith the combined shareof the three last answersto the question in the previous table. The two opinions the respondentswere to choosefrom included'The regional status of the Russian languagesotvesthe languageproblem and doesnot threaten the development of the Ukrainian languagein those regions where Russiangetssuch a status" and'The regional statusof the Russianlanguageaggravatesthe languageproblem in the country; ging the regiond language statusto Russianwould lead to superseedingUlaainian totdly in theseregions; it is implemented to makeit possiblenot to learn lJlaainian".Data areonly shownfor thosegroupswith predominant preferencesfor Ulqainianisation. o u t&l o 21.0 1 .5 25.1 5.3 4.6 26.3 6.0 Ri FS :EE 2.4 !!o gE excluded 2. tlkrainian should be the statelanEiuage,Russiana minoritv lansuaqe 4. Ukrainianshould be the statelanBuage,Russianan official languagein those regions 38.0 t4.2 44.3 18.0 r+.4 38.6 19.5 r5.2 22.7 r0.8 17.9 13.7 9.8 19.6 14.8 10.0 22.r 8.4 19.0 23.6 7.6 r5.4 18.8 5.r 47.8 3.2 39.8 45.2 6.7 37.6 50.3 0.4 2.2 0.0 0.3 2.7 3.0 wants it with eoual rishts 6. Russianshould be the onlystate language,Ulcainian excluded E5 .^ g qB 3 U '=r .= (! (! q) ?f; o €€ r.9 1.0 Regional status of Russian solves the language problem 37.0 28.3 14.5 48.0 25.6 Russianshould havea regionalor a higher status 22.7 l5.l r 1.6 28.5 14.6 9.0 where the majority 5.IJkrainian and Russianshouldbe state languages 9o .AE !do o o) 3. tlkrainian should be the statelanSage, Russiana parallel spokenlanguaqe 47 It is this minimalistaccommodationthat standsthe best chanceof being acceptedasa compromisesolutionby membersof all major ethnolinguisticand regionaland ideologicalgroups.To be sure,it is more acceptablefor proponentsof bilingualismthan supPortersof Ukrainianisatiorywho would ratherretain the legalstatus-quoevenif thus far it has not been adheredto in actual languagepractice.However, to prevent political destabilisationand mass protests, the state should fust of all accommodatethose grouPswhich are most dissatisfiedwith the current situation. And the survey data clearlyshow that Russophonesare much more critical than Ulaainophonesof the state Policy in the languagedomain which they tend to seeaslimiting the function of their language(seetable6 andT) It is interestingto note that the shareof Russophoneswho perceivethe statepolicy aslimiting the function of Russianis much higher than the shareof those who believe that the use of that languageshouldbe increased(seebelow). This confirms that it is not so much the scopeof actualuseoftheir languagethat the Russophones iue dissatisfied with, but rather its low legal statuswhich also may lead, or so they believe,to a shrinking scopeof usein the future. Therefore,evena moderateincreasein the status of Russianwould positively affecttheir attitudesand thus diminish a destabilisingpotential ofthe languageproblem in Ukrainiansociety. VolodymyrK"tyk LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine Table 6. Answersto question32'How do you assessthe languagepolicy of the state?" 6 ci .E JI D Everyday language Native Nationdity language 6 (! vt 4' = a C6 (! IA a C! a .E (! D b= u, o) u, aA & D J. d. Region & 3 :Ji gE 36 ao Ez ol.VD Positively 13.8 6.6 16.0 7,2 r6.r 7.7 10.8 16.5 10.8 Rather positively 26.0 15.2 28.2 14.5 29.9 t7.7 30.4 26.2 19.2 Rather negatively u.3 35.0 23.4 3r.7 23.4 30.3 26.2 20.5 30.1 Negatively 19.5 29.2 r5.9 31.9 16.2 29.0 15.3 19.8 25.7 It would not be very difficult for the partiesto persuadetheir constituenciesto acceptthe regionalstatusof Russianasa compromisesolution, shouldthey decideto do so.The meanvalueof the answersto questionon the statusof the two languages(question 12) grvenby the adherentsof different"ideological-politicaltrends' liesbetrveen3 and4, that is, somewherebetweenthe preservationof the presentcturencyof (spoken) Russianwell