Civil Affairs

"Independent historian Steven L. Ossad examines the life of West Point and World War II civil affairs icon Col. David Daniel "Mickey" Marcus. Known to our readers as the author of the excellent article "The Terrills of Virginia: Impossible Loyalties, Irreconcilable Differences," which appeared in the Spring 2014 issue (No. 91) of Army History, Ossad highlights the career of a man who would gain fame not only as an athlete at the U.S. Military Academy, but also as one of the primary architects of U.S. military civil affairs policy during World War II. Marcus would also go on to become the first Israeli Aluf (general) following the partition of Palestine and the only officer to be buried at West Point having died while fighting under the flag of a foreign nation. Immortalized in the 1966 movie Cast a Giant Shadow, Marcus' exploits gave rise to a large number of fictionalizations. Ossad sets the record straight, which in no way diminishes the legend of this extraordinary individual."

The necessity of developing the democratic civilian control over the armed forces has required a paradigm shift regarding how national security policies are elaborated. This paper has several objectives. First of all, the main purpose is to establish how the role of the Romanian Army in the national security architecture will evolve and to give an answer to a stringent question: how effective are the current levers of exercising the civilian control over the state security structures? Secondly, without pretending to offer the best solutions, this scientific endeavor aims to develop some concrete policy proposals that will streamline civilian control over the Romanian Army. A final objective of this article is to establish the level of influence exercised by this type of control over civil-military cooperation.

Nota bene! Articolul este cuprins între paginile 154-160.

The Military Legitimacy Review

http://militarylegitimacyreview.com/

(formerly The Military Legitimacy and Leadership Journal)



Informed Commentary on Might and Right

Military Legitimacy is about the balance between might and right.  It is a relative concept that differs in times of war and peace.  In wartime, national survival is paramount with defeat of the enemy by overwhelming military force the ultimate test of military legitimacy.  In peacetime the legitimacy of military operations is governed by legal and moral standards and values in both the US and the area of operations.  These standards and values are often in conflict, making the public support required for political and military legitimacy problematic.  That was a painful lesson learned first in Vietnam and confirmed more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The focus of The Military Legitimacy Review (formerly The Military Legitimacy and Leadership Journal of 2009 & 2010) is on peacetime military operations—those operations other than war such as counterinsurgency, stability operations and nation-building.  Combat is often an integral part of peacetime military operations, especially in the early stages, but strategic success is more dependent upon achieving political objectives than military objectives, and superior military force is never a substitute for the lack of legitimacy.  In fact, large deployments of US combat forces and the use of excessive force in hostile cultural environments can turn a military victory into political defeat.

Military legitimacy is based on public perceptions of military operations, so that it is a reflection of civil-military relations.  Overseas religious and cultural conflicts are the most obvious threats to the legitimacy of US military forces, while in the US civil-military issues are more subtle but nevertheless real.  That is because the US military is an authoritarian regime within a democratic society, and its communal values—such as concepts of duty and loyalty to the military mission—represent a potential threat to libertarian civilian values.  And because the military controls the nation’s most coercive powers, there is the danger that an isolated military and conflicting military and civilian values could undermine civil-military relations and threaten the legitimacy of the US military.

The following topical categories will be used to organize papers, articles and commentary on the website (see sidebar):

1. Religion and culture as they shape values, law and public support as standards of military legitimacy.

2. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law in foreign policy and as standards of military legitimacy.

3. Military legitimacy and leadership and how they relate to civil-military relations

4. Civil affairs as an operational concept and a civil-military capability.

5. Lessons learned in legitimacy and how they shape the future.

The purpose of The Military Legitimacy Review is to facilitate the exchange of ideas among those interested in the interplay of might and right and the role of the military as the ultimate extension of foreign policy.  It is our hope that the ideas expressed in the articles and opinions on this website will further the cause of peace and promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law as fundamental concepts of legitimacy throughout the world.  Unfortunately, we have a long way to go, but we believe that the US military has a vital role to play in promoting a lasting peace, so long as our might is right.

Who are “we”—those who bring you The Military Legitimacy Review?  We have all been military lawyers with experience in Special Operations Forces, whose doctrine has long embraced legitimacy as a primary operational principle.  We all understand that military legitimacy involves much more than compliance with the law and we want others to understand the dynamics and central role of legitimacy in peacetime military operations.

De Oppresso Liber (Free the Oppressed)! Secure The Victory!

Kevin Govern, Editor-in-Chief

Rudy Barnes, Jr., Publisher and Managing Editor

Larry Rubini and David Gordon, Editorial Board

By Spring 2004 (OIF2) it was clear that America's contemporary military doctrine and resources did not meet the human intelligence needs of Marines in the Hit-Haditha region of Anbar. So these Marines - mainly junior ranks - devised a new method of intelligence collections during a crucial time in Anbar combat operations.  Both men and women "skirt"ed all cultural norms and political propriety to take the fight to the enemy outside - only to discover the enemy within.
This paper provides a first-person account of what these Marines lived - how these Marines thought and fought, why they they succeeded and failed, and the IWP's legacy in Female Engagement and Civil Affairs in the American military today.
PLEASE NOTE: This document is a speaker's copy only.  Please contact the author for further resources (interviews, imagery, documentary resources, media, etc.)

Author's recommendations presented at DoD conference in Pentagon (December 2001) providing policy recommendations for the "way ahead" in Afghanistan.

As noted by the author in 2001, “9I0t is widely recognized that Afghanistan cannot be left as a failed state that might again shelter terrorists and breed instability across the region. However, this process of rebuilding the country will require an immense commitment of time, resources and attention by the international community. That is, while terrorism may have triggered the current intervention in Afghanistan, in the future, donor countries are going to have to tackle a much wider array of issues in order to bring about long term stability.”

This presentation provided policy recommendations to address these issues. Many of these recommendations are still relevant today.

"Comprehending the Mission to Advise" provides a practical definition of the duties and responsibilities associated with advising foreign security forces. Despite deploying thousands of servicemembers and civilians to security force missions around the globe to serve as "advisors", no formal definition of the job existed prior to 2019. The lack of a consistent definition contributed to inconsistencies in how advisors were employed and how advising missions were assessed. This article is written from the perspective of an actual advisor and attempts to describe the considerable scope of the actual duties associated with advising and references current U.S. military doctrine and policy related to the mission. The article also offers a method for describing the various types of environments advisors are required to serve in, based on the legitimacy and stability of the host nations.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali published a long essay, “A Problem From Heaven: Why the United States Should Back Islam’s Reformation,” in a 2015 issue of Foreign Affairs.  Her article opened a window on the dilemmas faced by Public Diplomacy policymakers after 9/11 and the judgment calls by two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes and Judith McHale.  She also asked some fundamental questions.

Author's Afghanistan Policy Recommendations, given at a DePaul University Conference in Chicago in 2009.

This talk examined the Obama Administration’s counter insurgency and counter terrorism strategies for Afghanistan. As noted by the author, there had been little evaluation of how the US and International community could effectively engage with Afghanistan and other countries in Central Asia. The author’s basic argument was that we need to craft a sustainable “Regional Engagement strategy” – not an “Exit Strategy” for the region. That is, what hasn’t (even as yet) been effectively implemented is helping to create strong democratic institutions that would support a viable Afghanistan. Instead, institutions were developed to effectuate the International Community’s exit from the region, rather than effectively assist with long-term stability and viability.  Many of the recommendations set forth in the talk are still relevant today.