Moral Objectivism

Subjectivists claim that the absence of a theological or metaphysical grounding to moral judgements renders them all as simply statements about our subjective wants and preferences. Leslie Allan argues that the subjectivists’ case rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of moral objectivity. He presents the view that subjectivists mistakenly counterpoise the ideal of moral objectivity with the expression of individual preferences. Being objective in moral deliberation, Allan argues, should be regarded instead as the antithesis of parochial and biased reasoning. This account of moral objectivity, he concludes, makes sense of a long-standing universalist tradition in moral philosophy.

This paper shall promote the theory of Moral Objectivism by (1) denying the plausibility of Ethical Relativism, (2) relating inherent human rights to the necessity of absolute morality, and (3) stressing the importance of believing in justified propositions in decision making.

Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’).  To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet others: nonsensical, i.e. meaningless.  And often one is left guessing.

Stressing that the pronoun "I" picks out one and only one person in the world (i.e., me), I argue against Hunt (and other like-minded Rand commentators) that the supposed "hard case" of destructive people who do not care for their own lives poses no special difficulty for rational egoism. I conclude that the proper response to a terse objection like "What about suicide bombers?" is the equally terse assertion "But I don't want to get blown up."

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

„Die Menschen trachten in der Tat nach dem Guten und nicht nach der absoluten Bewahrung des Hergebrachten.“ – Von diesem positiven Menschenbild geleitet, propagiert Martha Nussbaum (1998) die Idee einer globalen Ethik, welche universale und partikuläre moralische Forderungen nicht als Widerspruch betrachtet, sondern auf Basis der aristotelischen Idee einer essentiellen conditio humana zu einer kohärenten Moraltheorie verbindet. Diese beinhaltet entgegen der relativistischen Auffassung nicht bloss den Anspruch, dass sich durch die allen Menschen gemeinsame Grundlage nicht-relative Tugenden ableiten lassen, sondern eröffnet auch die Möglichkeit, bestehende konkurrierende Wertvorstellungen zu vergleichen und  gegeneinander abzuwägen, und so einen globalen ethischen Fortschritt zu erzielen. Wie eine Untersuchung der Kritisierbarkeit der Erbsünde jedoch aufzeigt, sieht sich Nussbaums Moraltheorie selbst unter Einbezug ihres Fähigkeiten-Ansatzes mit substantiellen Einschränkungen konfrontiert.

What implications do recent empirical findings from the fields of biology, primatology, anthropology, psychology and history have for metaethical theories about moral objectivity? I defend the thesis that these findings detract from the plausibility of a realist account of moral objectivity but leave room for a more moderate, antirealist account of objectivity, framed in terms of stance-invariance. The dissertation consists of six articles written for publication in academic journals. In these articles I present two novel, empirically informed challenges to moral realism, and point out some shortcomings of existing challenges. One of the novel challenges builds on the second horn of Sharon Street’s ‘Darwinian Dilemma’, according to which moral realists are committed to an implausible evolutionary hypothesis, and extends this criticism to the historical realm. The other novel challenge is fuelled by theoretical and experimental work in moral psychology, and takes issue with the presumed advantages of moral realism in explaining the qualities of our moral experience. Apart from criticizing moral realism, I also develop and defend an alternative account of moral objectivity in antirealist terms and argue that it is as least as successful as a realist account in capturing the objectivist commitments of ordinary moral discourse. In this introductory chapter I outline the aims and methods of the dissertation and demonstrate the coherence of the treatise.

Today’s political landscape encourages freedom of conscience while maintaining the tolerance of pluralism. But can conscience be wrong? Pervasive emotivism in Western culture defines morality as an expression of opinion elevates conscience to the supreme status of being the only judge of morality. In this view, authenticity is the only criterion for morality and conscience is reduced to peace of mind or reassurance about one’s choices. This view of conscience ultimately undermines the possibility of maintaining basic shared values that are necessary for pluralism.

Contrary to the emotivist view, the objectivist view provides a clear and precise definition of conscience that encourages freedom of conscience as well as providing guidelines for its limits based upon a distinction between internal motivation and external objective morality. This position will be presented with recourse to Thomas Aquinas and his advocates as they allow for the possibility of an erring conscience that leaves room to grow and leaves room for society to judge right and wrong behavior. I will cover such questions such as the following: Can conscience be mistaken? Does an erring conscience impose moral obligation? Can doing the right action feel wrong? How can freedom of conscience be encouraged while providing safeguards against moral anarchy?

This chapter focuses on how Kierkegaard criticizes both eudaimonism and Kantian autonomy for failing to account for unconditional obligations and genuine other-regard. Like Kant, Kierkegaard argues that eudaimonism makes moral virtue contingent on prudence. Kierkegaard views eudaimonism as an anthropocentric and self-regarding doctrine, which he contrasts not with Kantian autonomy but with theocentrism and proper other-regard. Kierkegaard then criticizes Kantian autonomy in much the same way as he criticizes eudaimonism.  Whereas eudaimonism makes morality contingent on prudence, autonomy makes morality contingent on decisions that may be revoked, he argues. As a result, human autonomy can account for hypothetical imperatives but not categorical imperatives. This line of reasoning seems problematic, however, since Kierkegaard takes Kantian autonomy to not only represent a form of moral constructivism, but also a form of moral relativism and decisionism. Still, Kierkegaard’s critique of autonomy indicates that morality and practical rationality need unconditional commitment towards what is objectively good.

In order to answer the question whether there is a place for values in the natural world, without claiming an independent sphere of universally existing values, I employ the concept of enactivism, according to which the processes of perception, cognition and emotion are essentially conceived as interactions of a living organism with its environment. On this basis, I develop a relational conception of value: values are understood as forms of affective significance, which result from the embodied, perceptual and acting relationship living beings have with their environment. Through their bodily and affective resonance, they disclose the affective qualities in their environment which are relevant to them – qualities which have objective, vital significance for their self-preservation. Hence, values are objective quali¬ties of the relationship between an embodied subject and its world.

It may seem that a naturalistic view of humankind renders ethics as a matter of taste. Science seems to dictate that there can be no objective standards for how we ought to behave. In fact, both of these positions misconstrue the nature of ethical reasoning and greatly impoverish our view of ourselves and of our social norms. In this talk, Leslie Allan invites you to consider how both objectivity and subjectivity are essential elements of moral discourse.

In recent years an increasing number of psychologists have begun to explore the prevalence, causes and effects of ordinary people’s intuitions about moral realism. Many of these studies have lacked in construct validity, i.e., they have failed to (fully or exclusively) measure moral realism. My aim in this paper accordingly is to motivate and guide methodological improvements. In analysis of prominent existing measures, I develop general recom-mendations for overcoming ten prima facie serious worries about research on folk moral real-ism. G1 and G2 require studies’ answer choices to be as metaethically comprehensive as methodologically feasible. G3 and G4 prevent fallacious inferences from intuitions about related debates. G5 and G6 limit first-order moral and epistemic influences. G7 address studies’ instructions. And G8 and G9 suggest tests of important psychological presuppositions.

This essay argues that acknowledging the existence of mind-independent facts is a matter of vital importance, in that acquiescence before the layout of the world is something demanded of knowing agents from the most elementary empirical deliverance to the most abstract construct. Building on the idea that normativity requires the presence of more than one option to choose from, the essay shows how the cessation of one's life is the disjunctive alternative of any experiential episode. This much has been missed, it argues, because of a generalized failure to appreciate how even the simplest atomic contents embroil their subjects in acts of assent. Its account thus casts a new light on relativism and skepticism, revealing them to be provisional luxuries supported only by the cognitive labor of others.

En este trabajo se critica la defensa que Ferrajoli hace del constitucionalismo garantista o normativo, que contrapone al constitucionalismo principialista o argumentativo. Se intenta mostrar que los rasgos definitorios del constitucionalismo principialista no tienen las consecuencias perniciosas que el autor les atribuye. En particular, se rechazan los argumentos que consideran que el objetivismo moral hace imposible el liberalismo político y la democracia. Se rechaza también que la distinción entre principios y reglas menoscabe la dimensión normativa del derecho y se muestra que el activismo judicial que la ponderación en la aplicación del derecho comporta es plenamente asumible en la concepción del constitucionalismo. Se vindica el denominado constitucionalismo incorporacionista: se mantiene la tesis de la no conexión necesaria entre el derecho y la moral, se asume el objetivismo moral y se adopta que, al incorporar consideraciones morales, los sistemas jurídicos incorporan criterios morales en la identificación y la aplicación del derecho.

I consider a variety of interpretations of the metaethical views of the average, philosophically untrained moral relativist and evaluate them in light of how well they explain certain facts about relativist behavior. I conclude that the best interpretations of ordinary relativism are based on the idea that the ethical standards of those who attribute moral praise or blame or who assess attributions of praise or blame for truth or falsity are the primary determinants of the truth values of moral judgments. Such a view allows an agent's practical reasons to affect the truth values of moral judgments when those reasons are sufficiently salient in the attributor's or assessor's context. I also offer a relevant alternatives account of moral judgment that models relativistic thinking about how changes in the ethical standards in place in various contexts occur and how these changes affect the correctness of moral judgments.

I first show how one might argue for a mind-independent conception of beauty and artistic merit. I then discuss whether this makes aesthetic judgements suitable to undermine skeptical worries about the existence of mind-independent moral value and categorical reasons.

در سالهاي اخير تقريرهاي متفاوتي از استدلال اخلاقي بر وجود خدا شكل گرفته
است. يكي از اين تقريرها، استدلال از طريق عينيتگرايي اخلاقيِ سي. اس. لوئيس
است؛ لوئيس با توسل به احكام و قوانين اخلاقي متـداول در حيـات انسـاني و بـا
توجه به مجادلات اخلاقي، انتقادات اخلاقي، و عذرآوري انسان هنگام عملنكردن
به قوانين اخلاقي، كه همه روزه براي انسان روي ميدهد، وجود عيني ارزشهـا و
قوانين اخلاقي را اثبات ميكند و سپس با توجه به تفاوت ماهيت قوانين اخلاقي و
قوانين طبيعي، بنيان استدلال اخلاقي خويش را پايـه گـذاري مـيكنـد. لـوئيس در
جستوجوي مبنا و اساس اين قوانين عيني اخلاقي، ذهني عالي را به عنوان يگانـه
مبناي حقيقي احكام اخلاقي اثبات ميكند. اين مقالـه بـه تقريـر و تبيـين اسـتدلال
اخلاقي لوئيس ميپردازد و در پايان به نقد و بررسي آن خواهد پرداخت




In recent years, different versions of the moral argument for existence of God are formed and presented. The argument from moral objectivism of CS Lewis is one of them. Lewis by appealing to the common moral orders and laws in human life and by considering ethical Quarrelling, moral criticism, and human excuses when he or she is failed to obey moral laws, asserts the objectivity of moral orders and values. Then he establishes the basis of his moral argument regarding the difference between the nature of the moral law and natural law. While Lewis seeks for the basis of the objective moral rules he shows that the only real basis for moral judgments is a great mind. This Article reviews lewis's moral argument and then evaluates it.

When one deliberates one has reasons both for and against doing something.  Could the reasons for OBJECTIVELY outweigh the reasons against, in the sense that someone who thought otherwise would simply be wrong?  (This is not the same question as that of whether any of the competing reasons could be objectively valid in itself.)  Three seemingly relevant kinds of ethical theory are examined: virtue ethics, utilitarianism and moral absolutism.  It is suggested that the proponents of these have all so far failed to show that they can give compelling objective reasons for acting on certain reasons rather than others.  We so far lack any conception of what sort of second-order considerations could adjudicate between competing reasons.  This is not so much an ‘error theory’ in J. L. Mackie’s sense as an admission of ignorance.

Objectivism is the view that how an agent ought to act depends on all kinds of facts, regardless of the agent's epistemic position with respect to them. One of the most important challenges to this view is constituted by certain cases involving specific conditions of uncertainty-so-called threeoptions cases. In these cases it seems overwhelmingly plausible that an agent ought to do what is recommendable given her limited perspective, even though the agent knows that this is not objectively the best course of action. The standard objectivist response to this challenge relies on a distinction between what one ought to do and what would be blameworthy or unreasonable to do. This response is affected by several problems. In this paper I introduce and defend an alternative objectivist response to the challenge. My proposal admits that in the relevant cases the agent ought to do what is recommendable given her perspective, but maintains that this diagnosis of the cases is fully compatible with objectivism. I argue that this proposal has several advantages over alternative accounts of the cases.

The meta-ethical commitments of folk respondents – specifically their commitment to the objectivity of moral claims – have recently become subject to empirical scrutiny. Experimental findings suggest that people are meta-ethical pluralists: there is both inter-and intrapersonal variation with regard to people's objectivist commitments. What meta-ethical implications, if any, do these findings have? I point out that current research does not directly address traditional meta-ethical questions: the methods used and distinctions drawn by experimenters do not perfectly match those of meta-ethicists. But I go on to argue that, in spite of this mismatch, the research findings should be of interest to moral philosophers, including meta-ethicists. Not only do these findings extend the field of moral psychology with new data and hypotheses, but they also provide tentative evidence that touches on the adequacy of theses in moral semantics and moral metaphysics. Specifically, they put pressure on arguments in support of moral realism.

Overview of the general philosophical problems discussed by Polystratus, the third Scholarch of the Epicurean Garden in Athens, in his work "On Irrational Contempt". He argues a case for an objective morality that can be found in the study of nature by differentiating between how things exist conventionally and how they have dispositional or relational properties. By these secondary effects, we can judge the goodness of something. Polystratus also argues the existence of gods (this view is revised and questioned by author Hiram Crespo) and goes on to accentuate the importance of understanding that the goal set by nature is happiness.

Talvez fosse útil, e mesmo filosoficamente conveniente, começar por definir de uma forma suficientemente rigorosa os conceitos de subjectividade e de objectividade que se tem em mente, a fim de evitar equívocos desnecessários que só podem atrapalhar a discussão e torná-la inconsequente por razões de ambiguidade conceptual. Assim, se definirmos a objectividade de um juízo ou conhecimento como a propriedade lógica ou epistémica que os torna verdadeiros ou válidos independentemente da subjectividade dos agentes que os concebem, isto é, dos seus gostos, interesses, opiniões, desejos ou crenças pessoais, enquanto definimos a subjectividade como a propriedade de um juízo ou conhecimento que faz depender a sua verdade ou validade desses mesmos agentes, ou seja, das suas opiniões, gostos, crenças, desejos ou interesses pessoais, então não se percebe como se poderá considerar, e muito menos afirmar dogmaticamente, sem qualquer argumento digno desse nome, que nem a lógica nem qualquer área da ciência ou da filosofia podem ser ou aspirar a ser epistemicamente neutrais ou objectivas. Se entendermos ambos os conceitos da forma acima referida, como é que se pode consistentemente afirmar que, por exemplo, o príncipio lógico da identidade, segundo o qual A= A, ou o princípio da implicação, segundo o qual se A implica B e B implica C, então A implica C, ou a famosa fórmula fisica que faz equivaler matematicamente a energia à massa vezes a velocidade da luz ao quadrado (E= m.c2), são juízos ou conhecimentos subjectivos. Só se entender por subjectivo o facto óbvio e indiscutível de serem descobertos, pensados, formulados e conhecidos por sujeitos. Mas esse não é, seguramente, o sentido filosoficamente relevante do termo, pois é evidente que se não existissem sujeitos capazes de conhecer também não haveria, pura e simplesmente, conhecimento, dado aquele ser uma das condições necessárias à ocorrência deste. Só que isso não prova que todos os pensamentos e conhecimentos produzidos ou alcançados por aqueles sejam em si mesmos subjectivos no sentido acima indicado, mas tão só no sentido, trivial e irrelevante para o caso, de haver um sujeito que os tem. Deste modo, as leis da lógica e as leis da física, ou bem que são objectivamente válidas e verdadeiras ou bem que não são, conforme descrevam ou não adequadamente as regras que o raciocínio deve cumprir para poder ser considerado formal ou informalmente

Some theologians claim that if God did not exist, there would be no grounding for our moral judgments. Our moral prescriptions, they argue, would be subject only to our changing whim and fancy. Leslie Allan challenges the presumption that moral objectivity consists in tapping into a realm of human-independent facts. He endeavours to show that moral judgments are expressions of human preferences taken from an impartial standpoint. This view, while explaining the nature of objectivity in ethics, leaves no room for a deity. Allan concludes by showing how this account of moral objectivity makes sense of a long-standing universalist tradition in moral philosophy and religious thinking.

