Deterrence Theory

This paper is a critical analysis of the judgment delivered by Madras High Court in Crl.O.P.(MD)No. 11735 of 2014 decided on 16.10.2015, deviating from the Reformatory theory of Punishments, recommending prescription of a barbaric punishment of castration for the accused of an offense of sexual abuse of children.

Do audits affect individual tax compliance? This question is not new and multiple answers have been attempted over the past four decades. Those who have made such attempts have suffered from the impediment of an inability to test their theories against known, or even approximated, rates of underreporting on individual income tax returns. The first part of this paper develops a method for approximating the underreporting rate for individual income tax returns, since no such method currently exists. The second part uses this method to take a stab at answering the question whether audits affect tax underreporting rates.

Comment les concepts de guerre, de guérilla et de bataille, chez Deleuze et chez Proust, quand ils sont placés en théorie des jeux dans le couple des échecs et du go, se connectent conceptuellement au numérique booléen pour produire le concept de cyberbataille.

Over the last two decades, conventional (non-nuclear) deterrence in Russia's military strategy has changed from being a sub-tactical, sub-strategic warfighting tool to being a separate military-political factor—a self-contained component in Russia's strategic deterrence concept. Soon after Russia revised its military doctrine in 2014, it applied this conventional deterrence concept in its Syria campaign—against the backdrop of being under international pressure vis-à-vis the Ukraine conflict and Russia-NATO tensions. In Syria, Russia fired new types of long-range, precision-guided missiles, showcasing these weapons both as battlefield tools and as geopolitical instruments of deterrence. The " Second Conventional Age " After the era of World Wars and nuclear arms races, a conventional deterrence renaissance took place. This so-called " second conventional age " was marked by the development of modern conventional weapons: long-range, precise ballistic and cruise missiles that use advanced intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance systems. These modern technologies include not only classic strike platforms—ballistic and cruise missiles, artillery systems, other precision-guided munitions (PGMs)—but also weapons based on new physical principles, for example, hypersonic weapons, self-maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs), anti-satellite and space weapons, and new types of non-kinetic, non-nuclear weapons (cyber, radio-electronic, electromagnetic). According to Russian military experts, the technological development of conventional weapons by many countries " has made such progress that the destruction of a single element of infrastructure, communication, and control systems can lead to a catastrophe, able to throw a country back many years in its development. " Conventional weapons have reached such a combination of range, accuracy, and lethality that even leading

Resumen: El presente artículo busca estudiar ciertos argumentos clásicos de las políticas de prevención del delito, señalando algunos de sus límites y elaborando algunas críticas contemporáneas que resultan ineludibles de discutir para quien aborda las posiciones prevencionistas. En este sentido, en primer lugar, el artículo enuncia algunas ideas clásicas de las políticas de prevención para en seguida establecer algunos puntos de análisis y problematización de la prevención. Lo anterior se hace desde dos campos de análisis: la prevención del delito desde afuera y desde adentro del sistema penal. Este recorrido nos permitirá establecer ciertos criterios de análisis de la prevención desde diferentes disciplinas, medios de la prevención, programas de acción prevencionistas, y actores de los mismos. Esto será abordado de una forma no exhaustiva, en forma de tópicos de debate frente a las políticas de prevención del delito y como posibles puntos de una agenda investigativa en el tema de la prevención ¿La pena previene o no el crimen? ¿Qué medidas punitivas previenen el crimen? ¿Hay crímenes o criminales que no son prevenidos por la pena? ¿Qué medidas de prevención hay fuera de las penales? ¿El empleo, la tecnología, la educación, la arquitectura son útiles para la prevención? ¿Cuáles son las ventajas y los riesgos de sus usos para la prevención? Estas preguntas son problematizadas en el presente trabajo buscando, no sus respuestas, sino sus desafíos y discusiones principales.

Abstract: This article studies a series of classical arguments around crime prevention policies. First, the article presents some classic ideas of crime deterrence identifying some points of analysis and discussion. This study is conducted through the study of two fields of analysis: crime prevention external to the criminal system and crime prevention from within the criminal system. This analysis allows us to identify different disciplines, devices, programs of action, and actors of crime deterrence. This evaluation will be conducted in a non-exhaustive way, establishing rather plausible topics of a research agenda when dealing with crime prevention. Does punishment deter crime? What punitive measures do deter crime? Are there crimes or criminals who are not deterred by punishment? Is employment, technology, education, architecture useful for deterrence purposes? What are the benefits and risks of their use for crime deterrence? These questions are problematized in this article in the search of their challenges and discussions rather than their answers.

Israeli security policy began to formulate in the early 1950s by its first leader, David Ben-Gurion. The three pillars of the defence doctrine were deterrence of possible threats; detection of impending attacks, and decisive military defeat of the enemy when the deterrence had failed. Up until the 1990s, the major perceived threat was an Arab military invasion into Israel and a war between states. In the early 1990s, Israel started to formulate a new security concept according to which the main threat might not emanate from states but from sub-state organizations such as Hamas and the Hezbollah. Israel is surrounded by non-state actors: Hamas, Hezbollah, rebel organizations in Syria, jihadist elements in the Golan Heights, Sinai and in Gaza, and the Palestinian Authority. Since the mid-2000s, a lot of attention is given to the Iranian nuclear threat and to rocket and missile attacks from Gaza, Lebanon and potentially other hostile areas.

Over the last two decades, conventional (non-nuclear) deterrence in Russia's military strategy has changed from being a sub-tactical, sub-strategic warfighting tool to being a separate military-political factor—a self-contained component in Russia's strategic deterrence concept. Soon after Russia revised its military doctrine in 2014, it applied this conventional deterrence concept in its Syria campaign—against the backdrop of being under international pressure vis-à-vis the Ukraine conflict and Russia-NATO tensions. In Syria, Russia fired new types of long-range, precision-guided missiles, showcasing these weapons both as battlefield tools and as geopolitical instruments of deterrence. The " Second Conventional Age " After the era of World Wars and nuclear arms races, a conventional deterrence renaissance took place. This so-called " second conventional age " was marked by the development of modern conventional weapons: long-range, precise ballistic and cruise missiles that use advanced intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance systems. These modern technologies include not only classic strike platforms—ballistic and cruise missiles, artillery systems, other precision-guided munitions (PGMs)—but also weapons based on new physical principles, for example, hypersonic weapons, self-maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs), anti-satellite and space weapons, and new types of non-kinetic, non-nuclear weapons (cyber, radio-electronic, electromagnetic). According to Russian military experts, the technological development of conventional weapons by many countries " has made such progress that the destruction of a single element of infrastructure, communication, and control systems can lead to a catastrophe, able to throw a country back many years in its development. " Conventional weapons have reached such a combination of range, accuracy, and lethality that even leading

The Australian Army's Archipelagic Manoeuvre represents the operational "way" that strategic ends can be achieved. This short blog suggests that Strategic Deterrence is a relevant strategic concept that links Defence Policy to Operational Concepts. Strategic Deterrence is an extension of Deterrence Theory, consisting of both active influence through posture and diplomacy, and passive operational deterrence through traditional capability and capacity. Strategic Deterrence provides the opportunity to link Australia's military power within the context of national power.

Co-Authored with Mark Ascough

This chapter details how genuine popular nationalist sentiments became integrated with China’s assertive maritime policy. As Chapter 5 showed, the rise of popular nationalism on the South China Sea issue was largely a function of the state’s own assertive policy and associated increased publicity of the issue. But while elements of the party-state have long considered public attention indispensable to the pursuit of disputed maritime claims, the extent to which central authorities were consciously in control of these corollary effects in the 2009-2011 period is unclear. From 2012 onwards, as this chapter shows, the state’s management of domestic nationalist discourse on the issue became much more coherent, turning a domestic risk factor into a force of deterrence that served the policy guideline of the “unity of rights defense and stability maintenance.”

