PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF
THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA: THE CASE OF AUGUSTINUS
FAVARONI OF ROME, OESA (†1443)
BY MONICA BRÎNZEI
The Faculty of Theology of Bologna, founded in 1364, presents a paradox when we
investigate its custom of performing principia on the Sentences prior to 1400.
Although we are fortunate to have from Bologna the most complete surviving documentation concerning the organization of a medieval theology faculty, only two complete sets of principia have been identified so far from the matricula of 450 known
scholastics. The situation hinders any comparative investigation that intends to test
how what is depicted in the statutes is reflected in practice. The two surviving sets
of principia from Bologna are those of the Cistercian Conrad of Ebrach, from 1368–
1369, and the Augustinian Augustinus Favaroni of Rome, dating to 1388–1389.
This study uses Augustinus Favaroni’s principia to illustrate how this academic exercise functioned at the University of Bologna. It begins with a biographical sketch of
Augustinus Favaroni of Rome followed by a short description of the principia as mirrored in the statutes of Bologna. It continues with a brief summary of each of the four
principia of Favaroni reporting the philosophical and theological topics developed in
his text, with an emphasis on the debates in which he engaged to defend his theses,
and concludes with an appendix containing an edition of the four principia.
Augustinus Favaroni was born in Rome in 1360, entered the studium of the
Augustinian Hermits at Bologna in 1384, and was bacchalarius formatus in
1389, after completing his lectures on Peter Lombard’s Sentences in 1388–1389.
This date is confirmed by the colophon at the end of his first Principium on fol.
159ra (qui legit Bononie 1388o et 89o). In 1392 he became a Master of Theology
and in 1398 he is still recorded as magister regens in Bologna.1 After finishing
his studies, Favaroni was very active in various Augustinian studia in Italy
This paper was written with the financial support of ERC DEBATE project n° 771589.
1
For Favaroni’s biography, see Gino Ciolini, Augustino da Roma (Favaroni †1443) e la
sua cristologia (Florence, 1944); the well-documented Daniela Gionta, “Agostino Favaroni,”
in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, 45 (1995): http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/agostino-favaroni_%28Dizionario_Biografico%29/ (accessed 15 July 2022); and Adolar Zumkeller, O.E.S.A., Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages, ed. John
E. Rotelle, O.S.A. (Villanova, PA, 1996), 52–54 and 107–108. For an updated list of his
texts, see Marco Toste, “Augustinus de Favaronibus,” in C.A.L.M.A.: Compendium Auctorum
Latinorum Medii Aevi (500–1500) (Florence, 2001), 1.4:502–505.
Traditio 77 (2022), 377–463
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Fordham
University. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
work is properly cited.
doi:10.1017/tdo.2022.4
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TRADITIO
(Bologna, Lecce, and Perugia), during which period he produced several treatises
and a commentary on the Apocalypse.2 By 1416, he was teaching theology in
Florence and during this period he wrote a commentary on Books I and II of Aristotle’s Ethics. Between 1419–1431 he served as Prior General of the Augustinian
Order. Another important moment of his life arrived in 1430, when at the
request of Pope Martin V, Favaroni’s confessor, Pietro Assalhit, went to Ostia
to obtain St. Monica’s relics for their translation to Rome and took Favaroni
with him. On 17 July 1431, Pope Eugene IV named him Archbishop of Nazareth
in Barletta (Apulia) and in 1432 he became the apostolic administrator of Cesena
until his resignation in 1435. Starting in 1430, Favaroni was the focus of an investigation of some of the propositions in his Tractatus super Apocalipsim that were
judged as being too close to Jan Hus’s doctrine.3 Seven propositions from this
treatise were the subject of a second examination in 1435. Favaroni defended
his position in two different treatises: Contra quosdam errores haereticorum and
Defensorium sacramenti unitatis Christi et Ecclesiae.4 Although he participated
in the Council of Basel from 1432 to 1435, this did not protect him from accusations of heresy, and his treatise on Christology was rejected by the same council on
15 October 1435. He spent the last years of his life in Tuscany and died in 1443 in
Prato, where he was buried.5
Although the Sentences questions of some of the major figures of the Augustinian Order from the fourteenth century were printed in the early modern period or
have been edited in recent decades, Augustinus Favaroni of Rome is one of those
scholars whose questions still remain unpublished. His Sentences survive in a
single manuscript: Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz,
lat. fol. 852, which was probably copied in 1398.6 Despite its limited circulation,
2
Nicholas Toner dedicated a study to this treatise to establish how orthodox or unorthodox Favaroni’s position was on sin and justification. See Nicholas Toner, O.S.A., The Doctrine
of Original Sin and Justification according to Augustine of Rome (Favaroni) †1443 (Louvain,
1958).
3
See Willigis Eckermann, “Augustinus Favaroni von Rom und Johannes Wyclif: Der
Ansatz Arer Lehre über die Kirche,” in Scientia Augustiniana, ed. Cornelius P. Mayer and
Willigis Eckermann (Würzburg, 1975), 323–48; and Adolar Zumkeller, O.S.A., “Die Augustinereremiten in der Auseinandersetzung mit Wyclif und Hus, ihre Beteiligung an den Konzilien von Konstanz und Basel,” Analecta Augustiniana 28 (1965): 5–56.
4
Willigis Eckermann, Opera inedita historiam XXII sessionis concilii Basilensis respicentia: Augustini de Roma OESA Contra quosdam errores haereticorum, et Defensorium sacramenti unitatis Christi et Ecclesiae, atque Henrici Kalteisen OP Propositiones in
condamnatione libelli Augustini de Roma (Rome, 1978).
5
Willigis Eckermann, “Zur Hermeneutik theologischer Aussagen: Überlegungen Heinrich Kalteisens OP auf dem Basler Konzil zu Propositionen des Augustinus Favaroni von
Rom OESA,” Augustiniana 25 (1975): 24–42.
6
The date of the manuscript is noted at the end of principium III (fol. 209rb), where
Favaroni is mentioned as currently being regent master in Bologna: “Explicit questio
tertii principii super tertium Sententiarum reverendi et subtilis doctoris magistri Augustini
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
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his commentary on the Sentences had an impact on other scholars, as the existence
of an abbreviation of Book I, composed in 1439 by Guilielmo Becchi, future Prior
General of the order from 1460 to 1469, attests.7 Another echo of the circulation of
Favaroni’s theological ideas is his inclusion in a list of twenty-three authorities
named by Johannes Schiphover in his Tractatus de conceptione Immaculate Virginis, composed around 1492.8
Among his treatises and various other theological texts, Favaroni’s known
works include commentaries on Aristotle’s Ethica, De caelo, and Metaphysica.9
Contrary to the attribution to Favaroni on the cover of the manuscript, Charles
Lohr ascribed the commentary on the Metaphysics in Firenze, Biblioteca
Medicea-Laurenziana, Plut. XIII, Sin. 7, fols. 76r–91r to Adam of Bocfeld.10
Samuel Harrison Thomas has argued against Lohr’s attribution, however, and
more recently Silvia Donati has done the same.11 Favaroni also wrote a treatise
De principatu papae, dedicated to Cardinal Cosma Magliorati (archbishop of
de Roma nunc regentis Bononie ordinis Fratrum Hermitarum sancti Augustinis 1398.” On
the still unstudied Sentences commentaries of the Augustinians, see Eric L. Saak, Creating
Augustine: Interpreting Augustine and Augustinianism in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford,
2012), 226. There are also cases of authors whose texts have been lost. See Monica Brinzei,
“Nouveaux témoignages sur les textes perdus d’Onofre de Florence OESA (1336–1403),
bachelier en théologie à Paris,” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 87
(2020): 59–86.
7
Stegmüller mentions the Abbreviatio I Sententiarum Augustini de Roma in Firenze, Leopoldina cod. 14. See Friedrich Stegmüller, Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri
Lombardi (Würzburg, 1947), 1:129 (no. 284). A list of Becchi’s texts can be found in
Davide A. Perini, Bibliographia augustiniana cum notis biographicis: Scriptores Itali (Florence,
1929), 1:103–105.
8
See Harald Berger, “Albertus de Saxonia (1390), Conradus de Waldhausen (1369) und
Ganderus recte Sanderus de Meppen (1401/06): Eine Begegnung in Prag im Jahr 1364,” Mitteilungen de Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 106 (1998): 31–50, at 40 n. 35.
9
His commentaries on Aristotelian texts confirm the general trend that “[m]endicant
commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus were, in the fourteenth century, usually composed
after the Sentences commentary and before magisterial regency.” See William J. Courtenay,
“Friedrich von Regensburg and Fribourg Cordeliers 26,” in Die Philosophie im 14. und 15.
Jahrhundert: In memoriam Konstanty Michalski (1879–1947), ed. Olaf Plut (Amsterdam,
1988), 603–13, at 607 n. 17. For the manuscripts of these texts, see Salesius Friemel, Die theologische Prinzipienlehre des Augustinus Favaroni von Rom O.E.S.A. (†1443) (Würzburg,
1950), 25–26. For the Ethics, see also David A. Lines, Aristotle’s Ethics in the Italian Renaissance (ca. 1300–1650) (Leiden, 2002), 190–91, 423, and 482–83.
10
Charles H. Lohr, “Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors A-F,” Traditio 23
(1967): 313–413, at 371–12; and idem, Latin Aristotle Commentaries, I.1, Medieval Authors AL (Florence, 2013), 70–71.
11
Samuel Harrison Thomas, “The Works of Magister Adam of Bocfeld (Bochermefort),”
Medievalia et Humanistica 2 (1944): 55–87, esp. 72–75; and Silvia Donati, “English Commentaries before Scotus, A Case-Study: The Discussion on the Unity of Being,” in A Companion to
the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, ed. Fabrizio Amerini and Gabriele Galluzzo (Leiden, 2014), 137–207, esp. 140 n. 12.
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TRADITIO
Bologna), later Pope Innocent VII, in which he defends papal primacy in both the
ecclesiastical and the secular spheres.12
To all of this biographical material we can add a remark on how the secondary
literature has classified Favaroni. Besides the episode of the condemnation, often
simply repeated without further inquiry, another trend has been either to assimilate him to Protestantism or to deny his being a possible source for Luther’s doctrine of predestination and sin.13 Favaroni was a provocative theologian who did
not pass up opportunities to attack his contemporaries in writing and to praise the
theology of the pre-scholastics, an attitude similar to what we find in France in
Jean Gerson, who criticized the present masters of theology and advocated a
return to classical sources in doing theology.14
PRINCIPIA ON
THE
SENTENCES
AT
BOLOGNA
ACCORDING TO THE
STATUTES
Courses at medieval universities often began with sermon-like speeches known
as principia.15 In the case of lectures on the Sentences of Peter Lombard by bachelors of theology, in the second decade of the fourteenth century these speeches were
combined with doctrinal exchanges between the bachelors. Following established
Parisian tradition, principia on the Sentences at Bologna were thus a mandatory
exercise in which bachelors of theology began their lectures with a public debate,
defending theses, attacking those of their colleagues, and demonstrating their erudition and rhetorical skills in the process. Although the debates were held in the
Faculty of Theology, the choice of topic seems to have been free and often
12
Dom J. Leclercq, “L’idée de la royauté du Christ pendant le grand schisme et la crise
conciliaire,” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 24 (1949): 249–65, at
261–64; Gonzalo Diaz, “Tratado inédito ‘De principatu papae’ de Augustin Favaroni, O.S.
A. († 1443),” Analecta Augustiniana 53 (1990): 95–192; Enrico Pispisa, “Il ‘De principatu
papae’ di Agostino Favaroni,” in Dante nel pensiero e nella esegesi dei secoli XIV e XV: Atti
del Convegno di studi realizzato dal Comune di Melfi in collaborazione con la Biblioteca Provinciale di Potenza e il Seminario di studi danteschi di Terra di lavoro. Melfi, 27 settembre-2 ottobre
1970, ed. Adalgisa Borraro and Pietro Borraro (Florence, 1975), 375–84, esp. 378–82; and
Aldo Vallone, Antidantismo politico nel XIV secolo (Naples, 1973), 137–40.
13
See more recently Thomas M. Izbicki, “The Revival of Papalism at the Council of
Basel,” in A Companion to the Council of Basel, ed. Michiel Decaluwé, Thomas M. Izbicki,
and Gerald Christianson (Leiden, 2017), 137–63, at 146–47; Alphons V. Müller, Agostino
Favaroni e la teologia di Lutero (Rome, 1914); and Eduard Stakemeier, Der Kampf um Augustin auf dem Tridentium (Paderborn, 1937).
14
Jean Gerson, “Gerson aux Messieurs de Navarre, Bruges, 29 avril 1400,” in Oeuvres
Complètes: L’oeuvre ecclésiastique (253a–291), ed. Palémon Glorieux (Paris, 1960), 2:30–35.
15
See, for example, Nancy Spatz, “Principia: A Study and Edition of Inception Speeches
Delivered before the Faculty of Theology of Paris, ca. 1180–1286” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1992). For comments on principia as presented in the statutes of Bologna, see Siegfried Wenzel, Of Sins and Sermons (Leuven, 2015), 146–47.
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
381
philosophical issues such as epistemology, causality, and model logic were thinly
cloaked under a theological title.
The statutes of the Bologna Faculty of Theology, edited in 1932 by Cardinal
Ehrle, inform us that the principia on the Sentences began on the first possible
day for lectures in October. Each day at the same hour a different bachelor
would deliver his first principium, related to the first of the four books of Lombard’s text, and the entire faculty was obliged to be present for all the first principia.16 Unlike at Paris, where the Carmelite bachelor always began the
proceedings, in Bologna the sequence of bachelors for the first principium
varied depending on who was dean and the seniority of the other masters, since
the order was linked to the bachelors’ individual masters. During the academic
year, which ended on 29 June, the process was repeated for each of the other
three books of the Sentences. Each principium was supposed to be composed of
a collatio, a protestatio, and a quaestio.17 For the collatio, the speech, the bachelor
was invited to praise theology or the Sentences. The protestatio was a public oath
by which the bachelor promised to respect the university, the Church, the faith,
and his colleagues during the debates.18
Although the Bologna statutes are detailed and give a general impression about
how principia should function within the Faculty of Theology, they do not give a
clear idea about how principia worked in reality. In this respect, actual texts deriving from this academic exercise provide considerably more information. In addition to the quaestio from the second principium of William of Cremona, two
complete sets of four principia survive from fourteenth-century Bologna, those
of the Cistercian Conrad of Ebrach, from 1368–1369, and the Augustinian Augustinus Favaroni of Rome, from 1388–1389, the subject of this article.19
THE FOUR PRINCIPIA OF AUGUSTINUS FAVARONI OF ROME
The manuscript Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz,
lat. fol. 852, fols. 155r–225v, contains the only copy of Augustinus Favaroni of
16
Francesco Ehrle, I più antichi statuti della facoltà teologica dell’Università di Bologna
(Bologna, 1932), 21, l. 1–8.
17
Ehrle, I più antichi statuti, 21, l. 8–19, and 22, l. 1–18.
18
Ehrle, I più antichi statuti, 46–47.
19
I am currently editing Conrad’s principia, but see Chris Schabel, Monica Brînzei, and
Mihai Maga, “A Golden Age of Theology at Prague: Prague Sentences Commentaries, ca.
1375–1385, with a Redating of the Arrival of Wycliffism in Bohemia,” Acta Universitatis Carolinae – Historia Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis 55 (2015): 19–39, at 21–30. For William’s
second principium, see Chris Schabel, “The Franciscan Guglielmo Centueri of Cremona’s
Bologna Principium of 1368, with an Appendix on Whether God Can Make the Past Not
to Have Been,” in Principia on the Sentences, ed. Monica Brinzei and William Duba
(Turnhout, forthcoming).
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TRADITIO
Rome’s Sentences commentary and Principia.20 The manuscript has multiple
codicological units. The unit with Favaroni’s Sentences is at the end of the
codex, but most of the first folio has been torn out (containing the speech and
beginning of the question of the first Principium) and so have more than thirty
folios from the end of the manuscript. Although the codex transmits a major
text by an Augustinian author, the manuscript did not come from the Augustinian
Regler Kloster (ca. 1117–1540) in Erfurt, unlike the other Augustinian manuscripts in the Berlin Staatsbibliothek.21 In all four of his Principia Favaroni
follows the same structure, dividing each principium into a speech, called a collatio
in the manuscript, and a question.22
For the collationes, it was common for an author to choose a biblical thema
linked to his name or identity.23 The thema for all three of Favaroni’s surviving
collationes in the Berlin manuscript comes from Psalm 44:2: Eructavit cor meum
verbum bonum, “My heart hath uttered a good word.” Digging into the etymology
of Favaroni’s name, we can propose a hypothetical heraldic pun linked to the
thema. In Lombardy, names such as Favaro or Favara derive from fava,
meaning “bean,” a plant recognized for its erect trajectory in its growth.24 A
similar clin d’oeil directs the listener to Tuscany, where fava designates the masculine sexual organ. The pun is of course lost in the Douai translation, but in Latin
anyone familiar with Favaroni’s eccentric intellectual profile and his provocative
attitude would not hesitate to suspect irony here and replace the second vowel of
the first word of the thema with an -e-.
The mise en page in the manuscript recalls speeches from Paris, in which poetry
is graphically highlighted in red ink marking the presence of a stanza.25 Each
20
For a presentation of the manuscript, see Friemel, Die theologische Prinzipienlehre (n. 9
above), 24.
21
I am grateful to Eef Overgaauw, the director of the medieval manuscript department
of the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, who allowed me to inspect all
the manuscripts that came from Erfurt; I was thus able to compare their medieval shelfmarks
to that of the manuscript lat. fol. 852. For the list of the manuscripts from Erfurt, see Sigrid
Krämer, Handschriftenerbe des Deutschen Mittelalters (München, 1989), 1:211.
22
For a discussion of the dual meaning of collatio in relation to principia on the Sentences,
see Chris Schabel, “The Victorine Pierre LeDuc’s Collationes, Sermo finalis, and Principia on
the Sentences, Paris 1382–3,” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 87
(2020): 237–334, at 238–39.
23
See Damasus Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century: Notes on Editions,
Marginalia, Opinions and Booklore,” Augustiniana 6 (1956): 146–274, at 269; and Ueli
Zahnd’s database: “Heraldic Puns in Medieval Principia,” https://puns.zahnd.be/ (accessed
15 July 2022).
24
See Emidio de Felice, Dizionario dei cognomi italiani (Milan, 1978), 122. I thank Irene
Zavattero for assistance on this point.
25
Roughly contemporary Parisian examples are John Regis’s principia in Paris, BnF, lat.
15156, fols. 34r–55v; those of Peter Gracilis in London, British Library, A 10, fols. 1r–11v,
126r–134r, 192r–197v, and 215r–219v; and especially those of Pierre d’Ailly: Petrus de
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
383
speech bears the rubric “collatio” and begins with a series of stanzas that display
Favaroni’s metrical talent.26 The speech of the first Principium has literally been
torn out, perhaps because someone wished to destroy the evidence of the text’s
attribution, since it is highly unlikely that there was an illustrated initial inside
a codex written in an ugly university script of no artistic value. Favaroni
uttered (eructavit) his speeches as a poetic expression of rhetoric and erudition,
with the intention of impressing his audience. The message he preaches here is
that the Sentences of Peter Lombard open a path to intellectual exaltation and
lay the foundations for spiritual elevation. Favaroni’s virtuosity is revealed
through his familiarity with the Bible, the Augustinian corpus, and the Sentences
themselves. The topic of the second collatio (fol. 204rb–vb) is creation, and
Favaroni harmonizes a philosophical vision borrowed from Boethius’ De consolatione on the composition of the cosmos from four properties (hot, cold, wet, dry)
with the act of divine creation from Augustine’s perspective. The third collatio (fol.
207rb–vb), on Christ’s humanity, blends scholastic and monastic vocabulary from
Peter Lombard and Bernard of Clairvaux to illustrate how the lex Christi uplifts
human nature.27 The fourth and final collatio (fol. 209va–b) again praises
Lombard and the crucial role the sacraments play on the road to salvation.
This speech too is a rhetorical patchwork of biblical and Augustinian vocabulary
obviously written to emphasize Favaroni’s poetic talent in theology.
After the collationes, Favaroni does not record his oral protestationes in written
form, but moves directly to the quaestiones. Each quaestio is divided into articles,
and the articles into conclusiones or theses, and Favaroni introduces a set of corollaries in support of each thesis. These are the titles of the questions:
Principium I (fols. 155r–159ra): “Utrum solum theologicum verbum ostendat
intellectui viatoris esse aliquod primum verbum quod sit prima veritas qua sint
vera quecumque alia vera, vel per aliquam aliam scientiam possit hoc sciri et evidenter concludi.”
Principium II (fols. 205ra–207ra): “Utrum quelibet divini vigoris activa productio sit sui termini formaliter creativa.”
Principium III (fols. 207va–209ra): “Utrum unio personalis humane nature ad
Verbum sit ceteris unionibus eligibilior quibus eadem natura potest Deo uniri.”
Principium IV (fols. 210ra–211v): “Utrum sacramenta legis ewangelice sint cuilibet viatori necessaria ad salutem.”
Alliaco, Questiones super primum, tertium et quartum librum Sententiarum: Principia et questio
circa prologum, ed. Monica Brînzei (Turnhout, 2013), 3–9, 45–52, 77–84, and 102–108.
26
A transcription of the three collationes can be consulted here: https://debate-erc.com/
rhyming-philosophical-stanzas/ (accessed 15 July 2022).
27
Bernard of Clairvaux appears frequently in principial speeches, for example, in those
of Pierre d’Ailly: Petrus de Alliaco, Principia et questio circa prologum, 45–47 and 75–81.
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384
TRADITIO
The presentation of the questions is devoid of traces of orality from the actual
exchanges between the bachelors. Favaroni quotes only two fellow bachelors of
the Sentences, called socii.
Socii
In his third Principium, Favaroni mentions as socii a reverendus baccalarius de
ordine Carmelitarum and a reverendus baccalarius de ordine Servorum Sancte Marie,
but no other information concerning their identity is provided. The Carmelite
Chapter General held at Brescia on May 26, 1387, assigned Antonio Masazana
to read the Sentences in Bologna in the second year, the first year being 1387–
1388, so he must have been the Carmelite sententiarius lecturing along with Favaroni in 1388–1389.28 In Brescia, Masanaza is listed as the definitor of the Irish province, perhaps an error for Lombardy, since he was from the convent of Milan and
was definitor of Lombardy at the 1393 General Chapter in Frankfurt. From the
Acta Capitulorum we know that he was Master of Theology in Bologna by 1393.
Masazana served as Prior Provincial of Lombardy from at least 1399 until his
death in 1421.29 While Antonio Masazana was thus Favaroni’s Carmelite socius,
we find in Ehrle’s list of scholars from the Faculty of Theology in Bologna two
possible candidates for the Servite socius: Antonio of Alessandria and Ludovico
of Venice, both of whom are recorded elsewhere as bachelors of theology at
Bologna in 1387.30 So far, we have no means of determining if one of them
engaged in debate with Favaroni the following year.
28
Acta Capitulorum Generalium Ordinis Fratrum B.V. Mariae de Monte Carmelo, ed.
Gabriel Wessels, O. Carm. (Rome, 1912), 1:101. It should be noted that Carlo of Bologna is
assigned for the first year, 1387–1388, but Antonio for the following two years and Johannes
Cranemer for the two years after that. In 1381 three Carmelites had been assigned for one
year each (Acta, 1:89), but in 1393 it was decided that Carmelite bachelors in Italian universities would lecture for two years, first on Books I–II and then on Books III–IV (Acta, 1:107).
The shift may have occurred with Antiono in 1388. Ehrle, I più antichi statuti (n. 16 above),
106 (no. 89) lists an Antonius de Mediolano ordinis Carmelitarum, but gives no further
information.
29
Acta Capitulorum Generalium, 1:99, 101, 106, and 122.
30
Ehrle, I più antichi statute (n. 16 above), 106 (no. 91) and 107 (no. 96); and Raffaele
P. Taucci, “I Maestri della facoltà teologica di Bologna,” Studi Storici Sull’ordine dei Servi
di Maria 1 (1933): 24–42, at 30. On the Order of Servites of Mary, see Conrad Borntrager,
“The Marian Spirituality of the Medieval Religious Orders: Medieval Servite Marian Spirituality,” Marian Studies 52 (2001): 229–45. Lorenzo Opimo of Bologna authored the only
extant text on the Sentences by a Servite. It survives in two manuscripts and an early
printed edition: Chris Schabel, “Lorenzo Opimo of Bologna, Teaching Doctor of the Servites
during the Reformation, and His Sentences Lectures at the University of Paris in 1370–71,”
Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 98 (2022) and 99 (2023), forthcoming.
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
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Favaroni does not explicitly mention any socii in the first, second, and fourth
Principia, but we find him debating with and arguing against some magistri of his
order, such as Gregory of Rimini and Hugolino of Orvieto. His attitude as a harsh
critic of scholastic authors, whether inside or outside his order, is recognizable in
all his writings.31 Just as Jean Gerson would do in Paris, Favaroni advocates in the
same terms a return to pre-moderni authors, his main alternative authorities being
Augustine and Hugh of Saint-Victor. Favaroni’s polemics against the magistri of
his time are also reflected in his Principia. A detailed analysis of the first Principium will serve to show how Favaroni defends his positions and attacks the theological views of others.
Primum Principium
The partial mutilation and tight binding of Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, lat. fol.
852, prevents access to the full text and renders the transcription of what is
visible quite difficult. We are fortunate to have the part of the first Principium
where Favaroni announces the structure of the question and gives the titles of
the three articles. The only missing section is the statement of the title of the question and the initial arguments, but both of these elements can be reconstructed
from the responses to the three articles.
Favaroni announces the following titles for the three articles, noting that the
last is identical to the question title as a whole:
1. Whether only theology shows the intellect of the viator that there is some
principle of being.
2. Whether only theology shows the intellect of the viator the full omnipotence of the principle of being.
3. Whether only the theological word (that is, theology) shows to the intellect of the viator that there is some first Word that is the first Truth by
which all other true things are true, or whether this can be known
through some other science.
Favaroni opens his first article by analyzing the relationship between theology
and physics. According to his view, physics does not consider separate substances,
since the object of physics is bodies with motion as a main property. From this he
concludes that physics cannot prove Deum esse, understanding God here as the
being that is the absolute first among beings (ens quod inter entia est simpliciter
primum). Asserting the absolute separation of physics and theology by restricting
physics to the very precise subject of moving bodies, Favaroni also holds that the
31
Ciolini, Agostino da Roma (n. 1 above), 27–30.
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TRADITIO
doctors who do not maintain this separation either misinterpret Aristotle or
wrongly believe that Aristotle was ignorant of the limits of physics.
After pointing out in his first article that physics cannot discuss a first separate
being, as does theology, since physics is the science of bodies in motion, Favaroni
continues his investigation by finding aspects common to theology and metaphysics. Unlike other theologians, he is not preoccupied with proving that the first
being can be the subject of metaphysics in the way that it is the subject of theology. Rather, Favaroni tries to determine to what extent the different sciences
of metaphysics and theology convey knowledge about the same subject matter.
The point of departure of his second article is the definition of omnipotence.
Explaining the concept, Favaroni builds his article by engaging in a deep reflection about the absolutely first being. This “first being in the order of beings” is
known in theology as Deum esse, but Favaroni stresses that many explanatory
principles of metaphysics and natural science also deal with an absolutely first
being. He therefore adds some examples to show that the primacy of being is
also known through a science other than theology: per aliam scientiam quam per
theologiam. Favaroni repeats this statement about twenty-five times throughout
his second article (approximately five columns in manuscript, about twentyfive hundred words). Almost every argument ends with the conclusion that a
science other than theology can inform us about the properties of Deum esse as
the first being. This repetition clearly shows his concern with establishing the relation between metaphysical and theological approaches to the first being. In order
to illustrate how metaphysics, which is a science different from theology, is familiar with the absolutely first being, Favaroni lists some propositions that emphasize how this absolute being is pivotal when it comes to explaining the principle of
causality or the process of the generation of possible beings. The article consists of
two theses (conclusiones), both of which are preceded by a series of suppositiones or
generally accepted propositions.
The first series, composed of four propositions, calls attention to how the principle of the generation of possible beings works and how it is a primary principle in
metaphysics: (1) The production of a possible being is not conceivable without an
agent through which per productionem ponatur in esse; (2) there is an efficient
cause, because every effect needs a cause, since a possible being cannot be itself
a cause; (3) being activum occurs according to its own nature; and (4) there is
no agent that acts against its own nature. In support of all four propositions,
Favaroni refers to Aristotle (De anima, Physics) and Averroes, adding that these
statements are general theses among philosophers. He emphasizes that the
truth of these propositions is known by natural reason and they thus comprise
one of the topics considered by a science other than theology, namely,
metaphysics.