El objeto de este trabajo es el de dar cuenta de las críticas a Kelsen contenidas en el último libro, todavía inédito, de Luigi Ferrajoli, Diritto e lógica. Dieci aporie nell'opera di Hans Kelsen, y formular algunas críticas a las tesis sostenidas en él por el propio Ferrajoli. Entre las críticas que el autor considera que cabe dirigir a este respecto a Ferrajoli, las principales afectan al carácter exclusivamente interno de la mirada ferrajoliana sobre el derecho, al carácter siempre opinable, y nunca verdadero o falso, que, según Ferrajoli, tienen los enunciados interpretativos, y a la incompatibilidad que, según el autor, se presenta entre las ambiciones de la teoría ferrajoliana y las limitaciones que a la misma impone su anclaje en el no cognitivismo ético.

The purpose of this paper is to give an account of the critiques that Ferrajoli addresses to Kelsen in his latest -still unpublished- book, Diritto e lógica. Dieci aporie nell'opera di Hans Kelsen, and to make some criticism of the theses held in it by Ferrajoli himself. Major criticisms that the author believes should be addressed in this regard to Ferrajoli affect the purely internal nature of Ferrajoli's approach to the law, the always debatable character, never true or false that, according to Ferrajoli, interpretive statements have, and the incompatibility which, according to the author, exists between the ambitions of Ferrajoli's theory and the limitations imposed on it by its anchoring in ethical non-cognitivism.

In order to answer the question whether there is a place for values in the natural world, without claiming an independent sphere of universally existing values, I employ the concept of enactivism, according to which the processes of perception, cognition and emotion are essentially conceived as interactions of a living organism with its environment. On this basis, I develop a relational conception of value: values are understood as forms of affective significance, which result from the embodied, perceptual and acting relationship living beings have with their environment. Through their bodily and affective resonance, they disclose the affective qualities in their environment which are relevant to them – qualities which have objective, vital significance for their self-preservation. Hence, values are objective quali¬ties of the relationship between an embodied subject and its world.

This paper describes a novel method of empirically investigating philosophical questions, which I term 'Qualitative Empirical Philosophy,' involving the use of semi-structured interviews. This offers an extension and a critique of 'Experimental Philoso-phy' and its use of survey methodology. Here I focus on the application of these methods to the study of folk metaethical relativism. I argue that surveys face severe challenges in ensuring subject comprehension, capturing the details of their views, and are simply incapable of detecting some plausible metaethical positions, whereas qualitative methods have several advantages.

Mackie’s claim that in general courage benefits its possessor seems inconsistent with his ‘error theory’ of value.  But how plausible is it in itself?  I suggest that his arguments for the claim fail in the same way as the arguments of those who more explicitly embrace ‘virtue ethics’ fail.  We do not know any way of objectively weighing risks against other considerations, of deciding whether something is ‘worth the risk’.  Since I have no PROOF that there could not be a way, I prefer to speak of ‘ignorance’ rather than ‘error’ here.

Davidson and Kolnai in different ways emphasise that practical syllogistic reasoning can only tell one that one has a reason to do or not to do something.  It cannot adjudicate between conflicting reasons.  It can tell one the means to certain ends but not which ends to pursue.  This paper considers possible responses to this predicament.  What if anything can be done to put deliberation - the 'weighing' of competing reasons - on  a rational basis?

I argue that Mackie's thesis about courage and self-interest is neither consistent with his 'error theory' of value nor convincing in itself.  The question of the objectivity of value needs to be distinguished from that of whether one value can objectively outweigh or outrank another.  This is so even when the only values under consideration are self-interested ones.

