Neuropragmatism

Nel presente articolo sosterrò che sebbene il naturalismo liberalizzato abbia buoni argomenti a favore del pluralismo ontolo- gico antiriduzionistico, esso non riesce tuttavia a mantenersi su un livello pienamente naturalistico. Il motivo di ciò risiederebbe in un’a- desione non completa al programma del pragmatismo, rispetto al quale il movimento di De Caro mantiene un background metafisico problematico. Fornirò un esempio di simili problematiche prenden- do in esame il tema del libero arbitrio e l’argomento dell’abduzione, le cui implicazioni sembrano delineare un agente incompatibile con le leggi naturali. Infine, sosterrò che il pragmatismo di John Dewey, grazie al suo stretto legame con l’esperienza e al rifiuto della metafisi- ca come studio di proprietà essenziali, rappresenta forse la migliore teorizzazione per un naturalismo pluralistico e non antiscientifico.

Good old-fashioned cognitive science characterizes human thinking as symbol manipulation qua computation and therefore emphasizes the processing of symbolic representations as a necessary if not sufficient condition for “general intelligent action.” Recent alternative conceptions of human thinking tend to deemphasize if not altogether eschew the notion of representation. The present paper shows how classical American pragmatist conceptions of human thinking can successfully avoid either of these extremes, replacing old-fashioned conceptions of representation with one that characterizes both representatum and representans in externalist terms.

In this article, I integrate pragmatic and contemporary literature to advance a valuative understanding of mind. That is, I argue valuations—taken to include emotions, interests and aesthetics—undergird cognition and perception.  In making this case, I focus on James’s view that selective interests bring coherence to thought and experience. I further argue that interests are emotion-like. Though substantiated on conceptual, experiential and neurobiological grounds, this gets next to no attention, even among those who claim pragmatic influences and suggest emotion intertwines with cognition, such as Damasio and Schulkin. Extending this from cognition to perception, I go on to offer a valuative account of the latter that merges James and Dewey’s positions with Gestalt notions and findings from experimental research, along with Gibson’s ideas, which have pragmatic bases. By pushing pragmatism a little beyond what its original authors intended, placing it next to some of its intellectual offspring and highlighting underappreciated aspects, I hope to nudge thinking on mind in new directions, while simultaneously clarifying and rendering a fuller appreciation of classical pragmatism.

In this paper I analyze recent neo-pragmatic views that have followed Wittgenstein’s anti-representationalist perspective on meaning. One can find a bifurcation in recent literature on the question of how human understanding and communication actually take place in society. Some are convinced that natural science can explain all our communicative capacities. Others still believe that there is something special about meaning. On both sides we find representationalists and anti-representationalists. I present here the main features of this bifurcation so as to argue in favor of a neural-pragmatic semantic, that still has a Wittgensteinian flavor, but that incorporates lessons received from embodied cognition theories and from biosemantics.
Key words: Meaning, Representationalism, Wittgensteinian pragmatism, Embodied cognition, Neural-pragmatism

I argue that neuropragmatism holds to a problematic version of Dewey's principle of continuity, and thus risks the melioristic dimensions of the neurophilosophical turn proposed for pragmatism. Therefore, firstly, I try to show that the neuropragmatist does hold this principle. Secondly, I give an alternative (historicist) account. Thirdly, I argue that the neuropragmatist's interpretation of the principle of continuity is problematic because it threatens to undermine their melioristic concerns because of their explanatory commitments. This historicist pragmatist order of explanation aims at avoiding this problem while maintaining meliorism. I conclude by arguing that this is a mistake in the conflation of two distinct stories, one ethical, and the other ontological.

Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragmatic pluralism and eliminative materialism. Pragmatic pluralism became predominant as Churchland's epistemology became more neurocomputationally inspired, which saved him from the skepticism implicit in certain passages of the theory of reduction he outlined in Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. However, once he replaces eliminativism with a neurologically inspired pragmatic pluralism, Churchland 1) cannot claim that folk psychology might be a false theory, in any significant sense 2) cannot claim that the concepts of Folk psychology might be empty of extension and lack reference. 3) cannot sustain Churchland's criticism of Dennett's "intentional stance" . 4) cannot claim to be a form of scientific realism, in the sense of believing that what science describes is somehow realer that what other conceptual systems describe.

