This paper presents detailed methods for constructing a flexible philosophical–analytical model through which to apply the analytic principles of CDA for the interpretation of metaphors across policy texts. Drawing on a theoretical... more
This paper presents detailed methods for constructing a flexible philosophical–analytical model through which to apply the analytic principles of CDA for the interpretation of metaphors across policy texts. Drawing on a theoretical framing from Foucault and the augmentation of Nietzsche’s views on valuation, we sketch a framework for examining ways in which evaluative semantic categories can be linked to sociological theories in order to bring out their relevance for the purpose of critical discourse analysis. This multi-level research framework draws upon a relationship between language analysis, the philosophical study of valuation, and political economy as a composite formulation of values through which neo-liberalism is discursively entwined and progressed through a system of principles of e/valuation.
It has been argued that belief in free will is socially consequential and psychologically universal. In this paper, we look at the folk concept of free will and its critical assessment in the context of recent psychological research. What... more
It has been argued that belief in free will is socially consequential and psychologically universal. In this paper, we look at the folk concept of free will and its critical assessment in the context of recent psychological research. What kind of people has been studied so far? A review of papers indicates that, overall, 91% of participants in studies on belief in free will were WEIRD. Is there a widespread consensus about the conceptual content of free will? We com- pared English “free will” with its lexical equivalents in Lithuanian, Hindi, Chinese and Mongo- lian languages and found that unlike Lithuanian, Chinese, Hindi, and Mongolian lexical expres- sions of “free will” do not refer to the same concept free will. Thus, given that free will has no cross-culturally universal conceptual content and that most of the reviewed studies were based on WEIRD samples, belief in free will is not a psychological universal.
Determinism from the 1 st and 3 rd person perspective as well as the universal point of reference aee dealt with. This is to show the absence of free will in the last perspective and the illusion of it when seen from the first two... more
Determinism from the 1 st and 3 rd person perspective as well as the universal point of reference aee dealt with. This is to show the absence of free will in the last perspective and the illusion of it when seen from the first two perspectives. 'Free' choice is dealt with as well as the absence of free will and the consequences of determinism for law and court judgements are explored. So, what if any, is the place and the role of God in all this? Did s/he create determinism and the potential for or any semblance of choice and free will? Or is the existence of God, the fulfilling of prayer intentions and miracles impossible and redundant in a universe of determinism (laws of nature etc) or universal determinism?
Is it Permissible to Believe in Moral Responsibility? In this paper we counter arguments which claim to establish that, in light of insufficient evidence, we should suspend belief in moral responsibility. We propose two arguments, the... more
Is it Permissible to Believe in Moral Responsibility? In this paper we counter arguments which claim to establish that, in light of insufficient evidence, we should suspend belief in moral responsibility. We propose two arguments, the first of which shows that even if we lack sufficient evidence for moral responsibility it is not the case that we should suspend belief in it. We are under the obligation to suspend our belief about moral responsibility only if we are actually morally responsible – as we cannot have any significant obligations in case we are not morally responsible. We substantiate this argument by scrutinizing the various ways a skeptic could demand us to suspend our judgment. Our second argument shows that taking into account all our possibilities, our best option seems to be to continue believing in moral responsibility. Otherwise we would risk too much, including failing to believe in important truths and disregarding significant moral obligations.
Belief in free will is founded on the idea that people are responsible for their behavior. People who believe in free will derive meaning in life from these beliefs. Conformity refers to succumbing to external pressures and imitating... more
Belief in free will is founded on the idea that people are responsible for their behavior. People who believe in free will derive meaning in life from these beliefs. Conformity refers to succumbing to external pressures and imitating others’ behaviors. Sometimes, conformity involves a loss of self‐awareness, which reduces perceived meaninglessness. We tested if disbelief in free will increases perceived meaninglessness and if people subsequently become more conformist to address this negative existential perception. We conducted three studies to test this hypothesis. In Study 1, experimentally induced disbelief in free will resulted in perceived meaninglessness. In Study 2, perceived meaninglessness correlated with conformity. Finally, in Study 3, perceived meaninglessness mediated the relationship between disbelief in free will and conformity, especially under high self‐awareness. We conclude that perceptions about meaning play a central role in the relationship between disbelief in free will and conformity.
