Deterrence Theory

Will AI-enabled capabilities increase inadvertent escalation risk? This article revisits Cold War-era thinking about inadvertent escalation to consider how Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology (especially AI augmentation of advanced conventional weapons) through various mechanisms and pathways could affect inadvertent escalation risk between nuclear-armed adversaries during a conventional crisis or conflict. How might AI be incorporated into nuclear and conventional operations in ways that affect escalation risk? It unpacks the psychological and cognitive features of escalation theorising (the security dilemma, the 'fog of war', and military doctrine and strategy) to examine whether and how the characteristics of AI technology, against the backdrop of a broader political-societal dynamic of the digital information ecosystem, might increase inadvertent escalation risk. Are existing notions of inadvertent escalation still relevant in the digital age? The article speaks to the broader scholarship in International Relationsnotably 'bargaining theories of war'that argues that the impact of technology on the cause of war occurs through its political effects, rather than tactical or operational battlefield alterations. In this way, it addresses a gap in the literature about the strategic and theoretical implications of the AI-nuclear dilemma.

This article partially examines Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualized model of deterrence by investigating the relationship between punishment, punishment avoidance, perceived certainty and severity of punishment, and self-reported driving under the influence (DUI). Generalized Structural Equation Modeling (GSEM) was conducted using self-report data from a nationally representative telephone survey of the general population. As hypothesized, experiences with punishment were positively related to perceptions of certainty of punishment, and increased punishment avoidance is related to decreased perceptions of punishment certainty and self-reported DUI. Although perceived certainty of punishment is negatively related to DUI, perceptions of punishment severity were positively related to self-reported DUI. Results also indicate that personal and vicarious experiences are significantly related to perceptions of certainty and severity of punishment and self-reported DUI. With the exception of perceptions of punishment severity, the findings are largely supportive of the theory. While the literature rarely examines perceptions of severity of punishment, some suggestions for future research are posited. The findings also suggest that deterrence may operate differently for those with alcohol addiction problems. These results considerably add to the scarce research that explores predictors of perceptions of punishment certainty and severity and the indirect path between these predictors and self-reported DUI.

The severity, certainty and celerity (swiftness) of punishment are theorised to influence offending through deterrence. Yet celerity is only occasionally included in empirical studies of criminal activity and the three deterrence factors have rarely been analysed in one empirical model. We address this gap with an analysis using unique panel data of recorded theft, burglary and violence against the person for 41 Police Force Areas in England and Wales using variables that capture these three theorised factors of deterrence. Police detection reduces subsequent burglary and theft but not violence while severity appears to reduce burglary but not theft or violent crime. We find that variation in the celerity of sanction has a significant impact on theft offences but not on burglary or violence offences. Increased average prison sentences reduce burglary only. We account for these results in terms of data challenges and the likely different motivations underlying violent and acquisitive crime.

In 2009, after US president Barack Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize for, amongst others, his commitment to long-term nuclear disarmament (BBC,2009), Time Magazine published an article titled “Want Peace? Give the Nuke a Nobel”. This reflects the long-standing claim that, far from a threat to world peace, nuclear weapons--or the fear of them--can actually be instrumental in reducing the incidence of violent conflict, by deterring not merely their own use, but also any conventional war that could trigger a nuclear exchange. Though the fear of 'Mutually Assured Destruction' has long been a well-established concept in (nuclear) deterrence theory, few have taken this argument to its logical conclusion--the idea, developed most famously by Kenneth N. Waltz in his controversial ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better’ (1981), that if the mutual fear of nuclear war can deter states from conventional war, and if such deterrence is stable, then perhaps measured nuclear proliferation to other countries could be the best stabilizer of regional and global conflict, ultimately creating zones of 'Nuclear Peace'.

The suggestions that nuclear weapons might be ‘the best [and] only peacekeeping weapon that the world has ever known’ [Sagan & Waltz,2010: 92], and that their ‘horizontal’ proliferation to other states might constitute ‘an international good’ [Waltz, 2009, 431], are remarkable and highly controversial, as they fly in the face of both the Non-Proliferation Treaty (‘NPT’), as well as dominant attitudes in the West towards many nuclear-threshold states, such as Iran and North Korea.

Driven by the question "would the world be safer if more nations had nuclear weapons?", this article examines the chief arguments presented against and in favor of broad nuclear proliferation, and their counterarguments. To answer this question, I briefly theorize the positive or negative impact, on deterrence
stability and military-organizational safety, of conditions such as asymmetrical strategic force strengths or -postures (counterforce / countervalue); novel technologies (cost-effective missile shields), operational protocols
(‘launch-on-warning’) and finally several ‘deterrence-breaking’ strategies ('Hamburg grab'; 'madman strategy').