Neurophilosophical pragmatism, or neuropragmatism, is a scientifically informed treatment of cognition, knowledge, the body-mind relation, agency, socialization, and further issues predicated on sound judgments about these basic matters. Neuropragmatism is capable of grappling with philosophical questions arising at many levels, from synapse to society. There is much at stake, as the epigraph by Dewey states. With its firm grounding in science, neuropragmatism may be the philosophy best equipped to deal productively with the challenges facing our culture, as developments in neuroscience and neurotechnology bring about both better means for dealing with old problems, and new ways of creating and dealing with the problems of today and tomorrow.

In his essay, "Affording our Culture: 'Smart' Technology and the Prospects for Creative Democracy," Tibor Solymosi addresses my challenge for neuropragmatism to counter what I have elsewhere called dopamine democracy.  Although I believe that Solymosi has begun to provide an explanation for how neuropragmatism may counter dopamine democracy, especially with his conceptions OE and cultural affordances, I respond with a helpful addition to his approach by returning to the theory of inquiry as put forth by John Dewey. In particular , I focus on the phases of inquiry as colored by Dewey's concept of humility. Solymosi does not pay adequate attention to the function of inquiry necessary for combatting dopamine democracy. His account of cultural affordances and education is strengthened by using Dewey's concept of humility as a guiding disposition for neuropragmatic inquiry. Recognizing humility as an instrument of neuropragmatic inquiry provides us with a tool to better address the pitfalls of dopamine democracy, especially misinformation and incentive salience. My argument proceeds by first articulating dopamine democracy as a problem and Solymosi's concept of cultural affordances and how he understands these as neuropragmatic tools to address the problem through education. I present humility as an instrumental concept derived from Dewey's work on inquiry. I then suggest how humility may serve neuropragmatic inquiry to assist in combatting the problems of dopamine democracy.

It has been known that the right hemisphere is contributed to language processing, especially in macro level, including macrostructure or discourse processing. This research is aimed at evaluating the students’ ability in language processing concerning macrostructure and the right hemispher brain function. This research is based on Dharmaperwira-prins method “Right Hemisphere Communication Assessment” (Pemeriksaan Komunikasi Hemisfer Kanan/PKHK). Research on students’ ability in macrostructure processing is important to conduct since students nowadays are regarded lack of ability in well being communication. The research is conducted toward 38 students of English Department of Andalas University. The data are taken by paper test which is designed to evaluate the students’ ability in macrostructure.

The result of research shows that most students have problems in providing important information, adjective, and feeling. By this result, it can be assumed that the participants have problem in right hemisphere competence concerning to language processing. These problems evoke not by accident or lesion in right hemisphere, yet it is caused by brain development which is focused on left hemisphere only.

Nel presente articolo sosterro che sebbene il naturalismo liberalizzato abbia buoni argomenti a favore del pluralismo ontolo- gico antiriduzionistico, esso non riesce tuttavia a mantenersi su un livello pienamente naturalistico. Il motivo di cio risiederebbe in un’a- desione non completa al programma del pragmatismo, rispetto al quale il movimento di De Caro mantiene un background metafisico problematico. Forniro un esempio di simili problematiche prenden- do in esame il tema del libero arbitrio e l’argomento dell’abduzione, le cui implicazioni sembrano delineare un agente incompatibile con le leggi naturali. Infine, sosterro che il pragmatismo di John Dewey, grazie al suo stretto legame con l’esperienza e al rifiuto della metafisi- ca come studio di proprieta essenziali, rappresenta forse la migliore teorizzazione per un naturalismo pluralistico e non antiscientifico.

In this paper, I attempt to draw out the conceptual implications of the vocabulary of a recent promising attempt to develop the connections between cognitive science and pragmatism--namely neuropragmatism. My purpose is to question the implications of the neuropragmatist's reliance on the concept of environment, and to push an analysis which attempts to broaden the philosophical resources available to pragmatism.

In the first section I cash out neuropragmatism and criticize the conceptual primacy of "environment" in the neuropragmatist vocabulary.

In the second section, I consider an alternative view in which the environment is "extended" by environments. I find this approach lacking.

In the third section, I offer a consideration of the problem of vocabularies in pragmatism's approach to both philosophical and scientific theorizing.