Another set of five similar propositions reinforces the same philosophical perspective. The first repeats that, in the order of beings, there is a being that is
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
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absolutely first and supremely active, while in the second proposition Favaroni
asserts that this first being in the order of beings is the absolute first cause in
the order of causes. In support of his third proposition, Favaroni introduces a
quotation from the Liber de causis, more precisely the famous first proposition,
which claims that the first cause has the most essential influence over its
effects, since “every primary cause infuses its effects more powerfully than does
a universal secondary cause.”32 Using the same authority, Favaroni posits his
fourth proposition: during the production of an effect, no second cause can
replace the influence of the first cause. With the fifth proposition he asserts
that the first cause is sufficient by itself and does not need another cause to supplement it.
In sum, according to Favaroni, the absolute first being has the principle of first
causality that rules over all possible beings and is more efficacious than secondary
causes. The existence of these properties, but also of the link between the first
being and the other beings that depend on it, is a rational truth that a science
other than theology knows. This means that metaphysics, a science different
from theology, can produce an understanding about God.
At this point, Favaroni attacks his famous confrère Gregory of Rimini, who lectured on the Sentences at Paris in 1343–1344. According to Rimini, theological
truth is held only on faith (sola fide), since it cannot be proven rationally.33 Favaroni
retorts that he is amazed by Rimini’s position since Augustine himself in De libero
arbitrio and De vera religione, and even Anselm in his Monologion and Boethius in De
consolatione, accepted that reason could demonstrate that there was not more than
one uncaused being, and that it need not be held on faith alone.
This is not the only case where Favaroni opposes Masters of Theology from his
own order. Starting with his third article, he directs a similar critique against the
renowned Augustinian Hermit Hugolino of Orvieto, who lectured on the Sentences
at Paris in 1348–1349. Hugolino collaborated in the creation of the Bologna
Faculty of Theology in the early 1360s, becoming one of the first masters of the
new institution.34 Hugolino’s theological ideas had a significant positive impact
32
Liber de causis, Edition établie à l’aide de 90 manuscrits avec introduction et notes, ed.
Adriaan Pattin (Leuven, 1966), 46. A more extended discussion on causality occurs in Favoroni’s Principium II.
33
The referent in Rimini’s text is in Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura super I et II Sententiarum, I, dist. 1, q. 2, ed. Damasus Trapp, Manuel Santos-Noya, and Manfred Schulze
(Berlin/New York, 1979), 65, lines 5–6.
34
Jean Rousset, “Hugolin d’Orvieto: Une controverse à la Faculté de Théologie de
Bologne au XIVe siècle,” Mélanges d’Archéologie et d’Histoire 47 (1930): 63–91; Adolar Zumkeller, “Hugolin von Orvieto über Urstand und Erbsünde,” Augustiniana 3 (1953): 35–62 and
Augustiniana 4 (1954): 164–93; and Amos Corbini, “Notitia intuitiva and complexe significabile in the 1340s at Paris: From Alphonsus Vargas Toletanus to Peter Ceffons,” in Philosophical Psychology in Late Medieval Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences: Actes of the
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TRADITIO
on this new academic milieu, for example, on Conrad of Ebrach, whose Sentences commentary is based on lectures given at Bologna in 1368–1369.35 Traces of Hugolino’s
impact can also be found that same year at Paris, where he received a more critical
reception in the Sentences lectures of the Augustinian John Hiltalingen of Basel.36
Favaroni follows Hiltalingen’s criticism, characterizing some of Hugolino’s
solutions as multum inepte et frivole.37 In quoting Hugolino, Favaroni makes
precise references to specific parts of his late confrère’s text, such as “the second
part of the first principal thesis of the first article of the first question of the prologue” and “the first part of the third principal thesis of the same article.” Favaroni cites the arguments of his socii with the same precision and thus treats
Hugolino almost as one of his socii, engaging him in a vibrant debate in which
the bachelor at Bologna repeatedly rejects Hugolino’s idea that theological
truths belong only to theological knowledge and no other science can approach
them. According to Hugolino, the understanding gained through philosophy is
limited, since philosophy focuses on the first matter and metaphysics inquires
about what it is nec quid and nec quantum, paraphrasing the Metaphysics Z3 of
XIVth Annual Symposium of the S.I.E.P.M. (Nijmegen 28–30 October 2009), ed. Monica
Brinzei and Chris Schabel (Turnhout, 2020), 3–38.
35
See Kassian Lauterer, Konrad von Ebrach S.O. Cist. (†1399): Lebenslauf und Schrifttum (Rome, 1962); and Monica Brinzei and Chris Schabel, “Les Cisterciens de l’université: Le
cas du commentaire des Sentences de Conrad d’Ebrach (†1399),” in Les Cisterciens et la
transmission des textes (XIIe-XVIIIe siècles), ed. Thomas Falmagne et al. (Turnhout,
2018), 453–86.
36
Friemel mentions Hiltalingen as an example of an Augustinian rejecting Hugolino:
Friemel, Die theologische Prinzipienlehre (n. 9 above), 145. The new edition of Hiltalingen’s
commentary (Book I, Principium and questions 1–3) contains many references to Hugolino,
but in almost all cases Hiltalingen follows his doctrinal position. His disagreement is not at all
comparable to Favaroni’s position. For example, Hiltalingen refers to different passages from
Hugolino’s Prologue than the ones that Favaroni cites with reference to the relationship
between philosophy and theology: “Ex quo primo patet, quod Hugolinus quaestione 1
prologi articulo 3 conclusione 1 minus proprie accipit philosophicam scientiam, quia solum
scripturam ab Aristotele de hac scientia tradita<m>:” See Iohannes de Basilea OESA,
Lectura super quattuor libros Sententiarum. Super primum librum. Principium primum,
Quaest. 1–3, ed. Venicio Marcolino, with Monica Brinzei and Carolin Oser-Grote (Würzburg,
2016), 1:224–25. Moreover, Hiltalingen does not mention Hugolino in his Principium, but, as
Marcolino discovered, he introduces Hugolino in his Vesperiae (Munich, Clm 26711, fol. 397va:
“Hoc corollarium concordat cum domino et magistro Hugolino libro 3, questione 1, circa
medium”). On occasion, Hiltalingen is also in opposition to Rimini. For example, in his question 1, where he deals with the nature of the object of theology, after reproducing five pages
verbatim from Rimini, Hiltalingen adds: “Sed, quamvis ista opinio sit multum famosa, mihi
tamen non apparet vera, tum propter dicta in se posita, tum propter implicata, tum etiam
propter multa inconvenientia ad ipsam sequentia”: Iohannes de Basilea OESA, Lectura
Super IV libros Sententiarum, I, q. 1, ed. Marcolino, 1:238.
37
This criticism corresponds to Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, In I Sent., Prol., q. 1, a. 1,
concl., in Commentarius in Quattuor Libros Sententiarium I, ed. Willigis Eckermann, O.S.A.
(Würzburg, 1980), 1:62.
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
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the Stagirite.38 Philosophy also deals only with the rational part of human
nature.39 Because of these limitations, philosophy cannot explain such things as
illumination, revelation, or the beatific vision — topics that, according to Hugolino, are known only through theology.40
Hugolino shows off his philosophical erudition by emphasizing the opposition
between theological and philosophical truth, identifying the latter with Aristotle’s
philosophy.41 Many passages in Hugolino’s Prologue stress the shortcomings of
philosophy for understanding truths like “God exists.” Favaroni is intimately
familiar with the passages from the Prologue where Hugolino criticizes Aristotle.42
38
Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, In I Sententiarum, Prologus, q. 1, art. 2, ed. Eckermann, 62,
lines 371–73: “Sumatur verbi gratia, materia prima sit A. De A novit philosophia, quod est
subiectum transmutationis, pura potentia nec quid nec quantum et cetera.” In his Prologue,
Hugolino often stresses the incompatibily between the philosophical and theological understanding of Deum esse, especially in art. 2 and art. 3. On Hugolino’s position on Aristotelian
philosophy, see Francesco Corvino, “La polemica antiaristotelica di Ugolino da Orvieto nella
cultura filosofica del sec. XIV,” in Filosofia e cultura in Umbria tra Medioevo e Rinascimento:
Atti del IV Convegno di studi umbri (Perugia, 1967), 407–58; and on his critique of philosophy
in the Prologue of Hugolino’s Sentences, see Silvia Magnavacca, “Notas sobre el rechazo de la
filosofia en Hugolino de Orvieto,” Rivista di storia della filosofia 61 (2006): 181–92. For a more
detailed analysis, see Martijn Schrama, “La foi et la théologie dans le Prologue du Commentaire des Sentences de Hugolin d’Orvieto,” in Schwerpunkte und Wirkungen des Sentenzenkommentars Hugolins von Orvieto, O.E.S.A., ed. Willigis Eckermann O.S.A. (Wurzburg, 1990),
145–96, esp. 145 and 157–60 for the relation between philosophy and theology.
39
Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, In I Sententiarum, Prologus, q. 1, art. 2, ed. Eckermann, 62,
lines 384–85: “Similiter de homine novit philosophia, quod est rationalis, capax scientiae et
virtutis.”
40
Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, In I Sententiarum, Prologus, q. 1, art. 2, ed. Eckermann, 62,
lines 380–84: “Item secundo capio ‘intelligentiam’ de qua novit philosophicus, quod movet
orbem, et hoc forsitan falsum est. Ideo non novit. Item quod intelligit se, et intelligit
Deum esse primum motorem. Sed theologia novit de eo illuminationes, revelationes, visiones
in verbo, fruitionem perpetuam, gaudium et certitudinem et cetera.”
41
See, for example, this summary of De anima: Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, In I Sententiarum, Prologus, q. 1, art. 2, ed. Eckermann, 67, lines 518–24: “Si Aristoteles in toto tractatu
De anima, cum probat, quod anima est potentialiter multa, quod multos habet actus distinctos, quod eget organo et in alia operatione non, et quos est forma corporis et cetera, continue
subintelligeret in mente et in probatione sua, quod anima quaelibet est materia prima vel
unus lapis vel unus punctus, accidens invisibile et cetera, tunc omnia sic esse probata ab
ipso, essent simpliciter falsa secundum eius acceptionem.” According to Schrama,
“Hugolin revient à une objection (. . .) selon laquelle l’existence de Dieu se rangerai par les
vérités philosophiques. Il estime que c’est le moment d’en finir avec tous les penseurs qui
ne sont pas illuminés par Dieu, et il vise notamment Aristote. Car ce dernier ne parle pas
de Dieu, mais il parle de quelque chose dont, à tort, il croit que c’est Dieu. Par suite, il se
trouve dans l’erreur.” See Schrama, “La foi et la théologie dans le Prologue,” 159.
42
Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, In I Sententiarum, Prologus, q. 1, art. 2, ed. Eckermann, 66,
lines 513–17: “Significabile illud primum verum, scilicet ‘Deum esse’, non est idem apud theologicum et mentem Aristotelis. Patet, quia in praedicato ly ‘esse’ stat pro infinito esse simpliciter actuativo immediate omnis esse, in subiecto stat pro deo trinitate et apud
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TRADITIO
Favaroni’s bold opposition to Hugolino is not limited to this case, but rather it is
systematic throughout Favaroni’s entire commentary. We find many places in
Favaroni’s own Prologue where he continues to disagree with Hugolino and
with his rejection of the use of philosophy for understanding theological issues.43
As in the case of Rimini, Favaroni refutes Hugolino’s position by explaining that,
in the Monologion, Anselm shows that there is a rational understanding of theological
subjects.44 Favaroni holds that theological topics can be known rationally, even by
deduction, and not only based on faith, the authority of Scripture, or assent. According to Favaroni, Anselm is not the only authority who preaches the rational understanding of theology, insisting that Augustine is of the same mind. In support of
this conviction, he quotes long passages from the Confessiones, De civitate Dei, and
De vera religione where Augustine presents the case of Greek philosophers dealing
with such theological issues as God as the creator of all and the Trinity. Favaroni
even asks who those platonici were who inspired Augustine to defend the idea that
they had knowledge about things that are in the Bible. In order to show that he is
well informed, Favaroni answers that the platonici were Porphyry and Plotinus.
Favaroni asserts that their knowledge did not derive from propositions held on
faith or extracted or deduced from the Bible, but ex visibilibus ad invisibilia,
quoting Augustine, who in turn paraphrases Romans 1:20.45 Favaroni stresses that
it belongs to human nature to be led to the invisible by way of the visible.
Aristotelem erat impossibile aliquod tale significatum esse subiecti vel praedicati. Igitur non
est idem.”
43
For example, Augustinus Favaroni de Roma, Prologus, in Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, lat.
fol. 852, fol. 194rb: “Igitur, cum queritur de aliquo vero, utrum sola theologia illud ostendat,
iste doctor <Hugolinus> in rationibus suis non accendit ad considerationem theologicam et
ad considerationem alterius scientie, sed ad quid dixerint phylosophi docentes alias scientias,
ideo deficit. Secundo deficit in rationibus suis, quoniam si ad doctrinam philosophorum respiciebat, debebat respicere ad doctrinam eorum philosophorum qui in eorum positionibus
fuerunt excellentiores et veritati propinquiores, antequam diceret quod nulla alia doctrina
etc. Tales autem fuerunt Platonici, ipse vero respexit Aristotelem, ideo rationes tales
nullum habent stabile fundamentum etc.” Similar ideas are repeated in Prologus, art. 2, in
Berlin, Staadtbibliothek, lat. fol. 852, fols. 169–80. For a preliminary investigation of some
fragments of this text, see Friemel, Die theologische Prinzipienlehre (n. 9 above), 126–52,
esp. 142–44.
44
For an analysis of Hugolino’s rejection of non-pagan philosophers, see Daniela Gionta,
“Filosofi precristiani e Rivelazione: Analogie e contrasti tra Ugolino da Orvieto e Egidio da
Viterbo,” in Schwerpunkte und Wirkungen, ed. Eckermann, 124–33, at 124–26.
45
Isabelle Draelants calls the use of this quotation from Paul “l’herménutique de l’invisible à travers le visible grâce aux propriétés des choses” in eadem, “Modèles épistémologiques
de l’enquête encyclopédique sur la nature des choses ob posteritatis utilitatemi,” in Modèles
scientifiques, modèles littéraires: Actes du XLVe Congrès de la SHMESP (Paris, 2015), 235–
60, esp. 242–44. For a history of the medieval usage of Romans 1:20 in Sentences commentaries, see Monica Calma, “La connaissance philosophique de la Trinité selon Pierre d’Ailly et la
fortune médiévale de la proposition Monas genuit monadem,” Przeglad Tomistyczny 15 (2009):
121–47.
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In sum, rather than attack his socii, Favaroni chooses to dispute with two of the
leading figures of the Augustinians, both Parisian Masters of Theology and Priors
General of the order: Gregory of Rimini and Hugolino of Orvieto, the latter being
the main founding master of the Faculty of Theology of Bologna. Favaroni thus
exhibits a bold attitude for a young Augustinian theologian, defending theses
that are not shared by the main authorities of his order in his day. Indeed, Favaroni’s attitude is almost radical, since instead of following the general Augustinian
trend, he pushes the limits of the common understanding of how rationality works
in the field of theology. He explains his position more clearly in the last article of
his question.
First, he digresses about the relation between a subject-matter and a science —
more precisely, how “topic A is not known by science B.” He claims that there are
two situations: ex parte scientie and ex parte intellectus. The first case relates to the
limitation of the science itself. For example, Deum esse cannot be known by geometry, since geometry is limited to other truths. The second case refers to a limitation of the intellect, which is not capable of understanding the subtleties of a given
science and, in some situations, not gifted enough to discover the hidden side of the
truth of that particular science.
Favaroni introduces this distinction in order to show that there are objective
situations in which a science cannot reach the subtlety of a subject matter. All
the same, neither of his two cases applies to the relationship between metaphysics
and theology, so here we may again read between the lines and discern another
indirect critique directed at Hugolino, who consistently rejects any implication
of philosophy or metaphysics in theology. By the end of his third article, Favaroni
more straightforwardly expresses his position. In the corollarium responsivum, he
points out that “every noble truth that theology can conclude about the absolutely first being, another different science can similarly conclude about the
same first being.” He also adds that every eternal and noble truth about the
first being can be demonstrated by a science different from theology, and this
other science can explain that God is the subject of theology.
In other words, metaphysics can be a guide to penetrate, understand, and
explain the truth that theology treats. Favaroni repeats this idea often and
expresses it even more clearly in the Prologue of his Sentences commentary,
where he frequently reiterates that metaphysics informs the viator’s intellect
about the first being. Favaroni grants an instrumental role to metaphysics,
since according to him metaphysics “dictates to the intellect of the viator that
God is the first and the most intelligent being.”46 In order to explain the relationship between theology and metaphysics more distinctly, he affirms the dictum
46
Augustinus Favaroni de Roma, Prologus, in Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, lat. fol. 852, fol.
170va: “scientia metaphysica dictat intellectui viatoris Deum esse primum et summum intelligens semper se actualissime intelligentem.”
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that “no science can prove its formal subject” and infers that theology cannot
prove “that eternal and noble truth explaining the formal reason by which God
is the subject in theology.” Yet this can be proven by another science, namely
metaphysics. Favaroni repeats this dictum and the argument in his Prologue.47
In both cases, Favaroni’s ultimate inspiration is the classic disagreement
between Averroes and Avicenna about whether God and the separate substances
are the subjects of metaphysics or physics.48 During their debate, they both used
Aristotle’s axiom from the Posterior Analytics that a science cannot demonstrate
the existence of its own subject matter. Favaroni exceeds the general use of the
example of the confrontation between Averroes and Avicenna, since he does not
deal with the relation between metaphysics and physics, but argues that God is
the subject matter of theology. No science can prove the existence of its subject
matter, which is taken on faith; therefore, theology cannot prove the existence
of God.
Favaroni concludes that there is a rational approach to theology that applies
even to the truths that are believed or that are revealed by the Holy Spirit. In
support, he again invokes the authority of Augustine, who said that the substance
of God can be investigated through revelation or through creatures. In the case of
the rational creature, metaphysics is needed in order to inform the intellect about
the different properties of the absolutely first being.
In the first Principium of his Sentences lectures, Favaroni defends an epistemology that allots ample space to rational inquiry in theology. By attacking Hugolino, one of the major theologians of his order, for downplaying the role of
philosophy in understanding theological truths, Favaroni appeals to the authority
of Augustine. Since the father of the order remarked that Greek philosophers such
as Plotinus and Porphyry had an understanding of theological truths, it is therefore permissible to admit that philosophy can deal with the properties that apply
to Deum esse, especially in metaphysics. This science, which is different from theology, covers many themes, such as creation, generation, and being, which assist in
47
Augustinus Favaroni de Roma, Prologus, art. 2, in Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, lat. fol.
852, fol. 171rb: “Aliquam nobilem veritatem scientia metaphysica concludit de Deo, quam
non potest concludere theologia. Probatur, quoniam veritas enuncians de Deo illam rationem
formalem, secundum quam Deus est subiectum in theologia, est nobilis veritas de Deo, ut
patebit infra. Et talem concludit metaphysica de Deo . . . quam tamen theologia non
potest concludere, quia nulla scientia probat suum subiectum.”
48
Averroes, In Arist. Phys., 1, comm. 81, vol. 4, fol. 47va: . . . “declaratum est in Posterioribus Analyticis quod impossibile est aliquam scientiam declarare suum subiectum esse, sed
concedit ipsum esse, aut quia manifestum per se, aut quia demonstratum in alia scientia.
Unde Avicenna peccavit maxime, cum dicit quod primus Philosophus demonstrat primum
esse, et processit in hoc in suo libro de scientia Divina per viam quam existimavit esse necessariam, et essentialem in illa scientia, et peccavit peccato manifesto.” A very clear description
of this example and its importance for medieval metaphysics is provided in Jenny E. Pelletier,
William Ockham on Metaphysics. The Science of Being and God (Leiden, 2013), 259 n. 86.
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
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the apprehension of God. According to Favaroni, metaphysics is a tool for theology; it helps the human intellect to reason about the divine. Thus theologians
— or at least Augustinian theologians — should not neglect its role. The disagreement between Favaroni and Hugolino is not confined to a rhetorical debate or a
game of arguments for the sake of provocation, but, as Salesius Friemel characterized it, in this confrontation “hier prallen zwei grundverschiedenen ‘Weltanschauungen’ aufeinander.”49
Secundum Principium
Favaroni divides his second Principium into three articles dealing with the
metaphysics of causation. Since Book II of Lombard’s Sentences concerns creation, Favaroni begins article one with a discussion that includes a definition of
creation. His tone is not wholly theological, but partially philosophical. The discussion is dominated by the influence of John of Ripa, a Franciscan who lectured
on the Sentences at Paris in the early 1350s.50 Some of Ripa’s technical vocabulary
regarding the intensity of forms or the latitude of perfection appears here, and we
hear echoes of Ripa’s views on the communicability of the divine essence to a creature ad extra. Book II of Ripa’s Sentences has not come down to us, but in Ripa’s
later Determinationes and in his question 29 of Book I we find detailed discussions
that help us follow Favaroni.51
Our Augustinian explains what kind of being results from God’s creative activity and how some degree of active potentiality corresponds to every entity to which
by its nature some degree of being in actuality corresponds. Favaroni also clarifies
how, because a created being depends on God and is characterized by a latitude of
perfection, it is not a pure act or a pure passive potency. Another characteristic of a
created being is that its degree of productivity is proportional to its degree of
actuality in esse, and an agent’s activity is not measured by the effect produced,
but by the active power established according to its degree of perfection. According
to Favaroni, the latitude of possible activities of creatures is infinite in accordance
with their specific degrees. The degrees of perfection proper to a being are signs of
how more or less intensive God acts in the production of a more or less noble effect
to which He communicates more or less perfection. For example, God can
49
Friemel, Die theologische Prinzipienlehre (n. 9 above), 152.
See the recent and extensive introduction to Ripa’s Lectura on the Sentences: Iohannes
de Ripa, Lectura Super primum Sententiarum. Distinctio Secunda, ed. Andrea Nannini (Rome,
2020), v–cxxx.
51
Johannes de Ripa, Determinationes: Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables, ed.
André Combes (Paris, 1957), q. 1, 80–167, esp. art. 3, 80–153; and the still unedited Johannes
de Ripa, Lectura, I, q. 29, available in French translation in Francis Ruello, La théologie naturelle de Jean de Ripa (XIVe siècle) (Paris, 1992), 625–39.
50
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TRADITIO
communicate esse and vivere to one being and esse, vivere, and intelligere to another
being, with the result that one will be nobler than the other.
In the second article of his second Principium, Favaroni asks if creative activity
can be communicated to a creature. The three conclusions and their corollaries
reveal how Favaroni understands the relationship between divine and created
nature in the process of causation. Citing the Liber de causis, Favaroni accepts
the subordination of secondary causes to the first cause and insists that a secondary
cause cannot produce without the presence of the first cause. God is not only a coagent sharing the production of an effect with secondary causes, but it is He who
grants the power to act. God provides the created nature with being and with
active powers that allow it to be a cause. The creature’s action is thus doubly
dependent on God, because God first disposes the creature ad esse existere and secondly ad agendum. In its action the creature plays the role of instrumentum Dei.
By the end of the second article, Favaroni’s solution becomes clear. First, by
themselves secondary causes are insufficient for producing an effect, and they
need the assistance of the first cause. Only God’s activity is sufficient to
produce everything as the effect of His action. Favaroni adds that in the production of an effect God’s action is prior, but this priority is not temporal. If a secondary cause were able to produce an effect without presupposing the activity of the
first cause, then it would have the power of creation, but creatures cannot create.
He again bolsters his position with Augustine’s authority, specifically a passage
from De Trinitate: neither transgressores angeli nor boni angeli can be called creatores. To clarify his opinion, Favaroni gives the example of the flowering of
trees: the sun is not the cause of the blooming of the trees, although the flowering
process needs sunlight to bloom. The blooming is part of the nature of trees that is
caused by the flowering power, and not directly by the sun, nor does the sun cause
the flowering power in the trees. This kind of inference applies, as Favaroni says, de
aliis virtutibus et actionibus. Favaroni thus ends the article by declaring that the
action of creation is not communicated to creatures.
The third and briefest article investigates how the verb “to create” (creare) and
the noun “creation” (creatio) apply to God and to His activity ad extra. Favaroni is
quite precise: creation is simply production de nichilo, and when God produces ex
nichilo the form, the matter, or the composite of a being, this is creation. Infusing
being from nothing is a creative act, but the rest of His production or activity
cannot be deemed creative in the same way as creation ex nichilo. For example,
there is a difference between His act of producing form from the potency of
matter and His act of producing ex nihilo.
Tertium Principium
To the extent that Favaroni’s name is present in the literature, it is mainly
because of his Christology. His obstinate opposition to the via communis of the
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Church and his persistent criticism of scholastic theologians resulted in his condemnation by the Church. In 1435 a set of seven propositions extracted from
his Lectura super Apocalypsim was censured by a tribunal that linked him to
Jan Hus. Five of Favoroni’s condemned propositions concerned Christ, of which
the first, Humana natura in Christo vere est Christus, was interpreted as advocating
the same type of heresy as that of Hus on the nature of the union of human and
divine natures in Christ.52 Although Favaroni’s pertinent third Principium on the
Sentences was apparently unknown to him, Gino Ciolini published a lucid study on
Favaroni’s Christology in 1971, focusing on other texts, such the Lectura super
Apocalypsim, Expositio in Epistolas beati Pauli, and Tractatus de Christo capite
Ecclesiae, which I believe stem from the debate between Favaroni and his socii
in the third Principium.53
Reflecting the content of distinctions 6–10 of Book III of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, Favaroni’s third Principium discusses how the personal union of the human
nature with the Word is supreme among the types of union with God. From the
first paragraph the audience is informed that there are generally acknowledged
to be three types of divine union, the union of Christ’s body and soul, the beatific
union, and the hypostatic union, to which Favoroni adds a fourth that not everyone accepts, the personalis unio, presented at the end of this third Principium. The
third Principium is divided into three articles, the first being almost propaedeutic,
proposing a series of definitions (perfectio formaliter, perfectio simpliciter, perfectio in
hoc, and so on) in order to clarify the different types of union in God. Favaroni also
employs the device of the ratio suppositalis, probably inspired by John of Ripa, in
whose works the concept plays a prominent role.54 For Ciolini, the ratio suppositalis is the cornerstone of Favaroni’s Christology, since it is found in all of his
texts as an integral part of his portrayal of the status of the relation between
Christ’s human and divine natures, even if Favaroni does not define the concept
clearly in article one of the third Principium or in any other text.55 Concerning
humanity, the ratio suppositalis describes the union of body and soul that is
52
For a detailed description of the different steps of his condemnation, see Zumkeller,
Theology and History of the Augustinian School (n. 1 above), 52–54 and 182–85. The proposition Duae naturae, divinitas et humanitas, sunt unus Christus of Jan Huss had been condemned at the Council of Constance in 1415. See the discussion of this parallel in Ciolini,
Agostino da Roma (n. 1 above), 32–33.
53
Ciolini, Agostino da Roma (n. 1 above). An updated list of these texts can be consulted
in the Alcuin database: http://www.alcuin.de/philosopher.php?id=296 (accessed 17 July
2022).
54
For example, distinction 26 of book I of John of Ripa is introduced by this title:
“Utrum rationes suppositales personarum divinarum realiter distinctive sint rationes formaliter absolute vel relative.” This question is analyzed by Ernst Borchert, Die Trinitätslehre des
Johannes de Ripa (Munich/Vienna, 1974), 1:475–95 and 2:876–84.
55
In fact, Ciolini asks himself: “Cosa è dunque questa ratio suppositalis a cui il nostro
Teologo affida tutto l’edificio della sua dottrina cristologica?” and remarks that “Il Favaroni
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TRADITIO
proper to human nature. According to Favaroni, this model also applies to the
relation between the human and divine natures in Christ, since they do not participate in each other to produce a third nature, but their unity is informative
based on a presence explained by a ratio suppositalis.
In the second article Favaroni announces that the divine nature can be united
to the human nature in Christ in three ways: beatifically, hypostatically, and
informative. This last sense reflects the position that Favaroni will embrace. It
appears that in order to explain his thesis more clearly, he introduces an exchange
that he had with one of his socii, the Carmelite, whose identity Favaroni does not
further specify, but whom we know to have been Antonio Masazana, as mentioned
above. Favaroni quotes three arguments extracted from the third Principium of
the reverendus baccalarius ordinis Carmelitarum, specifically from the fourth conclusion of the second article, where the Carmelite opposed Favaroni on the issue of
the nature of the union of the divine nature with created being. For the Carmelite,
such a union is inconceivable. First, the divine nature, being incommunicabilis,
cannot engage in any type of transfer that would establish a unity with a
created nature, nor can it receive within itself another type of being. Second, propositions such as “humanitas est Deus” are false and do not apply to Christ.56 As
Favaroni reports it, the third argument of the Carmelite is somewhat opaque: “It
is impossible for anything to bring something else to completion in a formal way
and not for it to be its principium quo operativum of the things that apply to that
form,” and it is “a contradiction for the principle of something to be formally
present in this way and for it not to subsist in that thing.”
Favaroni treats each of these objections individually. Armed with the authority
of Lombard and Boethius, he counter-attacks against his socius by using his
responses to emphasize the viability of his position. According to Favaroni, the
divine nature is united to the human nature ut forma informativa, that is, as a
subject informing its form, without actually producing a third nature. The
union of the body and the soul produces the humanity of a created being, and
this unity is informal. This type of informing is not intentional, unlike in the
case of intellectual species or an act of volition that determines an act of knowledge or an action. In his answer Favaroni takes the relation between body and
soul in the case of Christ as a model to explore possibilities for the union
between two elements that do not produce a third. The union of the divine and
human natures in Christ is real, and it is not necessary for the divine nature to
non è molto esplicito in proposito” concerning this concept. See Ciolini, Agostino da Roma (n.
1 above), 36.
56
This discussion is rooted in distinction 6 of book III of Peter Lombard’s Sentences (cap. 2,
50–52), where he presents the position of Hugh of Saint-Victor from De sacramentis and De verbo
incarnato on the definition Homo est Deus. In this passage Favaroni makes no reference to
Lombard.
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
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be present in an essential way. By way of explanation, Favaroni introduces the
example of the triduo when, for three days after the crucifixion, Christ’s soul
was separated from the body and not present locally. This was possible because
the hypostatic union in the body does not depend on the union with the soul,
but only on the ratio suppositalis based on which the Word suppositavit for the
presence of the soul. Another of Favaroni’s arguments is to draw a parallel: in
the relation between a subject and a form, the subject does not receive the denomination of form essentialiter, such that “corpus est anima,” but it does concretive,
such that “corpus est animatum,” for the soul is united with the body informative.
In a certain way, then, against the Carmelite socius, “humanitas est Deus,”
indeed, according to Boethius in De consolatione III, “quilibet beatus est Deus.”
An echo of these opinions seems to be heard in another treatise of Favaroni, and
even in the fifth of the condemned propositions, which, in the eyes of the Dominican Cardinal Juan de Torquemada during the trial in Basel in 1435, was a reiteration of Jan Hus’s stance on the humanity of Christ.57 The reason Favaroni
accepts this monophysite thesis, according to which the union of the divine and
human natures is real, is his belief that from this union the human nature can
be improved since the divine nature will act inside the union and perfect the
nature to which it is united.
The last article of the third Principium is by far the shortest (roughly half a
column in the manuscript), and here Favaroni launches the idea that the hypostatic union of the rational nature with God can be established without the beatific union. After insisting on the difference between the beatific union and the
hypostatic union in the soul of Christ, Favorini’s second corollary of the second
conclusion provides not only an opportunity to reinforce this difference, but
also an occasion to introduce to the scene a new socius. This time the polemic is
directed at a baccalarius de ordine Servorum Sancte Marie, about whom we
again have no other information. Favaroni quotes from the third article of the Servite’s third Principium, where he states that the Word in the soul of Christ is a
habitus sapientialis. The brevity of the record of the exchange between Favaroni
and his new colleague does not make it easy to understand their dialogue. We
have only the answer of Favaroni, who rejects the idea that the Word in the
soul of Christ is such a habit of wisdom through the personal union, but maintains
that it is so by the beatific union.
We can conclude from this analysis of Favaroni’s third Principium that his
Christological vision of the personalis unio between the human and divine
natures in Christ inspired reaction and opposition, as we witness in the confrontation with the Carmelite socius. The form of the text of his Principia suggests
57
See the explanations of Ciolini, Agostino da Roma (n. 1 above), and all the passages he
quotes in his book. See also Zumkeller, Theology and History of the Augustinian School (n. 1
above), 107.
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TRADITIO
that we are dealing with a reworked or edited version of his public debate with his
socii. Favaroni eliminated all the exchanges with the other socii and retained only
the discourse with his Carmelite and Servite colleagues, from which we can reconstitute their basic positions: (a) the personal union of the divine and human
natures cannot be accepted in Christ (for the Carmelite) and (b) the divine
Word is in Christ a habitus of wisdom (for the Servite). Favaroni’s decision to
emphasize his debate with the two socii on a Christological topic seems to have
a rhetorical foundation, since it is employed to reinforce his own view defending
the existence of a personal union of the human and divine natures in Christ.
Traces of this idea resurface in later texts by Favaroni, showing both his consistency and the sincerity of his doctrine, but also providing the grounds for his
condemnation in 1435. In 1430, during his trial, Favaroni protested that those
texts had been written thirty-six years previously, when he was young.58 Nevertheless, he had already expressed these ideas five years earlier, in the spring of
1389 in this third Principium, which was most likely the first time he publicized
his thesis of a personal union of Christ’s divine and human natures. If so, we can
add his example to the list of principia that became the objects of condemnation
during the Middle Ages. As mentioned, a significant proportion of doctrinal
condemnations connected to university teaching targeted positions first introduced in principial debates. The pressure to demonstrate intellectual prowess
and innovation with a sophisticated level of philosophical argumentation led
young candidates for the eventual the title of Master of Theology to ask bold
questions, challenge received opinions, and oppose complacency in theological
thinking. As a result, radical ideas could return to haunt their authors, who
could even face condemnation decades after their careers had become
established, as in the case of Favaroni, who was Prior General of his order
(1425–1431) and then archbishop of Nazareth (Apulia). In his trial, as Prior
General and then archbishop, Favaroni had to explain ideas contained in his
Commentarius in Apocalypsim beati Joannis apostoli, written in 1394 when he
was still magister regens in Bologna.59
Quartum Principium
Favaroni divides his fourth Principium into two articles dealing with two sacraments established for the remission of sin: baptism and penance, which Peter
Lombard discusses at length in Book IV, distinctions 2–7 and 14–22 respectively.
Since Favaroni would return to deal with baptism and penance in his later
58
His erroneous theses were the subject of a complaint in 1430. During the summer of
that year Favaroni wrote a defense, which has been edited by Willigis Eckermann from
Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, A.IV.17, fol. 320, in idem, Opera inedita historiam (n. 4 above).
59
Zumkeller, Theology and History of the Augustinian School (n. 1 above), 107.
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
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treatises, his fourth Principium should thus again be viewed as an early text
where he first approached issues that would occupy him as Master of Theology.60
The first article of the fourth Principium is divided into four conclusiones or
theses proposing different scenarios to test the limits of the efficacy of the sacrament of baptism. Favaroni attempts to determine if it is still possible, now that
the sacrament of baptism has been established, to achieve salvation without
this sacrament. In support of an affirmative answer, the Augustinian brings up
the phenomenon of unbaptized priests and quotes Pope Innocent III, who
attested to their existence in the Church. Favaroni adds that in certain cases
the mere desire for baptism can save and make someone who does not have the
unda baptismatis a member of the Church, for example, a martyr. He develops
this line of thought in order to discuss the relationship between the sacramentum
fidei and the fides sacramenti, an idea that he would later recycle in his In epistulam ad Romanos.61 The secondary literature interprets this approach as follows:
“Favaroni teaches that the efficacy of the sacrament is due, not to the sign of the
sacrament, but to the ‘fides sacramenti’ just as Luther taught.”62 Actually, what
Favaroni tries to demonstrate here is rather that in some situations there is a correlation between the sacrament and faith. Thus, one comes across the case of priests
who believe they have been baptized when they have not, yet they attain salvation
by the power of their faith. As revealed in the case of Paul, the fides sacramenti can
lead to salvation since in the absence of baptism one can become a member of the
Church Triumphant through faith alone. At the end of his third conclusion, Favaroni openly declares that “although an adult wayfarer can be saved without the
sacraments of the Church, he cannot be saved without the the faith of the sacraments”. What applies to adults, however, is not true for babies dying unbaptized,
because they have no interior acts by which they can be reconciled with God or
be incorporated into the Church Triumphant.
The fourth and final conclusion of the first article opens with a parallel between
evangelical and mosaic law, a topic that Favaroni would go on to treat in depth in
his In epistulam ad Romanos.63 This association leads him to compare baptism
60
For example, the Lectura in epistulam beati Pauli ad Romanos, in Roma, Biblioteca Angelica, 376, fols. 106–249; the Commentarius in Apocalypsim, in Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Chigiano B.VII.118, fols. 1–120; or the De peccato per originem tracto (or Tractatus
de iustificatione), in Chigiano B.VII.118, fols. 200ra–24ra. On these texts, see the list in Ciolini,
Agostino da Roma (n. 1 above), 89–92; and Toste, “Augustinus” (n. 1 above), 503–504.
61
Toner, The Doctrine of Original Sin and Justification (n. 2 above), 80–81.
62
Toner, The Doctrine of Original Sin and Justification (n. 2 above), 81. Toner refers here
to the misunderstanding of Müller, who read Favaroni as a pre-Lutherian propagandist:
Alphons V. Müller, Luthers theologische Quellen (Giessen, 1912), 16.
63
Toner, The Doctrine of Original Sin and Justification (n. 2 above), 89–104, presents
Favaroni’s position on justice and the tripartite system of law conceived by Favaroni:
secular, mosaic, and evangelic justice.
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with circumcision in order to provide a better understanding of the sacrament of
baptism. While circumcision was the primary means for remitting original sin
under the Old Law, the effect of baptism is the infusion of grace. Favaroni ends
up in opposition to the doctrine espoused in distinction 4 of Book IV of the Sentences, where Peter Lombard seems to accept that faith can be a remedy for original sin. For the Augustinian bachelor at Bologna, in contrast, faith is
insufficient for an adult to reach salvation: necessarium est sibi sacramentum.
It is surely no coincidence that the topics that Favaroni first examined as a
student of theology in the first article of the fourth Principium are mirrored in
later writings such as In epistulam ad Romanos and De peccato originali. Rather,
the case of Favaroni is illustrative of how principial texts from bachelor debates
could be recycled later at more advanced stages of a theologian’s career. This
observation also applies to the second article, where Favaroni covers the sacrament of penance. This article is organized according to the division of the first
article and explains how punishment is necessary for the removal of mortal
fault. This principium does not include any references to contemporary sources,
only to canonical authors such as Augustine, Anselm, Hugh of Saint-Victor,
and Peter Lombard himself. Augustine appears to be the main hero of theological
discussion for Favaroni, who reserves a half column of the manuscript for a very
accurate quotation, highlighted in red ink, from the Ad Iulianum. It is striking
that there are no traces of socii here, even though the polemical tension is
obvious when Favaroni attacks positions of Lombard. Indeed, the Augustinian
bachelor does not share Lombard’s opinion from Book IV, distinction 18, on the
role of contrition in the heart for removing a mortal sin. According to
the Master of the Sentences, with the infusion of contrition God assists with the
removal of fault. In order to demonstrate the weakness of Lombard’s position,
Favaroni uses the power of more traditional authorities, Augustine and Hugh of
Saint-Victor. He emphasizes that Hugh’s position is opposed to the Lombard,
for whom a priest has the power to absolve someone from a mortal sin by imposing
the proper penance. According to the second conclusion of article two, the function of the sacrament of penance is not to remove a mortal sin directly, but to
show via right reason the path that leads to its remission. The opposition that
Favaroni points out between Lombard and Hugh on the doctrine of penance
and on the efficacy of this sacrament resurfaces in Favaroni’s later works,
where he not only resumes his opinion from the fourth Principium on the sacrament of penance, but even the authorities used to defend his view, another illustration of the significance of principia for understanding a theologian’s later
doctrinal profile as a magister theologiae.64
64
We find, for example, in In epistulam ad Romanos, the same authorities – Hugh,
Anselm, and Augustine – with reference to the same titles. See the quotations in Toner and
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CONCLUSION
From the analysis of the structure, composition, and doctrinal content of
Augustinus Favaroni of Rome’s Principia, it is evident that principal debates at
Bologna in his time were a well-established practice that mirrors the same tendencies and characteristics as at Paris. One of the characteristics particular to the
genre is the debate between socii, yet in Favaroni’s case only two socii are introduced — the Carmelite Antonio Masazana and a Servite — only in the third Principium, and only regarding two arguments. Our Augustinian probably eliminated
the other exchanges with his socii when he revised his text for “publication,” preferring to devote more attention to his confrontation with established authorities
(Peter Lombard, Gregory of Rimini, Hugolino of Orvieto) who replaced the voices
of the socii in his debate. In Favaroni’s doctrine one can discern the tacit presence
of John of Ripa, who is never quoted, but whose influence is perceptible throughout the four principia. This is an interesting detail, which not only highlights the
reception of the Italian Franciscan in Italy itself, but also reveals that in 1388–
1389 in Bologna Favaroni employed technical vocabulary that was common in
Paris in previous decades, for example, in the principia of 1369–1370.65
Favaroni’s Principia also add interesting new information about the doctrinal
tendencies among the Augustinian Hermits. In his article “The Reception of
Augustine in the Later Middle Ages,” Eric L. Saak lists three types of Augustinianism: theological, philosophical, and political.66 The “philosophical” brand
corresponds to the Augustinianism of illumination in the tradition of Bonaventure
and Henry of Ghent. This case study of Augustinus Favaroni of Rome reveals that
he adheres to the two first categories. In Principia I and II, he exhibits an interest
in metaphysical approaches concerning being and causation, whereas in Principia
III and IV, Favaroni plays theologian, presenting his conception of the unity of
the divine and created natures and dealing with the sacraments.
Finally, Favaroni’s Principia illustrate how ideas presented and defended
during the principial debates were often recycled in treatises composed during
the later career of a theologian. Favaroni’s theses from his first Principium are
his analysis of the sacrament of penance: Toner, The Doctrine of Original Sin and Justification
(n. 2 above), 83–88.
65
For principia in Paris in 1369–1370, see Monica Brînzei, “When Theologians Play Philosopher: A Lost Confrontation between James of Eltville and His Socii on the Perfection of
Species and Its Infinite Latitude,” in The Cistercian James of Eltville († 1393): Author in
Paris and Authority in Vienna, ed. Monica Brînzei and Chris Schabel (Turnhout, 2018),
43–77.
66
Eric L. Saak, “The Reception of Augustine in the Later Middle Ages,” in The Reception
of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists, ed. Irena Backus, 2nd
ed. (Leiden, 1997), 1:367–404, esp. 373. On the “Augustinian School,” see Irena D. Backus,
Historical Method and Confessional Identity in the Era of the Reformation (1378–1615)
(Leiden, 2003), 1–14.
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TRADITIO
then repeated in the prologue of his Sentences questions; his early doctrine of the
sacraments is reflected in his later Lectura in Apocalypsim; and his conception of
the hypostatic union is repackaged in his Expositio in Epistolas beati Pauli and his
Tractatus de Christo capite Ecclesiae.
Institut de recherche et d’histoire des textes
monica.brinzei@irht.cnrs.fr
Keywords:
Augustinus Favaroni of Rome, Augustinian Hermits, principia, sermons, University
of Bologna, theology as a science, causality, sacraments, Christology
APPENDIX
Ratio Edendi
The Appendix contains an edition of Augustinus Favaroni of Rome’s four principia questions based on the only known surviving manuscript, Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, lat. fol. 852: Principium I, fols.
155va–159ra; Principium II, fols. 205ra–207ra; Principium III, fols. 207va–
209rb; and Principium IV, fols. 210ra–211vb. The edition follows the orthography
of the manuscript. The punctuation and textual divisions are mine, albeit taking
into consideration the marks of the scribe. Editorial additions are inserted
between <angle brackets>, as are titles and subtitles in order to highlight the
structure of the questions and their divisions into articles, conclusions, and sets
of corollaries. Foliation changes are noted in [square brackets]. On occasion the
text has been emended to correct obvious scribal errors, but these instances as
well as scribal corrections and marginal additions are all noted in the apparatus
criticus. The apparatus fontium contains all the explicit quotations in the text
using the abbreviations listed in the bibliography below.
Symbols and abbreviations used:
*
a. c.
a. c. s. l.
add.
add. sed del.
add. sed exp.
exp.
iter.
iter. et del.
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
lectio dubia
ante correctionem
ante correctionem supra lineam
addidit
addidit sed delevit (crossed out)
addidit sed expungit (underlined with dots)
expungit
iteravit
iteravit et delevit
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
iter. et exp.
in marg.
om.
p. c.
s. l.
tr.
=
=
=
=
=
=
403
iteravit et expungit
in margine
omissit
post correctionem
supra lineam
transposuit
Bibliography for Apparatus fontium
Augustinus Favaroni de Roma
Principia I–IV
AA = Auctoritates Aristotelis, Un florilège médiéval: Étude historique et édition
critique, ed. J. Hamesse (Louvain/Paris, 1974).
Ægid. Roman., In II Sent. = Ægidius Romanus, In secundum librum Sententiarum (Venice, 1581).
Ægid. Roman., Tr. de primo princ. = Ægidius Romanus, Quaestiones disputatae de
esse et essentia sive tractatus de primo principio (Venice, 1503).
Ambros., De ob. Valent. = Ambrosius, De obitu Valentiniani, ed. O. Faller (Vienna,
1955).
Anselm. Cant., Cur Deus = Anselmus Cantuariensis, Cur Deus homo libri duo, ed. F.
S. Schmitt (Bonn, 1929).
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(Edinburgh, 1946), 7–87.
Aug., De bapt. ctr. Donat. = Augustinus Hipponensis, Sancti Aureli Augustini
Scripta contra Donatistas, ed. M. Petschenig, CSEL 51 (Vienna, 1908), 145–375.
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B. Dombart and A. Kalb, CSL 47 (Turnhout, 1955).
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CSL 27 (Turnhout, 1981).
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874.
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De bono vidvitatis. De adulterinis coniugiis lib. II. De mendacio. Contra mendacium. De opere monachorum. De divinatione daemonum. De cura pro mortuis
gerenda. De patientia, ed. J. Zycha, CSEL 41 (Vienna/Prague/Leipzig, 1900).
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Zycha, CSEL 28.1 (Vienna, 1954).
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CSL 54 (Turnhout, 1974).
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Aug., Trin. = Augustinus Hipponensis, De trinitate libri XV, ed. W. J. Mountain
and F. Glorie, CSL 50 and 50A (Turnhout, 1968).
Aug., De vera relig. = Augustinus Hipponensis, De doctrina christiana. De vera religione, ed. K. D. Daur and J. Martin, CSL 32 (Turnhout, 1962), 169–260.
Aug., De peccat. merit. et rem. = Augustinus Hipponensis, De peccatorum meritis et
remissione, ed. C. F. Urba and J. Zycha, CSEL 60 (Vienna, 1913), 3–151.
Aug., De spir. et litt. ad Marcel. = Augustinus Hipponensis, De spiritu et littera ad
Marcellinum, ed. H. Olshausen (Königsberg, 1826).
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and J. Fraipont, CSL 38–40 (Turnhout, 1956).
Aug., Sup. Gen. contr. Manich., = Augustinus Hipponensis, De genesi contra Manichaeos libri II, ed. Dorothea Weber, CSEL 91 (Vienna, 1998).
Averr. In Arist. lib. Metaph. = Averroes Latinus, Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri
XIV cum Averrois Cordubensis commentariis, ed. Iunctas, vol. 8 (Venice, 1562).
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libri octo, cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eosdem commentariis, ed. Iunctas,
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Averr., In Arist. De anima = Averroes Latinus, Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros, ed. F. S. Crawford, Corpus Commentariorum Averrois
in Aristotelem 6.1 (Cambridge, MA, 1953).
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Fraipont, CSL 91A (Turnhout, 1968), 711–60.
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und Untersuchungen 6 (Berlin/New York, 1979–1984).
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art. LIII–LV, ed. G. A. Wilson, Opera omnia 31 (Leuven, 2014).
Hugo S. Vict., De sacram. = Hugo de Sancto Victore, De Sacramentis christianae
fidei, PL 176, cols. 173–618.
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libros Sententiarum, ed. W. Eckermann, vol. 1 (Würzburg, 1980).
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Ioh. Rip., De gr. supr. = Iohannes de Ripa, Questio de gradu supremo, ed. A.
Combes (Paris, 1964).
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
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Ps. Dionys., De div. nom. = Ps. Dionysius Areopagita, De divinis nominibus, ed. P.
Chevallier, Dyonisiaca, Recueil donnant l’ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l’Aréopage, I (Paris/Bruges, 1937).
Richard. S. Vict., Trin. = Richardus de S. Victore, De Trinitate, ed. J. Ribaillier
(Paris, 1958).
Thom. Aq., Quaest. disp. de malo = Thomas de Aquino, Quaestiones disputatae de
malo, ed. P.-M. Gils (Rome/Paris 1982).
Principium I
<Utrum solum theologicum verbum ostendat intellectui viatoris esse aliquod
primum verbum quod sit prima veritas qua sint vera quecumque alia vera, vel
per aliquam aliam scientiam possit hoc sciri et evidenter concludi>
Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, lat. fol. 852,
fols. 155va–159ra
[. . .] In ista questione erunt tres articuli. Iuxta materiam primi argumenti erit iste
primus articulus: utrum sola theologia ostendat intellectui viatoris esse aliquod
primum ens. Iuxta materiam secundi argumenti erit secundus articulus: utrum
sola theologia ostendat intellectui viatoris primi entis plenam omnipotentiam.
Tertius articulus erit titulus questionis: utrum solum theologicum verbum, id
est, sola theologia, ostendat etc.
<Primus articulus>
<Utrum sola theologia ostendat intellectui viatoris esse aliquod primum ens>
<Conclusio prima>
Pro primo articulo sit ista prima conclusio: nulla substantia separata secundum
esse et secundum operari est philosophice considerationis. [156ra] Probatur,
quia subiectum scientie physice est corpus mobile ut sic, igitur quidquid est
physice considerationis vel est corpus mobile vel habet per se habitudinem ad
ipsum. Hec patent in philosophia. Sed nulla substantia separata secundum esse
et secundum operari est corpus mobile, ut est notum, nec ad ipsum habet per se
habitudinem. Quod probatur, nam omne quod habet per se habitudinem ad
corpus mobile vel est in ipso ut pars constitutiva, vel ut accidens dispositivum,
vel per se requiritur ad motum; sed constat substantiam separatam non esse
partem neque accidens corporis mobilis. Quod autem non per se ad motum concurrat, patet, nam secundum Commentatorem V Physicorum,67 5 per se
67
Averr., In Arist. Phys. V.5, com. 5, 209rC.
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406
TRADITIO
concurrunt ad motum, scilicet motor, mobile, terminus a quo, et terminus ad
quem, et tempus; sed nulla68 substantia separata est aliquid istorum. Igitur conclusio vera. Hec eadem conclusio potest haberi ab Aristotele, II Physicorum,69 ubi vult
quod “que non mota movent non amplius sit physice considerationis;” igitur etc.
<Corollaria prime conclusionis>
Corollarium: ambitus totius physice considerationis seu speculationis versus nobiliora subiecta terminatur inclusive ad motores celestes qui movent orbes per70
modum agentium. Probatur, nam physica speculatio non remanet penitus infra
motores orbium, sicut quidam existimaverunt, nec transcendit supra, igitur terminatur etc. Secunda pars antecedentis est nota ex conclusione. Et prima probatur sic: quecumque consideratio se sublevat ad considerationem aliquorum
corporum naturalium ut naturalia sunt, ipsa se sublevat ad considerationem naturarum eorum – istud patet; sed corpora celestia sunt naturalia, secundum quam
conditionem cadunt sub physica consideratione; igitur scientia physica speculatur
circa eorum naturas, que sunt principia in eis eorum motuum. Unde sunt naturalia corpora. Hec omnia patent I Celo et mundo71 et II Physicorum.72 Principia
autem eorum motuum sunt motores eorum. Igitur speculatio physica usque ad
motores celestes se porrigit et ibi terminatur.
Secundum corollarium: scientia physica non considerat de toto ente sive de
omnibus entibus. Patet, quia eius consideratio terminatur ad motores orbium,
non autem totum ens terminatur ad eos; igitur.
Corollarium tertium: consideratio physica infimas tantum substantias attingit
et supremas minime capit. Probatur, quia terminatur ad motores celestes.
Motores autem sunt in infime intelligentie, secundum philosophos et theologos,
sicut faciliter posset probari per multos.
Corollarium quartum: esse aliquam substantiam separatam non motricem corporis per scientiam physicam non potest concludi. Patet, quia non transcendit
motores.
Quintum corollarium: nullam esse substantiam separatam non motricem corporis per scientiam physicam potest concludi. Patet, quia omnino impertinens
est sibi non ascendenti supra motores.
Corollarium sextum: per scientiam physicam finitas esse numero substantias
separatas non motrices vel infinitas non potest concludi, ideo non negat
ipsarum multitudinem infinitam nec asserit. Patet, quia ad ipsas scientia
68
69
70
71
72
nulla] substantias* add. sed del.
Arist. Physic. II.7, 198a 27–28 (AA 2, no. 87).
per] pro a. c.
Arist., De caelo de mundo I.2, 269a24–25.
Arist., Physic. II.1, 193a30.
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
407
physica non porrigit se, igitur nec habet eas finire nec infinitare.73 Hoc autem generaliter verum est de omni scientia, quod nec finitat nec infinitat illa de quibus se
non intromittit, ut physica de figuris geometricis utrum sint numero finite vel infinite non curat, cum ad eas sua consideratio non se porrigat; igitur corollarium verum.
<Conclusio secunda>
Secunda conclusio: scientia physica non ostendit intellectui viatoris esse in ordine
entium aliquod ens simpliciter primum. Ista conclusio satis potest videri in corollariis prime conclusionis. Sed aliter probatur sic: ultimum de posse physice speculationis [156rb] videtur esse ad concludendum in ordine moventium et
motorum esse aliquem primum motorem;74 sed illum motorem esse simpliciter
primum ens, ut est verum, demonstrabile non est; igitur, esto quod concludat
primum motorem, non tamen concludit ens simpliciter primum. Secunda pars
antecedentis patet, quia physica scientia non habet per quid procedat ad concludendum primum motorem esse ens simpliciter primum.
<Corollaria secunde conclusionis>
Ex ista conclusione sequitur corollarium, scilicet quod per scientiam physicam
non potest concludi Deum esse. Patet, quia nomine Dei intelligimus ens quod
inter entia est simpliciter primum; hoc autem non potest physice concludi, per
conclusionem; igitur etc.
Secundum corollarium: Deum esse non est verum philosophicum vel physice
cognoscibile. Patet, quoniam omne verum alicuius scientie est in illa scientia principium vel conclusio; sed Deum esse non est principium in scientia physica, nec
potest concludi; igitur etc.
Ex hiis patet quam turpiter decipiantur et antiqui multi et moderni putantes
Aristotelem in Physicis75 demonstrasse Deum esse, cum76 non demonstraverit nisi
primum motorem esse, motorem scilicet appropriatum et moventem executive,
scilicet per modum agentis, sicut patet VII et VIII Physicorum,77 in quibus non
agitur de motore movente per modum finis, sed precise executive per modum
agentis. Nec Aristoteles ipse, qui pre ceteris philosophis78 per propria uniuscuiusque scientie incessit ad probandum vera illius scientie, non exiens facultatem eius,
adeo ignoravit limites physice considerationis ut non viderit se non conclusisse
73
74
75
76
77
78
infinitare] finitare a. c.
motorem] iter.
Arist., Physic. II.1, 193a30.
cum] iter. et exp.
Arist., Physic. VII.1, 242a–b; et Physic. VIII.1, 250b–51a.
philosophis] physicis*
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TRADITIO
Deum esse in Physicis vel primum in entibus, esto quod probaverit primum
motorem. Sciebat enim non esse ulterius physice speculationis utrum primus
motor sit primum simpliciter in ordine entium. Inde nusquam in Physicis assumpsit probandum primum ens simpliciter. Secus autem in XII Metaphysice.79 Dicentes
igitur Aristotelem demonstrasse in Physicis Deum esse aut locuntur secundum propriam eorum existimationem,80 existimantes scilicet per illam: Aristoteles demonstravit sufficienter demonstratum Deum esse, et videant utrum sic sit, cum per
doctores sanctos et plerosque philosophos ponantur super omnes motores orbium
intelligentie ad invicem ordinate et Deum non esse de numero motorum, de
quibus est sermo in Physicis. Aut isti locuntur secundum existimationem Aristotelis
dicentes Aristotelem sic existimasse, et tunc faciunt Aristotelem ignorantem limites
physice considerationis, quem ego non puto, licet in multis errantem.
Tertium corollarium: scientia physica nec aliquid respuit nec aliquid approbat
de primo ente sive de Deo. Patet, quia consideratio de primo ente transcendit
limites eius, sicut nichil reicit nec aliquid approbat de figuris geometricis, quia
ad eas non se extendit consideratio sua.
Ex hiis patet scientiam physicam neminem fallere nec theologie in aliquo contradicere, sed ignorantia physice scientie et de Deo male sentit et theologice veritati obsistit. Ideo plurimos fallit. Fallit et illum qui hanc ignorantiam
philosophiam appellat.
<Conclusio tertia>
Tertia conclusio: aliquod esse ens in ordine entium simpliciter primum est per
aliam scientiam scibile quam per theologiam. Probatur, nam in ordine causarum
efficientium esse aliquam causam simpliciter primam est per aliam scientiam
scibile. Patet II Metaphysice.81 Et primam causam esse simpliciter primum ens
est scibile per eandem scientiam. Istud probabitur in sequenti articulo. Ergo conclusio ista est vera etc. [156va]
<Corollarium tertie conclusionis>
Corollarium: signata quacumque secunda82 causa per aliquam aliam scientiam
quam per theologiam, notius est Deum esse et aliquod ens simpliciter primum
esse quam assignatam causam causare. Probatur, nam in aliqua scientia etiam
notius est omnem effectum quem noviter videmus incipere habere aliquam
causam ipsum actuantem in esse quam prefatam causam causare, et per
79
80
81
82
Cf. Arist., Metaph. XI.7, 1073a5 sqq.
existimationem] estimationem a. c. s. l.