In terms of structure, this essay will present the general architecture of deterrence theory; common arguments against Waltz's 'laissez-faire' nuclear proliferation--and their validity. It will be considered if the ‘nuclear peace’-model, even if valid for the Cold War, is sufficiently applicable and transposable to other contexts to warrant Waltz’ advocacy of ‘total proliferation’—or whether proliferation should be ‘limited’ because the safety and stability of nuclear deterrence are not assured, either because its strategic logic can be subverted in ‘rogue states’ who lack rationality and restraint, or because the 'vulnerability' of 'poor’ nations small arsenals invites a decapitation strike. I will argue that this is not the case, and that Waltz’s ‘total’ form of proliferation optimism is indeed the most, or even the only legitimate ‘pro-proliferation’—or indeed, non-disarmament—argument.

Nevertheless, I conclude that even Waltz's cogent formulation fails to make the case for a ‘nuclear world’ being meaningfully safer, as it does not come to terms with how instability, irrationality, and most importantly organizational accidents are not mere imperfections of nuclear deterrence, but rather irreducible, essential, and inevitable to it, making systemic breakdown inevitable, cataclysmic, and in the long-term terminal.

This project uses a representative U.S. population sample and Generalized Structural Equation Modeling (GSEM) to explore the deterrence of driving under the influence (DUI) and it’s moderation by the differential deterrability of problem and non-problem drinkers. As hypothesized, the results indicate that personal and vicarious experiences with punishment and punishment avoidance were significant predictors of punishment certainty and self-reported DUI. Significant heterogeneity in both the formulation of perceived certainty of punishment and the relationship between this perception and DUI also exists between problem and non-problem drinkers. Most notably, certainty of punishment was a more robust negative predictor of DUI offending for problem drinkers, and prior punishment appears to have little effect on perceptions of punishment certainty for problem drinkers.

Purpose: This project examines the relationship between police enforcement of driving under the influence (DUI) and fatal alcohol related crashes.

Method: This article merged data from several sources to fit several 3-level growth curve models that assess the relationship between DUI arrests and fatal alcohol related crashes in U.S. counties from 1985-2015.

Results: The findings indicate that increases in DUI arrests are related to decreased fatal alcohol related crashes during the period. However, the two are not linearly related and the relationship varies across states.

Conclusions: The non-linearity indicates there is a point of diminished returns where increased arrests are no longer related to reductions in fatalities. These findings suggest that policy makers should explore alternative methods of reducing crashes to supplement enforcement efforts such as addressing problems of alcoholism and traffic safety.

The dock has been an iconic structure of the criminal justice system of Sri Lanka since its reception to the criminal courtroom during the British Colonial era. Making all suspects and accused of criminal cases stand in the dock during trial continues to be an unchallenged practice. This article evaluates the significance of the dock in trial courts from the perspective of a multi-disciplinary approach concerning law, criminology, psychology and architecture. It presents the arguments that the dock is not a legal requirement of a criminal trial, it violates the Constitution in terms of the rights conferred upon an accused, it cannot be supported by the criminological theory of deterrence and may instead contribute to an increase of criminality by the applicability of labeling theory, it does not consort to modern architectural concept of spatial justice and it may be detrimental to the mental wellbeing of an accused from a psychological viewpoint. Having identified the controversies inherent in the traditional construction of the dock, recommendations are made to bring in reforms to the physical structure of the dock as well as to the manner and criteria it is to be utilized in a trial to achieve a balance between interest of justice and interest of the accused.

After the Second World War, it slowly became clear that the implementation of violence had been “decentralized”. If during XIX and half of XX century violence vastly took place in the territories of great powers and the central actors of world politics (even inviolable USA and the UK were plagued on their territories), in the 70s of XX century we have witnessed a cardinal shift as violence started to spread more extensively among the third world, underdeveloped and transitional countries. The epicenters of violence had been shifted from the “civilized” world into the “uncivilized” world. Conventionally and commonly, this shift was anticipated as a decline of violence by researchers like Arendt herself. Nevertheless, I am suggesting that through careful examination of the central political events unfolding after the 70s this perspective lacks cogency. For this, I will examine such regions as the post-soviet region and the Middle East.

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Noam Chomsky’s ontological evaluation of the Cold War is decoding its essence and contradicts with the concept of deterrence which Arendt suggested: “The compact was that the US would be free to carry out violence and terror and atrocities with few limits in its own domains, and the Russians would be able to run their own dungeon without too much US interference. So the Cold War in effect was a war of the US against the Third World, and of Russia against its much smaller domains in Eastern Europe.” The discernible and impregnable fact is that the Cold War was profitable for both main actors of international politics and the ideological antagonism between them was disguising this predicament. The two leading forces of the globalized world installed and maintained the bipolar system that gave them a possibility to control their share of the world. Arendt’s concept of deterrence is not fully encapsulating the current global political crisis. Instead of stressing the role of hegemony in constructing world politics, she is asserting that deterrence can guarantee peace worldwide.