beyond its legal statusas a minority languageand the promotion of this statusto that of a regionallanguage.Two notable exceptionsare national-democrats who would prefer a lesserscopeof the use of Russianin accordancewith its legalstatus (mean value 234) and adherentsof a "political trend combining ideasof market economy with ideasof Ukraine'sreuniffcationwith Russia",half of whom want more than a regional status(meanvalue 4.16).As long asthe latter constituencyis givennothing in terms of status,the championsof its rights in the Party of Regionswill stick to the maximumdemandsand be rewardedby electoralsupport. Conclusion Table 7. Answers to the questions 35 and 36 'ln your opinion, the present languagepoliry towardsthe Ukrainian/Russianlanguage...'.Data areonlyshown forpredominantly Ukrainophone grouPswith regardto the Uhainian languageand for predominantly Russophonegoups with regard to the Russianlanguage. Na6onality e (! t! '!4 D supports and stimulatesthe function of the language neither hindersnor promotes its function limibthefunction ofthe language 43.8 G tD .A fr s.7 language Everyday language ccl tr (! Native (! (! .a at }( D & 41.0 7.0 T cl d (B 'l( D 40.3 aD IA Region pa & 6.2 i€ 'fi3 36.2 7.1 37.2 3 l . l 37.5 32.3 36.7 36.3 4r.3 40.8 n.9 r4.0 54.4 47.2 57.1 16.3 49.8 16.7 The above analysisdemonstratesthat languagepolitics in Ukraine has primarily been determinedby political actors' striving for power which causesthem to competewith one another and attempt to influencetheir respectiveconstituencies.While the loyalty to voters required that politicians adhereto a clear line on sensitivequestions,the strugglefor power within the political classoften led them to act contraryto their declaredposition or refrain from taking courseof action dictated by that position. The ambivalenceof popularattitudescontributedto the sustainabilityof suchopportunism, asmoderatechangesof political priorities andrhetorical emphasesdid not causepoliticiansand partiesto becomeunacceptablefor the bulk of their constituencies.This is why it was possiblefor many political actorsto alternatebetweendeclarationsof the urgency of the languageproblem and its virtual absence.Although the confrontation befweenproponentsof different solutionsled to a legislativestalemate,the executive agenciescould in the meantime cautiouslypromote the Ulaainian languagewithout provoking considerableprotestsby speakersof Russian. However, the polarisationof the political elites and the population during the OrangeRevolution createdan incentivefor the anti-Orangeforcesto emphasisetheir defenceof particularinterestsand valuesof its Southernand Easternconstituency,including the preferencefor the Russianlanguageand striving for its official status.This emphasisled the Party of Regionsto a triumph in the 2006 electionand the resultingretum to power,but in the following electionit underminedthe party'seffort to widen its electoral base. Finding itself once again in the opposition, the Blue are likely to strengthenthis divisive emphasisin order to use their constituency'sdiscontent as leverageagainstthe Orangeregime,which would contribute to the maintenanceof the VolodyrnyrKulyk regionalpolarisationand,therefore,pavethe way for the useof a'language card"in the following elections. To breakthis vicious circle,the Orangeleadersshouldsuggesta compromisesolution and then either engagetheir opponentsin a ded or make a legislativechangeon their own and popularisethis solution with both the Blue and Orangeconstituencies. Needlessto sap the Orange can only do this while in power. It seems,however,that many of them would rather take advantageof this situation to further consolidatethe legd preferencesof the Ukrainian languageand thus createpreconditionsfor its social dominance.Shouldthis consolidationtakeplace,it will certainlycontribute to the