Arist., Metaph. II.2, 994b.
secunda] s. l.
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
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eandem scientiam notius est esse aliquam causam simpliciter primam quam preassignatam secundam causam causare, et per eandem scientiam notius est primam
causam simpliciter esse simpliciter primum ens83 quam assignatam causam
causare, igitur etc. Primum assumptum patet, nam sit sol causa floritionis
arboris. Constat quod in aliqua alia scientia etiam notum est intellectui A floritionem habere causam sue productionis et facilius intellectus dissentiret huic: “Sol
est causa A floritionis,” quam huic:84 “A floritio habet causam productivam”;
igitur etc. Alia assumpta probantur similiter.
Ex hiis patet quid dicendum sit ad istum articulum, scilicet quod non sola theologia ostendit intellectui viatoris esse aliquod simpliciter primum ens.
<Secundus articulus>
<Utrum sola theologia ostendat intellectui viatoris primi entis plenam omnipotentiam>
Nunc igitur pertractandus est secundus articulus: utrum scilicet sola theologia
ostendat intellectui viatoris primi entis plenam omnipotentiam. Et articulus
iste in sui declaratione dependet a declaratione omnipotentie ut concurratur, scilicet: quid sit omnipotentia et in quo consistat? Ideo ponam aliquas propositiones
simul declarantes omnipotentiam et articulum.
<Suppositiones quatuor>
Premitto igitur tanquam suppositiones quatuor propositiones quas dico esse
scibiles per aliam scientiam quam per theologiam, quas nunc non probo causa
brevitatis, sed satis notum est unicuique quod dico.
Sit igitur prima talis: omne possibile quod nondum est est producibile sive
possibile produci. Ista est satis nota in lumine naturali, quia si nondum est,
non est possibile quod sit nisi per productionem ponatur in esse.
Secunda sit ista: omne producibile est ab alio producibile et non a se. Ista
similiter in lumine naturali est nota, et habetur II De anima.85
Tertia propositio: omne activum et alicuius actuativum in esse est activum per
formam sue86 nature et per actum formalem sibi intrinsecum. Ista similiter est
nota in lumine naturali, et habetur VIII Physicorum87 et a Commentatore III
De anima,88 commento quarto, et expressius III Physicorum,89 commento 17:
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
simpliciter primum ens] primum ens simpliciter a. c.
huic] a add. sed exp.
Arist., De anima II.7, 419a.
sue] nature add. sed del.
Arist., Physic. VIII.3, 202a16–17.
Averr., In Arist. De anima III, com. 4, 384–85.
Averr., In Arist. Phys. III, com. 17, 92C. Cf. Arist., Physic. III, 202a16–17.
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410
TRADITIO
“Omne enim quod agit, agit secundum quod est in actu” est propositio divulgata
apud philosophos.
Quarta propositio sit ista: nullum agens in virtute propria agit supra naturam
propriam, id est, producit effectum maioris actualitatis et perfectionis quam sit
actualitas propria et sua perfectio. Ista similiter divulgata est apud philosophos,
et patet ex precedenti.
Has quatuor propositiones dico esse notas de facto in alia scientia quam in
theologia, scilicet in metaphysica.
<Conclusio prima>
Tunc sit prima conclusio: ens quod est de facto simpliciter primum et quod est
scibile per aliam scientiam quam90 per theologiam, sicut patet in primo articulo,
esse simpliciter primum possibile est similiter per aliam scientiam scibile quam per
theologiam. Probatur, nam si ens quod de facto est simpliciter primum non est
simpliciter primum possibile, igitur esset possibile aliud supra ipsum. Sit illud
B. Tunc, si B esset possibile, cum nondum sit, per primam suppositionem esset
producibile, et per secundam esset ab alio producibile et non a se. Et notum est
cuilibet quod non est producibile ab alio quod eque non est perfectum sicut
ipsum. Et91 per tertiam et quartam suppositiones seu precedentes propositiones
non est producibile ab aliquo de facto92 existente, igitur conficitur contradictio,
scilicet quod esset producibile et non esset producibile, et ab aliquo esset producibile et a nullo. Huiusmodi deductionis pre[156vb]misse sunt note extra theologia
<m> et ipsa deductio pariter, igitur et conclusio.
<Corollaria prime conclusionis>
Corollarium primum: ens simpliciter primum esse perfectum secundum omnem
possibilem perfectionem simpliciter et cuiuslibet perfectionis simpliciter plenitudinem in se continere est per aliam scientiam scibile quam per theologiam. Istud
patet per conclusionem. Patet etiam per Anselmum, Monologion.93 Ex conclusione
quidem quia, cum nullum sit possibile ens supra primum de facto, nulla est possibilis perfectio que isti non competat, alias esset possibilis et nulli posse<t> competere. Nam si alicui posset competere, aut alicui supra id quod de facto est
primum, et hoc non, quia nullum tale est possibile, ut probatum est; aut
ipsimet primo de facto, et hoc etiam non, per tertiam et quartam suppositiones.
90
91
92
93
quam] s. l.
et] add. in marg.
facto] non add. sed exp.
Anselm. Cant., Monol. 1, 56.
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
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Hec deductio et omnia assumpta patent extra theologiam. Eodem modo de plenitudine, quia nulla alteri plenius possunt competere, igitur etc.
Corollarium: primum ens simpliciter sibi ipsi sufficere ad totam plenitudinem
sui esse et ad plenitudinem omnium perfectionum sibi plenissime intrinsecarum
est per aliam <scientiam> scibile quam per theologiam. Probatur, quoniam
ipsum a nullo superiori nec ab alio inferiori accipere prefatam plenitudinem,
sicut supra patet per conclusionem et eius suppositiones, notum est extra theologiam. Sed quod a nullo equali etiam extra theologiam notum <est> quod ostenditur sic: extra theologiam notum est ad omnem substantialem influxum sive
emanationem requiri causam per se ordinatam ad effectum et nullum individuum
ad aliud individuum eiusdem perfectionis substantialiter producendum ordinari
tanquam causam per se ad suum effectum. Patet in doctrinis philosophorum a theologis approbatis. Igitur94 corollarium verum. Istud etiam corollarium potest haberi
ab Anselmo, Monologion,95 sicut patebit in tertio articulo.
Et istud corollarium tangit totam radicem omnipotentie et in quo principaliter
omnipotentia consistit. Est enim hoc quod conclusum est excellentissimum obiectum plenissimi posse, a quo dirivantur quecumque alia que omnipotentie subsunt,
sicut a plenissimo esse divino dirivantur quecumque alia que usque a Deo plena
non sunt. Posse enim96 tam plenissimum esse, id est, habere et a se habere et
non ab alio accipere, sed ex se ad illud sufficere, est posse illud quod quecumque
alia que quoquo modo rationem entis habent participant, ideo posse tantam plenitudinem potest vere dici omni posse, quia est posse illud quod est eminenter
omnia et ad que illud posse in tantum est in quantum illam plenitudinem quam
principaliter potest imitantur. Sicut igitur divinum esse potest vere dici omni
esse quod est illud plenissimum esse quod eminenter continet alia, de quo dicit
beatus Augustinus et Anselmus quod solum vere est, alia autem non vere97
sunt, sed in tantum sunt in quantum aliquod vestigium vel imitationem illius
habent, si igitur divinum esse est solum verum esse et esse aliorum non verum
esse, igitur propter hoc quod divinum esse non est realiter esse aliorum, sed est
illud plenum et idem verum esse quod alia imitantur, non debet negari divinum
esse esse omni esse. Si enim per ymaginationem esset aliquod esse citra divinum
quod in se realiter perstringeret omnia alia esse citra98 divinum, adhuc verius
diceretur divinum esse omni esse quam illud quod sic [157ra] alia in se perstringeret, quia divinum esse esset plenitudo, quoniam illud citra participaret. Similiter, divinus intellectus intelligens suum intelligibile esse et sciens suum scibile esse
potest vere dici omnisciens, quia scit illud scibile in quo omnia scibilia continentur.
94
95
96
97
98
igitur] etc. add. sed exp.
Anselm. Cant., Monol. 1, 56.
enim] e? a. c. in marg.
non vere] tr. a. c.
citra] deum add. sed exp.
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412
TRADITIO
Principialiter enim intellectus divinus scit suum esse et consequenter alia. Ideo
propter suum esse quod scit principaliter et non propter alia debet dici omnisciens.
Sic, inquam, divinum posse, quia est posse illius plenissimi esse, in quo omnia alia
eminenter continentur, non quia ista potest, sed quia potest illud plenum esse
quod ista imitantur principaliter, debet dici omniposse. Illud enim principaliter
potest, ista autem in tantum potest in quantum illius qualemcumque participationem habent. Ideo illud esse plenissimum est excellentissimum obiectum omnipotentie, alia vero que omnipotentie subsunt ab illo principaliter derivantur.
Ideo dixi quod in isto secundo corollario tota radix omnipotentie tangebatur,
sed quia tardus intellectus non per pauca ad concernendam veritatem movetur,
ut plenius satisfiat ponam secundam conclusionem. Sed antequam ipsam
ponam premittam quinque suppositiones quas dico esse notas vel scibiles per
aliam scientiam quam per theologiam.
Quarum prima sit ista: illud quod in ordine entium est simpliciter primum ens
esse summe activum est per aliam scientiam scibile quam per theologiam. Ista
patet per tertiam suppositionem prime conclusionis.
Ex ista sequitur secunda, que est ista: illud quod in ordine entium est simpliciter primum ens esse in ordine causarum efficientium simpliciter primam causam
est per aliam scientiam scibile quam per theologiam. Ista patet, quia si simpliciter
primum ens non est simpliciter prima causa, cum aliqua sit prima causa et
ponenda sit per aliam scientiam quam per theologiam, ut patet in secundo
articulo, vel igitur primum simpliciter est citra primam causam, et tunc non
esset primum ens, quod implicat contradictionem, nec esset summe activum,
quod est contra precedentem, nam prima causa esset activior, per tertiam suppositionem prime conclusionis; vel primum ens est supra primam causam, et tunc vel
prima causa non est prima, quod implicat contradictionem, vel primum ens non
est summe activum, quod est contra precedentem. Necesse est igitur ut primum
simpliciter in ordine entium sit in ordine causarum simpliciter prima causa.
Hec tota deductio nota est extra theologiam.
Tertia suppositio sit ista: primam causam simpliciter in ordine causarum ad
productionem cuiuscumque essentialis effectus principalius et plenius influere
quam quamcumque aliam causam99 est per aliam scientiam scibile quam per theologiam. Patet prima propositione De causis.100
Ex ista sequitur quarta suppositio, scilicet: quod ad nullius effectus productionem aliqua secunda causa possit supplere totum influxum prime cause est scibile
per aliam scientiam quam per theologiam. Patet ex precedenti.
Quinta suppositio sit ista: quidquid sibi sufficit ad esse quod habet tantum sibi
sufficit quantum sibi sufficeret si a se ipso flueret. Ista patet, quia quidquid sibi
99
100
quamcumque aliam causam] quacumque alia causa
Lib. de causis 1, 46.
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ipsi sufficit ad esse quod habet tantum sibi sufficit quanta est sua intrinseca
actualitas. Sed quanta est sua intrinseca actualitas tantus esset influxus, et non
maior quo flueret a se, si a se ipso flueret, ut potest patere per tertiam et
quartam suppositiones prime conclusionis, et tanta sufficientia sibi ipsi sufficeret.
Item, si a se flueret quantus esset influxus quo flueret, igitur quidquid sufficit
sibi ipsi ad esse quod habet tantum sibi sufficit quantum sibi sufficeret si a se ipso
flueret. Tota ista deductio extra theologiam patet. Ideo [157rb] dico istas quinque
suppositiones patere in dictis philosophorum et theologorum approbatorum et ab
eisdem ratificatis.
<Conclusio secunda>
Nunc pono secundam conclusionem, que sit ista: nullum ens citra primum simpliciter sibi ipsi sufficere ad esse suum est per aliam scientiam scibile quam per
theologiam. Probatur, et sit A ens citra primum simpliciter quod sibi ipsi sufficiat
ad suum esse. Tunc arguitur sic per premissas suppositiones: A sufficit sibi ipsi,
igitur per quintam suppositionem tantum sibi sufficit quantum sibi sufficeret si
a se flueret; et per tertiam suppositionem, sed si A a se ipso flueret, prima
causa simpliciter principalius et plenius ad suum esse influeret; et per quartam
suppositionem, A non posset supplere totum influxum prime cause, igitur non
sibi ipsi sufficeret per suum influxum; igitur per ultimam suppositionem nec
nunc sibi ipsi sufficit, quod erat probandum. Tota ista deductio extra theologiam
patet, igitur conclusio vera.
Ex qua sequuntur aliqua corollaria.
<Corollaria secunde conclusionis>
Corollarium primum: quodlibet ens citra primum simpliciter ab eodem primo
dependere in esse est per aliam scientiam quam per theologiam scibile. Istud
patet ex dictis. Unde apparet non esse verum quod magister Gregorius101 ait II
Sententiarum, quod “non esse plura entia non habentia principium effectivum”
sola fide tenetur, sic quod non potest viva ratione convinci. Patet, inquam, ex
deductis non esse verum. Ipse enim fortasse, quinimmo sine forte, sola fide
tenuit. Et miror quid non notaverit beatum Augustinum, II De libero arbitrio,102
et De vera religione,103 deducentem premissum corollarium vivis et irrefragabilibus
rationibus, vel saltem Anselmum, Monologion,104 hoc idem105 deducentem. Et
101
102
103
104
105
Greg. Arim., In I Sent., 1.2, vol. IV, 6.
Aug., Gr. et lib. arb. I.2.4, 213.
Aug., De vera relig. IV.6, 119.
Anselm. Cant., Monol. 1, 56.
idem] dedu del.
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TRADITIO
dicit se Anselmus non fide procedere. Item, saltem Boethium attendisset, III De
consolatione,106 hoc idem claris rationibus deducentem.
Secundum corollarium: primum ens simpliciter cuilibet enti possibili vel existenti per plenitudinem vel participationem per se ipsum plene sufficere ad existentiam actualem est per aliam <scientiam> scibile quam per theologiam. Patet ex
superioribus, nam patet primum ens sibi ipsi sufficere ad omnem plenitudinem
perfectionis et esse notum extra theologiam. Et ex iam deductis patet omne
aliud citra ipsum ab ipso esse et dependere. Igitur ad cuiuslibet entis actualem
existentiam quidquid requiritur sive partialis essentia sive influxus ab ipso est
et ab ipso potest dari, igitur sufficit etc.
Tertium corollarium: primum ens simpliciter quodlibet aliud citra ipsum et
totum entium ordinem et totam rerum universitatem se solo producere ac
regere et gubernare et est verum et est per aliam scientiam scibile quam per theologiam. Ex dictis potest patere. Et per Boethium patet III De consolatione.107
Ex hiis patet complete quid sit “omnipotentia,” quia est plena sufficientia ad
omne esse positivum possibile108 qua primitus omnipotens sufficit sibi ipsi ad
omnem plenitudinem essendi et omnes in se perstringendi possibiles perfectiones
simpliciter et cuiuslibet earum immensam plenitudinem. Et secundo sufficit
cuilibet alteri non solum in esse cause efficientis, sed in esse cuiuscumque alterius
speciei cause in re requirente ex necessitate nature sue plures causas, non quidem
quod ipse omnipotens possit esse causa alteri rei cuiuscumque speciei cause, sed ita
sufficit cuilibet quod si requirit plures causas diversarum rationum ipsas ei quas
requirit causas potest dare. Et sic intelligit Boethius, III De consolatione,109
cum dicit Deum se solo gubernare mundum. Et beatus Augustinus, De fide et
symbolo,110 et Super Genesim contra Manicheos,111 ubi dicit Deum non adiutum
materia ad esse rerum compositarum, sed se solo sufficere cuilibet, cum sit omnipotens omnia; si res producenda requirit materiam ipsam, cum materiam ipse
omnipotens [157va] dat et dare sufficit, sufficit, inquam, omnipotens
cuilibet alteri ad omne essentiale esse et omne aliqualiter esse qualiter esse est
bene esse ipsi creature.
Ex hiis potest patere istud corollarium: si iuxta imaginationem aliquorum112
esset dare supremam speciem in esse possibilem, infinite perfectam, et Deo immediatam, in quam concurrerent omnes denominationes perfectionis simpliciter et
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
Boeth., Cons. III.11.14, 61.
Boeth., Cons. III.11.14, 61.
positivum possibile] tr. a. c.
Boeth., Cons. III.11.14, 61.
Aug., De fide et operib. II.2, 2–4.
Aug., Sup. Gen. contr. Manich. I.6.10, 76–77.
Ioh. Ripa, De gradu supremo 2, 201.
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
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quelibet infinite, et cui communicata essent ad cuiuslibet entis citra se productionem113 de nichilo infinita causalitas, et iuxta imaginationem Commentatoris esset
independens et ex se necesse esse, adhuc tamen non esset omnipotens. Patet, tam
ratione sui intrinseci esse, tam ratione aliorum quibus non sufficeret. Ratione
quidem sui esse intrinseci, nam licet sibi ipsi sufficeret ad infinitum esse quod
habet, non tamen posset ex se habere, immo nec habere nec sibi sufficeret ad
illud plenissimum esse a quo immense deficit. Cum tamen illud sit perfectius
ipsum quam non ipsum, ideo non habet posse respectu illius esse quod est excellentissimum obiectum omnipotentie, ut superius dicebatur.
Ratione vero aliorum quibus non sufficit sic patet: nam licet ad cuiuscumque
alterius entis citra se productionem et factionem de114 nichilo infinito influxu115
concurrat, non tamen sufficit istis entibus ad eorum esse, tum quia non potest
eis dare primam causam efficientem necessario requisitam ad quorumcumque productiones, cum ipsa prima causa non sit in istius potestate nec ipsam applicet ad
alicuius productionem; tum quia non potest eiusdem prime cause transcendentem
influxum; tum etiam quia rebus compositis non sufficit dare materiam et formam
necessario requisitas, cum hec principalius sint in potestate prime cause quam sint
in potestate istius. Non igitur sufficit eis, igitur non erit omnipotens.116
<Responsio ad articulum et corollaria>
Ex hiis sequitur responsio ad articulum, scilicet quod non solum theologicum
verbum ostendit intellectui viatoris omnipotentiam de primo ente simpliciter.
Ex ista declaratione articuli secuntur duo corollaria, unum quod non esse nec
posse esse plures omnipotentes est per aliam scientiam scibile quam per theologiam. Patet ex dictis, nam si sunt plures omnipotentes, sint igitur A et B. Tunc
sic: aut A et B sunt eque plene perfecta aut non. Istud est primum principium.
Si non, igitur A et B habent ad invicem ordinem essentialem perfectionis, id
est, unum est alio essentialiter perfectius. Sit A perfectius B. Tunc B non est omnipotens, per ea que dicta sunt in prima conclusione et in precedenti corollario, quia
A est plenius perfectissime quam B, ad cuius plenitudinem B non sufficit nec
potest attingere. Et117 posse ipsius A est tam plenum quam eius esse est
plenum esse, quia eius posse est ad totam illam plenitudinem, et posse ipsius B
non est ad ipsam, igitur non est omniposse, cum non possit in illud quod est118
113
114
115
116
117
118
productionem] ex nihilo add. sed del.
de] nihilo add. sed del.
influxu] fluxu a. c. s. l.
omnipotens] quintum corollarium add. sed del.
et] add. sed exp.
est] add. sed exp.
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TRADITIO
excellentissimum obiectum omnipotentie vel omniposse. Ideo posse ipsius B non
est omnipotentia. Igitur B non est omnipotens.
Si vero A et B dentur eque plene perfecta, tunc aut sunt eque ad invicem independentia aut unum ab alio fluit. Si unum ab alio fluit, fluat igitur B ab A. Et
constat quod B non est omnipotens, quia suum posse non sufficit sibi ad esse
quod habet. Sed A est plena sufficientia, et ideo plena potentia, que ipsi B
deficit, ideo non est omnipotens.
Si eque sint ad invicem independentia, igitur unum non sufficit alteri, id est, A
non est ipsi B plena potentia qua B sit id quod est, sed ipsummet B est sibi ipsi
plena119 potentia et plena sufficientia qua sibi ipsi sufficit ad totam plenitudinem
sui esse. Omnipotens autem debet esse potentia ad omnia simpliciter [157vb]
intrinseca et extrinseca ut eadem una potentia omnipotens ipse et se et omnia
possit et sic possit ut eadem una potentia sit et subsistat quidquid est vel subsistit
et nichil possit eandem potentiam subterfugere ut esse possit et non virtute ipsius
potentie. Et qua potentia omnipotens et sibi ipsi et omnibus aliis plene sufficiat ut
non sit alicui aliqua sufficientia nisi ista potentia. Unde si A non est ipsi B plena
potentia qua B sit, non est omnipotentia vel omniposse vel omnisufficienti<a>,
nam B esset per potentiam aliam et aliam sufficientiam qua sufficit sibi ipsi et
non indiget A; tamen nec sit ipsum A, A non est omnipotens. Hoc est quod intendit Boethius, III De consolatione,120 quando probat non plures deos esse, quia unus
alteri deesset.
Ideo sequitur secundum corollarium, quod non plures deos esse nec posse esse
est per aliam scientiam scibile quam per theologiam. Patet ex dictis.
<Tertius articulus>
<Utrum solum theologicum verbum ostendat intellectui viatoris esse aliquod
primum verbum quod sit prima veritas qua sint vera quecumque alia vera, vel
per aliquam aliam scientiam possit hoc sciri et evidenter concludi>
Restat nunc aliqua videre de tertio articulo istius questionis, videlicet: utrum
solum theologicum verbum ostendat intellectui viatoris esse aliquod primum
verbum quod sit prima veritas qua sint vera quecumque alia vera, vel per
aliquam aliam scientiam possit hoc sciri et evidenter concludi.
Ad quod videndum premitto quod A verum non esse scibile per B scientiam
potest parere duplicem sensum. Primum, quod A verum non sit B scientie considerationis vel speculationis, ut verbi gratia Deum esse non esse scibile per geometriam non est quod intellectus humanus non sufficiat ad hanc veritatem attingere,
sed non est geometrice considerationis vel speculationis. Si enim Euclides fuisset
119
120
plena] poni add. sed del.
Boeth., Cons. III.12, 60–63.
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
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perpetuatus in esse, et lumen121 sui intellectus122 continue confortatum per infinitam latitudinem veritatum geometricarum invicem ordinatarum processisset
scientifice demonstrando, numquam tamen potuisset concludere Deum esse per
illam scientiam, quia non est illius considerationis. Non enim esset ex defectu
intellectus veritates illas debiliter speculantis, sed ex parte artis non manuducentis123 intellectum ad veritatem hanc aspectum sue considerationis vitantem. Non
sic est autem de quadratura circuli. Circulum124 enim posse quadrari125 scibile per
geometriam est, quia est geometrice considerationis et scientia ipsa quantum est
de se est apta manuducere intellectum in hanc veritatem, esto quod nondum fuerit
nec futurus sit aliquis intellectus qui usque adeo in illa facultate profecerit ut
ipsam demonstrare potuerit. Si ipsa scientia de se illam porrigat, similiter
angulum extrinsecum trianguli rectilinei valere duos intrinsecos sibi oppositos
non est scibile per physicam etc.
Alium sensum parit prefata locutio quod A non sit scibile etc., quod hoc non sit
ex parte scientie, sed ex parte intellectus non potentis penetrare quecumque profunda illius scientie et latentes veritates sibi ipsi detegere, ut tactum est.
Primo modo habeo relinquere unam scientiam tanquam non ydoneam nec ex se
valentem ad ostendendum Deum esse, materiam esse puram potentialitatem in
genere entis, ut geometriam, et sic de multis. Secundo modo habeo relinquere alias
scientias tanquam ineptas ex se et inydoneas126 ad prefatas veritates ostendendas.
Sed propter ineptitudinem intellectus nondum capacis rationum quibus procedunt alie scientie, illam scientiam querere habeo que intellectum fide nutrit, que
talem ac tantum habet doctorem suas veritates, Spiritum Sanctum scilicet,
[158ra] revelantem ut eius auctoritati potius quam cuicumque rationi humane
se intellectus committere debeat. Et hoc est quod ait beatus Augustinus II
Super Genesim ad litteram:127 “de Scriptura revelata maior est,” inquit, “huius
Scripture auctoritas, quam totius seu omnis humani ingenii capacitas.” Propter
suam enim parvam capacitatem intellectus humanus, corruptibilis corporis
pondere aggravatus et sum<m>o fantasmatum obfuscatus, non patitur128
quantumlibet profundas aliarum scientiarum perscrutationes et earum
subtilissimas rationes. Ideo ratiocinado heu sepissime quadam verisimilitudine
falliter. Et quia ei tanta facultas non datur quanta opus est ad penetrandas
earum veritates et omnium ex parte vincendas materia similitudines rationum
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
lumen] lumine a. c.
intellectus] lumen add. sed del.
manuducentis] manudicentis a. c. s. l.
circulum] et add. sed del.
quadrari] quadraeri a. c.
inydoneas] ydoneas a. c. s. l.
Aug., Gen. ad litt. II.5.9, 39.
non patitur] iter. et del.
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TRADITIO
quibus invite decipitur, dicitur non posse per illas prefatas concludere veritates,
sed se committere debeat infallibili ac infallenti129 revelate Scripture.
Consimiliter distingendum est de ista: “A verum est scibile per B scientiam,”
sicut de negativa distinctum est.
Nunc pono propositiones de esse scibile per aliquam scientiam primo modo,
quia isto modo proprie accipitur A verum esse scibile per B scientiam, sicut
dicit Henricus de Gandavo in Summa,130 et est propria perscrutatio, quia scitur
que veritas per quam viam investigari possit. Secundo131 enim modo multe sunt
veritates que per nullam scientiam investigari possunt.
<Prima conclusio>
Sit igitur prima conclusio istius articuli hec: omne verum simpliciter necessarium
enuntiabile de primo ente simpliciter est per aliam scientiam scibile quam per
theologiam. Illud autem dixi “verum simpliciter necessarium” quod semper fuit
verum necessarium et semper erit necessarium, contra necessarium secundum
quid, quod si est necessarium, non semper fuit necessarium, sed incepit, sicut
verum de preterito ut “Adam fuit.”
Probatur igitur conclusio sic: omne verum simpliciter necessarium enuntiabile
de primo ente simpliciter enunciat de ipso aliquid quod sibi ex plenitudine perfectionis et omnipotentie competit, igitur quodlibet tale potest investigari per quamlibet scientiam per quam potest investigari primi entis plenitudo perfectionis et
omnipotentie; sed plenitudo perfectionis et omnipotentie primi entis potest per
aliquam scientiam investigari quam per theologiam, sicut patet ex precedenti
articulo; igitur etc. Antecedens prime consequentie est notum ex articulo precedenti. Et consequentia ipsa patet, nam omnis scientia investigans aliquam plenitudinem investigat omne quod est de ratione illius. Et secunda propositio
assumpta similiter ex precedenti claret articulo.
<Corollaria prime conclusionis>
Corollarium primum: omnes veritates eternas quas theologia asserit de primo ente
simpliciter vel concludere potest aliqua alia scientia asserit et concludere potest de
eodem primo. Patet ex conclusione.
Secundum corollarium: omnes nobiles veritates quas asserit theologia vel concludere potest de primo ente simpliciter easdem asserit vel concludere potest
aliqua alia scientia de eodem primo. Probatur sic: omnes nobiles veritates de
primo ente sunt veritates eterne; sed omnes veritates eternas quas asserit
129
130
131
infallenti] infallentei a. c.
Henr. Gand., Summa 1.1, 1.
secundo] modo del.
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PRINCIPIA ON THE SENTENCES IN THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY OF BOLOGNA
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theologia de primo ente asserit aliqua alia scientia de eodem primo, per precedens
corollarium; igitur etc. Minor probatur, quoniam si non omnes nobiles veritates de
primo ente sunt eterne veritates, igitur alique erunt temporales; sed nobiles veritates dicuntur quia divinas alias nobilitates exprimunt seu explicant; igitur
primum ens alias nobilitates non eternas sed temporales continet, quod est
impossibile.
Unde dico quod “Deum esse sapientem,” “Deum esse [158rb] omnipotentem”
sunt nobiles veritates de Deo. Similiter “Deum esse creativum,” “Divinum suppositum posse creatam naturam suppositare” sunt nobiles veritates de Deo et eterne.
Sed “Deum creare,” “Divinum suppositum creatam naturam suppositare” vel non
sunt veritates de Deo, quia non Dei sed potius fortasse creature nobilitates, sicut
non perfectiones, ut bene esse, <non> Dei sed potius creature indicant. Stat
fortasse aliquod enunciabile enunciari de Deo quod dicat perfectionem et non
Dei, sed potius alterius, ut scilicet “Deum creare,” “Deum suppositare” etc.
dicunt nobilitates de Deo, non tamen distinctas a nobilitatibus quas dicant
veritates eterne, scilicet “Deum posse creare, ” “Divinum suppositum naturam
creatam posse suppositare,” que sunt veritates eterne. Quod autem istorum
verius sit nichil ad presens.
