Fact Finding

Перевод классической статьи (381 цитирование в Google Scholar) по уголовному процессу, в которой Джон Гриффитс предложил вместо "модели битвы", господствовашей в американском процессе его времени, "модель семьи". Положения модели семьи раскрываются на фоне проводимой автором критики моделей уголовного процесса Г. Пакера. Помимо этого, статья содержит нетривиальные идеи по поводу: проблем гуманитарных наук, скованности сознания исследователей доминирующей идеологией, понятия преступника, преступления, наказания, причин краха реформы ювенального суда в США, функций уголовного процесса и права, их взаимоотношений, задач судьи, защитника и прокурора в процессе и д.р.

Legal probabilism is the view that juridical fact-finding should be modeled using Bayesian methods. One of the alternatives to it is the narration view, according to which instead we should conceptualize the process in terms of competing narrations of what (allegedly) happened. The goal of this paper is to develop a reconciliatory account, on which the narration view is construed from the Baye-sian perspective within the framework of formal Bayesian epistemology.

This piece tells the story of how Louise Arbour, as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, cemented fact-finding as a main human rights method. After some historical introduction and a discussion of the various approaches and types of fact-finding, the piece examines some challenges that face fact-finding in the human rights field. The specific role of  Arbour is narrated, particularly some of strategies she developed to address some of the dilemmas in this area are considered.  The piece also comments on  the particularities of  human rights investigations and criminal investigations, from the perspective of standards of proof and witness protection.

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Изложены основные положения научно-исследовательского проекта "Познавательные и прогностические решения в российском уголовном процессе" как того, что способствует ответу на "большой вызов" для российского общества и государства, указанный в пп. е), п. 15 Стратегии научно-технологического развития Российской Федерации, утвержденной указом Президента Российской Федерации от 1 декабря 2016 года № 642.

Обосновывая тезис о тождественности познания доказыванию, автор контраргументирует сохраняющееся с советского времени понимание последнего как вида познания. Такое уточнение, по его мнению, закладывает более прочную основу для переноса положений гносеологии в доказательственную деятельность. Без этого, в свою очередь, нельзя говорить о формировании правил принятия познавательных и прогностических уголовно-процессуальных решений, понятия о которых сконструированы К. В. Скобликом ранее. В статье аргументируется неспособность уголовно-процессуальной формы выступать отличительным признаком, подходящим для образования понятия доказывания как видового по отношению к познанию. Взаимоподчинение этих понятий складывается только на уровне несущественных признаков, на уровне же существенных — они тождественны. Следовательно, при создании уголовно-процессуальной формы познавательные закономерности должны не игнорироваться, а учитываться. На этой основе показаны несоответствия действующей редакции УПК РФ пониманию доказывания как познания. При получении указанных выводов использовались исторический метод, методы дедукции, индукции, определения и деления понятий.

Ключевые слова: познание, уголовно-процессуальное доказывание, форма, вид, несущественные и существенные признаки.

Examining theses about the nature of the concepts " cognition " and " proof of criminal procedure " , the author refutes the understanding of the latter as a species of cognition which has remained since Soviet times. The author believes this detail sets a strong cornerstone for adopting epistemological theses into the proof of criminal procedure. If this step is absent, it shall be impossible to think of forming rules of making the cognitive and prognostic criminal procedure decisions as pre-developed by K. V. Skoblik. The criminal procedure form does not have a specific character in order to create proofs of criminal procedure as the species of cognition. This statement is also argued in the article. The subordination between these concepts is based on nonessential features. If we use essential features, these concepts will be identical. Consequently, the criminal procedural form must not ignore objective laws of cogni-tion so we must construct it using these laws. Thereupon, the discrepancies of Russian CrPC towards understanding proving as cognition are shown in the academic paper. The historical method, methods of definitional concepts and division of concepts were applied by K. V. Skoblik in the current research.

Статья отвечает на вопросы: нужна ли гносеология в российском уголовном процессе? Если да, то какую конкретно теорию познания стоит выбрать? Сформулированы два критерия выбора необходимой гносеологии: методологичность и нацеленность уголовно-процессуального доказывания на установление обстоятельств ст. 73 УПК РФ. На основании этого предлагается использовать диалектическую теорию познания.