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In the smart machine age, the central front of resistance are social networks, the revolutions have moved from their traditional spaces such as streets and places of public gatherings and now it is running through the Internet. Mutiny and rebellion are less and less followed by the rivers of blood and armed conflict; revolutions have lost their organic intrinsic structure and became a spectacle and part of the simulation. The contemporary forms of the revolution have nothing to do anymore with a political or socio-economic fracture and became a synonym for shifting the power from one ruler to another. In modern times rebellions are blemished with lurking agreements among various influential groups and the system brutally cuts an entrance to politics for the innocent and uncorrupted forces. The next stage of development of the system can be displayed not only by disappearance and dematerialization of the ruling force but also by fading exploited entities, “The era of hegemony is the era of the cyber system. It governs, it regulates, but it does not dominate”. This is how Baudrillard’s vision of modernity can be theorized: “There are no longer any exploited or dominated. There is something else, something much harder to overtake by surprise. It is harder to critique as well, because critical thought is devitalized in this case”.

The objective of this research is, firstly to investigate the managerial perception of administering occupational health and safety (OHS) provisions to reduce workplace accidents and, secondly, to explore the managerial interpretation of the idea of white-collar crime in relation to the avoidance of, or negligence in administering, the OHS provisions. This research particularly focuses on the readymade garment (RMG) sector in Bangladesh. It is qualitative in nature and follows an interpretivist and constructivist philosophical paradigm. Data were collected from two deviant cases (e.g. Tazreen Fashions Limited and Rana Plaza) and from the questionnaire responses of 24 participants from 24 RMG factories (6 outsourced and 6 subcontracted) located in Dhaka. All of the participants were top-level, male, full-time executives at the RMG factories (i.e. owners and manages). Despite its limitations, the research finds that all of the factory owners believe in the appropriateness of the OHS provisions for reducing workplace accidents effectively. It also discovers that the application of OHS as a deterrent factor to accidents exists among the outsourced factory owners and but is absent from the subcontracted factory owners. The research also unfolds the different interpretations of white-collar crime between the outsourced and subcontracted factory owners. Based on the further analysis of the empirical evidence, however, it is suggested that the evasion of OHS practices can be labelled white-collar crime.

ABSTRACT
Background:  Policies undergirding the American War on Drugs assume that drug offenders respond rationally to adjustments in sanction certainty and severity. Previous studies find that instead of absolute deterrence, or the termination of criminal activity, drug offenders employ restrictive deterrence, or a variety of risk management strategies. Extant research and current drug policy both fail to examine the interaction of risk perception, management techniques, and life course events or circumstances. Methods: This dynamic examination of apprehension avoidance strategies relies on in-depth interviews mapping out the careers of 20 drug sellers in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. It examines their risk perceptions and risk management strategies and techniques, exploring rationales for shifts in offending behavior. Results: Respondents were highly risk-averse but used a narrow definition of sanctions relevant to shaping future offending behavior, typically making small adjustments in sales techniques. Rationales for these shifts included sanctions, personal preference, and life course events or circumstances. Only one attributed lasting desistance from offending to a sanction, although life course events such as parenthood and employment were associated with short-term and planned desistance.  Conclusions: The limited relevance of sanctions to offenders’ thinking about risk avoidance contextualizes the widespread failure of policies designed to deter drug sales. Findings support a growing conclusion that severity of punishment is a less powerful deterrent than certainty and that adjustments in certainty after arrest are offense-specific. The relationship of life course events – especially employment – to desistance and resumed offending suggest that social policies may be more effective than criminal justice sanctions in reducing drug offending.

Abstract: A historical analysis of nuclear weapons as opposed to the efforts to impose an arms control regime of impose disarmament clearly illustrates the links between national security and the political aims of acquiring weapons. Arms control efforts have faced the descriptive realities of international anarchy, while disarmament falls within a prescriptive, utopian goal. The article looks into aspects of nuclear weapons possession through a systemic approach, system polarity and threats through a number of basic tenets of Political Realism and the complexity of inter-state politics.

