Bioliberalism

Might we be facing the end of the human species? This question can be understood at least in two ways: we (humans) as a species will become obsolete and give way to a new, possibly better, species or we might go extinct altogether due to disastrous consequences we have contributed to on Earth. We might give a conclusive answer to both of them on the ground of John Harris’s moral thought. To the first meaning of the question, we can give an anti-essentialist answer referring negatively to identity driven vision of humanity. To the second one we can give a moral answer that refers to personhood and to what matters morally. In order to view this question from a slightly different point of view, a notion of a cyborg is helpful.

A cyborg is not only what it is—a cybernetic organism (a combination of machine and human)—but also what it is in relation to a given environment. In the case of the classic definition of a cyborg, cosmic space is mentioned. Apart from the vision of a cyborg defined in relations to body, to subject, to humanity, we can view it as a concept that can be defined as a moral category. In this sense we can ask which cosmos matters morally now?

With this theoretical merger of moral theory and cyborg ontology I will try to take a look at the imagined visions of humankind futures (in speculative evolution novels and afrofuturistic vision of an Afronaut) and the more corporeal examples of persons who might be cyborgs. Is there a moral difference between human being and a cyborg? From John Harris’s perspective of there might be non. However, the very notion of a cyborg, insofar as it is compatible with the project of enhancing evolution, perhaps indicates that in a moral sense we have a duty to cyborgise.

The main theme of this thesis is the bioconservatism as a movement and the arguments that have been produced by notable bioconservatives against the notion of the term human enhancement as transhumanists approach the term. First, the terms human enhancement, and its types, transhumanism, transhumanists, transhumans, cyborgs / metahumans, posthumans (and posthumanism) are explained. Secondly, the bioconservatism movement and the writer’s idea of the three different ways of being a bioconservative when leaving in a liberal state are presented. Then, it follows the second part of the thesis which it is constructed by showing six basic bioconservative arguments against the transhumanist approach to human enhancement. The arguments are: the “Human Nature Preservation” summa of arguments, the “best value” argument by G.A. Cohen and N. Agar, the “Factor X” argument by F. Fukuyama, the “precautionary principle” argument by G.J. Annas, the J. Habermas’ argument on how “the (reproductive) enhancements are against autonomy” and L. Kass’ “Yuck Factor” argument. We conclude with some closing remarks on the human enhancement, the bioconservative rhetoric against transhumanism, the character of the bioconservative argumentation and the usefulness of the debate.

Allen Buchanan has argued for a linking of the ethics of human enhancement to the ethics of development more generally. The promise of the 'enhance-ment enterprise' is that it may help develop society, just as other technological advances have in the past. He proposes a framework of intellectual property rights, government action to ensure the poor can access the enhancements, an international organization to administer the diffusion of new enhancement technologies from the West to poor countries, and the diffusion within countries to the poorer populations. I take seriously his proposal of discussing biomedical enhancement in terms of the ethics of development. On these grounds of assessment, I argue that his proposal is politically conservative. To make the case, I distinguish conservatism in ethics from conservatism in politics; and I contextualize the proposal against the background of development economics and the neoliberal approach to development.