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What Are We
Fighting For?:
The Noble Goal
of Courage in
Aristotle’s Ethics
ANDREI G. ZAVALIY
College of Arts and Sciences
American University of Kuwait
Salmiya, Kuwait
azavaliy@auk.edu.kwX
https://10.5507/aither.2023.001
*
An earlier version of this article was first presented
during a conference at Palacký University (Olomouc,
Czech Republic) in October 2022. I am grateful for
all the oral and written comments that have helped
to shape this paper to its present form.
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ABSTRACT
Aristotle’s analysis of the virtue
of courage presents a number of
interpretative difficulties. The initial
thesis that courage consists in
overcoming the fear of death in
the context of war for a worthy
or noble cause will be analysed
against several other, seemingly
inconsistent, definitions of this
virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics. The
normative aspect of the present study
aims at making sense of what could
qualify as a noble goal of a fearless
action for the Aristotelian model,
given that one’s personal eudaimonia
cannot be the goal of a warrior
willing to sacrifice his life in battle.
Reference to the intended proper
end of courageous behaviour is one
of the constitutive features of the
Aristotelian holistic account of this
virtue and this normative provision
remains unexplained in the text. Two
options are considered: (1) the noble
goal of courage is an altruistic concern
for the good of the polis; (2) the
goal of courage is personal honour
(including postmortem glorification).
It is argued that the second option is
a better fit with the Aristotelian model
of virtue ethics, which should be seen
as a form of enlightened egoism.
ANDREI G. ZAVALIY
WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?: THE NOBLE GOAL OF COURAGE IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS
1. PREFACE: INTRODUCING
THE TENSION
As careful readers of the Nicomachean
Ethics are well aware, Aristotle presents
a teleological account of ethical virtues
by stipulating personal eudaimonia
(happiness or human flourishing) as
the final goal, the telos, of moral development.1 Being a morally virtuous person,
1
A teleological account of ethical virtues
is contrasted here with a deontological
account, according to which a virtuous
character should be acquired for its own
sake, as something intrinsically valuable,
regardless of any further benefits.
Admittedly, Aristotle agrees that virtues
have intrinsic value when he writes that
“every virtue we certainly choose because
of themselves, because we would choose
each of them even if it had no further
result” (Eth. Nic. 1097b3-4). At the same
time, he adds, “we also choose them for
the sake of happiness, supposing that
for Aristotle, is a necessary (albeit not
sufficient) condition for reaching the
ultimate goal of all human activities,
and that view provides both a normative
and a strong motivational reason for
developing those praiseworthy traits of
character that he calls virtues of character and intellectual virtues. The list of
Aristotelian virtues in the Nicomachean
Ethics is a fascinating historical document of how the Athenian intellectuals
conceived of an exemplary gentleman
and an ideal citizen during the fourth
century BCE. At the same time, many
elements of Aristotle’s analysis of the
through them we shall be happy” (Ibid.,
my emphasis). In that sense, happiness
retains its unique status as “an end that is
complete without qualification” and virtues
are still seen as instrumental for reaching
the chief good of happiness.
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essential human excellences retain their
cross-cultural and cross-temporal significance even to the present day. Both
the ancients and the moderns would
agree on the praiseworthiness of a courageous character, and both would disdain cowardly behaviour. Although the
substantive content of the concept of
courage has changed considerably in
the contemporary world, it still remains
one of the most paradigmatic virtues of
a morally mature character.2
Together with the virtues of friendship and justice, courage (ἀνδρεία)
receives the most elaborate treatment
in Aristotle’s ethics. It is also an arête
that stands out from all the other virtues in one crucial respect. Unlike the
case with, for example, temperance,
friendship, or generosity, a consistent
and repeated exercise of martial courage greatly diminishes one’s chances of
achieving happiness in this life, since
it now becomes less likely that the courageous fighter will live long enough
to enjoy the benefits of a lasting peace.
Paradoxically, a coward who “throws
away his shield and takes to flight”3 and
thus survives the battle has an advantage over the courageous warrior who
perishes while fighting when it comes
to his chances of achieving happiness.
Being alive, after all, is a basic precondition for being happy.4
2
On the difference between the Aristotelian
conception of courage and the modern
approaches to this virtue see Zavaliy and
Aristidou (2014).
3
Rhetoric 1383b21.
4
It does not seem that Aristotle, unlike
Socrates in the Apology or in the Phaedo,
seriously entertained the possibility
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What is it, then, according to Aristotle, for the sake of which one should
become and remain courageous even
in the most desperate circumstances?
What should properly motivate a courageous warrior to stay put in the front
line of a phalanx when the chances of
survival are negligible? How is the
motivation of a truly courageous person different from the motivation of
a self-controlled person, or one who
merely approaches the state of genuine
arête? Before we tackle these theoretical questions, we should begin with an
overview of the several definitions of
courage provided by Aristotle in the
Nicomachean Ethics.
2. ARISTOTLE’S DEFINITIONS
OF COURAGE
Aristotle’s “Doctrine of the Mean” is
arguably the best-known part of his
ethical doctrine, and in it he famously
postulates that each moral virtue can
be defined as a mean state between two
vices: the vice of excess and the vice of
deficiency. Thus, a temperate man, for
example, is positioned at some midpoint
between two characters: a self-indulgent character (“the man who indulges
in every pleasure and abstains from
none”), and an insensible character
(“the man who shuns every pleasure”)
of some form of postmortem existence
of a conscious self. In the Eth. Nic. he
is straightforward: “Death is the most
terrible of all things; for it is the end, and
nothing is thought to be any longer either
good or bad for the dead” (1115b25-27). The
speculations about the indestructible
nature of the human mind (νόος) in De
Anima (408b17-30) do not imply the
possibility of personal immortality either.
ANDREI G. ZAVALIY
WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?: THE NOBLE GOAL OF COURAGE IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS
(1104a23-26). In a similar manner, Aristotle first introduces the virtue of courage as a state of character that is positioned between the vices of cowardice on
the one hand and rashness on the other
(11104a22). He further defines this virtue by referencing not one but two relevant feelings or ‘passions’ which ought
to be properly controlled by a morally
mature agent. The original definition
runs as follows:
With regard to feelings of fear and
confidence (φόβος καὶ θάρσος) courage is the mean; of the people who
exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name, while the man
who exceeds in confidence is rash,
and he who exceeds in fear and
falls short in confidence is a coward
(1107a31-b3).
This initial introduction of courage
in Book II of the Eth. Nic. sets the general
context for his understanding of this
virtue, but it does not go far enough in
specifying the proper objects of fear and
confidence, and neither does it clarify
how to discover the ideal balance between these basic passions of fear and
confidence.5 A special and more detailed
discussion of courage and cowardice is
reserved for Book III, Chapters 6-9 of the
5
Aristotle makes it clear that fear is the
more important of the two emotions
(1117a29-30). The somewhat uneasy
relationship between these emotions on
the Aristotelian model of this virtue is
analysed by Daniel Putnam (2001). For the
claim that fear and confidence actually
yield two different virtues see Urmson
(1980).
Eth. Nic. This is where we should turn
our attention to now.
The detailed analysis of the virtue
of courage in Book III is intriguing and
puzzling for a number of reasons. Elsewhere, I argue that Aristotle’s take on
courage in those chapters should be
interpreted as pursuing two main objectives: first, to counter the overly inclusive conception of this virtue advocated
by Plato (especially in the Laches), and,
secondly, to return to the Homeric roots
of genuine courage by radically limiting
the scope of the truly courageous agents
and restricting its manifestation to the
martial context (Zavaliy 2017). Plato’s
take on courage may serve as a helpful
background for our discussion of Aristotle. The most conspicuous difference
between Plato’s Socrates and Aristotle
concerns the scope of actions which
should properly fall under the category
“courageous”. There is a clear tendency
in the Laches towards the widening of
the scope of courageous actions with
Socrates suggesting, contrary to the initial opinion of his interlocutors, Laches
and Nicias, that soldiers in battle are
not the only ones who can manifest
courage, but so can those suffering the
perils of the sea, resisting the fear of
pain, fighting a disease, coping with
poverty, or confronting a politically
precarious situation. All these people
are potentially exhibiting essentially
the same virtue too (191d1-e1). Moreover, Socrates was willing to include in
the category of the courageous agents
even those who “are mighty to contend
against desires and pleasures” (191e1),
i.e. individuals showing an unusual
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level of self-control when faced with
strong temptations, and, perhaps, even
some wild animals (196e).6
We may assume that Socrates’ list
of courageous agents was not meant to
be exhaustive, but rather instrumental
in switching Laches’ attention from the
external circumstances which might
prompt a courageous response to the internal aspects of such a reaction. Indeed,
as in many other cases, here, too, the
internal state of the agent is of primary
importance in Socratic investigation.
As Santas rightly observes, for Socrates
“whether a man is courageous depends
not only on the objective situation, but
also on his estimate of the situation,
what we might call the psychological or
intentional aspects of courage” (1971,
191). According to this view, a young
sailor might be acting truly courageously during his first storm at sea if
he is convinced that the storm presents
a real danger to the ship, and yet his
more experienced comrade, while behaving in a similar manner, would not
be properly called brave as long as he
knows (say, from past occasions) that
the danger is merely apparent. One’s
sincere beliefs about the situation (even
if false) and one’s behaviour in response
6
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The other Platonic dialogue in which
courage gets detailed treatment is the
Republic. Surprisingly, Plato’s take on
the role of this virtue in the ideal city is
much closer to Aristotle’s Eth. Nic. than
to the views of Socrates in the Laches.
Nonetheless, in his discussion Aristotle
seems to be objecting specifically to
the earlier dialogue and disregards the
much-modified position presented in the
Republic. For an overview of the evolution
of Plato’s views on courage see Zavaliy
(2000, 180-197).
to those beliefs are both constitutive of
the virtue of courage for Socrates.
Plato’s overly inclusive and internalised conception of courage was unacceptable to Aristotle, who, in the spirit of
Homer, sought to limit the scope of truly
courageous feats to those performed on
a battlefield. As a first step, Aristotle
switches the focus from the characteristically Socratic type of question, “What
is courage?” back to the more practical one, “Who is a courageous person?”
The latter question, though, should not
be seen as a question about the specific
names of brave individuals, but rather
as an inquiry into the behavioural, emotive, and situational conditions necessary for courageous behaviour. Skipping
a painful Socratic process of elenchus,
Aristotle gives birth to his second definition of a courageous agent, which will
prove to be more intricate than it initially appears to be:
Legitimately speaking (κυρίως δὴ
λέγοιτ᾽), then, he will be called brave
who is fearless in the face of a noble death (καλόν θάνατον ἀδεής),
and of all emergencies that involve
death; and the emergencies of war
are in the highest degree of this kind
(1115a32-35).
The opening phrase here – “legitimately (or properly) speaking” – suggests that Aristotle is not going to use
the term ‘courageous’ loosely or simply
by analogy (the way Socrates presumably did in the Laches) but instead will
seek to define it as a technical term with
a set of rather stringent conditions for
ANDREI G. ZAVALIY
WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?: THE NOBLE GOAL OF COURAGE IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS
application. The next thing to notice is
that Aristotle’s focus from the beginning
is on military valour as the highest or,
perhaps, the only type of true courage.
Here Aristotle picks up the position
preferred by both Laches and Protagoras from Plato’s early dialogues, both
of whom connected courage with battlefield endurance, but he adds several
important qualifying details. Much of
what follows in the subsequent chapters
of the Eth,. Nic. deals with the discussion
of the spurious types of courage – those
cases that might appear as instances of
courageous behaviour but are not truly
so. As one might expect, most of the scenarios and characters that were explicitly endorsed by Socrates in the Laches
are ruled out by Aristotle. The long list
of those who fail to qualify as truly brave
individuals, according to Aristotle, includes those who fearlessly face poverty
or disease, those experiencing perils
at sea, those citizen-soldiers defending
their city because of their fear of penalties or desire for honours, those professional mercenaries who are fearless in
war because of their superior military
skills, those who rush into battle because they are driven by strong passions,
and those who stand their ground on the
battlefield because they underestimated
the strength of the opponent (1116a151117a27). In all these cases, the character trait manifested is either “similar
to” or “appears like” or is “most like”
courage, and yet still does not measure
up to genuine virtue.
One of the effects of Aristotle’s initial description of courage and its counterfeit varieties is that it now becomes
extremely problematic to find a suitable
example of a single courageous person,
whether taken from the rich ancient literary heritage or from real historical
episodes. Surprisingly, neither the Homeric heroes nor the proverbial Spartans are recognised as truly courageous
people by Aristotle, albeit for different
reasons. While there is little doubt that
Socrates himself would be a paradigmatic example of a courageous person
for Plato, a person who exhibited military, intellectual, and political courage,
it is much harder to determine whether
any real person in the context of war
has ever shown true courage according
to Aristotle’s demanding standards.7
All of the specific historical and literary examples mentioned by Aristotle
are brought up to illustrate examples
of ‘less-than-truly-courageous’ behaviour, while not a single positive case of
“true” courage has been identified in the
text. For an author who was, without
a doubt, brought up on the stories of
the great battles and great heroes of the
Persian Wars, and who was also a contemporary of Alexander’s remarkable
military achievements in Asia, such an
omission is baffling.
The third point about the definition
that deserves our attention is Aristotle’s mentioning of fearlessness in the
face of “a noble death”. We will reserve
7
Alcibiades testifies to Socrates’ military
prowess in the Symposium (220d-220e),
and Laches bestows similar praise (Laches
181b). Socrates’ autobiographical story from
the Apology about his refusal to obey the
order of the Thirty Tyrants while facing the
real risk of execution (32d) is an example
of political and moral courage.
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the discussion of the nobility of death
for the end, but a few comments should
be made about the notion of ‘fearlessness’. There is a familiar objection that
contrasts the apparent demand for fearlessness in this definition with the description of a courageous agent given
just a few pages later in the Eth. Nic.
The description in question (which is
also the third definition of a courageous
agent) runs as follows:
The man, then, who faces and who
fears (φοβούμενος) the right things
from the right motive, in the right
way and at the right time, and who
feels confidence under the corresponding conditions, is brave
(1115b16-18).
The quote suggests that a courageous
person must have a medial level of fear
which he is able to control and thus be
able to resist the desire to flee to safety.
What counts as a medial level of fear and
confidence in the circumstances is determined in each case by one’s practical
wisdom (φρόνησις) – an indispensable
rational capacity for all virtuous choices.
Nevertheless, contrary to our modern
intuitions, which are rooted both in the
Kantian ideal of an agent who fulfils his
moral duty despite contrary inclinations
and the Christian image of a saint who
overcomes strong temptations, Aristotle considers a self-controlled person
to be a morally inferior character when
compared to a virtuous one. Whereas
a self-controlled person is able to control
and subdue his deviant desires, a truly
virtuous agent acts from a character
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that excludes the possibility of temptation to act otherwise. Every inclination
and every passion of a virtuous agent is
brought into line with his unwavering
commitment to a rationally justifiable
end and this is clearly recognised by Aristotle as a preferable state.8
Does a soldier, who has the virtue of
courage in its entirety, feel any fear at
all? Does that person, when confronted
with a life-threatening situation in battle, experience a corresponding desire
to flee even in the slightest degree? Aristotle’s general requirement for the ‘purity’ of virtues seems to suggest that
a courageous agent would simply have
no deviant passions to control. Indeed,
on a number of occasions in the Eth. Nic.
a brave man is univocally described by
Aristotle as fearless.9 But how exactly
should we understand this attribution
of fearlessness to a courageous agent?
8
Not everyone would be unhappy if virtue
would be reduced to continence or
self-control. Ross (2004), for instance,
insists that virtue is really self-control,
and blames Aristotle for failing to see this
clearly.
9
Aristotle uses four different terms in
the Eth. Nic. in his description of a courageous man, all of which can be understood as indicating the absence of fear:
ἄϕοβος (1115a16; 1117a18), ἀδεής (1115a32),
ἀνέκπληκτος
(1115b9-10),
ἀτάραχον
(1117a18). But whereas ἄϕοβος (‘without
fear’) is the least ambivalent term, the
other three are more nuanced in their semantic content, and might suggest both an
internal “state of the soul” and an external
manifestation. Some of the common English renderings include: ἀδεής – “fearless”
(Rackham), “fearless” (W. D. Ross), “intrepid” (Irwin); ἀνέκπληκτος – “being proof
against fear” (Rackham), “dauntless” (W. D.
Ross), “unperturbed” (Irwin); ἀτάραχον –
“undismayed” (Rackham), “undisturbed”
(W. D. Ross), “unperturbed” (Irwin).
ANDREI G. ZAVALIY
WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?: THE NOBLE GOAL OF COURAGE IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS
Some modern scholars insist on taking
Aristotle’s terminology seriously and
prefer to take the claim of fearlessness
at face value. For example, it has been
argued by Michelle Brady that viewing
courage as involving fearlessness in the
literal sense has the theoretical advantage “of making this particular virtue
compatible with the rest of Aristotelian virtue”, because it now seems to
nicely fit at least one part of the original ethical model (2005, 193). Furthermore, Brady’s interpretation of courage as implying complete fearlessness
accords well with Aristotle’s claim that
the virtues are not only concerned with
directing actions, but also with controlling passions (e.g. 1104b14), and,
in addition, it counters the real threat
of reducing Aristotelian virtue to mere
self-control or continence. After all,
a frightened hoplite who has successfully managed to control his passion
of fear and remained standing in the
phalanx is not morally different from
someone who struggled against the
temptation to indulge in an illicit or excessive pleasure and came out victorious
in the end. If the latter person would not
be recognised as truly temperate by the
philosopher (but merely as a continent
or a self-controlled person), neither
should the former soldier be seen as
courageous. On this reading, true courage is incompatible with any degree of
fear. We may call this a strong or internal
interpretation of fearlessness.
A complication arises when we consider the corresponding vices from the
traditional list, where one of the vices
is defined by Aristotle as “excess in
fearlessness” (1115b25), and when we
also recall the third definition of a courageous person as one who fears but
does so “in the right way” (1115b16-18).