Ex istis sequitur conclusio responsiva ad articulum.
<Secunda conclusio>
Secunda conclusio: in summa natura esse aliquod132 verissimum et summum ac
primum verbum quod sit ars summa, ad cuius exemplar cuncta formentur que
quibusdam gradibus summe et prime nature sese vicinare133 nituntur, est scibile
per aliam scientiam quam per theologiam. Patet ex superioribus, nam hec est
veritas eterna, igitur, per corollarium primum prime conclusionis, est scibilis
per aliam scientiam, etc. Item est nobilis veritas de prima et summa natura,
igitur, per corollarium secundum prime conclusionis, est scibilis per aliam scientiam quam per theologiam.
Hec conclusio deducitur ab Anselmo suo Monologion,134 cuius prohemio135 premittit136 se quecumque conclusurum non conclusurum per theologiam, igitur per
aliam scientiam. Ait enim: “unam naturam, summam omnium que sunt, solam
sibi in eterna beatitudine sufficientem, omnibusque rebus aliis hoc ipsum quod
aliquid sunt aut quod aliquo modo bene sunt per omnipotentem bonitatem
dantem et facientem, aliaque plura de Deo sive de eius creatura necesse credimus,
132
133
134
135
136
aliquod] aliquod add. sed del.
vicinare] ni add. sed del.
Anselm. Cant., Monol. 1, 56.
Anselm. Cant., Monol. 1, 56.
premittit] in marg.
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TRADITIO
aut non audiendo aut non credendo ignorat, puto quia ipsa ex magna parte, si vel
mediocris ingenii, potest ipse sibi sola ratione persuadere.” Ex hoc dicto patet
quod quecumque conclusit Anselmus in prefato libro Monologion137 non theologice conclusit, nam sola ratione, et ratione non dependente a fide, sed ratione
que concludit non credenti, id est, auctoritati Scripture non assentienti, et non
audienti que sunt fidei. Et secundum multos prima principia138 theologie sunt
propositiones in Sacra Scriptura contente. Ideo omnes tales ponentes theologiam
procedere ex propositionibus creditis et in Sacra Scriptura contentis tanquam ex
primis principiis et resolubilibus habent dicere nullum esse processum theologicum non presupponentem fidem et propositiones creditas. Quis igitur ipsorum
audebit dicere, cum non credenti posse theologice procedi, quapropter dicere
ha<n>c nullam rationem concludentem non credenti, nec recipienti propositiones
creditas et in Sacra Scriptura contentas, esse theologicam? Utrum autem verum
sit quod theologia procedat ex propositionis creditis in Sacra Scriptura contentis
tanquam ex primis principiis alias fortasse videbitur. Saltim nunc apud dicentes
sic convincitur Anselmus139 non theologice processisse in illo tractatu, ubi
tamen rationibus conclusit hoc quod asserit. Hec secunda conclusio.
Preterea ad conclusionem sic: in summa natura esse aliquod tale verbum quale
ponit conclusio fuit iam per aliam scientiam conclusum, igitur est per aliam scientiam scibile vel concludibile.140 Consequentia nota. Antecedens probatur, nam
antequam tale verbum per aliquam revelatam Scripturam manifestaretur, vivis
rationibus fuit conclusum ab hominibus misteria non per revelatam Scripturam
scrutantibus, sed “a visibilibus141 ad invisibilia conscedentibus.”142 Testatur
enim beatus Augustinus [158va] VII Confessionum143 in quibusdam Platonicorum
libris multis rationibus tale verbum esse conclusum. Ait enim: “et primo volens
ostendere michi, quam resistas superbis, humilibus autem des gratiam, et
quanta misericordia tua demonstrata sit hominibus via humilitatis, quod
verbum tuum caro factum est et habitavit inter homines: procurasti michi
quosdam Platonicorum libros de Greca lingwa in Latinam versos. Et ibi144 legi
non quidem hiis verbis, sed hoc idem omnino multis et multiplicibus suadere rationibus, quod in principio erat verbum et verbum erat apud Deum et Deus erat
verbum: hoc erat in principio apud Deum; omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine
ipso factum est nichil; quod factum est, in ipso vita erat et vita erat lux
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
Anselm. Cant., Monol. 1, 56.
principia] et add. sed del.
Anselm. Cant., Monol. 1, 56.
concludibile] conclusibile a. c.
visibilibus] visibililibus a. c.
Cf. Richard. S. Vict., Trin., Prol., 82.
Aug., Conf. VII.7.13, 101.
Aug., Conf. VII.7.13, 101.
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hominum et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebre eam non comprehenderunt; et quia145
omnis anima, quamvis testimonium perhibeat de lumine, non tamen est ipsa
lumen, sed Verbum, Deus ipse, est verum lumen, quod illuminat omnem
hominem venientem in hunc mundum.”
Ex hiis patet146 assumptum probandum et conclusio. Sed qui fuerint illi Platonici in quibus libris dicit se beatus Augustinus147 legisse hec que Scripta sunt et
posita nullos certius putaverim quam Porphirium et Plutinum. Et de Porphirio
quidem ait beatus Augustinus X De civitate Dei148 ipsum dicere non “telete149
solis” et lune animam purgari, sed “principia posse purgare.” Et subdit beatus
Augustinus:150 “Que autem dicat esse principia sicut Platonicus, novimus. Dicit
enim Deum Patrem et Deum Filium, quem Grece appellant paternum intellectum
vel paternam mentem.”
Ex quo patet quid posuit primum intelligibile verbum, et quia posuit hoc
primum verbum animam posse purgare, consonat illi sententie qua superius
dictum151 est quod “quamvis hominis152 anima testimonium perhibeat de
lumine, non tamen ipsa est lumen, sed Verbum, Deus ipse,153 est lumen verum
quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.” Quod autem Plutinus posuerit eundem paternum intellectum et paternam mentem hinc colligi
potest quod beatus Augustinus154 quid de Spiritu Sancto Porphirius dixerit ait:
“De spiritu sancto autem ait nichil aut155 non aperte aliquid dicit, quamvis
quem alium dicat horum medium non intelligo. Si enim, sicut Plotinus, ubi de
principalibus substantiis disputat, anime naturam etiam iste vellet intelligi, non
utique diceret horum medium, id est Patris et Filii medium. Postponit enim Plotinus anime naturam paterno intellectui.” Ecce igitur quod Plotinus posuit paternum intellectum cui postposuit anime naturam. Ex hiis etiam satis patere potest
conclusio.
Item eandem conclusionem deducit beatus Augustinus De vera religione156
pulchra manuductione non theologica, quia non ex propositionibus creditis vel
in Sacra Scriptura contentis nec ex talibus deductis, sed, ut ait:157 “ex visibilibus
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
quia] quod
patet] cor add. sed del.
Aug., Civ. X.23, 296.
Aug., Civ. X.23, 296.
telete] theletis
Aug., Civ. X.23, 296.
Aug., De peccat. merit. et rem. I.25.36, 35.
hominis] omnis
ipse] ipsum
Aug., Civ. X.23, 296.
aut] ex parte add. sed exp.
Aug., De vera relig. 36.66, 230.
Richard. S. Vict., Trin., Prol., 82.
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TRADITIO
ad invisibilia” conscendenti que concludit etiam non credenti, ubi tandem ad hoc
devenit quod quia hec omnia creata aliquod summe unum imitari nituntur, ut
probat, et illud implere non possunt, ideo fallunt et maxime158 corpora sensibilia.
Ideo datur intelligi esse aliquid quod ita illi summe unita sit simile ut illud omnino
impleat. Unde ait:159 “Corpora in tantum fallunt, in quantum non implent illud
unum quod convincuntur imitari, a quo principio unum est quidquid est, ad cuius
similitudinem quidquid nititur, naturaliter approbamus, quia naturaliter160
<improbamus> quidquid ab unitate161 discedit, atque in eius dissimilitudinem
tendit, datur intelligi esse aliquid quod illius unius solius a quo principio unum
est quidquid aliquo modo unum est, ita simile sit162 ut hoc omnino impleat ac
sit [158vb] idipsum; hec est Veritas et Verbum in Principio, et Verbum Deus
apud Deum. Si enim falsitas ex hiis est que imitantur unum, non in quantum imitantur, sed in quantum implere non possunt; illa est Veritas que id implere potuit,
et id163 esse illud quod est; ipsa est que illud ostendit sicut est: unde et Verbum eius
et Lux eius, rectissime dicitur.”
<Corollarium secunde conclusionis>
Ex ista conclusione cum probationibus eius, ymmo et ex prima conclusione et corollariis eius, sequitur istud corollarium: quod per aliam scientiam quam per theologiam potest scire qua veritate sit verum omne verum. Patet, inquam, ex
omnibus dictis propositionibus et ex dictis allegatis Platonicorum et beati Augustini, ubi expresse habetur tale verbum “per quod omnia facta sunt et quod factum
est in ipso vita erat.” Et ait beatus Augustinus164 ibidem ubi supra: “cetera illius
unius similia dici possunt in quantum sunt, in tantum enim et sunt: hec autem
ipsa eius similitudo, et ideo veritas, ut autem veritate sunt vera, que vera sunt.
Ita similitudine similia sunt,” ubi patet quod ipsum Verbum quod implet illud
unum est summa illius dissimilitudo et ideo summa veritas, et sicut quecumque
similia ista similitudine sunt similia, ita quecumque vera ista veritate sunt vera.
Ideo subdit:165 “ut igitur veritas forma verorum ita similitudo forma similium,”
ubi corollarium, et, ut dixi, non theologice procedit.
Item Anselmus, ubi supra, ostendit qua “veritate sint vera quecumque vera,”
ubi dicit se concludere etiam non credenti, ideo non theologice etc. Unde falsa
est secunda pars prime conclusionis principalis primi articuli questionis prime
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
maxime] sensibilia add. sed exp.
Aug., De vera relig. 36.66, 230.
naturaliter] non aliter
unitate] brevitate
ita simile sit] iter.
id] iter.
Aug., De vera relig. 36, 230.
Aug., De vera relig. 36, 230.
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prologi magistri Hugolini.166 Falsa est etiam prima pars tertie conclusionis principalis eiusdem articuli, et probationes earum assumunt falsa, nec aliquod habent
bonum fundamentum, sicut multa alia que de theologia et physica in illa questione loquitur. Ideo multum inepte et frivole incedit, sicut alibi poterit declarari
et ex superioribus positis volenti advertere potest videri.
<Corollarium responsivum>
Ex iam dictis sequitur corollarium responsivum ad articulum, scilicet non solum
theologicum verbum, id est, theologica doctrina, ostendit intellectui viatoris esse
aliquod Primum Verbum quod sit Prima Veritas qua sint vera omnia vera, sed per
aliam scientiam sciri potest. Probatur etc.
Ex omnibus superioribus patet istud finale corollarium quod totum perstringit
et reservat articulum, scilicet: omnem nobilem veritatem quam potest theologia
concludere de primo ente simpliciter eamdem potest aliqua alia scientia de
eodem primo concludere, et aliquam nobilem veritatem potest aliqua alia scientia
de primo ente concludere quantum non potest theologia de eodem primo concludere. Prima pars est secundum corollarium prime conclusionis.
Et secunda pars probatur sic per primam conclusionem cum corollariis suis:
omnem eternam et nobilem veritatem de primo ente potest aliqua alia scientia
a theologia concludere, igitur illam eternam et nobilem veritatem explicantem formalem rationem qua Deus est subiectum in theologia potest aliqua alia scientia de
Deo concludere; sed talem non potest concludere theologia de Deo; igitur etc.
Minor patet, quia “nulla scientia potest probare suum subiectum formale,” ut
potest haberi a philosophis, igitur etc.
Ex hiis clare patet quam rationabilis sit theologica assertio et quam rationabiliter theologice veritati credatur, veritati, inquam, a Spiritu Sancto celitus revelate.
Non enim nobis falsa ad nos fallendum proponit, sed subvenit intellectui et
adiuvat cum ipse Spiritus Sanctus, qui hanc veritatem cui credimus hominibus
revelavit, etiam vestigia sue veritatis creaturis impressit, ut eis velud quibusdam
gradibus licet defectibilibus [159ra] ad eius plenitudinem exercitatior intellectus
conscendere posset. Nunc beatus Augustinus167 dicit se dupliciter posse inquirere
substantiam Dei, scilicet per Scripturam revelatam et per creaturam creatam:
“Non ero,” inquit, “segnis ad inquirendam substantiam Dei vel per Scripturam
eius vel per creaturam eius. Que utraque ad hoc nobis proponitur ut ille queratur,
ille diligatur qui illam inspiravit et istam creavit etc.”
Et sic finita est collatio pro primo libro Sententiarum cum sua questione subtiliter disputata et compilata per egregium et valentem doctorem magistrum
166
167
Hug. Urb. Vet., Comm., Prol., 1.1.1, t. 1, 62.
Aug., Trin. II, Prol.1, 81.
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TRADITIO
Augustinum de Roma Ordinis Fratrum Heremitarum Sancti Augustini, qui legit
Bononie 1388 et 89.
Principium II
<Utrum quelibet divini vigoris activa productio sit sui termini formaliter
creativa>
Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, lat. fol. 852,
fols. 205ra–207ra
Utrum quelibet divini vigoris activa productio sit sui termini formaliter creativa.
Et arguitur quod non: nulla activitas precise finita est activitas creativa; sed
quelibet divini vigoris activa productio est activitas precise finita; igitur questio
falsa. Maior probatur sic: nulla activitas precise tanta quanta potest creature
communicari est activitas creativa; sed quantacumque activitas finita est communicabilis creature; igitur etc. Minor probatur sic: per quamlibet divini vigoris
activam productionem producitur effectus precise finitus, igitur quelibet talis
est precise finita.
In oppositum arguitur sic: per quamlibet divini vigoris activam productionem
effectus capit totaliter esse, igitur quelibet talis est formaliter creativa; igitur
questio vera.
In ista questione tres erunt articuli.168 Primus: utrum quelibet activitas productiva Dei ad extra sit precise finita. Secundus: utrum activitas creativa sit communicabilis alicui creature. Tertius: utrum quelibet activitas productiva Dei ad
extra sit ex suo valore sui termini formaliter creativa.
<Primus articulus>
<Utrum quelibet activitas productiva Dei ad extra sit precise finita>
Pro primo articulo pono aliquas conclusiones.
<Prima conclusio>
Quarum prima sit ista: cuilibet entitati cui ex sua natura correspondet aliquis
gradus entis in actu, correspondet aliquis gradus potentialitatis active. Ista conclusio non habet dubium de entitate divina, sed probo eam de qualibet entitate
creata, nam nulla talis entitas creata, cui correspondet aliquis gradus actus
entis sive aliquis gradus actualitatis169 in suo esse, est purus actus, cum sit dependens, nec est pura potentia passiva. Vel igitur est natura forme sive separate sive
168
169
articuli] in marg.
actualitatis] actualitis
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coniuncte vel intrinsece constans ex natura forme; sed quelibet forma est principium alicuius operationis vel motus quo possit adipisci suam perfectionem et
actualitatem; igitur est quoquomodo activa.
Preterea, si conclusio non sit vera, sit A aliqua entitas cui correspondeat aliquis
gradus actualitatis in suo esse, ita quod non sit pura potentia sicut materia prima,
cui170 tamen non correspondet aliquis gradus potentialitatis active. Tunc sic: A
non potest se ipsam movere de potentia ad aliquem actum nec aliquid aliud a
se, igitur est otiosa in natura et, secundo, est pura potentia passiva.
<Secunda conclusio>
Secunda conclusio: cuilibet entitati active tantus correspondet gradus activitatis
quantus est gradus sue actualitatis in esse. Probatur, nam quelibet natura activa
est activa ex suo actu, ut patet per Aristotelem et Commentatorem in multis locis,
igitur quantus est gradus sui actus tante est ex se ipsa activa, et per consequens
tantus est gradus sue activitatis.
Preterea, sit A aliqua natura activa. Tunc sic: A tante est activa quanta est latitudo sui actus, et habitur propositum. Aut plus est activa quam sit latitudo sue
actualitatis, et hoc est impossibile, quia totum suum posse activum ipsa consequitur ex suo actu, igitur non potest esse plus activa quam sit suus actus. Et tunc
sequitur quod non est idem non gradus latitudinis actualis entis et latitudinis
posse activi.171 Hoc autem consequens est falsum, quoniam vel esset dare entitatem
aliquam cui corresponderet aliquis gradus actus et nullus gradus active potentie,
contra primam conclusionem; vel econverso, scilicet172 cui corresponderet aliquis
gradus active potentie et nullus gradus actus, quod est impossibile, cum ex actu
sumatur tota potentia activa in qualibet re.173
Preterea sic: si A entitas non est tante activa quante est actus in sua natura,
igitur si aliqualiter remitteretur in174 [205rb] esse sui activus, adhuc staret
ipsam esse tante activam quante prius, et sic staret aliquid esse alio formalius
et non eo activius, quod est contra doctrinam philosophorum et sanctorum;
igitur conclusio vera.
<Tertia conclusio>
Tertia conclusio: quelibet entitas cui correspondet aliqua latitudo perfectionis
essentialis secundum quamlibet rationem sibi intrinsecam per quam habet esse
170
171
172
173
174
cui] non add. sed del.
activi] activii a. c.
scilicet] cui add. sed del.
qualibet re] tr. a. c.
in] actu add. sed del.
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TRADITIO
in actu essentialiter est activa, et secundum quamlibet talem est tante activa
quante est in actu. Ista conclusio sequitur ex precedentibus. Capiatur enim A
entitas supra materiam primam cui correspondet aliqua latitudo essentialis perfectionis, et sumantur in ea rationes B et C, secundum quas habet esse in actu.
Et arguitur sic: si A competeret B ratio sine C, per B A redderetur aliquo modo
in actu, igitur, per primam conclusionem, redderetur aliquo modo activa et, per
secundam, esset tante activa quante esset in actu; igitur et nunc per B redditur
A activa et tante activa quante per B ipsa habet esse in actu. Et sic de C arguitur,
si C est imperfectior B. Si vero C est perfectior B, arguitur sic: ex B A redditur aliqualiter175 activa et tante quante habet esse in actu, igitur multo magis ex C, per
quam habet esse in pleniori actu.
<Quarta conclusio>
Quarta conclusio: si aliqua activitas sufficit ad productionem alicuius effectus,
puta B, nulla potest dari maior activitas ad eiusdem effectus productionem nec
minor sufficiens. Probatur hec conclusio, et sumamus C activitatem sufficientem
ad productionem B. Et arguitur sic: B secundum totam C activitatem capit esse,
igitur nulla activitas sufficit ipsi B ad esse que non potest supplere totam C activitatem; sed nulla minor C potest supplere totum C; igitur nulla minor sufficit ad
productionem B. Probo igitur quod nulla maior C, nam si sic, sit illa D. Et arguitur sic: per totam D activitatem B capit esse, igitur per totam D activitatem B
dependet, igitur indiget ea tota, igitur nulla que non sufficit supplere totam D sufficit B producere; sed nulla minor sufficit supplere totam D; igitur nulla minor sufficit B; igitur C non sufficit ad producendum B, quod est contra positum; igitur
conclusio vera.
Ex qua oriuntur aliqua corollaria.
<Corollaria quarte conclusionis>
Primum est quod si Deus se solo ageret aliquem effectum supplendo activitatem
secunde cause, non plus ageret ad productionem talis effectus quam agat ipsum
producendo cum176 secunda causa. Patet, nam si plus ageret, sequeretur quod
totum illud plus suppleretur nunc per activitatem cause secunde, et sic aliqua latitudo activitatis divine posset suppleri a secunda causa, quod est falsum, sicut
faciliter posset ostendi.
175
176
aliqualiter] activa add. sed del.
cum] secunda add. sed del.
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Secundum corollarium est: tante Deus agit de facto ad productionem cuiuscumque177 effectus quod totum agere creaturarum ad eundem effectum non facit cum
agere divino maius vel plus agere. Patet ex precedenti.
Tertium corollarium: quilibet effectus ad quem producendum concurrunt cause
create cum causa divina de facto capit esse totaliter et sufficienter per solum
divinum agere, ita quod, licet concurrant alie cause create, divinum tamen
agere solum sufficit et totum ac totaliter facit acsi non adesset aliarum causarum
concursus — licet Egidius178 in questionibus De primo principio aliter dicat, sed de
eius positione diffusius alibi inquiretur.
Quartum corollarium: non minus Deus ageret sua propria activitate quemlibet
effectum quem de facto producit si poneretur infinita latitudo179 causarum essentialiter ordinatarum et concurrentium ad eundem effectum quam ipsum de facto
agat. Patet ex precedentibus.
Quintum corollarium: quelibet divina activitas ad effectum aliquem producendum quamlibet activitatem cause create infinite excedit. Patet, quia infinite plus
eam excedit quam ipsam excederet180 quecumque181 causa in latitudine causarum
creatarum essentialiter ordinatarum, si poneretur infinita, [205va] sicut dicit corollarium precedens, cum activitas divina excederet totam huiusmodi latitudinem
et non sit minor de facto quam esset tunc; igitur corollarium verum.
Sextum corollarium: quemlibet effectum Deus infinita activitate producit.
Patet ex precedentibus.
<Quinta conclusio>
Quinta conclusio: quelibet activitas cuiuscumque cause create est tanta precise
quanta ipsa est in actu per rationem secundum quam agit. Probatur: sumatur
A causa creata, et agat secundum B rationem per quam est in actu, et activitas
eius sit C, effectus vero quem agit sit D. Aut igitur C activitas est tanta quante
A est in actu per B rationem secundum quam agit, et sic habetur propositum.
Vel est maior, et hoc est impossibile, quoniam A non est plus activa secundum B
quam ipsa sit in actu, per secundam et tertiam conclusiones; et activitas non
potest esse maior quam A sit activa; igitur talis activitas non potest esse maior
quam A sit in actu per B.
Vel C activitas est minor quam A sit in actu per B, et hoc ostenditur esse falsum
hoc modo: nam A tante est activa secundum B quante ipsa est in actu per B, iuxta
secundam et tertiam conclusiones; et C activitas non est tanta quante A est in actu
177
178
179
180
181
cuiuscumque] effectus add. sed del.
Ægid. Roman., Tr. de primo princ. 4, 7v.
latitudo] ca add. sed del.
excederet] excedereret a. c.
quecumque] ca add. sed del.
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TRADITIO
per B; igitur, si A potest secundum B agere maiori activitate, sit illa F. Aut igitur A
potest agere eundem D effectum activitate F que est maior C, aut equalem D, aut
minorem, aut maiorem.
Non eundem, per quartam conclusionem: D enim dependeret a tota activitate
F; igitur ea tota indigeret ad suum esse; igitur nulla sufficeret ipsum producere
que non posset supplere totam F ceteris paribus; sed nulla minor activitas
potest supplere totam182 F; igitur nulla minor sufficit ceteris paribus producere
D; igitur C non sufficit que est minor; et nullum aliud agens supplet, ut supponitur; igitur A non agit B C activitate, quod est positum.
Et per hoc probatur quod nec potest agere effectum equalem D activitate F,
quoniam quanta activitas requiritur et sufficit ad producendum D, tanta
omnino requiritur ad sibi equalem et econverso.
Similiter non potest A producere effectum minorem D activitate F, quia minor
activitas requiritur ad effectum minorem quam ad183 maiorem; sed quanta activitas sufficit maiori ut producatur et sit, tanta sufficit minori effectui ut in esse
ponatur, alias diceremus quod agens plus concurreret ad effectum ignobiliorem
quam ad nobiliorem et sic sol plus concurreret ad siccitatem quam ad lucem etc.
Quod autem ad nobiliorem effectum quam sit D A non possit agere activitate F
probatur sic: A non est causa creata suprema possibilis ad effectum D, nam activitas A ad effectum D per latitudinem infinitam184 deficit ab activitate divina,
igitur inter causalitatem divinam et activitatem A, que est C, ad effectum D est
dabilis activitas media ad D effectum. Hec autem activitas media non potest
esse ab A, ut probatum est, quia A non potest ad eundem effectum D maiori activitate concurrere quam sit C; igitur erit activitas alicuius cause perfectioris quam
sit A.
Etiam necesse est dare causam possibilem mediam inter causam A et causam
divinam ad productionem D, sive dicatur quod A possit ad productionem D effectus agere activitate maiori sive non, quoniam maxima activitas qua A potest producere D effectum per latitudinem deficit ab activitate divina ad eundem. Et quia
causa perfectior perfectius agit ad eundem effectum, causa illa media ageret ad
effectum D maiori activitate quam sit activitas C, si ipsa poneretur agere.
Vocetur igitur activitas excessus F, que ponebatur possibilis in A ad productionem
effectus perfectioris effectu D supra activitatem C, qua de facto ponitur D effectus
produci ab A. Et sumo supra causam A aliquam aliam causam producentem
eundem D tantum185 excedentem A quantum F excedit C, et sit illa G. Et arguitur
sic: activitas qua G producit D effectum tantum excedit activitatem186 C, per
182
183
184
185
186
totam] totam add. sed del.
ad] s. l.
infinitam] in marg.
tantum] transferat a. c.
activitatem] d add. sed del.
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quam [205vb] A producit eundem D effectum, quantum activitas F, que ponebatur possibilis in A, ad productionem effectus187 perfectioris excedit C; igitur activitas F est tanta quanta est activitas qua G producit D; igitur A per activitatem F
sufficit supplere activitatem G ad productionem D, et sic causa inferior posset supplere causalitatem cause superioris ad eundem effectum, quod est falsum. Et consequentia patet ex eo quod activitas A, que sunt C et F, sunt secundum eandem
rationem per quam A est in actu, ut ponebatur; causalitas igitur ad D est secundum consimilem rationem, quare conclusio vera est.
Ex qua secuntur aliqua corollaria.
<Corollaria quinte conclusionis>
Primum corollarium: activitas cuiuscumque agentis non mensuratur penes effectum productum, sed penes virtutem activam. Patet istud corollarium clare ex conclusione et eius deductione.
Secundum corollarium: infinita activitate Deus quemlibet effectum producit ad
extra. Patet hoc corollarium, quoniam infinitam188 virtutem activam Deus applicat ad producendum quemlibet effectum et tante ipsam applicat quante est
activa, ut per conclusionem et eius probationem potest videri; igitur.
Tertium corollarium: Deus quemlibet effectum cui communicat aliquam perfectionem simpliciter tanta activitate secundum propriam perfectionem denominationis consimilis agit ipsum actuando in esse talis perfectionis, quanta activitate
ipsum ageret si talis effectus caperet esse infinitam talem perfectionem. Verbi
gratia, si Deus communicat A effectui esse ens, que est prima perfectio in qua communicant omnes effectus divini, Deus secundum rationem entis sibi intrinsecam
applicat se ad actuandum A in esse entis, et secundum suam perfectionem entis
tanta activitate producit A in esse entis, scilicet ut sit ens, quanta activitate
ipsum produceret si A caperet esse infinitum ens. Consimiliter, si sibi communicat
esse vite, secundum perfectionem vite sibi intrinsecam applicat se ad agendum, et
tanta activitate actuat A in esse vite quanta activitate ipsum A actuaret, si A
caperet esse infinitam vitam, et tanta quanta est vita divina, et sic de aliis perfectionibus, quia vita divina non est minus activa et sui ipsius communicativa quam
sit vita, et sic de ceteris. Unde non <est> ex parte ipsius vite divine quod non
tante se communicet quante est, sed ex parte effectus producti non valentis participare tantam vitam.
Istud corollarium sic declaratum innuit Dyonisius189 4o De divinis nominibus,
docens nos ymaginari modum per quem producit res creatas, et allegatur ab
187
188
189
effectus] p. c.
infinitam] activitatem add. sed del.
Ps. Dionys., De div. nom. 4.1, 145–50.
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TRADITIO
Egidio190 in questione De primo principio in 2 Sententiarum191. Dicit enim quod
“sicut192 sol, non ratiocinans aut preeligens, omnia illuminat valentia participare
lumen secundum propriam rationem, ita Bonum quod est super solem omnibus
existentibus proportionaliter immittit totius bonitatis radios.” Vult igitur Dyonisius — et ita ymaginari debemus, ut ex prefato capitulo et aliis colligi potest —
quod Deus secundum rationem entis agat omnia in esse entis indifferenter
quantum ex se et ad omnia entia actuanda in esse entis equaliter se applicet
active. Quod autem omnia entia actuata non equaliter respiciant influentiam actionis divine ut sint equalia in esse entis, et sic de aliis perfectionibus, non est ex parte
Dei distribuentis gradus sue actionis, sed ex parte entium recipientium influentiam
Dei secundum diversas eorum capacitates, sicut diversa eandem perfectionem
divinam diversimode imitantur, cum ipsa unica et simplicissima sit in se non
habens diversitatem graduum secundum diversitatem imitantium. Unde per accidens est Deo prout est agens quod omnia que secundum eandem rationem producit
non producantur equalia; non autem est sibi per accidens [206ra] prout est agens
per intellectum, quia ut sic precognoscendo producit et applicat rationes ydeales.