Criminal US Intelligence Networks of Impunity in Greek Academia(12/2023)
PART I
In 2019 the University of Macedonia (Thessaloniki, Greece) Rector ordered an investigation after I publicly denounced a number of issues regarding transparency and criminal academic networks in academic affairs as well as massive cheating during final exams.
All these years the university authorities and at a later stage the Council of the institution did nothing to publicize the findings of the investigation despite my continuous requests. This very fact sets issues of rule of law and academic order.
In the meantime, I have been consistently targeted in many ways, while my car has been vandalized several times inside the university parking lot. I asked the then Dean (and former Rector) I. Kouskouvelis to take measures and condemn these acts, yet, his response was that this was Not falling within his administrative duties. I guess it was not within his moral, academic obligation to support a fellow academic under attack, either. This is indicative only of the level of democracy I have been cherished for years in University of Macedonia.
In an academic environment where students’ youth organization affiliated to Nea Dimokratia & PM K.Mitsotakis enjoy TOTAL IMMUNITY and IMPUNITY in massive cheating cases publicly acknowledged by students themselves in social media.
Eventually,it was the very same criminal milieu (DAP-UoM) that pulled the strings to change the Department of International & European Studies course load & turned all obligatory courses in 2nd,3rd,4th years to ELECTIVE. Practically there is no obligatory course in the aforementioned years of study.
The initial proposal for this radical change was made by the then Dean I.Kouskouvelis honoured by today’s university authorities despite the fact that he is an INSTIGATOR TO A CRIME committed by a student upon his request. The student started collecting signatures in Google demanding my removal from the department a very aim set by DAP-UoM for years now. Eventually he was forced to confess in Court that its was I. Kouskouvelis who asked him to do so!
The aforementioned Dean,f.Rector & f.Head of the Department was a member of the local criminal network of Tectonic Hall of Thessaloniki,Greece.
DAP-UoM (New Democracy ruling party youth organization in tertiary education)had been enjoying full protection in all kinds of illegal behaviour. Hundreds(at least)have cheated during final exams, yet NO INVESTIGATION took place whatsoever! For years they allowed students to open books & simply copy info & answers during the exams(!)without a single student being punished!
Instead of an investigation the Rector of University of Macedonia Katranidis ordered an investigation against me for publicizing these acts. A punishment, an intimidation act for doing my duty as a Head of Department.
Unlawfulness does Pay
1. A student carrying notes in the final exam room refused to handle his exam paper after he was caught cheating. Instead, he pushed back the exams supervisor, run to the exit and disappeared. NO student dared testify as they were intimidated. Students told me they knew who this person was, yet, they were afraid to speak up.
2. During class evaluation the forms were collected by an unknown student who had never been in class. The student picked up the forms & disappeared. I asked the Department Secretariat to inform me on his identity, yet, they refused to assist me on the grounds of this was personal data” not to be disclosed!
3. On another occasion a student filling in the evaluation form for that year’s classes was forced (upon my insistence) to reveal that he was NOT A STUDENT of the department. Eventually he admitted being a student of another university. The aim of this scam was evident. To under-evaluate me & “prove” that I was not good at my academic work. This is how the corruption system operated & the way they target those who refuse to be their tools

An Academic Institutional Crisis
Some critical issues arise from this clientelistic environment
Critical questions need answers
1. Is impunity a “local”(institutional failure),national issue or is it the outcome of blatant interference of power networks operating in universities? The answer is a common secret & I would not try to answer it because of a major and revealing lawsuit to come.
2. What was the meaning and purpose of an INGOGNITO visit to the Department of International & European Studies & the University of Macedonia of the then US Ambassador to Greece G. Pyatt?This is a multi-million-dollar question that NO-ONE dares to bring forward. Is it customary for an ambassador to SECRETLY visit a university department without academics knowing about this odd visit? The question becomes a real puzzle taking into consideration the ANONYMOUS Greece revelation that a network of counter-information with the aim to supposedly deal with Russian influence in the city was built on the pillars of University of Macedonia, ELIAMEP & a number of journalists. They denied everything, yet, some facts cannot be explained. Nor can there be an explanation as to why the university authorities did not support my demand to provide an answer to why my university office was bugged. Why was I forced to deliver the monitoring device to the police?Why didn’t the only witness to the incident testify? The answers to these questions may be found in the operating of USA Embassy in Athens & the way to “deal with” those who refuse to be recruited.
3. On speaking out about corruption & clientelist, un-meritocratic networks in the university a DEFAMATORY campaign against me started with individuals at the institutions spreading rumours of me being mentally sick! This is classic intelligence practice applied by secret services particularly by the US. Is this related to the incognito visit of f. US Athens ambassador to the UoM? It appears that he had a “preference” to the institution. In the process I had to file a lawsuit against a colleague at the department as he was involved in communications mails with defamatory content (he suggested that I was mentally sick & should seek help).To this day justice has NOT BEEN DONE . I dispose of sms corroborating this standard intelligence practice of character assassination.
4. What is the relation between f. Rector I. Kouskouvelis & USEmbassy Athens? How did he use his structural power as a freemason member of the local Tectonic Hall (a criminal network)to persecute all those who stood up for meritocracy, equal treatment, transparency & those exposing clientelist networks?His cooperation with DAP (New Democracy Youth Organization)is well-known as well as the huge clientelist network they built. In a sms sent to me by a New Democracy party official he underpins that “he is capable of everything” meaning he is extremely dangerous for anyone who stands in his way

This paper aims to label industrial accidents as white-collar crime in Bangladesh apparel industry, where occupational health and safety provisions are mostly brushed aside by the factory owners. The study incorporates theory and evidence from over 92 sources from the of criminology, legal systems, occupational health and safety systems, and industrial accidents. The study observes a severe leniency and negligence among the factory owners in advocation and adaptation of these provisions which can be labelled as white-collar crime.