The strong or internal interpretation
of fearlessness has a further practical
disadvantage of placing the virtue of
courage out of reach for the overwhelming majority of ordinary human beings,
which many readers would take to be
much more troublesome than any potential theoretical incongruities with
other parts of Aristotle’s virtue ethics.
Ultimately, experiencing no fear whatsoever in the face of a likely death in war
is hardly human.10
Faced with these objections, one may
prefer instead a weak or behavioural interpretation of fearlessness as a more
plausible alternative. A courageous
agent only acts as if he feels no fear of
death, even if the feeling of fear is present as a real subjective experience. One
of the defenders of this approach, David
Pears, writes that Aristotle most probably had in mind the “behavioural use”
of the word “fearless” in this context,
“which comments only on the manner of
the agent’s conduct,” rather than on his
mental experience (1980, 178-79).11 On
this sensible reading, the qualification
“fearless” should properly apply to one’s
external behaviour rather than to the internal state of someone who boldly faces
the dangers of war. An inexperienced
10
Aristotle cites anecdotal evidence of the
Celts, who “fear nothing”, but implies their
pathological deviation from the ‘normal’
human condition (1115b27).
11
See also (Urmson 1988) for a similar
position on the meaning of fearlessness
in Aristotle.
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warrior may tremble greatly “in his soul”
at the prospect of death or injury, but
what ultimately matters is his “fearless”
performance during military action.12
The weak interpretation is more in accord with our common intuitions. But,
in addition to the tensions with the textual evidence that were cited earlier, it
makes the distinction between a virtuous and a self-controlled person problematic, at least in the case of courage.
Nonetheless, it appears to be the only acceptable reading unless we are willing to
limit the category of courageous agents
to pathological characters only. After
all, as Aristotle observes, “he would be
a sort of madman or insensible person
if he feared nothing” (1115b26).13
12
There exists textual support for such
an interpretation. Aristotle, at one
point, claims that “the courageous man
is proof against fear (ἀνέκπληκτος) so
far as a human may be (ὡς ἄνθρωπος)”
(1115b10) (my emphasis). The qualifying
final clause probably takes the limits of
human psychology into consideration,
requiring fearlessness as a relative rather
than absolute condition. Likewise, a line
from 1115a16, which Rackham and Ross
render as a straightforward affirmation
of fearlessness: “the courageous man is
also a fearless person (ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ
ὁ ἀνδρεῖος)” should rather be translated
in a more qualified sense: “a courageous
person is a sort of (a type of) fearless
person” (together with Irwin and Crisp).
I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer
of the earlier draft of this paper for this
observation.
13
Stanley Rachman, for instance, cites
modern empirical studies which suggest
that natural fearlessness is a real but
extremely rare condition; there are a small
number of people who are relatively
impervious to fear, but this condition, if not
manifested in immature children, is often
correlated with psychological pathologies
(2004, 151-73).
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With the weak interpretation of
fearlessness as a constitutive element
of courage, we have come full circle
and have returned to the purely behavioural definition of courage as advanced
by Laches in Plato’s dialogue: a courageous man is someone “who does not
run away, but remains at his post and
fights against the enemy” (190e4-6). We
observed earlier that Aristotle favoured
Laches’ suggestion to limit the occasions
for courageous action to a military context. However, it is less likely that he
would also be content with limiting the
definition of the virtue itself to a description of the agent’s external behaviour, without considering the relevant
“passions” and, most importantly, the
normative reasons for action. According
to Aristotle, a soldier who “does not run
away” simply because he underestimated
the force of the enemy, or because his
appetite for future spoils is more intense
than his fear of death, would exhibit
a merely spurious form of courage. But
reference to an observable behaviour
alone would not allow him to make these
distinctions. In other words, courage
cannot be reduced to a formal description of one’s actions in a risky setting.
There must be something for the sake
of which a courageous action is undertaken and that goal must be of a certain
quality.
3. THE ΚΑΛΌΝ OF
A COURAGEOUS ACTION
We have observed that making fearlessness, when literally understood, into
a prerequisite for courage would drastically reduce the number of courageous
ANDREI G. ZAVALIY
WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?: THE NOBLE GOAL OF COURAGE IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS
individuals, since true fearlessness,
even if not downright pathological, appears to be a rare phenomenon. A fearless person is truly an exception, but it
is reasonably clear that fearlessness (in
whatever sense we understand it) is not
identical with courage for Aristotle, nor
is it a sufficient condition for this virtue.
A courageous person is praiseworthy,
admirable, and commendable. The inherently normative element of courage
would preclude the attempts to reduce
courage to mere fearlessness, since the
latter term lacks any obvious evaluative features when divorced from contextual clues. After all, mere mastery
over the emotion of fear in the face of
the fearsome is not a moral accomplishment in itself.14 Similarly, as Aristotle
would surely have realised, omitting
the specification of the proper goal of
a courageous action from the definition of courage threatens to eliminate
the normative or teleological aspect of
courage. Unless courage leads to some
substantive good or the action is undertaken with the intention of reaching
that good, it is not clear what makes it
into a virtue and why it is at all desirable
to acquire this character trait. The substantive good that a courageous agent
ought to consider as the final goal of
his behaviour is captured by Aristotle
in his notion of the “noble end (τέλος
καλόν)” of courage.
Admittedly, Aristotle never uses the
exact phase τέλος καλόν (‘noble end’)
14
Notably, a person who overcomes fear
of pain and death and commits suicide
would be considered a coward by Aristotle
(1116a11-15).
in the extant text, but the notion is
a natural derivation from these three
affirmations: “The brave man… will
face [dangers] for the sake of the noble
(τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα)” (1115b11-13); “To
the brave man bravery is noble; hence
the end it aims at is also such [i.e. noble] (τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν.
τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος)” (1115b21-22),
and “The real motive of courageous men
is the noble (τὸ καλόν)” (1116b30). It
seems obvious from these quotes that
Aristotle has a particular goal in mind
which he thinks should be the main motivating reason for a truly courageous
warrior.
The notion of nobility in Aristotle’s
discussion of courage remains one of
its most elusive elements. The initial
complication arises from the notorious semantic ambiguity of the adjective ‘καλόν,’ which, depending on the
context, can be translated as ‘virtuous,’
‘beautiful,’ ‘morally good,’ ‘noble’, or
simply ‘fine.’ In the text, the qualification “noble” (καλόν) is applied by Aristotle in the context of his analysis of
this virtue to the circumstances of war
(1115a27-30), to death (1115 a32-35;
1115b5-7), to danger (1115a30), to courage itself (1115b20-22), to the deeds of
war (1117b14), and, most importantly,
to the intended result of a courageous
action (1115b22-24; 1116b30). Some of
these attributions are more obvious than
others. We can interpret Aristotle’s contention that courage is καλόν as analytic
truth, which simply follows from his
conception of a virtue – a trait of character that contributes positively to fulfilling the specifically human purpose or
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function (έργον) (1099a20-21).15 Indeed,
in many cases Aristotle uses the term
καλόν (noble) as a close synonym of ‘virtuous’ (Lannstrom 2006, 12-13). But, as
Curzer justly observes, this cannot be
the correct sense of καλόν, at least as
it is used in connection with the final
goal of courage, a constitutive element
of this virtue: “Since Aristotle is using
the notion of nobility to specify what
counts as courageous, he cannot define
nobility in terms of courage, and then
define courage in terms of nobility”
(2012, 27).16 The goal of a courageous
action, in other words, cannot be καλόν
by default, simply because the virtue of
courage, just like all other virtues, has
this property.
Other attributions of καλόν cannot
be easily understood as being derived
from the nobility of virtue itself but must
refer to some further, external value.
Thus, the nobility of death must be seen
as being derived from the nobility of the
circumstances in which death occurs
(we may say that nobility is a “transitive”
property in this context). But the paradigmatic example of the circumstances
15
16
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The obviousness of the attribution
of ‘nobility’ to virtue is emphatically
affirmed, for example, by Protagoras in
the eponymous dialogue: “Unless I am
quite mad, [virtue] is the most honourable
(κάλλιστον) of all things” (349e5-7). In
another dialogue, Laches makes a similar
affirmation with regard to courage (Laches
192c5).
Curzer, likewise, rules out the translation
of καλόν as ‘beautiful’ (a common Homeric
meaning) when used in the phrase “καλόν
death” on the grounds that “it is quite
possible to die aesthetically from disease
or at sea, and unaesthetically on the
battlefield” (Ibid.).
in which a noble death could occur or
in which one could face a noble danger
is, for Aristotle, the circumstances of
war.17 But what is it that makes a war
or a battle noble? It surely cannot be
the case that war is noble and desirable
for its own sake. As Aristotle observes
elsewhere, “no one chooses to be at war
for the sake of being at war” (1177b9-10).
Hence, it must be some further goal of
war that alone bears the attribute “noble” non-derivatively.
There are a number of benefits one
can gain by waging a successful war.
However, as Aristotle observes, one
such important benefit is more obvious than others: “We make war that we
may live in peace” (1177b6). Still, peace,
we may agree, is not the ultimate goal
of war either, but is merely an instrumental one. We value peace primarily
because it creates suitable conditions
for pursuing our final end – εὐδαιμονία
(happiness, well-being, flourishing). Indeed, Aristotle, when speaking of happiness, uses a number of superlatives,
emphasising its unique status as a final
goal of all intentional actions, calling
it “the best, noblest (κάλλιστον), and
the most pleasant thing in the world”
(1099a24-25). He also acknowledges
17
This, of course, is the source of one of the
traditional charges against the Aristotelian
conception of courage. Curzer, among many
others, observes that “limiting courage
to life-threatening situations [in war]
flies in the face of common sense” (2012,
25). Elsewhere I argue that such a narrow
conception of the circumstances in which
courage can be manifested should be
explained by Aristotle’s desire to conform
to the Homeric paradigms of courage
(Zavaliy 2017).
ANDREI G. ZAVALIY
WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?: THE NOBLE GOAL OF COURAGE IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS
that “the more [the brave man] is possessed of virtue in its entirety, the happier he is” (1117b7), which reiterates an
earlier remark (1104b6-9) about a peculiar kind of delight (το χαίρον) that
a courageous agent experiences even at
the moment of the greatest danger. This
point about the joy that accompanies
military engagement will not be lost on
careful readers of Homer either, as in his
works many a hero shows real bloodlust
and eagerness for close encounters with
the enemy.18
This reading should partly alleviate
the common worry that for Aristotle the
term “noble” connotes some esoteric,
mysterious property that cannot easily
be transported to a different cultural
milieu. Courage is noble in the same
sense as that in which friendship is noble (cf. 1155a29), and deeds of courage,
which might often involve fighting in
a battle, are also noble, because they
aim to achieve the noblest goal of happiness. Noble, in this context, simply
qualifies a highly desirable state of affairs, something that one is willing to
risk one’s life for. Yet, as always, there
18
“He who stands his ground against things
that are terrible and delights (χαίρων)
in this or at least is not pained is brave,
while the man who is pained is a coward”
(1104b6-9). In Homer, a desire to prove
oneself worthy of one’s martial aretê
goes beyond mere readiness to fight
when forced to by the attacking enemy;
eagerness and even a strong yearning
(μέμαα) for fighting are also qualities that
distinguish the courageous leader. A real
bloodlust is felt, for instance, in the words
of Achilles, who encourages Agamemnon:
“Now let us remember our joy (χάρμης) in
warcraft” (Il.19.148 and esp. 213-14; cf. also
Il. 4.304; 5.569).
is a complication hiding behind the
obvious.
While the goal of war is peace, which
is a natural precondition of happiness,
which, in turn, is the noblest goal overall, it does not follow that the same
goal may ‘ground’ a virtuous action of
a particular warrior fighting in a war.
If a courageous person is willing to die
in battle, and if his death is nonetheless
noble and praiseworthy, the nobility of
such a death evidently derives not from
the person’s achieving his own pleasure
and happiness, but from some other worthy goal that is somehow furthered by
the person’s perishing on the battlefield.
