Regime Stability

根據經典現代化理論，經濟增長將促進民主轉型的發生。然而澳門並沒有在回歸後的高速經濟增長下，出現民主轉型。本文希望從比較政治的角度去解釋澳門為何仍維持一個穩定的威權政體。利用德國政治學家Johannes Gerschewski所提出的合法化(legitimation)、精英吸納(co-optation)和強制能力(repression)三個條件的政體穏定理論框架。以及澳門和新加坡、澳門和香港兩組比較案例分析。本文認為港澳在回歸後政體穩定上的差異，正是因為澳門和新加坡一樣滿足了上述三個實現政體穩定的必要條件，而香港亦沒有。

According to the classic modernization theory, democratization will follow economic development. The above predication, however, does not take place in the case of Macao. This paper intends to examine Macao’s regime stability in a comparative perspective. Through applied the theoretical framework from Johannes Gerschewski which constructed by three conditions: legitimation, co-optation and repression, and two sets of comparative case studies between Singapore, Macao and Hong Kong, this paper argues the difference in regime stability between Macao and Hong Kong after return to China due to the former achieves all the conditions mentioned above like Singapore; while the latter fails.

Do autocrats who pursue partial liberalization of their regimes grossly miscalculate and put their political survival at risk? This could be the case according to plausible interpretations of statistical studies on regime type and regime stability. These studies indicate that ``mixed'', ``incoherent'' or ``semi-democratic'' regimes are less durable than pure forms of both democratic and dictatorial regimes. However, the short duration of regimes coded as semi-democratic might be due to other factors, such as these regimes relatively often being multi-party autocracies and military regimes rather than more durable monarchies or one-party regimes, or that semi-democracy is endogenous to latent factors that reduce regime-survival prospects in general. In this paper, we identify four such potential ``methodological'' explanations to why semi-democracies are relatively short-lived. We investigate the relevance of these explanations empirically by replicating and then expanding the analysis in \citet{Gates:2006AJPS}. Although the relative instability of semi-democracies may have been exaggerated in previous studies, we do find that semi-democracies are inherently less durable. However, when only considering regime changes towards more democracy, there is no difference between autocracies and semi-democracies. Furthermore, we find only weak evidence of differences in the duration of different authoritarian regime types, such as military and single-party regimes, once accounting for differences in degree of democracy. However, there is some evidence that monarchies are relatively durable. Furthermore, in contrast to being a semi-democracy, being a competitive authoritarian regime does not reduce survival prospects.

In this paper, we examine the impact of ethnic cooptation on authoritarian stability. We argue theoretically and demonstrate empirically that the inclu- sion of elites from politically relevant ethnic groups significantly reduces the risk of authoritarian breakdown. We also show how this effect varies across different forms of regime change and type. While a prominent explanatory factor in conflict research, inter-ethnic competition for state power has so far been understudied within the literature on authoritarian regime survival. Although accounts of cooptation strategies have recently gained prominence, most remain structuralist and focus on formal institutions such as authori- tarian parties, parliaments and elections that facilitate cooperation between a dictator and coopted elites. We go beyond institutionalist analyses and shift the attention to the identity of those who need to be coopted, the degree to which cooptation is actually achieved and the contexts in which cooptation works best. We present three main findings: 1.) Ethnic cooptation stabilizes authoritarian regimes. 2.) It reduces the risk of irregular but not of regular forms of regime change. 3.) It is most effective where formal institutions are weak, namely in personalist dictatorships.

Even after twenty years of Lukashenka’s rule, Belarusians are still having to struggle for democracy. However, there has been a modest growth in the number of protesters during presidential elections and in the pro-EU mood of the Belarusian population. This article analyzes the dynamic of this growth through the prism of social movements literature and such concepts as framing, political opportunity, and mobilizing struc- tures. The argument is that the weakness of the mobilizing structures and framing processes at times when political opportunities presented themselves in Belarus resulted in an absence of large-scale protests and a failure to sustain the development of social movements in the country. at the same time, Belarus cannot be considered as being in a static or retrogressive state since transnational flows characteristic of a glo- balizing world have exposed people to wider flows of information, providing them with counterframes and resulting in a modest growth in the numbers of protesters and a change in the preferences of the Belarusian population.

This article examines the 2020 election and ongoing protest move- ment in Belarus by comparing them to the contested election in Bolivia (2019) that led to the overthrow of Evo Morales and his MAS party. In each case, a contested election brought about widespread street protests, which called into question the legitimacy of the governing regime. However, only in Bolivia do we see a turnover in state power. In Belarus, Aliaksandr Lukashenka has defied social movement protests and maintained control of the state. This article analyzes the role of the police and military forces and the geopo- litical relations of each country and argues that, unlike Bolivia, where Morales’s key military allies defected, the Belarusian govern- ment has managed to stay in power with the combination of strong coercive capacity and the support of a regional “black knight” – Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Such findings open the way for cautious prognoses for the ongoing protests in Belarus.

This paper has two purposes. First, to design the tool for measuring stability of government in hybrid regimes, and second, to assess the stability of Ukraine's government in comparison to three neighbouring states. Based on a constructed index of governmental stability and a comparison of its value to indices of international research institutions, the study shows that the region's governments are inherently unstable.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has undergone a religious resurgence. However, it was not until the ascension of Vladimir Putin that the government began to seize on this revival, as reflected in its increasing support for Russia’s majority religion. Why has the Russian state increasingly supported the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) since the early 2000s? This senior honors thesis attempts to answer this question through a comprehensive explanatory case study. Utilizing a three-part theory, the independent variables of regime stability, political legitimacy, and Orthodox identity are hypothesized as interwoven explanations. Through the collection of over 80 instances of preferential state support, a trend of increasing support over time was established. Two conclusions emerge from this research: first, there is correlational support for all three hypotheses, with identity demonstrating the strongest relationship; and second, a micro-level explanation for inter-year fluctuations of state support is partially validated. Overall, this thesis illuminates a trend previously unnoticed by scholars and, in addition, has assessed potential explanations for increasing state support of the ROC in Russia.

ככל שקרבות הבחירות לנשיאות איראן, גובר באיראן ובמערב השיח סביב האפשרות לבחירתו של "נשיא צבאי", שיבוא משורות משמרות המהפכה וינצל את כישוריו הצבאיים לפתרון האתגרים החריפים הניצבים בפני הרפובליקה האסלאמית מבית ומחוץ. הגם שמעמדם של משמרות המהפכה התחזק בעשורים האחרונים והם ממלאים תפקיד בולט בפוליטיקה ובכלכלה, כל דיון ב"מיליטריזציה" של המדינה האיראנית דורש, בין היתר, להבחין בין התערבות ישירה של משמרות המהפכה בפוליטיקה לבין השתלבותם של מפקדים לשעבר בפוליטיקה. בכל מקרה, הסיכויים להשתלטות משמרות המהפכה על המערכת הפוליטית האיראנית נראים קלושים, כל עוד המנהיג הנוכחי ח'אמנהאי אוחז במושכות השלטון. מות ח'אמנהאי עשוי להאיץ את תהליך המיליטריזציה של המדינה האיראנית ואולי אף להכשיר את הקרקע למודל שלטוני חלופי ולהשלכות מרחיקות לכת על מדיניותה מבית וכלפי חוץ.

Coastal vegetation is widely attributed to stabilize sediment. While most studies focused on how canopy causes flow reduction and thereby affects sediment dynamics, the role of roots and rhizomes on stabilizing the surface sediment has been less well studied. This study aims to quantify interactions between above-and below-ground biomass of eelgrass (i.e., living Zostera marina plants and mimics) with surface sediment erosion (i.e., bed load and suspended load), under different hydrodynamic forcing that was created using a wave flume. Belowground biomass played an important role preventing bed-load erosion, by roughly halving the amount of sediment transported after being exposed to maximal orbital velocities of 27 cm s −1 , with and without canopy. Surprisingly, for suspended sediment transport, we found opposite effects. In the presence of eelgrass, the critical erosion threshold started at lower velocities than on bare sediment, including sand and mud treatments. Moreover, in muddy systems, such resuspension reduced the light level below the minimum requirement of Z. marina. This surprising result for sediment resuspension was ascribed to a too small eelgrass patch for reducing waves but rather showing enhanced turbulence and scouring at meadow edges. Overall, we conclude that the conservation of the existent eelgrass meadows with developed roots and rhizomes is important for the sediment stabilization and the meadow scale should be taken into account to decrease sediment resuspension.

This article takes stock of recent advances in the field of comparative authoritarianism. The four books reviewed shed light on the effects of social activism, claim-making and social protests on authoritarian resilience. Taken as a whole, they intervene in the scholarly debates that examine the rise of collective, often contentious action under authoritarian rule. In so doing they account both for how states tolerate or even encourage collective action and the extent to which, in turn, protests by distinct social groups re-shape the political system. As authoritarian institutions, democratic-looking or otherwise, have received considerable attention of late, this article calls for greater attention to the economic and ideational dimensions of authoritarianism and, more generally, a broader research agenda.

Uganda suffered coups between 1966 and 1985, but has remained stable since 1986 despite predisposition to previous coups. Ethnic antagonism, weak state institutionalization, and past coups, had made Uganda coup-prone. Compared to previous governments, the post-1986 leadership effectively applied and undertook coup-prevention strategies consistent with James Quinlivan’s coup-proofing theory. These include establishing a parallel military structure to the mainstream military; formation of security services with parallel reporting channels, monitoring over society, and other security agencies; and co-optation of the military in politics through parliamentary representation. These measures have helped the regime to watch over security agencies and prevent possible military intervention. Uganda’s post-1986 regime stability is interesting in its own right. But it provides evidence consistent with, and useful for testing the efficacy of, Quinlivan’s coup-proofing theory: with relevant application and domestication the theory applies to Uganda.