Quartum corollarium: infinita est possibilis latitudo activitatis creaturarum
secundum gradus specificos. Patet corollarium, quoniam possibilis est infinita
latitudo entium secundum nobilitates essentiales per quas divinam nobilitatem
imitantur, igitur infinita est latitudo possibilis actualitatum entium per quas
divinam actualitatem imitantur; et quanta est alicuius nature actualitas tanta
est eius activitas, per tres primas propositiones et per precedentem conclusionem;
igitur etc.
<Sexta conclusio>
Sexta conclusio est: Deus quemlibet effectum nobiliorem cui plures perfectiones
communicat plus extensive agit quam effectum cui193 pauciores perfectiones communicat. Probatur: sumatur A natura creata cui Deus communicet esse et vivere,
non autem intelligere, et B cui ultra esse et vivere communicet intelligere. Et
arguitur sic: Deus non influit in A secundum rationem sue intellectualitatis, sed
secundum rationem vite et entis precise; sed in B influit secundum omnem rationem secundum quam influit in A et ultra secundum rationem sue intellectualitatis; igitur plus extensive influit in B quam in A. Et antecedens habetur a Dyonisio
V De divinis nominibus,194 ubi innuit quod Deus secundum quod ens influit in
190
191
192
193
194
Ægid. Roman., Tr. de primo princ. 5, 10r.
Ægid. Roman., In II Sent. 2.6, 31.
sicut] sol add. sed del.
cui] perfectiores add. sed. del.
Ps. Dionys., De div. nom. 5, 323–24.
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omnia entia, et secundum quod vita influit in omnia viventia, et sic de aliis perfectionibus secundum quas Deus diversimode nominatur.
Et hec de primo articulo sufficiant etc.
<Secundus articulus>
<Utrum aliqua activitas creativa sit communicabilis alicui creature>
Secundus articulus erat utrum aliqua activitas creativa sit communicabilis alicui
creature.
<Prima conclusio>
Pro cuius declaratione sit hec prima conclusio: quelibet activitas creature productiva
alicuius effectus essentialis innititur activitati divine ad eundem effectum et ab ipsa
immediate dependet. Hec conclusio sic intelligitur quod nulla causa creata agit ad
productionem alicuius effectus nisi causa divina ipsam premoveat et actuet ad
agendum, ita quod non sufficit quod causa divina sibi dederit virtutem activam et
dependeat ab ea in habendo virtutem per quam agat, sed requiritur quod divina
virtus, que omnia regit et dirigit omnia naturalia in suos fines, ipsam moveat ad
agendum et faciat ipsam agere et applicet ad effectum. Et sic Deus iuvat totam
naturam in actionibus suis non solum agendo cum ea, sed ipsam applicando ad agere.
Istam conclusionem sic declaratam ponit sanctus Thomas195 in questionibus De
malo et Egidius196 II Sententiarum, questione secunda, articulo 5 et in multis libris
suis, et Henricus Gandavensis197 in Summa. Probo igitur eam primo sic: omnis
causa creata ad eundem effectum essentialiter ordinatur sub causa prima, que
est Deus; sed in essentialiter ordinatis cuiuscumque generis primum est causa
omnium aliorum ut sint talia, sicut patet II Metaphysice;198 igitur Deus, cum
sit prima causa efficiens, erit causa cuiuslibet cause create ut sit causa sive ut
causet; igitur activitas creature innititur activitati divine et ab ipsa immediate
dependet.
Hic diceret aliquis: Deus cuilibet creature est causa agendi eo ipso quod dedit ei
esse et virtutem activam per quam ageret et ipsam sinit agere secundum acceptam
virtutem, non autem ut ipsam moveat et applicet ad agendum.
Sed ista responsio nec ordinem rerum intelligit nec dicta philosophorum satis
attendit, nam, ut patet II Metaphysice199 et VIII Physicorum,200 in causis
195
Thom. Aq., Quaest. disp. de malo 4.6, ad. 15 (Utrum peccatum originale ab Adam derivetur in omnes qui seminaliter ab ipso procedunt).
196
Ægid. Roman., In II Sent. 2.5, 26–29.
197
Henr. Gand., Summa, non inveni.
198
Arist., Metaph. II.2, 994a–b.
199
Arist., Metaph. II.2, 994a–b.
200
Arist., Phys. VIII.1, 252a11.
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TRADITIO
agentibus essentialiter ordinatis non requiritur quod semper causa superior sit
causa inferiori cause ut sit, sed ut causet, quia non essentialiter ordinantur ad
esse existere, sed ad causandum. Ideo sicut illa que essentialiter <ordinantur>
ad esse existere in esse dependent ab invicem, ita illa que essentialiter ordinantur
ad agere in agere dependent ab invicem. Hoc autem requirit ordo essentialis secundum quodcumque esse. Dupliciter igitur aliqua possunt essentialiter ordinari,
scilicet ad esse existere, et [206rb] sic primum est causa omnium aliorum essentialiter ordinatorum ut sint et existant, et quia quelibet creatura essentialiter ordinatur ad Deum in esse existere, Deus est causa cuiuslibet creature ut sit et
existat. Alio modo aliqua possunt essentialiter ordinari ad agendum, et sic
primum est causa omnium aliorum essentialiter ordinatorum ut agant. Et generaliter quodlibet superius in illo ordine est causa inferioris. Si igitur aliqua essentialiter ordinantur ad agendum et non ad esse existere, superior causa in illo ordine
erit causa inferioris ut agat et non ut sit, quod esse non poterit nisi ipsam movendo
et applicando ad agere, sicut in corporibus celestibus reperitur ordo essentialis non
quo ad esse existere, quia unum non fluit effective ab alio, sed quo ad influere in
ista inferiora. Ideo inferius non influit nisi in virtute superiores.
Inter Deum autem et quamlibet creaturam quo ad utrumque ordo essentialis
reperitur, quoniam quelibet creatura et in esse existere ordinatur sub Deo
tamquam sub primo et existente. Ideo sub primo istius generis, quod est genus
entium et existentium ut sic ac per hoc quelibet creatura in suo esse et in suo existere innititur existere et esse divino, ordinatur etiam essentialiter quelibet creatura ad agendum sub Deo tamquam sub primo agente. Unde etsi creatura in
esse existere non dependeret a Deo,201 et per consequens quantum ad hoc non ordinaretur essentialiter sub eo, adhuc tamen staret quod dependeret ab eo in suo
agere, et sic essentialiter ordinaretur sub eo in genere causarum202 agentium
non203 minus quam unum corpus celeste sub alio ordinatur influere, licet sub eo
non ordinetur in esse existere.
Unde Aristoteles et Commentator videntur sensisse quod corpora celestia non
dependeant a Deo in esse existere, sed quod dependeant ab eo in causando, quia
quantum ad hoc, ut ait Aristoteles204 XII Metaphysice, a Deo “dependet celum
et tota natura.” Non igitur creatura in agendo solum in hoc dependet a Deo et
ordinatur sub eo quod ab ipso recipit virtutem activam et simpliciter agere secundum illam virtutem et secum coagat ad eundem effectum, quia sic nullum corpus
celeste in agendo ab alio dependeret, sed requiritur quod Deus ipsam moveat et
applicet ad agendum secundum virtutem quam habet, sive talem virtutem a se
ipso habeat, sive ab eo acciperit, sive ab alio.
201
202
203
204
a Deo] abeo a. c.
causarum] celum add. sed del.
non] non add. sed del.
Arist., Metaph. XII.7, 1072b33–35.
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Preterea eamdem conclusionem arguo sic: quelibet creatura per suam actionem
agit ut instrumentum Dei; sed quodlibet instrumentum agit motum et applicatum ab agente primo; igitur quelibet creatura in sua actione movetur et applicatur
a Deo, et sic eius activitas activitati divine innititur, et hec est ratio antiquorum.
Item super hanc conclusionem sustentat205 Aristoteles II Metaphysice206 ad
probandum in causis agentibus non esse processum in infinitum. Dicit enim207
quod, quando plura moventia ordinantur ad invicem ad aliquod ultimate
motum,208 illa que sunt inter primum movens et ultimum motum sunt moventia
et mota, sive sint plura sive sit unum, et quod primum movet omnia intermedia.
Ubi Commentator209 commento 7 ait: “primum igitur est causa omnium, cum210
movet se sine medio et moveat medium et moveat postremum, id est, ultimum, per
medium.” Et infra eodem commento ait: “necesse est igitur, si omnia habeant211
causam in motu, ut primum sit causa omnium, scilicet causa sui ipsius et causa
residuorum, scilicet ut primum moveat se, medium per se, et postremum per
medium.” Ecce in isto commento bis patet propositum intelligentibus. Prima
igitur causa movet secundam, et secunda tertiam, si sint plures intermedie, et
sic usque ad ultimum motum quod ita movetur quod non movet. Ideo primum
movens movet et non movetur, ultimum motum movetur et non movet, media
vero inter primum movens et ultimum motum movent et moventur a primo.
Ideo primum est causa omnium in212 [206va] movendo, ut aiunt.
Item idem Commentator VIII Physicorum, commento 33213 ait: “Et omnis
motor aut erit primus motor, quia movet postremum motum, aut erit illic
medium inter primum motorem et postrerum motum, et illud medium aut erit
unum aut plura.214 Et intendit per primum motorem quod non movet quia
aliud movet ipsum, sed per se. Et intendit per medium id quod movet quia
aliud movet ipsum. Et ideo predixit215 quod omnis motor aut movet per se aut
per aliud.” Et infra eodem commento:216 “quoniam,” inquit, “primum non
indiget secundo, sed secundum indiget ut sit motor primo,217 et ideo medium
non est motor in actu nisi per primum, igitur est prius illo secundum naturam
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
sustentat] sustentatur
Arist., Metaph. II.7, 198a20.
enim] enim add. sed del.
motum] quod add.
Averr. In Arist. Lib. Metaph. II, comm. 7, 168vb–69ra.
cum] add. sed del.
habeant] add. sed del.
in] iter.
Averr., In Arist. Phys. VIII, comm. 33, 169va.
plura] una add. sed del.
ideo predixit] ipso produxit
Averr., In Arist. Phys. VIII, comm. 33, 169vb.
primo] primus
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TRADITIO
et secundum causam.” Ecce quod secunda causa non movet nisi mota per primam.
Et patet conclusio.
Ex qua secuntur aliqua corollaria.
<Corollaria prime conclusionis>
Primum corollarium: nulla activitas cuiuscumque agentis creati est tanta activitas ut in esse activitatis plene sufficiat ad productionem alicuius effectus. Probatur, nam nulla activitas que innititur activitati superioris agentis et ab ipsa
immediate dependet plene sufficit ad productionem; quelibet activitas cuiuscumque agentis creati est talis, per conclusionem; igitur corollarium verum.
Secundum corollarium: sola activitas divina est tanta activitas ut in esse activitatis per se ipsam plene sufficiat ad productionem effectus ad quem per se ordinatur. Probatur, quia activitas divina per se sufficit, ut patet per quattuor prima
corollaria quarte conclusionis precedentis articuli; et nulla alia, per precedens corollarium; igitur.
Tertium corollarium: nulli agenti creato communicari potest quod eius activitas
sit tanta quod per se ipsam in esse activitatis ad productionem alicuius effectus
plene sufficiat non presupponendo activitatem aliam cui innititur et quam supplere non possit. Patet ex precedenti conclusione et duobus corollariis. Ideo, si
hec est conditio requisita ad hoc quod aliqua actio sit creativa sui effectus, scilicet
quod non presupponat aliam activitatem cui innitatur et quam non possit supplere, sed per se ipsam sufficiat, nulli creature est communicabilis aliqua activitas
creativa.
<Secunda conclusio>
Secunda conclusio: quemlibet effectum Deus prius natura plene sua activitate producit quam ad ipsum producendum aliqua creatura causa agat. Probatur hec conclusio sic: in productione cuiuscumque effectus Deus respectu cause cuiuscumque
create est prima causa, igitur prius agit ad productionem eiusdem effectus quam
aliqua causa creata; et pro quacumque mensura Deus agit, sua actio est sufficienter et plene ac totaliter eius termini productiva, ut patet ex218 suprapositis; igitur.
Et principalis consequentia patet in commento prime propositionis De causis,219
ubi dicit auctor quod “causa universalis prima agit in causatum cause secunde antequam agat in ipsum causa secunda que sequitur ipsum.” Ex quo dicto patet consequentia facta. Nam nichil est aliud ante agere quam prius agere, igitur, si causa
prima ante agit in causatum quam causa secunda, prius agit quam causa
218
219
ex] pre add. sed del.
Lib. De causis 1.3, 134.
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secunda. Hec autem prioritas non est prioritas temporis, sed nature, igitur conclusio
vera. Et primum assumptum patet ex precedenti conclusione.
Ex hac etiam conclusione secuntur aliqua corollaria.
<Corollaria secunde conclusionis>
Primum corollarium: quelibet causa creata in sua actione presupponit effectum220
esse prius natura productum virtute prime cause. Probatur, nam causa creata non
agit nisi prius prima causa agat, per conclusionem; igitur Deus producit effectum
prius natura quam causa creata agat; igitur cum creata causa agit, prius natura
est effectus a Deo productus; igitur cum creata causa agit, presupponit effectum
prius natura esse a Deo productum. Hoc corollarium satis innuit auctor De
causis221 in eodem commento propositionis prime, cum dicit quod causa
secunda sequitur ipsum causatum. Ait enim sic: “causa universalis prima agit
in causatum cause secunde antequam agat in ipsum causa secunda que sequitur
ipsum. [158vb] Cum igitur agit causa secunda, que sequitur causatum, non
excusat ipsius actio a causa prima, que est supra eam. Et quando separatur
secunda a causato, quod222 sequitur ipsam,223 non separatur prima, que est
supra ipsam.”224 Ecce continue dicit causam secundam sequi ipsum225 causatum
in quod prius agit causa prima quam causa secunda. Et certum est quod causa
secunda non sequitur ipsum prout est causatum suum, quia nulla causa sequitur
suum causatum ut sit, sed econverso. Sequitur igitur ipsum prout est causatum
prime cause, quia sicut secunda causa sequitur causam primam in causando, ita
sequitur causatum eius ut sit.
Secundum corollarium: quelibet causa creata quam necessario in sua actione
presupponit actionem divinam cui innititur tam necessario effectus eius ut sit presupponitur effectui actionis divine ut sit. Patet ex dictis.
Tertium corollarium: nulli creature potest communicari quod producat effectum non iam naturaliter ab alio prius productum. Patet ex dictis. Ideo, si est
una conditio requisita ad causam esse creativam quod producat effectum non
iam ab alio quoquomodo productum, sed ita effectum preveniat in causando
quod per nullam prius mensuram habuerit esse, nulli creature potest communicari
aliqua actio creativa, cum ei communicari non possit quod primo attingat effectum et ipsum nullo modo sequatur.
220
221
222
223
224
225
effectum] esse add. sed del.
Lib. De causis 1.3, 134.
quod] que
ipsam] ipsum
ipsam] ipsum
ipsum] et add. sed del.
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TRADITIO
<Tertia conclusio>
Tertia conclusio: ad causam aliquam creare necessario requiritur quod talis causa
in productione effectus non presupponat activitatem superioris cause, et hoc est de
ratione creationis. Probatur conclusio sic: nulla causa inferior <que> dat suo effectui activitatem cause superioris, que est necessario requisita, concurrit ad eiusdem
effectus productionem nec eam inferior causa supplere potest; sed ad hoc quod
aliqua causa creet, necessario requiritur quod ad sui effectus productionem non concurrat aliqua activitas vel aliqua virtus quam ipsa non det et supplere possit; igitur
conclusio vera. Prima pars antecedentis patet ex supradictis.
Secunda vero probatur ex intentione beati Augustini III De Trinitate ubi ait
quod “nec transgressores angelos226 nec bonos “fas est putare creatores”227
horum effectuum quos hic inferius aliquando operantur, “nam magi pharaonis
operatione malignorum spirituum ranas et serpentes fecerunt, non tamen talia
ipsi spiritus creaverunt, quatumcumque celeriter fecerint.”228 Et innititur huic
rationi beatus Augustinus, quia omnium rerum que corporaliter visibiliterque
nascantur occulta quedam semina in corporeis mundi huius elementis latent,
que Deus originaliter eis indidit. Ipse igitur “creatorem omnium rerum qui
creator est invisibilium seminum, quia quecumque nascendo ad oculos nostros
exeunt ex occultis seminibus accipiunt progrediendi”229 hic primordia formetur.
Igitur ratio sit ad propositum talis: sol causando floritionem arboris, quia
ipsam causat mediante virtute pullulativa arboris, quam ipse sol non indidit
arbori, non potest dicit creator illius floritionis;230 igitur ad hoc quod sol creet,
necessario requiritur quod talem virtutem pullulativam ibi concurrentem sol
ipsi arbori dederit, et sic de aliis virtutibus et actionibus. Et sicut dictum est de
sole, ita de aliis creatis agentibus dicendum est.
Potest etiam ex hoc ratione beati Augustini aliter ratio ad conclusionem
formari sic: si sol causando floritionem arboris non potest ipsam dici creare ex
hoc quod creat eam mediante virtute pullulativa quam ipse non dedit, multo
magis non potest dici ipsam creature eo ipso quod ad eius productionem innititur
activitati superioris agentis et per ipsam imitatur, cum nec eam dederit nec possit
supplere; quare etc.
Ex hac conclusione sequitur corollarium responsivum ad articulum, scilicet
quod actio creativa non est communicabilis alicui creature. Patet ex iam dictis.
226
227
228
229
230
Aug., Trin. III.7.12, 139.
Aug., Trin. III.8.13, 141.
Vide Aug., Trin. III.7.12, 138.
Aug., Trin. III.8.13, 141.
illius floritionis] tr.; arboris add. sed. del.
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<Tertius articulus>
<Utrum quelibet activitas productiva Dei ad extra sit ex suo valore activitas creativa>
Tertius articulus erat iste: utrum quelibet activitas productiva Dei ad extra sit ex
suo valore activitas creativa.
Ad cuius declarationem [207ra] premitto aliquas suppositiones.
Prima est ista: quelibet natura citra divinam ab ipsa natura divina fluit in esse.
Istam suppositionem alibi probavi, ideo eam nunc non probo aliter.
Secunda suppositio: quamlibet rem productam Deus totam producit quoad
omnia sibi intrinseca realiter distincta, et quoad omnes rationes essentiales sibi
intrinsecas formaliter tantum distinctas. Ista suppositio quantum ad intrinseca
realiter distincta patet ex precedenti suppositione; quantum vero ad rationes
intrinsecas formaliter distinctas patere potest ex duobus precedentibus articulis.
Tertia suppositio est ista: quarumlibet entitatum essentialiter productarum
quarum una non est pars alterius, Deus potest quamcumque per se producere
et conservare in esse non producendo aliam. Istam suppositionem, quia satis
per communes scolas et est divulgata, pro nunc non aliter probo, sed alias
probabo.
Quarta suppositio est ista: quaslibet entitates productas Deus producit distinctis activitatibus.
<Conclusiones responsive>
<Prima conclusio>
Nunc sit prima conclusio responsiva: quelibet activitas productiva Dei ad extra est
activitas creativa. Probatur, et sit A aliqua activitas Dei productiva ad extra: aut
igitur per activitatem A producitur materia, aut forma, aut compositum, et non
distinguo plus de forma substantiali quam accidentali. Si producitur materia,
igitur producitur de nichilo, et A activitas sufficit sine alia activitate alterius
agentis, sicut patere potest ex corollariis quarte conclusionis primi articuli;231
igitur per A activitatem de facto creatur. Si vero per A activitatem producitur
forma, aut232 talis forma educitur de potentia materie aut non. Si non, de facto
creatur per A, sicut arguebatur de materia. Si educitur de potentia materie,
poterit tamen produci anichilata materia, per tertiam suppositionem, et per A
activitatem, per quartam conclusionem cum suis corollariis primi articuli; igitur
poterit per A sufficienter produci; et non de potentia materie; igitur per A
potest sufficienter creari; igitur A est actio creativa ex suo valore. Si autem per
A activitatem producitur compositum, per primam et secundam suppositiones
231
232
Vide supra 426–27.
aut] cum propositum add. sed del.
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TRADITIO
producitur totum, igitur producitur productione una totali comprehendente productiones partiales partium intrinsecarum, et illa est creativa: tum, quia per
ipsam effectus de nichilo producitur et ei sufficit in esse causalitatis active; tum
quia constat ex partialibus activitatibus creativis, scilicet ex productione
materie et ex productione forme, que sunt creative, ut ostensum est.
<Secunda conclusio>
Secunda conclusio: quamlibet entitatem actualiter existentem citra divinam,
Deus de facto creat. Probatur, quia quelibet talis entitas vel est composita vel
simplex; si composita, Deus ei dat quidquid intrat eius compositionem, per
primam suppositionem, et non requirit activitatem alterius agentis; igitur creat.
Et ex hoc patere potest de simplici.
<Tertia conclusio>
Tertia conclusio: non quelibet activitas productiva Dei ad extra est creatio, sive non
quodlibet divinum agere productivum ad extra est creare. Probatur, nam per
aliquam activitatem Dei ad extra producitur forma de potentia materie, igitur
aliqua talis non est creatio. Consequentia patet, quoniam talis activitas per quam
educitur forma de potentia materie non dat eidem forme materiam de cuius potentialitate educitur, igitur non dat sibi quod de nichilo producatur; sed creare est de
nichilo producere. Et quod activitas illa per quam educitur forma de potentia
materie non det eidem forme illam materiam de cuius potentialitate educitur
patet per quartam suppositionem, quoniam alia activitate producitur materia,
alia forma que de potentialitate eius educitur. Dico igitur quod Deus producendo
formam de potentia materie ipsam creat, ut dicit secunda conclusio, quia producit
materiam et ipsam preparat forme que de eius potentialitate educitur. Tamen, quia
alia activitate producitur materia et alia producitur forma de eius potentia, ideo
Deus non creat formam per B productionem — sit B productio per quam forma
producitur de potentia materie — et ita B productio non est creatio. Potest
autem B productio esse creatio talis forme, quia per B productionem potest talis
forma sufficienter produci, et non de potentia materie, et tunc esset creatio etc.
Explicit questio secundi principii magistri Augustini de Roma.
Principium III
<Utrum unio personalis humane nature ad Verbum sit ceteris unionibus eligibilior
quibus eadem natura potest Deo uniri.>
Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, lat. fol. 852,
fols. 207va–209rb
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[207va] Utrum unio personalis humane nature ad Verbum sit ceteris unionibus eligibilior quibus eadem natura potest Deo uniri.
Et arguitur primo quod sic: quia illa unio humane nature ad Deum est ceteris
eligibilior que est maxima gratiarum; sed hec est unio personalis; igitur questio
vera. Et maior probatur, quoniam illa unio est simpliciter eligibilior ceteris que
est nature vite magis bona; sed illa est sibi magis bona que est sibi maior
gratia; igitur etc. Minor autem patet per beatum Augustinum XIII De Trinitate,
capitulo 19:233 “in rebus,” inquit, “per tempus exortis234 illa summa gratia quod
homo in unitatem persone coniunctus est Deo” etc. [207vb]
In oppositum arguo sic: unio beatifica eligibilior est unione personali, igitur
questio falsa. Assumptum patet, nam beatitudo est ultimus finis humane
nature, igitur est eligibilior ceteris bonis possibilibus ei.
Circa istam questionem est primo advertendum quod in Christo sunt tres
uniones que debent ab omnibus de plane concedi. Prima est unio nature corporis
Christi ad naturam anime eius. Secunda est utriusque illarum ad Verbum ypostatice. Tertia est unio anime ad Verbum beatifice. Est autem et quarta, que non ab
omnibus conceditur, sed hanc probo esse in sequentibus. Has igitur quattuor
uniones in Christo ad invicem comparabo. Ideo in hac questio tres erunt articuli.
Primus articulus erit iste: Utrum unio ypostatica sit ipsi nature unite tam bona
formaliter ut, qualibet alia unione circumscripta eiusdem nature ad Deum, sit a
natura unita per se eligibilis.
Secundus articulus erit: Utrum unio beatifica nature rationalis ad Deum sit ipsi
nature beate tam bona formaliter ut sit per se eligibilior ypostatica unione.
Tertius articulus erit iste: Utrum unio ypostatica possit esse nature rationalis
ad Deum sine beatifica unione.
<Primus articulus>
<Utrum unio ypostatica sit ipsi nature unite tam bona formaliter ut, qualibet alia
unione circumscripta eiusdem nature ad Deum, sit a natura unita per se eligibilis>
<Prima conclusio>
Circa primum articulum pono aliquas conclusiones, quarum prima sit ista: nulla
ratio suppositalis in aliqua natura dicit formaliter perfectionem. Probatur conclusio, quoniam si sic, potissime esset235 ratio suppositalis in Deo. Sed consequens
falsum. Et consequentia patet, quoniam omnis denominatio reperta in Deo et
creaturis, si dicit perfectionem in creaturis, prius dicit perfectionem in Deo,
233
234
235
Aug., Trin. XIII.19.24, 416.
exortis] ortis a. c. s. l.
esset] esse a. c. s. l.
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TRADITIO
igitur, si ratio consimilis denominationis reperiretur in Deo et creaturis, et in creaturis dicit formaliter perfectionem, multo magis talis ratio dicit perfectionem in
Deo. Et falsitas consequentis patet, quoniam si ratio suppositalis in Deo236
diceret formaliter perfectionem, aliqua perfectio competeret uni persone divine
que non competeret alteri, nec competeret nature divine formaliter. Consequens
falsum. Et consequentia nota, nam cuilibet persone divine competit ratio suppositalis que non competet alteri; et quelibet perfectio, que competit nature divine
formaliter competit tribus personis; igitur etc. Item falsitas eiusdem consequentis
arguitur sic: omnis perfectio reperta in Deo est perfectio simpliciter, cum in Deo
non possit esse aliqua perfectione secundum quid vel in hoc, quia quelibet talis
est diminuta et nulla perfectione diminuta est vel esse potest in Deo; igitur si
ratio suppositalis dicit perfectionem in Deo, dicit perfectionem simpliciter. Sed
consequens falsum, quia cum nulla ratio suppositalis competat cuilibet persone
divine, quelibet persona divina ab aliqua persona deficeret et non esset universaliter perfecta. Consequens falsum.
Ex hac conclusione deduco quattuor corollarias propositiones.
<Corollaria prime conclusionis>
Prima est ista: nulla ratio individualis in creaturis dicit perfectionem formaliter.
Patet, quia si sic, multo magis ratio suppositalis in eadem natura. Consequens
falsum, per conclusionem; igitur propositio vera. Preterea, si ratio individualis
diceret formaliter perfectionem, aut igitur diceret perfectionem simpliciter aut
perfectionem in hoc. Si perfectionem simpliciter, igitur illa competit Deo cui competit omnis perfectio simpliciter. Consequens falsum, igitur. Quod autem non dicat
perfectionem in hoc probatur, quoniam nulla talis perfectio ascendit per totam
latitudinem entium, sed sistit et remanet citra aliquem gradum finitum in latitudine entis; ratio vero individualis se extendit sursum per totam latitudinem entis
et ascendit ad quemlibet gradum eius, cum quodlibet ens creatum individuetur
sub aliqua specie; igitur ratio individualis non dicit perfectionem in hoc.
Secunda propositio est ista: nulla ratio personalis dicit in aliqua natura formaliter perfectionem. Patet, quia ratio personalis vel est formaliter ratio suppositalis in
eadem natura vel ipsam formaliter includit,237 cum omnis persona sit suppositum.
Potest etiam probari per rationem que facta est ad precedentem propositionem,
quia nec dicit perfectionem simpliciter nec perfectionem in hoc; igitur.238 [208ra]
236
Deo] dicit add. sed del.
includit] cum add. sed del.
238
igitur] Istam primam conclusionem cum suis corollariis retractavit iste doctor tractatu 4° ad dominum Karolum de Malatestis in declaratione primi dubii primi dubii (!) principalis etc. add. in marg. infra
237
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Tertia propositio est ista: ratio suppositalis equaliter competit cuilibet suppositio et ratio personalis equaliter competit cuilibet persone. Probatur, quia si non,
sequeretur quod aliqua talis ratio comprehenderet latitudinem, et secundum
maiorem latitudinem competeret uni quam reliquo, et si sic, sequitur quod
aliqua talis ratio in Deo esset formaliter infinita. Consequens falsum. Et consequentia hec ultima patet, quia cum Deo competat ratio suppositalis et personalis,
si aliqua talis comprehendit in creaturis aliquam latitudinem, in Deo dicet gradum
plenitudinis. Et falsitas consequentis patet, quoniam omnis ratio que est formaliter infinita239 in Deo dicit perfectionem; nulla autem talis est huiusmodi; igitur.
Quarta propositio: cuilibet supposito vel persone indivisibiliter competit ratio
suppositalis vel personalis. Patet, quia nulli competit secundum aliquam latitudinem, igitur cuilibet competit indivisibiliter.