As we observed earlier, one must be alive
(at the very least) in order to achieve personal eudaimonia. But what could that
other goal be? What should be the motive
of a warrior to act courageously even
in those drastic circumstances where
one’s perishing is nearly assured? Surprisingly, Aristotle does not give us as
much as a single hint of the possible options here. A short remark in the Politics,
where Aristotle seems to be commenting
on the proper goal of courage, is not very
helpful either. We learn from that text
that courage should not be practised for
the sake of wealth (χρήματα), but when
it comes to a more positive formulation,
Aristotle’s words remain cryptic: “For
[…] the function of courage is to produce
daring (ποιεῖν θάρσος)” (1258a11-12).
The short line is not illuminating at all
as it fails to specify the desirable goal of
that ‘daring’ and thus borders on being
an empty platitude.19 I suggest, then,
19
The word θάρσος is a term that was
also translated in a different context as
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41
42
that we should attempt to identify a plausible candidate for the noble goal of courage by a method of exclusion.
4. A SELF-REGARDING VIRTUE
The answer to the question that we formulated earlier – What should motivate
sacrificial behaviour in war? – may appear to be too self-evident to require
much elaboration. Michelle Brady, for
one, believes that Aristotle’s silence
on this subject of the noble goal can be
explained by its obviousness to his immediate audience. According to Brady,
it was a universally shared assumption
in Aristotle’s Athens and elsewhere in
Greece that the soldier’s sacrifice was
made for the preservation and well-being of the polis, a point that Aristotle
simply felt no need to reiterate (Brady
2005, 199). Brady’s suggestion does
not lack initial plausibility and may be
illustrated by a historical episode. In
a famous scene, related by Herodotus,
King Leonidas and his 300 Spartans
stood at the Thermopylae Pass and observed the massive onset of the Persian army. As he deliberated, he had to
consider the options for action. While
other Greek troops lost their spirit and
preferred to withdraw, Leonidas, according to the historian, remained and
cited two main reasons for his decision
to stand his ground despite the tremendous odds: “For himself [for King
Leonidas], however, it was not good to
‘confidence’ – one of the two emotions
with respect to which courage was initially
defined (Eth. Nic. 1107a31-b3). Outside
of philosophical parlance, θάρσος is
a common synonym for courage itself.
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leave; if he remained, he would leave
a name of great fame (κλέος μέγα), and
the prosperity (εὐδαιμονίη) of Sparta
would not be blotted out” (Hist. 7.220).
Besides the traditional Homeric value
of great glory (κλέος), eudaimonia was
apparently among the motivating reasons for King Leonidas’ actions as well.
But, to be sure, it was not his own happiness; it was rather the city of Sparta
that stood to benefit from his sacrifice
on the battlefield.20 Eudaimonia, as the
final goal of any intentional action, according to Aristotle’s original assumption, is being transferred here from an
individual to a collective entity – but
it is still perceived by the individual
agent (namely, Leonidas) as something
extremely valuable, something that
is worth fighting and dying for. The
happiness of King Leonidas, in other
words, is closely connected with the
happiness of his native polis and is simply inconceivable apart from it.
By choosing a nearly certain death
over withdrawal, King Leonidas was
acting in accordance with the injunctions of the Spartan poet Tyrtaeus,
whose inspiring martial elegies he
had surely memorised from early childhood. In one of the fragments, Tyrtaeus
seems to explicitly identify the goal of
courageous behaviour with communal
prosperity:
20
A straightforward connection between
happiness and courage was affirmed
earlier by Pericles, where freedom was the
natural link between the two: “Happiness
(εὐδαιμονία) is the fruit of freedom and
freedom [is the fruit] of valour (εὔψυχος)”
(Thuc. 2.43.4).
ANDREI G. ZAVALIY
WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?: THE NOBLE GOAL OF COURAGE IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS
This is the common good, for the polis and the whole demos,
when a man stands firm in the front
ranks without flinching
and puts disgraceful flight completely from his mind (12.15-17W).
The pan-Hellenic fame of the legendary King Leonidas and the indisputable
authority of Tyrtaeus as the foremost
martial elegist of all Greece confirm
Brady’s suggestion that there was little
doubt in the mind of an average Greek
about the proper justificatory reason for
a soldier’s sacrifice in war.
Whereas the goal, suggested by
Brady, fits well with popular opinion and
even with common sense, it is less than
obvious that it fits equally well with the
Aristotelian conception of virtue. Citing
the good of others as the proper goal (and
a motivating reason) of virtuous action
implies a form of ethical altruism – a belief that the moral value of a character
trait (or a behaviour stemming from it)
is constituted by the benefits it confers,
or is likely to confer, on other members
of a moral community. But whether Aristotle’s virtue ethics can be interpreted
as a form of altruistic consequentialism
is a highly controversial issue, which can
only be addressed tangentially here. Admittedly, several places in the Eth. Nic.
seem to claim that virtues contribute not
only to individual happiness but to the
common good as well, and, moreover,
that the common good is, in some sense,
preferable to personal eudaimonia. Only
two such passages from the Eth. Nic. will
be briefly examined below. The most frequently cited one reads as follows:
Those who busy themselves in an exceptional degree with noble (καλόν)
actions all men approve and praise;
and if all were to strive towards what
is noble and strain every nerve to do
the noblest deeds, everything would
be as it should be for the common
weal, and every one would secure for
himself the goods that are greatest,
since virtue is the greatest of goods
(1169a6-11).
Here Aristotle affirms that both the
personal good and the common weal
would be successfully served if every
single citizen strived to develop a virtuous character. The claim appears to
be highly plausible as an empirical observation: if all citizens are honest, temperate, friendly, and just, the polis itself
will surely flourish and prosper. But this
factual observation, even if true, can
hardly support a normative claim that
virtues should be practised for the sake
of the common weal. Rogers, commenting on this passage, observes that “Aristotle does not say [in these lines] the
καλόν promotes an individual’s good by
promoting the common good, but that
it leads to both the common good and
that of each individual. Since, however,
no priority or hierarchy is established
among these goods, the passage no
more shows that the καλόν is bound up
with the community’s than with one’s
personal good” (1993, 365). In other
words, the tendency of virtuous characters to contribute to a harmonious
and prosperous community is merely
a (fortunate) side effect of their virtuous
behaviour but does not constitute the
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44
essence of the virtues. Virtues would
still be intrinsically valuable for an individual even in the absence of such
a beneficial social effect.