O texto das páginas subsequentes visa dar a conhecer a obra de BERNARD S. JACKSON, Making Sense in Law – Linguistic, Psychological and Semiotic Perspectives (lida na edição de Liverpool, UK: Deborah Charles Publications, 1995).
Além das partes introdutória e conclusiva, de exemplos que adaptei à realidade (sobretudo linguística) portuguesa, e das notas de rodapé, este trabalho compõe-se de um resumo da indicada obra e nisso reside o seu interesse.

“Let him have it, Chris!” Estas palavras determinaram a condenação à morte de Derek Bentley, enforcado em Londres, em 28 de janeiro de 1953. Foram gritadas por Derek imediatamente antes de Chris Craig iniciar o tiroteio no qual um polícia seria mortalmente atingido.
Mas o que é que Derek, um rapaz de 19 anos, epiléptico, analfabeto e com uma idade mental de 11, quis realmente transmitir ao seu companheiro Chris, de 16 anos de idade? Que disparasse sobre o polícia, como Chris aparentemente percebeu e como os polícias sobreviventes atestaram em tribunal? Ou que entregasse a arma ao polícia, como alegado pela defesa e incansavelmente afirmado pela família de Derek durante décadas, até à reabilitação da sua memória no final da década de 90?
Esta história verídica , passada ao cinema por Peter Medak em 1991, é das mais emblemáticas das muitas que a leitura do livro de Bernard Jackson me trouxe à memória.

Making Sense in Law é precisamente sobre o sentido que atribuímos às situações juridicamente relevantes, como as retemos, como as recordamos, como as transmitimos, como os outros as vão compreender. Porque é que, em dadas situações, queremos significar uma coisa e o nosso interlocutor percebe outra diferente? Perceberá o julgador o que a testemunha lhe quer transmitir, da forma como esta pretende ser entendida? Será que o que a testemunha transmite corresponde ao que percecionou? Se não existe essa correspondência, será apenas por dissipação ou desvanecimento da memória? Ou existirão também fenómenos de confusão cronológica de dados e acrescentos de várias proveniências? Mais: o que a testemunha percecionou corresponde ao que efetivamente se passou?
Na procura de respostas a estas e outras questões, o autor transporta-nos pelos mundos da linguística, da semiótica e da psicologia, revelando os trabalhos de largas dezenas de investigadores daquelas áreas...

Do legal judgments influence people’s attitudes and beliefs concerning contested events? This article builds on studies from three disciplines – law, psychology, and political science – and employs experimental methods to shed light on the impact of legal institutions on their intended audiences. The article identifies a rising ‘legalization of truth’ phenomenon – the adoption of legal discourse to construct and interpret facts outside the courthouse. It argues that legal truth, while providing a framework of legal terminology and conventions to analyze and understand facts, comes with a price tag: it triggers cognitive and emotional biases that frustrate efforts to disseminate controversial information and to resolve factual disputes; and it lacks the emotional appeal, participatory value, and social cues that moral expressions or other types of social truth-telling entail.
To demonstrate the legalization of truth process and to measure its impact on attitudes and beliefs, this article focuses on the practice of international fact-finding. In recent years, international fact-finding has become a dominant response to armed conflicts and political violence around the world. Lacking compulsory jurisdiction, international fact-finding bodies have adopted legal discourse, assuming that legal reports uniformly inform the relevant publics with an authoritative account of what happened and motivate domestic sanctioning of in-group offenders.
This article challenges both assumptions. Based on two survey-experiments fielded in 2013 and 2014 on representative samples of 1,000 and 2,000 U.S. nationals, respectively, as well as on an original dataset of U.N. fact-finding missions, the study demonstrates that three elements of legal discourse - binary legal judgment, ‘hot’ legal terminology, and legal frame - harm the perceived credibility and persuasive value of fact-finding reports: the legal judgment of the fact-finding report is likely to trigger cognitive biases and belief polarization; ‘hot’ legal terminology is likely to trigger emotional biases and reduce the perceived fairness of the report; and the legal frame appears to be less effective than moral frame in influencing attitudes on accountability.