The paper begins with an overview of contemporary liberal-egalitarian theories in order to show the diversity among different understandings of justice. Then, the paper draws a borderline between luck egalitarianism (Arneson, G. A. Cohen, Roemer) and a pro-democratic, relational egalitarianism (Rawls, J. Cohen, Anderson, Barry) that focuses on the society’s structure, i.e. the production of its inner relations.
The following part introduces the idea of reflective equilibrium and its theoretical benefits in terms of “de-metaphysised” ethics. Furthermore, this part elaborates Dworkin’s liberal principle of justice as the basis of his liberal moral doctrine.
Finally, the paper shows that a “de-metaphysised” ethics could not be equated with the conception of justice as mutual advantage, and neither is it lost in an Archimedean skepticism. By referring to Barry’s work, the paper elaborates the idea of justice as impartiality through the debate between moral objectivism and skepticism.
The paper ends with synthesising a conclusion of the previous three parts. Also, it defines justice as implied by Rawls’ liberal egalitarianism. Ultimately, the paper identifies the need for further research of the topic that would elaborate and answer the questions highlighted by this paper.

The Achilles heel of the political philosophy of multiculturalism is the problem of the oppression of ‘internal minorities’. What can we say if some minority cultures do not promote certain individualistic values, or reject the idea of universal human rights altogether? Does the repudiation of the group claims to internal restrictions inevitably presuppose a commitment to Western, liberal  values, and is it consequently tantamount to ethnocentrism? In this case, we would seem to deny the very principle of ‘equal recognition’ of cultures, and hence would arrive at an impasse. Or are there some objective, universally acceptable standards of value which do not violate this principle?
I will argue in my paper that without at least some element of ethical
objectivism as an implicit normative postulate, multiculturalism would be
difficult, if not impossible to be sustained and defended.

در قرون اخیر، انتقادات گسترده¬ی فلسفی که با پیشرفت های چشمگیر علمی همراه شده است، اتقان براهین سنتی اثبات وجود خدا را متزلزل نموده و زیر سوال برده است. از این رو خداباوران برای اثبات معقولیّت دیدگاه خود، به حوزه ها و عرصه های نوینی همچون اخلاق روی آوردند. یکی از استدلال های اخلاقی معاصر بر وجود خدا، استدلال اخلاقی رابرت مری هیو آدامز است. آدامز با ابداع نظریه ی فضیلت، تبیینی نوین از ارزش های اخلاقی ارائه می دهد که هم قابلیّت توجیه عینیّت ارزش های اخلاقی، به عنوان مؤلفه ی مهم معناداری اخلاق را دارد و هم صدق خداباوری را به عنوان بخشی مهم از آن تبیین، معرفی می کند. در این مقاله به توضیح و تبیین این نظریه پرداخته ایم و به تقریر استدلال بر آمده از این نظریه، که قرائن و دلایلی بر وجود خدا فراهم می آورد می پردازیم و سپس نقدهای وارد شده بر آن را مورد بررسی قرار خواهیم داد.


With the advent of scientific advances in recent centuries, widespread philosophical criticisms weakened the traditional evidences and compelled the theistic to pursue novel evidences such as ethics to support their ideas., the moral argument of Robert Merrihew Adams is one of the contemporary moral argument for the existence of God. By devised the theory of virtue by Adams, offers a new explanation of moral values which have ability to justify the objectivity of moral values, as the most important element of Ethics Meaningful, and also have ability to justify The truth of theism, as a important part of this explanation. In this article we have tried to explain this idea and described this theory and analyzed the argument which raised from this theory and prepared evidences and reasons for the existence of God and then we examine the critics of that.

Leslie Allan defends his thesis that ethics is objective in the sense of requiring moral agents to offer impartial reasons for acting. Radical subjectivists have attacked this requirement for impartiality on a number of grounds. Some critics make the charge that Allan’s thesis is simply a version of subjectivism in disguise. He responds by showing how a broadly naturalist view of ethics accommodates objective moral constraints. Allan also counters cases in which impartiality is purportedly not morally required and considers the subjectivists’ response to the problem of demarcating moral from non-moral judgements.

Hard problems are sometimes best tackled obliquely. Why be moral? What is the status of moral language? Isn’t morality all relative to culture or person? These are all hard problems of moral philosophy, and it is important that we try to tackle them. In this book I will seek to shed light on these problems by getting clear about the basic foundations of our moral thinking. In getting clear about foundations, solutions to some of these hard problems will, I hope, be suggested and ways forward opened up. In particular, I will be defending a view of morality as essentially other-regarding, recasting questions like ‘Why be moral?’ as questions about why we should regard others. Then, I want to suggest that the source of our other-regarding thought is a phenomenon I call ‘primary recognition’. By this I mean the unmediated experience of seeing other humans as those due moral concern. This experience is, I will argue, an incorrigible and necessary part of all functioning human beings. The third strand of my project here will be to locate all of this within a wider discussion about the Wittgensteinian notion of basic moral certain. By understanding basic moral certainty in its universal and local forms we open the way to understanding the diversity, and sometime incommensurability, of our various moral systems in a way that does not require full-blown moral relativism.
The main business of this book will be to give a strong account of these three elements: morality as other-regarding, as having its source in primary recognition, and its being grounded in basic moral certainties. With this picture in place I will suggest some ways in which it can help solve, or dissolve, some of the hard problems in contemporary moral philosophy.

Many moral philosophers have assumed that ordinary folk embrace moral objectivism. But, if so, why do folk embrace objectivism? One possibility is the pervasive connection between religion and morality in ordinary life. Some theorists contend that God is viewed as a divine guarantor of right and wrong, rendering morality universal and absolute. But is belief in God per se sufficient for moral objectivism? In this paper, we present original research exploring the connections between metaethics and particular conceptions of God among religious participants. Study 1 shows that, when controlling for religiosity, age, and belief in God's loving characteristics, it is belief in God's punishing characteristics (specifically, the existence of Hell) that uniquely predicts rejection of moral relativism. Study 2 shows that followers of Abrahamic faiths are more likely to endorse moral objectivism when thinking of the Divine, regardless of loving or punishing characteristics. And Study 3 shows that priming for moral objectivism makes theists more likely to endorse God's punishing characteristics. A general picture is suggested by these data. For Abrahamic theists, God's particular characteristics are not germane to the question of whether his moral commandments are real and objective. And while theists strongly endorse God's loving characteristics, focusing on the objective nature of morality can highlight God's punishing nature, reminding theists that objective morality requires a divine guarantor of justice to enforce it.

Many moral philosophers have assumed that ordinary folk embrace moral objectivism. But, if so, why do folk embrace objectivism? One possibility is the pervasive connection between religion and morality in ordinary life. Some theorists contend that God is viewed as a divine guarantor of right and wrong, rendering morality universal and absolute. But is belief in God per se sufficient for moral objectivism? In this paper, we present original research exploring the connections between metaethics and particular conceptions of God among religious participants. Study 1 shows that, when controlling for religiosity, age, and belief in God's loving characteristics, it is belief in God's punishing characteristics (specifically, the existence of Hell) that uniquely predicts rejection of moral relativism. Study 2 shows that followers of Abrahamic faiths are more likely to endorse moral objectivism when thinking of the Divine, regardless of loving or punishing characteristics. And Study ...

انتقادات گسترده¬ی فلسفی، همراه با پیشرفت¬های علمی قرون اخیر، براهین سنّتی اثبات وجود خدا را متزلزل نمود و مؤمنانرا برای اثبات معقولیّت دیدگاه خود، مجبور به روی آوردن به براهین نوین¬تری کرد. از سوی دیگر حضور پررنگ دیدگاه¬های طبیعت¬گرایانه در قلمرو اخلاق، عینیّت ارزش¬های اخلاقی و در نتیجه بنیان¬های اخلاقی جامعه¬ی انسانی را تهدید می¬کرد. با توجه به این¬که استدلال اخلاقی کانت، که برای حفظ اطلاق امر اخلاقی وضع شده بود، نه تنها مورد هجمه¬ی انتقادات فراوانی قرار گرفت بود، بلکه رضایت مؤمنان را نیز فراهم نمی¬کرد؛تعدادی از اندیشمندان که به عینیّت ارزش¬های اخلاقی باور داشتند، تلاش کردند نظریه¬ای را سامان دهند که هم از عینیّت ارزش¬های اخلاقی محافظت کند و هم برای معقولیّت وجود خدا قرائنی عقلی پدید آورد.این رساله با مطالعه¬ی سیر این اندیشه درباره¬ی «خدا و عینیّت¬گرایی اخلاقی»، و با تمرکز بر موضوع «استدلال¬ از طریق عینیّت ارزش¬های اخلاقی بر وجود خدا»، در سه فصل اصلی تنظیم شده¬است. فصل نخستین بحث به سنت راشدال- سورلی اختصاص داده¬ و در دو بخش به شکل¬گیری و تکامل استدلال از طریق عینیّت¬گرایی اخلاقی اشاره کرده¬است. در فصل دوم، ورود و تکاملِ تفکراتِ متفاوت¬تری نسبت به سنّت راشدال- سورلی، مورد مطالعه قرار گرفته و به استدلال¬های سی. اس. لوئیس، تروبلود و آدامز پرداخته شده¬است. فصل سوم این رساله، به نقد، مقایسه¬ی مباحث مطرح شده و بررسی نکات مهمی پیرامون ارتباط خداباوری و اخلاق  اختصاص داده شده¬است و در انتها به این نتیجه رسیده-است که باور به عینیّت ارزش¬های اخلاقی، شاید توان ارائه¬ی استدلالی خردناگریز را نداشته باشد، اما دیدگاه مؤمنانه و عینیّت¬گرایی اخلاقی، حمایتی دوجانبه از یکدیگر دارند و از این رو باور به عینیّت ارزش¬های اخلاقی، شواهد و قرائن مهمی به نفع خداباوری پدید می¬آورد.
کلمات کلیدی:
استدلال اخلاقی بر وجود خدا، ارزش اخلاقی، سنت راشدال- سورلی، عینیّت¬گرایی اخلاقی،تبیین مؤمنانه از اخلاق، سی. اس. لوئیس، نظریّه¬ی خیر، رابرت آدامز.

With the advent of scientific advances in recent centuries, widespread philosophical criticisms weakened the traditional evidences and compelled the theistic to pursue novel evidences to support their ideas.  On the other hand objectivity of moral values, and consequently the moral basis of human society threatened by Raising of naturalistic view in the realm of ethics.
Since the moral argument of Kant which was established to protect moral order absolutism, not only was targeted by overwhelming disapprovals but it also was incapable of satisfying the believer, A number of philosophers who believed in moral values objectivism attempted to organize a hypothesis in order to both safeguard moral values objectivism and create cogent indications for the existence of God.
This dissertation has been organized in three chapters with studying the path in this thought about “God and moral objectivism” and with concentration on “The moral argument for the existence of God”. The first chapter is dedicated to Rashdall-Sorley tradition which implies in two sections to the formation and evolution of argument using moral objectivism. In the second chapter, the introduction and evolution of opinions different from Rashdall-Sorley tradition is studied and the arguments of Adams, Trueblood and C.S. Lewis are elaborated. The third chapter of this dissertation is allocated to criticizing, comparing the discussed issues and investigating crucial notes about the relation between theism and morality which eventually concludes that believing in moral values objectivism perhaps cannot provide an rationally inescapable argument, but theism and moral objectivism have a mutual support and therefore believing in moral values objectivism provides significant evidences in favor of theism.

Based on bivalent thinking and on the law or principle of excluded middle or third, it is commonly believed that either realism or its negation in the form of anti-realism must be the case in those areas where such distinctions can be sensibly applied. In this paper, however, I make the seemingly strange claim that neither realism nor anti-realism is the case in any area on the basis that both " realism " and " anti-realism " contain fundamentally flawed conceptual content that makes both positions or terms redundant. Somewhat more specifically, I argue that the multi-thesis versions of " realism " and " anti-realism " are redundant and that the respective expressions and associations of content are best forgotten entirely. Furthermore, I argue that the ontological single-thesis versions are also redundant but best replaced by an ontological and ontologically Kantian " objectivism " and " subjectivism " of unproblematic content. In terms of related metaethical content and since moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism are often associated with redundant moral realism and, respectively, anti-realism, I then argue that moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism are best disassociated from the redundant multi-and single-thesis moral realisms and, respectively, anti-realisms. The fourth and last thesis is that, contrary to what one might suspect, there is no necessary connection between moral cognitivism and moral objectivism or between moral non-cognitivism and moral subjectivism.