CFIUS

L'elaborato presenta un particolare veicolo di investimento, i Fondi Sovrani, che hanno assunto importanza ed attenzioni nel nuovo millennio, in quanto, a gestire la ricchezza da questi accumulata, non sono soggetti privati ma direttamente o indirettamente gli Stati sovrani.
Nel primo capitolo si chiariscono le principali caratteristiche dei FOS, la gestione statale, la preponderanza degli investimenti all'estero e l'ottica di lungo-periodo degli investimenti, oltre alla presenza di finalità ulteriori, segnatamente politiche, rispetto al principio della massimizzazione del
rapporto rischio/rendimento, tipico degli investitori privati.
Tuttavia, essendo il fenomeno dei FOS estremamente eterogeneo, come dimostrano le difficoltà della dottrina ad individuare una definizione puntuale e a giungere ad una classificazione pacifica, si sono evidenziate le principali differenze rispetto ad altre forme di investimento quali i fondi pensione, gli hedge fund e le riserve ufficiali ed è stata analizzata la loro evoluzione e il ruolo giocato nella crisi economica del 2008.
Infine, è stato presentato il funzionamento di due fondi sovrani: quello italiano, CDP Equity S.p.A e quello costituito su iniziativa dei Paesi membri dell'Unione Europea.
La sempre maggiore, e talvolta ingombrante presenza dei Fondi Sovrani, nei mercati finanziari, ha destato preoccupazioni sul piano geopolitico e su quello economico, vista la loro scarsa propensione a comunicare dati e informazioni sulla propria struttura giuridica e sui risultati finanziari ottenuti.
Per questo motivo diverse organizzazioni internazionali, fra cui l'OCSE e il Fondo Monetario Internazionale hanno tentato di incrementare la
trasparenza di questi veicoli di investimento: l'esperimento più approfondito ha portato all'emanazione dei Santiago Principles, un codice di condotta a cui i FOS, su base volontaria, possono aderire, rendendo così pubblici i propri meccanismi di funzionamento, la propria governance e i risultati ottenuti. A oltre un decennio dalla loro pubblicazione, sono stati descritti gli aspetti positivi e i limiti di questa iniziativa, su tutti la facoltatività e l'assenza di un meccanismo sanzionatorio arrivando alla conclusione che essa sia servita ad accreditare i FOS nei mercati finanziari come un investitore istituzionale affidabile.
Nell'ultima parte dell'elaborato sono state prese in considerazione le tecniche difensive adottate dagli Stati, nel caso in cui gli investimenti esteri, anche dei Fondi Sovrani, vengano considerati pregiudizievoli per la sicurezza nazionale, nozione tutt'altro che unanime e prestatisi a nascondere intenzioni neoprotezionistiche degli Stati: è stata presentata la via scelta da molti Paesi, quella della regolazione mediante Bilateral Investment Agreement, i c.d. BIT, mentre particolare attenzione è
stata dedicata al meccanismo di scrutinio preventivo presente negli Stati Uniti attraverso il CFIUS, che vede il coinvolgimento in prima persona del Presidente.
A livello europeo, si è prima valutata la compatibilità degli investimenti dei FOS rispetto ai principi cardine dell'ordinamento europeo quali la libera circolazione dei capitali e la libertà di stabilimento e successivamente è stata presentata la tecnica della Golden Power introdotta nell'ordinamento italiano, la quale potrebbe fungere da modello per l'introduzione di una disciplina a livello europeo,
superando la frammentazione attuale, a cui peraltro la Commissione aveva tentato di porre rimedio.

Recently, some European countries and institutions have expressed concerns about a lack of reciprocity in foreign direct investment (FDI) treatment with third countries. Indeed, European investors in foreign countries often do not enjoy the same treatment that foreign investors receive in Europe. Member States and EU institutions legitimately relied upon reciprocity which is the basic principle of international trade and investment law and that aims at promoting mutual benefits of the parties involved in the trading system.
In particular, there is an increasing consensus among European politicians that a more efficient screening mechanism of inward FDIs in the European Union (EU) is needed in order to avoid takeovers of European strategic assets by non-European investors that could jeopardize European security and economy. Hence, this contribution tries to identify possible legal bases in the EU Treaties for the creation of a single UE body of FDI control (the so-called European Committee on Foreign Investment).
However, such a mechanism could affect some of the present international obligations undertaken by the EU with its trading partners. In this regard, this article tries to argue that the establishment of a European Committee on Foreign Investment could be legitimately pursued at the international level because of the reciprocity principle. Finally, the present contribution tries to provide some essential aspects of the Committee proposed here.