After reviewing the continuities and changes in the PRC’s behaviour in the South China Sea since 2012, the chapter outlines the development of CCP theoretical constructions that conceptualize public attention, attitudes, and actions as a resource or weapon in maritime disputes. The long-running project to raise the public’s maritime consciousness, particularly in the South China Sea, received unprecedented impetus from the top of the party-state from 2007 onwards. But more sophisticated notions of public opinion warfare and public diplomacy, developed and implemented under Hu Jintao, recognized that popular sentiments on contentious foreign policy issues can be an asset or a liability in different circumstances. Both stress the importance of attenuating public discourse in accordance with the state’s immediate objectives, and active management of the risks of doing so.

The third section examines the implementation of these concepts in the CCP’s routine guidance of domestic public opinion and its projection to foreign audiences. Based on the images of Chinese public opinion presented in PRC officials’ comments, it outlines a concept of “grassroots deterrence” to explain the strategic purpose of state-led popular nationalism in the South China Sea. It proposes that the public’s role is not limited to supporting potential war efforts, or providing a “hands-tying” mechanism to establish resolve, but can also help deter retaliation against China’s assertive activities by foregrounding a genuine risk of irrational escalation. The networked authoritarian state’s partially-visible, partially-opaque public opinion risk management capabilities give it an information advantage regarding those risks, while also clarifying both elements of the signal’s complex of threat and reassurance. This creates strong incentives for caution on the part of China’s adversaries as they respond to its assertive actions.

The crisis over Scarborough Shoal in April-May 2012 provided an opportunity and a motivation for the CCP to draw on nationalist participation, while also testing the state’s ability to manage the attendant risks. Reconstructing this crucial case shows that the wave of popular sentiment during the crisis emerged through a state-led process of strategic public opinion channeling. This wave arose not in response to the original on-water incident in April, but to an escalation of official rhetoric and state media coverage, four weeks later. The war buzz delivered a vague, but unmistakable, threat of escalation that helped persuade Manila not to oppose the new status quo of PRC control of the disputed shoal and, paradoxically, to dampen down anti-China nationalism in the Philippines. Once the Aquino administration moderated its public statements, curtailed domestic anti-China activity, and reopened diplomatic channels, Beijing abruptly reversed the volume and tone of domestic media coverage and the wave of nationalism quickly subsided. In this way, the domestic public helped achieve the PRC’s goal of maintaining regional stability in the context of its assertive maritime rights defense efforts. The chapter concludes by outlining the continued development of the party-state’s capabilities for shaping domestic popular discourse on the South China Sea issue, from Scarborough Shoal onwards through late 2016.

Il Cyber Strategy & Policy Brief si pone come scopo quello di sensibilizzare ogni mese i lettori su questi argomenti, analizzando i principali avvenimenti a livello internazionale, al fine di desumere i trend della ‘minaccia cibernetica’ e le lezioni apprese utili alla salvaguardia della nostra sicurezza nazionale.

Parole chiave: Cyber Command, Cyber Intelligence, Cyber Warfare, Danimarca, Deterrenza, GCHQ, Iran, Marine Corps, Regno Unito, Stati Uniti, Strategia, Syrian Electronic Army.

This study sought to evaluate the deterrent impact the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN SPAM) Act has had on email spam rates over time. A sample of 5,490,905 spam emails was collected and aggregated into a monthly time series. Thirteen measures of CAN SPAM Act enforcement were coded from news articles and included in a time-series regression. The results suggest a possible deterrent effect of prosecutions, convictions, and lengthy jail sentences for spammers, but an emboldening effect of short jail sentences. The penalties under the CAN SPAM Act focus on fines more than prison terms. The results find no deterrent effect for fines, as spammers tend to earn a large income from sending spam. The Act might be revised to include prison sentences, especially longer ones to avoid the emboldening effect found. A deterrent impact was found for prosecutions, even though the CAN SPAM Act is under-enforced. Expanding enforcement might also be advisable.