The second quote comes from the
very first page of the Eth. Nic., where
Aristotle establishes the priority of the
science of politics by virtue of the fact
that politics, unlike all other sciences,
is concerned with the highest good, the
good of the collective:
Politics uses the rest of the sciences,
and since, again, it legislates as to
what we are to do and what we are to
abstain from, the end of this science
must include those of the others, so
that this end must be the good for
man (sic). For even if the end is the
same for a single man and for a state,
that of the state seems at all events
something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve;
though it is worthwhile to attain the
end merely for one man, it is finer
and more godlike (κάλλιον δὲ καὶ
θειότερον) to attain it for a nation or
for city-states (1094b6-10).
This idea has a close parallel in the
Politics (1253a18–29), where Aristotle
argues for the priority of the state over
an individual, with an obvious correlative inference that the good of the state
is more important than the good of a single citizen. But even though the science
of ethics is but a branch of the science
of politics, their final goals need not be
identical. While the final goal of politics
is indeed the communal weal, the goal
of ethics is individual eudaimonia, even
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if we grant the Aristotelian assumption
that the former is in some sense superior
and prior to the latter. As a politician,
King Leonidas should be primarily concerned with the well-being of his native
Sparta and that justifies and explains
his decision to engage the Persians in
a hopeless battle; as an individual who
(hypothetically) would have accepted
the Aristotelian ethical model of the virtues, the motive for his behaviour need
not be the same. Moreover, one can act
admirably and in a ‘godlike’ manner as
a politician, yet still without acting in
a truly virtuous manner.21
Praiseworthy social consequences of
a virtuous behavior are not what makes
that behaviour virtuous. We should be
careful not to turn Aristotle into an early
utilitarian thinker. Rogers rightly warns
the readers of the quoted passage not to
judge hastily: “To say that benefitting
many is more virtuous or καλόν than
benefitting one, is not to say that what
is virtuous about benefitting many is the
fact that one is benefitting many. Analogously, it is more courageous to stand
firm in battle than to flee, but standing
firm in battle is not what it is to be courageous, but instead a manifestation of
courage, which consists, rather, in the
21
Aristotle never mentions the episode with
the 300 Spartans, but, despite modern
expectations, it is less than obvious that he
would consider them as exemplars of true
courage. Thus, Pears argues that Aristotle
would disqualify them from the list of all
courageous warriors on the basis of their
apparent excess of confidence (1980, 183).
I will suggest below that they probably
would have been considered courageous
by Aristotle (had he cared to discuss the
topic) on other grounds.
ANDREI G. ZAVALIY
WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?: THE NOBLE GOAL OF COURAGE IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS
proper moderation of one’s fears and
confidences” (1993, 367).
The form of ethics defended by Aristotle is quite appropriately called
‘egoistic eudaimonism’ – a system of
behavioural constraints and the rules
for character development where the
ultimate beneficiary of one’s rationally
informed choices (i.e. as judged proper
by the power of practical reason – phronesis) is the agent himself. There is
simply no place in Aristotle’s ethics for
a sincere and altruistic concern for the
well-being of others if it does not contribute in any way to one’s own eudaimonia.22 If all virtuous actions (including those proceeding from the virtue
of friendship) are self-regarding in the
long run, it is highly unlikely that the
philosopher would make an exception
for courage and would advocate a form
of utilitarianism when justifying the
risk a soldier is exposed to in battle. We
must therefore look elsewhere for the
noble goal of bravery.
5. THE NOBILITY OF HONOUR
I suggest that we finally consider one
other candidate for the noble goal of
courage at the end of this article. In his
analysis of the various deficient forms of
22
In my estimate, Angier (2018) has
convincingly shown that all recent attempts
to present Aristotle as endorsing a form
of altruistic ethics (e.g. in connection
with his discussion of friendship) simply
do not square with the available textual
evidence. Aristotelian ethics is indeed
a form of enlightened ethical egoism,
but this should not be seen as being
a denigrating remark. As Rogers argues,
one of Aristotle’s greatest insights was
precisely the realisation that “altruism is
unnecessary for virtue” (1993, 371).
courage Aristotle mentions the courage
of the citizen troops (πολιτική ἀνδρεία),
that is, of the soldiers drafted into the
army from the rank of ordinary citizens
in time of war (as opposed to professional mercenaries) (1116a18-20).23 He
makes a further subdivision with regard
to the motivation of these drafted warriors. Some of them join the army out of
fear of punishment by the authorities,
while others volunteer to fight because
of considerations of shame and honour
(1116a21-34). The latter group exhibits
a form of courage that Aristotle obviously ranks above the former, forced
variety. He praises the voluntary courage of the citizens as that “most closely
resembling [true courage] (μάλιστα
γὰρ ἔοικεν)” and his explanation of this
rather favourable estimate is revealing:
“For it [the form of voluntary courage
of a citizen soldier] is due to shame and
desire for a noble object (καλοῦ ὄρεξιν)
namely, honour (τιμή)” (1116a28). This
quote is unique as it is the only place
where Aristotle explicitly identifies
honour with “a noble object”. By doing
23
Aristotle begins his description of the five
forms of courage with the phrase ἔστι μὲν
οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ
ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους (116a15-16),
which is meant to demarcate his own
conception of this virtue from those
other popular views that, apparently,
compete for the title of true virtue but fall
short for various reasons. This much is
uncontroversial. It does not imply, however,
that Aristotle rejects every single aspect
of the description of those subsequent
five forms. For example, as I argue below,
Aristotle rejects ‘political courage’ as being
identical with his own understanding,
without necessarily rejecting the idea
that honour, the intended goal of political
courage, is nonetheless a noble object.
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46
this Aristotle is apparently legitimising a desire for honour (and glory, we
may assume) as the proper final goal of
a courageous action. A fearless soldier
motivated by his desire to leave a great
name behind for posterity is thereby
motivated by something truly noble and
is to this extent exhibiting genuine virtue. So, perhaps, we have found what we
were searching for – the noble goal of
a courageous soldier is the noble object
of honour.24 But before resting with this
conclusion, we should take a brief look
at what Aristotle said about the value of
honour in general.
Admittedly, Aristotle’s view on the
value of honour is somewhat ambivalent.
One place where honour is discussed
at some length occurs in the context of
his search for the true meaning of happiness (εὐδαιμονία) at the beginning of
the Eth. Nic. After a vulgar life devoted
to pleasures was quickly dismissed, honour was presented as a common goal
of “cultivated people active in politics,”
and the question was raised whether it
24
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It still remains puzzling why the voluntary
courage of the citizen troops is not
identified with genuine virtue by Aristotle
but is said to be “most closely resembling”
it. What exactly is missing and what else is
needed to turn it into virtue? Irwin suggests
the following explanation (Irwin prefers to
translate καλόν as ‘fine’): “These citizen
soldiers aim at honor, which is FINE. But
they do not aim at the fine, as the virtuous
person does. If they aimed at the fine, they
would recognize that the action itself is
fine whether or not it receives honor” (1999,
213). The explanation seems far-fetched
as it turns Aristotle into a deontologist
who recognises the absolute intrinsic
moral value of an action, regardless of
the consequences that it might bring for
an agent.
would then be proper to identify honour
with the final good. Aristotle’s answer is
rather straightforward: “[Honour] appears to be too superficial to be what we
are seeking [i.e. final good], for it seems
to depend more on those who honour
than on the one honoured, whereas we
intuitively believe that the good is something of our own” (1095b23-26). Thus,
he continues, we may likewise safely
dismiss political life and its main goal,
honour, from consideration, and start
looking elsewhere for the kind of life
which would lead to happiness.25 At the
same time, as we have seen in the previous paragraph, on at least one occasion
Aristotle seems to endorse honour as
a noble, and, therefore, as a morally desirable end of action. Can honour, then,
while being καλόν on the philosopher’s
own admission, ‘ground’ a courageous
action as its final and proper goal?
The following conclusion, although
tentative, seems to me rather plausible.
While rejecting honour as the proper
final end of human life in general, Aristotle is not denying its nobility or desirability in the relevant sense of the word.
It may well be the case that the true happiness of a fulfilled life is not identical
with a life devoted to honour, and yet
a courageous agent, as earlier observed,
was not expected to pursue his own happiness by engaging in life-threatening
behaviour during war – for obvious reasons. By recognising honour as noble
(καλόν), we are not implying that it is
the ultimate self-sufficient final good,
25
The inadequacy of honour, as the common
goal of “the many”, is also discussed at Eth.
Nic. 1159a22-27.
ANDREI G. ZAVALIY
WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?: THE NOBLE GOAL OF COURAGE IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS
i.e. we are not challenging Aristotle’s
evaluation of εὐδαιμονία as being “the
noblest (κάλλιστον)” (1099a24-25).
But it seems that a goal of action can
still be noble, even without fitting the
category of the “most final end” or “the
noblest end” in the Aristotelian sense.
As we have already seen, the qualification καλόν is freely applied by Aristotle
to a variety of virtues, objects, and circumstances, and, when the pursuit of
personal εὐδαιμονία comes into conflict
with the harsh realities of war, there is
no reason why a desire for honour and
postmortem glory should be denied the
characteristic of nobility.26
Finally, Aristotle’s brief digression
on whether one’s state as a happy (or
unhappy) person can be affected after
death (1100a18-31) may be cited as a supplementary point in favour of the above
interpretation – although I do not know
how much weight to assign to it. In addition to the “fortune of the descendants”
as one of the possible causal factors that
are thought (by ‘the many’) to affect
one’s happiness, Aristotle specifically
mentions “[postmortem] honours and
26
Both honour (τιμή) and glory (κλέος) refer
in Homer to the praise and admiration
paid to rulers and warriors. While honour
is typically enjoyed during the lifetime of
a person (and often has monetary value),
glory refers to the post-mortem extolment
of a hero by later generations. Aristotle
focuses on honour (τιμή) in his discussion,
but there is no reason to suppose that he
takes it to be qualitatively different from
glory, as these two terms were used as
close synonyms at least as early as the
fifth century BCE. Cf. Aristophanes: “Divine
Homer, where did he get honour and glory
(τιμὴν καὶ κλέος) if not from teaching useful
things?” (Ran. 1035).
dishonours (τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι)” that
may befall the deceased as another potential influence (1100a20). After considering the objection that happiness is
an activity, he nonetheless tentatively
concludes that “it would be odd if [these
factors] did not for some time have some
effect on the happiness [of a deceased
person]” (1100a30). However mysterious and inconsistent with the Aristotelian conception of happiness this
cryptic remark may otherwise sound,
it provides direct textual evidence for
describing a fallen but properly glorified warrior as not being devoid of eudaimonia after all. King Leonidas and
his legendary regiment of 300 Spartans
fought valiantly for the sake of the noble
goal of “great glory (κλέος μέγα)” and
the exceptional postmortem veneration
they received must have had some effect
(on Aristotle’s admission) on their eudaimonia as well.
If we do accept honour as the
proper noble goal of courage, two final
observations should be made. First,
the Aristotelian conception of courage
will turn out to be more Homeric in
nature than he was willing to admit in
the text.27 Secondly, for Aristotle the
virtue of courage will remain an exclusively aristocratic virtue, the virtue of
a select few heroes, as only these characters are capable of being motivated
to risk their lives by the prospects of
27
Elsewhere I argue that the Homeric model of
courage, insofar as it can be reconstructed
from the actions of the central heroes of
the epics, is fully compatible with the
Aristotelian theoretical account, despite
Aristotle’s explicit protestations (Zavaliy
2017).
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48
postmortem glory alone. The majority
of ordinary warriors, such as those
who are motivated by money, by fear
of punishment, or even by a seemingly
altruistic desire to protect their family,
will have to rest content with something less than true courage, something that only approximates genuine
virtue to various degrees. The obvious
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elitist implication of this account, I believe, constitutes the main weakness of
the Aristotelian view of courage, but its
substantive criticism is only possible
in conjunction with a well-developed
alternative account of what constitutes
true bravery. This daunting project,
however, will have to be undertaken
at another time.
ANDREI G. ZAVALIY
WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?: THE NOBLE GOAL OF COURAGE IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS
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