The article concludes that international and domestic organizations should rethink their current design and practice of fact-finding bodies, acknowledge the limitations of adopting a legal discourse to interpret facts, and recognize the questionable efficacy of legal fact-finding in influencing attitudes and beliefs. Accordingly, the goals, structures, and processes of fact-finding should be reorganized, matching goals with appropriate structures and processes. By revealing the impact of the legalization of truth on people’s beliefs and attitudes, this article creates a new framework to understand the failures and successes of legal fact-finding in particular and the practice and output of legal institutions more broadly.

This seminar brings together findings from two different research projects on refugees, dealing with a common question: how do government and non-government authorities understand and accommodate diversity in their interactions with refugees and asylum seekers? The first part of the seminar draws on the emerging findings of doctoral research in linguistics, conducted at Macquarie University. It focuses on the assessment of credibility in Australian asylum procedures. Using critical discourse analysis, I evaluate credibility assessment guidelines for asylum appeal decision makers, along with a selection of published decisions. The second part of the seminar is based on a three-year research project conducted by a team from Sydney Law School, at the University of Sydney. This project sought to explore the experiences of refugees with disabilities across six countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Uganda, Jordan and Turkey) in light of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The focus here was primarily on the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and how it interacts with and accommodates persons with disabilities in displacement situations. In these two case studies, the responsible institutions (the Australian Immigration Department and UNHCR respectively) acknowledge that refugees and asylum seekers may need particular assistance or accommodation due to their diversity. However, the culture of the institution itself can create difficulties. The tendency to standardise or simplify difference can mean that persons of a given culture, religion, gender or country of origin are expected to act in standardly different ways. Standard categorisation also applies for disability: a person can be coded as having, for example, a vision impairment or a physical impairment, but little may be actually known about the person’s lived experience, their individual needs and capabilities in displacement and other important aspects of their lives. This limits the suitability of operational responses and procedures and may lead to false and discriminatory assumptions. Both studies support the conclusion that the concept of diversity needs to be more closely and critically examined, alongside institutional discourses that value categorisation and standardisation. This would better allow the development of policy and procedure which are truly inclusive, and that best promote and ensure the rights of people seeking international protection as refugees.

Продолжая ряд публикаций, посвященных познавательным и прогностическим уголовно-процессуальным решениям, автор уточняет, что их понимание и возможность выделения зависят от взгляда на соотношение понятий «познание» и «уголовно-процессуальное доказывание». Разрешение последнего вопроса автор связывает с пониманием природы российского уголовного процесса. Критикуется устоявшаяся в доктрине позиция о доказывании как познание + обоснование, порожденная, по мнению автора, представлением о российском уголовном процессе как смешанном. Обосновывается тождественность понятий «познание» и «уголовно-процессуальное доказыва-ние» на основе понимания российского уголовного процесса как публичного. В качестве методологической ошибки процессуалистов, чьи работы анализируются в статье, названо стремление разрешить вопрос о соотноше-нии понятий «познание» и «уголовно-процессуальное доказывание» на уровне род-вид через уровень целое-часть. Полученные результаты позволяют утверждать: 1) поскольку основания принятия познавательных и прогностических решений формируются в ходе познавательной деятельности (доказывания), то, принимая эти решения, необходимо соблюдать именно правила ведения познания: требования формальной и диалектической логики; 2) решение, независимо от содержания и стадии (предварительное расследование, судебное разбирательство), где оно принимается, в основании имеет один и тот же механизм формирования.

Ключевые слова: познание, уголовно-процессуальное доказывание, смешанный уголовный процесс, публичный уголовный процесс, познавательные и прогностические уголовно-процессуальные решения.

В статье выясняются основания принятия постановления о привлечении в качестве обвиняемого, обвинительного заключения / акта, приговора, т.е. познавательных решений. Утверждается о необходимости достижения субъектом доказывания, при привлечении лица в качестве обвиняемого, уголовно-процессуальной достаточности, при составлении же обвинительного заключения/акта, постановления приговора - формально-логической достаточности. Выводы исследования подкреплены изучением международной судебной практики, сравнением с немецким уголовным процессом.