Interinstitutional politics

The extent to which the European Commission exercises ‘political’
roles in European integration is very much up for debate. Some
recent analyses of the Commission take it for granted that its
political roles have been in decline, while others have suggested
they have increased – especially under the current President of the
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, who was appointed in 2014 by
a much more politicised process than had been used previously
and whose College has sought to present itself as being guided by
a political mission and as offering political leadership to the EU. In
this article, we aim to show that in the debate about the political
roles of the Commission, ‘political’ has often been poorly defined
and operationalised. By drawing on Public Administration scholarship,
we offer a framework for analysing how and where in the EU
system the Commission’s political roles might become manifest.
We then assess empirically these roles in different functions the
Commission undertakes.

This contribution aims to examine the competences of the European Parliament in the procedure for concluding international agreements and, therefore, the importance of this Institution in the development of relations between Switzerland and the European Union since the Lisbon Reform. The author starts by outlining the parliamentary competences during the conclusion of international agreements procedure according, firstly, to article 218 TFEU, and secondly, to the Framework Agreement adopted in 2010 between the European Commission and the European Parliament. Subsequently, the degree of involvement of the European Parliament in the relations between Switzerland and the European Union since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon is more precisely analysed. In the author’s view, the Lisbon Reform has definitely strengthened the position of the European Parliament. However, thus far, that evolution has not been truly observed under the Swiss-EU relations.

The article is devoted to theoretical and methodological categorization and systematization of institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral attributes and features of semi-presidentialism. The author identified at least two groups of causes and factors, i.e. exogenous and endogenous, that define and categorize semi-presidentialism: the actual content of a constitution, the combination of traditions and circumstances (exogenous causes and factors), the composition of parliamentary majority and the position of a president in relation to parliamentary majority (endogenous causes and factors). It was motivated that, within the same constitutional delineation, a specific semi-presidential country can be classified in practice, first of all in the cut of varying institutional rules and formal/actual powers of presidents, governmental cabinets/prime ministers and parliaments. The researcher found out that taking into account the place and role of political institutions in inter-party competition and party hierarchy has a significant influence on this process. That is why semi-presidentialism was generalized as a system of government, which is comprehensively updated and taxonomied formally and actually. At the same time, it was recorded that semi-presidentialism uses specific hierarchical and transactional relations in the triangle “the head of state–governmental cabinet–parliament”. Their combination affects the formal and actual positioning and taxonomy of different types of heterogeneous semi-presidentialism. It was generalized that semi-presidentialism is definitively and permanently characterized with: a restrained and moderate model of separation of powers and appropriate system of checks and balances; popular election of a president for a fixed term; the collective responsibility of a prime minister and a cabinet to a legislature; the actual “securitization” of a president from interference in his or her activities by other institutions and branches of state power; actual (or at least formal), but multi-step and different deconcentration or dualization of the executive between a president (the head of state) and a prime minister (the head of governmental cabinet); double or dual nature of the origin and implementation of the executive, but not a double or dual nature of the responsibility of the executive.
Keywords: semi-presidentialism, president, prime minister, governmental cabinet, legislature, interinstitutional relations.

The article is dedicated to analysing and comparing the president’s institution under the European semi-presidentialism, in particular in theoretical and empirical contexts. Based on the methodology of new institutionalism and behaviourism, the author researched the arbitrary nature and framework of the president’s institution in the European semi-presidentialism, in particular in historical, theoretical and methodological cuts. Special attention was paid to the problems of ways, features and consequences of presidential elections under the European semi-presidentialism. The study is also devoted to the issues of electoral and institutional specifics and logics of popular presidential legitimacy under the European semi-presidentialism. Finally, the article appeals to institutional, procedural, political and behavioural parameters of formal and actual powers and activism of presidents in the European semi-presidentialism. Generally, the scientist developed a complete and systematic view of the president’s institution under the European semi-presidentialism and argued the constant feasibility of the typology of the latter. Keywords: semi-presidentialism, president, elections, legitimacy, European countries.

Resumen: En la práctica peruana de derecho internacional, el universo de acuerdos internacionales no se reduce a los tratados. En ese contexto, el presente artículo busca examinar el instrumento internacional por antonomasia que se celebra entre entidades públicas de al menos dos Estados y que, en el marco de la legislación peruana, se denomina «acuerdo interinstitucional». Primero, se estudiarán sus principales características con el fin de identificar su naturaleza jurídica. Posteriormente, se examinarán algunos de los principales desafíos que el uso del acuerdo interinstitucional afronta: (1) la dificultad de catalogarlo como norma jurídica dentro del sistema de fuentes de derecho en el Perú; (2) la posible confusión con otros instrumentos internacionales, como los acuerdos de hermanamiento (una especie del acuerdo interinstitucional), el memorándum de entendimiento o los convenios de colaboración; y (3) las posibles consecuencias del incumplimiento de un acuerdo interinstitucional y su relación con la comisión de un hecho ilícito internacional en el plano de la responsabilidad internacional del Estado. Palabras clave: acuerdo interinstitucional, tratado, plenos poderes, entidad de la Administración pública, responsabilidad internacional

Abstract: In the Peruvian practice of international law, the universe of international agreements is not reduced merely to treaties. In that context, this article seeks to examine the international instrument par excellence that is celebrated between public entities of at least two States. Such accord, within the framework of Peruvian legislation, is called «interinstitutional agreement». First, this paper will study the main characteristics of this kind of agreement with the purpose of identifying its legal nature. Subsequently, it will examine some of the main challenges the use of an interinstitutional agreement faces: (1) the difficulty of classifying an interinstitutional agreement as a legal norm within the Peruvian system of law sources; (2) the possible confusion with other international instruments, such as twinning arrangements (a kind of interinstitutional agreement),  memoranda of understanding or collaboration agreements; (3) the possible consequences than an interinstitutional agreement infers in regard to the commission of an international illicit act in the sphere of the international responsibility of the State.