Работа представляет собой исправленную версию ранее опубликованной статьи¹. Этот вариант распространяется без помощи каких-либо издательств и впервые публикуется на портале Academia.edu.¶ Русский мыслитель XIX века Никита Петрович... more
Работа представляет собой исправленную версию ранее опубликованной статьи¹. Этот вариант распространяется без помощи каких-либо издательств и впервые публикуется на портале Academia.edu.¶
Русский мыслитель XIX века Никита Петрович Гиляров-Платонов оставил после себя собрание черновиков с экономическими заметками. В статье я постарался собрать его разрозненные идеи в цельные модели и определить место Гилярова-Платонова на общем дереве экономической мысли. Работа затрагивает вопросы теории цены, капитала и кредита, а также модели человека. Первая версия статьи заняла I место на XX Конкурсе имени В.Н. Вениаминова, в секции «Экономические исследования: точки противоречий и точки развития».¶
¹ Алексеев И.М. Об одной недооценённой, но весьма перспективной форме исследований: реконструкции по черновикам (на материалах Н. П. Гилярова-Платонова) // Вестник экономического научного общества студентов и аспирантов. Выпуск № 61. Санкт-Петербург : Издательство МБИ, 2022. 185 с.
Questo volume è diviso in due parti. La prima è dedicata alla politica della pesca in Italia. La seconda contiene un'analisi dei metodi per la fissazione dei margini di intermediazione dei farmaci etici.
Русский мыслитель XIX века Никита Петрович Гиляров-Платонов оставил после себя собрание черновиков с экономическими заметками. В статье я постарался собрать его разрозненные идеи в цельные модели и определить место Гилярова-Платонова на... more
Русский мыслитель XIX века Никита Петрович Гиляров-Платонов оставил после себя собрание черновиков с экономическими заметками. В статье я постарался собрать его разрозненные идеи в цельные модели и определить место Гилярова-Платонова на общем дереве экономической мысли. Работа затрагивает вопросы теории цены, капитала и кредита, а также модели человека. Статья заняла I место на XX Конкурсе имени В.Н. Вениаминова, в секции «Экономические исследования: точки противоречий и точки развития».¶
Ссылка для цитирования:
Алексеев И.М. Об одной недооценённой, но весьма перспективной форме исследований: реконструкции по черновикам (на материалах Н. П. Гилярова-Платонова) // Вестник экономического научного общества студентов и аспирантов. Выпуск № 61. Санкт-Петербург : Издательство МБИ, 2022. 185 с.
The paper offers two new insights in the context of the Mahatma Gandhi national rural employment guarantee act (MGNREGA) in India: first, we establish that migration of the skilled workers can occur under the MGNREGA scheme due to the low... more
The paper offers two new insights in the context of the Mahatma Gandhi national rural employment guarantee act (MGNREGA) in India: first, we establish that migration of the skilled workers can occur under the MGNREGA scheme due to the low wage rate while the quality of work degrades as skilled workers migrate. As a result, we argue, only subsidies can offer a helpline in this regard. Secondly, this paper also argues that the political economy assumes critical importance for any welfare intervention like MGNREGA. We hence model the political economy of rural sector to explain why MGNREGA policies can fail. We show that, in situations where political parties and politicians can sequentially commit first to de facto (local) tax rates, and then levels and distribution of local public goods such as institutions and infrastructure, the political equilibrium is an underprovision equilibrium. In the underprovision equilibrium, the local government at the grass-root level of democracy choose...
This paper compares methods of firm level pricing determination under different theoretical frameworks including perfect competition, imperfect competition, and real competition. The basic frameworks of perfect and imperfect competition... more
This paper compares methods of firm level pricing determination under different theoretical frameworks including perfect competition, imperfect competition, and real competition. The basic frameworks of perfect and imperfect competition are sketched out, followed by a brief historical overview of the evolution of the theories. Real competition is then considered, with the conclusion being real competition is the framework best able to describe and predict economic phenomena.