Russian-speakers' discontentwhich may lead to the Orange'sdefeatin the next election and the undoing of their Ukrainianisationprogressto or even beyond the point of Kuchma's ambivalence.However, as a considerablepart of its deputies do not care much about this issue and would rather refrain from any legislative changes,it seems more likely that the Orangecoalitionwill not manageto implementany resolutemeasures, all the more so becauseits leaderswill not want to undermine their electoral chances. Bibliography lntetttiatts LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine 51 Legal and political docutnents Constitution of tlkraine, adopted on 28 June 1996,www.presidenlgov.ua/eng/presid ent/constitution/. Declarationof the Political Council of the Partyof Regionson the Protectionof Constitutional Rightsofthe Russian-speaking Citizensof lJkraine,17 May2006,http://www. partyofregions.org.ua/pr-east-west-Mbl31798fl9, asquotedinWolchuk200T:545. KodeksadministratyvnohosudochynswaUkrarny, adopted on 6 July 2005, http:/ /za kon l.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi. Law of the Ulaainian Soviet SocialistRepublic On Languagesin the lJkrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, adopted on 28 October 1989,hW:/ /www.riga.lv/minelres/ NationalT'egislation/Ukraine/ Ukraine Language-English.htm. LegalInterpretation of the Ministry ofJusticeConcerningthe Decisionsof Certain Organsof LocalAdministration (IGarkiv City Council, SevastopolCity Council,and the Luhansk City Council) with Respectto the Statusand Rules Goveming the Use of the RussianLanguagewithin the Boundaries of the City of Kharkiv, Sevastopol,and Luhansk oblast,l0 May 2006, The UkraineList,no. 391, 23 May 2006, compiledby D.Arel, http: / /www:lsainianstudies.uottawa.ca/ukrainelist /ukt391 s.html. Donii, Oles' (Oleksandr),deputy of the VerkhovnaRada,memberof the faction of Our Ukraine - People'sSelf-Defence,22J anaary2O08. PeredvyborchaprohramaYanukovycha.Povnyi text, Ukratns'kaPravda,12July 2004, http :/ /www.rada.com.u a/ news/ 2004/ 7/ 12/ 105I 8.htm. Holub, Oleksandr,deputy of the VerkhovnaRada,memberof the faction of the Communist p arty,24J arruary2008. Proelrt zakonu "Bazovyi zakon Ukrarhy'Pro movy LJkrainy'",29 November 2006, http :/ / gska2.rada.gov .aa/ pls/ nt eb_n/webproc4_I ?id=&pf3 5I | =28857. Kliuchkovs'lgri,Yurii, deputy of the Verkhovna Rada,member of the faction of Our Ulaaine - People'sSelf-Defence,23January2008. Prohramadiial'nosti Kabinetu Ministriv Ukrarny "Ukrarns'kyiprorfv: Dlia liudei, a ne politykiv" (proekt), posted on 10January2008, http://www.kmu.gov.u af cona ol / uk / publish / article ?art_id = L0 423 | I 07 & cat i d= 47 2929 0 I . Kolesnichenko,Vadym, deputy of the VerkhovnaRada,member of the faction of the Party of Regions,23 December 2007. Popesku,Ivan (Popescu,Ion), deputyof the VerkhovnaRada,memberof the faction of the Party of Regions,23 November2}D7. Yavorivs'kyi,Volodymyr, deputy of the VerkhovnaRada,member of the faction of the Bloc of Yuliia Tymoshenko,lTJanuary2008. lUshenniaKonstytutsiinohoSudu Ukrarnyv spravi za konstytutsiinympodanniam60 narodnykh deputativUlaainy pro ofitsiinetlumachenniapolozhen'chastynydruhoi statti 14 ZakonuUlaarny"Pro kinematohraffiu"l...l,ZO.LZ.}OO7,http://www. ccu.gov.ua/ pls/ w can/P000?lang=g. 'l'syvil'nyi protsesual'nyi kodeks Ukrainy, adopted on 18 March 2004, hnp z/ / zakonl.rada.gov.ualcgi-bin/laws/main.cgi. VolodymyrK"lyk LanguagePolicies and LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUkraine 53 Uhoda pro stvorennia Koalitsii demokratychnykh syl u Verkhovnii Radi Ukruny M sHykannia,fsigned on I 7 October 2O07f, http ://www.byut.com.ua/files/sm38_ Ugoda_koalicia_200 7.doc. llalmaceda,M.2007 Energr Dependency, Politicsand Corruptionin the Former Souiet Union: Rassiat Power,Oligarchs'ProJitsand Ukraine's MissingEnergr Policy, London and NewYork: Routledge. 