Indian Nuclear Discourse

The book, focusing on the nuclear-politics interface, examines which political party should be given credit, and how much in shaping India's nuclear weapons policy. Taking into account the views of the Congress, BJP and CPI {M), the study concludes that there is no single mother of India's nuclear bomb. In the process, it approves the assumption t hat national political leadership, not the political parties, is paramount in India's nuclear weapons decision making. Furthermore, nuclear policy does not change with the change of government, and changes despite the same party forms the government again. The study highlights how the issue of nuclear weapon has an awesome appearance on the Indian political scene during the last six-decade. Thematically, the book attempts to identify the trends in the policies of the three parties, especially on the role of nuclear weapons in national security, domestic politics, and non-proliferation regime to speculate on the contours of India's future nuclear weapons policy.

The paper describes the evolution of Soviet attitudes toward India's military and civilian nuclear programs from 1967 to 1989. It notes that the Soviet leaders insisted on the application of safeguards on the nuclear fuel and facilities which they themselves provided to India, even if this incurred Indian dissatisfaction. In contrast, they were considerably less interested in curbing those elements of the Indian nuclear program where their own adherence to NPT regulations was not at stake. Nor were Soviet offers of nuclear assistance linked with strong efforts to pressure India to sign the NPT in exchange, although the USSR did subject other countries (including North Korea and Algeria) to such pressure, and stressed that the IAEA should assist only the signatories to the treaty. All in all, Soviet views about India’s nuclear program seem to have been more decisively shaped by the Kremlin’s specific strategic objectives than by the general principles of non-proliferation. Among others, the deterioration or improvement of Moscow’s relations with Beijing, Washington and Bonn greatly
influenced Soviet attitudes toward India’s nuclear policies. Notably, initial Soviet concerns about the prospect of a nuclear-armed India were motivated primarily by a fear of its precedent-setting effect; the view that India per se might also constitute a serious proliferation problem started to appear only in the mid-1980s, in the context of Sino-Soviet and Soviet-American detente. As long as Sino-Soviet relations remained tense, the USSR was more interested in preventing Sino-Indian and Indo-American rapprochement than in dissuading India’s nuclear ambitions.

The issue of nuclear escalation is neither simple, nor straight-forward in the context of the South Asian region. This is mainly because this region is a home to two inherently rival nuclear states. Nuclear equation in South Asia is not quite simple to comprehend the changing political and strategic scenario of this region. After 1998, both India and Pakistan moved towards a stage where slight negligence and irresponsible behavior can result huge devastation in the entire region. Moreover, the risk of attaining the nuclear material through espionage in both states can lead to a disastrous outcome where the non state actors and the terrorist organizations are operating to challenge the status quo. Nuclear weapons ensure the security of the state on one hand and on the other, risk of nuclear war casts a deep shadow over the region. Both India and Pakistan has to think out of box solutions to lessen the dangers of a nuclear holocaust. The study concludes that existing nuclear security culture in Pakistan is appropriate .International community should preempt any situation of escalation between the two, rather than engaging in “fire-fighting

India’s nuclear journey, which began in the 1950s, has matured, both in terms of its energy and nuclear weapons programs. Despite a gamut of nuclear-related studies devoted to the Indian case, the focus has remained limited to the nuclear evolution, India’s nuclear energy and weapons programs, and nuclear policies. Despite being the world’s largest democracy, there is limited scholarship exploring the connection between Indian public opinion and nuclear issues. Given this context, this paper underscores the need to comprehensively study Indian public attitudes on nuclear issues in India. This is substantiated by the fact that India is undergoing a transformation marked by an upward economic trajectory, growing literacy rates, increasing nuclear dependency, and a more politically engaged and vocal youth.

The paper begins by conceptualizing the different publics relevant to the subject before proceeding to a review of the existing literature on the topic. It also maps broader changes that are taking place in the country that are likely to affect public attitudes towards nuclear issues in the coming decades. The paper covers the extant public surveys and polls which seek to unravel Indian attitudes on a range of nuclear issues. Subsequently, it identifies the gaps in current methodologies and points to a possible way forward that would result in a more nuanced, well-informed understanding of how the Indian public perceives nuclear issues.

India’s tryst with global nuclear regimes unswerving or chequered is a matter of protracted debate. While many Western scholars point to India’s defiant behaviour, Indian scholars trumpet New Delhi’s unambiguous non-proliferation record and disarmament pledge. Amidst this dyadic narrative, India manoeuvres to be an insider of the global non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regimes. How quick and what value it would add to these regimes as member is a matter of conjecture; but its rendezvous with the global nuclear regimes would turn a full circle the day it would gate-crash the hitherto developed countries’ privileged nuclear cohorts.

In the course of public contestation and debate, political parties in India have attempted to garner acceptance for their respective positions on the Indo-US nuclear deal by drawing on key historical norms. Notions of freedom, which have historically constituted a primary feature in Indian foreign policy discourse, continue to feature in foreign policy debate and form a focus of consensus and dissent even today, as they did during the dawn of independence.

... The author would like to thank Assa Doron, Robin Jeffrey and Auriol Weigold for their help-ful comments oh this article. Email: kate.sullivan@anu.edu.au the end of the cold war, India's relations with the world have un-dergone a radical and multidi-mensional transformation. ...

The recent successful test firing of the canisterised Agni V was a significant milestone in India’s long range nuclear strike capability. This was the third successful test launch of the missile where one of the key developmental objectives were met, i.e. canisterising it. This is a remarkable achievement as only a couple of countries have achieved such a capability. Canisterisation of the missile would enable better handling of the missile and would to some extent ease the reloading effort. The other objective is to incorporate MIRV capability on which DRDO is reportedly working.

• Moscow remains bitterly opposed to NATO’s missile shield.
• American and Allied efforts to persuade Russia that it is not aimed at that country and that its capabilities are limited and pose no threat to her nuclear arsenal are going nowhere, with Moscow sceptical on both counts.
• Indian voices are stressing that by pushing Russia too far and denting her nuclear arsenal, the West could “create a strategic void, which only China can fill”.
• This observation, usually overlooked in recent diplomatic and academic exchanges, may provide a basis for some sort of accommodation between the two old Cold War enemies, currently threatened, like India, by China’s rise.
• Such contributions are proof of the intellectual benefits of having India accepted as a full member of the nuclear club, following the US-India civil nuclear deal, which de facto amended the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty).