Law, Liberty, and Morality

Procuraremos neste trabalho descobrir de que forma se articulam no pensamento de Friedrich August von Hayek as exigências morais e as exigências jurídicas que se colocam em relação a qualquer ordem social. Isto é, trata-se de saber se, na ordem liberal defendida por Hayek, há lugar nas regras de direito a considerações de ordem moral. O direito pode consagrar determinadas concepções morais? Se sim, quais? Se não, reduzir-se-á o campo da moral a uma esfera meramente privada, ou haverá ainda algum espaço para ela na esfera pública? Estas são algumas questões para as quais procurarei respostas no pensamento de Hayek.

A presente coletânea objetiva discutir diversas temáticas do campo forense a partir de uma visão crítica. Apresentando a visão de diferentes temas jurídicos sobre impasses sociais. A coletânea abarca uma série diálogos importantes para se pensar o mundo forense brasileiro de hoje. Assim, dentre as discussões propostas, encontramos temas como: Direito Agrário, Direito e Literatura, Direito ao Esquecimento, Liberdade Religiosa, Direito do Consumidor, Direito de Família, dentre outros.

n° 98, p. 159-178.
This article shows the importance of the early formation of British multiculturalism
as a crucial backdrop of the Hart-Devlin debate of the 1960s. Hart criticized Devlin’s “disintegration thesis” showing, correctly, that it fails sociologically. However, at important points, Devlin’s position does not fit easily with Hart's interpretation, but seems concerned with specific aspects of the British legal tradition. Contrary to other European cultures, liberty and tradition are not opposed in common law culture. British liberalism relies on certain legal standards, such as the “ordinary Englishman” and "the man in the Clapham omnibus", which he brings to the debate through the image of "the man in the jury box." Members of the judiciary around that time display uncertainty as to how such standards are to be managed in the context of mass immigration which marked the starting point of British multicultural society in the late 1950s. Rather than a straightforward confrontation between liberal and conservative camps as it is usually presented,  the Hart-Devlin debate reveals a surprising crisis in British legal culture. This, I argue, the protagnists of the debate would no doubt have had in mind. Devlin's position may no doubt fail. The reasons are not necessarily those we have looked to.

vol. VI, p. 11-33.
Le débat Hart-Devlin demeure en grande partie méconnu sur le Continent. Il s’agit pourtant d’un débat public de grande qualité entre deux juristes distingués,
et qui a eu un grand impact sur la vague de libéralisation des moeurs durant
les années 1960, dont notamment la dépénalisation de l’homosexualité. Cette
contribution vise à mettre en lumière la critique par H.L.A. Hart du moralisme
juridique de son contemporain Lord Devlin. Les partisans du moralisme juridique
soutiennent que l’on peut avoir recours au droit afin de mettre en oeuvre
la moralité. Hart renoue avec le libéralisme utilitariste de Bentham et John
Stuart Mill afin de proposer une critique morale des institutions juridiques en
vigueur en dénonçant les souffrances injustifiées que cela permettrait d’infliger
à l’individu du seul fait de l’immoralité de son comportement, et ce alors même
qu’il ne porte pas atteinte à autrui. Cet article se penche dans un second temps
sur le statut de l’utilitarisme hartien au regard de son positivisme juridique. Il
s’agira de comprendre comment Hart peut prendre position dans ce débat tout
en prétendant pouvoir maintenir une stricte séparation conceptuelle du droit et
de la morale au sein de son domaine d’étude.

Hart’s criticism of Devlin’s stance on the legal enforcement of morality has been highly influential in shaping a new liberal sensibility and in paving the way to many important legal reforms in the UK. After fifty years it is perhaps time to go back to Law, Liberty and Morality to see it in the perspective of the general evolution of Hart’s thought since the early Fifties. This is a period of extraordinary creativity for the Oxford philosopher, in which he writes many important contributions to legal, moral and political philosophy. Prominent among those is ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, an article that sets the agenda for Hart’s subsequent work on liberty, fairness and rights, and provides the philosophical background for the liberal understanding of the relations between law and morality defended in Law, Liberty and Morality.