<Secunda conclusio>
Secunda conclusio est ista: nulla unio ypostatica vel personalis est nature unite vel
esse potest formaliter perfectiva. Probatur sic: propter unionem ypostaticam vel
personalem non communicatur formaliter nature unite nisi ratio suppositalis vel
personalis; sed nulla talis est nature unite formaliter perfectiva; igitur conclusio
vera. Prima pars antecedentis patet. Et secunda probatur sic: nulla talis ratio
dicit formaliter perfectionem, igitur nulla talis240 est nature241 unite formaliter perfectiva. Antecedens patet ex prima conclusione. Consequentia vero patet ex eo quod
nichil est alterius formaliter perfectivum nisi sit secundum se formalis perfectio.
Item sic ad conclusionem: nullum suppositum per rationem suppositalem redditur formaliter perfectius quam per solam naturam, igitur nullius suppositi
precisa ratio suppositalis potest aliquid aliud vel aliquam aliam naturam formaliter reddere perfectiorem; igitur non est nature unite formaliter perfectiva.
Item omnis unio formaliter perfectiva nature unite est perfectiva eiusdem
nature per aliquam latitudinem perfectionis; sed unio242 ypostatica non est perfectiva nature unite per aliquam latitudinem perfectionis eo quod ratio suppositalis
indivisibiliter competit cuiuslibet suo supposito, per quartam propositionem
prime conclusionis; igitur etc.
<Corollaria secunde conclusionis>
Ex hac conclusione secuntur 5 corollarie propositiones, quarum prima est ista: si
eadem natura successive suppositaretur diversis suppositis, non plus per unum
239
240
241
242
infinita] finita a. c., in s. l.
talis] est add. sed del.
nature] nacetur
unio] unita
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TRADITIO
quam per aliud243 perficeretur sive creatum sive increatum. Patet ex conclusione,
quia nulla unio suppositalis est nature unite formaliter perfectiva, igitur non plus
perficeretur per unum suppositum quam per aliud.
Item natura suppositata non posset plus per unum suppositum perfici quam
per aliud nisi ratio suppositalis unius diceret maiorem perfectionem formaliter
quam alterius; sed hoc stare non potest, per primam conclusionem; igitur etc.
Secunda propositio est ista: si eadem natura simul uniretur ypostatice pluribus
suppositis sive divinis sive creatis, non plus perficeretur per illa plura quam per
unum illorum precise. Patet, quia plures rationes suppositales non dicunt
maiorem perfectionem quam una earum tantum, igitur plures uniones suppositales non plus perficiunt eandem naturam quam una tantum earum. Et antecedens patet superius.
Tertia propositio: anima Christi non redditur perfectior si uniretur tribus personis divinis simul quam reddatur de facto per uniri precise uni. Patet ex
precedenti.
Quarta propositio: anima Christi de facto per unionem ypostaticam quam
habet ad Verbum non redditur formaliter perfectior nec supponitur alicui alteri
nature cui non supponeretur si non esset unita vel sola ypostatica unione circumscripta. De corpore Christi intelligo quod per unionem ypostaticam formaliter non
redditur perfectius quam si non esset unitum. Et patet propositio ex
precedentibus.
Quinta propositio: non bene est244 anime Christi per se quoquomodo per uniri
[208rb] precise ypostatice Verbo. Probatur, quia tam bene precise est unicuique rei
per se per illud quod consequitur quanto per illud formaliter perficitur vel redditur
perfecta formaliter; sed anima Christi non redditur quoquomodo perfecta formaliter per uniri precise ypostatice Verbo; igitur etc.
<Tertia conclusio>
Tertia conclusio sit hec: unio ypostatica per se precise sumpta ut ab aliis unionibus
distinguitur non est ab aliqua natura unibili per se eligibilis. Probatur sic: tanta
est eligibilitas cuiuscumque eligibilis rei ab aliqua natura quante eidem nature est
vel esse potest per se bona; sed unio ypostatica245 precise sumpta246 non est nec
esse potest nature unibili per se bona; igitur conclusio vera. Prima pars antecedentis patet, quoniam omne ab aliquo eligibile est ab eo eligibile sub ratione sibi boni,
igitur tanta erit eligibilitas cuiuslibet eligibilis rei ab aliqua natura quante eidem
nature est vel potest esse bona, ita quod ratio eligibilitatis et ratio boni in re
243
244
245
246
aliud] suppositaretur add. sed del.
est] anime add. sed del.
ypostatica] per se add. sed del.
precise sumpta] sumpta precise a. c.
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eligibili omnino adequantur. Et ita quelibet res eligibilis tanta erit in esse eligibilitatis quanta in esse bonitatis. Secunda vero pars antecedentis patet, quoniam si
sic, sequeretur quod unio ypostatica esset nature unite formaliter perfectiva, quia
nichil est alteri per se bonum nisi sit eiusdem formaliter perfectivum. Consequens
falsum, ut patet per superiora.
Item, si unio ypostatica esset nature unite formaliter per se bona, igitur bene
esset anime per se quoquomodo per uniri ypostatice formaliter Verbo. Consequens
<falsum>. Patet falsitas per quintam propositionem secunde conclusionis, igitur
etc.
Ex hac conclusione quattuor propositiones secuntur.
<Corollarie tertie conclusionis>
Prima: non est per se eligibilius a natura creata suppositari supposito divino quam
supposito creato et alieno quam proprio et econverso. Patet ex conclusione.
Secunda propositio: non est eligibilius uniri ypostatice tribus divinis suppositis
simul quam uni tantum et econverso. Patet similiter ex conclusione.
Tertia propositio: unio ypostatica humane nature ad Verbum per se formaliter
sumpta non fuit nature unite de se aliquanta gratia. Patet, quia non fuit aliquante
eligibilitatis per se, igitur non per se aliquanta gratia.
Quarta propositio: si natura humana de facto unita ypostatice Verbo solam
unionem ypostaticam per se formaliter sumptam amicteret, nichil perfectionis,
vel bonitatis, vel gratie quam de facto habet amicteret. Patet, quoniam nichil
tale per ypostaticam unionem formaliter, sicut ex superioribus potest patere.
Ex istis propositionibus patet quid dicendum sit ad primum articulum.
<Secundus articulus>
<Utrum unio beatifica nature rationalis ad Deum sit ipsi nature beate tam bona
formaliter ut sit per se eligibilior ypostatica unione>
Secundus articulus erat iste: utrum unio beatifica nature rationalis ad Deum sit
ipsi247 nature beate tam bona formaliter ut sit per se eligibilior ypostatica unione.
<Prima conclusio>
Circa quem articulum pono aliquas conclusiones, quarum prima sit ista: quilibet
gradus iustificationis mentis create in via est ipsi menti iustificate formaliter
melior quam sit sibi tota bona perfectio essentialis sue nature. Probatur hec
247
ipsi] ipse
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TRADITIO
conclusio primo ex intentione beati Augustini, XII De civitate Dei,248 ubi vult quod
angeli boni cum adhuc viatores meliores erant ex bona voluntate quam ex tota
essentiali perfectione nature. Quapropter, ut ait: “si boni angeli fuerunt prius sine
bona voluntate, eamque in se ipsis Deo non operante fecerunt, igitur meliores a
se ipsis quam ab illo facti sunt. Absit!” Ubi patet quod melior erat eis bona voluntas
quam tota perfectio naturalis, aliter beatus Augustinus nichil concluderet.
Preterea probatur249 eadem conclusio ex intentione beati Augustini Super
Psalmo 144 exponentis illud psalmiste: Et iustitia tua exultabunt,250 ubi vult
quod quid melius sit homo in hoc quod iustus est quam in hoc quod homo. Quapropter, ut ait, si homo sibi tribuit quod iustus est et Deo quod homo est, inferius
dat Deo et superius [208va] dat sibi.251 Ex quo patet252 conclusio.
Tertio, conclusio probatur sic: cuilibet menti create melior est quicumque
gradus sapientie quam sua tota perfectio essentialis, et eidem melior est quicumque gradus iustificationis quam quicumque gradus sapientie, igitur conclusio
vera. Consequentia bona et totum antecedens potest haberi ab Anselmo, Monologion capitulo 15.253
Ex hac conclusione infero duas propositiones.
<Corollaria prime conclusionis>
Prima est quod cuilibet menti viatrici melius esset uniri Deo iustificate quantumlibet parvo gradu iustitie vie quam uniri Deo ypostatica unione. Probatur,254
quoniam cuilibet menti create melior est tota perfectio essentialis sue nature
quam sit sibi unio ypostatica, ut potest patere ex secunda conclusione precedentis
articuli et duabus relatis propositionibus; et melior est cuilibet menti create viatrici quicumque gradus iustificationis vie quam tota perfectio essentialis sue
nature, per precedentem conclusionem, igitur propositio vera.
Secunda propositio: menti non iustificate et tamen alico gradu divini luminis
illustrate melius est Deo uniri per quantumlibet parvum lumen intelligentie
quam sibi esset bonum uniri ypostatice Verbo. Patet per probationem tertiam precedentis conclusionis et secundam conclusionem precedentis articuli.
Item mens, licet non iustificata, aliquo tamen gradu divine luminis illustrata,
imperficetur si, privata tali lumine, tenebresceret, et anima Christi in nullo imperficeretur si solam amicteret ypostaticam unionem, igitur propositio vera.
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
Aug., Civ. XII.9, 363.
probatur] easdem add. sed del.
Ps. 144:7.
Aug., In Ps. 144.10, 2095.
patet] tertio add. sed exp.
Anselm. Cant., Monol. 15, 28, 30–29, and 3.
probatur] consequens add. sed exp.
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Consequentia nota est. Et prima pars antecedentis potest haberi ab Anselmo255
ubi supra. Et secunda pars patet per quartam propositionem tertie conclusionis
precedentis articuli.
<Secunda conclusio>
Secunda conclusio sit hec: cuilibet menti create melior est quantumlibet parva
portio iustitie patrie quantalibet latitudine iusticie vie. Hanc conclusionem
probat beatus Augustinus in libro De Spiritu et littera ad Marcellinum,256
quoniam quanta erit cognitio Dei in patria tanta erit eius dilectio, et quanta dilectio tanta iustitia; sed quantalibet parva portio cognitionis facialis melior est quantalibet latitudine cognitionis enigmatice; igitur conclusio vera.
Ex qua secuntur due propositiones.
<Corollaria secunde conclusionis>
Prima: incomparabiliter melior et eligibilior est unio beatifica ad Deum quam
precise unio ypostatica. Patet manifeste ex duabus propositionibus precedentibus.
Secundum corollarium: incomparabiliter maior gratia est uniri beatifice Deo
quam ei uniri tantummodo257 ypostatice. Patet, quia illud est alicui maior
gratia quod est ei melius.
<Tertia conclusio>
Tertia conclusio: melior est corpori Christi unio quam habet ad animam quam
unio solummodo ypostatica258 quam habet ad Verbum. Probatur: nam unio
quam habet anima Christi ad eius corpus est illius corporis formaliter perfectiva;
sed unio ypostatica non est illius corporis formaliter perfectiva; igitur conclusio
vera. Consequentia nota. Et259 prima pars antecedentis patet, quoniam anima
Christi est vera forma substantialis corporis Christi, igitur ipsum intrinsece
substantialiter perficit sicut quelibet forma substantialis suum subiectum.
Et secunda pars patet ex secunda conclusione precedentis articuli et
propositionibus eius.
Ex hac conclusione secuntur tres propositiones.
255
256
257
258
259
Anselm. Cant., Monol. 15, 28–29.
Vide Aug., De spir. et litt. ad Marcel. 1.36, 83.
modo] s. l.
ypostatica] quam add. sed del.
et] antecedens add. sed del.
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TRADITIO
<Corollaria tertie conclusionis>
Prima est ista: anima Christi est magis bona suo corpori per intrinsecam informationem quam sit eidem Verbum per ypostaticam unionem. Patet, quia magis
anima perficit corpus per intrinsecam informationem quam Verbum per ypostaticam unionem.
Secunda propositio: maius bonum recepit corpus Christi in instanti conceptionis per uniri anime ut forme informative quam per uniri Verbo ypostatica unione.
Patet ex precedenti etc.
Tertia propositio: maius bonum perdidit corpus Christi in triduo per carere
anima intrinsece informante quam sibi remanserit per uniri Verbo ypostatice sustentanti. Patet ex precedentibus.
<Quarta conclusio>
Quarta conclusio: natura divina [208vb] est unita nature humane in Christo
aliqua unione qua nec est unita alicui alteri nature create, nec260 eidem humanitati Christi ypostatice. Hec conclusio habet duas partes, quarum prima est quod
divina natura est unita humane nature in Christo aliqua unione qua non est unita
alicui alteri nature create. Advertendum tamen quod, cum dico naturam divinam
esse unitam nature create, loquor large secundum communem modum et usum
loquendi, quia proprie loquendo natura divina unit sibi naturam creatam et
natura creata unitur ei, non autem unitur ipsa nature create, sicut quelibet creatura assimilatur Deo, non autem Deus assimilatur alicui creature, sicut alias
ostendetur. Probo igitur istam primam partem conclusionis sic: natura divina
sic est unita nature humane in Christo quod per illam unionem nature dicitur
incarnata; sed non sic est unita alicui alteri nature create ut possit fieri consimilis261 denominatio; igitur etc. Prima pars antecedentis patet per Magistrum262
III Sententiarum, dist. 5, capitulo “Nomina.” Secunda vero pars antecedentis et
consequentia de se patent.
Secunda autem pars conclusionis est ista: quod tali unione divina natura non
est unita nature humane in Christo ypostatice. Et hoc probatur per eundem
Magistrum,263 dist. qua supra, capitulo sequenti, ubi querit quare divina
natura, ex quo est incarnata, non dicitur facta homo sicut Verbum. Ad quod
respondetur et264 responderi “potest quod Dei Filius dicitur factus homo vel
260
261
262
263
264
nec] eidem add. sed exp.
consimilis] de add. sed del.
Petr. Lomb., Sent. III.5.1, 41–46.
Petr. Lomb., Sent. III.5.2, 46.
et] sicut a. c. s. l.
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esse homo non solum quod hominem assumpsit, sed quia ipsum in unitatem et singularitatem sui, id est persone, accepit. Natura autem divina hominem quidem
accepit, sed non in unitatem et singularitatem sui.” Ex qua responsione patet
primo quod aliter Verbum assumpsit hominem, aliter natura divina. Patet
secundo quod Verbum ex modo quo assumpsit hominem potest265 vere dici
homo, natura autem divina ex modo quo assumsit eundem hominem non debet
dici homo. Patet tertio quod Verbum dicitur homo quia hominem assumpsit ypostatice, id est in unitatem266 ypostasis sue sive suppositi, natura autem divina non
potest dici homo, quia non assumpsit hominem ypostatice nec in unitatem sui. Ex
quibus patet conclusio. Patet etiam quod distincta unio est qua natura divina
unitur nature humane in Christo, per quam dicitur incarnata et non homo, ab
unione qua Verbum eidem nature humane unitur, per quam utrumque dicitur,
scilicet incarnatum et factum homo.
Ex hac conclusione secuntur due propositiones.
Prima est ista: Verbum dupliciter est unitum nature humane in Christo: uno
modo ut suppositum, per quem modum unionis dicitur “homo,” et hoc modo
solum suppositum Verbi, et non natura divina nec aliud suppositum divinum,
est eidem nature unitum. Alio267 modo ut natura, et isto modo unionis natura
divina principaliter et per se est unita nature humane et Verbum ex consequenti
per ydemptitatem quam habet ad naturam divinam. Ideo per istum modum
unionis non potest dici “homo” sicut nec ipsa natura divina.
Secunda propositio: natura divina est unita nature humane ut forma informativa. Probatur propositio, quoniam est sibi unita, et non ypostatice, per conclusionem, nec intentionaliter sicut species intelligibilis vel actus intellectionis potentie
intellective ad motum intentionalem, vel sicut actus volitionis potentie volitive ad
operationem vitalem. Patet hoc, quoniam ex tali unione non posset dici humanata
et increata, igitur est sibi unita unione formaliter neutra, que non potest esse nisi
informativa, et habetur intentum. Ex istis patet quod humana natura in Christo
est unita Verbo tripliciter, scilicet ypostatice, beatifice, et informative sicut subiectum forme.
Sed contra istam propositionem arguit tripliciter reverendus baccalarius de ordine
Carmelitarum268 in suo tertio [209ra] principio probans suam tertiam conclusionem primi articuli, cui hec propositio contradicit.
265
potest] vere add. sed del.
unitatem] p. c.
267
alio] autem* add. sed del.
268
Reverendus baccalarius de ordine carmelitarum, id est Antonius Masazana. Textus
non extat.
266
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TRADITIO
<Positio baccalarii de ordine Carmelitarum>
Et primo arguit sic: non est possibilis communicatio formalis inter aliqua per
aliquam unionem nisi illa trahantur ad unionem essentialem vel suppositalem;
sed inter Deum et creaturam prima unio non est possibilis, cum divinitas non
possit verti in aliud quam ipsa sit, cum sit incommunicabilis, nec aliud in
ipsam, per idem. Ulterius non prosequor argumentum, quia hic stat difficultas
contra propositionem meam.
<Responsio ad baccalarium de ordine Carmelitarum>
Ad hoc autem argumentum respondeo ex quatuor propositionibus.
Prima est ista: Verbum potuit in triduo, retento ypostatice corpore, solam
deponere animam, et Pater potuit in unitatem sui suppositi ipsam assumere.
Patet, quoniam in triduo anima fuit separata a corpore et localiter distincta ab
eo, igitur unio ypostatica corporis non dependebat ex unione anime; et Verbum
eque libere semper ipsam suppositavit sicut in primo instanti assumpsit, igitur
potuit ipsam disponere retento corpore; et Pater potuit incarnari, ut patet III
Sententiarum dist. 1,269 igitur potuit eam a Verbo eiectam270 assumere.
Secunda propositio: anima Christi ypostatice Patri unita potuit ut forma
reuniri corpori ypostatice Verbo unito. Patet, nam sicut impertinens est unio
ypostatica qua anima Verbo unitur unioni qua idem Verbum unitur corpori, ita
impertinens esset sibi unio qua resultarent et Patri.
Tertia propositio: in tali reunione anime ad corpus non <est> tertia natura conflata. Patet, nam nature que suppositantur diversis suppositis non possunt communicare ut partes in unam naturam, alias staret quelibet illarum suppositari
supposito proprio et tamen intrare compositionem, quod est falsum.
Quarta propositio: stat naturam formalem creatam uniri informative potentiali subiecto et cum eo non constituere compositum tertium. Patet ex precedenti.
Ideo nichil prohibet naturam divinam, cum sit natura formalis, uniri nature
create, que respectu eius est potentialis, et non componere cum ea aliquod
tertium. Ex istis propositionibus patet responsio271 ad rationem factam, nam
antecedens est cum reverentia declinandum.
Secundo ad idem reverendus baccalarius arguit sic: in Christo non est facta talis
unio, igitur non est possibilis. Antecedens est manifestum, quoniam ista est falsa:
“humanitas est Deus.”
269
270
271
Petr. Lomb., Sent. III.1.3, 26.
eiectam] electam
responsio] facta add. sed del.
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Ad istud argumentum declino antecedens. Et ad probationem, cum dicitur, “ista
est falsa: ‘humanitas est272 Deus,’” dico quod si ly “Deus” summitur essentialiter,
concedo quod hec sit falsa, sed consequentiam sic declino qua infertur ex hoc
quod in Christo non sit facta talis unio, quia in unione formali forme ad subiectum
subiectum non suscipit denominationem forme essentialiter, ut dicatur “corpus est
anima,” et tamen constat quod anima unitur corpori informative, sed suscipit eius
denominationem concretive,273 ut dicatur “corpus est animatum.” Si vero ly
“Deus” sumatur participative, non solum humanitas Christi est Deus, sed quilibet
beatus est Deus, sicut deducit Boethius III De consolatione.274
Tertio ad idem baccalarius reverendus arguit sic: impossibile est aliquid perficere aliud modo formali et illud non esse illius principium quo operativum competentium illi forme, et implicat contradictionem adesse sic formaliter principium
alicuius et illud non subsistere illo, igitur etc.
Ad hoc argumentum declino primum assumptum. Et ad probationem dico
quod non per unionem formalem, sed per suppositalem est275 alicui sic276
principium quo operativum.277 Unde si calor non informaret substantiam ignis,
et tamen subsisteret suppositale ignis, adhuc calefacere esset Verbi et non
caloris. Et si calor informative uniretur substantie ignis et suppositale Verbo calefacere, non esset ignis cui informative uniretur, sed Verbi cui uniretur suppositaliter [209rb] solum. Ideo cum calor utroque modo uniatur de facto substantie
ignis, non est ignis calefacere ratione unionis informative, sed ratione unionis suppositalis.
<Quinta conclusio>
Quinta conclusio istius articuli est ista: hec unio qua natura divina unitur nature
humane ut forma informativa melior est ipsi nature humane et eligibilior quam
unio ypostatica quam habet ad Verbum. Probatur, quoniam huiusmodi unio est
nature perfectiva, ypostatica autem non, ut supra patet. Et primum assumptum
patet, quoniam talis unione natura divina278 unitur nature humane secundum
rationem aliquam dicentem perfectionem, igitur secundum ipsam perficit
naturam cui unitur.
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
est] Deus add. sed del.
concretive] p. c.
Boeth., Cons. III.10.25, 55.
est] ad add. sed del.
sic] primum add. sed del.
quo operativum] cooperationum
natura divina] iter.
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TRADITIO
Ex qua conclusione sequitur corollarium responsivum ad articulum, scilicet
quod unio ypostatica minus eligibilis est per se formaliter sumpta qualibet alia
unione qua natura humana potest uniri Deo. Patet ex dictis.
Et hec de secundo articulo.
<Tertius articulus>
<Utrum unio ypostatica possit esse nature rationalis ad Deum sine unione beatifica>
Tertius articulus erat: utrum unio ypostatica possit esse nature rationalis ad
Deum sine unione beatifica. Circa quem articulum pono aliquas conclusiones.
<Prima conclusio>
Prima conclusio: natura irrationalis potest uniri Deo ypostatica unione. Patet,
nam in triduo corpus humanum mortuum erat unitum ypostatice Verbo, et
potuit remanere unitum deposita anima, igitur eque bene quecumque alia
natura irrationalis, et patet conclusio.
Ex qua sequitur corollarium quod unio ypostatica non habet essentialem
dependentiam ab unione beatifica in anima Christi. Patet, quia alias in nulla
natura posset esse ypostatica unio sine beatifica, et si<c> nulla natura irrationabilis que non est capax beatitudinis posset uniri ypostatice, quod patet <esse>
falsum ex conclusione.
<Secunda conclusio>
Secunda conclusio est ista: absolute possibilis est unio ypostatica nature rationalis
ad Deum sine unione beatifica. Probatur, quoniam unio ypostatica non habet
necessariam dependentiam ab unione beatifica, per corollarium precedens; nec
unio beatifica necessario dependet ab ypostatica, quoniam unio beatifica in
multis beatis de facto reperitur sine unione ypostatica; igitur possibilis est una
unio sine reliqua in eadem natura rationali.
Ex qua conclusione sequitur corollarium primum, scilicet quod unio ypostatica
et unio beatifica in anima Christi ita ab invicem distinguuntur quod una non continet formaliter reliquam. Patet ex dictis in hoc articulo cum primo.
Ex iam dictis infero corollarium, scilicet quod anima Christi ex vi personalis
unionis non intelligit que Verbum, ymmo nichil omnino intelligit ex vi talis
unionis. Patet, quoniam anima Christi intelligit in Verbo quecumque in eo intelligit ex vi beatifice unionis precise, quam etiam alie279 anime habent in Verbo, igitur
279
alie] hec anime vel anime add. et del.
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non ex vi personalis unionis. Consequentia nota est ex premissis propositionibus.
Et antecedens potest patere ex primo articulo.
<Positio baccalarii de ordine Servorum>
Sed contra istud corollarium arguit reverendus baccalarius de ordine Servorum
sancte Marie280 in tertio suo principio articulo tertio probans ultimum corollarium, cui contradicit hoc corollarium. Et arguit sic: Verbum divinum est anime
Christi velud habitus sapientialis, propter quod dicit Apostolus281 quod in
Christo sunt thesauri sapientie etc.
<Responsio ad baccalarium de ordine Servorum>
Ad hoc argumentum concedo totum antecedens, sed cum reverentia declino consequentiam qua infertur “igitur corollarium verum,” quoniam Verbum non est
anime Christi habitus sapientialis ex vi personalis unionis, sed ex vi beatifice
unionis.282 Nam et cuilibet alteri beato Verbum est habitus sapientialis, licet
enim quoad gradum quo intensius283 anima Christi plus aliis beatificetur, non
tamen in Verbo aliter etc.
Explicit questio tertii principii super tertium Sententiarum reverendi et subtilis
doctoris magistri Augustini de Roma nunc regentis Bononie ordinis Fratrum Hermitarum sancti Augustini 1398. Utinam. . . Utinam. . . Utinam.
Principium IV
<Utrum sacramenta legis evangelice sint cuilibet viatori necessaria ad salutem>
Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, lat. fol. 852,
fols. 210ra–211vb
Utrum sacramenta legis evangelice sint cuilibet viatori necessaria ad salutem.
Arguo primo quod non, quia alias non fuerunt viatoribus necessaria, igitur nec
nunc. Antecedens patet, quia multi iusti salvati sunt ante sacramentorum institutionem. Et consequentia patet, quia lex nova est onus leve, igitur etc.
In oppositum arguitur sic: per sacramentorum perceptionem viatores incorporantur Ecclesie, extra quam salvari non possunt, igitur questio vera.
Circa questionem istam est notandum quod cum septem sint sacramenta Ecclesie, duo tantum sunt instituta ad peccatorum remissionem, scilicet baptismus et
280
Bacalarius de ordine servorum Sancte Marie, id est Antonius de Alexandria vel Ludovicus de Venetiis. Vide Ehrle, I più antichi statuti (n. 16 above), 104 (no. 37). Textus non extat.
281
Coloss. 2:3.
282
unionis] nom add. sed del.
283
intensius] anime Christi add. sed del.
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TRADITIO
penitentia. Ideo de hiis duobus aliquid dicendum est. Duo igitur erunt articuli in
ista questione.
Primus erit: utrum post institutionem284 sacramenti baptismatis potuerit
aliquis sine tali sacramento salvari.
Secundus erit: utrum cuilibet resurgenti a culpa mortali sit sacramentum penitentie necessarium ad salutem.
<Primus articulus>
<Utrum post institutionem sacramenti baptismatis potuerit aliquis sine tali sacramento salvari>
<Prima conclusio>
Circa primum285 articulum sit ista prima conclusio: stat aliquem adultum salvari
qui potuit suscipere sacramentum baptismatis et nunquam suscepit. Probatur286
de presbitero non baptizato287 qui, cum religiose et devote vixisset, post mortem
repertum est ipsum non fuisse baptizatum, et episcopus Cremonensis de eo duxit
apostolicam sedem consulere. Cui respondit summus pontifex Innocentius III sub
hac forma: “Respondemus: presbiterum, quem sine unda baptismatis extremum
diem clausisse significasti, quia in sancte matris Ecclesie fide et Christi nominis
confessione perseveravit, ab originali peccato solutum, et celestis patrie
gaudium esse adeptum, asserimus incunctanter.”288 Ex hac auctoritate arguitur
sic: talis presbiter salvatus est, et constat ipsum non sumpsisse sacramentum baptismatis et suscipere potuisse, igitur conclusio vera.
Ex hac conclusione infero tria corollaria.
<Corollaria prime conclusionis>
Primum: stat aliquem non baptizatum salvari et nec postulasse, nec desiderasse,
vel optasse suscipere sacramentum baptismatis. Patet de presbitero iam prefato
qui nec postulavit nec desideravit sacramentum baptismatis.
Secundum corollarium: solum desiderium suscipiendi sacramentum baptismatis in aliquo289 casu sufficit ad salutem. Patet, quia si aliquis sine desiderio
284
285
286
287
288
289
institutionem] institutionem a. c.
primum] ab add. sed del.
probatur] de (-)co* (-)us* casus add. in marg.
Innocent. III, Decretal. 43.2, 648–49.
Innocent. III, Decretal. 43.2, 648.
aliquo] actu add. sed del.
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sacramenti290 baptismatis potest salvari, multo magis ex desiderio, si unda baptismatis desit. Habetur etiam hoc corollarium Extra, ubi supra, per auctoritates
beati Augustini291 et Ambrosii, ubi secundum Glossam adducitur casus de Valentiniano qui, dum properaret ad baptismum, in itinere decessit, quem dicit Ambrosius292 gratiam non amisisse quam postulaverat. Et habetur IV Sententiarum,
dist. 4,293 ubi probatur294 corollarium premissum.