1995-2006. Universalnatsional'noiednosti. Tekst, pidpysanyina kruhlomu stoli, 3 August 2006, Ukrains'fuPraui1a,3.08.2006, http://pravdacom.ualnews /20M/8/3/+SSgZ.hnn. Ilarrington,L. 1997The GeographicComponent of MassAttitudes in Ukraine.PosfandEconomics, SovietGeography Vol.38, No. L0,601-6I4. 'Region, Barrington, L. 2002. Language,and Nationality: Rethinking Support in Ukraine for Maintaining Distance from Russia'.InDilernmasoJ State-LedNation-Buildingin lJkraine,Kvzio, T. and P. D'Anieri (eds.).Wesq)ort: Praeger, 13r-146. 'Party Birch, S. f998 systemformation and voting behavior in the Ukrainian parliamentary electionof L994'.In Contemporary Ukraine:DynamicsoJ Post-Soviet (ed.). M.E.Sharpe,139-160. T. Armonk and London: TransformatioryKuzio , Zakon lJkraiury"Pro telebachenniai radiomovlennia",adoptedon 21 December 1993, http :/ / zakonI .rada.gov.ual cgi-bin/ laws/ main.cgi?nreg=3759- 12. Zakon Ulraiury'Pro ratyfikatsiiu Iewopeis'koi khartii rehional'nykh mov abo mov menshyn', adopted on 15 May 2003, httpt/ /r*on.radagov.ua/cgi-bin/aws/main. cgi?nreg=802-15. Zakon U}rainy "Pro vnesenniazmin do Zakonu Ukraiiny"Pro telebachenniai radiomovlennia",adoptedon L2.OL.20[I6, hapz//zakonl.nda.govta/c$-bn/lar,ts/main. cgi?nreg=J317-15. Secondarysources 'Ukraine's Antonovych,M. and B. Bowring (forthcoming). Long andWinding Roadto the Charter'.ln TheEuropeanCharterfor Rcgionalor Minority Languages: Legal Challengaand Opportuniti*, Strasbourg:Council of Europe. Arel, D. 1995aLanguagePolitics in IndependentUkraine: Towards One or Two State Languages? Post-Soviet Affairs,Vol.23, No. 3, 597-622. 'Ukraine: Arel, D. 1995b The Temptation of the NationalizingState'.ln PoliticalCulture and Civil Societyin Russiaand the New Stata oJ Eurasia,Tismaneanu,V. (.d.). ArrnonkandLondor\ 157-I 88. Arel, D. 2002Interpreting'Nationality'and'Language'inthe 2001 UkrainianCensus. Post-Soviet Affairs,Vol. 18,No. 3, 238-243. Chernenko,H. 2005 Movne meniu. Dzerlcnlotyzhnia, L8-24.O6,hnp://www.dt.ua/ 3000/3680/s0328/. D'Anieri, P. 1999'Conclusion: Institutionalizingdemocraryin a divided state'.In StateandInstitutionBuildingin Ukraine,Kuzio, T., Kravchuk,R and P. D'Anieri (eds.).NewYork: St. Martain'sPress,325-337. D'Anieri, P. 2001 Democrary Unfulfilled: The Establishmentof ElectoralAuthoritarianismin Ukraine.lournaloJUkrainianStudia,Yol.26, No. l, 13-35. 'pidstavliae' Yanukovycha?Ukrains'kapravda, Haran', O. 2004 Khto zh naspravdi 28.09,http :/ / p ravda.com.ua/ news/ 2004/ 9/ 28/ 122l2,.htm. Holovakha,Y. L997Suspil'stvo, monitshchotransformuiet'sia: Dosuidsotsiolohichnoho orynhuv Ukraini. Kyiv: Fond "Demokratychni initsiatyvy",Instytut sotsiolohii NAN Ukrainy. Arel, D. 2005 The "OrangeRcvolution":Analyskand lmplicationsoJthe 2004 Presidential Electionin Ukraine.Third Annual Stasiuk-CambridgeLecture on Contemporary Ukraine, Cambridge University, 25 February,httpz/ /www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.calukrain e_hst/ pdf/ Arel_Cambridge.pdf. Ukraine:EducationalPolicyand the ReJanmaat,J. 2000 Nation-Buildingin Post-Soviet sponseof the Russian-Sp eakingPopulation Amsterdam: NetherlandsGeographical Studies. 'Regionalism Khmelko, V. and A Wilson 1998 and ethnic and linguistic cleavagesin TransJonnation, Ukraine'. In ContemporaryUkraine: DynamicsoJ Post-Soviet 60-80. Kuzio,T. (ed.).Armonk andLondon: M.E.Sharpe, Arel, D. and V. Khmelko 1996 The Russianfactor and territorial polarization in Ukraine.TheHarriman Review,Vol.9, No. 1-2, 8I -91. Kubidek,P. 1994 Delegativedemocracyin Russiaand Ulaaine, Communistand PostCommunistStuilia,Y ol.27, No. 4, 423-441. A2a,L.1995Ridnamova:z obochynynabol'shalcViche,No.I I, L20-L26. Kubicek, P. L999What happenedto nationalistsin Ukraine? Nationalismand Ethnic Politics,Vol.5,No. 1,29-+5. 54 VolodymyrKulyk Kubicek, P. 2000a UnbrolcznTir-s:The State,Interat Associations, and Corporatismin Post-Soviet Ukraine.Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. Kubicek,P. 2000bRegionalPolarizationin Uhaine: PublicOpinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour. Europ e-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 2, 273 -2.94. Ktlyk, V. l99S Pysmennytskevidrodzhennia:ukrains'ka denhavna ideia v dyskursi 'oporytsii vseredyni rezhymu' pershykh rokiv perebudovy. Suchasnisf', No.l, 54-79. LanguagePoliciesand LanguageAttitudes in Post-OrangeUlaaine 'State, Motyl, A f99S nation, and elites in independent Ukraine'. In Contemporary Transformation,Kuzio, T. (ed"). Armonk and [Jkraine:Dynamicsof Post-Soviet e,3-16. London: M.E.Sharp Toronto and Buffalo: University of Nahaylo, B. 1999 The Ukrainian Resurgence. Toronto Press. Working Paper#L72.KelloggInstitutefor O'Donnell,G.1992 Delegativedemocracy? InternationalStudies,Universityof Notre Dame. Kulyk, V. I 999 Ukr ains'kyi natsionalizm u neznlezhniiUkr aini Kyt'tr. Riabchuk,M. 2003 DviWrainy: Real'nimezhi,virtual'ni viiny.Kyiv: Krytyka. Ktlyk, V. 2001 Politicsof ethnicity in post-SovietlJkraine:beyondBrubaker.Journalof UkrainianStudia,Yol.26,No. 1-2, I97-221. Minderheitin iler Ukraine.Wien: Braumiiller. ScheqH. 1997Die Rechteder russkchen Kolyk, V.2OOZReukitinga SuccasStory:ImplementationoJtheRecommendations of the OSCEHigh Commissioner on National Minoritiesto Ukraine, 199+2000.Ham' burg: Centrefor the OSCE Research,Institute for PeaceResearchand Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. K"lyL, V. 2004.Movna vidpovid' Yushchenka . D ztrlcnlotyzhnia,6- l}.IL, http :/ / www. dt.ual3000/ 3680/ 48239/ . Socor,V.2006 Ukraine'sNational Unity Declaration:No GuideTo Poliry OrAction, 07.O8,http :/ / jamestown.org/ edm/ amcle.php?article i d=237 L3 56. 'fyshchenko, Y. 2006 Movnyi referendum v ARK: do istorii pytannia. Ukrains'ka .ua/ newsf 2006/ 3/ 7/ 39474.htm. Prauda, 07.03.,http z/ / www.pravda.com 'l'yshchenko,Y.2007 Priorytety politychnykh partii: Movna polityka ta etnopolityka. Biuleten'"Tuii rrybir",No. l. Kyiv: Ukrarns'kyinezdezhnyitsentr politychnykh doslidzen'. Kulyk, Y.2006a Constructing common sense:Languageand Ethnicity in Ukrainian public discourse.Ethnicand RncialStudies, Y ol. 29,No. 2, 28 1-3I 4. 'Normalisation Kolyk, V. 2006b of ambiguity:Policies and discourseson languageissuesin post-Soviet[Jkraine'.InHistory, Languageanil Societyin theBorderlands of Europe.Ukraineand Belarusin Focns,Tiirnquist-Plewa,B. (ed). Malmii: Sekel Boldirlag Il7-l4tr.. Wilson, A 2000 The Ukrainians: UnexpectedNation. New Haven: Yale University Press. K.rlyk,V. 2006cNot Much Has Changedon the LanguageFront. UKL List, no.392,2 hnpz/ /www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/ukraine_list/ukl392J.html Jutre [Ut<rainianoriginal publishedn Krytyka,No. 6, 2006]. Wolczuk,K 2001 TheMoulding of Ukraine:The ConstitutionalPoliticsoJStateFormation. Budapest: Central EuropeanUniversityPress. K"lyL, V.2007 Regional'nyi'zakon pro vseukraiurs'lcu dvomovnist.Ukrains'kaPrauda, 4.0 1,http :/ / www.pravda.com.ualn ews/ 2O07/ I / 4/ 52992/ htm. K"lyL, V. forthcoming Dyskursukrains'lEkhmedii: Identychnosti,ideolohii vladni stosunky.Kyiv:K4/t''ka. Levitsky, S. and L.Way,2002. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.lournal of Vol. 13,No. 2, SL-63. Democracy, 'The Motyl A 1995 conceptualpresident:Leonid Kravchukand the politics of surrealism'. In Patternsin Post-SorietLeadership,Colton, T. and R Tucker (eds.). Boulder,CO: WesMewPress, 103-f21. Wilson,A 2005 Ukraine'sOrangeRevolutionNew Haven:YaleUniversity Press. Wilson,A and S. Birch 1999Voting stability,political gridlock Ukraine's 1998parliaStudiu,Vol.51,No. 6 1039-1068. mentaryelections.Europe-Asia Wolczuk, K 2007 Whose Ukraine?Languageand RegionalFactorsin the 2004 and ofMinority Issues,Vol. 5, 2005/6, 2006Electionsin Ukraine.EuropeanYearbook 52t-547.