A review of state-initiated and state-sponsored incidents in cyberspace over the past decade reveals that over two thirds of these involved actors within the Asia-Pacific, often occurring in the context of politico-economic disputes. These activities, ranging from attempts at espionage to coercion, in all appearance appears to confirm the domain’s increasing strategic value. But upon closer inspection, only half of these have resulted in meeting their political objectives. Moreover, these have involved notable regional powers employing relatively unsophisticated tools and tactics in cyberspace. This challenges the prevailing notion that cyberspace provides an asymmetric advantage for middling and/or weak powers due to its low cost of entry and the increasing technological dependence of targets. With growing tensions in the Asia-Pacific, the need to better understand the strategic utilization of this domain is paramount. In so doing, this paper argues that coercive success in cyberspace is not determined solely by an aggressor’s technological prowess but depends crucially on appropriate force employment and an understanding of the domain’s unique geography. Through the analysis of the Stuxnet operation, the paper demonstrates that careful consideration of these factors may better account for the success or failure of coercion in the domain.

La théorie moderne de la dissuasion et la rationalité coûts/bénéfices sont étroitement liées l’une à l’autre. En fait, sans cette dernière, la théorie de la dissuasion n’aurait plus de fondements puisqu’elle repose sur la croyance voulant que sous certaines conditions — ayant trait notamment à sa sévérité et à sa certitude — la sanction pénale peut décourager quiconque aurait l’audace de défier la norme pénale. La rationalité coûts/bénéfices constitue donc cette prémisse selon laquelle l’être humain gouvernerait son comportement, incluant le comportement criminel, à partir d’un calcul fait de coûts et de bénéfices. La généralisation de la portée de cette théorie de la décision constitue notre objet de recherche. La question qui se pose est celle de savoir si la théorie elle-même n’aurait pas trop exagéré la portée de cette rationalité coûts-bénéfices. Il ne s’agit pas tant de remettre en question le fait qu’elle puisse opérer ici et là, mais bien de réfléchir aux limites de sa généralisation, de se poser la question de savoir si compte tenu des données dont on dispose il est encore raisonnable, aujourd’hui, d’entretenir cette croyance à l’effet que tous les comportements dits criminels sont opérés dans le cadre de cette rationalité coûts/bénéfices. C’est la question que nous posons dans cette recherche exploratoire dont l’objectif est de cerner une rationalité inédite développée théoriquement par Pires (2002) et vérifiée empiriquement par Dubé (2012) : la rationalité du risque.
Dans cette recherche, ces dernières considérations nous amènent à traiter les postulats de la rationalité coûts/bénéfices comme des hypothèses et non comme des faits. Cette posture épistémologique se situe en dehors du positivisme et réintroduit le doute dans l’observation. Ce doute est alors confronté à une empirie particulière : il ne s’agit plus de tester la sévérité ou la certitude des peines telles que les conçoivent le droit criminel, mais bien de comprendre comment, dans la commission de leurs infractions, les individus se les représentent, comment ils les perçoivent, et quel poids leur attribuent-ils dans la décision de commettre ou de commettre à nouveau une infraction. Dans cette perspective qui s’inspire directement des approches phénoménologiques, la dissuasion est ainsi conçue comme un phénomène d’abord et avant tout subjectif. Au plan méthodologique, nous avons cherché à saisir ces « réalités subjectives » à partir d’entretiens qualitatifs semi-dirigés réalisés auprès d’individus ayant commis des crimes graves. Dans ces entretiens, plusieurs postulats de la théorie de la dissuasion sont ébranlés sous le poids d’une phénoménologie faisant ressortir les traits et fondements de la rationalité du risque, rationalité qui réduit la portée de la rationalité coûts/bénéfices tout en frappant d’impertinence le réductionnisme qui associe à la qualité de la peine la qualité de l’effet dissuasif.
À partir de nos observations empiriques, nous avons élaboré quatre (4) idéaux-types de trajectoires décisionnelles : pris dans leur ensemble, ceux-ci suggèrent que l’effet dissuasif de la sanction pénale est loin d’être aussi déterminant que nous a habitués à le croire le droit criminel moderne. Les résultats de notre recherche semblent en effet indiquer que dans bien des cas, la menace de la conséquence pénale se retrouve neutralisée par la rationalité du risque qui intervient dans l’esprit de l’individu pour reconvertir la « certitude » du coût en incertitude, en probabilité. Le coût n’est alors plus vécu comme un coût, mais bien comme un risque, comme une possibilité parmi d’autres et que l’individu a l’impression de pouvoir contrôler. La dissuasion générale se retrouve ainsi fragilisée. Par ailleurs, face à la condamnation, lorsque l’individu l’associe à l’échec du passage à l’acte, la rationalité du risque intervient encore pour remettre en question non pas tant, dans l’absolu, la décision de commettre le crime, mais bien la manière de le commettre. L’échec est alors associé soit à une mauvaise décision (qui n’est pas celle de commettre le crime), soit au fruit du hasard contre lequel on ne pouvait rien. Dans un cas comme dans l’autre, la dissuasion spécifique se retrouve ainsi fragilisée.