Discussions of corporate governance often focus solely on the attractiveness of firms to investors, but it is also true that firms seek out preferred investors. What, then, are the characteristics of an attractive investor? With nearly $6 trillion in assets, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are increasingly important players in equity markets in the United States and abroad, and possess characteristics that firms prize: deep pockets, long-term (and for some, theoretically infinite) investment horizons, and potential network benefits that many other shareholders cannot offer. However, despite their economic power, their reach, and their general desirability as investors, SWFs are almost entirely disengaged from corporate governance matters in U.S. firms. Indeed, with the exception of Norway’s Government Pension Fund-Global, SWFs are notable primarily just for their passivity as shareholders.

Given the domestic and external political and regulatory factors that discourage SWF engagement in corporate governance in the United States, how can SWFs provide appropriate stewardship over their equity investments? The article answers this question by describing how SWFs and regulators can create the crucial “space” necessary for SWF engagement in corporate governance. The analysis proceeds in three substantive sections. Part I lays out a definition of SWFs and describes SWF investment patterns. Part II reviews empirical evidence on SWF investment behavior and the effects that the investment has on firm values, and then examines evidence on SWF activities in corporate governance. Part III discusses the key factors that limit SWF involvement in corporate governance activities. Part IV describes how, given these limitations, SWFs may engage in governance without triggering regulatory reprisals, and how regulators can encourage SWF investment and engagement.

In 2007, the U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Investment in the United States Act (FINSA), the most recent in a series of calibrations to a basic regulatory framework that is now nearly 40 years old. FINSA has particularly significant effects on investment by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Indeed, FINSA is properly understood as a response to SWF and SOE activity, and is designed to provide a framework in which U.S. regulators can weigh the particular risks presented with investment by state-controlled entities. Although in general FINSA has performed ably and as intended in its first five years of implementation, balancing the risks associated with SOE and SWF investment in a competitively neutral way has historically been a challenge, and now seems to be even more challenging after the passage of FINSA.

We are experiencing a technical revolution in biotechnology that will change the way we live as much as any technological advance in human history. Advances in gene sequencing, gene editing, and gene synthesis have shifted our relationship with the building blocks of life. This new science, synthetic biology, is in its early stages but has already created distinct threats and opportunities in US national security. It promises advances in materials science, manufacturing, logistics, sensor technology, medicine, health care, and human augmentation while simultaneously increasing the possibility and severity of man-made pandemics through unintended consequences in genetic experiments or improved bioweapons. This article proposes a National Strategy for Synthetic Biology (NSSB) to defend the homeland and promote American strength by building security into synthetic biology and by making synthetic biology an investment priority. The United States can achieve greater security by regulating and controlling synthetic biology to prevent unintended consequences while investing in people and industries to maintain a security advantage in the field.

Esta tesis doctoral analiza la incidencia en la soberanía económica y de la seguridad nacional de la intervención y participación de los Estados en los mercados de capitales globales. En la primera parte se examina la regulación norteamericana en materia de controles a la inversión extranjera por razones de seguridad nacional. En primer lugar, delimita el marco conceptual de la inversión extranjera, aludiendo expresamente a los riesgos tanto políticos como de seguridad nacional que plantea. A continuación, se analiza la evolución de la normativa de los Estados Unidos en el último siglo. En particular, se estudia la denominada enmienda Exon-Florio como marco normativo de la inversión extranjera y su control por motivos de seguridad nacional. Se realiza un estudio de su aplicación práctica, con especial referencia al mercado de las telecomunicaciones y el sector de la defensa. Finalmente se hace una valoración en conjunto del sistema de su influencia en otros ordenamientos, en particular en los países de la Unión Europea. A continuación, se analiza la situación en la Unión Europea para poder compararla con el modelo americano. Con carácter previo, se analizan fundamentos jurídico-económicos del proyecto europeo y su relación con la seguridad nacional, con un estudio de la incidencia de la libre circulación de capitales en el proceso integración europea. A la luz de esas consideraciones se examina la relación de la inversión extranjera con el Mercado Interior como instrumento de integración; las restricciones que se puede imponer a la inversión extranjera y sus eventuales justificaciones. Se concluye con un análisis del test de proporcionalidad y la situación de los flujos de inversión extranjera procedente de terceros Estados. Finalmente, se estudian los problemas asociados a los flujos de inversión realizada por terceros Estados a través de los denominados Fondos Soberanos de Inversión. Se estudia el fenómeno de los Estados como inversores y el surgimiento de los fondos soberanos de inversión. Se trata de delimitar el concepto de fondo soberano para, en cuarto lugar, discutir la posibles respuestas regulatorias a este fenómeno. Se concluye con un estudio de la manera específica la regulación americana, europea e internacional sobre inversión soberana.
Resum:
This doctoral thesis analyzes the impact on economic sovereignty and national security of the involvement and participation of States in global capital markets. The first part examines the US regulation on controls on foreign investment for national security reasons. First, it defines the conceptual framework for foreign investment, specifically referring to both political and national security risks raised by it. Then, it focuses on the evolution of the regulation of the United States in the last century. In particular, the so-called Exon-Florio amendment is studied as a regulatory framework for foreign investment and its control for reasons of national security. A concrete study of its practical application is made, with particular reference to the telecommunications market and the defense sector. Finally, it makes an assessment of this system and its influence in other jurisdictions, particularly in the countries of the European Union ago. The second part focuses on the situation in the European Union for its comparison with the American model. Previously, it examines the legal and economic foundations of the European project and its relation to national security, with a study of the impact of free movement of capital on the European integration process. In light of these considerations, it studies the relationship of foreign investment and the Internal Market as an instrument of integration; restrictions that may be imposed on foreign investment and its possible justifications. It concludes with an analysis of the test of proportionality and the situation of foreign investment flows coming from third countries. Finally, the thesis moves onto the problems associated with flows of investment by third countries through the so-called Sovereign Wealth Funds. It studies the phenomenon of States as investors and the emergence of sovereign wealth funds. This is to define the concept of sovereign wealth funds and, fourthly, discusses the possible regulatory responses to this phenomenon. It concludes with a study of the specific American, European and International regulations on sovereign investment.

This article analyses the impact that the Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada might have on the European energy sector once concluded by the Parties. While the CETA should contribute to boost the cooperation among governments, this shouldn’t happen for the cooperation between enterprises. Indeed, the investment chapter of the CETA shouldn’t allow a higher degree of openness to foreign investments between its Parties in the energy industry, which is considered a strategic sector both in the EU and in Canada. The article tries to suggest a solution to this problem from the European side. The considerations on the treatment of the energy sector provided by the CETA and on the investment chapter included in this agreement may be doubly useful. On the one hand, to better understand the relation among the new free trade agreements that the EU is negotiating with third countries and the protection of strategic industries, on the other, to have some guidelines to analyse the other treaties in negotiation as the TTIP with the USA.

This paper tries to answer the following question: is it possible to create in the EU a Committee similar to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS)?
The European Parliament considers that a European equivalent of the CFIUS would be desirable to protect the strategic sectors of the European economy. Therefore, the paper sets the essential aspects of the US model of control on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and tries to identify in the EU Treaties the proper legal basis for the institution of a Committee on FDI in Europe.
The legal basis deemed to be correct is Article 207 (2) of the TFEU (unilateral measures of common commercial policy). Thus, the EU Commission could be vested with the power to review the compatibility of inward FDI with the EU general interest through an EU regulation adopted in virtue of Article 207 (2). The Commission would be assisted by a Committee similar to the CFIUS.
Then, the paper explores the possible consequences of the adoption of such a regulation in the EU on the legal systems of the Member States.
At last, this work tries to demonstrate that the sole responsibility of the Member States in the field of national security, recognized by Article 4 (2) TEU, is not an obstacle to the adoption of the EU regulation assumed here.

The most controversial issues regarding EU international investment agreements are, on the one hand, the actual extent of the EU’s exclusive external competence over international investments and, on the other, the opportunity to include investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) clauses in these agreements. The former issue is mainly a legal question, and it especially concerns the inclusion of portfolio investments in the EU’s exclusive external competence. In this respect, this article seeks to provide some insights on the opinion that the European Commission has recently requested from the Court of Justice on the free trade agreement between the EU and Singapore on the basis of the latest developments in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. By contrast, the second issue is mainly a political question and focuses on the inclusion of ISDS in the investment chapter of the Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada. In this respect, while highlighting the main criticisms of the inclusion of ISDS in CETA, it is argued that the right response to European concerns about ISDS provisions in CETA and in TTIP should not be the removal of ISDS from those agreements. Instead, in order to reduce the asymmetric conditions related to the regulatory powers of the parties to CETA, it would be opportune to ask whether it may be appropriate to adopt, in the EU, a system of control on foreign investments like the one existing in Canada and in the United States. In particular, it is demonstrated how the solution can be found in Articles 64(2) and 207(2) TFEU that could be used to adopt a regulation establishing an EU committee on foreign investment in charge of the review of inflow investments coming from non-EU countries in order to protect the EU’s general interests—first, EU security and welfare—just as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and the Minister of Industry of Canada already do.

At the center of foreign investment regulation in the United States is a critical but relatively quiet committee of executive agencies: the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. This committee serves an increasingly important role as the U.S. draws hundreds of billions in foreign investment every year, some of it coming from state-controlled entities such as sovereign wealth funds, state-controlled pension funds, and state-owned enterprises. U.S. regulation of investment by these state-controlled and affiliated entities is continually evolving to meet the changing foreign investment landscape. This Note reviews the process of review, recent changes in the process, and the continued evolution of foreign investment regulation in the U.S., particularly as it applies to investment by state-controlled and affiliated entities.

Investments by sovereign wealth funds ('SWFs') - pools of capital accumulated by and under the control of sovereign states, mostly from the Persian Gulf and East Asia - in European and North American companies have changed dramatically both in scope and in nature in the last few years. This article examines the screening mechanisms in place, recently changed, or currently under consideration by the United States, France and India. While by no means an exhaustive or even representative survey, this sample highlights how different jurisdictions apply varying degrees of scrutiny to FDI in an age of increased sovereign-directed investments. As such, it illustrates some of the key issues an investor and its advisers may wish to examine when contemplating a potentially sensitive investment such as the role of the executive in the review, the availability of judicial review in national or transnational courts, the definition of key concepts such as foreign investment/investor, and the sectors regarded as sensitive. For each jurisdiction, the article examines: (1) the governing law and recent changes thereto; (2) the screening mechanisms including (i) the composition of the review body, (ii) key concepts such as 'foreign investment', (iii) the industries subject to review, and (iv) review timelines and other key features of the review process; and (3) notable recent deals or public controversies.

The text deals with the relation between foreign investment and security in the domestic debate in the United States. Arguments based on the notion of “economic security” suggest the adoption of protectionist measures that would represent a rupture in terms of the principles and the liberal bias that distinguish the foreign investment policy in the U.S. since the post-war. These concerns led to the approval of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) in 2007 that reformed the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, responsible for monitoring and investigating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. companies by foreign investors, based on the implications for national security. It is observed the defense of the traditional policy of open doors by the Executive and the Treasury Department, because of the systemic implications and the sensitivity of the U.S. to economic interdependence. However, the debate has generated effects on the behavior of other actors in the international system, such as “investment protectionism” in OECD countries, and as with the relation between trade and investment that guided the United States strategies in the GATT/WTO negotiations, the axis “investment and security” will possibly affect multilateral negotiations. Therefore, this article analyzes the concept of economic security, identifies positions on domestic policy on the reform of CFIUS since its creation in 1970 until the reform of 2007, and discusses their significance from the standpoint of international politics.

Esta tesis doctoral analiza la incidencia en la soberania economica y de la seguridad nacional de la intervencion y participacion de los Estados en los mercados de capitales globales. En la primera parte se examina la regulacion norteamericana en materia de controles a la inversion extranjera por razones de seguridad nacional. En primer lugar, delimita el marco conceptual de la inversion extranjera, aludiendo expresamente a los riesgos tanto politicos como de seguridad nacional que plantea. A continuacion, se analiza la evolucion de la normativa de los Estados Unidos en el ultimo siglo. En particular, se estudia la denominada enmienda Exon-Florio como marco normativo de la inversion extranjera y su control por motivos de seguridad nacional. Se realiza un estudio de su aplicacion practica, con especial referencia al mercado de las telecomunicaciones y el sector de la defensa. Finalmente se hace una valoracion en conjunto del sistema de su influencia en otros ordenamientos, en particu...

In September, the EU Commission presented a proposal for the establishment of a common framework for the screening of non-EU FDI, which has recently been a hot topic in Europe. This Perspective tries to confront the Commission’s proposal with other solutions, including the establishment of a European Committee on FDI.