Idealistic Studies

Starting from a set of distinctions drawn by H. H. Price between classical vs. symbolist and representationalist vs. non-representationalist theories of mind, I argue that Hegel made a studious attempt to reconcile and do justice to the truth in each of these theories by incorporating the strong points of each into a highly structured theory of mental activity. Contrary to what one might expect, Hegel rejects the classical representational theory of Plato and Descartes and unites symbolic representationalism with classical nonrepresentationalism.

This paper aims to defend a dialectical account of selfhood in the context of the contemporary debates on personal identity in Anglo-American philosophy. I interpret Reductionism and Non-Reductionism—the two dominant positions in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy—as forming something analogous to an antinomy. Reductionists argue that the self is merely an identity that is reducible to a set of facts, while Non-Reductionists argue that the self is a separate entity beyond any set of facts. I argue that a comprehensive view of the self requires aspects from both of these positions. The self, then, should be understood as an ongoing activity that relates the various features of one’s identity together.

In “Being Judgement Possibility,” Hölderlin posits that the division between subject and object produced in conscious knowledge requires admitting a being as the ground of that knowledge’s unity. Commentators argue over the way to access such being according to Hölderlin. For Dieter Henrich, being is a presupposition recognized reflexively. Manfred Frank, by contrast, maintains that Hölderlin grants direct access to it in an “intellectual intuition.” This article addresses the respective interpretations of both authors. It shows that Frank’s interpretation is closer to the textual evidence than Henrich’s interpretation. Frank’s interpretation also allows one to explain better the way in which the division between subject and object avoids leading to dispersal. Finally, this article considers the insufficiency of Frank’s interpretation so as to clarify an issue that he himself advances in the course of his argument: how the I manages to distinguish itself in the sphere of intuitable ...

Résumé/Abstract Etude du débat sur la réappropriation de l'argument ontologique par Collingwood dans son «Essai sur la méthode philosophique». A partir de la correspondance entre Collingwood et Ryle dans les années 1930, l'A. défend la validité ...

Résumé/Abstract Schelling argues that the Kantian transcendental apparatus lacks the ability to systematically ground itself. He insists that one must account for the prior emergence of experiential reality in addition to delineating this reality's structure once ...

G. W. F. Hegel’s Elements of Philosophy of Right analogizes the unfolding of a people’s political self-consciousness to the unfolding of an education. Yet Hegel is somewhat unsystematic in accounting for how the process of political education unfolds in its differentiated moments. This paper pieces together a more systematic account of political education from Hegel’s scattered remarks on the subject in Philosophy of Right. I argue that, once we understand how political education fits into the holistic picture of Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie, we see that it exercises both a fortifying and a threatening influence on the state: fortifying the state insofar as it habituates individuality to universality in the form of ethical dispositions such as patriotism, threatening the state insofar as it represents a destabilizing tendency toward democratic judgment in the emergence of public opinion. I conclude by raising the possibility that political education poses an entropic, “democratic” threat to the modern state.

Etude des deux introductions a la «Doctrine de la science» redigees par Fichte dans le sens d'une certitude concernant a la fois la philosophie morale et le fondement rationnel de l'experience, au sein du meme projet d'un systeme philosophique unique. Defendant l'interpretation de F. Neuhouser fondee sur l'idee d'une certitude rationnelle et d'une certitude morale comme principes de la responsabilite et de l'experience, l'A. souligne la complementarite des deux introductions avec les autres oeuvres de Fichte traitant de la certitude: «La vocation de l'homme» et «Aenesidemus»

My purpose is to compare Berkeley's and Gentile's idealism, interpreting Berkeley's "Treatise" §§ 22-23 and Gentile's reading of this passage. The Italian philosopher finds in Berkeley's "master argument" the original source of the true idealistic way of thinking, but he believes that Berkeley has not been sufficiently consistent in deducing all the consequences from his "new principle". This criticism is the ground of Gentile's actual idealism. Comparing the two positions is very instructive both to elucidate the general issue of idealism and to understand Berkeley's philosophy.

Résumé/Abstract Etude de la conception de l'histoire universelle comme jugement du monde développée par Hegel dans les cours de Heidelberg et les cours de Berlin. A la rencontre de l'abstrait et du concret, l'A. interprète la philosophie hégélienne de l'histoire ...

This essay deals with the function of Kant's category of the Apperzeption in what we today call the “new metaphysics” of German Idealism. It is an important question because Kant's thought is well known for his critique of metaphysics. But the category was essentially ...