A deterrence theory of punishment holds that the institution of criminal punishment is morally justified because it serves to deter crime. Because the fear of external sanction is an important incentive in crime deterrence, the deterrence theory is often associated with the idea of severe, disproportionate punishment. An objection to this theory holds that hope of escape renders even the severest punishment inapt and irrelevant.
In this paper, I revisit the concept of deterrence and defend a more plausible deterrence theory of punishment – the Wide-scope Deterrence Theory. The Wide-Scope Theory holds that we must make the best use of all the deterrence tools available, including both external and internal sanctions. Drawing on insights from the early Confucian tradition, I develop a Deep Deterrence Theory, which holds that the most important deterrence tool involves internal, not external, sanction. I describe how internal sanctions deter potential offences and why relevant policies need not conflict with liberalism’s respect for neutrality.

This article examines the openly adversarial neoconservative foundation under George Bush to the supposedly more ‘engaged’ diplomatic interaction under Barack Obama. What will be exposed is a fairly uninspired and non-innovative American policy that not only fails to consider Russian initiatives from Russia’s own national security perspectives, but aims to contain it within a continued Cold War box that not only sours opportunities for collaboration but guarantees the absence of partnership in areas of global security. This piece examines the consequences of imagining Russia only as nemesis.

T. M. Scanlon’s contractualism is a meta-ethical theory that explains moral motivation and also provides a conception of how to carry out moral deliberation. It supports non-consequentialism – the theory that both consequences and deontological considerations are morally significant in moral deliberation. Regarding the issue of punishment, non-consequentialism allows us to take account of the need for deterrence as well as principles of fairness, justice, and even desert. Moreover, Scanlonian contractualism accounts for permissibility in terms of justifiability: An act is permissible if and only if it can be justified to everyone affected by it. This contractualist thesis explains why it is always impermissible to frame an innocent person, why vicarious punishment is impermissible, and why there has to be a cap on sentences. Contractualism therefore allows us to take deterrence as a goal of punishment without the excess of utilitarianism. This paper further argues that the resulting view is superior to pure retributivism. Finally, it shows why legal excuses and mitigation can be justified in terms of the notion of negative desert.

The Endurance of Extended Deterrence: Continuity, Change, and Complexity in Theory and Practice. In T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz, Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age. University of Chicago Press, 2009: 277-303.

Israel is a unique country by many criteria, but among the foremost, it is the only country whose neighbors have threatened it for most of its existence with total eradication. Even today when Israel is by far the most powerful military power in the Middle East most of its population views total destruction of the country and genocide of its population as a near-certain outcome of military defeat. Despite Israel’s military advantages, Israel’s defense doctrine views war as a the “no choice option” which carries a heavy social and economic price tag. Therefore, Israeli doctrine relies heavily on projection of deterrence. This is based on “hard” elements such as technological superiority and – not least – the perception of Israel as a non-declared nuclear power, and “soft” elements, such as a broad Israeli consensus regarding the justification and legitimacy of fighting when the Homeland is attacked.
Israel’s deterrence doctrine has developed in the face of constant challenges and evolving threat environments. Events over the years have given rise to debates in the Israeli public regarding the “erosion” of Israeli deterrence. However, these debates are replete with fallacies: conflation of conventional, non-conventional (nuclear) and sub-conventional (terrorist) deterrence; the assumption that degradation of deterrence in one area necessarily degrades deterrence in another; and disregarding the linkage between Israel’s nuclear deterrence and the motivation of its enemies to engage in high levels of conventional hostilities. In addition, an understanding of Israeli deterrence doctrine must be based on the distinction between three national situation levels in the context of which deterrence must be achieved: “Routine”, “Emergency” and “War and the role of “compellence” and pre-emption of offensive capabilities of the enemy as an instrument for inducing deterrence (“pre-terrence”). Other aspects that must be addressed include the erosion of deterrence over time after a “deterrence-generating” event (in Israeli strategic parlance “refreshing deterrence”), the role of “red lines”, psychological, ideological and religious factors that are paramount in Israeli doctrine which has always embraced the concepts of “tailored deterrence” and modes of signaling.
Ultimately, it is the argument of this article that Israel has succeeded in maintaining strategic deterrence vis-à-vis neighboring states. Deterrence of terrorist organizations however has been based – when it existed – mainly on tactical deterrence through day to day actions which add up to an ever-shifting perception of the object of deterrence regarding Israel’s resolve to act against it. This perception is laden with cultural and psychological overtones and passed through overlapping prisms of history, culture, language, ideological axioms, modes of transmission and reception of information on the “other” and finally, the psyche of the leadership of the party to be deterred, identification of the decision makers with the interests which are threatened and the dynamics of threat assessment within that leadership. Failure of Israeli deterrence has been mainly due to Israeli negligence in transmitting the deterrent message, filters in the enemy leadership that preclude the message from getting through, and influence of the ideological/religious/political Weltanschauung of the enemy leadership.
This article attempts to provide an understanding of the evolution of Israel’s deterrence doctrine, its successes and its failures, and, mutatis mutandis, lessons that it can offer to deterrence doctrine in general and to that of the United States in particular.