Tertium corollarium: stat aliquem incorporari Ecclesie absque ullius sacramenti
susceptione. Istud corollarium expresse habetur Extra, De presbitero non baptizato,
capitulo295 Veniens,296 ubi dicitur quod “quis non solum per sacramentum fidei, sed
per fidem etiam sacramenti efficitur procul dubio membrum Christi”297 et per consequens membrum Ecclesie. Et per hoc probatur quod presbiter non baptizatus erat
membrum Christi. Item patet de presbitero qui sine unda baptismatis extremum
diem clausit quem constat nullum ceterorum sacramentorum habuisse. Quod si
quis dicat ipsum sacramentum habuisse ordinis, contra: nam si ante eius mortem
inventum fuisset ipsum non fuisse baptizatum, ipse298 fuisset reordinandus, igitur
non vere susceperat sacramentum ordinis. Consequentia patet, quoniam sacramentum ordinis non debet reiterari. Et antecedens patet titulo quo supra, capitulo Si
quis presbiter299 et capitulo Veniens,300 et in glossa ibidem expresse, in qua
habetur quod nec fuit [210rb] sacerdos nec conficiebat.
<Secunda conclusio>
Secunda conclusio: non stat secundum legem iam statutam aliquem parvulum in
aliquo casu sine baptismatis sacramento salvari. Probatur, quoniam parvulus
non habet proprium actum interiorem per quem possit Deo reconciliari et incorporari Ecclesie. Nec ad hoc sufficit sibi fides parentum, ut dicit Magister IV Sententiarum, dist. 4.301 Igitur, cum extra Ecclesiam non possit esse salus, ut dicit
beatus Augustinus in libro De fide ad Petrum,302 nullus parvulus potest sine
290
sacramenti] add. in marg.
Aug., Retract. II.18, 153, apud Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.4.4, 256. Vide etiam Innocent.
III, Decretal. 43.2, 648.
292
Ambros., De ob. Valent., nn. 29–30, 344, apud Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.4.4, 256. Vide
etiam Innocent. III, Decretal., 43.2, 648.
293
Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.4.4, 256.
294
probatur] preissit add. sed del.
295
capitulo] unico add. sed. del.
296
Innocent. III, Decretal. 43.3, 648.
297
Innocent. III, Decretal. 43.3, 648.
298
ipse] ipsius
299
Innocent. III, Decretal. 43.3, 648.
300
Innocent. III, Decretal. 43.3, 648.
301
Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.4.7, 262.
302
Vide Fulg. Rusp., Fid. 3.43, 1424, apud Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.5.4, 264.
291
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TRADITIO
sacramento baptismatis in aliquo casu salvari. Unde si deferantur ad baptismum, et
antequam perveniant parvuli moriantur, dampnabuntur, ut habetur in hoc IV, dist.
4.303
<Tertio conclusio>
Tertia conclusio: non stat aliquem adultum salvari sine fide sacramenti baptismatis, qua scilicet vel credat se baptizatum esse vel credat se baptizari debere. Probatur, quia aliter non esset verum verbum Salvatoris dicentis: Nisi quis renatus
fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto, non intrabit in regnum celorum.304 Quod saltim
de fide sacramenti oportet intelligi, cum in casu sine sacramento quis possit
salvari, ut supra patet.
Ex hanc conclusione secuntur corollaria.
<Corollaria tertie conclusionis>
Primum corollarium: sine fide sacramentorum Ecclesie nullus viator adultus
potest Ecclesie incorporari. Patet, quia quilibet qui Ecclesie incorporatur aut
incorporatur per sacramentum fidei ut parvuli aut per fidem sacramenti ut
adulti; per sacramentum sine fide adulti incorporari non possunt, quia ficte
sumerent; igitur per fidem sacramenti305 necesse est eos incorporari.
Secundum corollarium: nullus viator adultus sine fide sacramentorum Ecclesie
potest effici membrum Christi. Patet corollarium, quia omnis viator qui est
membrum Christi est membrum Ecclesie; sed nullus sine fide sacramentorum
potest esse membrum Ecclesie; igitur.
Tertium corollarium: nullus viator adultus sine fide sacramentorum Ecclesie
potest vere Deo reconciliari. Patet, quia nullus potest Deo reconciliari nisi efficiatur membrum Christi; sed306 nullus sine fide sacramentorum potest esse
membrum Christi; igitur etc.
Quartum corollarium: licet viator adultus sine sacramentis Ecclesie, non tamen
sine fide sacramentorum potest salvari. Patet ex dictis.
<Quarta conclusio>
Quarta conclusio: sacramentum baptismatis necessarium est ad salutem cuilibet
adulto potenti ipsum suscipere.
Hec conclusio probatur ex quatuor propositionibus, quarum prima est ista:
principalis effectus sacramenti baptismatis ad quem principaliter sacramentum
303
304
305
306
Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.4.7, 262.
Ioh. 3:5.
sacramenti] et add. sed del.
sed] nullus add. sed del.
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baptismatis est ordinatum vel est impressio caracteris, vel infusio gratie, vel
remissio actualis peccati, vel solutio a reatu originalis peccati, nam hec omnia,
licet quis percipiat in sacramento baptismatis, non tamen ad hec omnia principaliter est institutum. Non potest dici quod principaliter sit ordinatum ad impressionem caracteris, quoniam sacramentum baptismatis principaliter est institutum
ad illum effectum quem olim habebat circumcisio tempore legis mosayce, ut
habetur Extra, De baptismo et eius effectu, capitulo Maiores; sed circumcisio non
fuit ordinata ad impressionem caracteris, sed ad solutionem reatus originalis
peccati; igitur. Nec dici potest quod sacramentum baptismatis ordinatum sit principaliter ad infusionem gratie, nam certe tenet Ecclesia parvulos in baptismate
consequi principalem effectum ad quem ordinatum est sacramentum, et tamen
non certe tenet eis gratiam infundi, ut patet Extra, titulo et capitulo quibus
supra; propter peccata vero actualia non est ordinatum sacramentum baptismatis, ut notum est, quia propterea ordinatum est sacramentum penitentie; relinquitur igitur quod principaliter sit ordinatum ad solutionem reatus originalis peccati.
Secunda propositio: quamdiu adultus non baptizatus tempus habet [210va]
quo possit suscipere sacramentum baptismatis, tamdiu obligatur ad ipsum suscipiendum. Patet per casum qui ponitur Extra, De presbitero non baptizato, capitulo
Veniens,307 et per glossam in capitulo Apostolicam sedem.308
Tertia propositio: quamdiu adultus non baptizatus habet tempus quo possit
suscipere sacramentum baptismatis, tamdiu tenetur obnoxius pene originalis
culpe seu peccati. Patet, quoniam quamdiu obligatur ad sacramentum baptismatis, tamdiu indiget eo, et non nisi ad eius principalem effectum, qui est solutio
reatus originalis peccati, igitur tamdiu est sub reatu; sed quamdiu habet
tempus quo possit suscipere sacramentum, tamdiu obligatur ad ipsum, per precedentem propositionem; igitur etc.
Quarta propositio: viatori obnoxio pene peccati potenti suscipere sacramentum
ad remedium illius peccati ordinatum non sufficit solum fides sacramenti. Hoc
habetur a Magistro IV Sententiarum, dist. 4,309 ubi habetur quod fides sufficit
ubi “necessitas excludit sacramentum,” sed si potest habere sacramentum, tenetur.
Ex hiis propositionibus deducitur conclusio principalis: nam quilibet adultus
non baptizatus, dum habet tempus suscipiendi sacramentum, tenetur sub reatu
originalis peccati, per tertiam propositionem, ad quem solvendum non sufficit
sola fides, per quartam propositionem, igitur necessarium est sibi sacramentum.
Et hec de primo articulo dicta sufficiant.
307
308
309
Innocent. III, Decretal. 43.3, 648.
Innocent. III, Decretal. 43.2, 648.
Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.4.4, 255.
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TRADITIO
<Secundus articulus>
<Utrum cuilibet resurgenti a culpa mortali sit sacramentum penitentie necessarium ad salutem>
Secundus articulus erat: utrum cuilibet resurgenti a culpa mortali sit sacramentum penitentie necessarium ad salutem.
<Prima conclusio>
Circa quem articulum sit ista prima conclusio: nullius resurgentis a culpa mortali
propria cordis contritio sufficit ad ipsum salvandum. Ad probationem istius conclusionis assumo tres propositiones, quarum prima sit ista: quilibet peccans mortaliter ex rigore vindicative iustitie penam sensitivam meretur eternam. Probatur
propositio, quia aut nullam meretur penam sensitivam, aut precise temporalem,
aut eternam. Nullus sane mentis dicet quod nullam. Sed quod non precise temporalem probo sic: quamlibet diuturnam penam quis meretur ex solis venialibus; sed
cuilibet mortali correspondet maior pena quam quotcumque venialibus; igitur
quodlibet mortale meretur penam ultra omnem temporalem; igitur eternam.
Secunda propositio: nullus peccans mortaliter finaliter potest salvari nisi pro
sua culpa plene sit satisfactum secundum debitum vindicative iustitie. Hec propositio potest probari per fundamenta Anselmi quibus probat, I Cur Deus homo,310
quod Deus non potest dimittere aliquod peccatum impunitum. Probatur etiam,
quia redemptio humani generis non inniteretur vindicative iustitie vel plus
iustie quam misericordie, quod est falsum.
Tertia propositio: nulla amaricatio cordis contriti equipollet in pena toti pene
debite culpe mortali. Ista per se patet cuilibet intelligenti.
Ex hiis tribus propositionibus concluditur premissa311 conclusio, quia ex quo
cordis contritio non est tanta pena quanta debetur culpe mortali, per tertiam propositionem, et nullus peccans mortaliter potest salvari nisi pro eius culpa sic plene
satisfactum, per secundam propositionem, sequitur quod nullius resurgentis a
culpa mortali propria cordis contritio sufficit ad ipsum salvandum.
Ex hac conclusione cum propositionibus suis secuntur tria corollaria.
<Corollaria prime conclusionis>
Primum: nulla pena alicuius resurgentis a culpa mortali sufficit ad ipsum salvandum. Patet, quia nulla talis est tanta quanta debetur peccato mortali.
310
311
Anselm. Cant., Cur Deus I.12, 22.
premissa] a add. sed del.
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Secundum corollarium: quilibet resurgens a culpa mortali necesse habet sibi
applicari passionem Christi sub [210vb] ratione satisfactionis secundum
debitum vindicative iustitie. Patet ex propositionibus conclusionis.
Tertium corollarium: si alicui resurgenti a culpa mortali applicaretur passio Christi
sub ratione meriti quo gratiam consequatur iustificatus ut resurgat, et non sub
ratione satisfactionis, non posset salvari, licet iustificaretur. Patet ex supra dictis.
<Secunda conclusio>
Secunda conclusio istius articuli: per sacramentum penitentie applicatur vere
penitenti passio Christi sub ratione satisfactionis pro culpa mortali commissa.
Hec conclusio probatur ex duabus propositionibus, quarum prima est ista: principalis effectus ad quem sacramentum penitentie est institutum principaliter
<vel> est infusio prime gratie per quam peccator resurgit si fuerat mortali irretitus peccato, et hoc non, quia ante ministerium sacerdotis per quod penitentia redditur sacramentalis, peccator est vivificatus per gratiam et resurrexit a morte
peccati, ut patet. Aut talis effectus sacramenti penitentie est incrementum
gratie prius habite, et hoc etiam non: tum quia principaliter ad hoc est institutum
sacramentum eukaristie, ut patet IV Sententiarum dist. 8a312 et dist. 12a,313 ad
eundem autem effectum non sunt duo sacramenta principaliter instituta. Tum
etiam quia officium sacerdotis in sacramento penitentie non esset per se et
primo usque clavium Ecclesie, quod est falsa; et consequentia tenet, quoniam
potestas clavium non est per se ordinata ad incrementum314 virtutum. Tum
tertio quia sacerdos in sacramento penitentie non plus esset iudex ecclesiasticus
quam in ceteris sacramentis. Aut principalis effectus ad quem institutum est
sacramentum penitentie est non solvere, sed ostendere solutum, iuxta quorumdam responsionem, et hoc non, quia principalis effectus sacramenti esset significare et non efficere, quod est falsum. Sed de hoc plus habebitur inferius. Restat
igitur quod eius principalis effectus sit solvere reatum, cum propter aliquem
istorum videatur hoc sacramentum, scilicet penitentie, principaliter esse institutum.315 Preterea: ad illum effectum hoc sacramentum est principaliter institutum
quem sacerdos, in eo quod ministerialiter agit, dicit se facere; sed dicit se absolvere
a peccatis; igitur iste est effectus sacramenti huius.
Secunda propositio: sacramentum penitentie efficaciam habet et fructum ex
virtute passionis Christi. Patet, quia per hoc sacramentum reconciliamur Deo;
reconciliamur autem Deo per mortem filii eius, ut ait Apostolus;316 igitur.
312
313
314
315
316
Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.8, 280–86.
Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.12, 304–11.
incrementum] gratie add. sed del.
principaliter esse institutum] esse institutum principaliter a. c.
Rom. 5:10.
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TRADITIO
Ex istis propositionibus probatur conclusio sic: per sacramentum penitentie
solvitur reatus actualis peccati, per primam propositionem, et hoc ex virtute passionis Christi, per secundam; igitur per sacramentum penitentie peccator fit particeps passionis Christi; igitur per hoc sacramentum penitenti applicatur passio
Christi. Aut igitur sibi applicatur passio Christi ut est meritoria, et hoc non,
quia sic applicatur sibi ad consecutionem donorum, virtutum, et gratiarum, ad
que principaliter non ordinatur sacramentum penitentie. Aut sibi applicatur ut
est satisfactoria317 pro peccato, et habetur propositum, quia tunc solvitur
reatus pene ad quam pro culpa secundum debitum vindicative iustitie
obligabatur.
Ex hanc conclusione secuntur duo corollaria.
<Corollaria secunde conclusionis>
Primum est: potestas absolutionis in sacerdote non est potestas ordinis, sed potestas iurisdictionis. Probatur, nam per potestatem quam exercet sacerdos in absolutione applicat passionem Christi, ut est satisfactoria ad solutionem reatus peccati
penitentis; hoc autem est distribuere thesauros Ecclesie, sicut in largitione indulgentiarum ad solutionem reatus pene purgatorii; distribuere autem passionem
Christi ad solutionem reatus est iurisdictionis, non ordinis; igitur etc.
Secundum corollarium: potestas absolutionis non est equalis in omnibus sacerdotibus. [211ra] Patet, quia potestas iurisdictionis non est equalis in omnibus
sacerdotibus, sed in solo capite Ecclesie, scilicet papa, est per plenitudinem, ab
aliis aut secundum mensuram per determinationem a capite participatur. Preterea, potestas iurisdictionis quelibet est potestas clavium; potestas autem
clavium a papa derivatur in ceteros ministros Ecclesie et non equaliter; igitur etc.
<Tertia conclusio>
Tertia conclusio: nullius resurgentis a culpa mortali reatus sive debitum pene solvitur antequam per ministerium sacerdotis fiat sibi remissio peccatorum. Hec
conclusio, licet sit contra Magistrum in IV,318 est tamen pro opinione Hugonis
in libro De sacramentis,319 a quo discessit Magister in sua opinione. Vult enim
Magister, ut patet dist. 19 huius IV,320 quod per solam cordis contritionem solvitur
debitum pene antequam penitens ad sacerdotem pervenerit, ita quod sacerdos non
solvit a debito pene, sed solus Deus. Et ita vult quod Deus per se ipsum et animam
interius vivificet contra mortem peccati et per se ipsum debitum pene eterne
317
318
319
320
satisfactoria] priusp add. sed del.
Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.18.4, 357.
Hugo S. Vict., De sacram. II.14.7, 565.
Non dist. 19, sed dist. 18; vide Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.18.4, 357.
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solvat, ita quod neutrum horum concessum est sacerdotibus. Hugo321 vero dicit
Deum per se ipsum animam interius vivificare et a morte peccati resuscitare,
sacerdotem autem ipsam a debito pene solvere, quod significatum dicit fuisse in
Lazaro quem Christus per se ipsum a morte suscitavit et suscitatum non per se
ipsum solvit, sed solvendum apostolis tradidit. Et quia hec opinio rationabilior
michi videtur, ideo cum reverentia Magistri posui prefatam conclusionem ad
innuendum quod non per solam cordis contritionem solvitur reatus sive
debitum pene, esto quod per solam cordis contritionem iustificetur peccator et suscitetur a morte peccati, sed remanent reatus quousque per sacramentum solvatur.
Et ideo hoc est officium sacerdotis in sacramento penitentie et potestas clavium,
scilicet iam resuscitatum a morte peccati solvere a debito pene.
Probatur igitur conclusio ex duabus propositionibus, quarum prima est ista:
sola cordis contritio — que adultum nondum baptizatum mortalibus irretitum
peccatis iustificat et a morte peccati resuscitat, et tamen a debito pene non
solvit, sed post iustificationem factam per cordis contritionem remanet reatus
quousque per sacramentum solvatur — quod sola cordis contritio non solvit
debitum pene in adulto mortalibus irretito peccatis, qui alias fuit baptizatus,
quem eque iustificat. Hec propositio est omnino de intentione Magistri, quia
vult quod in utroque fiat solutio peccati ante sacramentum per solam cordis contritionem sive iustificationem322 precedentem sacramentum, sicut colligitur ex
dist. 4 et dist. 18 huius IV.323
Patet etiam propositio, quia sumptis duobus mortalibus irretitis peccatis,
quorum unus fuit alias baptizatus, reliquus vero non, qui per fidem et cordis contritionem equaliter iustificentur et resurgant a morte peccati ante sacramentum,
irrationabiliter assereretur plus alterum per iustificationem precedentem sacramentum solutum a debito pene qua reliquum, si Deus per se ipsum sine sacramento in sola cordis contritione solvat debitum pene, sicut dicit Magister.
Preterea quantum unus astringitur iam iustificatus ad sacramentum baptismatis, tantum alter astringitur ad sacramentum penitentie, cum unum sacramentum
ita datum sit in remedium actualis peccati sicut reliquum in remedium originalis,
igitur iustificatio que habetur per cordis contritionem, si in uno solvit debitum
pene ante sacramentum, et in reliquo, et si in uno non sufficit solvere, nec in
reliquo.
Secunda propositio: in adulto non baptizato iam correctio et per cordis contritionem iustificato a peccatis mortalibus quibus irretitus erat non solvitur reatus
[211rb] ante sacramentum regenerationis, sed manet quousque per sacramentum
deleatur. Oppositum huius est fundamentum Magistri in dist. 4.324 Hec propositio
321
322
323
324
Hugo S. Vict., De sacram. II.14.7, 565.
iustificationem] iustitionem a. c.
Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.4–5, 251–68.
Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.4.2, 253.
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TRADITIO
habetur expresse a beato Augustinus VI libro Contra Iulianum, ubi ponitur casus
de infideli qui ydolis sacrificet, deinde cesset ydolis sacrificare, et per fidem correctus iam recte vivat. De quo per longum processum disputat beatus Augustinus
ostendens quod reatus peccati ymmolationis remanet quousque per sacramentum
regenerationis solvatur. Ait enim inter cetera: “Sicut ydolis ymmolatio, que iam
nec in actione est, quia preteriit, nec in voluntate, quia error quo fiebat oblatus
est, manet tamen reatus eius donec in lavacro regenerationis peccatorum
omnium remissione solvatur.” Sed queso te, cum et ipse concedis peccati facti
transacti reatum manere nisi sacro fonte diluatur, dic michi, reatus iste quid sit
et ubi manet325 homine correcto recteque vivente, nondum tamen remissione peccatorum liberato? Subiectum est reatus ille, sicut corpus, an in subiecto, sicut
febris aut vulnus in corpore, aut avaritia vel error in326 animo? In subiecto esse
dicturus es: neque enim reatum affirmabis esse substantiam. In quo igitur tibi
videtur esse subiecto? Cur queram quid respondeas, et non potius verba tua
ponam? “Actu - inquis - pretereunte, manet eius reatus in illius conscientia qui
deliquit, donec dimittatur,” igitur in subiecto est, hoc est, in animo eius qui deliquisse se meminit, et scrupolo mole statur, donec fiat delicti remissione securus.
Quid si obliviscatur se deliquisse, nec eius conscientia stimuletur, ubi erit reatus
ille, quem transeunte peccato manere concedis, donec remittatur? Nec certe in
corpore est, quia non est eorum accidentium que accidunt corpori; non est in
animo, quia eius memoriam delevit oblivio: et tamen est. Ubi est igitur, cum
bene vivat homo; nec dici possit, eorum peccatorum eius reatum manere que
meminit; eorum vero que oblitus est, non manere? Manet quippe omnio donec
dimittatur. Ubi igitur manet, nisi in occultis legibus Dei, que conscripte sunt quodammodo in mentibus angelorum, ut327 nulla sit iniquitas impunita, nisi quam
sanguis Mediatoris expiaverit; cuius signo crucis consecratur328 unda baptismatis,
ut ea diluatur reatus tamquam in chirographo scriptus, in notitia spiritualium
potestatum, per quas pena exigitur peccatorum”329? Hec ille.
Ex hoc processu habentur tria.
Primum, quod peccatore correcto et iam recte vivente, et per consequens iustificato, adhuc manet eius peccati reatus donec per sacramentum solvatur in quo fit
remissio peccatorum. Et habetur secunda propositio supraposita.
Secundum, quod talis reatus est reatus eterne pene, non precise temporalis, per
quod excluditur quedam ratio Magistri. Patet hoc, quoniam de illo reatu est
semper mentio quem incurrit sic sacrificans per actum ymmolationis qui statim
perpetrata iniquitate scriptus fuit in chirographo, in notitia spiritualium
325
326
327
328
329
manet] homine iter. sed del.
in] animo add. sed del.
ut] nulla add. sed del.
consecratur] an add. sed del.
Aug., C. Iulianum 6.19.62, 860–61.
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potestatum, sive in occultis legibus Dei conscriptis in mentibus angelorum ut
nulla sit iniquitas impunita nisi quam sanguis Mediatoris expiaverit. Ideo chirographum in quo scriptus fuit reatus eterne pene iniquitati debite non delebatur
de mentibus angelorum et de notitia spiritualium potestatum per solam cordis
contritionem.
Tertium est quod talem chirographum deletur per sacramentum ex eo quod
per330 ipsum iam iustifico applicatur331 sanguis Christi in pretium satisfactorie
solutionis debiti, per quod beatus Augustinus332 nobis significat secundam conclusionem superius positam. Patet hoc, nam reatus scriptus est in chirographo in
mentibus angelorum [211va] et in notitia spiritualium potestatum, “ut nulla sit
iniquitas impunita nisi quam sanguis Mediatoris expiaverit, cuius signo crucis
consecratur unda baptismatis ut ea diluatur reatus tanquam in chirographo scriptus.”333 Quod autem hic de unda baptismatis dicitur intelligendum est etiam de
sacramento334 penitentie, quia per ipsum deleri haberet tale chirographum si
taliter sacrificans fuisset alias baptizatus. De per accidens enim tale chirographum
deletur per sacramentum baptismatis, sed solum chirographum originalis culpe de
per se debetur sacramento baptismatis.
Ex duabus premissis propositionibus deducitur conclusio sic: reatus mortalis
peccati in adulto non baptizato non solvitur per cordis contritionem et iustificationem ante sacramentum, per secundam propositionem, et hoc idem iudicium est
de alias baptizato, per primam propositionem, igitur nullius resurgentis a culpa
mortali reatus sive debitum pene solvitur antequam per ministerium sacerdotis
fiat sibi335 remissio peccatorum.
Ex hac conclusione secuntur due propositiones.
Prima est propositio Hugonis in suo libro De sacramentis,336 scilicet quod sacerdos per actum sacramentalem quem exercet in sacramento penitentie penitentem
absolvit a debito eterne pene ad quam obligatus erat ex peccato, quem tamen
Deus se solo prius a morte peccati suscitaverat et per cordis contritionem iustificaverat. Patet ex conclusione, cum usque ad perceptionem sacramenti penitens
teneatur reus et per ministerium sacerdotis eius reatus solvatur.
Preterea cum sacerdos dicat se solvere exercendo potestatem clavium, aut vere
solvit aut non. Si vere solvit, aut a debito eterne pene, et habetur propositum, aut
a debito pene temporalis, et hoc non, tum quia penitens post absolutionem factam
a sacerdote non teneretur aliter satisfacere hic vel in futuro, quod est falsum, quia,
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
per] s. l.
applicatur] im add. sed del.
Aug., C. Iulianum 6.19.62, 860–61.
Aug., C. Iulianum 6.19.62, 861.
etiam de sacramento] de sacramento etiam a. c.
sibi] s. l.
Hugo S. Vict., De sacram. II.14.7, 565.
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TRADITIO
nulla purgatoria pena interveniente, statim post absolutionem volaret ad celum si
mox decederet, quod constat falsum esse. Consequentia prima patet, quia si post
absolutionem tenetur penitens satisfacere hic vel in futurum, non est a sacerdote
absolutus a temporali. Tum etiam quia sacerdos post absolutionem factam penitentem ad penam temporalem satisfactoriam ligat, et non nisi pro reatu pene temporalis quam, si non hic expleverit, in futurum satisfaciet purgatoria pena. Igitur
cum absolvebat, non absolvebat a temporali pena, et per consequens absolvebat
ab eterna pena.
Si vero337 dicitur quod sacerdos non vere solvit, sed tantum ostendit solutum,
tunc inepta est forma sacramenti, et sacerdos dicit se facere quod non facit, et
sacramentum hoc tantum signat et non efficit remissionem peccatorum, cum
tamen ad338 remissionem peccatorum sic principaliter institutum. Sacramenta
autem evangelice legis sunt ad efficiendum instituta unumquodque ad suum effectum, qui in sacramento penitentie est remissio peccatorum. Licet enim plures alias
utilitates penitentes consequantur per ipsum, non tamen est propter eas principaliter institutum, sed ad remissionem peccatorum.
Secunda propositio corollaria est ista: stat aliquem esse in caritate et non esse
dignum vita eterna. Patet de iustificato per contritionem cordis et nondum soluto a
reatu peccati per sacramentum remissionis peccatorum. Talis enim quamdiu per
culpam obligatur ad penam tamdiu est indignus vita eterna beata. Obligatur autem
ad penam iam per caritatem iustificatus donec per sacramentum remissionis peccatorum eius reatus solvatur, sicut ex dictis beati Augustini superius adductis patet.
Patet etiam propositio de cathecismo proficiente et recte vivente, quod esse non
potest sine caritate, [211vb] et tamen indignus est vita beata, quia secundum
beatum Augustinum 13 sermone Super Johannem,339 “adhuc340 sarcinam341 peccatorum suorum portat” donec per baptismum renascatur et Ecclesie incorporetur.
<Quarta conclusio>
Quarta conclusio: stat aliquem in sola fide sacramenti sine sacerdotali absolutione
salvari. Patet conclusio per beatum Augustinum in libro De penitentia,342 et
habetur in textu dist. 17 huius IVti,343 de desiderante sacerdotem cui nec
tempus nec locus concedit, qui, si in tali impossibilitate decedit, ex solo desiderio
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
vero] vere
ad] s. l.
Vide Aug., Super Johan. 121.4, 667; apud Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.18.5, 359.
adhuc] seatiamen add. sed del.
sarcinam] sartiamen
Vide Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.17.1, 344.
Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.17.1, 344.
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consequitur344 veniam et “supplet ibi sacramentum omnipotentis benignitas,”345
ut habetur dist. 4a.346
Ex hac conclusione sequitur hec corollaria propositio, scilicet quod347 omnipotentis benignitas, supplens vicem sacramenti in eo qui sacramentum habere non
potuit, non supplet nisi cum totum tempus vite exspiraverit. Patet, quia
quamdiu vixerit peccator, tamdiu est in statu quo possit habere sacramentum,
et remanens manet reatus et obligatur ad sacramentum; igitur etc.
Preterea, si propositio non sit vera, sit quod in A instanti ante mortem peccatoris suppleverit omnipotentis benignitas. Contra: post A remanet vel remanere
potest tempus quo possit recipere sacramentum et obligabitur, igitur adhuc
manent reatus. Preterea, non est causa quare in A quam ante A, igitur vel
statim cum primo iustificatur, et hoc non per supra dicta, vel primo cum totum
tempus exspiraverit et status quo subicitur sacramentis, et habetur propositum.
Preterea si post A posset habere sacramentum et negligeret, et cum tali negligentia decederet, decederet utique cum reatu348 priorum peccatorum, igitur non erat
facta remissio in A, et per consequens suppleverat omnipotentis benignitas. Et
antecedens probatur, quoniam si ante A potuisset habere sacramentum et neglexisset, et cum tali negligentia decessisset in A, decessisset utique cum reatu
priorum peccatorum, alias reduceremus usque ad primum instans iustificationis,
igitur simpliciter post A decederet cum349 reatu priorum peccatorum.
Et sic patet quid sit dicendum ad questionem.
Explicit questio quarti principii disputata Bononie per reverendum magistrum
Augustinum de Roma nunc ibidem regentem 1398. Utimam. Utimam. Utimam.
344
345
346
347
348
349
consequitur] ve add. sed del.
Vide Aug., De bapt. ctr. Donat. IV.24, 260; apud Petr. Lomb. Sent. IV.4.4, 258.
Petr. Lomb., Sent. IV.4.4, 258.
quod] omni add. sed. del.
reatu] post add. sed del.
cum] a add. sed del.
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