We propose an evolutionary model in which boundedly rational firms compete and learn in a dynamic oligopoly with imperfect information and evolving degrees of market power. Firms in the model set prices according to routines, and try to... more
We propose an evolutionary model in which boundedly rational firms compete and learn in a dynamic oligopoly with imperfect information and evolving degrees of market power. Firms in the model set prices according to routines, and try to make profits by capturing market share. The model can be extended to deal with heterogeneous costs and technological advance. The demand side of the market is composed of boundedly rational consumers who are capable of adapting to changing market options. Supply-demand interactions can be represented through a population dynamics model from which prices and market structures emerge. We obtain closed-form and simulation results which we interpret and compare with benchmark results from a standard non-cooperative game (Bertrand). When we compare the results with the Bertrand setting, we find a surprising result. Whereas in the fully rational Bertrand setting, firms either lower prices and erode their extra profits, or try to cooperate in a collusive equilibrium that is detrimental for consumer welfare, in the evolutionary setting firms make substantial profits, compete by adjusting prices, and the dynamics improve consumer welfare. From these results we claim that, instead of treating market power, external-ities, and asymmetric information as market failures, we should consider them as essential traits of market competition. We argue that neo-Schumpeterian models incorporate all of these features together, thus leading towards a more realistic price theory for market economies.
Abstract: Price plays a unique role in neoliberal economic theory, quantifying value and providing markets with the information needed to produce equilibrium conditions and optimal social welfare. While the role of price is clear, the... more
Abstract: Price plays a unique role in neoliberal economic theory, quantifying value and providing markets with the information needed to produce equilibrium conditions and optimal social welfare. While the role of price is clear, the mechanisms by which prices are discovered, and by which the commodities they value are defined, are left obscure in neoliberal theory. Automatic price discovery, and self-evident commodity identities, are assumed. Observation of newly created markets in ecosystem services suggests that this is a moment of significant tension within neoliberal practice, as potential market participants seek guidance from the state on appropriate commodity measures and pricing practices. Bureaucrats and economists, following the neoliberal preference for governance over government, turn the task back onto civil society. The invocation of abstract rules, instead of the formulation of practical guidance, by policymakers means that the neoliberal marketization of non-market public goods is a contingent and sometimes rudderless task for those who must make markets work on the ground. This presents many opportunities for constructive engagement on the part of geographers and other critics of neoliberal strategy.
This paper explores Michał Kalecki’s proposal of a price policy which was supposed to replace the post-war rationing system in Poland and establishes a modificated price leadership model in quasi-duopoly. The main problem of the rationing... more
This paper explores Michał Kalecki’s proposal of a price policy which was supposed to replace the post-war rationing system in Poland and establishes a modificated price leadership model in quasi-duopoly. The main problem of the rationing system after World War II was analysed many times by leading economists but Kalecki pointed out a different point of view.
The paper offers two new insights in the context of the Mahatma Gandhi national rural employment guarantee act (MGNREGA) in India: first, we establish that migration of the skilled workers can occur under the MGNREGA scheme due to the low... more
The paper offers two new insights in the context of the Mahatma Gandhi national rural employment guarantee act (MGNREGA) in India: first, we establish that migration of the skilled workers can occur under the MGNREGA scheme due to the low wage rate while the quality of work degrades as skilled workers migrate. As a result, we argue, only subsidies can offer a helpline in this regard. Secondly, this paper also argues that the political economy assumes critical importance for any welfare intervention like MGNREGA. We hence model the political economy of rural sector to explain why MGNREGA policies can fail. We show that, in situations where political parties and politicians can sequentially commit first to de facto (local) tax rates, and then levels and distribution of local public goods such as institutions and infrastructure, the political equilibrium is an under-provision-equilibrium. In the under-provision-equilibrium, the local government at the grass-root level of democracy chooses low tax rates (de facto) and offers inadequate local public goods, which can thus be an equilibrium outcome, which will in turn deter rural development through MGNREGA policies to eradicate rural poverty.