Deterrence theory states that world stability can be maintained if the costs of war far outweigh its benefits. Weapons and strategies that make defense cheaper and offense more costly decrease the likelihood of conflict. Nuclear weapons may have thereby helped create the stability of the Cold War via the costs associated with launching first; according to this argument, war between the US and USSR never occurred because the price of war (i.e. mutual destruction) was too high. This theoretical paper will extend this argument to cyber-attacks and suggest that in order to maintain the security of a nation's information technology, cyber-defense systems that correspond with Deterrence theory must be introduced. Cyber-attacks can be deterred if the proper system, a virus wall, is in place to counter any infiltration of a nation's defense systems. This proposed virus wall would be a way to achieve stability from nation state cyber-attacks. Theoretical advancements of International Relations will also be proposed, specifically considering the area of Security Studies.

In this paper, I propose a new self-defense theory of punishment, the rights-protection theory. By appealing to the interest theory of right, I show that what we call “the right of self-defense” is actually composed of the right(s) to protect our basic rights. The right of self-defense is not a single, self-standing right but a group of derivative rights justified by their contribution to the protection of the core, basic rights. Thus, these rights of self-defense are both justified and constrained by the basic rights they are supposed to protect.
I then explain how this theory responds to a common objection. Opponents argue that, to exercise the right of self-defense, some threat must be present. However, in the context of punishment, the threat has already taken effect or is already gone. Thus, the right of self-defense becomes irrelevant when we punish an offender. I show that this objection is based on an implausibly narrow conception of self-defense. A reasonable conception would allow us to exercise our right of self-defense when there is a present definite threat, a future definite threat, or a potential threat. Thus, we may still exercise our right of self-defense in the context of punishment.

Nel corso degli ultimi anni la nozione di deterrenza,
da tempo quasi completamente scomparsa
dal vocabolario della politica internazionale,
è riemersa in numerosi documenti strategici
di paesi Europei. La deterrenza del XXI secolo
tuttavia è sia concetto, che fenomeno profondamente
differente da quello che è stato in
quelli che potremmo definire i suoi “anni d’oro”
i 50 e 60 del XX secolo. L'obiettivo di questa ricerca
è quello di far comprendere tale diversità
ed il ruolo che la deterrenza potrebbe svolgere
negli affari internazionali negli anni a venire attraverso
uno studio dell’evoluzione storica della
sua teoria e della pratica.

Nuclear and conventional deterrence are in fact quite different in terms of theory, practice, and impact. The differences play out in various ways depending on whether strategies of denial, punishment, or retaliation constitute the basis of the deterrent threat. The fact that battle outcomes with conventional weapons are so difficult to predict highlights the observation that conventional deterrent threats are " contest-able. " The contestability of conventional threats can raise doubts in the minds of those targeted by conventional deterrence concerning the capability of the side issuing deterrent threats to actually succeed. Con-testability is the Achilles' heel of conventional deterrence. By contrast, deterrent threats based on nuclear weapons are largely uncontestable. They offer an ideal deterrent capability because they tend to eliminate optimism about a positive war outcome. The fact that nuclear threats are uncontestable does not guarantee that they will be viewed as credible, while the contestable nature of conventional threats does not preclude their credibility. 

Türk Ceza Adalet Sistemi (TCAS), felsefi temelleri itibariyle Aydınlanma Çağı'nda ortaya çıkan ve büyük oranda Avrupa'da başlayıp tüm dünyaya yayılan Klasik Okul felsefesine dayanan ceza eksenli bir adalet anlayışı üzerine kurulmuştur. Bu çalışma, çeşitli kurum ve kuruluşlardan elde edilen resmi istatistiksel verileri analiz ederek TCAS'nin beklenen caydırıcı ve suç önleyici etkiyi meydana getiremediğini; bu durumun ise Klasik Okul felsefesinde ifadesini bulan ve cezalandırma sistemlerine ilişkin olarak ortaya konulan gerekliliklerin uygulanmasında ortaya çıkan belirli problemlerden kaynaklandığını göstermektedir. Sonuç olarak, ceza adalet sistemimizi daha etkin ve caydırıcı bir yapıya kavuşturabilmek için bir takım politika önerileri sunulmuştur.