As the risks posed by cyber conflicts become more pervasive, increasingly more efforts are devoted to develop medium- and long-term plans to ensure stability of the cyber domain. Strategic cyber deterrence (SCD) is a crucial aspect to any plan for cyber stability, as proved by the interest of NATO and the UN, the EU, UK as well as US government in this topic. However, deploying conventional deterrence strategies, like retaliation, within the cyber domain proves to be a comprehensive challenge due to the global reach, the distributed and interconnected nature of the domain. For this reason, scholars, policy-makers, military experts, and international lawyers stress the urgent need to foster and coordinate analyses and expertise to identify the problems concerning SCD and develop adequate solutions to shape effective SCD and promote cyber stability.

Security experts argue that cyberspace has added a new strategic environment that requires new approaches to defence and thereby deterrence. The hard reality of cyber-attacks, which can be asymmetric and non-attributable, force states to reconsider their deterrence policy. Security experts need to untie the Gordian knot of cyber-deterrence. Questioning whether states can deter state-executed cyber-attacks against their critical infrastructure and whether that can be achieved by denial or punishment, is the task of this essay. The purpose is to demonstrate that the Cold War model of nuclear deterrence, which involves denial and punishment, seems dysfunctional in cyberspace.

Traditionally, India has resorted to a ‘passive’ form of deterrence against Pakistan. While it has been effective to prevent a conventional war, it has been ineffective against Pakistan’s proxy war strategy involving the use of terrorism “to bleed India through a thousand cuts". Conceptually, therefore, India may need to shift from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ deterrence, possibly even 'deterrence by punishment' using its naval power, and develop attendant capabilities.

The severity, certainty and celerity (swiftness) of punishment are theorised to influence offending through deterrence. Yet celerity is rarely included in empirical studies of criminal activity and the three deterrence factors have never been analysed in one empirical model. We address this gap with an analysis using unique panel data of recorded theft, burglary and violence against the person for 41 Police Force Areas in England and Wales using variables that capture these three theorised factors of deterrence. We find that the three factors affect crime in different ways. Increased detection by the police (certainty) is associated with reduced theft and burglary but not violence. We find that variation in the celerity of sanction has a significant impact on theft offences but not on burglary or violence offences. Increased average prison sentences (severity) reduce burglary only. We account for these results in terms of data challenges and the likely different motivations underlyi...

As políticas de segurança pública no Brasil vêm sendo dominadas pelo modelo da teoria da dissuasão, a partir da crença na eficácia de medidas como a intensificação do patrulhamento policial ostensivo, o aumento das redes de vigilância e controle e o crescimento das prisões em flagrante. No entanto, a literatura internacional tem mostrado como uma polícia que vise à obediência normativa é mais eficaz e menos custosa. Este trabalho busca discutir a relevância da teoria da legitimidade e da justeza procedimental para o debate atual das reformas da polícia no contexto brasileiro e apontar como as políticas públicas de segurança implementadas no país tem adotado estratégias baseadas no modelo dissuasório. Indicamos como essa agenda de pesquisa pode contribuir para a discussão a respeito das reformas das polícias no Brasil e na América Latina.

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This book offers a reconceptualisation of conventional deterrence theory, and applies it to enduring rivalries in the Middle East.

The work argues that many of the problems encountered in the development of deterrence theory lay in the fact that it was developed during the Cold War, when the immediate problem it had to address was how to prevent catastrophic nuclear wars. The logic of nuclear deterrence compelled a preoccupation with the problem of stability over credibility; however, because the logic of conventional deterrence is different, the solution of the tension between credibility and stability is achieved by deference to credibility, due to the requirements of reputation and costly signaling.

This book aims to narrow the gap between theory and evidence. It explores how a reconceptualization of the theory as a process that culminates in the internalization of deterrence within enduring rivalries is better suited to account for its final success: a finding that has eluded deterrence theorists for long.

This interdisciplinary book will be of much interest to students of deterrence theory, strategic studies, international security, Middle Eastern studies and IR in general.
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