The theory of deterrence is considered a cornerstone of criminal justice but remains problematic in testing and proof.  It is simply difficult to discern why people do not commit crime.  A variety of propositions have been tested over the years, with some success, but much of what has resulted is either inconclusive or moderate in effect at best.
This article provides a brief review of deterrence theory and comments about its future.  I examine the key components of the theory as well as its classical origin and review some newer propositions as well.

Dans cet article, nous nous appuyons sur les thèses d’Alvaro Pires pour problématiser trois des principaux obstacles à l’évolution du droit criminel moderne, soient ceux découlant respectivement de la dénonciation, de la rétribution et de la dissuasion. L’article propose de revenir aux théories qui fondent ces objectifs punitifs et de rendre plus visible toute la contingence qui entoure historiquement les choix philosophiques ayant favorisé, pour chacun de ces cas, une conception essentiellement négative, afflictive et souvent « carcéralisante » du droit de punir. Ce retour aux « sources » a ultimement pour but de mettre en évidence des possibilités de reconstruction aujourd’hui plus positives, moins hostiles et plus sensibles à la préservation des liens sociaux. Ces déconstructions-reconstructions sont ici conçues comme relevant d’opérations fondamentales pour l’avènement d’un droit criminel plus « responsif », capable d’apprentissage et d’autocorrection dans son rapport au crime et à la peine.

The essay beings by outlining the context in which nuclear weapons emerged. Using Melville’s Nuclear Revolution Theory it presents the viewpoint that nuclear weapons have contributed to a change in strategic thinking and international diplomatic discourse. The essay argues that nuclear weapons changed the meaning of war, victory losing its former meaning not only due to their effects on humanity and nature, but adversary states’ second strike capability leading to MAD. Deterrence may seem logical in theory- practice shows different.  The essay explores the questionable reliability of the human element in control of nuclear weapons, as well as some systems designed for their use. Furthermore its normative implications, as well as the underlying assumptions of rationality necessary for deterrence- all elements which can be contested to argue nuclear weapons will not guarantee either security, safety or peace long term, in fact are more likely to lead to disaster.

Israel follows a policy of disproportionate high response to violence from its adversaries, through which it builds up  'cumulative deterrence.' While this policy has given it longer periods of 'no-violence', will it usher in sustained periods of peace? Many of its own leaders do not think so? So, is there a way out?

For more than a quarter-century, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been one of the most important factors influencing the political map of the South Caucasus. On 12 May 1994, Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan signed a cease-fire agreement that ended military operations in the conflict zone and has been observed until recently.
Negotiations for a peaceful settlement have been underway within the framework of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Minsk Group co-chaired by the USA, Russia, and France since 1992, but society and the elite in Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan remain largely unprepared for compromise. Considering the settlement process a zero-sum game, they have generally accused one another of
escalating the conflict and of a lack of willingness to restore peace. Other countries and international organizations involved in the negotiations do not share a vision of the future and frequently pursue their own interests. Accordingly, the Karabakh conflict could remain unresolved for decades more. The aim of the paper is a general assessment of the current stage and dynamic of this conflict and the impact of new trends and old obstacles on the prospects for further settlement.

Шестой выпуск Аналитических докладов Института Кавказа
посвящен
проблематике военно-политического измерения украинского
кризиса, его возможных уроков и последствий для постсоветского
пространства. Рассматривается динамика развития военно-политических
процессов, освещаются военно-технические и военно-
стратегические особенности украинского кризиса, в том числе – в
контексте так называемых «гибридных» войн. Доклад представляет
интерес как для политологов, международников, специалистов в сфере
безопасности и военной политики, так и для широкого круга читателей.

T. M. Scanlon’s contractualism is a meta-ethical theory that explains moral motivation and also provides a conception of how to carry out moral deliberation. It supports non-consequentialism – the theory that both consequences and deontological considerations are morally significant in moral deliberation. Regarding the issue of punishment, non-consequentialism allows us to take account of the need for deterrence as well as principles of fairness, justice, and even desert. Moreover, Scanlonian contractualism accounts for permissibility in terms of justifiability: An act is permissible if and only if it can be justified to everyone affected by it. This contractualist thesis explains why it is always impermissible to frame an innocent person, why vicarious punishment is impermissible, and why there has to be a cap on sentences. Contractualism therefore allows us to take deterrence as a goal of punishment without the excess of utilitarianism. This paper further argues that the resulting view is superior to pure retributivism. Finally, it shows why legal excuses and mitigation can be justified in terms of the notion of negative desert.